 Okay, good morning and welcome to this first panel. You see, Tiara is very careful to say first panel rather than opening panel. This panel is called Geoeconomics and Development in a Fragmented World. And in light of the comments you were just making to start us off, it's a very good topic with which to get started. We have a great panel. Now, let me just say a couple of things to get us started, if I may. International development and politics, international politics, geopolitics have always been connected. So it's not as if this is something new. The question I think we will explore in this panel is how the relationship is changing and what that means for the way in which we think about development, we think about development cooperation. And I'd like to propose that there are at least three ways in which that relationship is changing. First, we used to think about international development mainly as how to improve living standards, how to deal with poverty within individual countries. It was a country-based approach to thinking about issues. Today we think about international development much more as a set of global challenges which include climate change, pandemics, biodiversity. And while these overlay with countries, the way we think about them has become broader and different. Secondly, because we are thinking about these broader challenges, we can no longer, when we think about development cooperation, simply have the development agency or the development ministry in a rich country deal with their share of how to support development. Now every ministry, every agency, whether it's the financial sector and the role that it plays, whether it's the health ministries around the world, everybody needs to cooperate to be able to deal with global challenges much more so than was the case before. And finally, third, even though the need for cooperation is broader to solve these shared challenges, the possibilities of cooperation, the scope for cooperation is becoming more constrained because of the fragmentation in the way in which global politics is organized now and the rivalry amongst great powers. And so we will explore, I hope, all of those issues during this panel. And what I'd like to do, if I may, is to start, first of all, with Aminata Toure because she brings a perspective of having thought about these issues and dealt with them in different ways in Senegal. And so, Madame Toure, if I could start with you and then we'll go further. Thank you very much. Well, it's always a pleasure to be here. So we're talking about a fragmented world. I think societies themselves are fragmented, whether you're from a wealthy country or a less wealthy country. And that's the first thing that we need to acknowledge, that even in wealthy countries you do have people who feel left, you know, on the side. Internationally, when we talk about international development, we have to reshuffle our concept. Theoretically, China is supposed to still be a developing country, by the way, which I think doesn't meet the criteria. To say that we live in a world where we really need to stop and maybe offer a new length to analyze it. I think there is sort of a history in the making, in a painful way most of the time. But what we are witnessing from where I'm sitting, which is Africa, let's remember that it's 54 countries. It's an important grouping. That's where maybe the future of nutrition will be decided, because you do have 60% of available land. You do have the youngest population in the world. You have huge resources. So you cannot talk about the future without having a deep analysis about what's going on in Africa. And what is going on in Africa is sort of a mixture of concern, first of course. I'm from West Africa concerned about security. And we know what's going on in the Sahel, what happened between the former colonial power, but became a partner, and the relationship is not necessarily going well in Mali and Niger and Chad. You do have new generation coming to power in questionable ways, for sure, but they are there. And how are we going to sort of make sure that we do have international development along the side of international institution that works and partners who trust themselves? Because I think we are in a mix of trust crisis among international partners, among countries who were under colonial sort of power and moved on 60 years down the line, developing different relationships. Some people are saying, well, it's not that different between Africa and its former partners. So I think there is also from the other side a new way of looking at things. And secondly, we do have, as I said, the youngest population in the world. So how are you going to make sure that that population is more of an asset rather than a liability? Because liability also concerns our partners with international migrations and even securities and all these things. So I think what we really need to think about is what could be the solution to make sure that we converge together and we define a civilized world. First of all, I think we have to think about the United Nations. That is weaker and weaker. International cooperation is occurring outside of the United Nations that is still struggling to find even funding. We saw how, sorry to say, little relevant they have been in the Ukraine crisis, for instance, but in other crises too. I was talking about the Sahel and other places, but I think we need to give stronger teeth to the United Nations first. Second, I think we need to open up the leadership. As we speak, I say talk about 54 countries, African countries, and no permanency. That doesn't make sense to me. Taking into consideration what I said before. Second, making sure that an important part of the world is part of the Security Council. I think we need to redefine a relationship between former colonial powers and current developing countries. For instance, acknowledging what happened across history and maybe trying to make it right. I see that in some countries, after the Johnson events two years back, that many countries are looking into their colonial history and trying to sort of make it right, as I said. And also having a genuine international cooperation, which means that we're going to look generally into young people's rights, into women's rights, and we're going to make sure that on a solidarity basis, we are going together to define common goals and accomplish it, which means also that countries who pledge financially should come to the pot, which is not the case. Of course, you cannot talk about fragmented world without talking about climate change. We have hopes that after Chalmencech, we will really, really, really see genuine movement toward making sort of the financial pledges a reality. So that's what I wanted to say at this point. Let's look into the solution because the problem, we know them. And we saw the solution. We saw the problem, we know them. So now we should focus on the solution, and the solution for me is a more unified vision of putting human beings at the center. And I know we have a lot of people coming from the private sector, which is important. And I think private sector should look again in today's practices because you only do business when you have peace, when you don't have unrest, when you have consumers who are healthy, because nobody is doing business in Ukraine anyway, or in many other places that we don't talk about. That brings also the issue of forgotten conflicts that goes over time. And the feeling that it depends of where you sit on the planet for your conflict to be recognized and solution brought up for peace to come back. So I think it brings back the whole issue, common issue of human rights. We are all human fellows. So we have a common planet that we want to work and live in and be loved and et cetera. So maybe if we go, we start by the end, we may find ways to converge. Thank you. Thank you very much. Thank you very much for starting us off. And thank you for saying that maybe we've described the problem often enough, but we need to focus on what are the ways, not just to define the solutions, but also to make the bridge to the solutions. How do we create the conditions so that the solutions actually become real? So one issue that has been raised in this is that we are moving from the globalization to de-globalization, or some form of re-globalization. And as Jean-Marie Fougum, you're the WTO. You've been looking at these