 Section 59 of Personal Memoirs of U.S. Grant The Campaign in Georgia Shermans March to the Sea War Antidotes The March on Savannah Investment of Savannah Capture of Savannah Let us now return to the operations in the military division of the Mississippi and accompany Sherman in his March to the Sea. The possession of Atlanta, by us, narrowed the territory of the enemy very materially and cut off one of his two remaining lines of roads from east to west. A short time after the fall of Atlanta, Mr. Davis visited Palmetto and Macon and made speeches at each place. He spoke at Palmetto on the 20th of September and at Macon on the 22nd. In as much as he had relieved Johnston and appointed Hood, and Hood had immediately taken the initiative, it is natural to suppose that Mr. Davis was disappointed with General Johnston's policy. My own judgment is that Johnston acted very wisely. He husbanded his men and saved as much of his territory as he could without fighting decisive battles in which all might be lost. As Sherman advanced, as I have shown, his army became spread out, until, if this had been continued, it would have been easy to destroy it in detail. I know that both Sherman and I were rejoiced when we heard of the change. Hood was unquestionably a brave gallant soldier and not destitute of ability, but unfortunately his policy was to fight the enemy wherever he saw him without thinking much of the consequences of defeat. In his speeches, Mr. Davis denounced Governor Brown of Georgia and General Johnston in unmeasured terms, even insinuating that their loyalty to the southern cause was doubtful. So far as General Johnston is concerned, I think Davis did him a great injustice in this particular. I had known the general before the war and strongly believe it would be impossible for him to accept a high commission for the purpose of betraying the cause he had espoused. There, as I have said, I think that his policy was the best one that could have been pursued by the whole south protract the war, which was all that was necessary to enable them to gain recognition in the end. The north was already growing weary, as the south evidently was also, but with this difference. In the north the people governed and could stop hostilities whenever they chose to stop supplies. The south was a military camp, controlled absolutely by the government, with soldiers to back it, and the war could have been protracted no matter to what extent the discontent reached, up to the point of open mutiny of the soldiers themselves. Mr. Davis's speeches were frank appeals to the people of Georgia and that portion of the south to come to their relief. He tried to assure his frightened hearers that the Yankees were rapidly digging their own graves, that measures were already being taken to cut them off from supplies from the north, and that, with a force in front and cut off from the rear, they must soon starve in the midst of a hostile people. Papers containing reports of these speeches immediately reached the northern states and they were republished. Of course, that caused no alarm so long as telegraphic communication was kept up with Sherman. When Hood was forced to retreat from Atlanta, he moved to the southwest and was followed by a portion of Sherman's army. He soon appeared upon the railroad in Sherman's rear and with his whole army began destroying the road. At the same time also the work was begun in Tennessee and Kentucky which Mr. Davis had assured his hearers at Palmetto and Macon would take place. He ordered Forrest about the ablest cavalry general in the south north for this purpose and Forrest and Wheeler carried out their orders with more or less destruction, occasionally picking up a garrison. Forrest indeed performed the very remarkable feat of capturing with cavalry two gunboats and a number of transports, something the accomplishment of which is very hard to account for. Hood's army had been weakened by Governor Brown's withdrawing the Georgia state troops for the purpose of gathering in the seasons' crops for the use of the people and for the use of the army. This not only depleted Hood's forces, but it served a most excellent purpose in gathering in supplies of food and forage for the use of our army in its subsequent march. Sherman was obliged to push on with his force and go himself with portions of it hither and thither until it was clearly demonstrated to him that with the army he then had it would be impossible to hold the line from Atlanta back and leave him any force whatever with which to take the offensive. Had that plan been adhered to, very large reinforcements would have been necessary and Mr. Davis's prediction of the destruction of the army would have been realized or else Sherman would have been obliged to make a successful retreat, which Mr. Davis said in his speeches would prove more disastrous than Napoleon's retreat from Moscow. These speeches of Mr. Davis were not long in reaching Sherman. He took advantage of the information they gave and made all the preparation possible for him to make to meet what now became expected attempts to break his communications. Something else had to be done, and to Sherman's sensible and soldierly mind, the idea was not long in dawning upon him, not only that something else had to be done, but what that something else should be. On September 10th I telegraphed Sherman as follows. City Point, Virginia, September 10, 1864, Major General Sherman, Atlanta, Georgia. So soon as your men are sufficiently rested and preparations can be made, it is desirable that another campaign should be commenced. We want to keep the enemy constantly pressed to the end of the war. If we give him no peace whilst the war lasts, the end cannot be distant. Now that we have all of Mobile Bay that is valuable, I do not know, but it will be the best move to transfer Canvies troops to act upon Savannah whilst you move on Augusta. I should like to hear from you, however, in this matter. U.S. Grant, Lieutenant General. Sherman replied promptly. If I could be sure of finding provisions and ammunition at Augusta or Columbus, Georgia, I could march to Millageville and compel Hood to give up Augusta or Macon and then turn on the other. If you can manage to take the Savannah River as high up as Augusta or the Chattahoochee as far up as Columbus, I can sweep the whole State of Georgia. On the 12th I sent a special messenger, one of my own staff, with a letter inviting Sherman's views about the next campaign. City Point, Virginia, September 12, 1864. Major General W. T. Sherman, commanding Mill Division of the Mississippi. I sent Lieutenant Colonel Porter of my staff with this. Colonel Porter will explain to you the exact condition of affairs here better than I can do in the limits of a letter. Although I feel myself strong enough for offensive operations, I am holding on quietly to get advantage of recruits and convalescents, who are coming forward very rapidly. My lines are necessarily very long, extending from deep bottom north of the James across the peninsula formed by the Appomattox and the James, and south of the Appomattox to the Weldon Road. This line is very strongly fortified and can be held with comparatively few men, but from its great length takes many in the aggregate. I propose, when I do move, to extend my left so as to control what is known as the Southside or Lynchburg and Petersburg Road, then, if possible, to keep the Danville Road cut. At the same time this move is made, I want to send a force of from six to ten thousand men against Wilmington. The way I propose to do this is to land the men north of Fort Fisher and hold that point. At the same time a large naval fleet will be assembled there and the ironclads will run the batteries as they did at Mobile. This will give us the same control of the harbor of Wilmington that we now have of the harbor of Mobile. What you are to do with the forces at your command, I do not see. The difficulties of supplying your army, except when you are constantly moving, beyond where you are, I plainly see. If it had not been for Price's movements, can be would have sent twelve thousand more men to Mobile. From your command on the Mississippi an equal number could have been taken. With these forces my idea would have