 OK, first, well, first of all, thank you. Delighted to have you for this session. As all of you know, we had a last minute complexification in our program, which turned out to be a blessing. Because at the same time, we had asked Dr. Brzezinski to lead a smaller, more salon-style event. But then he agreed that he would do the same kind of a salon-style event, but in front of 300 people. So this is going to be a little slightly less intimate. But I don't think it's going to be any less interesting. I've got a couple of little announcements first before we get started. First, if you've got a cell phone with you, put it on silent sun. Silent sun, OK? I don't want to ring it here, because we don't want to have anybody else disrupted. You could have left yours on. Silent sun. What we're going to do, and just because of the timing, you all are going to get a lovely box lunch. It'll be available outside. And we'll just take him a 15-minute transition period between this session and the next session. Just grab a box lunch, find any place you can to sit down and enjoy it with a friend, so that we can start the last session. And finally, let me just say thank you to you, Dr. Brzezinski, for agreeing to be kind of a seminar leader. I mean, I'm one of the luckiest guys in the world. I have regular opportunities to engage with Dr. Brzezinski. And I never cease to be just amazed at what I get to learn. And so today, I get to share that with all of you. And so thank you. And thank you for doing this speak. I'd like you to imagine that we've got an invisible globe. And we're going to spin the globe and land on a couple of places and talk about them. And I'm going to do that at the beginning and then ask all of you to be ready if you've got questions. When we do have questions, please put up your hand. I'll try to recognize you. I'd ask when we please stand up when I pick you, so that the microphone people know who to come to in this big room. Let me start, spin the globe, but I'm going to drop my finger on Turkey. In some sense, this is one of the most interesting places in the world right now. About a year ago, my wife and I went down to the Sackler Art Gallery. And there was this fabulous exhibit called the Tributary Treasures of the Muscovy Court. And it was a collection of very fabulous gifts that had been given to the Tsar by visiting ambassadors. And they were basically ambassadors from Turkey and from Iran. And it was really a show about these three empires that were kind of touching each other, feeling each other, rubbing, pressuring, et cetera. And as I was going through the show, I realized we're kind of looking at that again in a way. And I would like to ask you, Dr. Brzezinski, nobody has studied Russia more intensively than have you. You have been a student. You coined the phrase arc of instability. I'd like you to focus on Turkey and this region. What do you see unfolding in this region and Turkey's own conception of itself? That's a very good question. That region, in my mind at least as I look at the map, has to be seen as part of a somewhat larger region that surrounds it, embraces it, and involves it. That is to say, that huge swath of South Asia, Southwest Asia, Middle East, which ranges roughly on the global map from Xinjiang, the Western frontier of China, all the way to Suez, and now in fact further west, perhaps to the border between Libya and Tunisia. Now, if you look at huge part of the world, I have called that in some of my writings, sort of my geopolitical writings, the new global Balkans. And why did I call it the Balkans? Because the Balkans was in many ways similar, but much smaller, but similar in the sense that it was a region of intense and very complex internal conflicts that had a lot in common with each other because they involved either conflicts within a religion or between adjoining religions. And it had the effect of sucking in the major powers into repeated engagements and thus international conflicts. And that was the function that the Balkans played in Europe throughout much of the 19th century, actually in some respects even earlier during the Turkish efforts to expand the Ottoman Empire. And it had the effect of producing major wars between major powers. Now, this huge area of the world today is in many ways similar and it has a somewhat similar suction effect, though with one very important difference. It does not involve the direct collision of major powers, but sequential engagement, sucking in of major powers. And the classical example of that is of course the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, which produced a reaction from the outside, but a cautious reaction of supporting the resistance and forcing the Soviet Union out. And lately it has involved the United States in a sequential engagement first in the Middle East itself, then through its own initiated war in Iraq and then through its necessary unavoidable reaction to 9-11, which required us to go into Afghanistan to eliminate al-Qaeda. Although the question arises whether that objective perhaps shouldn't have been defined more narrowly instead of so broadly because after all, we have pushed al-Qaeda out of Afghanistan. That is no longer the issue. But we're still deeply involved in Afghanistan. But whether the same time is different and therefore perplexing, and that brings me back to your question specifically, is that other major powers are not involved, even though they can be affected by the outcomes. But they prefer not to be directly engaged. And that