issues. You're right in the center of it. Can you give us a little bit of your sense of what's actually been happening in this phase? What are the facts that we're telling us, and how do you see the process moving forward? Well, thank you, Masoud, and good morning, everyone. I think your microphone is not yet on, but hopefully it will be. Can you hear me? I was saying thank you, Masoud, and good morning, everyone. On your first question, what do we see? We don't really see de-globalization in the figures, at least in the trade figures. I'm leaving aside investment or finance. Of course, there are trends which have been observed like an apparent slowdown of the rate of openness that is trade over GDP, but it can be explained by many statistical phenomena such as variations in the commodity prices or also the compositions of the GDP, which is more led by services, where trade is more led by goods. So there is not really the feeling that there is a structural ebbing of globalization as far as trade is concerned. There is also a slowing down of trade in the second half of the decade, which probably has to do with some maturity of the value chains development. There is a sort of plateau, but here, again, we don't see that moving back toward a reduction of the contribution of world trade to GDP. What is happening is, yes, that there are new forces which are going to shape this globalization and make it probably more complex and generate more transaction costs for businesses and also for government. There are three of those which are really clear. The first one is, of course, the return of what we may call generically strategic trade policies, which has to do with industrial policy, and this is very documented. Now we see a lot of increasing of the intervention of the states to create comparative advantages. This has to do with the Cheap and Science Act in the U.S. or the Inflation Reduction Act. The projects of common European interest in Europe, of course China 2025, and also in Japan there are some of these. It's quite documented that the OECD, you see at least, for instance, the level of government subsidies increasing. That's one. The second one is what I may call quite naturally decoupling policies which involve a vast array of policies from the worst, which is war and sanctions, to the least, just the second one, trade war. Basically the one which has been unleashed by President Trump against China, or the softer concept of open strategic autonomy. You don't know exactly what is lying there. But there is this idea that you will have a world-shaped, a world market will be shaped by a lot of politics. And if you take, for instance, sanctions, it was not really a systemic issue when it was dealing with small economies, if I may call them like that. But when you are dealing with the elements of the world economy like Russia, then you see that there is the beginning of a global impact. And also recently in Brussels there was a forum on export control, and the figures were astonishing because, for instance, for the UK, it's minus 97% of export towards Russia and closely the same for the EU. So this decoupling is quite a new trend. We have been modelling that in the WTO, imagining a world just like in the old days separated in two blocks, and that would mean, according to our economists, a reduction of GDP of overall GDP in the long term of 5%. And the third trend, of course, is decarbonisation. And we know that when it comes to net-zero strategies, different countries and players are adopting different strategies. For instance, to put the price on carbon, the EU has been choosing a market exchange of emission permits, other are choosing taxes, other are moving toward regulations like the US. So you do not have an equivalence of that, and it's even worse when you try to start measuring carbon. Just take the steel sector, which is representing more or less 8% of the global emissions. This is the standard measurement in the world. So these are trends which are going to make it more complex. Are our institutions for international cooperation capable of dealing with that? Well, we in the WTO have been buried so many times that I think even this morning I heard that we were already dead, but I don't think so. We have quite a mixed situation. The first one is that there is a quite a reasonably strong capital about the core principle which are articulating the world trading system. This is our transparency, good face and non-discrimination. And you do not see radical contestations or radical dispute over those principles, even in a worse situation like the one with the Trump administration, nobody has been walking out of the WTO. So you don't see really disagreement on the fact that we can cooperate on this basis. And in fact, we even had some successes this year. I may come back to it. What we face and we are confronted with is several trends which all the institutions are dealing with. The first one is obviously the divergences in values and government systems which translate into difficulties in the negotiation. The second one has to do with how do we manage the common and the legacy for common. This is the very big debate over climate change but in the WTO we faced it also in the negotiation on fisheries, about the prohibition of subsidies which were contributing to overfishing. And then you have developing countries saying, guys, why should I restrain the development of my fisheries? Why you have been taking all the fish historically? So this is really complicated. These legacies issues are complicating the negotiation and they are very hard to cope. And of course there is a difference in capacities to tackle with the new trends of decarbonisation and digitalisation. So I think we will do some stop and go. We will have some successes in emergency circumstances. For instance, regarding the how to cope with the food crisis today, I think that if I look at the half empty glass, the response of global institutions is quite reasonable to a certain extent effective. I'm not saying that we are off the hook. It's a very difficult situation but there is an answer. And in many cases we will just face tail-mates on core issues. So we'll have to deal with that but do not throw the baby with the bath water. Thank you very much. Thank you for talking about the trends. Also raising this question, which I think we will come back to maybe even in the next panel, which is are the institutions that were created, many of them going back 75, 80 years now, up to the job of dealing with the trends and issues that they are now being forced to deal with. And also do the main shareholders, members of these institutions, have confidence in them? Because what I find quite interesting to look at is that all the heads of institutions are busy defending themselves against their own shareholders more and more who are busy criticizing what they are doing. And that's a difficult situation in which to find yourself. Now, I do want to go next to Kim Hangchun. Kim, I mean Ataturia and also Jean-Marie have talked about climate and the financing of global public goods. One of the issues of the table is how do we deal with the financing of global public goods, which are clearly under finance. And I know you've been thinking about this. You want to talk a bit about that issue. What's your take on this? Okay. Thank you for, first of all, thank you for having me. This very, very meaningful venue. And then I'd like to talk about where, what kind of world we are living. Because now, I was in Moscow the last week of October and I was surrounded by the many scholars who have quite a different way of thinking compared to the participants here. And then we talked about many things about the global governance. Last night, when I arrived here, I had to look at the title of the global governance. And then in Balda, they tried to talk about the many issues that now the world can be going on without any global governance. And what the global governance they mean is that, you know, a kind of the platform or existing order that was established since the Second World War. So what I recognized them and why I was there was that there are big differences, big contrasts between two group of people how to understand the contemporary world. So we are now observing the big chasm between the two groups of people and so this kind of fragmentation and the blockization is now very, very substantial as we recognize. And