been to divide them, sending one half to Mobile and the other half to Savannah. You could then move as proposed in your telegram so as to threaten Macon and Augusta equally. Whichever was abandoned by the enemy, you could take and open up a new base of supplies. My object now in sending a staff officer is not so much to suggest operations for you as to get your views and have plans matured by the time everything can be got ready. It will probably be the fifth of October before any of the plans here in Indicated will be executed. If you have any promotions to recommend, send the names forward and I will approve them, U.S. Grant, Lieutenant General. This reached Sherman on September 20th. On the 25th of September Sherman reported to Washington that Hood's troops were in his rear. He had provided against this by sending a division to Chattanooga and a division to Rome, Georgia, which was in the rear of Hood, supposing that Hood would fall back in the direction from which he had come to reach the railroad. At the same time Sherman and Hood kept up a correspondence relative to the exchange of prisoners, the treatment of citizens and other matters suitable to be arranged between hostile commanders in the field. On the 27th of September I telegraphed Sherman as follows. At any point Virginia, September 27, 1864, 10.30 a.m., Major General Sherman, I have directed all recruits and new troops from the western states to be sent to Nashville to receive their further orders from you, U.S. Grant, Lieutenant General. On the 29th Sherman sent Thomas back to Chattanooga and afterwards to Nashville with another division, Morgan's, of the advanced army. Sherman then suggested that when he was prepared his movements should take place against Milledgeville and then to Savannah. His expectation at that time was to make this movement as soon as he could get up his supplies. Hood was moving in his own country and was moving light so that he could make two miles to Sherman's one. He depended upon the country to gather his supplies and so was not affected by delays. As I have said, until this unexpected state of affairs happened, Mobile had been looked upon as the objective point of Sherman's army. It had been a favorite move of mine from 1862 when I first suggested to the then Commander-in-Chief that the troops in Louisiana instead of frittering away their time in the trans-Mississippi should move against Mobile. I recommended this from time to time until I came into command of the army, the last of March 1864, having the power in my own hands. I now ordered the concentration of supplies, stores, and troops in the Department of the Gulf about New Orleans with a view to a move against Mobile in support of and in conjunction with the other armies operating in the field. Before I came into command these troops had been scattered over the trans-Mississippi Department in such a way that they could not be or were not gotten back in time to take any part in the original movement, hence the consideration which had caused Mobile to be selected as the objective point for Sherman's army to find his next base of supplies after having cut loose from Atlanta no longer existed. General G. M. Dodge, an exceedingly efficient officer having been badly wounded, had to leave the army about the first of October. He was in command of two divisions of the 16th Corps, consolidated into one. Sherman then divided his army into the right and left wings, the right commanded by General O. O. Howard and the left by General Slocum. General Dodge's two divisions were assigned, one to each of these wings. Howard's command embraced the 15th and 17th Corps and Slocum's the 14th and 20th Corps, commanded by General Jeff C. Davis and A. S. Williams. General's Logan and Blair commanded the two corps composing the right wing. About this time they left to take part in the presidential election which took place that year, leaving their corps to Osterhouse and Ransom. I have no doubt that their leaving was at the earnest solicitation of the War Department. General Blair got back in time to resume his command and to proceed with it throughout the march to the sea and back to the Grand Review at Washington. General Logan did not return to his command until after it reached Savannah. Logan felt very much aggrieved at the transfer of General Howard from that portion of the Army of the Potomac, which was then with the Western Army, to the command of the Army of the Tennessee, with which Army General Logan had served from the Battle of Belmont to the Fall of Atlanta, having passed successfully through all grades from Colonel, commanding a regiment, to General, commanding a brigade, division, and army corps, until upon the death of McPherson the command of the entire Army of the Tennessee devolved upon him in the midst of a hotly contested battle. He conceived that he had done his full duty as commander in that engagement, and I can bear testimony from personal observation that he had proved himself fully equal to all the lower positions which he had occupied as a soldier. I will not pretend to question the motive which actuated Sherman in taking an officer from another Army to supersede General Logan. I have no doubt whatever that he did this for what he considered would be to the good of the service, which was more important than that the personal feelings of any individual should not be agreed. So I doubt whether he had an officer with him who could have filled the place as Logan would have done. Differences of opinion must exist between the best of friends as to policies in war and of judgment as to men's fitness. The officer who has the command, however, should be allowed to judge of the fitness of the officers under him unless he is very manifestly wrong. Sherman's Army, after all the depletions, numbered about 60,000 effective men. All weak men had been left to hold the rear, and those remaining were not only well men, but strong and hearty, so that he had 60,000 as good soldiers as ever trod the earth. Better than any European soldiers, because they not only worked like a machine, but the machine thought. European armies know very little what they are fighting for, and care less. Included in these 60,000 troops, there were two small divisions of cavalry, numbering altogether about 4,000 men. It had about 35,000 to 40,000 men, independent of forest, whose forces were operating in Tennessee and Kentucky as Mr. Davis had promised they should. This part of Mr. Davis's military plan was admirable and promised the best results of anything he could have done according to my judgment. I say this because I have criticized his military judgment in the removal of Johnston and also in the appointment of Hood. I am aware, however, that there was high feeling existing at that time between Davis and his subordinate, whom I regarded as one of his ableist lieutenants. On the 5th of October, the railroad back from Atlanta was again very badly broken Hood, having got on the track with his army. Sherman saw, after night, from a high point, the road burning for miles. The defense of the railroad by our troops was very gallant, but they could not hold points between their entrenched positions against Hood's whole army. In fact, they made no attempt to do so, but generally the entrenched positions were held, as well as important bridges and store located at them. Alatouna, for instance, was defended by a small force of men under the command of General Kors, one of the very able and efficient volunteer officers produced by the war. He, with a small force, was cut off from the remainder of the national army and was attacked with great vigor by many times his own number. Sherman, from his high position, could see the battle raging with the Confederate troops between him and his subordinate. He sent men, of course, to raise the temporary siege, but the time that would be necessarily consumed in reaching Kors would be so great that all occupying the entrenchments might be dead. Kors was a man who would never surrender. From a high position, some of Sherman's signal corps discovered a signal flag waving from a hole in the blockhouse at Alatouna. It was from Kors. He had been shot through the face. He signaled to his chief a message which left no doubt of his