 Alright, let's move on. Let's get to the arguments against scientism. These are actually not that easy to find in a literature, so I've been working on them myself. And what I'll do is present three versions of, three different kinds of arguments against scientism and then also have a look at what kinds of replies adherents of scientism could give to them. So here we go. Here's the first argument, and I've called it the fundamental argument, unpretentiously, but we'll see in a minute why it's called the fundamental argument. The basic idea of the argument is that, sure we can do science and surely it provides knowledge, but science itself is based on things that are not science and science can provide knowledge only if those things from which it starts count as knowledge. So the things I have in mind here are such things as perception, of course, so I know that there is a microscope over here because I see one, but also memory. So I remember that this DNA sample is the same one that I used yesterday. There's introspection, so I know that I intend to carry out this experiment tomorrow. I know what I believe about my previous experiments. For instance, I know that I believe that I should redo this experiment. If all those sources that science is based on do not count as knowledge, then natural science itself cannot provide knowledge. So that's why it's called the fundamental argument. If science provides knowledge, it can only do so because non-science can provide knowledge. What response could one give to this? Well, the first response is to say, this is kind of a partial defense, is to say this may be true for the five senses, so vision, for instance, and also memory, it may be introspection as well, but it's not true for morality and it's also not true for religion because we do not appeal to moral beliefs, we don't use moral beliefs and we don't use any religious or supernatural beliefs in doing natural science. I think that's definitely going to be true for religious beliefs, but it's also true for moral beliefs is an interesting issue. I'm not going to debate it today, but I just wanted to point out that this is a reply adherents of scientism could give. Another interesting reply that one could give is the following. It appeals to an example that's often used in philosophy, which is the ship of Theseus. So it's often used as an example in metaphysics. Theseus has a ship that consists of 365 wooden planks and he sets sail and he leaves harbour and he has another 365 planks on board. And what he does when he is out there at sea is he replaces one plank of the ship every day and by the end of the year every plank of the ship has been replaced with a new plank. So in a way we have an entirely new ship. And you can imagine that the old 365 planks are destroyed or a new ship is made out of them or whatever you like. The question is, is this still the same ship or is it a different ship? So this is a topic that is discussed in metaphysics. It has to do with identity over time. But the interesting thing is that this example can be used for the issue at hand. So to meet the fundamental argument. And people like Neurat, whom I think I mentioned earlier, have actually used it in defence of scientism. So what they say is this. Look, you can't replace everything at once. You can't replace the whole basis, the whole fundament of science at once. But you can replace one particular non-scientific thing with a scientific thing. So here's a belief that science is based on. Let's scrutinise it by way of natural science. And if it's not correct, let's replace it. And if it's correct, then it has passed the natural scientific test. And then let's move on to some other place. And if we do that long enough, we can verify or if necessary replace all the fundamentals, all the bases of science. So natural science is indeed based on certain non-scientific things. But if we do thorough checks all the time in the end, it will no longer be the case. So this is a reply that one could give. Well, this raises lots of philosophical questions. For instance, one can't start from nothing, right? One has to use something. One has to rely on one's memory and one's visual perception when one starts. Of course, one can return to that memory and to that visual perception later on. But isn't it the case that if the beliefs that one started with were irrational, that that property is conferred to those later beliefs? That's a question that needs to be addressed. So there's a lot to be said here, but I just wanted to point out this is an important argument that opponents of scientism have levelled against scientism. The fundamental argument, at least that's how one could call it. Let's move on to the second argument that is often called the argument from self-referential incoherence. Arguments from self-referential incoherence are often found in philosophy. So you will find them, for instance, when it comes to certain kinds of reductionism or when it comes to certain kinds of foundationalism in epistemology. I'll leave the discussion of those for another time. I just want to apply it to scientism in this particular case. So the basic idea is that scientism is in trouble because the thesis of scientism, so the thesis that only natural science provides knowledge, is itself not an instance of a product of natural science. So the thesis doesn't meet its own criteria. It's not something that we believe on the base of natural scientific research. Hence, we cannot rationally believe and we cannot rationally embrace. We cannot know that scientism is true. But if we cannot know that scientism is true, then why should we believe it in the first place? That's the move one could make here. Now I believe that there are several responses available to the adhering of scientism. Those responses are going to be controversial, but I would like to mention them here. Because I think these are options that the adhering of scientism needs to explore. First, one might think that there is scientific evidence for scientism. So one might think that, well, there is the success of science that I mentioned. And then there is also science that supports debunking explanations that I mentioned earlier of non-scientific sources of belief. So there is enough evidence to think that science provides knowledge, whereas