 Let's get started this evening. I am Leslie Vincimori. I am in the politics department here at SOAS. I co-direct the Center for the International Politics of Conflict, Rights, and Justice, together with Stephen Hopkins, who's here in the front row. Tonight's event is co-hosted by the Center for the International Politics of Conflict, Rights, and Justice. Please remember that. And the Center for International Studies and Diplomacy, it's part of the International Relations Speaker Series. And if you aren't familiar with that series, I would encourage you to look us up, because we really do host a wonderful array of scholars from all over the world. And we try to bring in people who are leaders in their academic field and who have made a very significant and consequential contribution to very important real-world questions, sometimes by having worked in the real world, sometimes by the questions that they ask, by the ways that they engage. And tonight's speaker is obviously a wonderful example of that. Before I introduce our speaker and our discussant to you, I just want to say a word of thanks to Richard Appleby, who where are you, Richard? Richard's disappeared, but Richard is our center manager for CISD. To our interns, Diana, Maya, and Adrian for CCRJ, they are phenomenal. They are postgraduate students. They are lending us their time and their goodwill. And it's really extraordinary to have students who are willing to go the extra mile just because they want to be engaged and be part of it. And that's what they've done. Please make yourself welcome. You can come in here. These are our model UN students from across London. Tony turns them out. But yeah, so thank you to our CCRJ volunteers. Thank you. We have some CISD volunteers here this evening. And thank you to Richard Appleby and everybody else who's helped to put together tonight all really on their own time. And thank you to all of you because Friday night is not really the sort of the go-to night for turning up to a lecture when there are many other things that you can do in London. So Tony, it's a tribute to you that everybody is here this evening. Please feel free to make yourself at home and come along down the row. So let me introduce our speaker to you. Tonight's event, we've titled Human Dignity and Terrorism. Professor Anthony Arendt is a wonderful former colleague of mine. He's on the faculty at Georgetown University, where I used to teach. He is professor of government and foreign service at Georgetown. He has served as director of the Master's of Science in Foreign Service program for many years now. He is also senior associate dean for graduate and faculty affairs. He wears many hats. He is as Georgetown as they come, I think, to the core, including your undergraduate degree. He then went on to get his PhD at the University of Virginia. Tony lives about a five minute walk away from Georgetown. And really, I think when anything is needed, whether it's intellectual, administrative, interpersonal, or really anything, Tony is sort of there for everybody. He has published many books, co-authored, co-edited, and authored many books and has written extensively articles and in the media for well-known newspapers that we all read regularly. One of his most significant books was Legal Rules and International Society, published in 1999. He's here tonight, really, to talk about this book and some of his more discreet content. He's co-edited this book and written many parts of it. Human Dignity and the Future of Global Institutions. He edited this with Mark Lagann, who is president of Freedom House. But Tony's here to talk to us this evening about his chapter and his contribution within it, which is more specifically on terrorism. I would urge those of you who are interested in the broader book to be sure to go to SOAS Open Air Radio, SOAS Radio program in probably another week or so because we had, I interviewed him earlier about the entire project and we were able to cover a lot and it's really, it's really a fascinating contribution and it's very rich and so there's a lot in here, probably even beyond what we're able to think about this evening. Tony's major research interests extend far beyond human rights and dignity to international law, international organization, the constitutional law of United States foreign relations. He is especially interested in international law relating to the use of force and an international legal philosophy. He is a phenomenal teacher. He's a dear friend of mine. It's wonderful to have him here. So thank you very much for coming. Before you take the stage, let me introduce our discussant who has, again, wonderfully volunteered her time on a Friday night. Dr. Aicha Chubuchu is an assistant professor in human rights in the Department of Sociology and at the Center for the Study of Human Rights at the London School of Economics. She received her PhD in anthropology from Columbia University but her work is very much interdisciplinary. She is taught at Columbia University. She taught at Harvard University before she moved across to London. She is originally from Turkey but studied her first degree. Was at Cornell University. So she's really a wonderful example of internationalism in many different ways. Her own research is engaged in questions of internationalism, cosmopolitanism, and the politics of solidarity. This is a research group that she leads. She's interested in social and political theory in the history and critique of international law and human rights in post-colonial theory. So thank you so much for coming. It's wonderful to have you here. Tony's gonna start us out for 20, 25, but whatever he'd like to take. And then we're gonna turn it over to you for a short time and then we'll open it up to all of you. So thank you for coming and thank you for coming, Tony. All right, I wanna thank my dear friend, Leslie, for bringing me here. It's a pleasure to be here. And I'm gonna begin with an apology. I have to walk around and at the same time, I have to hold a microphone and I'm Italian. So that means I need to talk with one hand but I may switch hands every now and then. So my apologies for doing that. I do have a loud voice and so hopefully I'm not screaming into the microphone too much, but I wanna thank Leslie, I wanna thank Steven. Richard, where did Richard go? Did we determine where he went? That's not my fault. All right, where is Richard? I was gonna thank Richard somewhere. Richard is wherever he was. And I also want to acknowledge my former student, Ashley Lenahan, who's down here in the front row. And it's an honor to see her there as well. I understand there's some model UN people here. So raise your hands. And you're from Westminster, is that right? All right, so you guys know everything else. You can probably answer questions that I'm gonna ask to you but I promise not to do it. I'm scaring them already, okay. Let me begin by saying that this project started several years ago as my colleague Mark Lagan and I were looking at the idea of human dignity. Now, what we wanted to do was develop a concept which had already been something we would see reflected in the thinking of international relations both in terms of what public officials would say. Oh, Clowdy, I see you up there too. Great to see you as well. What public officials would say but also what academics would say as an area where we could build international consensus. And the immediate concept that we developed was this notion of human dignity because if we surveyed world leaders, if we surveyed religious figures, everyone from the Aga Khan to the Pope, to Islamic leaders, to Jewish leaders, to Hindu leaders, we found that there was an idea of human dignity that seemed to resonate. And our hope was that as we looked into the international system and saw that the modern state system was really undergoing tumultuous changes, that we saw a variety of actors in the international system that there needed to be a touchstone, a motivating factor that could somehow unite all these disparate parts of the international system. Now I don't want to overstate this case or even claim that we've been able to do that but our goal was to start a dialogue, to develop a working definition of human dignity and then to explore how different institutions do, can and should apply this concept of human dignity. Now when I know different institutions, I mean everything from states, to intergovernmental organizations, to non-governmental organizations, to non-state actors of various kinds, private sector actors, faith-based actors, and so on. And so the book began through a series of conferences held at Georgetown and at the Council on Foreign Relations where we developed the idea and then brought in a number of writers and commentators with the goal of asking how human dignity related to one of these different areas. And I can talk more about that particular project later on in our conversation. One of the substantive chapters that I wrote focused on a very particular issue and that is human dignity and terrorism. And the question I was asking is what does a human dignity lens tell us about this concept of terrorism? Now in order for me to get into the details of that, I really need to begin with what our working definition of human dignity is. We define human dignity as the fundamental agency of human beings to apply their gifts to thrive. So it's about agency. It's about agency of the individual to use his or her gifts to thrive. As such, it requires social recognition of each person's inherent value and claim to equal access to opportunity. To be meaningful, human dignity must be institutionalized in practice and governance. Now, huge caveat, this is a working definition. This is what we called from a survey of the literature from various views of various individuals in the international system. We don't offer it as the final definition, but rather as an invitation to what we call a dignitarian dialogue, an invitation to engage in a conversation about building a consensus. So three things there, it's fundamental agency of the individual. It requires social recognition. Your dignity is not realized unless social institutions acknowledge it, recognize it. And as a consequence, it must be institutionalized