 After this view from Moscow, let's move to Washington to the honorable Stuart Eisenstadt, who I discovered had represented the United States already at Kyoto in 1997. He has a stellar career in working for the U.S. government. He had been Under Secretary of State on two occasions, Deputy Secretary of the Treasury, and of course he's well known for having resolved many of the pending issues that all could survivors had to deal with to recover some of the assets that were confiscated by the Nazis. Mr. Eisenstadt, floor is yours. Thank you very much, Mr. Ambassador, and I'm sorry that I can't be with you personally. First, I want to first outline the policy goals of the Biden administration in general. First is to move from the Trump administration and America. First, bilateralism and neo-isolationism to an America fully engaged as a leader to solve global problems and promote global order and rule of law. Second is to reinvigorate alliances with Europe, with NATO and the European Union, which I have been Ambassador in the Clinton administration, and with the Asian Pacific countries to take on 21st century challenges. First is to deal with many terrorism, al-Qaeda and ISIS. Second, global health issues, particularly the COVID pandemic, where the administration has donated more vaccines to COVAX for Africa and developing countries than any other country. Third is a real emphasis which was totally rejected by the previous administration on client chain. Former Secretary of State Perry has been designated as the leader and reporting toward Glasgow. But we realize that this also requires global cooperation. The U.S. emits only 15% of the world's emissions, and we need to enlist other countries if we're going to meet the Paris goalings. As we speak now, the administration is seeking legislation and a sharply divided Congress for the Biden administration's global back better program, which has a substantial climate change component. And I believe with all the divisions that we've read that by the end of this month a substantial part of that package will pass. A third priority of the foreign policy is to enlist allies to deal with the challenge of China, which is considered by the administration the greatest geopolitical challenge. Secretary Blinken has put it very clearly this way. We will compete economically, technologically, and militarily with China. We will collaborate wherever possible with China, for example, on climate change. And if need be, confront China when it moves in inappropriate ways in areas like the South China Sea. A fourth concept and goal of the Biden foreign policy is to relate it to domestic policy. The belief that a stronger America at home will mean a stronger America abroad. Now let me be frank in talking about the problems with these goals, and then I'll be directly to the Middle East. The first problem in achieving these goals is quite frankly the United States, which is still the strongest power militarily and economically, does not have the unchallenged supremacy it did 10 to 15 years ago. Dealing with the rise of China with a more assertive and aggressive Russia and with the rise of regional powers from North Korea to Iran and beyond. Second, it's very difficult to achieve many of these goals without the projection of military force. And here are the absence of boots on the ground, the loss of Bagram Air Force Base in Afghanistan. The chaotic withdrawal from Afghanistan without prior notification to our allies who actually had more troops in Afghanistan than did the U.S. Combined with the submarine deal with Australia, have led problems in seeking to build and rebuild those alliances. At the same time, the administration has continued Trump, Euroteros from European steel and aluminum and on China. Let me move now to the Middle East. I have to be candid and I'm not, of course, speaking for the administration, but someone who I think is quite knowledgeable about the administration and those many of its key players and work with them in previous administrations. The administration sees the Middle East as a lower priority on its foreign policy agenda than dealing with China and Russia and the Asia Pacific. The Middle Eastern wars have brain and diverted trillions of dollars from domestic needs. And in an era of high domestic polarization politically, there is bipartisan movement to focus more on China and less on what are called endless wars. To move from a policy based on military force to what President Biden called the UN address with diplomacy. Now, let me quote my good friend, Secretary of State Tony Blinker. And he said, just as a matter of time allocation and budget priorities, I think we'll be giving less to the Middle East, not more. The National Security Advisor Greg Sullivan said that one of the mistakes of U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East over the last several decades under both Republican and Democratic administrations was putting greater priority to military than diplomatic components. There recently released interim national security strategy guidelines. It is notable how little attention has been given in that document to the Middle East. There is a statement about maintaining ironclad commitment to Israel and security and promoting a two-state solution. But there is a realization that trying to relaunch the kind of aggressive peace process that then Secretary Kerry did in 2014. And the Obama administration is not going to be fruitful. Neither side is prepared to make the kinds of compromises that would make such a peace agreement possible. Therefore, the administration will put greater emphasis than the previous administration on improving the labs of Palestinians and opposing the