 Section 5 of Personal Memoirs of U.S. Grant A trip to Austin? Promotion to Full Second Lieutenant? Army of Occupation. When our party left Corpus Christi, it was quite large, including the cavalry escort, paymaster, major dicks, his clerk, and the officers who, like myself, were simply on leave. All the officers on leave, except Lieutenant Benjamin, afterwards killed in the Valley of Mexico, Lieutenant now General Auger, and myself concluded to spend their allotted time at San Antonio and return from there. We were all to be back at Corpus Christi by the end of the month. The paymaster was detained in Austin so long that, if we had waited for him, we would have exceeded our leave. We concluded, therefore, to start back at once with the animals we had, and having to rely principally on grass for their food, it was a good six days journey. We had to sleep on the prairie every night, except at Goliad, and possibly one night on the Colorado, without shelter, and with only such food as we carried with us and prepared ourselves. The journey was hazardous on account of Indians, and there were white men in Texas whom I would not have cared to meet in a secluded place. Lieutenant Auger was taken seriously sick before we reached Goliad and at a distance from any habitation. To add to the complication, his horse, a mustang that had probably been captured from the band of wild horses before alluded to, and of undoubted longevity at his capture, gave out. It was absolutely necessary to get forward to Goliad to find a shelter for our sick companion. By a dent of patience and exceedingly slow movements, Goliad was at last reached, and a shelter and bed secured for our patient. We remained over a day, hoping that Auger might recover sufficiently to resume his travels. He did not, however, and knowing that Major Dix would be along in a few days with his wagon-train now empty and escort, we arranged with our Louisiana friend to take the best of care of the sick Lieutenant until thus relieved, and went on. I had never been a sportsman in my life, had scarcely ever gone in search of game and rarely seen any when looking for it. On this trip, there was no minute of time while traveling between San Patricio and the settlements on the San Antonio River, from San Antonio to Austin, and again from the Colorado River back to San Patricio, when deer or antelope could not be seen in great numbers. Each officer carried a shotgun and every evening after going into camp, some would go out and soon return with venison and wild turkeys enough for the entire camp. I, however, never went out, and had no occasion to fire my gun except. Being detained over a day at Goliad, Benjamin and I concluded to go down to the creek, which was fringed with timber, much of it, the pecan, and bring back a few turkeys. We had scarcely reached the edge of the timber, when I heard the flutter of wings overhead, and in an instant I saw two or three turkeys flying away. These were soon followed by more, then more, and more, until a flock of twenty or thirty had left from just over my head. All this time, I stood watching the turkeys to see where they flew, with my gun on my shoulder, and never once thought of leveling it at the birds. When I had time to reflect upon the matter, I came to the conclusion that, as a sportsman, I was a failure, and went back to the house. Benjamin remained out, and got as many turkeys as he wanted to carry back. After the second night at Goliad, Benjamin and I started to make the remainder of the journey alone. We reached Corpus Christi just in time to avoid absence without leave. We met no one, not even an Indian, during the remainder of our journey except at San Patricio. A new settlement had been started there in our absence of three weeks, induced, possibly, by the fact that there were houses already built, while the proximity of troops gave protection against the Indians. On the evening of the first day out from Goliad, we heard the most unearthly howling of wolves directly in our front. The prairie grass was tall, and we could not see the beast, but the sound indicated that they were near. To my ear it appeared that there must have been enough of them to devour our party, horses and all, at a single meal. The part of Ohio that I hailed from was not thickly settled, but wolves had been driven out long before I left. Benjamin was from Indiana, still less populated, where the wolf yet roamed over the prairies. He understood the nature of the animal and the capacity of a few to make believe there was an unlimited number of them. He kept on towards the noise, unmoved. I followed in his trail, lacking moral courage to turn back and join our sick companion. I have no doubt that if Benjamin had proposed returning to Goliad, I would not only have seconded the motion, but have suggested that it was very hard-hearted in us to leave all of our sick there in the first place, but Benjamin did not propose turning back. When he did speak it was to ask, Grant, how many wolves do you think there are in that pack? Knowing where he was from and suspecting that he thought I would overestimate the number, I determined to show my acquaintance with the animal by putting the estimate below what possibly could be correct and answered, oh, about twenty, very indifferently. He smiled and rode on. In a minute we were close upon them and before they saw us. There were just two of them, seated upon their haunches with their mouths close together. They had made all the noise we had been hearing for the past ten minutes. I have often thought of this incident since, when I have heard the noise of a few disappointed politicians who had deserted their associates. There are always more of them before they are accounted. A week or two before leaving Corpus Christi on this trip I had been promoted from Seventh-Second Lieutenant, Fourth Infantry, to Full Second Lieutenant, Seventh Infantry. Frank Gardner of the Seventh was promoted to the Fourth in the same orders. We immediately made application to be transferred so as to get back to our old regiments. On my return I found that our application had been approved at Washington, while in the Seventh Infantry I was in the Company of Captain Holmes, afterwards a Lieutenant General in the Confederate Army. I never came in contact with him in the War of the Rebellion, nor did he render any very conspicuous service in his high rank. My transfer carried me to the Company of Captain McCall, who resigned from the Army after the Mexican War and settled in Philadelphia. He was prompt, however, to volunteer when the rebellion broke out and soon rose to the rank of Major General in the Union Army. I was not fortunate enough to meet him after he resigned. In the old Army he was esteemed very highly as a soldier and gentleman. Our relations were always most pleasant. The preparations at Corpus Christi for an advance progressed as rapidly in the absence of some twenty or more lieutenants as if we had been there. The principal business consisted in securing mules and getting them broken to harness. The process was slow but amusing. The animals sold to the government were all young and unbroken even to the saddle and were quite as wild as the wild horses of the prairie. Usually a number would be brought in by a Company of Mexicans, partners in the delivery. The mules were first driven into a stockade called a corral, enclosing an acre or more of ground. The Mexicans who were all experienced in throwing the lasso would go into the corral on horseback with their lassoes attached to the pommels of their saddles. Soldiers, detailed as teamsters and blacksmiths, would also enter the corral, the former with ropes to serve as halters, the latter with branding irons and a fire to keep the irons heated. A lasso was then thrown over the neck of a mule when he would immediately go to the length of his tether first one end then the other in the air. While he was thus plunging and gyrating another lasso would be thrown by another Mexican catching the animal by a forefoot. This would bring the mule to the ground when he was seized and held by the teamsters while the blacksmiths put upon him with hot irons the initials US. Ropes were then put about the neck with a slip noose which would tighten around the throat if pulled. With a man on each side holding these ropes the mule was released from his other bindings and allowed to rise. With more or less difficulty he would be conducted to a picket rope outside and fastened there. The delivery of that mule was then complete. This process was gone through with every mule and wild horse with the army of occupation. The method of breaking them was less cruel and much more amusing. It is a well-known fact that where domestic animals are used for specific purposes from generation to generation the descendants are easily as a rule subdued to the same use. At that time in northern Mexico the mule or his ancestors the horse and the ass was seldom used except for the saddle or pack. At all events the corpus Christi mule resisted the new use to which he was being put. The treatment he was subjected to in order to overcome his prejudices was summary and effective. The soldiers were principally foreigners who had enlisted in our large cities and with the exception of a chance-dramon among them it is not probable that any of the men who reported themselves as competent teamsters had ever driven a mule team in their lives or indeed that many had had any previous experience in driving any animal whatever to harness. Numbers together can accomplish what twice their number acting individually could not perform. Five mules were allotted to each wagon. A teamster would select at the picket rope five animals of nearly the same color in general appearance for his team. With a full corps of assistants, other teamsters, he would then proceed to get his mules together. In twos the men would approach each animal selected avoiding as far as possible its heels. Two ropes would be put about the neck of each animal with slip noose so that he could be choked if too unruly. They were then let out, harnessed by fours and hitched to the wagon in the position they had to keep ever after. Two men remained on either side of the leader with the lassoes about its neck and one man retained the same restraining influence over each of the others. All being ready, the