pertains particularly to China, which I think sees in it some indirect but not publicly stated benefit. Namely, we pay the price. We make the effort. We are thereby diverted and profoundly engaged. And they can, in a sense, indirectly benefit from that. So are the Indians, who, yes, have played a very complicated game of somewhat supporting the Soviets in Afghanistan, of being somewhat critical of our role in Afghanistan, but without direct engagement, but of course benefiting from it, not only vis-à-vis us as much, but more against Pakistan. And it has the role of perplexing the Turks regarding their future role, especially since at one point in recent history, they saw themselves as being part of Europe. They were invited into the relationship back in 1963. But subsequently, the pace has slowed down rather deliberately because of the European hesitations and second thoughts, even though the Turks themselves embarked on a Western-oriented modernization as early as the mid-1920s. So I think Turkey, in that context, finds itself, in a sense, frustrated, endangered, and at the same time challenged. It is, however, a political and economic success. And that has consequences. And I think as a result, the Turks are now embarked on a policy of defining for themselves a foreign policy which, in many respects, is compatible with our goals for the region, but which, in some respects, collides with some specifics of our policies, particularly in so far as the immediate Middle East is concerned, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. To some extent, our policy towards Iran is something the Turks do not share and are critical of. And in that sense, Turkey is becoming an independent but rather increasingly important player. And that further complicates the situation in the region. My own bottom line on all of that is that, on balance, I have to say that I think our engagement in the region, in terms of its direct military manifestations, has not been productive and is not in keeping with our long-range national interest. And some of our objectives in the region have been mutually conflicting, especially in so far as the Arab-Israeli conflict is concerned. And as a consequence of the foregoing, our position in the region is rapidly deteriorating. 30 years ago, looking more narrowly at this region, we had good relationships with some of the key regional powers. We had a good relationship with Turkey, which was a very faithful NATO ally. We had a good working relationship with Iranians. The Saudis were totally dependent on us. The Egyptians were accommodating to us. The Pakistan's needed us badly vis-à-vis India. Today, in every respect, every single one of these relationships is pointed in a negative direction, one way or another. And that, I think, is a very serious dilemma for us and has fundamental bearing on our future role, not only in that part of the world, but potentially more generally in the world at large. Well, I'll tell you, just this first comment. You all ought to book rooms here tonight. You're gonna be here. I mean, this is fascinating. You've opened up about a dozen interesting questions I want to follow up, but specifically, let me first say on Iran, how you see the Iran trajectory unfolding and how you see Turkey playing a role vis-à-vis Iran. I think Iran, in the short run, is a very serious problem and could result in some sort of a crisis that would be, I think, regionally very destabilizing and probably would confront us with even more dire prospects in the ones that we face currently. In the long run, Iran has all of the necessary preconditions for positive political change. If you look at the fundamental sort of social, economic statistics of the country, in every respect, it's comparable to Turkey. And it's not an accident, incidentally, because when Turkey embarked on its modernization in the 1920s, the Iranians followed shortly thereafter within half a decade and had more or less the same objective and both were intensely focused on the German model as relevant to their development at the time in the pre-Nazi German model, of course. I think that Iran, in the short run, of course poses the question of how do we adjust to the reality that it is an ambitious regional power, strong, quite capable of waging protracted warfare. If we were to become engaged, we would probably find our problems in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Persian Gulf greatly magnified and we would probably be embroiled for a long, long time, much longer than our current involvement. With an outcome which, of course, would be decisive in our favor if we used all of our power, but we wouldn't be able to use all of our power because we are self-limited when it comes to unconventional warfare. We cannot, in the context of an unconventional warfare, unleash all of the weapons at our possession and therefore wipe out the enemy, more or less what we did to Japan and to Germany in 1945. So we could be bogged down, but in the long run, if we don't engage in policies which encourage the fusion of Iranian fundamentalism with Iranian nationalism, then I expect that the theocratic phenomenon in Iran will prove to be transient. That it is almost irrational in its scale. It's heavily based on the more backward, rural areas of Iran. Iran is urbanizing, it is changing, and it is a society in which it has a relatively high number of people in institutions of higher learning. And we saw them on the streets of Tehran more than a year ago when there was the abortive Iranian