determination to hold his post at all hazards. It was at this point probably that Sherman first realized that with the forces at his disposal the keeping open of his line of communication with the North would be impossible if he expected to retain any force with which to operate offensively beyond Atlanta. He proposed, therefore, to destroy the roads back to Chattanooga when all ready to move and leave the latter place garrisoned. Yet before abandoning the railroad it was necessary that he should repair damages already done and hold the road until he could get forward such supplies, ordinary stores, and small rations as he wanted to carry with him on his proposed march, and to return to the North his surplus artillery, his object being to move light, and to have no more artillery than could be used to advantage on the field. Sherman thought Hood would follow him, though he proposed to prepare for the contingency of the latter moving the other way while he was moving south by making Thomas strong enough to hold Tennessee and Kentucky. I myself was thoroughly satisfied that Hood would go North as he did. On the 2nd of November I telegraphed Sherman, authorizing him definitely to move according to the plan he had proposed, that is, cutting loose from his base, giving up Atlanta and the railroad back to Chattanooga. To strengthen Thomas he sent Stanley, 4th Corps, back and also ordered Schofield, commanding the Army of the Ohio, 12,000 strong, to report to him. In addition to this, A.J. Smith, who, with two divisions of Sherman's Army, was in Missouri aiding Rosecrans in driving the enemy from that state, was under orders to return to Thomas and, under the most unfavorable circumstances, might be expected to arrive there long before Hood could reach Nashville. In addition to this, the new levies of troops that were being raised in the Northwest went to Thomas as rapidly as enrolled and equipped. Thomas, without any of these additions spoken of, had a garrison at Chattanooga, which had been strengthened by one division and garrisons at Bridgeport, Stevenson, Decatur, Murfreesboro and Florence. There were already with him in Nashville 10,000 soldiers in round numbers and many thousands of employees in the quartermasters and other departments who could be put in the entrenchments in front of Nashville for its defense. General Wilson was there with 10,000 dismounted cavalrymen who were being equipped for the field. Thomas had at this time about 45,000 men without any of the reinforcements here above enumerated. These reinforcements gave him altogether about 70,000 men without counting what might be added by the new levies already spoken of. About this time Beauregard arrived upon the field, not to supersede Hood in command, but to take general charge over the entire district in which Hood and Sherman were or might be operating. He made the most frantic appeals to the citizens for assistance to be rendered in every way by sending reinforcements, by destroying supplies on the line of march of the invaders, by destroying the bridges over which they would have to cross and by, in every way, obstructing the roads to their front. But it was hard to convince the people of the propriety of destroying supplies which were so much needed by themselves, and each one hoped that his own possessions might escape. Hood soon started north and went into camp near Decatur, Alabama, where he remained until the 29th of October, but without making an attack on the garrison of that place. The Tennessee River was patrolled by gunboats from mussel shoals east and also below the second shoals out to the Ohio River. These with the troops that might be concentrated from the garrisons along the river at any point where Hood might choose to attempt to cross, made it impossible for him to cross the Tennessee at any place where it was navigable. But mussel shoals is not navigable, and below them again is another shoal which also obstructs navigation. Hood therefore moved down to a point near the opposite Florence, Alabama, crossed over, and remained there for some time collecting supplies of food, forage, and ammunition. All of these had to come from a considerable distance south because the region in which he was then situated was mountainous, with small valleys which produced but little, and what they had produced had long since been exhausted. On the 1st of November I suggested to Sherman, and also ask his views thereon, the propriety of destroying Hood before he started on his campaign. On the 2nd of November, as stated, I approved definitely his making his proposed campaign through Georgia, leaving Hood behind to the tender mercy of Thomas and the troops in his command. Sherman fixed the 10th of November as the day of starting. Sherman started on that day to get back to Atlanta, and on the 15th the real march to the sea commenced. The right wing, under Howard, and the cavalry went to Jonesboro, Millageville, then the capital of Georgia, being Sherman's objective or stopping place on the way to Savannah. The left wing moved to Stone Mountain along roads much further east than those taken by the right wing. Slocum was in command, and threatened Augusta as the point to which he was moving. But he was to turn off and meet the right wing at Millageville. Atlanta was destroyed so far as to render it worthless for military purposes before starting. Sherman himself remaining over a day to superintend the work and see that it was well done. Sherman's orders for this campaign were perfect. Before starting he had sent back all sick, disabled, and weak men retaining nothing but the hardy, well-enured soldiers to accompany him on his long march in prospect. His artillery was reduced to sixty-five guns. The ammunition carried with them was two hundred rounds for musket and gun. Small rations were taken in a small wagon train which was loaded to its capacity for rapid movement. The army was expected to live on the country and to always keep the wagons full of forage and provisions against a possible delay of a few days. The troops, both of the right and left wings, made most of their advance along the line of railroads which they destroyed. The method adopted to perform this work was to burn and destroy all the bridges and culverts and for a long distance, at places, to tear up the track and bend the rails. Soldiers to do this rapidly would form a line along one side of the road with crowbars and poles, place these under the rails and, hoisting all at once, turn over many rods of road at one time. The ties would then be placed in piles and the rails, as they were loosened, would be carried and put across these long heaps. When a sufficient number of rails were placed upon a pile of ties it would be set on fire. This would heat the rails very much more in the middle, that being over the main part of the fire, than at the ends, so that they would naturally bend of their own weight. But the soldiers, to increase the damage, would take tongs and one or two men at each end of the rail, carry it with forests against the nearest tree and twist it around, thus leaving rails forming bands to ornament the forest trees of Georgia. All this work was going on at the same time, there being a sufficient number of men detailed for that purpose. Some piled the logs and built the fire, some put the rails upon the fire, while others would bend those that were sufficiently heated, so that, by the time the last bit of road was torn up, that it was designed to destroy at a certain place, the rails previously taken up were already destroyed. The organization for supplying the army was very complete. Each brigade furnished a company to gather supplies of forage and provisions for the command to which they belonged. Strict injunctions were issued against pillaging or otherwise unnecessarily annoying the people. But everything in shape of food for man and forage for beast was taken. The supplies were turned over to the brigade commissary and quartermaster, and were issued by them to their respective commands precisely the same as if they had been purchased. The captures consisted largely of cattle, sheep, poultry, some bacon, cornmeal, often molasses, and occasionally coffee or other small ration. The skill of these men, called by themselves and the