then second, we are now facing the very rapid transformation, great transformation like the digitalization and then also green transformation. And also we have the unforeseen events like the pandemic and the world. So all of these kind of things make our existing world to create the global public goods. So now we are now getting more difficult in creating all of these global public goods which the many developing countries and the underdeveloped countries can develop and grow based on this kind of the platform or the existing order. And then I think that is one of the main reasons why we are now suffering from providing a proper level of the global public goods. So when it comes to the international development towards the development assistance, also we are now combating the poverty and then global health crisis and also the side effect of digitalization, also the climate crisis. All of these things can be contributing to the big change of the structure of the ODA now. And this can be, on the one thing, this is the kind of the, now the supporting, the wider income disparities among the people. But also it can contribute to the creating global public goods in terms of the ODA ramification. So I think that now we are now facing in a moment of the revolutionizing our structure of the ODA towards the new direction of the providing more global public goods through the digitalization, through the climate crisis, combating against the climate crisis and the digitalization and the green technology. Many people would think that there was a problem with the digitalization, but digitalization has destroyed middle-skilled workers. Middle-skilled workers' jobs were destroyed because of digitalization. So only a small amount of unskilled and then high-skilled can survive under the digitalization. So we need to think about these issues when we are applying our ODA project to the developing countries and also green technology as well. Green technology also, most of the green technology is developed in the advanced countries because the reason is, of course I mean the developing green technology in the advanced country is kind of the very market-oriented so they can make money by developing this green technology. But that kind of environment cannot be provided in the least developed countries. So all of these kind of big changes, together with the pandemic and the world and bipolarization, all of things target for the ODA and also I think that to provide the more public global goods then the strengthening of ODA and then changing the structure of the ODA is now very important. Okay, thank you. Thank you very much. And thank you for bringing the question of the development assistance, ODA and how it's being used now. And as you say, if you look at aggregate numbers for ODA they are now about 180 billion or so. They've gone up a little bit over the last few years. But most of this increase is accounted for by increase in humanitarian assistance and by increase in including the financing of refugees inside the country that is providing the assistance. So the largest recipient of Swedish ODA today is Sweden. The largest recipient of UK ODA today is the UK because that is where they're spending the largest share of their overseas assistance right now. And also global public goods. So many developing countries are raising the question of whether, in fact, we are short changing the traditional development agenda by using the same limited part of ODA for these other equally important but different purposes. That, of course, was part of the conversation in Shermel Shake. It's been a lot of the discussion in the way in which you can mobilize private capital. Bertrand, you have been thinking about it acting on these issues for many years. I know you have been recently talking about the outcome of Shermel Shake as well in this. I want to get a little bit of your sense on where the debate stands and where you think the challenges lie in terms of making progress. Coming back to Aminata's first suggestion that we start looking at how to move to the solutions. Thank you, Masoud, and it's great to be here. Thank you, Thierry. Yes, we discussed that last year already. I think the waters are more troubled even than they were last year, as you rightly said, in your opening remarks, Thierry. We are at the moment where, on the one hand, we have the convergence of traditional crisis, economic crisis, social crisis, energy crisis, et cetera, and also an underlying transformation of many things. And the combination of this crisis and transformation is very difficult to handle. Transformation are geopolitical. I mean, the decarbonization of our economy was being discussed in Montreal starting today on biodiversity. Of course, there's technological changes in AI. I mean, all these things are making this puzzle a little bit difficult to apprehend. On top of that, we have, and this is really what matters in what you said, this growing tension between, I would say, the north and the south, or maybe the west and the south. Let me put it this way. We've seen that with the vaccines. We've seen that with the debate on, you know this when I'm touring on the gas in Africa. Two years ago, it was bad to finance gas. Now we have a little gas problem, so we turn back to Africa and say, maybe we should reopen the door. We have also these tensions on demography. On the one hand, we have this demographic push. We are an aging world, and I've read some papers on the European demography and the needs to open to migrations, and people don't want migrations. So all this makes this a little bit difficult. On top of that, you have what Mr. Macron has called the two elephants. You have the China and the U.S., which are two elephants fighting each other, and they don't care about what's around the elephants. So we are in a world where on top of that, and this is really a concern to me, we are trying to develop a new set of norms and standards, and in particular, seen from Europe, we develop everything which is connected to ESG and impact and a new way to discuss sustainable finance, sustainable investment, which I think is well-intentioned, and I've been supporting that for ages, which is also increasing the gap between several parts of the world. Sometimes when I want to be provocative, I say, I don't want Europe to become bubble on. You know where we're very nice and cozy between us and we explain to the rest of the world, you should do like us, but it's not working this way. And so that's really where I want to come from, and that's one of your questions. And all of this is also at a moment where I believe, Jean-Marie tried to mitigate my feeling, that a lot of people are less and less concerned about what's happening far from them. Maybe some of you will remember the short novel from Voltaire, Candide, 300 years ago, or 250 years ago, which ends by, we have to cultivate our garden. And people, I think, read this literally today. My garden, I mean, the world is too complex. Climate is too big. Refugee is too big. Cyber security too big. I just can't handle this, so I'm taking care of my garden, literally understood. We know these fences, and if I do take care of my garden, the world will be okay. The problem is that I think both Voltaire and us today should not think about the garden as a closed ring-fenced area, but as our planet. And how do we move from the garden to the planet and back and forth? And that's really where we are today, and I think it's very difficult, including from a private sector perspective, because now your garden is yielding more money. Two years ago, when you put your money at home, you got zero. Now you got 4%. So why should I go to Africa if I can get 4% at home? So everything is converging in that direction. So I think we have to really take into account a number of avenues to explore, and the sooner the better. And that's probably what President Macron has in mind when he's convening this summit in June on resetting the relationship with the global south. I think there is one avenue which has been discussed for ages, and you mentioned it, which is the Security Council, the Bretton Woods system, et cetera. I mean, of course it must be discussed, and as French, we probably have more to lose than others. I think it's difficult, but it needs to be put on the table, definitely. Then we also have to put on the table the use of new financing. I mean, you've mentioned, you've entered