spring at work which unsuccessfully failed. And what is interesting is that there are more women actually in Iranian universities than there are men. And the picture of a kind of primitive, totally theocratic Iranian society does not correspond to the realities in the city. In the cities, I should say. And what struck me for example during those manifestations was how similar the young people of Iran are in appearance, in manner, in slogans to what one sees also on the tube elsewhere, including Europe. So my expectation is that in 10 years from now, in 15 years from now, if there is no major eruption in the American-Iranian relationship, Iran will resume what I think is its basic thrust, which is to become a modern power and it will fulfill I think the changing and more compatible aspirations of the Iranian people. So it's a question of strategic patience in my judgment. Something that the Chinese are very good at, something that we're not so good at. Can I ask you to explore with us kind of the evolving power geometry of the Persian Gulf? When the street protests erupted in Bahrain, we tried to step in to help broker some kind of a reconciliation process. That went down very badly with the royal family in Bahrain and frankly with the House of Saud. And caused a very deep alienation. How long? We don't know, but at that time a very deep alienation between us and Bahrain and Saudi over this question of the power geometry of the region. And yet there's no one else except us that's going to be a presence in a larger outside of the region. How do you see this power geometry evolving now, especially in light of the so-called Arab Spring? Probably in a messy fashion. To put it very bluntly, it's very difficult for us to have a consistent policy there because we have conflicting interests. We have a base in Bahrain, a very important base which is critical to our military supremacy in the Persian Gulf, which needs to be maintained in the short run. But at the same time it's a base without a solid social foundation because our presence there politically works in favor of the ruling dynasty and of the Sunni minority that is in charge. I am fearful that the policy of repression that the Bahrain government may be now embarking upon is going to make that even worse. The notion, for example, of doctors and nurses numbering almost 50, being tried because they treated the wounded who happened to be in the main Shia because they were the ones who were demonstrating is to me appalling. And yet we are in effect identified with it because we have such a stake in our base. Secondly, we have a stake also in Bahrain because of its importance to Saudi Arabia and the Saudis naturally attach great importance to it. But the Saudis are currently totally disillusioned with us. That's a fact of life. To some extent their disillusionment is reflection of their own internal problems. But to some extent it also may be to some extent a reflection of their sense that our policy in the region has not been consistent with our public stance and even with some of our negotiating commitments. And that does involve what is one of the critical problems in the region, namely the persistence of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the growing perception in the region that we're not serious about solving it. We're not serious about using our influence to bring it about to an outcome which I personally still think is attainable but with growing uncertainty, namely an accommodation that makes Israel a permanent part of the Middle East and even an accepted part of the Middle East and is assured of its security. But at the same time by creating a modus vivendi with the Palestinians, creates a potential of Israel and Palestine together cooperating because they will be intermeshed if they become two states, becoming in effect the Singapore of the Middle East. I think that's an opportunity that's being wasted and it's an opportunity which in the short run works against our interests and maximizes resentment such as those which are now being expressed more openly in Saudi Arabia and in the long run poses a danger not only just to our general interest in the region but to Israel's well-being. So I'm of the view that in effect this aspect of our policy has unfortunately had the effect of then intensifying Saudi suspicions about democratic change. There are probably inner fears of it affecting them as well because that will happen at some point and thus has put us on a course in which alienation between us and the Saudis is deepening and that has an immediate impact, a kind of a paralyzing impact on any constructed approach to the issue of Bahrain as a symptom as well as an issue in the short run but also as something which foreshadows a much deeper reality which is this. We entered the Middle East as a major power only right after World War II. Till then it was largely a domain of the British and the French since the Treaty of Versailles but even somewhat earlier with the French, the British and the Italians making inroads already in the latter part of the 19th century. All of that came to an end in 1945 and we were welcomed into the region with open arms by the Saudis and others who saw in us as an international guarantee of their new status of independence. And in that context we had the relationships with the countries in the region to which I referred earlier. Today, I think all of that is changing and the Arab Spring which creates such fear in Riyadh and which has unleashed such hopes in Washington, I fear