 due date for op-eds actually I said this in the class but some of you might have been missing so the due date the deadline for op-ed submission is December 17th op-ed due date December 17th and the simulation will take place on December 21st because it is a Tuesday like today and we will start at 10.30 and this room will be available and I will make necessary arrangements by coming earlier or maybe a day before I don't know if there's any class before us just on Tuesday mornings but we will start at 10.30 and of course there will be intermissions every 50 minutes and we might have to continue for a third hour until 1.30 or 1.20 something like that I mean in the afternoon so on Fridays we have only one hour and actually we have slots for two hours but the simulation might last longer so it is better if we had the simulation on December 21st all right so please mark your agendas about these two important dates and also let your friends know about this because some of you I mean may not have been here in previous sessions and some of your friends as far as I can see actually are missing here all right and you have to coordinate with your peers or teammates that there will be a simulation and most likely on December 17th I may give you some hints or we may even have a rehearsal I mean just maybe try to figure out as to what actually you will be doing here during the simulation all right so this December 17th deadline the due date for op-ed submissions late submissions will not be accepted and the simulation December 21st right so any questions and I will give the exams during the break not now and also after the class and we will continue with the PowerPoint slide that we sort of stick to which I have quite find quite interesting and useful for discussing many of the issues that are actually being discussed today oops so we stick to this PowerPoint slide not because we don't have any other PowerPoint of course we do have and I might prepare as I said before a lot of PowerPoints but this is important in the sense that we are not going as fast as I did actually while presenting this PowerPoint back in November 2006 at NATO school and the whole presentation lasted for about 50 minutes and actually as I said it was the best presentation chosen by the participants among some 30 plus other presentations at the NATO school this is something important but the reason why it takes so long is that I sort of spend enough time for covering every single issue that I've mentioned here in blue points and of course I make this comparison between today and past and past like 2005 2006 anything before and there are many issues which are of course revolving around the Iranian nuclear program and if you look at the WikiLeaks you see there the Iran's nuclear program is to who said what I mean which king or shake or I don't know prime minister or president of which country said what about Iran's nuclear program and everything and by the way I don't know if you follow this scandalous development the WikiLeaks leaking secret files which were supposed to be secret or confidential but this is something that in a sense confirms something that I used to say at the beginning of every single semester that I'm teaching here I mean since 1997 there is a huge gap between what people say and what people do in the international arena in the political circles in the major circles as well so nothing is what it seems to be or what you see so it is important to understand that there's a there is this huge gap and therefore we cannot rely on what people say but we have to rely on what they actually do and since or in the absence of information about what they have done actually of course we have to figure out what may have happened in the past and we do this by relying on the past information of course which could be evidence which could be substantiated with facts figures documents or archival information etc so that's why international relations experts must work on the archives documents primary sources which are revealed to public scrutiny I mean for research of course until WikiLeaks it took about 20 years 30 years 50 years depending on the level of secrecy of the document and for instance if you go and read my article which is published in Middle Eastern study I guess Iran's nuclear program and Western Iranian nuclear ambitions and Western countries and something like that I can remember the exact title and there I have referred to a number of archival stuff which I retrieve from the National Security Archives of the United States as to who said what or what kind of communication took place between for instance the US Embassy in Tehran and the Washington the State Department and what kind of directives were sent to the ambassador in Tehran from Washington by the State Department or by the president or what kind of negotiations or discussions may have taken place between the Shah of Iran and the president of the United States I don't know Kennedy or his followers etc so Johnson for so therefore it is important to bear in mind that as international relations experts or scholars we are dealing with actually with certain illusions and we are not necessarily able to have access to all the real-time tangible verifiable data at all times so therefore it is our task to familiarize ourselves with the typical behavior of states and in some cases specific behavior of particular states and by basing our analysis on this information that is available based on what we sort of I get from reliable sources we can only construct