at the SDR. What can we do with the SDR? This is real money that can be created and distributed and leveraged accordingly. And this is taking time. It's difficult, but we have to put this on the table. We also have to look at the IDA. IDA is a concessional money from the World Bank Group. We need to do more. I've tried when I was there to do more. The average IDA, there are hundreds of billions which are available there, provided we show a little bit of courage and imagination. We have, and I've said this many times, we have to have the development institutions work together as a system. Everybody is working in its silos. They don't want to cooperate. They compete with each other. Let's face it. So here again, it's not so much as shareholders and the institution, it's a system together. So I think we have ample resources at our hands that we don't choose for a number of reasons. So I think this is more actionable than just saying, let's reform Bretton Woods. There is money that we can mobilize. I think, and maybe Maurice will remember that, 20 years ago with President Chirac, we worked on new innovative mechanisms. President Chirac had a good formula. He said globalization should pay for globalization. I think it's a way, we created 20 years ago, the tax on plane tickets to finance to finance unit aid, medical research. I think we have to find new global resources. That's a nice way to unite people. Maybe it's a tax, and I know when French people speak about tax, it's always suspicious. But maybe tax on extractive industries. Maybe tax on carbon. I have no idea. But find some things that put us in the same boat and that guarantees some flow of money over the years, not dependent on the will of parliament year after year after year. So I think we have to work in that direction. And that's probably also a way to work on global public goods as well. I think we also have to develop new instruments. I mean, you mentioned some of them. The question is not to move money from one pot to the other with the same amount of money. But I think we have to redesign our ODA in an appropriate manner. I mean, we talk about public goods. We don't do much about this. And it's true that if you tell the development decision or you have to finance public goods, they will take money out of the bilateral aid to public goods. And then people will be angry and rightly so. And then comes the mobilization of the private sector, which is extremely dear to my heart. It's more and more difficult because precisely of what I mentioned, the financial conditions have changed. The interest of people has changed. They are less interested in emerging market and developing economies. It's more risky. It's far away. People telling me, my clients don't want their money to be sent so far away. They want their money to be used in France, in the US, America first. That is true. So how do we really find a way to mobilize? And I think it's now the time to address all types of issues which have been known for ages. I mean, I've participated to hundreds of panels on mobilizing private money, on blended finance, on public-private cooperation. We know all the solutions. We don't need another one, but we really need to say, what are the technical obstacles? I mean, there are technical obstacles regarding the definition of ODA. How do you take into account guarantees? Guarantees are not taken into account in ODA. With guarantees, you can leverage more money than by direct transfer. That's again, I don't want to be boring, but that's one idea. You have to do look at the Basel Street constraints. You have to look at the Sovency 2 constraints. You have to take them one by one. What are the obstacles? And then you have to really make a push, it is important. We will not win the climate battle in Paris, Brussels, or Washington. We will win the climate battle in Lagos, Delhi, and Bogota. So if we want to get that battle won, we have to transfer the money and the skills, etc. If we don't do it, we're going to lose it. That's what I call the billion students. We have to really shift the needle and go in that direction. I think it's extremely important. And we have also to make sure that the development institutions agree that the key, the way they should be incentivized, the way they should be assessed is do they mobilize private money? It is not the case today. It's still marginal. And we really have to change that. If we don't change that, private money will not move. Let's face it, there is no incentive whatsoever to move in scalable manner. So I think, I don't think we will have a revolution. I think we need a revolution. That's again, my French flavor. I don't think we'll get it. Let's face it. We will not reform better onward this year. We will not find the magic system to mobilize private sector. But I think we need a serious evolution. We need to really be serious about this. I'm really tired of fooling myself with all these conversations. We say, yeah, we should do that. We should do that. And so little is changing. I think again, we will not find a way to calm the waters. But if we can find a way to use a song, build a bridge over the troubled water, that would be good enough. Thank you. Very good. So now we have the garden, which we thought we could protect. But actually, as you say, unfortunately, no matter how much you tend your own garden, the forces that are impacting it are global. And you've identified a number of technical things could be done. You mentioned SDRs. About two years ago, there was, as many of you know, a big allocation of new SDRs, $650 billion. And this is a really remarkable achievement in the middle of the pandemic. And there was a big effort to say that apart from the initial allocation, a lot of the SDRs, more than two-thirds, went to countries that didn't really need them, rich countries, and they should recycle these SDRs. They should find ways to provide these SDRs to countries that needed the money. And many mechanisms were discussed. Here we are two years later. And the fact of the matter is that while some of those SDRs have moved from the central banks of rich countries to the account of the IMF, not a single SDR has yet reached any poor country two years later. So we have just had a big conversation and a moving of numbers across accounts, but so far, no real transfer has taken place. And I think what that brings us to is the last two interventions, I hope we'll focus on it, is all this that you're talking about, that other panelists were talking about, requires cooperation. And yet, cooperation right now is in short supply. Particularly because of the rivalry, and I think it is, it's gone beyond competition to being rivalry between the U.S. and some of its allies, increasingly, and China. And of course, developing countries find themselves caught between this and are hoping that they can stay out of this and have good relationships with everyone, but is that feasible going forward? So I want to turn first to Jeff Frieden to get your perspective on this, and then I'm going to come to Vincent, who's been studying the evolution in China. So, Jeff, over to you. Right, well, thank you very much. I think I appreciate Madame Touré's reminding us of the importance of understanding the divisions within countries and the legitimate concerns of those, but at your suggestion, Massoud, I think I want to focus on the geo-economic and political situation and the constraints that that imposes, and I'm afraid I am pessimistic on many of these dimensions, keeping in mind, of course, that a pessimist is just a well-informed optimist, so I think I'm being realistic about the possibilities. And as we all know, there we are in the midst of, I think, a fundamental change in the kinds of constraints and opportunities faced by developing countries as the world has evolved. And this is going to be a very, very challenging period to come. The last couple of decades, we've gotten used to cheap money in plentiful quantities with the search for yield and very low interest rates, negative real interest rates, very high commodity prices in general with some commodity booms in the period, and relatively open trade. And I guess I would just point out that all of those are changing. We confront a period of, a sustained period of high interest rates and of economic and financial conditions that are drawing capital back to the developed world out of the developing world. There is a global