in practice and governance. You say, oh great, you have human dignity, but it's not meaningfully institutionalized than it is meaningless. So we're beginning with that concept of human dignity and then asking ourselves the question, if we buy for a moment that that can serve as a working definition of human dignity, what does it tell us about the phenomenon that is known as terrorism? Now, in order to explore that, I'm gonna look at three areas. First of all, so that we're all on the same page, what is terrorism? Then I'm gonna offer some propositions about terrorism and human dignity. In other words, what does this human dignity lens tell us about terrorism? And then finally, to start the dialogue, some brief recommendations for institutions. What can institutions do in the wake of this concept? All right, so first of all, we wanna start off with the definition of terrorism. And let me note that the international legal system doesn't actually have a defined definition of terrorism. There is a definition of genocide, for example, we could point to in the genocide convention. There are definitions of all sorts of other legal concepts, but terrorism has defied definition. Well, I'm gonna give it, again, a working definition for purposes of understanding what human dignity says. Historically, terrorism is not a new phenomenon. We can go back millennia and find various groups that have engaged in terrorist activities, whether it be zealots, or the assassins, or the KKK in the United States, or the IRA, or Black September, or the Badr-Meinhof group. When I was a student in Germany in 1978 and 79, one of the first things that greeted me when I got off the plane were signs like this that would say, So, look out, there are guns out there. And various other signs that would say, Well, more recently, we of course have seen groups, Eta, Al-Qaeda, Al-Shabaab, ISIS, and we can continue to put various other groups up there. What is terrorism? The definition I'm using is one which I think makes sense in light of what international law has to say about the lawful use of force, but it's still a specific definition to me and is not reflected in any specific international legal document. So, terrorism is the threat or use of force, that's probably not particularly debatable, undertaken for political purposes by a non-state actor that intentionally targets civilians and other non-combatants in violation of existing law relating to the conduct of hostilities. Now, I know that's a mouthful. First of all, threat or use of force. Again, that's probably not particularly problematic. Undertaken for political purposes, in terrorism there is a political element. It is differentiable from criminal activity which is undertaken for private gain or other such purposes. There is a political nature to terrorism. It is done by a non-state actor. By definition, terrorism is done by a non-state actor. Now, it doesn't mean that states can't do horrific things and can't violate international law in all kinds of different ways. And it also doesn't mean that states cannot sponsor terrorists. When we talk about terrorism per se, we're talking about actions of non-state actors. It intentionally targets civilians and other non-combatants in violation of existing law relating to the conduct of hostility. So it violates existing international law relating to the conduct of hostilities. So, to put a face on this, the attacks of September 11th, undertaken by Al Qaeda, an act of terrorism. The Bali bombings, an act of terrorism. The London subway bombing, an act of terrorism. The Madrid train bombings, act of terrorism. The more recent attacks in Paris and in Brussels, acts of terrorism. Something that is not an act of terrorism by this definition was the bombing of the USS Cole. Why? Why would that not be an act of terrorism? Correct, correct. This was a military target that was being hit. This was not a civilian or other non-combatant. Now, that doesn't mean that it was fine and dandy under international law, but it does mean it doesn't meet the specific definition of terrorism. So that's the term that we're using. Again, people can quibble about the particulars of that definition, but I think it generally reflects what current customary international law and treaty law would say, even though there may not be a precise definition of terrorism that you could find on the books. Okay. What does a human dignity lens suggest for terrorism? In other words, if we have the lens we talked about before, come on in, come on in, come on in. If we have the lens that we spoke about before, human dignity understanding, the fundamental agency of an individual to use his or her gifts to thrive, that it has to be socially recognized, and that it has to be institutionalized to be meaningful. Taking this lens, what does it tell us about this phenomenon out there that is terrorism? Okay, here I'm gonna submit several specific propositions. Okay, first, now I hope this goes without saying, but it might not. Terrorists acts violate human dignity. Given the understanding of human dignity that I have proposed, given the definition of terrorism that I have suggested, terrorist acts violate human dignity. This proposition rejects what appears on that slide, that one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter. Human dignity says it doesn't matter what your goal is. It doesn't matter what your underlying purpose is. It doesn't matter how noble your cause is. The terrorist act by definition violates human dignity because you are targeting civilians or other non-combatants in violation of existing law. So it completely sets aside motivation. This, by the way, was one of the big impediments in reaching a legal definition. Getting into the idea of how do we look at motivation. Human dignity says it doesn't matter what your motivation is. Doesn't matter how just your cause is. If you do this, you are violating human dignity. So that's proposition number one. Proposition number two, and I apologize, we got text and legal provisions up here. Terrorists acts violate international law. To me, this seems pretty straightforward. Now there are two elements of international law dealing with the use of force. The law relating to the recourse to force, the so-called use-odd-bellum, these are the legal rules that relate to when one actor can permissively initiate force against another actor. And the law concerning the conduct of hostilities, the use in bellow, the laws of war, sometimes referred to as the law of armed conflict or international humanitarian law. Terrorists acts violate both types of the law. So what I have up there is article two, paragraph four of the UN Charter. All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations. Now, that provision only applies to states, technically all members. Matter of fact, it only applies to all members of the UN, technically speaking. It has been interpreted, especially in recent years, as also applying to the acts of non-state actors. So if we look at the response of the United Nations Security Council, really beginning with the actions after September 11th and moving forward, there has been a general condemnation of the threat or use of force that is against the territorial integrity or political independence of a state launched by non-state actors. Second, terrorist acts violate, and this is again by definition, the law concerning the conduct of hostilities. These legal rules which reflect customary international law, typically embodied in a number of treaties, including the Hague conventions of 1907 and the Geneva conventions of 1948. So clearly, clearly violating international humanitarian law we're targeting innocent civilians. Again, that's not a particularly controversial proposition. The third proposition is human dignity, I think, requires that we draw distinctions between terrorist acts, terrorist groups, and terrorists. Now, what do I mean here? Well, a terrorist act would be an example of some of those things we've talked about before, when someone for political purposes intentionally targets a civilian or other non-combatant in violation of international law. Okay, that would be a terrorist act. Terrorist groups, if we're gonna label something a terrorist group, here's where human dignity says be careful. If we're a group of people, we're the SOAs group, all right? And so we're a group of people. And Ashley down here decides on her own to commit a terrorist act. Okay, can we label the whole group a terrorist group? Should we label the whole group a terrorist group? Human dignity would say no. You have to look at who's doing what, and if you're gonna label a group as a terrorist group, you have to look at the purpose, the goals of the group, their entire MO. So something like al-Qaeda or ISIS, it's easy. But there are a lot of groups out there where maybe a couple people commit terrorist acts, but the whole group doesn't necessarily advocate that. Human dignity says draw the distinction. Don't paint the entire group with a broad brush, just because some of the actions of some of its members. Similarly, terrorists. A terrorist is someone who commits a terrorist act, of course. One of the challenges that legal structures have in looking at terrorism and terrorist groups is that there are a variety of ways in which individuals can be connected to the group. So if we are al-Qaeda, Ashley here could be the mastermind. She could be determining the plots. She could be determining the direction and so on. You could be the al-Baghdadi of this group or whatever. Well, other people might be agreeing with that. Still others might sorta know that it's going on. And somebody like Clowdy in the back might just happen to be hanging around or providing shelter for someone. And maybe not really committed to the actions undertaken by the group. Human dignity says you gotta draw these distinctions. You can't paint individuals, as I noted earlier, with a broad brush. So you have to differentiate between leaders, between foot soldiers, between people who are tolerating the group on their territory because maybe their children will be killed if they don't. And far too often some of the legal reactions to terrorists have been to put everybody in the same category. Everybody