army bummers, in collecting their loads and getting back to their respective commands was marvelous. When they started out in the morning they were always on foot, but scarcely one of them returned in the evening without being mounted on a horse or mule. These would be turned in for the general use of the army, and the next day these men would start out afoot and return again in the evening mounted. Many of the exploits of these men would fall under the head of romance. Indeed, I am afraid that in telling some of their experiences the romance got the better of the truth upon which the story was founded and that in the way many of these anecdotes are told very little of the foundation is left. I suspect that most of them consist chiefly of the fiction added to make the stories better. In one instance it was reported that a few men of Sherman's army passed a house where they discovered some chickens under the dwelling. They immediately proceeded to capture them, to add to the army's supplies. The lady of the house, who happened to be at home, made piteous appeals to have these spared, saying they were a few she had put away to save by permission of other parties who had preceded and who had taken all the others that she had. The soldiers seemed moved at her appeal. But looking at the chickens again they were tempted and one of them replied, the rebellion must be suppressed if it takes the last chicken in the Confederacy and proceeded to appropriate the last one. Another anecdote characteristic of these times has been told. The South, prior to the rebellion, kept bloodhounds to pursue runaway slaves who took refuge in the neighboring swamps and also to hunt convicts. Orders were issued to kill all these animals as they were met with. On one occasion a soldier picked up a poodle, the favorite pet of its mistress, and was carrying it off to execution when the lady made a strong appeal to him to spare it. The soldier replied, Madam, our orders are to kill every bloodhound. But this is not a bloodhound, said the lady. Well, Madam, we cannot tell what it will grow into if we leave it behind, said the soldier, as he went off with it. Notwithstanding these anecdotes and the necessary hardship they would seem to imply, I do not believe there was much unwarranted pillaging considering that we were in the enemy's territory and without any supplies except such as the country afforded. On the 23rd Sherman, with the left wing, reached Millageville. The right wing was not far off but proceeded on its way towards Savannah, destroying the road as it went. The troops at Millageville remained over a day to destroy factories, buildings used for military purposes, etc., before resuming its march. The Governor, who had been almost defying Mr. Davis before this, now fled precipitately, as did the legislature of the state and all the state officers. The Governor, Sherman says, was careful to carry away even his garden vegetables while he left the archives of the state to fall into our hands. The only military force that was opposed to Sherman's forward march was the Georgia militia, a division under the command of General G. W. Smith and a battalion under Harry Wayne. Neither the quality of the forces nor their numbers was sufficient to even retard the progress of Sherman's army. The people at the south became so frantic at this time. At the successful invasion of Georgia that they took the cadets from the military college and added them to the ranks of the militia. They even liberated the state convicts under promise from them that they would serve in the army. I have but little doubt that the worst acts that were attributed to Sherman's army were committed by these convicts and by other southern people who ought to have been under sentence such people as could be found in every community north and south who took advantage of their country being invaded to commit crime. They were in but little danger of detection or of arrest even if detected. The southern papers in commenting upon Sherman's movements pictured him as in the most deplorable condition, stating that his men were starving, that they were demoralized and wondering about almost without object, aiming only to reach the sea coast and get under the protection of our navy. These papers got to the north and had more or less effect upon the minds of the people, causing much distress to all loyal persons particularly to those who had husbands, sons, or brothers with Sherman. Mr. Lincoln, seeing these accounts, had a letter written asking me if I could give him anything that he could say to the loyal people that would comfort them. I told him there was not the slightest occasion for alarm, that with sixty thousand such men as Sherman had with him such a commanding officer as he was could not be cut off in the open country. He might possibly be prevented from reaching the point he had started out to reach, but he would get through somewhere and would finally get to his chosen destination and even if worst came to worst he could return north. I heard afterwards of Mr. Lincoln's saying to those who would inquire of him as to what he thought about the safety of Sherman's army that Sherman was all right. Grant says they are safe with such a general and that if they cannot get out where they want to they can crawl back by the whole they went in at. While at Milledgeville the soldiers met at the state house, organized a legislature, and proceeded to business precisely as if they were the legislative body belonging to the state of Georgia. The debates were exciting and were upon the subject of the situation the South was in at that time, particularly the state of Georgia. They went so far as to repeal after a spirited and acrimonious debate the ordinance of succession. The next day, twenty-fourth, Sherman continued his march going by the way of Waynesboro and Louisville, Millen being the next objective, and where the two columns the right and left wings were to meet. The left wing moved to the left of the direct road and the cavalry still farther off so as to make it look as though Augusta was the point they were aiming for. They moved on all the roads they could find leading in that direction. The cavalry was sent to make a rapid march in hope of surprising Millen before the Union prisoners could be carried away, but they failed in this. The distance from Milledgeville to Millen was about one hundred miles. At this point Wheeler, who had been ordered from Tennessee, arrived and swelled the numbers and efficiency of the troops confronting Sherman. Hardy, a native of Georgia, also came, but brought no troops with him. It was intended that he should raise as large an army as possible with which to intercept Sherman's march. He did succeed in raising some troops, and with these and those under the command of Wheeler and Wayne had an army sufficient to cause some annoyance, but no great detention. Our cavalry and Wheeler's had a pretty severe engagement in which Wheeler was driven towards Augusta, thus giving the idea that Sherman was probably making for that point. Millen was reached on the third of December, and the march was resumed the following day for Savannah, the final objective. McG had now been sent to Augusta with some troops. Wade Hampton was there also trying to raise cavalry sufficient to destroy Sherman's army. If he ever raised a force it was too late to do the work expected of it. Hardy's whole force probably numbered less than ten thousand men. From Millen to Savannah the country is sandy and poor and affords but very little forage other than rice straw, which was then growing. This answered a very good purpose as forage, and the rice grain was in addition to the soldier's rations. No further resistance worthy of note was met with until within a few miles of Savannah. This place was found to be entrenched and garrisoned. Sherman proceeded at once on his arrival to invest at the place, and found that the enemy had placed torpedoes in the ground which were to explode when stepped on by man or beast. One of these exploded under an officer's horse, blowing the animal to pieces, and tearing one of the legs of the officer so badly that it had to be amputated. Sherman at once ordered his prisoners to the front, moving them and a compact body in