growth slowdown, including in China, which I think portends generally weaker commodity prices throughout the world. There are perhaps most important greater and greater limits on trade coming from the OECD, from the developed countries. Traditional protectionism, but more important now, concerned about the domestic production of essential commodities, of essential goods, whether out of the pandemic or out of national security considerations. There are greater limits associated with climate policy, with border adjustment mechanisms being designed in country after country that will be serious constraints on the developing world's ability to access the markets of the developed world. There is the increasing likelihood and reality of tying trade more and more to human rights, labor rights, democracy, and climate policy, all of which, again, are constraints being imposed by the developed world. And that doesn't even mention, with due respect, the Continuing American Campaign to Destroy the WTO. So all of this, I think, portends much more difficult access to OECD markets on the part of developing countries and access which often is and will continue to be contingent on satisfying some quite stringent economic and political requirements that will be politically very difficult and economically very difficult for many poor countries around the world. So are there alternatives? Well, there's China with the Development Road Initiative, with the Chinese Development Banks and Development Projects, but as was pointed out, China is, in many ways, a very, very large developing country. But I think many are finding that, as is true of virtually all of these relationships, money comes with strings attached. It's not free money. Chinese contractors, technology, workers, and geopolitical strings as well in terms of policy towards Taiwan. And more importantly, I think that the ability of China to stand as a true replacement for alternative to the OECD is strictly limited simply by the level of development in China and the size of the Chinese economy. So there are some opportunities there, but in no way can China be seen as a replacement to the OECD in supplying capital technology markets for the development process. The Russian Axis, which sometimes is pointed at as an alternative, I think is increasingly disappearing into the horizon as the Russian government gallops down the path of Russia, a pariah state. This is essentially, I think, going to continue and deepen as the conflict with the West turns into a new Cold War. The relevant consideration here is that not only do we have a sanctions regime in place and being put in place, but those sanctions are going to become more and more stringent. There will be secondary and tertiary sanctions that will make it extremely difficult for countries to maintain economic ties or to deepen economic ties with Russia and the broader impact of a new Cold War I think will be severe and serious. So, all in all, this is a very challenging period. The developed countries have been placing and will continue to place greater and greater demands on the economic and political realities of the developing world and the emerging markets, whether they are economic, political or geopolitical, meaning that there will be some very, very difficult choices to be made. The developed world, the OECD is and will continue to be increasingly stringent in the kinds of demands that it places on the developing countries. There are no easy alternatives available, so I think, all in all, this is going to be a very, very challenging time for the developing world and for the prospects of development. I should say that I appreciate the kinds of alternatives or mechanism design issues discussed here, but as Asu'd alluded to, the willingness and ability to design and implement those changes depends on the underlying domestic political and geopolitical realities, especially in the OECD, and I am pessimistic about the possibility of moving fast in that direction. I think we have to be realistic about what is reasonable to expect, given the very, very difficult domestic political circumstances that we haven't really talked about within many of the developing of the developed countries and in that context, I think that realism would be a better state of mind in thinking about the way forward and the realities are extremely challenging on every dimension. Thank you very much, Jeff. Thank you for sort of bringing into that perspective things are going to be quite difficult and also linking it right back to the first comment which is that the fragmentation and the realities within countries are driving a lot of the international relations. I want to end up with going to Vincent. So China's been the big driver of global growth. It's become the largest lender to developing countries. It's a big market for them. It's invested through the Belt and Road initiatives but now, as Jeff pointed out, the Chinese economic growth is slowing down dramatically. Maybe for the next few years, we're going to actually have to get used to a China that is not growing at 8% or 10% a year on average, but about half that. There's a lot of internal imbalances, housing market, financial sector to be sorted out. There's some pulling back on the Belt and Road. From your perspective, I know Vincent, you've been doing from the OECD, country studies and you've looked at China, what's your take on what that means for the process of the relationship with developing countries and the engagement of China in global processes including on climate change? Thank you, Massoud, and I'm very reassured by Professor Frieden's statement that the OECD will not be replaced by China any time soon. As the OECD person here, that's nice to hear and I agree. My last trip to China shortly before the COVID raised its ugly head in Wuhan was in late 2019 when China was celebrating four decades of convergence towards advanced economies. To give you one number GDP per capita in China was 3% of the G7 average in the late 70s and it rose to 36% of the OECD average by the late 2010s. This is an amazing takeoff that only Korea and a couple of other countries managed to achieve earlier on. In the process, poverty was reduced dramatically, living standards increased a lot and in 2019 we were celebrating the China dream with China having overtaken the US a few years earlier in terms of absolute size in PPP terms and we were talking about how China would project its might across the globe through the Belt and Road Initiative which was mentioned several times and then the pandemic stepped in which initially was managed quite effectively in a sense by China but then as we have seen in recent days three years of confinement, of repeated lockdowns and of low growth have taken their toll and Chinese leaders are obsessed by two things one is growth and the other is social stability and both were at risk with the way China tried to manage this pandemic it's sort of an impossible trinity that they were after to have at the same time maintained social stability growth and low casualties this was not sustainable over time especially with fairly ineffective Sinovac and Sinofarm vaccines there's a recent article in the Lancet just a few weeks ago that documents that the effectiveness of the Chinese vaccines is much less than that of the RMNA vaccines developed in the West and China's unwillingness to use the more effective vaccines is quite symptomatic in my view so we have seen this week is basically a very abrupt turnaround in the management of the pandemic the authorities have announced 10 measures to relax COVID discipline and have decided to shift the resources from massive testing and massive quarantining and ghastly facilities towards vaccination particularly and towards support to those who are henceforth allowed to confine at home so this is heartening it will be tested though because we have reports yesterday in Beijing that the treatments are in short supply to cope with the surge in cases that are now appearing even though the number of cases is widely understated because they have stopped testing or they test much less so there will be a difficult transition to words living with COVID in China now going back to the convergence process I started with I think something has changed in recent years it was alluded to my neighbor talking about de-globalization and fragmentation or the absence thereof but in the numbers indeed if we look