hold would be slackened and the team started. The first motion was generally five mules in the air at one time, backs bowed, hind feet extended to the rear. After repeating this movement a few times the leaders would start to run. This would bring the breaching tight against the mules at the wheels which these last seemed to regard as a most unwarrantable attempt at coercion and would resist by taking a seat sometimes going so far as to lie down. In time all were broken in to do their duty submissively if not cheerfully. But there never was a time during the war when it was safe to let a Mexican mule get entirely loose. Their drivers were all teamsters by the time they got through. I recollect one case of a mule that had worked in a team under the saddle not only for some time at Corpus Christi, where he was broken, but all the way to the point opposite Matamoros, then to Camargo, where he got loose from his fastenings during the night. He did not run away at first, but stayed in the neighborhood for a day or two, coming up sometimes to the feed trough even, but on the approach of the teamster he always got out of the way. At last growing tired of the constant effort to catch him he disappeared altogether. Nothing short of a Mexican with his lasso could have caught him. Regulations would not have warranted the expenditure of a dollar in hiring a man with a lasso to catch that mule, but they did allow the expenditure of the mule on a certificate that he had run away without any fault of the quartermaster on whose returns he was born and also the purchase of another to take his place. I am a competent witness for I was regimental quartermaster at the time, while at Corpus Christi all the officers who had a fancy for riding kept horses. The animals cost little in the first instance, and when picketed they would get their living without any cost. I had three not long before the army moved, but a sad accident bereft me of them all at one time. A colored boy who gave them all the attention they got, besides looking after my tent and that of a classmate and fellow lieutenant and cooking for us, all for about eight dollars per month, was riding one to water and leading the other two. The lead horses pulled him from his seat and all three ran away. They never were heard of afterwards. Shortly after that someone told Captain Bliss, General Taylor's adjutant general of my misfortune. Yes, I heard Grant lost five or six dollars worth of horses the other day, he replied. That was a slander. They were broken to the saddle when I got them and cost nearly twenty dollars. I never suspected the colored boy of malicious intent in letting them get away because if they had not escaped he could have had one of them to ride on the long march then in prospect. This is the LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. At last the preparations were complete and orders were issued for the advance to begin on the 8th of March. General Taylor had an army of not more than three thousand men, one battery, the siege guns and all the convalescent troops were sent on by water to Brazos Santiago at the mouth of the Rio Grande. A guard was left back at Corpus Christi to look after public property and to take care of those who were too sick to be removed. The remainder of the army, probably not more than twenty five hundred men, was divided into three brigades with the cavalry independent. Colonel Twiggs with seven companies of dragoons and a battery of light artillery moved on the 8th. He was followed by the three infantry brigades with the day's interval between the commands. Thus the rear brigade did not move from Corpus Christi until the eleventh of March. In view of the immense bodies of men moved on the same day over narrow roads through dense forests and across large streams in our late war, it seems strange now that a body of less than three thousand men should have broken into four columns separated by a day's march. General Taylor was opposed to anything like plundering by the troops, and in this instance, I doubt not, he looked upon the enemy as the aggrieved party and was not willing to injure them further than his instructions from Washington demanded. His orders to the troops enjoined scrupulous regard for the rights of all peaceable persons and the payment of the highest price for all supplies taken for the use of the army. All officers of foot-regiments who had horses were permitted to ride them on the march when it did not interfere with their military duties. As already related, having lost my five or six dollars' worth of horses, but a short time before, I determined not to get another but to make the journey on foot. My company commander, Captain McCall, had two good American horses of considerably more value in that country where native horses were cheap than they were in the States. He used one himself and wanted the other for his servant. He was quite anxious to know whether I did not intend to get me another horse before the march began. I told him no, I belonged to a foot regiment. I did not understand the object of his solicitude at the time, but when we were about to start he said, their grant is a horse for you. I found that he could not bear the idea of his servant riding on a long march while his lieutenant went afoot. He had found a Mustang, a three-year-old colt only recently captured, which had been purchased by one of the colored servants with a foot regiment for the sum of three dollars. It was probably the only horse at Corpus Christi that could have been purchased just then for any reasonable price. Five dollars, sixty-six and two thirds percent, advance, induce the owner to part with the Mustang. I was sorry to take him because I really felt that belonging to a foot regiment it was my duty to march with the men. But I saw the captain's earnestness in the matter and accepted the horse for the trip. The day we started was the first time the horse had ever been under saddle. I had, however, but little difficulty in breaking him, though for the first day there were frequent disagreements between us as to which way we should go and sometimes whether we should go at all. At no time during the day could I choose exactly the part of the colt I would march with, but after that I had as tractable a horse as any with the army, and there was none that stood the trip better. He never ate a mouthful of food on the journey, except the grass he could pick within the length of his picket-rope. A few days out from Corpus Christi the immense herd of wild horses that ranged at that time between the new seas and the Rio Grande was seen directly in advance of the head of the colt and but a few miles off. It was the very band from which the horse I was riding had been captured but a few weeks before. The colt was halted for a rest and a number of officers, myself among them, rode out two or three miles to the right to see the extent of the herd. The country was a rolling prairie and from the higher ground the vision was obstructed only by the earth's curvature. As far as the eye could reach to our right the herd extended. To the left it extended equally. There was no estimating the number of animals in it. I have no idea that they could all have been corralled in the state of Rhode Island or Delaware at one time. If they had been they would have been so thick that the pasture age would have given out the first day. The whole, who saw the southern herd of buffalo fifteen or twenty years ago, can appreciate the size of the Texas band of wild horses in 1846. At the point where the army struck the little Colorado river the stream was quite wide and of sufficient depth for navigation. The water was brackish and the banks were filled with timber. Here the whole army concentrated before attempting to cross. The army was not accompanied by a pontoon train and at that time the troops were not instructed in bridge building. To add to the embarrassment of the situation the army was here for the first time threatened with opposition. Buglers concealed from our view by the brush on the opposite side sounded the assembly and other military calls. Like the wolves before spoken of they gave the impression that there was a large number of them and that if the troops were in proportion to the noise they were sufficient to devour General Taylor and his army. There were probably but few troops and those engaged principally in watching the movements of the invader. A few of our cavalry dashed in and forwarded and swam the stream and all opposition was soon dispersed. I do not remember that a single shot was fired. The troops waited the stream which was up to their necks in the deepest part. Teams were crossed by attaching a long to the end of the wagon-tongue passing it between the two swing-mules and by the side of the leader hitching his bridle as well as the bridle of the mules in rear to it and carrying the end to men on the opposite shore. The bank down to the water was steep on both sides. A rope long enough to cross the river, therefore, was attached to the back axle of the wagon and men behind would hold the rope to prevent the wagon beating the mules into the water. This ladder rope also served the purpose of bringing the end of the forward one back to be used over again. The water was deep enough for a short distance to swim the little Mexican mules which the army was then using but they and the wagons were pulled through so fast by the men at the end of the rope ahead that no time was left them to show their obscenacy. In this manner the artillery and transportation of the army of occupation crossed the Colorado River. About the middle of the month of March the advance of the army reached Rio Grande and went into camp near the banks of the river opposite the city of Metamorris and almost under the guns of a small fort at the lower end of the town. There was not at that time a single habitation from Corpus Christi until the Rio Grande was reached. The work of fortifying was commenced at once. The fort was laid out by the engineers but the work was done by the soldiers under the supervision of their officers, the chief engineer retaining general directions. The Mexicans now became so incensed at our near approach that some of their troops crossed the river above us and made it unsafe for small bodies of men to go far beyond the limits of camp. They