non-scientific sources of knowledge do not. So one might think, look, scientism itself, in the end, is supported by scientific evidence. There's a lot to be said about here because scientism is still a claim about knowledge. So one needs to have a certain idea about what knowledge is or what rational belief is. But rather than delving into those physiological questions, I will move on. Second one could say, look, scientism works. It's just a really good theory and a really helpful theory in carrying out science. And here, again, discussion is possible. So one might say, well, scientism works in doing science, but then other theories work equally well. So if you have a theory that says science provides knowledge, but other sources of belief also provide knowledge, such as memory and introspection and moral intuition, that works equally fine. I can do my scientific research equally well if I don't embrace scientism. So this reply is going to be controversial. An equally controversial reply is going to be the reply that says, scientism is true and we should make an exception for scientism itself. So something counts as knowledge only if it's based on science, except for the thesis of scientism itself. That is a piece of knowledge, an instance of knowledge, even though it's not based on natural science. That's what one could say, but of course this is going to be controversial because it seems so ad hoc, right? Why make an exception only for scientism itself, on what basis? So maybe the most promising reply is the final reply that I'm going to mention, namely to treat scientism not as a claim or as a statement, but as a stance. The idea or the concept of a stance has been developed in some more detail by Bas van Vraassen, the Dutch American philosopher of science, who has written extensively about empiricism. So he claims that empiricism is a certain stance and not so much a thesis or a claim. A stance is a set of beliefs, a set of attitudes, a set of approaches, a way of doing certain things. So it's not merely a claim, but it's something broader and also something deeper than that. And this is an idea that some adherents of scientism embrace. An example is James Laderman. So James Laderman has defended a restricted version of scientism, namely scientism about metaphysics. And he says, look, we should treat scientism not as a thesis, but as a stance. It's a particular attitude one takes. And because it's an attitude that one takes, it does not suffer from the problem of self-referential incoherence because it doesn't claim that scientism itself is a case of knowledge. This is an interesting suggestion, but also a challenging one. Because if it's not a case of knowledge itself, but merely a stance, then how are we going to judge whether we should adopt this particular stance so that a scientific stance, rather than another stance, a non-scientistic stance, on what basis are we going to evaluate which stance we should take? What are the criteria? And it seems to me that this issue is not yet developed enough in the literature to see where this is going. But it seems a potentially promising route to take for those who want to claim that we should all embrace scientism, but that it does not suffer from problems of self-referential incoherence. And this brings me to the final argument that I would like to mention against scientism. And I call it the argument for non-scientific values and principles in science. And you will find certain aspects of this argument in the work of Michael Stanmark, the Swedish philosopher of science and Swedish epistemologist. So he has written quite a bit on scientism. He's one of the first philosophers, I think, to write extensively about it. And the argument is basically this. If we do science, then we look at different scientific theories and we compare them with each other. But we do so on the basis of certain criteria. So here are a few examples of those criteria. One of them is precision, right? How precise is this particular theory that we have over here? Or how precise is that one? Second, it's explanatory scope. So how much does it explain? We generally prefer a theory that explains more to a theory that explains less. Third one is explanatory power. So how well does it? How well does it explain the phenomenon at hand? Fourth, simplicity. We generally prefer the theory that is simpler, so that is committed to fewer entities. So the simpler a theory is, the more likely it is that it is true. A fifth one is, of course, coherence with background knowledge. So we want theories that cohere with what we already believe or what we already think we know. Another one is fruitfulness. So some theories can actually be fruitfully employed in further research, whereas other theories cannot. Unifying power. I already mentioned evolutionary theory that has great unifying power. So it takes all sorts of theories and ideas and observations together and explains them in one grand unifying theory. And the final one is elegance or beauty. This is important for in mathematics. So mathematicians say they often prefer a theory because it's more elegant, it's more beautiful and have some trouble spelling out exactly what that amounts to. But at least it's one of the virtues theories can have. Now here's the point. So if you look at this long list of virtues of criteria for selecting theories, then one makes a choice in favor of one theory and against another theory based on balancing those criteria. But the balancing of those criteria is not something one can do on a scientific basis. So there can be two scientists who have the exact same data and the same background knowledge. But they come to embrace a different theory because the one finds, say, simplicity more important, whereas the other finds explanatory power more important. And what this shows is that within the science itself, so within the scientific practice, there are core values that are not themselves scientific and that we can't judge on the basis of scientific research. So this is a challenge for a scientism itself. Given that there are non-scientific values that play a crucial role in scientific research. So these are three arguments against scientism and maybe they can be met, maybe they cannot be met. I think this is a topic that will receive much more scrutiny in the nearby future.