is gradually going to become the Arab winter and that is to say we're not going to see really democratic governments emerge that quickly. I think the preconditions for that in Egypt and not to mention Syria are not very promising. I am skeptical that we will see some serious accommodation between the Israelis and the Palestinians because we have chosen to be passive. We're going to find the Arabs driven by resentment and insecurity perhaps engaging in conflicting policies among themselves. We're yet to see what's going to happen in Yemen and then between Yemen and Saudi Arabia because that's perhaps in the cards next. And as a result, our exit from the region which is an exit not willed by us but forced by circumstances will continue and perhaps become more marked and the question will arise what will happen in the region and who on the outside will begin to capitalize on it. Now I've got three ways I can go. But let me hold us for a minute on the Palestinian Israeli thing. We've got a big probably crisis coming up here in coming months. There's a real head of steam to seek formal legal recognition of Palestine as a state at the UN. The United States has signaled that we would probably veto that if it came to the Security Council. So now the agenda shifted over to make it a resolution of the General Assembly. And while it may not have legally binding status it's going to create political momentum and that's not going to be received well here. What would you do if you were right up now in the NSC what would you be doing right now for our government to help think through this complex problem? Well first of all I do agree that a resolution of membership for Palestine is essentially a statement rather than the executional legitimation of the reality. And it can't be therefore counterproductive because it doesn't achieve anything except sets in motion expectations which then may erupt into violence. So there is some legitimacy to the US concern that simply passing a verbose resolution thereby somehow rather legitimating membership for Palestine in the UN when Palestine doesn't exist as a state is not the wise course of action. But I don't think analysis of that issue should stop right there because one has to ask oneself all right so suppose we block it. Suppose something is passed in the General Assembly contrary to us where are we then? Well we're seen thereafter for decades to come as the country which opposes Palestinian independence and Palestinian statehood. That becomes a kind of fundamental marker which for many people in the region as we now see reflected in changing Egyptian attitudes is an important issue. And this will stand in sharp contrast to how we voted in 47, 48 when we endorsed the creation of the state of Israel as a Jewish state and that was the right thing to do at the time especially in the wake of World War II. But this will stand in sharp contrast to it and will mark us in the region essentially as a power that's hostile to their aspirations. So we have to find a way in my judgment of avoiding this thrust to a resolution that in effect recognizes statehood and proclaims it without it existing and offers something in its place which has the capacity for mobilizing world opinion and to have at least some positive impact although I don't overestimate its immediate political consequence. And my judgment that could be accomplished if we and our principle allies the Quartet but also all the members, the permanent members of the Security Council and probably in effect every member of the Security Council put in a resolution which in effect states that the international community insists and demands that the Israelis and the Palestinians undertake serious negotiations for a peace process the outlines of which are defined by the resolution. Thereby in effect setting in motion clarity regarding what the eventual outcome will be because right now our position is we want them to negotiate on this equitable basis swaps involved in the 67 line. That's our position the president stated it and everything else is left unclear. Well how can they negotiate an agreement on the 67 lines which would involve some swaps when they don't know what the other issues will involve and how they might be accommodated and when they don't even have the opportunity to say well we'll be a little more accommodating on the territorial issue if we get this or that. In brief I think we need a statement from the world from the international community as to what the fundamental framework of a peace treaty to be negotiated by the parties in detail ought to be. And that in my judgment I've been writing about this now for several years and it has now become something that it's more or less the position of more and more people internationally including in the United States so they're a prominent political figures from both parties take a similar position to the effect that it should involve four trade-offs that are interrelated and have to be seen as a package. One no right of return for the Palestinian refugees to what is today Israel because one of the cardinal demands of the Palestinian movement is that the ex-police or their descendants have the right to return to the original homes. Well we cannot expect Israel to commit suicide for the sake of peace and that's not a reasonable demand but we can say as well there is no right of return for the ex-police except maybe for a small symbolic number of elderly, very elderly people not their children and grandchildren and preferably with the women