 So, let me begin by thanking Peter and Marie-Ellen for organizing this beautiful event. I've learned plenty of new things about djina philosophy and I have the thoughtful privilege to probably present you the first conference today that is more caused by ignorance, that knowledge. I am not an endologist, neither I'm a Sanskritist, but somehow the program is very well done because what I will be talking about may be seen as a kind of appendix to what you just heard and presented the Naya very well and I will just add a few comments about what the Naya vada may inspire to someone who is looking at it from the perspective of modern linguistics and especially from the field of the semantic pragmatic in the so-called semantic pragmatic interface. So, I would like to begin with this idea that you find for instance a Jivas Javi paper that one of the constituting characteristics of djina attitude and worldview is that commentary is of particular importance and retrieving the meaning of discourse is particularly complex in the sense that you not only need lexical, syntactical and semantic levels, but sometimes the meaning is really different of what is explicitly said, so you need special heuristics, you need pragmatics to retrieve the meaning of what is said. And then it's been claimed by, especially by Peter, for instance, that you've got, for instance, deep correspondences between Habermas, for instance, universal pragmatics and djina philosophy of language. And here I highlight that the subcategories of the explanation of the most of speech may correspond to the level of empirical semantics and pragmatics, so there is a connection between what djina author in the tradition were doing doing philosophy of language and what we are doing now in empirical or scientific approach to natural language phenomena. So the idea of the talk is to look at the details or to try to look at some details about what in the djina philosophy of language echoes what is going on in the contrary linguistics. So here is the outline of what I will be talking about. First I will make some comments about what's going on at the interface between semantics and pragmatics now. Then focus on the existential position and how they are dealt with in the so-called dynamic semantics. And then I will try to look at the from the perspective outlined in the previous sections. And as a preamble, I would like to put myself into this under the authority of Stahl about anachronism. I like this point. So the idea is that if you are looking at Indian astronomy for instance what we know about stars is relevant to understand what they are doing. It's not like it's just mere technicality having to do with what we see when you look at the sky. It has to do with the sky and then if you want to understand Indian traditional astronomy you have to know something about astronomy. And I think it's the same for it's contentious. But I think it's the same for language analysis that you need the full blown linguistics, today linguistics to understand what's going on in giant historical texts because they are dealing with the same kind of phenomena I think. So semantic-pragmatic interface. First it's a question of division of labour and you may be aware of the fact that this notion of an interface between semantics and pragmatics looks really like a war. It's who does what in the analysis of meaning and you've got plenty of different stances about that. But I will just focus on one rather not too controversial point of view about what is the difference between semantics and pragmatics. So you've got Ken Bach saying that first it's about semantic information and semantic information is encoded in what is uttered. These are stable linguistic features of the sentence together with any extra linguistic information that provides semantic value to context-sensitive expression in what is uttered. So the first thing and this is no fully uncontroversial is that even in semantics you've got context sensitivity. You've got the X's, you've got a lot of phenomena that can only be accounted for taking into account context while doing semantics. And then you've got a pragmatic information is extra linguistic information that rises from an actual act of entrance and is relevant to the here determination of what the speaker is communicating. Whereas semantic information is encoded in what is uttered, pragmatic information is generated by or at least made relevant by the act of uttering it. So the main divide lies along the notion of grammaticalization of something that is linguistic encoding. And then one of the main consequence of that is that linguistic encoding induce a well-defined set of relevant information. When you look at what is actually said, literally said or when you look at what is uttered you can make an exhaustive list of what is relevant to give semantic value to all the components. While on the other hand speech acts, when you consider speech act of entering something and you try to analyze what is made relevant by the fact that someone says something in a given situation you won't get a well-defined set of the relevant information. This is why the inference, the so-called pragmatic inferences that you use to complete the meaning or to decipher the meaning of what someone is saying or conveying uttering something in the given situation is called free enrichment. And free here means that it's unbounded and you cannot just put a limit to what you can infer from respect to meaning of what someone is saying in a given circumstance. So you've got this phenomenon which is also in dealing with natural language practices you've got the pragmatic intrusion, what Levinson called pragmatic intrusion. And it's an extremely complex phenomenon. It's the idea that the truth condition of what is said, to use Grice's phrase, truth condition of what is said are undetermined by pragmatic inferred content. So you've got the very idea and the contextual framework in which I'm working is that you cannot divide, you cannot separate semantics and pragmatics. There's no