a certain degree of analogy and make a kind of a guessing some sort of a you know maybe hypothesized hypothesizing about what may have happened or what may be happening so it is indeed a very difficult thing to be an international relations scholar if you are a professional I mean if you are a meter professional meter officer or a diplomat or a bureaucrat in some of the ministries you have access to a certain of course limited depending on your level access to real information which is not of course this close to other people so you cannot have access as a scholar unless you have the permission to do so I think I said this on one occasion but let me repeat when I was writing my doctoral dissertation on nuclear non-proliferation regime I was curious about the policy of Turkish public Turkish government and some institutions such as the military I applied to the Turkish channel stuff with a letter written by my supervisor then Alikar Osmanol and we made this application formal application to have access to certain information and library whatever documents they may have well we received the answer a couple of years later after I earned my PhD and the answer was no we will not allow you to make research thank you I did my dissertation or my work already which was found successful so therefore this there are many limitations in front of us well actually this week leagues may provide a lot of substantial information for the researchers not only for journalists but also for the scholars as to what may have happened in the recent past or what may be happening today and what are these sort of information that are revealed a point at for the future I mean what kind of developments are likely to take place in the future you might remember that I was talking about the unease the lack of or the degree of discontent in the Gulf countries but I mean some of you had said I can't remember who well sir but you know I've met in a job they just paid a visit to Saudi Arabia does this mean that they have good relations of course on the face value when look at the screens of TVs or whatever newspapers you see pictures shaking hands smiling at each other well this is how it is at the face value but behind the doors they of course not necessarily exchange similar feelings about each other and especially behind closures when they talk about their enemies or the detrescent they perceive when with the United States or with other Western countries they expect the United States and Western countries to do something of course which they don't reveal to the public so this kind of issues are actually at the core of the limitations of the international relations scholars and to overcome this difficulty it is always useful and indeed it is essential it is a sine qua non thing for international relations scholars to look into the archival data I mean what sort of what kind of developments have really taken place 30 years ago 20 years ago 10 years ago sometimes informations may be disclosed to public scrutiny much earlier than many people expect and sometimes you for instance I remember again during my research at the United U.S. National Secure Archives you get a sort of document you I mean you get the message that you have the document is available you say wow I got it then you have the full document with maybe a couple of sentences left without any sort of blank everything so they still erase much of the information names places dates etc and as such the document may not be of much use for your research so anyway it is something at this field as I always said not only this semester every single semester that I started teaching here to my students in order to emphasize the value of reading about the past because as I said last Friday you do not necessarily seem to be happy with reading information or commentary data whatever about past events you want to discuss today and this is not a pop culture issue international relations is a very serious business and it has it deals with people's lives it affects people's lives and what you do as a professional as well as a scholar has to be of course very seriously decided so this is therefore important and the most recent developments the Vickie leaks and everything tells to tell us again how important it is to know about what exactly is happening so therefore here we will see information about what in my opinion and based on my research is exactly happening in with respect to the Iran's Victor program I think I we had covered this part and we had come to the United States I guess and yeah I mean we had started already we may be just repeating some of certain things but it's not a big deal we'll still continue we emphasize that Iran constitutes a threat actually back in 2006 it was a potential threat now Americans security experts not only from the government but also from academia from journalistic circles they emphasize this as a clear threat and not only the United States but also as you have seen and we've heard about over the last couple of days countries in the Gulf and as well as Israel and even Turkey at some point I just had a quick glance at some of the documents which were leaked and reporting the conversation between Phil Gordon and Ahmed Davutoglu and Phil Gordon is trying to sort of influence Ahmed Davutoglu's opinion that his I mean Davutoglu's initiatives with respect to you know this swap deal nectar exchange exchange of nectar lower and tyrannium nuclear material will not serve anything will not go anywhere actually this is something that you