goes to Guantanamo, irrespective of your connection with the actual terrorist acts. Human dignity says do not draw those broad labels. Differentiate based on the individual. Fourth proposition. Forcible response is in fact permissible to terrorists. It is permissible to use military force to counter an act of terrorism. But as with any aspect of the use of force under international law, the response must be proportionate to ending the threat. And you must discriminate between military and non-military targets. Now I'm gonna attempt not to get political in what I'm about to say, but there are certain people that have run for certain offices in certain countries who have used terms like we're gonna carpet bomb them. No, that's not lawful. That's not a proper response. We're gonna, I'm not making this stuff, I couldn't make this stuff up. We're gonna take out their children and their spouses. No, that's not permissible. Human dignity says you cannot do that. If I'm a terrorist, died in the world terrorist, you can't kill my kids. You can't kill my wife. You can't kill my uncle and my aunt. You can target me. You can use proportionate force to target me, but you have to draw this distinction. Far too often in the rhetoric that we hear today, things are painted with very broad brush. But human dignity says you can't do that. You have to think of the individual. Now, the flip side. Terror suspects must be treated humanely. In other words, if Ashley is alleged to have committed a terrorist act, she does not forfeit her human dignity. She does not lose her right to be treated as a human being. So things like indefinite detention becomes problematic. We think you're a terrorist, we can't prove it. We're afraid that you're gonna do something else, so we're just gonna send you off somewhere and hold you until the war on terror is over. That's problematic from a human dignity perspective. Similarly, torture, cruel and inhumane treatment must be rejected. If we're looking at things through a human dignity lens, we have to reject those things. So, waterboarding. There was a big debate in the United States. It was an embarrassing debate where the Justice Department issued several memoranda under the name of J. Bybee, who's now a circuit court judge in the United States, that essentially said waterboarding is not torture. That various other enhanced interrogation methods are not torture like, oh, I don't know, stress positions or something like that. I think it's bad law if you read the memos, but even if it isn't bad law, in other words, even if those are reasonable interpretations, a human dignity lens would say it's still wrong. It is wrong to strip from anyone his or her dignity. Another proposition. Terrorism doesn't come about on its own just because. There are reasons that individuals become terrorists. Now, it's a wide-ranging set of reasons. The reasons that an Osama bin Laden, or an al-Baghdadi, or an Abu Zabeda, or Khalid Sheikh Muhammad becomes a terrorist may be different from the reasons why some very, very impoverished person becomes a foot soldier for al-Qaeda or ISIS. So, the reasons will vary depending on the individual. There are some individuals, undoubtedly, that are motivated by deep-held ideology. But there are a lot of other people that are engaged because they're unemployed, they're illiterate, and there's an allure of something, of heroism. The international system needs to spend time looking at the root causes of terrorism. Now, this is not to justify terrorism, but human dignity says we have to ask why individuals are becoming terrorists. So, maybe they're factors like illiteracy, poverty, unemployment, bad governance. You can see where you're in a situation in northern Iraq or eastern northern Syria, and there is no government. So, ISIS comes in, they establish order. They establish some kind of system of governance. Maybe they even start providing goods and services. So, you end up supporting them, not necessarily because you think they're the ideologically pure group, but because they're the only group, because they're providing some form of society for you, bad governance. Another thing that we have seen, and there's been a lot written on the recent attacks in Belgium and elsewhere, are people who were criminals, people who grew up in a very impoverished situation, took to criminal activity, and later in their life were radicalized. So, they weren't radicals. They weren't radicalized people who then became terrorists. There were people who were engaging in criminal activity who then saw this radicalization as an attractive way to lead their lives. We need to explore all these and other root causes. Human dignity says we need to say why people are doing these things and address those questions. Okay, and I'll stop in a minute. What are some recommendations for global institutions? Viewing terrorism from this human dignity lens, these are just a few recommendations that we could spin out. One is, I feel like we need a new Geneva Convention. Now, I've been saying this since September 12th, 2001, and everybody's been telling me I'm crazy since September 12th, 2001. And the likelihood that there's going to be a Geneva Convention is probably not great anytime real soon, but why do I say this? The Geneva Conventions adopted in the wake of World War II following on the earlier Geneva Conventions of the 20s were primarily established to deal with state-to-state conflict. I know Common Article III of the Geneva Conventions does address conflict that is not of an international character, but the problem is because these documents are still primarily focused on states there are lacunae in the law. There are gaps in the law. Now, while I think the United States handled things very poorly when they said that Al Qaeda and the Taliban were not entitled to any guarantees under the Geneva Convention, and later on the US Supreme Court said, no, actually they are entitled to some guarantees under the Geneva Convention, the only way the United States could reach that argument was because the law was unclear. The law was not established to address these kinds of non-state actors. So, if I were king of the world, maybe I should have something more ambitious than convening another Geneva Conference, but that's what I would do. We would come together and the International Committee on the Red Cross would attempt to deal with some of these lacunae. That's a wish list. I don't think there's the political will in the international system to do it, but I think human dignity would say we should do it because it would clarify some legal problems. Second proposal. And here I'm drawing on a concept that my friend and colleague Mark Lagann had developed and that is trying to formulate a global fund for governance. Now, we have seen global funds done in a number of other areas. These are essentially public-private partnerships. So, the global fund, for example, for AIDS, malaria, and tuberculosis was extraordinarily successful in raising funds to address some of those issues. Now, let's add some ups and downs over the years, but this is the idea. What if there were a global fund for governance? Again, understanding the idea that maybe one of the root causes of terrorism is bad governance. Now, a global fund for governance could support things like legal education, developing judicial and other institutions, developing alternative mechanisms for conflict resolution, but also something as simple as allowing people to get to courts. Now, I say that, we could go into a situation where a state has courts, but nobody can get there. Why? Because they can't afford to travel to where the courts are because they can't afford to take time off work to participate in the courts. So things like this, training police and the like. Again, this isn't gonna solve all our problems, but it is at least something I think worth considering because you're trying to address a root cause. Final recommendation here, and again, this is not an exhaustive list, further dialogue on human dignity. In the book, we make it clear that human dignity, as we have defined it, is a working definition. As I noted at the outset, we developed this notion because we saw that there seemed to be a consensus around the idea of human dignity, and so we offer the working definition. This is not a final definition. What we really wanna invite is an international dialogue where individuals, states, non-state actors, NGOs of various kinds will look at this concept and see if it makes sense to see what it means and see how they can implement it in their own realm. One final point. Our whole goal here is not to eliminate the great edifice that is international human rights law. In presenting this topic, I had a friend of mine who was in the legal advisor's office at the US Department of State saying, how could you advocate human rights or human dignity? Aren't you doing away with human rights? And our answer was no. We like the fact that there are international legal agreements on human rights, but not everybody does. Our sense is that human dignity is more primordial, that human dignity is prior to any specific international legal instrument, and at the same time, human dignity is teleological. The end of human rights instruments is to promote human dignity. Human rights instruments do not exist for themselves. They exist to promote the greater concept of human dignity. And so we invite a dialogue on that to figure out what this means and how it can have a powerful impact in the tumultuous world. So I'm gonna turn it over to our distinguished discussant. I think very much for this very energetic talk. I feel like I got tired of listening to you. The first question I want to raise is actually about the genre of your scholarship. What kind of scholarship is this? Is it, do you see yourself in a working and writing in a prescriptive mode? Clearly your policy recommendations would suggest so. Or are you claiming to be describing something that already exists in the world? At one point you said, what human dignity does, can and should do. And those three things are, I believe, separate from each other. Although the force of your argument often comes across as effective precisely because you conflate what consensus