at the share of foreign trade divided by GDP in China this share has declined very substantially over the past 15 years or so and this reflects several things one is simply that China is becoming a much bigger economy so it's normal that it would be less open on this measure there are other factors one is the Made in China 2025 strategy that was alluded to by Jean-Marie as well dates back to the mid-2010s whereby China seeks to reduce its dependence on foreign technology then there's the Trump war in 2018 and onwards with the tit-for-tat tariffs then there's the US CHIPS and Science Act the EU CHIPS Act the US inflation reduction act all go in the same direction of bringing security concerns into economics and trying to French or to home shore activities more inward looking perspective on globalization at the same time there's left FDI in China and the foreign firms operating in China are either exiting for some of them decoupling their activities in China from those elsewhere now the Belt and Road Initiative was mentioned the new Silk Roads and this is also a good illustration of how China's clout has been at the same time very impressive and has shown limits a number of countries, recipient countries are now stuck with infrastructure that is only half functional and with debt significant debt opaque debt to Chinese lenders so there is a problem there and then on climate change to wrap up perhaps the most important issue China is by far the largest emitter of greenhouse gases in the world twice as much as the US of course in per capita terms it's still half as much as the US but the US is not very virtuous so it's really bad China has long recognized this challenge if only because you cannot breathe in Beijing the smug is so bad so they're well aware and in their successful five-year plans they have set out ambitions to reduce emissions and in some ways they have played a very important role I think of solar panels for example because China has stepped up the production of those that we have seen a dramatic decline in global warming and global warming and global warming and global warming which will definitely be part of the solution for climate change but in parallel China continues to be over-reliant on coal on a massive scale they have promised to stop building coal-fired plants abroad there is clearly a problem here with how China is going to achieve its commitment to have peak carbon by 2030 and to have a carbon neutrality by 2060 and more importantly the world at large will reach its climate goals so for China part of the solution is to move away from a model that's highly dependent on that real estate is very intensive in cement in steel it's not compatible with a low carbon model and financially it's also proven to be unsustainable and China has this long standing goal of giving more way to consumption this would help moving further towards services and away from heavy industry Great, thank you very much Vincent, okay we actually have 20 minutes still left and so I'd like to open it up and see if there are questions or comments people would like to make from the floor and if they could if you could respect the same punctuality that the panellists have done we'll get many of you in who would like to lead off so I have calling the first row over there I think somebody should be walking around with microphones if not there's another question there's one there you see I don't see there's somebody coming over with a microphone now if not let's just share one of the microphones from the panel here to make sure that you get heard there we go there's a panel they've got one thank you it was very interesting my question is to all of you the stock markets have fell down drastically all over the world I'm interesting to see what you think about the future of the stock markets and more than that what would be the future of the cryptocurrencies because it seems to be that it is diminished totally from the system Investment advice now I've been over the back there I think a microphone right in the back middle there I don't see that I'm going to speak I'm going to speak in French if you allow me the analysis which are very interesting on the fragmentation it seems to be attached to economic and political and often linked to what is happening now the war of Ukraine it seems to me that the basis of this fragmentation started at the beginning of the century certainly in 2001 China became a member of the OMC source of interdependence but at the same time it created with Russia the Organization of Cooperation of Shanghai which is now large and which is maybe a basis of new non-linear and then there was the crisis 2008 with the rise of the G20 which often replaced the G7 and then the brick and then what is happening now what is happening now it is essentially a development of a multi alignment I propose I ask you to think about what is happening here in the region the trip of the Chinese president in Saudi Arabia and in the Gulf its meaning and its consequences on the fragmentation thank you very much I think there is also Mr. Sabrina over there just sitting over there and then we come to the lady in the front row after that thank you this fascinating panel there is one point of immigration and I would be very interested to know how in your perception this question of immigration plays in cooperation or the absence of international cooperation its impact on current geopolitical as on the international organization it is a phenomenon that affects the entire planet America as Europe it is a fundamental subject for this region how does it play in your view of the global landscape thank you Jean Michel and then there is the lady in the front right here thank you very much for all the panelists I have mostly a comment and it's a comment on what Madame Tomei said she said how come Africa have 57 countries and they don't even have one seat on the UN Security Council so don't you think like the whole world starting from the Bretton Woods it like you know with the IMF World WTO the whole system the world system had favor the west the developing countries on the expense the developed countries on the expense of the developing countries which basically somehow hinders their development thank you okay thank you and then there is the gentleman just behind her and then one before then I come to the panel after that thank you very much thank you thank you thank you we have gone from 0 to 2 mics thank you very much in line with that question there was quite some controversy this summer about the president of the World Bank being called the climate denier do you think more broadly that the international organization should be reformed in order to put climate change more at the center action. Thank you very much. Okay, very pertinent. Theo, did you have a question? After the remark of Monsieur Wallelou a few minutes ago, I'd like to say to confirm that Prince Faisal al-Saud that is the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Saudi Arabia will be with us on Sunday afternoon and I think that will give us an opportunity to discuss the foreign policy of Saudi Arabia. Thank you so much for mentioning that. I think there's one final comment over there and then we come to the panel. So I'm a little bit worried because I agree that every culture is a garden, but every one has a vision of the garden of the other, different from the sienna. Okay, thank you very much. Can everybody's garden look different or do they have to look more and more alike to be global? Okay, I think we have some very interesting questions and I'm going to just go to the panelists to ask them to pick up on whatever of the questions they think they would like to answer. There's investment advice on stock markets and crypto to start with. There's the issue of migration. There's whether the world system itself has been designed in a way that you could say, you know, does it take into account the needs and interests of developing countries? The international institutions have to be in some ways renewed to focus more on climate change and what about this issue of globalization, deglobalization? So Madam Turep, let's continue with the same order. Yes, well I mean about the system. Obviously if we go back to 1948 when we were designing even the UN system and other cooperation organization, most of the African countries and Asian countries were under colonization and we're carrying, you know, all these