captured two companies of lagoons, commanded by Captain Staunton and Hardy. The latter figured as a general in the late war on the Confederate side and was author of the tactics first used by both armies. Lieutenant Theodric Porter of the Fourth Infantry was killed while out with a small detachment and Major Cross, the assistant quartermaster general, had also been killed not far from camp. There was no base of supplies nearer than Point Isabel on the coast north of the mouth of the Rio Grande and 25 miles away. The enemy, if the Mexicans could be called such at this time when no war had been declared, hovered about in such numbers that it was not safe to send a wagon train after supplies with any escort that could be spared. I have already said that General Taylor's whole command on the Rio Grande numbered less than 3,000 men. He had, however, a few more troops at Point Isabel or Brazos Santiago. The supplies brought from Corpus Christi and wagons were running short. Work was therefore pushed with great vigor on the defenses to enable the minimum number of troops to hold the fort. All the men who could be employed were kept at work from early dawn until darkness closed the labors of the day. With all this the fort was not completed until the supplies grew so short that further delay in obtaining more could not be thought of. By the latter part of April the work was in a partially defensible condition and the Seventh Infantry, Major Jacob Brown commanding, was marched in to Garrison It with some few pieces of artillery. All the supplies on hand, with the exception of enough to carry the rest of the army to Point Isabel, were left with the Garrison and the march was commenced with the remainder of the command, every wagon being taken with the army. Early on the second day after starting the force reached its destination without opposition from the Mexicans. There was some delay in getting supplies ashore from vessels at anchor in the open roadstead. End of Section 6, Recording by Jim Clevinger, Little Rock, Arkansas, Jim at jocclev.com Section 7 of Personal Memoirs of U.S. Grant This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org. Recording by Jim Clevinger, Personal Memoirs of U.S. Grant by Ulysses S. Grant, Chapter 7 The Mexican War, The Battle of Palo Alto, The Battle of Rosacade La Palma, Army of Invasion, General Taylor Movement on Camargo. While General Taylor was away with the bulk of his army, the little garrison up the river was besieged. As we lay in our tents upon the seashore, the artillery at the fort on the Rio Grande could be distinctly heard. The war had begun. There were no possible means of obtaining news from the garrison and information from outside could not be otherwise than favorable. What General Taylor's feelings were during this suspense I do not know, but for myself, a young Second Lieutenant who had never heard a hostile gun before, I felt sorry that I had enlisted. A great many men, when they smell battle afar off, chafe to get into the fray. When they say so themselves they generally fail to convince their hearers that they are as anxious as they would like to make believe. And as they approach danger they become more subdued. This rule is not universal, for I have known a few men who were always aching for a fight when there was no enemy near, who were as good as their word when the battle did come, but the number of such men is small. On the 7th of May the wagons were all loaded and General Taylor started on his return with his army reinforced at Point Isabel, but still less than three thousand strong, to relieve the garrison on the Rio Grande. The road from Point Isabel to Matamoros is over an open, rolling, treeless prairie, until the timber that borders the bank of the Rio Grande is reached. This river, like the Mississippi, flows through a rich, alluvial valley in the most meandering manner, running towards all points of the compass at times within a few miles. Formerly the river ran by Rosacadela some four or five miles east of the present channel. The old bed of the river at Rosaca had become filled at places leaving a succession of little lakes. The timber that had formerly grown upon both banks and for a considerable distance out was still standing. This timber was struck six or eight miles out from the besieged garrison at a point known as Palo Alto, tall trees or woods. Early in the afternoon of the 8th of May, as Palo Alto was approached, an army, certainly outnumbering our little force, was seen drawn up in line of battle just in front of the timber. There bayonets and spearheads glistened in the sunlight formidable. The force was composed largely of cavalry, armed with lances. Where we were, the grass was tall, reaching nearly to the shoulders of the men, very stiff, and each stalk was pointed at the top and hard and almost as sharp as a darning needle. General Taylor halted his army before the head of column came in range of the artillery of the Mexicans. He then formed a line of battle facing the enemy. His artillery, two batteries and two eighteen-pounder iron guns, drawn by oxen, were placed in position at intervals along the line. A battalion was thrown to the rear, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Childs of the artillery, as reserves. These preparations completed. Orders were given for a platoon of each company to stack arms and go to a stream off to the right of the command to fill their canteens and also those of the rest of their respective companies. When the men were all back in their places in line, the command to advance was given. As I looked down that long line of about three thousand armed men, advancing towards a larger force also armed, I thought what a fearful responsibility General Taylor must feel, commanding such a host and so far away from friends. The Mexicans immediately opened fire upon us, first with artillery and then with infantry. At first their shots did not reach us, and the advance was continued. As we got nearer, the cannonballs commenced going through the ranks. They hurt no one, however, during this advance because they would strike the ground long before they reached our line and ricocheted through the tall grass so slowly that the men would see them in open ranks and let them pass. When we got to a point where the artillery could be used with effect, a halt was called and the battle opened on both sides. The infantry under General Taylor was armed with flintlock muskets and paper cartridges charged with powder, buckshot, and ball. At the distance of a few hundred yards, a man might fire at you all day without your finding it out. The artillery was generally six pounder brass guns throwing only solid shot. But General Taylor had with him three or four twelve pounder howitzers throwing shell, besides his eighteen pounders before spoken of, that had a long range. This made a powerful armament. The Mexicans were armed about as we were, so far as their infantry was concerned, but their artillery only fired solid shot. We had greatly the advantage in this arm. The artillery was advanced a rod or two in front of the line and opened fire. The infantry stood at order arms as spectators, watching the effect of our shots upon the enemy and watching his shots so as to step out of their way. It could be seen that the eighteen pounders and the howitzers did a great deal of execution. On our side there was little or no loss while we occupied this position. During the battle Major Ring Gold, an accomplished and brave artillery officer was mortally wounded and Lieutenant Luther, also of the artillery, was struck. During the day several advances were made and just at dusk it became evident that the Mexicans were falling back. We again advanced and occupied at the close of the battle substantially the ground held by the enemy at the beginning. In this last move there was a brisk fire upon our troops and some execution was done. One cannonball passed through our ranks, not far from me. It took off the head of an enlisted man and the under jaw of Captain Page of my regiment, while the splinters from the basket of the killed soldier and his brains and bones knocked down two or three others including one officer, Lieutenant Wellin, hurting them more or less. Our casualties for the day were nine killed and forty-seven wounded. At the break of day on the ninth the army under Taylor was ready to renew the battle but an advance showed that the enemy had entirely left our front during the night. The chaperrill before us was impenetrable except where there were roads or trails with occasionally clear or bare spots of small dimensions. A body of men penetrating it might easily be ambushed. It was better to have a few men caught in this way than the whole army yet it was necessary that the garrison at the river should be relieved. To get to them the chaperrill had to be passed. Thus I assume General Taylor reasoned. He halted the army not far in advance of the ground occupied by the Mexicans the day before and selected Captain C. F. Smith of the artillery and Captain McCall of my company to take one hundred and fifty picked men each and find where the enemy had gone. This left me in command of the company. An honor and responsibility I thought very great. Smith and McCall found no obstruction in the way of their advance until they came up to the succession of ponds before described at Rosaca. The Mexicans had passed them and formed their lines on the opposite bank. This position they had strengthened a little by throwing up dead trees and brush in their front and by placing artillery to cover the approaches and open places. Smith and McCall deployed on each side of the road as well as they could and engaged the enemy at long range. Word was sent back and the advance of the whole army was at once commenced. As we came up we were deployed in like manner. I was with the right wing and led my company through the thicket wherever a penetrable place could be found taking advantage of any clear spot that would carry me towards the enemy. At last I got pretty close up without knowing it. The balls commenced to whistle very thick overhead cutting the limbs of the chaperrill right and left. We could not see the enemy so I ordered my men to lie down an order that did not have to be enforced. We kept our position until it became evident that the enemy were not