there already exists about human dignity, what consensus there could exist about human dignity and should exist about human dignity. Often I was, I coach you, well, I didn't take much to catch you doing that, but it was interesting the form of speech you adopted saying human dignity says, human dignity says. And so I wondered, who is this human dignity that speaks through you? And why only or primarily through you? I asked that because, I asked that because so much of your argument depends on working from a definition of human dignity and outlining what you call a human dignity lens would and would not allow. Let's take what you asserted to be obvious, for example, that terrorism violates human dignity. And who says so? Human dignity. So why would terrorism, for example, violate human dignity? Let me play the devil's advocate here. Since I am your discussant, it's up to me to be the devil, I suppose. And some other, for example, human dignity by definition precludes us from understanding terrorism as something that states might engage in. So by definition, through the human dignity lens, terrorism is acts committed by non-state actors. So I mean, I could go on and on about the particular things that the human dignity says, but I want to underline just that part, the ease with which you speak about what the human dignity lens shows and does not show. To pick one more example, for example, at points it seemed to me that almost the point becomes A, by definition, terrorism violates human dignity, and B, all forceful actions to fight terrorism by states are therefore justified. Actually, that's, I don't know what to say. There's no amount of force that could not be justified by that, except that you say it needs to be proportionate, and then you keep to the definitional proportionality offered by current international humanitarian law, which says proportional to the achievement of military annihilation of the threat. So even the nuclear bomb where the law speaks clearly or unclearly, it depends on who you ask, could be justified then to legitimately fight against terrorist activity or terrorism if the nuclear bomb is what it took to eliminate the threat. So I don't doubt your good intentions at all. I mean, my question would not be at the level of, oh, are you trying to propose a new framework to replace human rights? But to me, it seems like a lot of your propositions actually replicate what there is perplexing about the paradigm of human rights and human rights law in the first place. And I know you want to be augmenting those problems, but I wondered what makes you so confident that you're not replicating them at a new level, including the very problem of consensus on the content of human dignity and what human dignity would say. I think I can leave it at that. Thank you very much. That was good. Okay, Tony, would you like a few minutes? Just thank you very much. So a couple quick responses. First of all, you are absolutely correct that I was going from descriptive to prescription. That was my intent. Here's my understanding. In trying to come up with a concept of human dignity, we start with this point. There seems to be an element of consensus around this term. It's not absolute. There are gonna be different interpretations of it. One thing that we think is more powerful about human dignity as a term is that it hasn't been marred in some of the rhetorical concerns that the human rights literature has been whether it's perceptions that the human rights literature is or the human rights rhetoric is to Western or is not focused on the differences among individuals that we see in the international system. So that's where we're beginning. We're trying to say, okay, there does seem to be, if we survey the literature on human dignity, there does seem to be this modicum of consensus. Now I do not wanna overstate the case. I don't wanna overstate the case. What we're looking at is we're saying, okay, this is an idea. Now, what do we wanna do? Let's take the idea of human dignity and let's bring in a bunch, and this is what the book does, bring in a bunch of people with this sort of basic framework and have them look at different actors. And we look at everybody from the secretary general to faith-based institutions, to the private sector. I look at the concept of terrorism and get their views on how this concept of human dignity would apply in those areas. So I do that with terrorism and as I take the concept, this is my interpretation. I don't wanna say it as anything else. This is my view as to what a human dignity lens would suggest in those areas. At the same time, the purpose of this project is not to have a completed book. The purpose of the project is to truly engage in a dialogue and get others saying exactly what you're saying, say, wait a minute, how does this take us any further than human rights? That's what we want. We want to engage in a dialogue because ultimately we think this concept could produce positive effects in the international system. If it doesn't, then we should throw it aside. Our view is we start with the idea there seems to be consensus a little bit, a little bit around something. Then we have people say, well, what would that mean in these different areas? Let's look at that. And I looked at the area of terrorism and now what can we do to engage the international community in further conversations about this? And we really mean dialogue. And the reason I say that is sometimes people think of dialogue as I tell you what I think and you nod, yes. It may very well be that people say, no, we don't like the definition. Here's our pushback. We admit of that. We think that's a good thing. Couple other points just to respond. The definition being non-state actors. Everything can't be terrorism, meaning we can't put everything under that category and I'm restricting it based on sort of the traditional interpretations of terrorism being something done by non-state actors. This does not mean that states can't do horrific things. It's just generally, from my understanding of the way discourses evolve, we typically don't call state actions terrorists. Somebody could come up with a different definition but that's why we're making that particular argument. One other thing on the, didn't necessarily have enough time to get into the details of this but I would say that I would not argue that one has unlimited amount of force that one can use in response any more than one would ever have that under international law with respect to action used by states. So, and I think there are a lot of restrictions that are imposed, whether it's by the Hague Convention or the Geneva Convention. So I would be, I would never see the fact that there's a terrorist act out there justifying all manner of activity and as I look at things such as the United States drone program, I really call into question the proportionality of that action and similarly, I think there are other prescriptions, again, didn't have a chance to get into this, other prescriptions on like nuclear weapons which I think are inherently indiscriminate and would violate international law or chemical and biological weapons. So again, didn't have a lot of time to get into that but I would think there are clear limits on how far you could go. Any questions but I'm gonna open it up and I'll come back to mine in due course. When you ask your question, please be sure to say who you are and what your affiliation is just because that gives us better perspective on who you are. Steve Hopgood if you'd like to start. Oh, sure. Yeah, I have a specific point on your chapter who are you? Who are you? Steve Hopgood. And where are you affiliated? I co-direct the center with you. Gotta get that in there. A specific point on your chapter, I just have a problem with the non-state actor, particularly because you say at some point that motivations are unimportant, it's not, it's the act itself effectively. If motivations don't matter, reasons don't matter and to some degree what separates the state from a non-state actor is the reasons they give for how they act. Now, going on the basis of an historical definition of terrorism which has been drawn up by states themselves in international law or something they've agreed, as soon as you get into a more prescriptive vein surely you've got to open up the question of the reasons states give for why they act in this way and therefore if attacking terrorists in some indiscriminate way is the definition or part of the definition of terrorism, states have got to be capable of committing terrorist acts themselves. So, that's my specific point. And then I also want to push back on this dignity question. I mean, all my work is on human rights. There's a shift within human rights away from natural rights to stress things like an overlapping consensus or conventions precisely because once you start to get into core questions about what grounds or funds those rights you end up with any number of different positions on personhood, on justifications for rights, isn't bringing, I just don't see the value added of bringing human dignity in because you're just opening up all those, you know, the Catholic Church has a long historical line on what human dignity is and it doesn't look a lot like women's rights. Okay, it's defined by, it's a very patriarchal definition of dignity, it's defined by others for individuals themselves. So aren't you just going back to what is effectively the natural rights discussion about what people are really like and actually risking, I just can't see how you're not risking undermining the human rights law that actually exists and trying to implement that by opening up a conversation about fundamental ideas of good or human purpose rather than saying, okay, let's just get agreement on this and try to make this stuff work. Okay, so this is exactly the pushback that we heard from the legal advisors of the State Department and a couple of things, yeah, there's that risk. In other words, I admit that when we introduced this new concept here, people might think we're attempting to draw back or denigrate from existing international legal instruments on human rights. Our goal, again, I understand risk, our goal is absolutely the opposite. We believe that