know it's taking place between Davutoglu and Phil Gordon he's trying to tell us tell his Turkish counterpart that this is not going to go anywhere but this is not going to help and Davutoglu sort of sticks to his own opinion that and he emphasizes that this is something that may be useful as I mentioned here on a couple of occasions and also have written about it the swap deal between Turkey Iran and Brazil which was signed on May 17th this year earlier this year is maybe if not the only but one of the most important breakthroughs which has taken place over the last several years when this issue came to the fore more intensively so sorry for all this so there we see the United States pursues a policy which is which I decided or just label as stick only policy there is this term carrots and sticks as you are most probably aware this is something that is used in the diplomatic jargon carrots and sticks and some people don't like this term and they say we are not animals so why should we be you know given incentives with carrots or why should we be punished by sticks but this is the term this part of the terminology jargon use etc and the United States policy was as I put it here stick only policy so the United States expected Iran to take certain steps first and then maybe considering some favors some some benefits that is some carrots not necessarily carrots first and sticks first and then if if Iran live ups lives up to its commitments then some carrots might follow that was the United States policy which in my opinion has not changed dramatically there's a slight change in the attitude especially with the change of government in the United States Bush has gone and Obama came to power and as we have seen he sort of about this time last year actually in early October and which continued a little bit into the November last year there was a certain amount of diplomatic negotiations between Iran of course Iranian representatives and the representatives of P5 plus one you know this term P5 plus one the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council plus Germany and as such actually Germany has made itself into another big power which was a long term ambition of German diplomats or just German politicians because I'm sure they and we very much the UK's and French's French positions as P5 members of P5 and Germany which used to be a much more economically maybe even military and political stronger country than when compared to the UK and France why they keep asking why they are not there of course they do not ask this loudly so you may not hear but we we understand from their sort of statements stance positions in some international developments anyway we mentioned again last time that the United States has a limited economic diplomatic leverages so actually the United States lacks a number of mechanisms that might be useful in bringing Iran to terms from their perspective so I mean by applying stick only policy I mean by sort of a threatening Iran only without providing any incentives or any encouragements or any tangible benefits in return for anything that Iran might do then of course if if the United States does not have these mechanisms or does not have this capacity of course it will not be possible from the United States perspective to establish is sort of a certain degree of communication that might be fruitful that might be that might provide certain tangible results so therefore it is it is United States has difficulties and that's why even though the United States complained very much about European Union's intervention which I said after the revelations of the coming from the opposition group the Mujahideen Halk Halkum Mujahideen whose headquarters now in is in Washington and they big in August 2002 they sort of reveal information about the presence of this Natanz Nektur facility and then Muhammad al-Baraday went to Tehran and asked for certain clarifications about the allegations of a secret enrichment facility and of course based on what he got or what he did not get from the Iranians he in early 2003 he issued an ultimatum and a statement he made a statement and asked Iran to sign the additional protocol the enhanced verification mechanism verification inspection document of the IAEA by October 31st 2003 and by that time the European Union countries of United Kingdom France and Germany have taken the initiative to convince the Iranians that it would be in their best interest to sign the additional protocol what is interesting about the additional protocol that this might be a little bit of a petition for those who listen to this part but again still useful to refresh your minds and for those who have not been here just to understand the significance of additional protocol it is it is the document according to which the International Atomic Energy Agency conducts or carries out inspections in countries there is as we mentioned before the model protocol coming from 1970-71 the updated version which is insert information circular which is a internal sort of documentation on recording number of the IAEA there is this additional protocol actually it is 98 and there are certain updates in search for it 540 these are not important things for those who are not particularly interested but this is obligatory for every MPT non-nuclear weapon state non-nuclear weapon states party to the MPT must sign or must conclude a safe cars agreement with the IAEA based on the small protocol this is obligatory but since it was concluded in 1970-71 based on certain concerns