firing at us and then withdrew to find better ground to advance upon. By this time some progress had been made on our left. A section of artillery had been captured by the cavalry and some prisoners had been taken. The Mexicans were giving way all along the line and many of them had no doubt left early. I at last found a clear space separating two ponds. There seemed to be a few men in front and I charged upon them with my company. There was no resistance and we captured a Mexican colonel who had been wounded and a few men. Just as I was sending them to the rear with a guard of two or three men a private came from the front bringing back one of our officers who had been badly wounded in advance of where I was. The ground had been charged over before. My exploit was equal to that of the soldier who boasted that he had cut off the leg of one of the enemy. When asked why he did not cut off his head he replied someone had done that before. This left no doubt in my mind but that the battle of Rosacadela Palma would have been won just as it was if I had not been there. There was no further resistance. The evening of the ninth the army was encamped on its old ground near the fort and the garrison was relieved. The siege had lasted a number of days but the casualties were few in number. Major Jacob Brown of the seventh infantry, the commanding officer, had been killed and in his honor the fort was named. Since then a town of considerable importance has sprung up on the ground occupied by the fort and troops which has also taken his name. The battles of Palo Alto and Rosacadela Palma seem to us engaged as pretty important affairs but we had only a faint conception of their magnitude until they were fought over in the north by the press and the reports came back to us. At the same time or about the same time we learned that war existed between the United States and Mexico by the acts of the latter country. On learning this fact General Taylor transferred our camps to the south or west bank of the river and Matamoros was occupied. We then became the army of invasion. Up to this time Taylor had none but regular troops in his command but now that invasion had already taken place volunteers for one year commenced arriving. The army remained at Matamoros until sufficiently reinforced to warrant a movement into the interior. General Taylor was not an officer to trouble the administration much with his demands but was inclined to do the best he could with the means given him. He felt his responsibility as going no further. If he had thought that he was sent to perform an impossibility with the means given him he would probably have informed the authorities of his opinion and left them to determine what should be done. If the judgment was against him he would have gone on and done the best he could with the means at hand without parading his grievance before the public. No soldier could face either danger or responsibility more calmly than he. These are qualities more rarely found than genius or physical courage. General Taylor never made any great show or parade either of uniform or retinue. In dress he was possibly too plain, rarely wearing anything in the field to indicate his rank or even that he was an officer but he was known to every soldier in his army and was respected by all. I can call to mind only one instance when I saw him in uniform and one other when I heard of his wearing it on both occasions he was unfortunate. The first was at Corpus Christi. He had concluded to review his army before starting on the march and gave orders accordingly. Colonel Twiggs was then second in rank with the army and to him was given the command of the review. Colonel and Brevet Brigadier General Worth a far different soldier from Taylor in the use of the uniform was next to Twiggs in rank and claimed superiority by virtue of his Brevet rank when the accidents of service through them were one or the other had to command. Worth declined to attend the review as subordinate to Twiggs until the question was settled by the highest authority. This broke up the review and the question was referred to Washington for final decision. General Taylor was himself only a Colonel in real rank at that time and a Brigadier General by Brevet. He was assigned to duty however by the President with the rank which his Brevet gave him. Worth was not so assigned but by virtue of commanding a division he must under the army regulations of that day have drawn the pay of his Brevet rank. The question was submitted to Washington and no response was received until after the army had reached the Rio Grande. It was decided against General Worth who at once tendered his resignation and left the army going north no doubt by the same vessel that carried it. This kept him out of the battles of Palo Alto and Resaca de la Palma. Either the resignation was not accepted or General Worth withdrew it before action had been taken. At all events he returned to the army in time to command his division in the Battle of Monterey and served with it to the end of the war. The second occasion on which General Taylor was said to have donned his uniform was in order to receive a visit from the flag officer of the Naval Squadron off the mouth of the Rio Grande. While the army was on that river the flag officer sent word that he would call on the General to pay his respects on a certain day. General Taylor knowing that Naval officers habitually wore all the uniform the law allowed on all occasions of ceremony thought it would be only civil to receive his guest in the same style. His uniform was therefore got out brushed up and put on in advance of the visit. The flag officer knowing General Taylor's aversion to the wearing of the uniform and feeling that it would be regarded as a compliment should he meet him in civilians dress left off his uniform for this occasion. The meeting was said to have been embarrassing to both and the conversation was principally apologetic. The time was wild away pleasantly enough at Matamoros while we were waiting for volunteers. It is probable that all the most important people of the territory occupied by our army left their homes before we got there. But with those remaining the best of relations apparently existed. It was the policy of the commanding general to allow no pillaging, no taking of private property for public or individual use without satisfactory compensation so that a better market was afforded than the people had ever known before. Among the troops that joined us at Matamoros was an Ohio regiment of which Thomas L. Hamer, the member of Congress who had given me my appointment to West Point was major. He told me then that he could have had the Colonelcy but that as he knew he was to be appointed a brigadier general he preferred at first to take the lower grade. I have said before that Hamer was one of the ablest men Ohio ever produced. At that time he was in the prime of life being less than fifty years of age and possessed an admirable physique, promising long life. But he was taken sick before Monterey and died within a few days. I have always believed that had his life been spared he would have been President of the United States during the term filled by President Pierce. Had Hamer filled that office his partiality for me was such. There is but little doubt I should have been appointed to one of the staff corps of the Army, the pay department probably, and would therefore now be preparing to retire. Neither of these speculations is unreasonable and they are mentioned to show how little men control their own destiny. Reinforcements having arrived in the month of August the movement commenced from Matamoros to Camargo the head of navigation on the Rio Grande. The line of the Rio Grande was all that was necessary to hold unless it was intended to invade Mexico from the north. In that case the most natural route to take was the one which General Taylor selected. It entered a pass in the Sierra Madre Mountains at Monterey through which the main road runs to the city of Mexico. Monterey itself was a good point to hold even if the line of the Rio Grande covered all the territory we desired to occupy at that time. It is built on a plain 2,000 feet above tide water where the air is bracing and the situation healthy. On the 19th of August the Army started for Monterey leaving a small garrison at Matamoros. The troops with the exception of the artillery, cavalry, and the brigade to which I belonged were moved up the river to Camargo on steamers. As there were but two or three of these the boats had to make a number of trips before the last of the troops were up. Those who marched did so by the south side of the river. Lieutenant Colonel Garland of the 4th Infantry was the brigade commander and on this occasion commanded the entire marching force. One day out convinced him that marching by day in that latitude in the month of August was not a beneficial sanitary measure particularly for northern men. The order of marching was changed and night marches were substituted with the best results. When Camargo was reached we found a city of tents outside the Mexican hamlet. I was detailed to act as quartermaster and commissary to the regiment. The teams that had proven abundantly sufficient to transport all supplies from Corpus Christi to the Rio Grande over the level prairies of Texas were entirely inadequate to the needs of the reinforced army in a mountainous country. To obviate the deficiency, pack mules were hired with Mexicans to pack and drive them. I had charge of the few wagons allotted to the 4th Infantry and of the pack train to supplement them. There were not men enough in the army to manage that train without the help of Mexicans who had learned how. As it was, the difficulty was great enough. The troops would take up their march at an early hour each day. After they had started, the tents and cooking utensils had to be made into packages so that they could be lashed to the backs of the mules. Sheet iron kettles, tent poles, and mess chests were inconvenient articles to transport in that way. It took several hours to get ready to start each morning and by the time we were ready some of the mules first loaded would be tired of standing so long with their loads on their backs. Sometimes one would start to run, bowing his back and kicking up until he scattered his