expansion of Israeli settlement, which would complicate an eventual two-state solution. The second piece of this new national security strategy is to work with regional partners in the Middle East to deter Iranian aggression. The third component of the Middle East piece of this strategy is to disrupt al-Qaida and related terrorist networks and to prevent a resurgence of ISIS. And next is to resolve armed conflicts. But with a clear statement, and I'm virtually quoting from this document, that we do not believe that military forces the answer to the recent challenges and we will not give our partners in the Middle East, and that means in part Saudi Arabia, what they call in their document a blank check to pursue policies that odds with American interests and values. And they say in this document, that is why we have withdrawn U.S. support for offensive military operations in Yemen and back U.N. efforts to end the war. They state that our aim will be to de-escalate regional tensions and create space for people throughout the Middle East to realize their aspirations. They further state that in the Middle East we will right sides, and frankly that's a diplomatic term for reduced, our military presence to the level required to disrupt international terrorist network, to deter Iranian aggression and protect other vital U.S. interests. Now I believe that those who have better served if we had continued to keep 3,000 U.S. troops in Afghanistan, but that obviously was not the decision that the President made. Now beyond that, there will be support for the Trump-era Abraham Accords and an effort to expand them. There will in my opinion be continued support for the condition of Morocco entering into normalized relations with Israel namely Iraq and sovereignty over the western Sahara, and I've been to Morocco many, many times and have the privilege of serving on an advisory board of OCP, one of their largest companies. I think also the administration will continue to keep Sudan off terrorist lists, so-called SST lists, which was their condition for normalization. Now let me close with talking about Iran. The administration recently used military force against Iranian-backed coalitions that were targeting U.S. coalition forces or ambassadors of your country and Iraq. There is a strong desire to get Iran back into the JCPOA and there is a feeling that a decision by President Trump withdraw from it with all its imperfections has opened the door for Iran to break through the limits of the 2015 agreement and to get perilous quote to a ability to produce weapons-grade nuclear fuel. If I can be more specific, under the 2015 JCPOA, Iran was limited to Iranian enrichment to less than 4%. And may I say to my Russian colleague, Russian played a very constructive role in the JCPOA, not just in the negotiations, but it was the location in which Iran sent its enriched uranium. Now, since the Trump administration was true, Iran is building large stockpiles of enriched uranium to 20% and even to 60% with faster spinning centrifuges, which are very close to weapons-grade and experts believe it is only a short few months to be able to reach that weapons-grade level and it gone from having 300 to over 3,000 kilograms of enriched uranium. Now, let me give a forecast, which may or may not turn out to be correct, but it is the best assumption I can make and for many years I have chaired the Atlantic Council's Iran Task Force, the think tank on Iran. I've met with former and foreign ministers of reef on several occasions and I think it is a tragedy that during a more moderate regime with President Rouhani and Foreign Ministers of Reef, we couldn't have built on the JCPOA. Instead, we now have a very hotline new government on Abraham Raisi and the foreign ministers' comments at the UN within the last few days were very, very tough, where Secretary of State Lincoln has called for a longer and stronger accord to replace the 2015 JCPOA, which runs in 2030. The Iranian foreign minister directly rejected what he called the so-called longer and stronger deal and he said that we expect to get greater sanctions released than we got under the JCPOA. Now, given this confrontation, I still believe that both the U.S. and Iran see it in their national interest to get back into an accord and my friend Rob Malley is negotiating that for the U.S. And I believe that the best we will be able to see will be an interim accord which will get Iran back into a slightly stronger JCPOA with perhaps slightly more sanctions relief, but nothing more. Now, I know that many of our colleagues in the region rightly, rightly, want Iran constrained not just in this dimension, but in terms of their building whispers, in terms of their support for terrorist groups and for their violations of rights and interventions in countries like Lebanon and in Syria. But that unfortunately will not happen or wait than the nuclear agreement can bear. But I do want to mention to my colleagues from the Arab states that even if there is a re-entrance of the U.S. and Iran into the JCPOA or to a slightly expanded JCPOA, the U.S. continues to maintain sanctions, separate sanctions on Iran for its nuclear missile program and for its support for terrorism and is shown by the recent military attack that I mentioned on Iranian-backed militia operating in Iraq. It will not hesitate to take such actions. Thank you very much for allowing me to participate in this panel and in my dear friend Thierry Manpreel's World Policy Conference. I'm more than happy to take any questions. Well, thank you for staying up so late. It's around, I think, 2 o'clock or 3 o'clock in the morning. There's not so much staying up late as getting up early. No, thank you.