way to do that because pragmatics is involved in the determination of semantic content and obviously semantic content will be the basis that trigger the pragmatic inferences. So they are inseparable actually. So dynamic semantics is something that was invented mainly following Kampf and Irina Haim work in the early 80s and it's a way to deal with those typical phenomena of pragmatic intrusion such as an aphorah, the axis, ellipsis, presupposition, etc. And the standard approach in semantics consists in mapping sentences or language sentences to truth conditions. Usually you do that using a presentation of the semantic content such as formula but you don't need to use the formula. For instance Montague wrote a very influential paper in 73 showing that you can really do model theory directly on a non-trivial part of English and you don't need formula to represent what the meaning is. You can interpret those directly on the model but it's convenient to use formula. And then dynamic semantics is really a pragmatic shift in meaning theory because it considers that the meaning of something is not the truth condition, is the context change potential. So you've got always a context, maybe it's a neural context, there is nothing in the context but you always have a context and meaning is actually a function from context to context. So when you ask yourself what the meaning of this sentence, the real question you ask is what this sentence when uttered does to the context? What's the new context after the entrance of the sentence? So here language use it at the core of semantics. So the old fashioned division saying that you've got pragmatics when language is used and semantics is without respect to use, that's over. We're no longer into this because language use is extremely relevant to determining semantic context. So the most influential dynamic semantics comes discourse representation theory or the IT for short. And the main idea is twofold. First you conceptually separate the introduction of a discourse reference and the binding of the quantifiers. So in the usual way of doing semantics when you've got a discourse reference introduced it's always in the scope of a quantifier. And here you just separate both operations. And then you provide a dependency structure which is just a way to know what are the, it's a fine grained way to know what are the discourse reference available when you need to assign a reference to some term. And it's well I won't go into detail but the idea is that if you want to get an aphor correctly for instance you need to have such a fine notion of what is available. So if you have an indefinite known phrase like a man for instance it behaves as though they introduce something like free variables rather than existential quantifiers with a determinate nuclear scope. So dynamic semantics achieve such effect like allowing correct binding for anaphora by making the assignment function with maps free variables to individual parts of the contents of the discourse. So I think there's a typo here but the idea, the main idea and that's why I use this quote is that the way you link the discourse reference to the word is a part of what you say. And I think this is extremely relevant for an Ayahuasca. So that's the idea. The discourse reference are available in your representation of meaning for a constant definition of their semantic value. You don't have a predetermined theory of what are the discourse reference. What they are is part of what you say when you say something. So existential presupposition. So for presupposition I think you're all acquainted with the phenomenon but just for memory. So the example is from Russell. It's extremely well known, the king of France is bold and you notice that if I say the king of France is bold obviously I suppose that there is a unique king of France. If there is no king of France, my sentence the king of France is bold is just meaningless. Or it has no true value to say it in those terms. So it's important to note also that for instance bold is not a term that is carrying an existential presupposition. There is no presupposition attached to bold here but to the king of France there is one. So the usual way to describe the meaning of an indefinite description like the king of France is to write down a formula like this that says there's one guy and this guy is the king of France as if there is any other guy that is the king of France this other guy is the same as the first. So that's good but it says that there is exactly one king of France in the universe which is maybe good news for the king of France but if you want to say the pot and you use that you will end up saying that there is exactly one pot in the universe which may not be a very good news for your semantics but because probably it's not what you want to say. So how do you do that? In DRT you do it like that. This arrow, you hear me? This arrow represents the function so this is the way you represent the context. You've got the first list and this is the list of discourse reference and the second list and those are conditions saying what happens to those discourse reference. So in arbitrary context the dots are just whatever and if I have to interpret the pot I go from whatever to whatever plus a new guy X and two conditions on the guy. The first condition is that the guy is a pot obviously and the second condition is that C predicate and what does the C mean? I just add because it's important for the difference between definite and indefinite description there is a definite description so you've got the extra rules that say you have to look in the guys that were already there for the guy that is the pot you're talking about. This is extremely important because when you say give me the pot for instance the people hearing you will have to try what pot you're talking about and you suppose that it's an available and salient, relevant pot that you can say it's the one so it's a pot already available So about C here's what comes say about this C predicate. The contextual predicate