of a number of countries such as Japan Germany who did not want to be subject to extensive verify inspections which they considered would cause some disadvantages commercially economically as well as other concerns this model protocol was not a very strong document and according to this model protocol the International Atomic Energy Agency could visit the nuclear facilities that are declared by the states and even if the IAEA had some sort of intelligence from various sources which by the way IAEA could not then rely on anybody's intelligence it was forbidden but somehow let's assume this is a country and there are these nuclear facilities in this country but the authorities have only declared these three but left this one out the IAEA even if they knew about it they could not go there because they had to rely on the declaration made initial declaration made by the host country an MPT member country and the inspections had to be carried out according to model protocol and even then in these facilities it could go only to specific designated area it could not go everywhere in the facility so this model protocol was relatively very weak document so after some the revelations of Iraqi nuclear capabilities as you should remember after 687 AASCOM and IAEA were mandated to destroy remove or render harmless the chemical biological weapons ballistic missiles by AASCOM and IAEA, NICTOR infrastructure by the IAEA so after all this and the revelations about South African nuclear capabilities that they had built six NICTOR warheads already seventh was underway then they decided on the eve of the transition from white minority to black majority they decided to disarm to become a non-nuclear weapon state so based on all these lessons learned from the Iraqi case South African case and others the IAEA initiated what is called program 93 plus 2 the program 93 plus 2 was actually a study internal study within the International Atomic Energy Agency which aim at finding ways or suggesting ways as to how to improve the existing model protocol as to how to come up with a more stronger document which would meet the needs of the contemporary sort of concerns of the international community so and the task was first of all to identify the powers of IAEA the powers of the IAEA that were not used by the IAEA for political or technical reasons and the additional powers that IAEA needed in order to enhance its verification capability so the additional protocol this program 93 plus 2 study 93 which was expected to end in 95 within two years and it sometime in 96 and some revisions some fine tuning studies were conducted and I remember in 1998 the document was finished and sometime later was open to signature but what is important with respect to this document is that it is definitely a very powerful document maybe not the ultimate version of one might have in his head in terms of how verification mechanism or inspection document should be but it is something which is close to the very ideal document but what is important is that we have to bear in mind that unlike model protocol which is obligatory for the MPT states the non-nuclear weapon states addition protocol is not obligatory for a non-nuclear weapon states to sign it is actually signed voluntarily by a number of states including Turkey and Turkey signed and ratified the document back in 2000-2001 and states who signed this document are those who want to provide enough transparency and confidence to the rest of the world meaning that under additional protocol there is nothing I can hide under model protocol which is obligatory and which is still enforced by many for many states it is possible to hide some of the facilities as well as still in some of the facilities even if they are declared to the IAEA it is possible to hide some of the material or some of the work that might be going on but according to the additional protocol if a state has signed and ratified it and therefore subject to the terms of the additional protocol with respect to the IAEA's inspections the IAEA might go to that country might go not only to the designated facilities but also to everywhere within the country may might take samples from soil from the air from the water from they can visit any single building or any they can go anywhere so it is extremely difficult for a state to hide anything under additional protocol or to sort of keep IAEA away from any clandestine work that might be going on so the signing and ratification of additional protocol is an indication of goodwill or the an indication of the the intention that that particular state will not do anything wrong in the future because it is very likely for the IAEA to detect tiny diversion of a significant amount of fissile material from peaceful to neutral purposes so therefore these are the issues that actually we should bear in mind at you know somewhere to beg because the additional protocol issue has always come up and still something that is being extensively discussed with respect to Iran's neutral program because Iran as I said under the pressure of the IAEA Director General Mohamed El-Baradeh with a statement that he made in February 2003 I guess and and he gave this deadline to the Iranian authorities to sign the matter pro additional protocol otherwise he said he would take the issue to the board and the board would most likely take the issue to the United Nations Security Council back then it was not at the Security Council Ibrahim can you can just repeat the well I mean if they find somewhere to weapon