international human rights instruments form the basis, human dignity can take us further, it can provide a justification for these various international legal instruments. And at least in some of the conversations I've had with individuals, they have said it's a more powerful philosophical concept than saying, well, we can get agreement on these things. That's our goal, but I do absolutely, absolutely understand the risk and this is one reason we have to keep, you know, we keep saying this time and time again. We are indeed taking a risk. I do understand that. Now your other point was with respect to states so my feeling is that the term terrorism has been a term that has developed to respond to or address actions by non-state actors and that that's sort of the conventional understanding. Now it doesn't mean that states can't commit acts which otherwise violate international law. States can violate international humanitarian law and we already have in my view sort of a set of norms on that. So part of it is taking this category of non-state actor and saying, okay, when they do it, how can we characterize this and how can we understand their kind of behavior? Now there was another element of your question to, I see your point. Okay, well then what we should ask for is the actor if we're talking about a state, a state can commit an act of aggression but we don't refer to a state as an aggressor. A state can commit an act of aggression. A non-state actor can commit an act of terrorism. Okay, so when I ask students sometimes what is al-Qaeda? I don't actually want the answer a terrorist group. I want the answer a trans-state political group. Right now I would argue al-Qaeda for instance is committing acts of terrorism so I do think it's important to draw that distinction to say you can have various kinds of actors and just as a state can violate international law a non-state actor can also violate international law. That may need some more clarification on my part but I agree with that basic proposition. Does anybody have a comment exactly on this point? Cause I do have a list that's developing but if you have, no, no, that doesn't work. Exactly on this point. Did you know? Meza, meza. Okay, Katrina you were next on. And if you say who you are, where you're affiliated and also what you teach so that everybody in the audience has a sense of your relevance and background that would be great. Hi there, I'm Katrina, I'm Katrina Drew. I teach international law at SOAS. So I decided to push you on this state to non-state point and I'm really interested in the way they use the categories of legal enforcement. So it seems to me on the one hand you want to break down traditional distinctions between states and non-states for the purpose of augmenting the obligations of non-state actors. So you want non-state actors to be able to breach Article 24 of the UN Charter which would be traditionally only states and you want state and non-state actors to be involved in armed attacks so that they can be the subject of self-defense. So on the one hand you want to break it down and that kind of goes against in a way the non-state actor. But when it comes to terrorism and states you want to maintain the distinctions. I'm really interesting where human dignity speaks to maintaining the distinction between states and non-state actors for the purposes only of augmenting one of those actors sets of international legal obligations. Well that's a good point. I mean I wouldn't necessarily object to eliminating the concept of terrorism completely if we could have another category where a non-state actor could do this and could do that and those actions would be considered unlawful. I'm using terrorism as a heuristic to understand behavior in the international system and I think defining something that exists. But if we could come up with a formulation along those lines that would be fine because I think we would then be able to say whatever actor an actor does this it violates these rules it can be held accountable for doing these things. The challenge is we haven't yet been able to do that. Now perhaps if we were able to have a revised again I don't really think this is gonna happen anytime soon a revised Geneva Convention you might be able to categorize people so I would welcome that kind of concept if we could actually move in that direction. My name is Ke'an Nishon George. I'm a lecturer here at SOAS. Thank you for seeing for the talk. Next time I come to see you talk I'm gonna bring earplugs I think. Thank you nonetheless. Then you wouldn't hear anything. I think I'll still hear you to be honest. My question or my point I guess plays on comments already made which is that there are a set of I think hierarchies that are snuck into some of your definitions and in particular your conception of human dignity that is really played out in the way in which you make a distinction between the illegitimate nature of force used by terrorists and the legitimate force used by states and I think basically I think what's evident here is that there is a clear hierarchical distinction between what is considered legitimate and illegitimate in a way that favors the state and I think this is subsequently reflected in your conception of human dignity. I think Fanon is quite instructive when you talk about things like social recognition because Fanon of course observed that recognition may be offered by the oppressor by the settler over the native but that recognition is not substantive and that formal recognition in fact masks considerably more or that formal equality masks considerably more violent hierarchy and I think that's evident in particular in this again distinction between the legitimate use of force in the case of the state and the illegitimate use of force in the case of the terrorist. So basically the point I'm making is that there is a presupposed hierarchy that is not justified here and I'd be interested to be to justify that hierarchy and in particular I wanna sort of like bring this out by saying, sorry, by saying you called for a dialogue in terms of defining what human dignity is. I was wondering if you're inviting terrorists as you define them into this dialogue or can they be allowed to participate in this definition of human dignity and if so then doesn't their intentions matter don't their intentions and their motives matter? Well inviting somebody into a dialogue doesn't necessarily mean we support what they've done or their intentions it just means we recognize their human dignity and their right to engage. Okay, first of all, you mentioned that this hierarchy seems to sort of legitimate a hierarchy of state and non-state actors, okay. And that that is problematic. Yes, it is tremendously problematic. It is tremendously problematic. In the Westphalian system, states are given the privilege of using force and non-state actors aren't. Now, let me play this out. It still means that states can use force in impermissible ways. So there's not an absolute right as to how states can use force. However, if we look at the international system today, one has to question where book actually does, we problematize the state system. And we say if we look at the international system today, we actually see a whole rise of non-state actors that are playing the role of providing goods and services as much as states do in the traditional, perhaps mythical nonetheless, Westphalian system. The term we use in the book is one that Hedley-Bould described in 1977 in the Anarchical Society as a neo-medieval system. Okay, I'm gonna show you a slide. One of the reasons for putting up this slide with al-Qaeda attacking the coal is this is an action by a non-state actor that doesn't rise the level of terrorism because it's not against civilians, it's against military targets. The international system acknowledges a right to revolution. It acknowledges a right of non-state actors to use force against the state. However, currently international law says, yeah, but there are ways you need to do it. There are ways in which you have to abide by certain rules. The international system has not yet come to the point where you are. In other words, saying, look, we got a variety of non-state actors, we have to understand that they play, in many respects, similar roles and yet there's a discrimination. But maybe we need to go there. Maybe in a true neo-medieval system, we have to recognize that states are not the only domain for creating international law and for having agency. So I like that. I like what you're suggesting. We're not there yet, but I'm supportive of moving in that direction. Alexander. Alexander, be a politics arse. Professor Ren, following on a very similar line of inquiry, your application of the human dignity lens on the definition of terrorism is very strictly and rigidly deontological. So if we logically follow that, your prescriptions would either suggest that terrorists, irrespective of differentiating group or individual, would either suggest they either A, irreconcilable altogether, or B, we need to differentiate with reconcilables and irreconcilables. So I guess I really want to tease out two things. First, if you could elucidate a little bit further on this particular issue of whether we should negotiate with terrorists or should we talk to terrorists, engage them in dialogue and so on and so forth. And second also about the difficult negotiation between a deontological description of terrorism and a tealogical, sorry, calling, so to speak, of your human dignity lens. Okay, and I'm not sure I fully understand the question, but let me begin by saying, I'm not prescribing how anyone should interact with people who are terrorists in what we've talked about today. I don't think human dignity would say you shouldn't negotiate with terrorists or you should negotiate with terrorists. I think what it would say is, and again, I'm going back to what it would say, what my interpretation of human dignity is, you need to understand that these people are people, that they have the right to their own human dignity. Now, politically, it may be appropriate to negotiate or it may not be appropriate. There's so many different factors that fall into that. I don't think a lens of human dignity would