load. Others would lie down and try to disarrange their loads by attempting to get on the top of them by rolling on them. Others, with tent poles for part of their loads, would manage to run a tent pole on one side of a sapling while they would take the other. I am not aware of ever having used a profane expletive in my life, but I would have the charity to excuse those who may have done so if they were in charge of a train of Mexican pack-mules at the time. Section 8 of Personal Memoirs of U.S. Grant Chapter 8 Advance on Monterey, the Black Fort, the Battle of Monterey, Surrender of the City. The advance from Camargo was commenced on the 5th of September. The army was divided into four columns, separated from each other by one day's march. The advance reached Sorralvo in four days and halted for the remainder of the troops to come up. By the 13th the rearguard had arrived and the same day the advance resumed its march, followed as before a day separating the divisions. The forward division halted again at Marin, 24 miles from Monterey. Both this place and Sorralvo were nearly deserted, and men, women and children were seen running and scattered over the hills as we approached. But when the people returned they found all their abandoned property safe, which must have given them a favorable opinion of Osgringo's de Yankees. From Marin the movement was en masse. On the 19th General Taylor, with his army, was camped at Walnut Springs within three miles of Monterey. The town is on a small stream coming out of the mountain pass and is backed by a range of hills of moderate elevation. To the north, between the city and Walnut Springs stretches an extensive plain. On this plain, and entirely outside of the last houses of the city, stood a strong fort, enclosed on all sides to which our army gave the name of Black Fort. Its guns commanded the approaches to the city to the full extent of their range. There were two detached spurs of hills, or mountains, to the north and northwest of the city, which were also fortified. On one of these stood the Bishop's Palace. The road to South Tillo leaves the upper or western end of the city under the fire of the guns from these heights. The lower or eastern end was defended by two or three small detached works armed with artillery and infantry. To the south was the mountain stream before mentioned, and back of that the range of foothills. The plaza in the center of the city was the citadel, properly speaking. All the streets leading from it were swept by artillery, cannon being entrenched behind temporary parapets. The housetops near the plaza were converted into infantry fortifications by the use of sandbags for parapets. Such were the defenses of Monterey in September 1847. General Ampudia, with the force of certainly 10,000 men, was in command. General Taylor's force was about 6,500 strong in three divisions under General's butler, twigs, and worth. The troops went into camp at Walnut Springs while the engineer officers under Major Mansfield, a general in the late war, commenced their reconnaissance. Major Mansfield found that it would be practicable to get troops around, out of range of the Blackford and the works on the detached hills to the northwest of the city, to the Saltillo Road. With this road in our possession the enemy would be cut off from receiving further supplies, if not from all communications with the interior. General Worth, with his division somewhat reinforced, was given the task of gaining possession of the Saltillo Road and of carrying the detached works outside the city in that quarter. He started on his march early in the afternoon of the 20th. The divisions under General butler and twigs were drawn up to threaten the east and north sides of the city and the works on those fronts, in support of the movement under General Worth. Worth's was regarded as the main attack on Monterey, and all other operations were in support of it. His march this day was uninterrupted, but the enemy was seen to reinforce heavily about the Bishop's Palace and the other outside fortifications on their left. General Worth reached a defensible position just out of range of the enemy's guns on the heights northwest of the city and bivouacked for the night. The engineer officers with him, Captain Sanders and Lieutenant George G. Meade, afterwards the commander of the victorious National Army at the Battle of Gettysburg, made a reconnaissance to the Saltillo Road under cover of night. During the night of the 20th, General Taylor had established a battery consisting of two 24-pounder howitzers and a 10-inch mortar at a point from which they could play upon Black Fort. A natural depression in the plain, sufficiently deep to protect men standing in it from the fire from the fort, was selected and the battery established on the crest nearest the enemy. The Fourth Infantry, then consisting of but six reduced companies, was ordered to support the artilleryists while they were entrenching themselves and their guns. I was regimental quartermaster at the time and was ordered to remain in charge of camp and the public property at Walnut Springs. It was supposed that the regiment would return to its camp in the morning. The point for establishing the siege battery was reached and the work performed without attracting the attention of the enemy. At daylight the next morning fire was opened on both sides and continued with, what seemed to me at that day, great fury. My curiosity got the better of my judgment and I mounted a horse and rode to the front to see what was going on. I had been there but a short time when an order to charge was given and, lacking the moral courage to return to camp where I had been ordered to stay, I charged with the regiment. As soon as the troops were out of the depression they came under the fire of Blackfort. As they advanced they got under fire from batteries guarding the east or lower end of the city and of musketry. About one third of the men engaged in the charge were killed or wounded in the space of a few minutes. We retreated to get out of fire, not backward, but eastward and perpendicular to the direct road running into the city from Walnut Springs. I was, I believe, the only person in the fourth infantry in the charge who was on horseback. When we got to a place of safety the regiment halted and drew itself together, what was left of it, the adjutant of the regiment, Lieutenant Hoskins, who was not in robust health, found himself very much fatigued from running on foot into charge and retreat, and seeing me on horseback expressed a wish that he could be mounted also. I offered him my horse and he accepted the offer. A few minutes later I saw a soldier, a quartermaster's man, mounted not far away. I ran to him, took his horse, and was back with the regiment in a few minutes. In a short time we were off again and the next place of safety from the shots of the enemy that I recollect of being in was a field of cane or corn to the northeast of the lower batteries. The adjutant to whom I had loaned my horse was killed and I was designated to act in his place. This charge was ill-conceived or badly executed. We belonged to the brigade commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Garland and he had received orders to charge the lower batteries of the city and carry them, if he could, without too much loss for the purpose of creating a diversion in favor of worth, who was conducting the movement which, it was intended, should be decisive. By a movement by the left flank, Garland could have led his men beyond the range of the fire from Blackfort and advance towards the northeast angle of the city, as well covered from fire as could be expected. There was no undue loss of life in reaching the lower end of Monterey except that sustained by Garland's command. Meanwhile, Whitman's brigade, conducted by an officer of engineers, had reached the eastern end of the city and was placed under cover of the houses without much loss. Colonel Garland's brigade also arrived at the suburbs and, by the assistance of some of our troops that had reached house tops from which they could fire into a little battery covering the approaches to the lower end of the city, the battery was speedily captured and its guns were turned upon another work of the enemy. An entrance into the east end of the city was now secured and the houses protected our troops so long as they were inactive. On the west, General Worth had reached the Saltillo Road after some fighting but without heavy loss. He turned from his new position and captured the forts on both heights in that quarter. This gave him possession of the upper or west end of Monterey. Troops from both twigs and butlers division were in possession of the east end of the town but the Blackfort to the north of the town and the plaza in the center were still in the possession of the enemy. Our camp set on the Walnut Springs three miles away were guarded by a company from each regiment. A regiment of Kentucky volunteers guarded the mortars and howitzers engaged against Blackfort. Practically, Monterey was invested. There was nothing done on the 22nd by the United States troops but the enemy kept up a harmless fire upon us from Blackfort and the batteries still in their possession at the east end of the city. During the night they evacuated these so that on the morning of the 23rd we held undisputed possession of the east end of Monterey. Twigs's division was at the lower end of the city and well covered from the fire of the enemy but the streets leading to the plaza, all Spanish or Spanish American towns have near their centers a square called a plaza were commanded from all directions by artillery. The houses were flat roofed and but one or two stories high and about the plaza the roofs were manned with infantry the troops being protected from our fire by parapets made of sandbags. All advances into the city were thus attended with much danger. While moving along streets which did not lead to the plaza our men were protected from the fire and from the view of the enemy except at the crossings. At these a volley of musketry and a discharge of grapeshot were invariably encountered. The third and fourth regiments of infantry made an advance nearly to the plaza in this way and with heavy loss. The loss of the third infantry in commissioned officers was especially