C must as a term contextual implies be recovered from the context in which the description is used. The C imposes on the context a constraint which is reminiscent of those imposed by Inafric pronouns. The predicate C is to be identified with the is antecedent and the identification should fit the interpretation of the discourse as a whole. More specifically it should enable the interpreter to see the contextualized existence and uniqueness presupposition as fulfilled. The idea is that when I say a pot for instance or the pot in the next slide is about the indefinite description so it's the same when I say a pot for instance. In the content if I want to give an adequate representation of the meaning of what I say when I say a pot there is a predicate in this that will tell me what do I mean by pot? What kind of reference, discourse reference is that I'm talking about. So when you don't want to have the uniqueness constraints you introduce a new predicate I put E there which is like C but just without uniqueness because if I say a pot I'm not saying that there is just one, maybe the various one. So the hypothesis that we're working under for this paper is this one that the Naya Vada is precisely a great deal of the Naya Vada is a theory about C and E predicates and more generally a set of guidelines for construing an adequate representation of the meaning of an uttered sentence. And I was, so as I told you I'm not British so I had this impression that Naya means viewpoint because everybody says that and then I went to Money Williams and I asked for Naya and it gave me like 10 meanings and none of that was viewpoint at all. And it has to do with leadership, guidance and expertise in doing suffix so I had this impression but maybe Naya also means like guidelines like orientation to do the right thing or something like that and this was my obviously I'm sure there are very very good reasons to translate it as viewpoint and there's no doubt about that but for me it was convenient to see it like a guideline because what I think Naya are at least in part is this pragmatic advice or guidelines to how to retrieve the meaning when someone says something to you or to understand what the people are saying. So now I will try to look at the interesting or at least interesting for me natural language phenomena that corresponds to what happens in all those Naya's. So the assumption is that the domain in which you will interpret the discourse reference is given by the parameter theory it's a parameter are those criteria for correct cognition and so by sound or correct cognition grasp individuals things and those things are if you take them as a whole the domain in which you will interpret this course and the role of the Naya so is to provide a guide to construct correctly the meaning of an utterance in a given context and make sure I think it's important at least for respect to what Parashantra says for instance when he presents the Naya make sure that you can always interpret the meaning of the terms with object of sound cognition. So you don't want to end up with an nonexistent object or incognizable object or contradictory object or anything like that. So when that theory should also give to the student of it for instance contextual factors allowing the interpreter to choose the right Naya. So someone says something and which Naya will I use to interpret what people are saying. And one of the main factor obviously is the culture or philosophical background of the utterer, the speaker. That's why you've got systematic analogies or connections between each Naya and school of thought. Because if a Buddhist is talking then use for instance the false Naya because usually they are viewing the word this way so it's a good guide. So let's look at the first Naya and it said that terms should be interpreted either as referring to a particular or as a universal so that which doesn't go in a unique way. And Parashantra proposed two characterization of the linguistic phenomena Naya applies to first. You've got intention declaration so you ask someone what are you doing I'm cutting a cord of wood. But the guy is just with his axe and he cut no wood. So the problem is that you grasp the meaning, you understand what the guy says and there is no cord available in the context. So you need a universal to account for the fact that you grasp the meaning of what it said and while there is no available particular or at the same time the utterance is actually about a particular so you really need to be able to interpret using both universal and particular to make sense out of declaration of intentions and everything that concerns something which is not actually present. Second way of characterizing Parashantra told us this example this person is happy you can always say happiness is what the person has. So term are ambivalence in the sense that you can switch them syntactically and you've got sentences that are at the same ferricity conditions you can say them ferricitously in the same conditions but the meaning is not the same. So my understanding of the reason why Parashantra used this example and this switch is that if what is carrying the existential position in a predication like that is the subject and you've got this same ferricity condition for this person is happy and happiness is what this person have you need in your domain to have both universal and particular. So that's Naigala. Then some Graha it's the rule that force all reference of all existential position to be typed as universal. So according to Parashantra this can be done in two ways. You've got the ultimate universal and according to this rule there is actually only one discourse reference. It's always the same and you can't call it being for instance. So everything you say is about being just being. So when you write the semantic representation of a simple sentence like the pot is red you need heavy rewriting to really get to what it means and what it means but maybe in such a gloss like that the reality is such that the pot is red and such that