push you in one direction or another on that. Now, if you want to sort of clarify the other part of your question so that I might be able to approach an answer. Your definition of terrorist locks in certain criteria which is necessarily deontological, so it assumes that the end doesn't matter. Yet, of course, the prescription about human dignity, it seems to call us to respect human dignity, promote it so that if we were to adopt, say, for example, a theological definition of terrorism, it would be that they violate human dignity, therefore we should promote it. Okay, so my sense here would be the problem with the definition I've given, and that's not, again, if we wanna be, we could say uses of force by non-state actors and there'd be a whole set of categories that we could put in there much as we would do uses of force by states. Okay, so we could certainly draw that distinction and there'd be nothing wrong with drawing that distinction. So just as states can do all these things and at some level it might become an aggressor, at some level it might violate international humanitarian law, so we could take non-state actors and come up with a whole host of activities. If I were giving a lecture on state aggression, I would be talking about states that were committing an act of aggression and by definition I would be saying that's something they were doing violated existing law. So if we're talking about non-state actors that are engaging in these kinds of activities, my conclusion is that if they're targeting innocent civilians or other non-combatants, they are per se denying the human dignity of those individuals, that's where I'm going with that. So the reasons they're doing that may be useful in political negotiations in addressing the underlying causes, but just as a state that may commit an act of aggression, it's still an act of aggression irrespective of its motives, so a group that would commit an act of terrorism would still be a terrorist act irrespective of its motives. I agree with that. Yes, just on the question of ontology, another way of asking it and this is the way I thought about asking it without using the word is don't you think a problem appears when you first assume dignity as something people always already have on the one hand and as something to be promoted on the other hand. So there is a slippage between the two. What are the consequences of this kind of slippage? For example, when you predicate, when you base dignity and its definition on agency, then the question simply arises, what about people who for one reason or another do not have agency, don't they have dignity? So complications arise, whether they're imprisoned, whether they're disabled, whether they're, for whatever reason. And there's been so much literature already critiquing the framework of agency for understanding human rights, for example. And I wonder if the same set of problems do not apply to human dignity when you base everything on agency as, and in this gap between what always already exists and what is to be promoted. I mean, that's a good point. And I think when you look at agency, you do have to draw distinctions. I was saying to Leslie earlier, we gave a talk at Princeton. And one of the issues came up was very specifically about people who are disabled and various other things on that. I do think that when we're looking, so that's a good point. I do think when we're looking at human dignity, the argument, and this is that we see this, I'm not saying that everybody has it, I'm saying we see it as a concept where there seems to be philosophical, rhetorical agreement that this should be something that the system. And we start with that because it's a concept that seems to resonate. Now, why does it resonate for different people for different reasons? It may be a natural approach to some people. It may just be, it may be religiously based. There may be a whole host of reasons, but we see it as a concept. And then we take it to the point where we say, okay, starting with this, can this be a basis for improving the human condition to be very blunt? And we suggest it can, but recognizing that we're not masters of the universe, we think that by introducing this concept, we can promote a fruitful dialogue which will allow international human rights instruments to be implemented and allow for the better realization of conditions of international peace and security and justice. That's what our hope is, but we wanna get the dialogue going. Okay, we have quite a list. The gentleman here has been waiting very patiently right in the back in the blazer. My name is Frank Gehly. I work for a foundation called the Arkadash Foundation on Religious Dialogue. There's so many, it's a very rich contribution and actually there are many points which I'll be inclined to make, or questions. One is human dignity and today is actually the birthday of Immanuel Kant. And I could not help thinking of his famous formula, one of his formulations of a categorical imperatives always make the maximum of your actions to treat others not as means but as ends in themselves. So it seems to me, I thought we all definition of human dignity in a way echoed some kind of Kantian concept, which is wonderful. At the same time, I wonder if anybody has actually ever changed or directed directed his morality in practice according to Immanuel Kant. It's wonderful for academics, intellectuals working in academia but maybe not really had the practical consequences. But the other question I wanted to ask is a lot to what you spoke about targeting civilians. I think you had no time to bring in everything but I think there are some qualifying terms which cry for being included like direct and deliberate targeting civilians. Civilians can be got at in direct ways. But more radically, and this I feel a bit of a really diabolical in asking, I'm talking about devil's advocate, asking this. The definition of a civilian, yes, someone who does not bear arms but that is actually quite old fashioned because in guerrilla warfare, you spoke about women and children but again, how many of them today can actually contribute directly to a war effort? Some people, some skeptics, some bloody-minded people may say this definition is actually very old fashioned, almost unworkable and some civilians in better commerce are actually not civilians at all. Okay, so a couple things. We actually talk about Kant in the introduction to the book. So this is very much coming from the Kantian perspective or we can certainly see it consistent with Kant. And you're absolutely right. In my international law class, I show pictures of kids that are coming at you with weapons. And I say, are these legitimate targets? And the answer is yes. So clearly included in what I'm talking about, innocent civilians, meaning they're not combatants or other non-combatants. Clearly, if an individual comes to you, whether they're five years old or 25 years old or 85 years old, if they are posing a military threat, you have the right under international law to target them. And it's horrific because we do see it in a number of cases, including people with suicide bombs and the like, but they would clearly be acceptable, I hate to say acceptable targets, but legitimate targets under international law. I think you were on the list, yes, again. So microphone right here to the woman in the, all of the green cardigan. Hi, thank you so much again. My name is Noreen Sajwani and I just graduated from Georgetown. And I'm a first year master's student at the Institute of Ismaili Studies, studying Islamic studies. Excellent. What did you study at Georgetown? Healthcare management and policy. Excellent. So not at all related. Nursing health studies? Yeah, it's great. So thank you so much again. My question was a little bit more on the prescription side. And I was wondering, given my own background in religious studies, what would you say, aside from dialogue, could be the role in the beginning you kind of started by talking about the Aga Khan as well as other Hindu faith leaders and the role that they could play in this effort. What do you think, aside from dialogue, could be the role of either religion or religious leaders in this conversation? I mean, many will argue that human dignity is something that, you know, given its working definition can be agreed upon, but then how do you change the dialogue towards implementing human dignity within the scope of terrorism? So that's a really good question. And there was a chapter in the book by Nicole Bibin-Sadaka, where she actually talks about some of these faith-based institutions, clearly promoting the dialogue. But I do think it can go much beyond that. Couple things, I think religious leaders have a tremendous amount of authority, especially in certain communities. And so one thing they can do is to try to address some of the root causes. What is leading people to radicalize in this way or the other way? What can they do to support it? Obviously, speaking out against certain things and certain types of behavior are useful things. But this would be an area where I would invite people to respond, because that's such a good question, is how could religious leaders play a greater role in promoting human dignity? What concrete steps could they take? As you know from Georgetown, one of the things that we really emphasize in its inner DNA are inner religious dialogues. So we bring, you know, the Imam and the rabbi and the priests and the Hindu clergy and Buddhists together. And we talk about these things. Now, you can argue the talk is talk. But even then, that's setting an example that we're all part of the same humanity and we're all working together. But actually, I'd have to be a great book, is there's a dissertation. What role could religious leaders play in promoting this? Right down here, Ashley, I'm gonna add you to the list. Ashley, one hand, national studies at the LSE. And a Georgetown grad. And a Georgetown grad. Double Georgetown grad. Double Georgetown grad. And for you, Malta-U.N.ers, I had him in high school for Malta-U.N. So he's good to Malta-U.N. people. I was young then. Heard me all. No, I mean, first of all, I really like this because I've heard in my other cap, I do a lot of work on policy