in no longer child-bearing age so let's say over 80. Something like that but nothing more than that and for the rest if the children of the ex-police from Lebanon and elsewhere want to be part of the Palestinian state they will be resettled with international help in the Palestinian state. So that's point number one a very bitter pill for the Palestinians to swallow. Then point number two is a bitter pill for the Israelis to swallow but similarly there can be no peace without addressing that issue and that is that in some fashion Jerusalem has to be a capital of two states. The fact of the matter is there are two different communities living in Jerusalem and the Palestinians have lived in Jerusalem for centuries so you cannot ignore that. You cannot simply say people who lived there 2,000 years ago have a right but anyone thereafter doesn't. These people have been there for centuries. There is an East Jerusalem that actually the Palestinians call Al-Quds. That can be and should be the capital of the Palestinian state and there are ways of keeping the city open and united. The Palestinians and the Israelis and the Geneva Accords address this issue in enormous detail. These are the two leading groups on both sides that negotiated not the governments, not the authorities and they found a variety of arrangements that are compatible with the city remaining united but the capital of two states. The religious parts have to be shared under some sort of international and maybe jointly religious authority with one state more responsible for some sectors, the Jewish state responsible clearly for the Jewish sectors and so forth. And I think that has the possibility of being successful and not addressing this issue is a prescription for permanent hostility. You can see the dome of the mosque almost anywhere from the West Bank and it will be just a symbol of the fact that there is no piece of reconciliation. It's a piece of conquest and therefore that has to be addressed difficult as it is for the Israelis but many of them will recognize that. The Barak has talked about that privately, all murdered it and so forth. It is the religious extremists that are rejecting it. The right wing which is also not necessarily religious but more fascist like the foreign minister who talks freely about the population of the West Bank being expelled as a solution to the problem. That's the second big part. The third part has been already articulated. Borders, swaps based roughly in the 67 lines without any substantial change in the territorial distribution of the old Palestine. What many people forget is that today if one uses the 67 lines, the territory of the old Palestine is 78% Israeli, 22% Palestinian even though the size of the populations are almost similar. The Israelis are somewhat more numerous still than the Palestinians but this will not endure because the demographic dynamics favor the Palestinians. So you cannot change elsewhere portions. You cannot have a situation in which all of a sudden the territorial split becomes 85% Israeli, 15% Palestinian. It's already 78% versus 22. This is why the swaps have to be equal. That's the reasoning behind it. And of course the last element is security arrangements so that the Israelis do not feel vulnerable and I think the placing of American troops or NATO troops on the Jordan River banks is I think probably one key element in it. The other being that basically Palestine will not be a militarized state. It will be demilitarized. Now putting something like this in front of the UN would elicit in my judgment almost certainly the unanimous vote of the security council. Secondly, I think there's a reasonable chance that a big majority of the international community would vote for it. And that would avoid a situation in which otherwise I think we essentially take a vote in which we become stamped as the enemy by one of the two parties named the Palestinians and the Arabs. Then the world community endorses something different. Palestinian frustrations rise and then just think where this will take Egypt for example. As it tries to define itself in a more independent fashion. And we already see previews of where it's going to go. Talk about a relationship with Iran between Egypt. Talk about opening up to Gaza. Talk about revising the treaty, the agreements are guiding energy deliveries and so forth. In whose interest is that? But the question is whether we have the determination, the leadership to do it. I'll bet you anything that every European country would support it. The Chinese would support it. I think the Russians would support it. And I think the majority of the international community would support it. We could stay in this region but I want to spin the globe just because I want to cover enough space and then all of you that kind of open up questions. I'd like, let's go over to East Asia. Just this week we've been commemorating anniversary of historic opening up of relations between the United States and China. You and Henry Kissinger were the grand architects of this. You brought it to fruition with a formal recognition. And for the last 30 years, we've been on a compatible trajectory but the last year and a half it's been scratchy. It's been difficult. Is this just the inevitable outcome of China becoming more powerful and more prosperous and more demanding of its standing? Is there something unique going on with the leadership cadre in China that's making it this way now? What do you think accounts for this edginess that we've seen in our