advance to either explode the torpedoes or dig them up. No further explosions took place. On the 10th of December the siege of Savannah commenced. Sherman then, before proceeding any further with operations for the capture of the place, started with some troops to open communication with our fleet, which he expected to find in the lower harbour or as nearby as the forts of the enemy would permit. In marching to the coast he encountered Fort McAllister, which it was necessary to reduce before the supplies he might find on shipboard could be made available. Fort McAllister was soon captured by an assault made by General Hazen's division. Communication was then established with the fleet. The capture of Savannah then only occupied a few days and involved no great loss of life. The garrison, however, as we shall see, was enabled to escape by crossing the river and moving eastward. When Sherman had opened communication with the fleet he found there a steamer, which I had forwarded to him, carrying the accumulated mails for his army, also supplies which I supposed he would be in need of. General J. G. Foster, who commanded all the troops south of North Carolina on the Atlantic Seaboard, visited General Sherman before he had opened communication with the fleet with the view of ascertaining what assistance he could be to him. Foster returned immediately to his own headquarters at Hilton Head for the purpose of sending Sherman siege guns, and also if he should find he had them to spare, supplies of clothing, hard bread, etc., thinking that these articles might not be found outside. The mail on the steamer which I sent down had been collected by Colonel A. H. Markland of the Post Office Department who went in charge of it. On this same vessel I sent an officer of my staff, Lieutenant Dunn, with the following letter to General Sherman. City Point, Virginia, December 3, 1864, Major General W. T. Sherman, commanding armies near Savannah, Georgia. The little information gleaned from the southern press, indicating no great obstacle to your progress. I have directed your mails, which had been previously collected at Baltimore by Colonel Markland, Special Agent of the Post Office Department, to be sent as far as the blockading squadron off Savannah to be forwarded to you as soon as heard from on the coast. Not liking to rejoice before the victory is assured, I abstain from congratulating you and those under your command until bottom has been struck. I have never had a fear, however, for the result. Since you left Atlanta no very great progress has been made here. The enemy has been closely watched, though, and prevented from detaching against you. I think not one man has gone from here except some twelve or fifteen hundred dismounted cavalry. Bragg has gone from Wilmington. I am trying to take advantage of his absence to get possession of that place. Owing to some preparations Admiral Porter and General Butler are making to blow up Fort Fisher, which, while hoping for the best, I do not believe a particle in, there is a delay in getting this expedition off. I hope they will be ready to start by the seventh, and that Bragg will not have started back by that time. In this letter I do not intend to give you anything like directions for further action, but will state a general idea I have, and will get your views after you have established yourself on the sea coast. With your veteran army I hope to get control of the only two through-roaks from east to west possessed by the enemy before the fall of Atlanta. The condition will be filled by holding Savannah and Augusta, or by holding any other port to the east of Savannah and Branchfield. If Wilmington falls, a force from there can cooperate with you. Thomas has got back into the defenses of Nashville with Hood close upon him. Decatur has been abandoned, and so have all the roads except the main one leading to Chattanooga. Part of this falling back was undoubtedly necessary, and all of it may have been. It did not look so, however, to me. In my opinion, Thomas, far outnumber Hood in infantry, in cavalry Hood has the advantage in morale and numbers. I hope yet that Hood will be badly crippled if not destroyed. The general news you will learn from the papers better than I could give it. After all becomes quiet and roads become so bad up here that there is likely to be a week or two when nothing can be done, I will run down the coast to see you. If you desire it, I will ask Mrs. Sherman to go with me. Yours truly, U.S. Grant, Lieutenant General. I quote this letter because it gives the reader a full knowledge of the events of that period. Sherman now, the fifteenth, returned to Savannah to complete its investment and ensure the surrender of the garrison. The country about Savannah is low and marshy, and the city was well entrenched from the river above to the river below, and assaults could not be made except along a comparatively narrow causeway, for this reason assaults must have resulted in serious destruction of life to the Union troops with the chance of failing altogether. Sherman therefore decided upon a complete investment of the place. When he believed this investment completed, he summoned the garrison to surrender. General Hardy, who was in command, replied in substance that the condition of affairs was not such as Sherman had described. He said he was in full communication with his department and was receiving supplies constantly. Hardy, however, was cut off entirely from all communication with the west side of the river and by the river itself to the north and south. On the south Carolina side the country was all rice fields, through which it would have been impossible to bring supplies so that Hardy had no possible communication with the outside world except by a dilapidated plank road starting from the west bank of the river. Sherman, receiving this reply, proceeded in person to a point on the coast where General Foster had troops stationed under General Hatch for the purpose of making arrangements with the latter officer to go through, by one of the numerous channels running inland along that part of the coast of South Carolina, to the plank road which General Hardy still possessed and thus to cut him off from the last means he had of getting supplies, if not of communication. While arranging for this movement and before the attempt to execute the plan had been commenced, Sherman received information through one of his staff officers that the enemy had evacuated Savannah the night before. This was the night of the 21st of December. Before evacuating the place, Hardy had blown up the Navy Yard. Some ironclads had been destroyed as well as other property that might have been valuable to us, but he left an immense amount of stores untouched, consisting of cotton, railroad cars, workshops, numerous pieces of artillery, and several thousand stands of small arms. A little incident occurred soon after the fall of Savannah which Sherman relates in his memoirs and which is worthy of reputation. Savannah was one of the points where blockade runners entered. Only after the city fell into our possession a blockade runner came sailing up serenely, not doubting, but the Confederates were still in possession. It was not molested, and the captain did not find out his mistake until he had tied up and gone to the Custom House where he found a new occupant of the building and made a less profitable disposition of his vessel and cargo than he had expected. As there was some discussion as to the authorship of Sherman's March to the Sea by critics of his book when it appeared before the public, I want to state here that no question upon that subject was ever raised between General Sherman and myself. Circumstances made the plan on which Sherman expected to act impracticable, as commander of the forces he necessarily had to devise a new one which would give more promise of success. Consequently he recommended the destruction of the railroad back to Chattanooga and that he should be authorized then to move as he did from Atlanta forward. His suggestions were finally approved although they did not immediately find favor in Washington. Even when it came to the time of starting, the greatest apprehension as to the propriety of the campaign he was about to commence filled the mind of the President, induced no doubt by his advisors. This went so far as to move the President to ask me to suspend Sherman's March for a day or two until I could think the matter over. My recollection is, though, I find no record to show it that out of deference to the President's wish I did send a dispatch to Sherman asking him to wait a day or two, or else the connections between us were already cut so that I could not do so. However this may be, the question of who devised the plan of March from Atlanta to Savannah is easily answered. It was clearly Sherman and to him also belongs the credit of its brilliant execution. It was hardly possible that anyone else than those on the spot could have devised a new plan of campaign to supersede one that did not promise success. I was in favor of Sherman's plan from the time it was first submitted to me. My chief of staff, however, was very bitterly opposed to it and, as I learned subsequently, finding that he could not move me, he appealed to the authorities at Washington to stop it. End of Section 59, Recording by Jim Clevinger, Little Rock, Arkansas, Jim, at joclev.com. Section 60 of Personal Memoirs of U.S. Grant. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Recording by Jim Clevinger, Personal Memoirs of U.S. Grant by Ulysses S. Grant, Chapter 60. The Battle of Franklin, The Battle of Nashville As we have seen, hoods succeeded in crossing the Tennessee River between mussel shoals and the lower shoals at the end of October 1864. Thomas sent Schofield with a fourth and twenty-third corps, together with three brigades of Wilson's cavalry to Pulaski to watch him. On the 17th of November, hood started and moved in such a manner as to avoid Schofield, thereby turning his position. Hood had with him three infantry corps, commanded respectively by Stephen D. Lee, Stuart, and Cheatham. These with his cavalry numbered about forty-five thousand men. Schofield had, of all arms, about thirty thousand. Thomas's orders were, therefore, for Schofield to watch the movements of the enemy, but not to fight a battle if he could avoid it, but to fall back in case of an advance on Nashville and to fight the enemy as he fell back, so as to retard the enemy's movements until he could be reinforced by Thomas himself. As soon as Schofield saw this movement of hoods, he sent his trains to the rear, but did not fall back himself until the twenty-first and then only to Columbia. At Columbia there was a slight skirmish, but no battle. In this place Schofield then retreated to Franklin. He had sent his wagons in advance, and Stanley had gone with them with two divisions to protect them. Cheatham's corps of Hood's army pursued the wagon train and went into camp at Spring Hill for the night of the twenty-ninth. Schofield, retreating from Columbia on the twenty-ninth, passed Spring Hill, where Cheatham was bevwacked during the night without molestation, though within half a mile of where the Confederates were encamped. On the morning of the thirtieth he had arrived at Franklin. Hood followed closely and reached Franklin in time to make an attack the same day. The fight was very desperate and sanguinary. The Confederate generals led their men in the repeated charges and the loss among them was of unusual proportions. This fighting continued with great severity until long after the night closed in when the Confederates drew off. General Stanley, who commanded two divisions of the Union troops and whose troops bore the brunt of the battle, was wounded in the fight, but maintained his position. The enemy's loss at Franklin, according to Thomas's report, was 1,750 buried upon the field by our troops, 3,800 in the hospital, and 702 prisoners besides. Schofield's loss, as officially reported, was 189 killed, 1,033 wounded, and 1,104 captured and missing. Thomas made no effort to reinforce Schofield at Franklin, as it seemed to me at the time he should have done, and fight out the battle there. He simply ordered Schofield to continue his retreat to Nashville, which the latter did during that night and the next day. Thomas, in the meantime, was making his preparations to receive Hood. The road to Chattanooga was still well guarded with strong garrisons at Murfreesboro, Stevenson, Bridgeport, and Chattanooga. Thomas had previously given up Decatur and had been reinforced by A. J. Smith's two divisions just returned from Missouri. He also had Steedman's division and R. S. Granger's, which he had drawn from the front. This quartermaster's men, about 10,000 in number, had been organized and armed under the command of the chief quartermaster, General J. L. Donaldson, and placed in the fortifications under the general supervision of General Z. B. Tower of the United States engineers. Hood was allowed to move upon Nashville and to invest that place almost without interference. Thomas was strongly fortified in his position so that he would have been safe against the attack of Hood. He had troops enough even to annihilate him in the open field. To me his delay was unaccountable, sitting there and permitting himself to be invested so that, in the end, to raise the siege, he would have to fight the enemy strongly posted behind fortifications. It is true the weather was very bad. The rain was falling and freezing as it fell so that the ground was covered with a sheet of ice that made it very difficult to move. But I was afraid that the enemy would find means of moving. He lewed Thomas and managed to get north of the Cumberland River. If he did this, I apprehended most serious results from the campaign in the north and was afraid we might even have to send troops from the east to head him off if he got there. General Thomas's movements being always so deliberate and so slow, though, effective in defense. I, consequently, urged Thomas in frequent dispatches sent from city point to make the attack at once. The country was alarmed, the administration was alarmed, and I was alarmed lest the very thing would take place which I have just described that is, hood would get north. It was all without avail further than to elicit dispatches from Thomas saying that he was getting ready to move as soon as he could, that he was making preparations, etc. At last I had to say to General Thomas that I should be obliged to remove him unless he acted promptly. He replied that he was very sorry, but he would move as soon as he could. General Logan, happening to visit city point about that time and knowing him as a prompt, gallant and efficient officer, I gave him an order to proceed to Nashville to believe Thomas. I directed him, however, not to deliver the order or publish it until he reached there, and if Thomas had moved, then not to deliver it at all, but communicate with me by telegraph. After Logan started, in thinking over the situation, I became restless and concluded to go myself. I went as far as Washington City when a dispatch was received from General Thomas announcing his readiness at last to move and designated the time of his movement. I concluded to wait until that time. He did move and was successful from the start. This was on the 15th of December. General Logan was at Louisville at the time this movement was made, and telegraphed the fact to Washington and proceeded no farther himself. The battle during the 15th was severe, but favorable to the Union troops and continued until night closed in upon the combat. The next day the battle was renewed. After a successful assault upon Hood's men in their entrenchments, the enemy fled in disorder, routed and broken. Seeing they're dead, there are tillery and small arms and great numbers on the field besides the wounded that were captured. Our cavalry had fought on foot as infantry and had knocked their horses with them so that they were not ready to join in the pursuit the moment the enemy retreated. They sent back, however, for their horses and endeavored to get to Franklin ahead of Hood's broken army by the granny white road, too much time was consumed in getting started. They had got but a few miles beyond the scene at the battle when they found the enemy's cavalry dismounted and behind entrenchments covering the road on which they were advancing. Here another battle ensued, our men dismounting and fighting