bags since then and obviously they're not fit. That's the least we could say about it and they need to be reformed and the first reform is starting by giving a permanency to Africa. I think African countries have been consistent with that. It's very interesting how when we start talking about globalization, China invites itself as a main topic. I mean that's a pattern I observed everywhere which speaks to how powerful they are, whether we like it or not, which doesn't matter to them anyway, but what we have to see is that from where I'm sitting again, Africa, we are saying, well, this is a model that we need to have because as you pointed out, drastically over 40 to 30 years poverty went down at a rate never seen before in history. This is now a powerhouse in the international scene, so why don't we do that? And I think it, you know, our traditional partners have to be very aware that for African leaders, China is going to remain as a key player. Of course there is no free money, but there's never been free money dealing with the West and the West, and neither on the contrary. So I think if we would like to sort of keep a business thing together, we better pay attention to what is going on in the relationship between China and the rest of the world in Africa, which is a mineral rich continent, and it's going to be the same for a long time. So I think the question is posed to OCD countries and to other international partners who want to make money in Africa. Second, the issue about migration, which is part also of the, you know, the struggle we are having with Europe mostly. I was reading yesterday that there is a dire lack of, you know, I mean, people are having jobs, but they're not seeing people to take the jobs. There's a lack of workers, obviously, but yet you do have unfit migration regulation, which is more of a sort of psychological barrier than, you know, a making sense decision. Europe needs young workers, obviously, but of a certain type, according to voters. Do you want them to look like European, but it's not going to be the case, because Europe is a very old continent. And as, you know, the only, you know, workers you can get mostly will be from places that don't look like European. So that is also something that we need to, Europe need to deal with. I think Europe reminds me of, you know, old castles, you know, that used to have day times and who refuse now to see that, I mean, the foundation are aging and you need to maybe do some maintenance. So I think this type of forum help us to move forward, because we have to go to the bottom line of the issue if you want to find solutions. I think there is a way for good cooperation on a win-win basis. The lady who raised the issues is the same. In Africa, you are having now strong movement of youth. A minute, 70% of the population is below the age of 35. So talking to them about the past is not relevant. What they want to see is solution now. And if we really would like to build healthy relationship and somehow, because that's the issue of OECD countries contain, meaning the expansion of China, it's to redefine the way we do business. Thank you. Thank you very much. Okay. Let's take two minutes each, please. So, sorry. Thank you. On the stock market, we are more concerned about the consequences and the causes at the WTO. Consequences could be financial crisis in developing countries, which are already struggling with their food bills, which are very high because of the inflation. So the question of the fragmentation and the China posed by Mr. Wallaloo, first of all, China does not seek at all in terms of trade, alternatives to the multilateral system existing. On the contrary, she loves OECD a lot. She has interest in it. She has also offered OECD a Chinese garden which is at the entrance, which is very beautiful, which shows a certain intention of staying in the institution. What is interesting to understand the dynamics is to look at the trade war in the United States. We have a first study, which is not of the OECD, which is of the Peterson Institute, but which says that, basically, one, this trade war has not led to a cut-off between China and the United States. The trade has continued to progress. And two, this trade war has produced exactly the effects that were aimed at, that is to say, on the products aimed at by American tariffs, there has been a serious reduction in trade, often intermediate products, technology products. And on products that have not been aimed at, there has been, for example, the game consoles for young Americans, because there, it has put political problems, on products that have not been aimed at, there has been an increase in trade. And I think that the globalization of the future will have something to do with that, more complex, more selective things, on high technology products, on semi-conductor products, electric cars, etc. We will see fragmentation, but not necessarily on the global panorama. On the question of immigration, in our trade, it is translated by the question of physical movements in the services. And there, we fall on what Aminata said, that is to say, the opposition, or Bertrand, West, South, that is to say that in the legacy of the rules, it is a sector that is less liberalized than that of the good, and it is part of asymmetries that complicate a lot negotiations, because the countries that have an interest in the export of these services by the labor force, consider that we must first put it back at a level before doing other liberalization in the other sectors. So we have that. And last on the question about Africa and global governance, I think in the WTO, we see Africa claiming its voice more and more. Of course, our leader is an African, which is not by accident, it means something. Second, Africa is more and more invested in the negotiation. I'll just take one example is our dispute settlement system, which has been weakened by the U.S. Africa is pleading for its restoration. And what is really interesting is that Africa was not a user of the dispute settlement system. There are very minimal cases where Africa has been involved in the trade dispute. So that means Africa is interested in having the non-discrimination principle being enforced in the WTO in the future. Thank you very much. Vincent, I'll just come down. Thank you. So I'll take the stock price and crypto question and the migration one just briefly. So the fact that stock prices have suffered is no surprise with interest rates moving up and bound to move up further. After years and years of negative interest rates or free money, there was an asset bubble clearly, and it's now popping. On crypto and its collapse, I think this illustrates the need to regulate crypto and more generally the shadow banking sector more carefully, because those developments can have systemic consequences. On migration, I think it's interesting to see the differences between OECD countries. Some countries have welcomed migrants with open arms on a big scale, for example, Sweden. Others are more reluctant, Korea, Japan, traditionally, but even in Korea and Japan, where they tend to prefer robots to immigrants, they are now employing more and more immigrants. It's not necessarily an open policy in Japan, for example, but it is clearly a trend from a very low base, but it's moving up. Thank you very much, Vincent. Okay. Yeah, I'm going to talk about very briefly about China. I mean, China has contributed to the world economy after joining the WTO, and China exported this inflation, deflation or price stability to the world for the last two decades, and also create the market as well. So there are good aspects of China, but now I think that the world is now in the page of the aftermath of the global financial crisis still. So for more than 15 years, we are now suffering from the aftermath of the global financial crisis and also cheap money as well. And so all of these kind of things, I mean, and also the relations between the Saudi Arabia and the United States are now, because of the necessity of the cooperation between the two countries in terms of the natural resources and oil, then I think that the Saudi Arabia would be more independent from the Western countries, and then all the British countries are now very, very welcome the application of the Saudi Arabia is joining the BRICS. So in June, we had the G7, and we had the NATO summit, but don't forget that there was a very big gathering of the