relations during the last two years? Well, to put it in a nutshell, I think our insecurity and their sense of triumphalism, I think the two combined produce some of these sharp edges that have been complicating the relationship. Our insecurity has some rational grounds for it. I think there are some reasons for us to feel insecure. Our foreign policy in recent years I think has been a mishmash of over militarization and unilateralism and to some extent in one particular case, demagogy and deception to put it mildly, in the case of the Chinese they feel that they're in the process of regaining the status to which they're entitled and which they feel and I think correctly they enjoyed for most of history, known history. So to them it's a return to normality from which they were deprived in their view by outside intervention in which we play the minor role actually but certainly by the Europeans and by the Japanese. At our end, the difficulties that we have do I think legitimately give rise to the question of where we headed and that means not just internationally in so far as a successive involvement in my judgment in the global Balkans by the United States as the solitary actor. It would be very different if we had others with us but we're the solitary actor and what does the domestic paralysis, gridlock and uncertainty indicate about our capacity for dealing with our domestic problems and for playing a leading world role. If you look seriously at some of the things that are being said by people who are being described as potential presidential candidates, you begin to sort of wonder is a country in a state of some delirium you know, I don't want to mention names but I think you know who I'm talking about and it's not just one person. There are several people. We can see it from there. Yeah. And you know, so in that setting I think it's not surprising that people in this country to some extent are concerned and then beyond that there are some serious problems to which there are no easy answers. How do we get out of the debt issue to which we have slid kind of almost by indirection as a kind of at one point it was the conventional wisdom that this can go on forever because of the enormous confidence the world community has in us but the world community has much less of a confidence in us today. So that I think is a serious problem that is complicating our ability to act in the global scene and as a consequence, I think some Chinese have begun to taste their sense of historic triumph prematurely because they aren't there yet and while they're headed in that direction they could encounter enormous difficulties at home probably more at home than abroad because they're being very prudent very careful abroad and at the same time we're a little bit uneasy about our prospects with all of that complicated by an issue to which I don't have any real answer but which I think perhaps has been oversimplified by one grand slogan named the globalization. Globalization is a grand idea in an age in which we're becoming globally interactive and interdependent but it does raise the question well if you plunge too rapidly into globalization perhaps the distribution of benefits will be asymmetrical and that certainly is a question that pertains to our industry and our ability to compete effectively in the manufacturing area on a global scene in which certain advantages accrue to those who are coming up rather than pioneering and I'm not sure that we can find a solution to that problem by emphasis on high tech because high tech by definition is not labor intensive. Dr. Brzezinski you study the Chinese deeply and you interact with them regularly when you first started working with them the great competence in the country was grounded in the government and the Communist Party but in the last 30 years certainly the last 15 years there's been this explosion of talent in China and it's not been in the government it's actually been outside of the government and it's a much more complicated country now it's a much more dynamic country now there are many more friction spots between Chinese interests and other world interests is the Communist Party capable of now managing in its kind of non-transparent rather sclerotic way of coping with this dynamic China? I have heard you make that point before and I think it's an excellent point because you're absolutely right 30 years ago anyone who was ambitious and talented and kind of wanted to achieve something in life had only one way to go enjoying the party and rising the hierarchy as you point out today there are many other attractive alternatives also a centralized non-competitive bureaucratic system of political domination I think almost inevitably breeds sclerosis and a decline in the quality of leadership this was really very, very much at the heart of the failure of the Soviet Union if you look at the quality of the Soviet leadership let's say in the 20s then in the 30s then beyond the 40s because that was World War the 50s, 60s, there's almost a steady downward trend in terms of the quality of the people their ability to understand reality and their ability to break with the conventional wisdom to innovate and so forth and some of that is beginning to happen in the Chinese in the government sector I don't want to personalize it of course it's easiest to personalize it because the original figures of the revolution are always outstanding but as time passes I imagine this phenomenon which you very rightly diagnose as a danger is becoming more widespread