on foot in which the Confederates were, again, routed and driven in great disorder. Our cavalry then went into Bivouac and renewed the pursuit on the following morning. They were too late. The enemy already had possession of Franklin and was beyond them. It now became a chase in which the Confederates had the lead. Our troops continued the pursuit to within a few miles of Columbia where they found the rebels had destroyed the railroad bridge as well as all other bridges over Duck River. The heavy rains of a few days before had swelled the stream into a mad torrent, impassable except on bridges. Unfortunately, either through a mistake in the wording of the order or otherwise, the pontoon bridge which was to have been sent by rail out to Franklin to be taken dense with the pursuing column had gone toward Chattanooga. There was consequently a delay of some four days in building bridges out of the remains of the old railroad bridge. Of course Hood got such a start in this time that further pursuit was useless, although it was continued for some distance, but without coming upon him again. Section 61 of Personal Memoirs of U.S. Grant This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. According by Jim Clevinger, Personal Memoirs of U.S. Grant by Ulysses S. Grant, Chapter 61. Expedition Against Fort Fisher Attack on the Fort Failure of the Expedition Second Expedition Against the Fort Capture of Fort Fisher Up to January 1865, the enemy occupied Fort Fisher at the mouth of Cape Fear River and below the city of Wilmington. This port was of immense importance to the Confederates because it formed their principal inlet for blockade runners by means of which they brought in from abroad such supplies and munitions of war as they could not produce at home. It was equally important to us to get possession of it, not only because it was desirable to cut off their supplies so as to ensure a speedy termination of the war, but also because foreign governments, particularly the British government, were constantly threatening that unless ours could maintain the blockade of that coast, they should cease to recognize any blockade. For these reasons I determined, with the concurrence of the Navy Department in December, to send an expedition against Fort Fisher for the purpose of capturing it. To show the difficulty experienced in maintaining the blockade, I will mention a circumstance that took place at Fort Fisher after its fall. Two English blockade runners came in at night. Their commanders, not supposing the fort had fallen, worked their way through all our fleet and got into the river unobserved. They then signaled the fort, announcing their arrival. There was a colored man in the fort who had been there before and who understood these signals. He informed General Terry what reply he should make to have them come in and Terry did as he advised. The vessels came in, their officers entirely unconscious that they were falling into the hands of the Union forces. Even after they were brought into the fort, they were entertained in conversation for some little time before suspecting that the Union troops were occupying the fort. They were finally informed that their vessels and cargos were prizes. I selected General Wiesel of the Army of the James to go with the expedition, but gave instructions through General Butler. He commanded the department within whose geographical limits Fort Fisher was situated, as well as Buford and other points on that coast held by our troops. He was, therefore, entitled to the right of fitting out the expedition against Fort Fisher. General Butler conceived the idea that if a steamer loaded heavily with powder could be run up to near the shore under the fort and exploded, it would create great havoc and make the capture an easy matter. Admiral Porter, who was to command the naval squadron, seemed to fall in with the idea, and it was not disapproved of in Washington, the Navy was, therefore, given the task of preparing the steamer for this purpose. I had no confidence in the success of the scheme, and so expressed myself. But, as no serious harm could come of the experiment, and the authorities at Washington seemed desirous to have it tried, I permitted it. The steamer was sent to Buford, North Carolina, and was there loaded with powder and prepared for the part she was to play in the reduction of Fort Fisher. General Butler chose to go in command of the expedition himself, and was all ready to sail by the 9th of December, 1864. Very heavy storms prevailed, however, at that time along that part of the sea coast, and prevented him from getting off until the 13th or 14th. His advance arrived off Fort Fisher on the 15th. The Naval force had been already assembled, or was assembling, but they were obliged to run into Buford for munitions, coal, et cetera, then too. The powder boat was not yet fully prepared. The fleet was ready to proceed on the 18th, but Butler, who had remained outside from the 15th up to that time, now found himself out of coal, fresh water, et cetera, and had to put into Buford to replenish. Another storm overtook him, and several days more were lost before the Army and Navy were both ready at the same time to cooperate. On the night of 1923 the powder boat was towed in by a gunboat as near to the fort as it was safe to run. She was then propelled by her own machinery, two within about five hundred yards of the shore. There the clockwork, which was to explode her within a certain length of time, was set and she was abandoned. Everybody left, and even the vessels put out to sea to prevent the effect of the explosion upon them. At two o'clock in the morning the explosion took place, and produced no more effect on the fort or anything else on land than the bursting of a boiler anywhere on the Atlantic Ocean would have done. Indeed, when the troops in Fort Fisher heard the explosion, they supposed it was the bursting of a boiler in one of the Yankee gunboats. Fort Fisher was situated upon a low, flat peninsula north of Cape Fear River. The soil is sandy, back a little the peninsula is very heavily wooded and covered with freshwater swamps. The fort ran across this peninsula about five hundred yards in wet, and extended along the sea coast about thirteen hundred yards. The fort had an armament of twenty one guns and three mortars on the land side and twenty four guns on the sea front. At that time it was only garrisoned by four companies of infantry, one light battery, and the gunners at the heavy guns less than seven hundred men with a reserve of less than a thousand men five miles up the peninsula. General Whitting of the Confederate Army was in command and General Bragg was in command of the force at Wilmington. Both commenced calling for reinforcements the moment they saw our troops landing. The governor of North Carolina called for everybody who could stand behind a parapet and shoot a gun to join them. In this way they got two or three hundred additional men into Fort Fisher. And Hoax Division, five or six thousand strong, was sent down from Richmond. A few of these troops arrived the very day that Butler was ready to advance. On the twenty-fourth the fleet formed for an attack in arcs of concentric circles. Their heavy iron clads going in very close range, being nearest the shore, and leaving intervals or spaces so that the outer vessels could fire between them. Porter was thus enabled to throw one hundred and fifteen shells per minute. The damage done to the fort by these shells was very slight, only two or three cannon being disabled in the fort, but the firing silenced all the guns by making it too hot for the men to maintain their positions about them and compelling them to seek shelter in the bomb-proofs. On the next day part of Butler's troops under General Adalbert Ames affected a landing out a range of the fort without difficulty. This was accomplished under the protection of gun boats sent for the purpose and undercover of a renewed attack upon the fort by the fleet. They formed a line across the peninsula and advanced, part going north and part toward the fort, covering themselves as they did so. Curtis pushed forward and came near to Fort Fisher, capturing the small garrison at what was called a flag-pond battery. Weetzel