the pot is red is predicated. It's a condition. So you've got reality and this is the discourse reference. This carries existential position and such that the pot is red is just a condition. It's a predicate. So you don't have any existential position about that. So actually everything you say is just about one discourse reference. Then you've got the intermediate universal where the rewriting is lighter. So you've got those universal like for instance in Plato's metaphysics so pot is associated to potness and red and redness and everything and then you can understand this pot is red for instance or the pot is red like potness and redness co-occur. So you've got the same locus for two universal and potness and redness actually carry existential position but co-occurrence is just a condition. So you don't have existential position. You don't need to have co-occurrence as something that the discourse refers to. Then Viabharara, this is so it's a rule that provides ways to interpret discourse in its most common exception. At least in what I read one of the main focus with Viabharara is common practice, the layman practice. So the idea is to be able to grasp the more common usage of language and it seems to be the most concerned with the way one may compose universal to get the semantic value of a particular also and to set things about that also. So universal in that respect are not collection like in the collective viewpoint where you use our ability to neglect, to disregard small differences to collect all the chairs into just chairness. You use universal as a differentiator. So for instance the blue books, fetch me a book, which book, the blue one. So blue here is universal that's used as a differentiator to pick up one single book which is the one you need. And the meaning of a blue book maybe in this respect understood as the individual among the books which is blue. And it's particularly interesting to look at it that way because blue is then, the meaning of blue is then in the context of book. Blue here depends on what book means and for blue books it's not very important but if I say a small planet for instance it would be I think a mistake that to infer for what I say that I'm saying that there is a small thing which is a planet or there is something which is both a planet and small because a small planet is not a small object. It's a very big one. Five minutes are remaining. That's fresh. Interestingly when Prarashandra presents he says also that one of the problems with that with one of the defect associated with the viewpoint with the Naya is if you take it at phase where you can compound meanings and yield unsound results. For instance you can say sky lotus. So it would be in the context of a lotus something which grows in the sky and there is no something as sky lotus so you don't want to allow unbounded meaning compositions. And this is at least I think that Prarashandra has this kind of thing in mind. Raju Sutra is missing Shabda. We enter in the domain of those word bound viewpoints and the idea of Shabda is to retrieve the proper reference by following linguistic convention alone. So the idea is that linguistic terms are mainly received semantic value out of convention. And just for the sake of understanding what I see in the three last embedding or the relation between the three Naya I will focus on proper names. And the Shabda rule strongly reminds of the quotation theory of proper names. So you've got Indra and that's the typical Prarashandra example for the three last Naya. And the semantic value of Indra is in the quotation theory of proper names like you find it in Gertz for instance. It's the individual name Indra. And the quotation here is important because this is your link with linguistic practices. This is your link with linguistic practices. The quotation is just a link with what Kripke would call the initial baptism when society decided that this God will be called Indra for instance. So you go to Samaviruda dropping the quotation. This Naya insist on the compositional aspect of the building of name meaning. It's the subject matter of what Broncos called semantic etymology. And we can denote Indra bars as the result of semantic and materialistic analysis of what Indra, name Indra means. And then you get this semantic value for Indra that is Indra and this is a set of conditions that you can retrieve by this semantic etymological analysis. So importantly that's a note. It will typically yield this positional predicate like the one who destroys sit-alors for instance it may be understood as a predicate that is I can destroy sit-alors. It's not saying that I'm doing it now and that's important to see the difference with Evambuta because the last Naya is actually the same. You just add one operator which is actually the operator saying that the meaning that you retrieve by analysis of what Indra means you add that actually is doing this and this will give you a semantic representation of the meaning of a name like Indra. So I've got at least two open programs in the way I try to understand all this. The first is it seems for instance in the presentation of the Naya Vada that several authors insist on this idea of an embedding. We've been un-described that also. This idea that each viewpoint is a restriction on the previous one and in what I presented it's not obvious how you could do that for the seven at once. You can do that for the two, three, four. It's easy. You can do that for five, six, seven. It's easy but to go from one to seven in one set of restricting conditions it's really far from obvious. Another question maybe you know that so I will start by asking you questions. Is it possible did any author consider the possibility that when interpreting one given a single utterance you may apply simultaneously various Naya's because it seems that you may for instance used one of the three lasts and one of the three firsts at the same time to calculate or determine the semantic representation of the meaning of an utterance. So that's my take on Naya. Thanks.