making and I've heard so frequently quoted lately this idea that Rawls points out that as you get towards modernity, politicians no longer have the ability to draw on kind of common philosophical principles in the same way that they used to are common religious principles. And I think this is a nice conceptualization because as you say, human dignity is somewhat more primordial than even that. And so it's something that per chance down the road, it could be a good way to change things. And that's my question for you. I want to ask you to draw out this idea of a new Geneva Convention, which is a bit tough because as I think of this and I was trying to think of what that would look like and who you would have to have at the table. That's a good question. And if you were to do that and to get the buy-in, you would have to, in inverted quotes, get the buy-in and at the table of terrorist groups. But as you say, you don't necessarily want to label certain groups as terrorist groups, but they may have terrorists within them. So just an idea of how you would see that going and how that might play out and how you would deal with those issues. So that is a really good question. And one of the problems in responding to the gentleman's question earlier about privileging states, when Mark Legen and I were putting this together, we were talking about the need for a new San Francisco moment. Now, if you think San Francisco was where the United Nations Charter was formulated in 1945, our claim is that the international system is no longer a state system per se, but is this neo-medieval system. So we need some kind of San Francisco moment. What does that actually mean? Who do you bring together? And we can envision bringing NGOs and IGOs and various other private sector actors together, but what about these other groups? So let me say I don't know the answer to that particular question because ideally you would want to get buy-in, but I'm not sure we necessarily say, okay, ISIS, come on down, al-Shabaab, Boko Haram, you guys are welcome. I'm not sure they would do it, number one, or we would want to do it. As I have conceptualized this, the big category is that there is this group of non-state actors that need to somehow be addressed in the conventions because of the lacunae, because the United States, others too, blame the United States because the United States was able to say you guys aren't entitled to any guarantees under these conventions, and yet they're participants in the international system. So as I would see it, the ICRC would put together, perhaps consult with various people and come up with some ideas about how those groups can be defined. Now, that's, you know, you're right. Ultimately you gotta get buy-in and you still have a state system dictating how we're gonna deal with non-states. I'm just not sure we're at a point right now where we could go beyond that. But what I would say is I still am not sure that we could even get states to agree to this at this point in time. So it's still a bit of a pipe dream. Question from the Model UN team, Steven. Gotta be a question from the Model UN. Over here. Again, if you say who you are. Hi, I'm Steven. I'm from Westminster School. And actually I went to the Georgetown Foreign Service summer program in international relations taught by Professor Arendt two or three years ago. Welcome. My question is actually going back to the earlier question about the sort of practical effectiveness of using Kantian ideas. I think in Germany, the enshrining of human dignity as the core constitutional principle in the basic law has been very effective in holding a number of contentious laws in the German constitutional courts to account. And I think that I'm curious to know whether you think a concept of human dignity enshrined at a national constitutional level could be effective in other countries such as the United States of America that are more relevant in perhaps counterterrorism policies. That's a really good idea. And that's something you should write up. Now, a couple of things to say about that. One of the challenges we have with international human rights law is that while the term dignity is mentioned in the universal declaration, there really was no justification given for the rights at the time in large part because they weren't able to get it. And so the view was, let's get agreement on some concrete specifics and move from there, which I think was the right decision at the time. As we move forward, I think if there is an animating principle like that, it helps one to then define things in light of that. And it goes back to what I was saying before, irrespective of the Bible memoranda and the way the Justice Department and the United States address certain things. If people would have been saying, thinking about it in a sort of different vein, they would either be interpreting the law differently or saying, okay, the law allows us to do this, but should we do it anyway from an ethical perspective? So I like the idea. I think German is a good example. I think other countries in the world, it may work. I think it's so far as the United States is concerned. Good luck on amending the Constitution anytime soon. I think we probably, and I'm not trying to be flippant, I just, it's a very challenging thing to do. I think in terms of the international community, extent to which we might be able to get some of these ideas implemented in international law could then have a positive effect because if we look at Hamdan versus Rumsfeld, where the U.S. Supreme Court was interpreting Common Article III of the Geneva Conventions, the administration, the Bush administration at the time said, these rights do not apply to these individuals. Common Article III does not apply, and the Supreme Court said, we're sorry, we disagree with you because international law is a part of U.S. law, so the extent to which some of these ideas can be defined in legal terms, going back to amending the Geneva Conventions, it could have a positive effect on how the United States or other countries behave even if we can't actually easily amend the domestic law in those states, but I like the idea. I think you should write it up. In all your spare time. I know, exactly. Borja, right here in the stripy shirt. And again, if you introduce yourself. Yeah, so my name is Borja Montregal and I'm a student here. My question is, so let's assume that this human dignity is really agreed, okay, between different communities. My problem is that when you translate this human dignity with implications of its relationship with terrorism, institutions, or different issues, suddenly it becomes totally political and much more in the way that you have defined it. So I'm wondering if those people that have agreed to this common concept of human dignity could feel betrayed on the translation that you do to the relations with different issues and therefore it could be counterproductive with all the fight that has been done with human rights that has been highlighted before. That's a good point and that is indeed one of the risks. My sense is if you look at the international human rights agreements, they're already being interpreted politically. My hope is that in a concept like this, you would be able to build a greater amount of consensus. Maybe not, but my sense is that you wanna begin and you wanna try to build from that, but you're right. And I would argue that when we look at how anything happens in international affairs at some level, it's all political. At some level it's all political. So the extent to which we could have a common animating idea may at least have us commonly politically doing it, but it is a risk. The woman right here behind Borscha. Hi, my name is Mandak. I'm a master of students in violence, conflict and development here at SOAS. My question is in regards to the application of this framework in day-to-day sort of situations, because on the one hand, there is the disregard of motivations when it comes to Proposition One. But then Proposition Two, when you want to look at the root causes of why an individual would commit the acts that they do, you need to look at the motivations. And in that same vein, Proposition Three, when we're trying to distinguish who is a terrorist or what is a terrorist group doesn't identify who it is that's identifying the identities of these groups, who is it that's saying that a terrorist is a terrorist or who is that saying that a terrorist group is not a terrorist group or that one individual's act within a categorized terrorist group constitutes them as a terrorist. And in sort of a broader sense, we can see, for example, when it comes to remittances, we see that if an individual sends remittances to a particular family member, let's say in Somalia, and that family member may or may not be associated with al-Shabaab, there's no sort of connection and understanding that was this money used for terrorist activities or not, but the sender is still considered as an individual supporting a terrorist. And so there's that one side and on the other side, how would this framework address pre-existing biases that already exist within institutions and those who engage with counterinsurgency measures and engage with terrorist groups on a day-to-day basis? Okay, so several really good points there. The first thing I would say is who draws the distinctions? The first thing I'm suggesting is that we need to. So in a sense, that's a useful concept because if we look at, say, U.S. law where we have material support of terrorism and all kinds of things, you could be a terrorist come in my house, I don't know you're a terrorist, I serve you a meal and suddenly I've engaged in material support of terrorism. So part of the thing there is to be aware of this and to make an effort to draw better national laws that draw those distinctions. How they're gonna play out is gonna depend on the specific issues, but it is complicated, but my view as part of it is to be aware of it. Second point, in terms of saying, when I say you don't look at the motivation, what I'm saying is this, if a person or group commits a terrorist act, that violates human dignity, it doesn't matter why they're violating human dignity. If I'm an innocent, again, truly