severe. There were only five companies of the regiment and not over twelve officers present and five of these officers were killed. When within a square of the plaza this small command ten companies and all was brought to a halt. Placing themselves undercover from the shots of the enemy the men would watch to detect a head above the sandbags on the neighboring houses. The exposure of a single head would bring a volley from our soldiers. We had not occupied this position long when it was discovered that our ammunition was growing low. I volunteered to go back to the point we had started from report our position to General Twigs and ask for ammunition to be forwarded. We were at this time occupying ground off from the street in rear of the houses. My ride back was an exposed one. Before starting I adjusted myself on the side of my horse furthest from the enemy and with only one foot holding to the candle of the saddle and an arm over the neck of the horse exposed I started at full run. It was only at street crossings that my horse was under fire but these I crossed at such a flying rate that generally I was passed an undercover of the next block of houses before the enemy fired. I got out safely without a scratch. At one place on my ride I saw a sentry walking in front of a house and stopped to inquire what he was doing there. Finding that the house was full of wounded American officers and soldiers I dismounted and went in. I found there Captain Williams of the Engineer Corps wounded in the head probably fatally and Lieutenant Tarrett also badly wounded his bowels protruding from his wound. There were quite a number of soldiers also. Promising them to report their situation I left, readjusted myself to my horse, recommenced to run and was soon with the troops at the east end. Before ammunition could be collected the two regiments I had been with were seen returning running the same gauntlet in getting out that they had passed in going in but with comparatively little loss. The movement was countermanded and the troops were withdrawn. The poor wounded officers and men I had found fell into the hands of the enemy during the night and died. While this was going on at the east, General Worth, with a small division of troops, was advancing towards the plaza from the opposite end of the city. He resorted to a better expedient for getting to the plaza, the Citadel, than we did on the east. Instead of moving by the open streets he advanced through the houses, cutting passageways from one to another. Without much loss of life he got so near the plaza during the night that before morning ampedia the Mexican commander made overtures for the surrender of the city and garrison. This stopped all further hostilities. The terms of surrender were soon agreed upon. The prisoners were paroled and permitted to take their horses in personal property with them. My pity was aroused by the sight of the Mexican garrison of Monterey marching out of town as prisoners and no doubt the same feeling was experienced by most of our army who witnessed it. Many of the prisoners were cavalry armed with lances and mounted on miserable little half-starved horses that did not look as if they could carry their riders out of town. The men looked in but little better condition. I thought how little interest the men before me had in the results of the war and how little knowledge they had of what it was all about. After the surrender of the garrison of Monterey a quiet camp life was led until midwinter. As had been the case on the Rio Grande, the people who remained at their homes fraternized with the Yankees in the pleasantest manner. In fact, under the main policy of our commander I questioned whether the great majority of the Mexican people did not regret our departure as much as they had regretted our coming. Property and person were thoroughly protected and a market was afforded for all the products of the country such as the people had never enjoyed before. The educated and wealthy portion of the population here as elsewhere abandoned their homes and remained away from them as long as they were in the possession of the invaders. But this class formed a very small percentage of the whole population. CHAPTER IX Political Intrigue Buena Vista Movement Against Veracruz Siege and Capture of Veracruz The Mexican War was a political war and the administration conducting it desired to make party capital out of it. General Scott was at the head of the army and, being a soldier of acknowledged professional capacity, his claim to the command of the forces in the field was almost indisputable and does not seem to have been denied by President Polk or Marcy, his secretary of war. Scott was a wig and the administration was democratic. General Scott was also known to have political aspirations and nothing so popularizes a candidate for high civil positions as military victories. It would not do, therefore, to give him command of the Army of Conquest. The plans submitted by Scott for a campaign in Mexico were disapproved by the administration and he replied, in atone possibly a little disrespectful to the effect that if a soldier's plans were not to be supported by the administration's success could not be expected. This was on the 27th of May, 1846. Four days later General Scott was notified that he need not go to Mexico. General Gaines was next in rank, but he was too old and feeble to take the field. Colonel Zachary Taylor, a brigadier general by Brevet, was therefore left in command. He, too, was a wig but was not supposed to entertain any political ambitions, nor did he, but after the fall of Monterey, his third battle and third complete victory, the wigpapers at home began to speak of him as the candidate of their party for the presidency. Something had to be done to neutralize his growing popularity. He could not be relieved from duty in the field where all his battles had been victories. The design would have been too transparent. It was finally decided to send General Scott to Mexico in chief command and to authorize him to carry out his own original plan, that is, capture Veracruz and march upon the capital of the country. It was no doubt supposed that Scott's ambition would lead him to slaughter Taylor or destroy his chances for the presidency, and yet it was hoped that he would not make sufficient capital himself to secure the prize. The administration had indeed a most embarrassing problem to solve. It was engaged in a war of conquest which must be carried to a successful issue, or the political object would be unattained. Yet all the capable officers of the requisite rank belonged to the opposition, and the man selected for his lack of political ambition had himself become a prominent candidate for the presidency. It was necessary to destroy his chances promptly. The problem was to do this without the loss of conquest and without permitting another general of the same political party to acquire like popularity. The fact is the administration of Mr. Polk made every preparation to disgrace Scott, or to speak more correctly, to drive him to such desperation that he would disgrace himself. General Scott had opposed conquest by the way of the Rio Grande, Matamoros in Saltillo, from the first. Now that he was in command of all of the forces in Mexico, he withdrew from Taylor most of his regular troops and left him only enough volunteers, as he thought, to hold the line then in possession of the invading army. Indeed, Scott did not deem it important to hold anything beyond the Rio Grande and authorized Taylor to fall back to that line if he chose. General Taylor protested against the depletion of his army, and his subsequent movement upon Buena Vista would indicate that he did not share the views of his chief in regard to the unimportance of conquest beyond the Rio Grande. Scott had estimated the men and material that would be required to capture Veracruz and to march on the capital of the country two hundred and sixty miles in the interior. He was promised all he asked and seemed to have not only the confidence of the president, but his sincere good wishes. The promises were all broken. Only about half the troops were furnished that had been pledged. Other war material was withheld and Scott had scarcely started for Mexico before the president undertook to supersede him by the appointment of Senator Thomas H. Benton as Lieutenant General. This being refused by Congress, the president asked legislative authority to place a junior over a senior of the same grade with a view of appointing Benton to the rank of Major General and then placing him in command of the army, but Congress failed to accede to this proposition as well, and Scott remained in command. But every general appointed to serve under him was politically opposed to the chief and several were personally hostile. General Scott reached Brazos Santiago or Point Isabel at the mouth of the Rio Grande late in December 1846 and proceeded at once up the river to Camargo where he had written General Taylor to meet him. Taylor, however, had gone to or towards Tampico for the purpose of establishing a post there. He had started on this march before he was aware of General Scott being in the country. Under these circumstances, Scott had to issue his orders designating the troops to be withdrawn from Taylor without the personal consultation he had expected to hold with his subordinate. General Taylor's victory at Buena Vista February 22, 23 and 24, 1847 with an army composed almost entirely of volunteers who had not been in battle before and over a vastly superior force numerically made his nomination for the presidency by the Whigs a foregone conclusion. He was nominated and elected in 1848. I believe that he sincerely regretted this turn in his fortunes, preferring the peace afforded by a quiet life free from abuse to the honor of filling the highest office in the gift of any people, the presidency of the United States. When General Scott assumed command of the Army of Invasion, I was in the division of General David Twigs in Taylor's command, but under the new orders my regiment was transferred to the division of General William Worth in which I served to the close of the war. The troops withdrawn from Taylor to form part of the forces to operate against Veracruz were assembled at the mouth of the Rio Grande preparatory