why not be an entrepreneur why not to pursue a career in some different area if it gives you personal rewards, satisfactions fulfills your national aspirations and then beyond all of that there is a complicating factor first of all the social injustice that has to be addressed and it's rooted to some extent in backwardness which has to be overcome and the risk of nationalism yes, is it for me? then Chinese nationalism is I think a very volatile force and while it's risky to generalize about sort of national moods and national styles there is a quality of emotion and rage, outrage to outbursts of Chinese nationalism that can be perplexing and dangerous you see this even sometimes in negotiating with the Chinese who are very self-controlled and very deliberate but at some point if they get angry they really get angry and they show it and you translate that into massive, huge scale phenomenon and can be something that even the regime might not be able to control good example of it is in the last several years the conflict with the Japanese over the islands and Kaku Islands and the kind of emotions it produced at soccer matches it's unbelievable and the Chinese government got scared so all of that could affect the quality of their internal management you know this during the last year China was confronted with a very painful dilemma this kind of this North Korean regime for whatever set of reasons chose on two occasions to attack South Korean forces they sank the chin on the patrol vessel a little over a year ago and then they bombed the island, Yongpyeong Island and it really presented a terrible dilemma to the Chinese they had to pick for 30 years they've been trying to divide us from Korea by establishing good ties with Korea now they had to pick they had to pick between North Korea and South Korea and they picked the North Koreans what do you think was the kind of the thinking going on and what do you think it means in North East Asia we have a little mini well I think it means in the first instance it reflects the fact that the Chinese want stability in the immediate environment they don't want a breakdown of stability whether it be over South China Sea or at this stage over Pakistan in or over Korea because they know that at this stage would predict consequences which are inherently unpredictable and would almost inevitably draw us in and I think that's a perfectly reasonable attitude of them on their part and now they can't swing over and all of a sudden embrace the South Koreans over issues that divide the North from the South and particularly the Northern provocations because there were these miniature provocations as you've mentioned because what does that mean that they choose the South over the North and what happens in the North and then the North might even go berserk in those conditions so I think in a way they're kind of caught in between their realization that this is risky, dangerous but also the realization that if they sort of side up align themselves with us too much it can just unleash North Korean extremism irrationality in full force so I think they're maneuvering essentially to preserve the status quo in the hope that over time internal pressures within North Korea will force the North Korean regime to begin to implement different policies maybe in connection with the change in leadership because it is quite striking that the Chinese appear to be putting on these educational shows for the North Korean leadership regarding their economic success their change and so forth so I think they're essentially playing for time in an effort to keep the outer environment of a China that they see as rising but which they emphasize is peacefully rising stable and I think that is their central preoccupation because they look ahead and think that in that context of stability their prospects of achieving their internal objectives and with them their external objectives are increased whereas an early crisis in the region throws everything out of whack and makes all predictions and calculations essentially irrelevant so I think that is their main sort of foreign policy preoccupation not to mention the sort of side aspect up to which I've alluded before namely they probably think it's beneficial in their long range historical competition with us for us to be paying a high price of engagement while they benefit from this engagement I'd like to follow up on that but I'm cheating all of you I mean I apologize I've got a whole bunch more questions in my mind but let me open this up let me solicit questions we'll start right back here just stand up so that Jeff can get the microphone to you My name is Rich Douglas I work for General Electric a theme in your remarks Dr. Brzezkin thank you very much I thought just very insightful remarks was that in the past the 20s World War II the U.S. internationally we did a lot right lately we're doing a lot wrong and I just wondered if you have some thoughts on the why that is is it perhaps you came back later and mentioned in the Soviet Union in China quality of leadership is perhaps going out are we facing the same thing and if so why if you could just comment on why has the international relations clue bird seem to have flown away from us for I'm so worried with the last words because it got a little blurred I'm sorry you know in previous foreign policy we the United States have done a lot right we seem to be doing a lot wrong do you have any thoughts on correctly why is that are we having a leadership I don't have any sort of grand