BRICS summit countries. So Indian Prime Minister Modi was very busy to participate in the BRICS summit and followed by the G7. So another big war is now the moving without our noticing of what's going on. And the last one is about the reformation of the international organization. I think that now the international organization has played a very good role, but now I think that it's time to really think about the reform of the international organizations, especially United Nations and Secret Council, and other some, of course, I mean trade order as well. And the cryptocurrency and many other issues now we are now talking about them. The main problem is that we have no global governance. We have no global regulations to cover the oldest kind of the rules. So that's the one of the main reason why we cannot speed, we cannot fix the oldest problems in the speedy. Thank you very much, chef. Yes, on equities and crypto, but we had very, very low and negative real interest rates. So we had bubbles in other asset markets and now interest rates are rising. So those bubbles are all bursting and that will continue for the foreseeable future. And in my view, most of those bubbles should burst and it's a positive development. That brings me to a general principle. I'm an academic. I deal in what's wise and what's not shoulds. That is, why does the world look the way it does? What is the way that the world looks? Whatever our shoulds may be, I think it's important to have that in mind. And that brings me to this point about the Bretton Woods or post war institutions and the possibilities of other institutions. Sure, the post world war II and the reigning international economic institutions definitely obey the golden rule. The golden rule is the people who have the gold get to make the rules and there's no surprising surprise that those who made the rules in the post war period made rules that favor them. Alternative options, the countries that were successful have been successful were not successful because of the non-aligned movement. The non-aligned movement in the previous non-aligned movement had no impact on development strategies, no positive impact on development strategies. The countries that were successful, the ones that played by the rules, whether it was Korea, China, or others, and that's going to continue, the creation of a new axis, whether it's Russo-Chinese or some other form, is not going to happen not in the foreseeable future because, as I said, and as others have also echoed, the OECD is not the only game in town, but it is the only realistically significant game in town for developing countries. That's the reality. The reality may be unpleasant, but it is the reality, and it's the reality that developing countries are going to have to live with. Thank you. Merci. Merci Massoud. Je vais parler en français sur les cryptos et les marchés. Je n'ai pas beaucoup de commentaires. Je rappellerais juste que Warren Buffett avait dit en 2008, peut-être certains s'en souviennent, c'est quand la marée baisse qu'on voit qu'il se baigne sans maillot. Et j'ajoutais perfidement à l'époque, on a découvert qu'on était dans un camp de naturalistes. Il n'y a pas beaucoup de maillots. Et aujourd'hui, on voit bien, on l'a vu en Grande-Bretagne au moment du mini-budget de l'East Trust, on a découvert que les fonds de pension anglais étaient plus fragiles dans leur structuration qu'on ne le croyait. On le voit aujourd'hui sur les cryptos. Il y en aura d'autres. On va découvrir des tas de choses sous l'eau qui ne sont pas très plaisantes, et ça ne va pas être extrêmement agréable. Sur les organisations internationales, on a dit beaucoup de choses, et encore une fois, leur réforme, elle était à la fois souhaitable et difficile à envisager compte tenu de tous les blocages. Il y a quelque chose qui me paraît très important aujourd'hui. On a parlé du dirigeant de la Banque mondiale. Je pense que toutes les organisations internationales devraient être 100% compatibles. Sustainable Development Goals est 100% compatible climat point bar. On ne commence pas à dire, je fais 35%. Je fais 42%. Je fais... Non, à un moment, il faut arrêter. La planète s'est donnée une feuille de route. Les organisations internationales suivent la feuille de route qu'elle aime ou qu'elle ne l'aime pas. Et là, il faut être absolument, absolument clair. Sur l'immigration Jean-Michel a souligné, je l'avais dit un peu. Je pense qu'on risque d'être dans un monde assez effrayant. D'un côté, on se replie, comme je le disais, sur son jardin. Le French Shoring, comme disait Janet Yellen, on va rapatrier un certain nombre de choses. Pour un certain nombre de raisons, on va limiter une partie du commerce. Je commence à voir dans mes investissements des gens me disent, tu ne peux pas investir là puisque les produits sont exportés en avion. Ça a aimé du carbone et donc c'est pas bon dans les normes européennes. On va avoir des effets de bord qui vont qu'on va rétrécir tout ça. En face de ça, on a un défi démographique immense. Aminata Touré l'a rappelé. Comment est-ce qu'on, comment est-ce qu'on traite ça? Si on se replie sur soi et qu'on n'offre pas de perspective au pays où la démographie explose et que, par ailleurs, on ne veut pas de migration chez soi, il y a un moment, on ne va pas square the circle. Comment on va y arriver? Je ne sais pas. Mais si on ne trouve pas une réponse dans les cinq à quinze ans à cette question, nous avons un monde effrayant devant nous. Je pèse ce mot. Et sur la question de Philippe Chalmain, oui, il y a plein de jardins. Chacun voit son jardin. C'est d'ailleurs le principe du jardin avec les palissades. C'est que chacun fait son petit jardin en espérant que l'assemble de tous les jardins fera quelque chose de formidable. C'est possible. C'est peu vraisemblable. Encore une fois, il y a une différence d'échelle entre son jardin individuel et la planète, le jardin d'Eden, d'une certaine manière. Et donc comment, sous le contrôle de M. Le Rabin, comment est-ce qu'on organise ce lien entre notre jardin individuel et ce jardin planétaire? Je pense que là aussi, si on ne veut pas de ce monde effrayant dont je veux parler, il est absolument urgent de tous devenir jardiniers à la française, à la chinoise, à la japonaise, à l'anglaise, tout ce qu'on veut, mais avec cette vision collective indispensable. Thank you very much Bertrand. So I think we've come to the end of our panel and I'm not going to try to summarize anything, but I'll just say one thing which is, I think what is very clear from this conversation is that there are going to be some really difficult issues to resolve, that are genuine difficult questions with trade-offs that are not easy to sort out. But in that conversation, we should at least attempt not to do, create problems that don't need to exist. And I just picked two that were identified. One is the question of natural gas and its use in Africa. It's an obstacle to a meaningful conversation now because the approach that many countries have taken to the use and development of natural gas in Africa is incoherent with their own policies on the use of natural gas. And by insisting that Africa should find a future energy needs when the majority of people in Africa do not have an energy access at the right level, without relying on natural gas while Europe and US should continue to draw upon it, just creates an unnecessary aggravation in already difficult conversation. And the second example I think is to assume that everybody shares the preoccupation and perspective that say you have in the US about China today. I mean, we, I sit in the US and we may be preoccupied with the impact of a growing China in the world and what that means. But to assume that every other country is equally preoccupied with that and shares the perspective that you have in the US makes it harder to have a conversation. So I think you were saying in the final comment, Madam Thuray said that we should not assume and we should start from the recognition that other countries don't have the same perspectives. An honest conversation would help us to go quickly to the difficult problems that we actually will have to resolve with a great deal of discussion. So I think there's been a terrific panel. I want to ask you to please join me in thanking them for their contribution. And I think we go directly to the next panel, which is the breakdown of the global economic order, the appropriate next title.