to embarkation for their destination. I found General Worth a different man from any I had before served directly under. He was nervous, impatient, and restless on the march or when important or responsible duty confronted him. There was not the least reason for haste on the march, for it was known that it would take weeks to assemble shipping enough at the point of our embarkation to carry the army, but General Worth moved his division with a rapidity that would have been commendable had he been going to the relief of a beleaguered garrison. The length of the marches was regulated by the distance between places affording a supply of water for the troops, and these distances were sometimes long and sometimes short. General Worth, on one occasion at least, after having made the full distance intended for the day and after the troops were in camp and preparing their food, ordered tents struck and made the march that night which had been intended for the next day. Some commanders can move troops so as to get the maximum distance out of them without fatigue, while others can wear them out in a few days without accomplishing so much. General Worth belonged to this latter class. He enjoyed, however, a fine reputation for his fighting qualities and thus attached his officers and men to him. The army lay in camp upon the sand beach in the neighborhood of the mouth of the Rio Grande for several weeks, awaiting the arrival of transports to carry it to its new field of operations. The transports were all sailing vessels. The passage was a tedious one, and many of the troops were on shipboard over thirty days from the embarkation at the mouth of the Rio Grande to the time of the debarkation south of Veracruz. The trip was a comfortless one for officers and men. The transports used were built for carrying freight and possessed but limited accommodations for passengers, and the climate added to the discomfort of all. The transports with troops were assembled in the harbor of Anton Lazardo some sixteen miles south of Veracruz as they arrived, and there awaited the remainder of the fleet bringing artillery, ammunition, and supplies of all kinds from the north. With the fleet there was a little steam propeller dispatch boat. The first vessel of the kind I had ever seen and probably the first of its kind ever seen by any one then with the army. At that day ocean steamers were rare, and what there were were side wheelers. This little vessel going through the fleet so fast, so noiselessly, and with its propeller underwater out of view, attracted a great deal of attention. I recollect that Lieutenant Sidney Smith of the Fourth Infantry by whom I happened to be standing on the deck of a vessel when this propeller was passing exclaimed, why the thing looks as if it was propelled by the forces of circumstances. Finally on the 7th of March, 1847, the little army of ten or twelve thousand men, given Scott to date a country with a population of seven or eight million, a mountainous country affording the greatest possible natural advantages for defense, was all assembled and ready to commence the perilous task of landing from vessels lying in the open sea. The debarkation took place inside of the little island of Sacrificio some three miles south of Veracruz. The vessels could not get anywhere near shore so that everything had to be landed in lighters or surf boats. General Scott had provided these before leaving the north. The breakers were sometimes high so that the landing was tedious. The men were got ashore rapidly because they could wade when they came to shallow water, but the camp and garrison equipage, provisions, ammunition, and all stores had to be protected from the salt water and therefore their landing took several days. The Mexicans were very kind to us, however, and threw no obstacles in the way of our landing except an occasional shot from their nearest fort. During the debarkation one shot took off the head of Major Albertus. No other, I believe, reached anywhere near the same distance. On the ninth of March the troops were landed and the investment of Veracruz from the Gulf of Mexico south of the city to the Gulf again on the north was soon easily affected. The landing of stores was continued until everything was got ashore. Veracruz, at the time of which I write, and up to 1880, was a walled city. The wall extended from the water's edge south of the town to the water again on the north. There were fortifications at intervals along the line and at the angles. In front of the city and on an island half a mile out in the Gulf stands San Juan de Uluwa, an enclosed fortification of large dimensions and great strength for that period. Against artillery of the present day the land forts and walls would prove elements of weakness rather than strength. After the trading army had established their camps out of range of the fire from the city batteries were established under cover of night far to the front of the line where the troops lay. These batteries were entrenched and the approaches sufficiently protected. If a sortie had been made at any time by the Mexicans the men serving the batteries could have been quickly reinforced without great exposure to the fire from the enemy's main line. No serious attempt was made to capture the batteries or to drive our troops away. The siege continued with brisk firing on our side till the 27th of March by which time a considerable breach had been made in the wall surrounding the city. Upon this General Morales, who was governor of both the city and of San Juan de Uluwa, commenced a correspondence with General Scott looking to the surrender of the town, forts and garrison. On the 29th Veracruz and San Juan de Uluwa were occupied by Scott's army. About 5,000 prisoners and 400 pieces of artillery, besides large amounts of small arms and ammunition, fell into the hands of the victorious force. The casualties on our side during the siege amounted to 64 officers and men killed and wounded. End of section 9, recording by Jim Clevenger, Little Rock, Arkansas, Jim at JOCCLEV.COM March 2, Jalapa Battle of Cerro Gordo Perote Puebla Scott and Taylor General Scott had less than 12,000 men at Veracruz. He had been promised by the administration a very much larger force or claim that he had, and he was a man of veracity. 12,000 was a very small army with which to penetrate 260 miles into an enemy's country and to besiege the capital, a city at that time of largely over 100,000 inhabitants. Then, too, any line of march that could be selected led through mountain passes easily defended. In fact, there were at that time but two roads from Veracruz to the city of Mexico that could be taken by an army, one by Jalapa and Perote, the other by Cordova and Orizaba, the two coming together on the Great Plane which extends to the city of Mexico after the range of mountains is passed. It was very important to get the army away from Veracruz as soon as possible in order to avoid the Yellow Fever or Vomito which usually visits that city early in the year and is very fatal to persons not acclimated. But transportation, which was expected from the north, was arriving very slowly. It was absolutely necessary to have enough to supply the army to Jalapa 65 miles in the interior and above the fevers of the coast. At that point the country is fertile and an army of the size of general Scots could subsist there for an indefinite period. Not counting the sick, the weak and the garrisons for the captured city and fort, the moving column was now less than 10,000 strong. This force was composed of three divisions under General Twiggs, Patterson, and Worth. The importance of escaping the Vomito was so great that as soon as transportation enough could be got together to move a division the advance was commenced. On the 8th of April, Twiggs's division started for Jalapa. He was followed very soon by Patterson with his division. General Worth was to bring up to rear with his command as soon as transportation enough was assembled to carry six days' rations for his troops with the necessary ammunition and camp and garrison equipage. It was the 13th of April before this division left Veracruz. The leading division ran against the enemy at Cerro Gordo some 50 miles west on the road to Jalapa and went into camp at Plandelrio about three miles from the fortification. General Patterson reached Plandelrio with his division soon after Twiggs arrived. The two were then secure against an attack from Santa Ana who commanded the Mexican forces. At all events, they confronted the enemy without reinforcements and without molestation until the 18th of April. General Scott had remained at Veracruz to hasten preparations for the field, but on the 12th, learning the situation at the front, he hastened on to take personal supervision. He at once commenced his preparation for the capture of the position held by Santa Ana and of the troops holding it. Cerro Gordo is one of the higher spurs of the mountains some 12 to 15 miles east of Jalapa and Santa Ana had selected this point as the easiest to defend against an invading army. The road, said to have been built by Cortez, zigzags around the mountainside and was defended at every turn by artillery. On either side were deep chasms or mountain walls. A direct attack along the road was an impossibility. A flank movement seemed equally impossible. After the arrival of the commanding general upon the scene, reconnaissance were sent out to find or to make a road by which the rear of the enemy's works might be reached without a front attack. These reconnaissance were made under the supervision of Captain Robert E. Lee, assisted by Lieutenant's P.G.T. Beauregard, Isaac I. Stevens, Z.B. Tower, G.W. Smith, George B. McClellan and J.G. Foster of the Corps of Engineers, all officers who attained rank and fame on one side or the other in the great conflict for the preservation of the unity of the nation. The reconnaissance was completed and the labor of cutting out and making roads by the flank of the enemy was affected by the seventeenth of the month. This was accomplished without the knowledge of Santa Ana or his army and over ground where he supposed it impossible. On the same day General Scott issued his order for the attack on the eighteenth. The attack was made as ordered and perhaps there was not a battle of the Mexican War or