they will possibly call the experts and professionals to deal with it the task of the IAEA is verification of a country's good behavior because states that are members of the MPT as non nuclear weapon states have committed themselves to never ever even think about building nuclear weapons so and that was the bargain remember in return for not building weapons non-nuclear states were promised to sort of entertain to enjoy to the extent possible to the largest extent possible the benefits of peaceful application of nuclear energy right if they don't have nuclear nuclear energy generation capabilities they would be allowed and they would also be given assistance in getting this technology from abroad so there will be no hindrances no provocations nothing that would prevent these states from using nuclear energy for peaceful purposes so and the IAEA was given the task of verifying that states who have promised to stay non-mitry I mean or not diverting from peaceful to meet your purposes verify that they are living up to their commitments so in order to be able to verify that these states are not doing anything wrong they have to go to these states carry out inspections and they must be confident that everything is according to schedule and nothing is wrong in the case of Iran especially after this you know Ahmadinejad came to power and the EU3 and the Iranian sort of initiatives were just halted there was no negotiations no inspections nothing and and of course IAEA was carrying out its inspection based on the model protocol for declared facilities and in a limited fashion and the IAEA issued reports saying that they could not substantiate the allegations that Iran was building weapon I mean they could not say that Iran was building a weapon but they could not be confident that Iran was not building a weapon either in order to be confident in order to verify that Iran was not building a weapon they they were asking for carrying out many more inspections in many more places and that was possible for a very short while starting from November 2003 when the EU3 went to Tehran and they struck a deal with the Iranian government and the French British and German foreign minister when they met their Iranian counterpart and they sort of suggested to Iran that it will be in the best interest of Iran if they not only signed but ratified the the the additional protocol but Iranian government authorities said look we as the government we can only sign the protocol as an intention of our good will but it is the authority or it is the sort of sovereign right of the the major list the parliament to ratify it so they could not do anything and then the EU3 again in November 2003 suggested to their Iranian counterparts asked from the government to act as if model additional protocol was in force as if it was ratified so again as an intention of good will Iranians acted as if additional protocol was in force and allow the international atomic energy agency inspectors to visit whichever place they would like to visit then again the United States was not satisfied with that performance and was blaming the EU3 initiative as something that was gaining Iran enough time to build atomic bombs and therefore they said this is a waste of energy waste of time and it is only gaining time to Iran and EU3 initiative will not lead anywhere and Iran will deceive the Europeans this and that but of course at that time 2004 until early 2005 and especially throughout 2004 Iranian seem to be a very much cooperating with the international atomic energy agency until such time the international atomic energy agency asked for conducting inspections in a meter base somewhere close to Tehran some 40 kilometers away from Tehran marching which is a meter base and actually they wanted to carry out inspections on four of the you know specific places within the meter base and of course the Iranian said well this is well beyond the sort of authority of the IAEA it is a meter base there is nothing nuclear going on so Iran that IAEA does not have any authority to to go there but the IAEA insisted and that at that time that was toward the end of 2004 or maybe early 2005 I think it was in early 2005 and Iranian authority said all right one time one visit or one facility and they let the IAEA officers in the director general to pick either one of these not just one and that they said whichever you pick we will let you go if you have any thoughts about something going on in these facilities be careful make your choice very well and pick the one that you deem very important because the United States was alleging was sort of a blaming or accusing Iran of conducting some tests deep under the ground in this minister facility tests for nuclear warheads and of course these tests tests can be carried out by conventional explosives with high explosives I mean in order to test a warhead that you will be using in your nuclear weapon you have to carry out some tests as to how much you know it is resisting the blast and everything so and then the IAEA picked one of them but that was to nail whale because they didn't find anything and Iran said look you see I mean you use your chances and there's nothing wrong going on but the United States and the Europeans were not truly satisfied because they said maybe it was in the other one but the IAEA has wasted its chance with this all right let's give a break and we'll continue afterwards and those who want to learn their grace stay here I will read names and I will give papers and others I can leave