accompanied him to within a half a mile of the works. Here he saw that the fort had not entered, and so reported to Butler advising against an assault. Ames, who had gone north in his advance, captured 228 of the reserves. These prisoners reported to Butler that 1600 of Hoax Division of 6000 from Richmond had already arrived and the rest would soon be in his rear. Upon these reports Butler determined to withdraw his troops from the peninsula and return to the fleet. At that time there had not been a man on our side injured except by one of the shells from the fleet. Curtis had got within a few yards of the works. Some of his men had snatched a flag from the parapet of the fort, and others had taken a horse from the inside of the stockade. At night Butler informed Porter of his withdrawal, giving the reasons above stated, and announced his purpose as soon as his men could embark to start for Hampton Roads. Porter represented to him that he had sent to Buford for more ammunition. He could fire much faster than he had been doing and would keep the enemy from showing himself until our men were within twenty yards of the fort, and he begged that Butler would leave some brave fellows like those who had snatched the flag from the parapet and taken the horse from the fort. Butler was unchangeable. He got all his troops aboard except Curtis's brigade and started back. In doing this Butler made a fearful mistake. My instructions to him or to the officer who went in command of the expedition were explicit in the statement that to affect a landing would be of itself a great victory, and if one should be affected the foothold must not be relinquished. On the contrary, a regular siege of the fort must be commenced and to guard against interference by reason of storms, supplies of provisions must be laid in as soon as they could be got on shore. But General Butler seems to have lost sight of this part of his instructions and was back at Fort Monroe on the twenty-eighth. I telegraph to the President as follows. City Point, Virginia December twenty-eight eighteen sixty-four eight thirty p.m. The Wilmington expedition has proven a gross and culpable failure. Many of the troops are back here. Delays and free talk of the object of the expedition enabled the enemy to move troops to Wilmington to defeat it. After the expedition sailed from Fort Monroe three days of fine weather were squandered during which the enemy was without a force to protect himself. Who is to blame will, I hope, be known. U.S. Grant, Lieutenant General. Porter sent dispatches to the Navy Department in which he complained bitterly of having been abandoned by the Army just when the fort was nearly in our possession and begged that our troops might be sent back again to cooperate but with a different commander. As soon as I heard this I sent a messenger to Porter with a letter asking him to hold on. I assured him that I fully sympathized with him in his disappointment and that I would send the same troops back with a different commander with some reinforcements to offset those which the enemy had received. I told him it would take some little time to get transportation for the additional troops, but as soon as it could be had the men should be on their way to him and there would be no delay on my part. I selected A. H. Terry to command. It was the sixth of January before the transports could be got ready and the troops aboard. They sailed from Fortress Monroe on that day. The object and destination of the second expedition were at the time kept a secret to all except a few in the Navy Department and in the Army to whom it was necessary to impart the information. General Terry had not the slightest idea of where he was going or what he was to do. He simply knew that he was going to see and that he had his orders with him, which were to be open when out at sea. He was instructed to communicate freely with Porter and have entire harmony between Army and Navy because the work before them would require the best efforts of both arms of service. They arrived off Buford on the eighth, a heavy storm, however, prevented a landing at Fort Fisher until the 13th. The Navy prepared itself for attack about as before and the same time assisted the Army in landing, this time five miles away. Only ironclads fired at first the object being to draw the fire of the enemy's guns so as to ascertain their positions. This object being accomplished they then let in their shots thick and fast. Very soon the guns were all silenced and the fort showed evident signs of being much injured. Terry deployed his men across the peninsula as had been done before and at two o'clock on the following morning was up within two miles of the fort with a respectable Abitas in front of his line. His artillery was all landed on that day the 14th. Again Curtis's brigade of Ames's division had the lead. By noon they had carried an unfinished work less than a half mile from the fort and turned it so as to face the other way. Terry now saw Porter and arranged for an assault on the following day. The two commanders arranged their signals so that they could communicate with each other from time to time as they might have occasion. At daylight the fleet commenced its firing. The time agreed upon for the assault was the middle of the afternoon and Ames, who commanded the assaulting column, moved at 3.30. Porter landed a force of sailors and marines to move against the sea front in cooperation with Ames's assault. They were under commander breeze of the navy. These sailors and marines had worked their way up to within a couple of hundred yards of the fort before the assault. The signal was given and the assault was made, but the poor sailors and marines were repulsed and very badly handled by the enemy, losing 280 killed and wounded out of their number. Curtis's brigade charged successfully, though, met by a heavy fire, some of the men having to wade through the swamp up to their wastes to reach the fort. Many were wounded, of course, and some killed, but they soon reached the palisades. These they cut away and pushed on through. The other troops then came up. Penny-packers following Curtis and Bell, who commanded the third brigade of Ames's division following Penny-packer. But the fort was not yet captured, though the parapet was gained. The works were very extensive. The large parapet around the work would have been but very little protection to those inside except when they were close up under it. Traversas had therefore been run until really the work was a succession of small forts enclosed by a large one. The rebels made a desperate effort to hold the fort and had to be driven from these traversas one by one. The fight continued till long after night. Our troops gained first one traverse and then another, and by ten o'clock at night the place was carried. During this engagement the sailors, who had been repulsed in their assault on the bastion, rendered the best service they could by reinforcing Terry's northern line, thus enabling him to send a detachment to the assistance of Ames. The fleet kept up a continuous fire upon that part of the fort, which was still occupied by the enemy, by means of signals they could be informed where to direct their shots. During the succeeding nights the enemy blew up Fort Caswell on the opposite side of Fear River and abandoned two extensive works on Smith's Island in the river. Our captures and all amounted to 169 guns besides small arms with full supplies of ammunition and 2,083 prisoners. In addition to these there were about 700 dead and wounded left there. We had lost 110 killed and 536 wounded. In this assault on Fort Fisher, Bell, one of the brigade commanders was killed and two, Curtis and Pennypacker, were badly wounded. Secretary Stanton, who was on his way back from Savannah, arrived off Fort Fisher soon after it fell. When he heard the good news he promoted all the officers of any considerable rank for their conspicuous gallantry. Terry had been nominated for Major General, but had not been confirmed. This confirmed him, and soon after I recommended him for a brigadier of generalacy in the regular army and it was given to him for this victory. End of section 61, recording by Jim Clevenger, Little Rock, Arkansas. Jim at joclev.com.