of any other where orders issued before an engagement were nearer being a correct report of what afterwards took place. Under the supervision of the engineers roadways had been opened over chasms to the right where the walls were so steep that men could barely climb them. Animals could not. These had been opened under cover of night without attracting the notice of the enemy. The engineers who had directed the opening led the way and the troops followed. Artillery was let down the steep slopes by hand. The men engaged attaching a strong rope to the rear axle and letting the guns down a piece at a time while the men at the ropes kept their ground on top paying out gradually while a few at the front directed the course of the piece. In like manner the guns were drawn by hand up the opposite slope. In this way Scott's troops reached their assigned position in rear of most of the entrenchments of the enemy unobserved. The attack was made. The Mexican reserves behind the works beat a hasty retreat and those occupying them surrendered. On the left General Pillow's command made a formidable demonstration which doubtless held a part of the enemy in his front and contributed to the victory. I am not pretending to give full details of all the battles fought but of the portion that I saw. There were troops engaged on both sides at other points in which both sustained losses but the battle was won as here narrated. The surprise of the enemy was complete. The victory overwhelming. Some three thousand prisoners fell into Scott's hands. Also a large amount of ordinance and ordinance stores. The prisoners were paroled. The artillery parked and the small arms and ammunition destroyed. The battle of Buena Vista was probably very important to the success of General Scott at Cerro Gordo and in his entire campaign from Veracruz to the Great Plains reaching to the city of Mexico. The only army Santa Ana had to protect his capital and the mountain passes west of Veracruz was the one he had with him confronting General Taylor. It is not likely that he would have gone as far north as Monterey to attack the United States troops when he knew his country was threatened with invasion further south. When Taylor moved to Saltillo and then advanced on to Buena Vista Santa Ana crossed the desert confronting the invading army hoping no doubt to crush it and get back in time to meet General Scott in the mountain passes west of Veracruz. His attack on Taylor was disastrous to the Mexican army but notwithstanding this he marched his army to Cerro Gordo a distance not much short of one thousand miles by the line he had to travel in time to entrench himself well before Scott got there. If he had been successful at Buena Vista his troops would no doubt have made a more stubborn resistance at Cerro Gordo. Had the battle of Buena Vista not been fought Santa Ana would have had time to move leisurely to meet the invader further south and with an army not demoralized nor depleted by defeat. After the battle the victorious army moved on to Gelapa where it was in a beautiful productive and healthy country far above the fevers of the coast. Gelapa however is still in the mountains and between there and the great plain the whole line of the road is easy of defense. It was important therefore to get possession of the great highway between the sea coast and the capital up to the point where it leaves the mountains before the enemy could have time to reorganize and fortify in our front. Worst division was selected to go forward to secure this result. The division marched to Perote on the great plain not far from where the road debauches from the mountains. There is a low strong fort on the plain in front of the town known as the Castle of Perote. This however offered no resistance and fell into our hands with its armament. General Scott having now only nine or ten thousand men west of Veracruz and the time of some four thousand of them being about to expire a long delay was the consequence. The troops were in a healthy climate and where they could subsist for an indefinite period even if their line back to Veracruz should be cut off. It being ascertained that the men whose time would expire before the city of Mexico could possibly fall into the hands of the American Army would not remain beyond the term for which they had volunteered, the commanding general determined to discharge them at once for a delay until the expiration of their time would have compelled them to pass through Veracruz during the season of the Vomito. This reduced Scott's force in the field to about five thousand men. Early in May, Worth with his division left Perote and marched on to Puebla. The roads were wide in the country open except through one pass in a spur of mountains coming up from the south through which the road runs. Notwithstanding this, the small column was divided into two bodies moving a day apart. Nothing occurred on the march of special note except that while lying at the town of Amazoke, an easy day's march east of Puebla, a body of the enemy's cavalry two or three thousand strong was seen to our right not more than a mile away. A battery or two with two or three infantry regiments was sent against them and they soon disappeared. On the fifteenth of May we entered the city of Puebla. General Worth was in command at Puebla until the latter end of May when General Scott arrived. Here, as well as on the march up, his restlessness particularly under responsibilities showed itself. During his brief command he had the enemy hovering around near the city in vastly superior numbers to his own. The brigade to which I was attached changed quarters three different times in about a week occupying at first quarters near the plaza in the heart of the city, then at the western entrance, then at the extreme east. On one occasion General Worth had the troops in line under arms all day with three days cooked rations in their haversacks. He galloped from one command to another proclaiming the near proximity of Santa Ana with an army vastly superior to his own. General Scott arrived upon the scene the latter part of the month and nothing more was heard of Santa Ana and his myriads. There were, of course, bodies of mounted Mexicans hovering around to watch our movements and to pick up stragglers or small bodies of troops if they ventured too far out. These always withdrew on the approach of any considerable number of our soldiers. After the arrival of General Scott I was sent as quartermaster with a large train of wagons back two days March at least to procure for each. We had less than a thousand men as escorts and never thought of danger. We procured full loads for our entire train at two plantations which could easily have furnished us much more. There had been a great delay in obtaining the authority of Congress for the raising of the troops asked for by the administration. A bill was before the national legislature from early in the session of 1846-1847 authorizing the creation of ten additional regiments for the war to be attached to the regular army, but it was the middle of February before it became a law. Appointments of commissioned officers had then to be made, men had to be enlisted, the regiments equipped, and the whole transported to Mexico. It was August before General Scott received reinforcement sufficient of warrant and advance. His moving column, not even now more than ten thousand strong, was in four divisions commanded by Generals Twig, Worth, Pillow, and Quitman. There was also a cavalry corps under General Harney composed of detachments of the First, Second, and Third Dragoons. The advance commenced the 7th of August with Twig's division in front. The remaining three divisions followed with an interval of a day between. The marches were short to make concentration easier in case of attack. I had now been in battle with the two leading commanders conducting armies in a foreign land. The contrast between the two was very marked. General Taylor never wore uniform, but dressed himself entirely for comfort. He moved about the field in which he was operating to see through his own eyes the situation. Often he would be without staff officers, and when he was accompanied by them there was no prescribed order in which they followed. He was very much given to sit his horse sideways with both feet on one side particularly on the battlefield. General Scott was the reverse in all these particulars. He always wore all the uniform prescribed or allowed by law when he inspected his lines. Word would be sent to all division and brigade commanders in advance, notifying them of the hour when the commanding general might be expected. This was done so that all the army might be under arms to salute their chief as he passed. On these occasions he wore his dressed uniform, cocked hat, igrelettes, saber, and spurs. His staff proper, besides all officers constructively on his staff, engineers, inspectors, master masters, etc. That could be spared, followed, also in uniform and in prescribed order. Orders were prepared with great care and evidently with the view that they should be a history of what followed. In their modes of expressing thought these two generals contrasted quite as strongly as in their other characteristics. General Scott was precise in language, cultivated a style peculiarly his own, was proud of his rhetoric, not a verse to speaking of himself, often in the third person, and he could bestow praise upon the person he was talking about without the least embarrassment. Taylor was not a conversationalist, but on paper he could put his meaning so plainly that there could be no mistaking it. He knew how to express what he wanted to say in the fewest well-chosen words but would not sacrifice meaning to the construction of high-sounding sentences. But with their opposite characteristics both were great and successful soldiers, both were true, patriotic, and upright in all their dealings. Both were pleasant to serve under. Taylor was pleasant to serve with. Scott saw more through the eyes of his staff officers stand through his own. His plans were deliberately prepared and fully expressed in orders. Taylor saw for himself and gave orders to meet the emergency without reference to how they would read in history. End of section 10. Recording by Jim Clevincher, Little Rock, Arkansas. Jim at joccldv.com.