innocent civilian and I get on the bus out here and some group blows me up and I'm not, that violates my dignity per se. It doesn't matter if they did it for a great cause. So that's the first proposition. That's why, and that's, I think important because we don't excuse it or we don't say, oh, but it didn't really violate human dignity because it was done for a great cause. Now, in looking at the roots of terrorism, we have to look at what motivates people to do these things. That doesn't mean we excuse somebody from doing it, but rather we say, how can we prevent this from happening in the future? What kinds of structural matters do we need to undertake? And maybe it's because there are hierarchies in the international system which are conducive to this. We need to consider how we can change some of those things. Gentlemen, over here in the blue. Hello, TJ Campbell. I'm a Georgetown University graduate, friend of Tony's, oldest friend. Old friend, long time. Well, I shouldn't say old, old friend. We go back a number of years. A few years, definitely. You were class of 90, right? That's right, that's right. But he was two when he graduated. And I'm a philanthropy manager at an educational charity that supports children's education in Africa. Can you say, what's the name? Lessons for Life Foundation. I wanted to hone in a bit, and I'm surprised no one's brought this up, but a little bit on the definition of political in this working definition of terrorism, because I'm thinking of violence against, non-state violence against groups of people based on ethnic hatred or religious hatred. I'm thinking specifically like the Rohingya in Myanmar that are being persecuted, not necessarily by the state. The state might be turning a blind eye for this like mass violence against those people and who've been there for five, 600 years and happened to be Muslim and predominantly Buddhist country and they're really suffering a lot for that. And at an extreme example like Rwanda, that yes, there might have been a political element but a lot of it was a long running ethnic rivalry. So does the word political incorporates ethnic and religious bases of this violence? This is a really good question. And I would say it does, but I would also say I may need to clarify that more because I wanna make sure, what I'm really trying to differentiate a terrorist act from is a criminal act. And what you're describing would fall under my definition but that may be something that I could clarify more in the writing on that because I think that's a very good point. Gentlemen here, didn't you have a question? Did you not? Oh, somebody here had a question, but I think we also have questions. We have time for, oh my, okay. I'm gonna take them in two now and then we're going to wrap up. I'm gonna start with the young person right here in the front row. Steven. On the basis that if people don't ask their questions soon sometimes they don't ask them at all. And then we'll come to the last few here and then we'll wrap up. Sounds good. Hi, my name is Raghav and I got to ask me to school as well. I wanted to ask for some clarification on the Global Fund for Governance, which you mentioned. Obviously it's a really good idea to have it but it has to go into the right hands as such and I'm wondering how you're gonna make sure this happens and it doesn't go to corrupt governments for example and who are you going to choose who's going to hand out these funds? I mean like will you make it the US government or a committee of experts or who will you choose? Okay, so that's a really good question and that's something we need to develop. I suggest it as a good idea but the only way it's gonna be a good idea if it's implemented in a way that actually gets to the people that could use it. I would not envision a circumstance where we say okay we need good governance in Somalia. So let's give a billion pound to the government of Somalia I'm not sure there is one but yeah. So I think that's a very good point and people can develop these ideas very easily and I think it is a good idea but if it's not implemented properly it will be a complete waste. We've seen this in the delivery of humanitarian assistance for example. Circumstances where it gets to exactly the wrong people or it sits in rots in the docks because it's not properly delivered so that would be something that would need to be worked out very carefully. I do not work out the details in the proposal but somebody's gonna move toward it and they're gonna need to do that. If you have a question put your hand up very high because I wanna make sure I'm gonna take all the questions but I'm not going to take them individually anymore because we are at our end time and we have drinks. And we don't want to stand between anybody and drinks. And everybody here is invited so please join us for a drink afterwards. So let me take three questions and then the final two and I'll save mine for dinner. All right. So right here at the back. It's all good. I have a question target for the individual is violating or arming somebody. But then I wonder what the definitions of terrorism that are often used and have this consensus on they always think that they need to be for political goals so that actually directly look at motivation and so I'm a little bit confused on that. And secondly I have a little bit of a question on based on the values that people didn't see and I think it's been a different individual so if it's a civilian or an active battalion or some kind of very young individual like that it seems to say that that's not the terrorism that violates their community is terrorism but if it's a military personnel or something like that and they have the community that is violated it's still not an active terrorism because they are wearing these patterns and there's no war. But it might violate other laws. In other words it violated international humanitarian law. I did. Right here at the very back. The gentleman, no no no further back. Right from the back row. Hello, my name is Bashar. Bashar Basaj. I'm a student down for King's College right down the road from you guys. I wanted to ask something about Proposition 4 about the Forcibly Responsed Terrorism. Sorry I forgot your name. Dr. Chubukchi. She pointed out, she discussed it when she was staging her rebuttal towards your towards your discussion. But I wanted to just want to clarify one point. You said enforceable response to terrorism first of the aspects it must be proportionate. How do you define proportionality within response to terrorism? What form or sense does it take? Don't answer that. Really, really easy questions. Hands very high. The woman here in the Blontarine glasses. I don't need that. Okay. But not yet. Sorry. Because of the time. Hands high if you still have questions. Gentleman here in the black. My name is Leo Chikini. I'm a former American diplomat who did not study at Georgetown. But if I'd been one of your students when you introduced your definition of terrorism and hearing all of this discussion, I would suggest that you could let it stand without reference to state or non-state party. And it would still be a good definition of terrorism. Very good. Any other comments or questions before we give the panelists a last word? And if your questions aren't answered, which they won't because there are too many, join us for a drink and feel free to approach the panelists and pursue that. So, Kareem, you have one final. And anybody else wanna add something before we're... I'm hiding blocks because I feel bad doing two questions. Okay. It's okay. You'll keep it short. Oh, well. Kant's call, the categorical imperative is called, Kant was also a massive racist who distinguished between different races. And I think that's worth noting because there's an issue that I raised in reference to dignity that I think is also applicable to the notion of humanity, which is that humanity isn't just something that's already given, it's something that's practiced. And the very act of, for example, dropping drones on terrorist targets is an actual assault on someone's humanity, right? It deletes that person. They're no longer human. And so, I guess the question is, again, how do you differentiate between those who are deserving of humanity and those who are not deserving of humanity or those who are deserving of human dignity and those who are not deserving of human dignity? So, in particular, because, again, terrorists' intentions don't matter, but bombing terrorists in the name of human dignity brings in an element of intentionality into that act. So, why is it that some people have intentionality and that's relevant and some people don't have intentionality that is, and that's relevant? We are gonna take most of these as comments and for further discussion over drinks. I think we've got everybody, which is wonderful. Those were fantastic interventions from the audience. Thank you so much. I'm gonna give each of you just a minute or two. So, you're gonna be terribly frustrated, Tony, I'm sorry. No, that's okay. So, would you like to add? No, I'll give my minute. Your minute, okay. So, you really only have two minutes because then everybody here is gonna join us for a drink. That's okay. The minute's Tony. Just the one quick point on, terrorists are entitled to human dignity too. That's my point. And go ahead. No, sorry. No. His point is this. How can we, no, no, his point is this. How can we bomb them? Because they are using force against us and we are defending ourselves. That's the logic. If I'm a police officer and somebody comes at me with a gun, I'm using force to defend myself. That's the logic. If it goes beyond that, it becomes disproportionate and violates their human dignities. But just as if Iraq invades Kuwait, Kuwait has the right to defend itself and call on other states to defend itself. If a terrorist launches an attack against groups of people, those individuals have the right to defend themselves against the terrorists, but it must be proportionate. That's the logic. Okay, wonderful. Thank you, Dr. Chibuchu. Thank you, Professor Aran. Thank you all of you for coming tonight and we hope to see you at Sawa's again. Thank you. And please do join us for a drink just outside the doors.