insights into it but I do think that we blew an enormous opportunity after 1991 because after 1991 we were seeing universally as the victor state in a prolonged but peaceful competition or cold war we were hailed as the socio-economic model for the world some people talked about the end of history in that context namely that in terms of models the democratic liberal system is the ultimate system and where it's epitome where it's personal expression and in that context we sort of took a leap of absence from global responsibility I think the first two presidencies democratic administration I'm being nonpartisan in this essentially focused on domestic issues and on the fulfillment of the opportunity in terms of the good life and sort of making our system more socially rewarding or equitable or whatever and our society became preoccupied essentially with domestic issues and with the fulfillment of collective as well as individual dreams we sort of took a leap of absence from global responsibility we didn't try to shape a new architecture either vis-a-vis the post-communist Russia nor with any degree of consistency vis-a-vis China having normalized relations with them back in the late 1970s and then we were followed by a republic administration and gained two administrations and that administration got stamped by in 9-11 and I think its reaction to it was demagogic extreme and further distorted the American role in the world because from a posture of relative non-involvement and kind of passive acceptance of the new era of hope and peace we became all of a sudden a warrior engaging in sort of the war on terror against the war on the jihad all sorts of mobilizing slogans about terror domestically and internationally which I think created in our society a distorted view of reality a society driven much more by concerns and fears rather than by realistic assessment of what is happening on the global scene and that has embroiled us increasingly in difficulties the cost of which and the consequences of which we are continuing to feel and probably will be coping with for a number of years yet to come so in that kind of grand sense I think we missed an opportunity I don't want to ascribe it in any particular sense to either specific presidents or specific parties I think it was more a question of kind of a national failure to seize an opportunity that really did confront us in a unique fashion because no one else stood as tall or stood as legitimate and respected worldwide as the United States 20 years ago and just look at global public opinion polls and ask yourself where do we stand today and look how we're engaged in major wars literally alone yes we can force some of our friends Europeans to send token forces to help us but no one else is seriously there because out of conviction and some of our other major rivals quasi partners in the world are the beneficiaries of this rather one sided condition In the far in the back and then I'll come down here Joe Bosco with CSIS Dr. Bajinsky I want to return to the role that you and Henry Kissinger played in the opening of relations with China I have to be respectful in my question because I had both of you as professors in college it seems to me that is it fair to ask that both of you had the working assumption and also President Nixon and President Carter that ultimately Taiwan would fall under the rule of communist China and if that's true as a working assumption have your views changed since Taiwan has become a very viable and functioning democracy Well I can only speak for myself I can't speak for Henry our view in the negotiations with the Chinese which I expressed and which is part of the record was that in so far as the United States is concerned we accept the communicate I was issued by Nixon and Mao the Shanghai communicate because that was a feta complete when we came to power that was what we inherited but that in our view this issue has to be resolved if it is to be resolved peacefully and that our fundamental interests would be engaged if it were otherwise and that we presume that this is also in China's interest because one way or another historical change will determine the nature of the relationship between Taiwan and China and that I think is a safe prediction namely if historical change is such that we're still deeply and effectively engaged in Asia and present in it it will have an obvious impact on the relationship between Taiwan and China and probably increases the prospects of a separate Taiwan existing or existing for longer time quite significantly on the other hand if internal problems in our country excessive engagement in the global Balkans which then produces in this country a wave reaction against international involvement creates conditions in which Taiwan will find it increasingly difficult to resist the entreaties of the mainland and pressure from the mainland then it will in fact become part of the mainland and that's something that we will not be able to interfere no will be inclined to interfere with under those circumstances so in effect it is something that will work out on the basis of what happens ultimately in the grand relationship between China and America which in turn is dependent on the degree to which each of them stays healthy, effective, responsible and rational and that is something that no one can predict within the degree of certainty. Right down here in the front, Jeff. Thank you Paula Stern and I'm very glad that you picked up from last week's discussion on the arc of instability and in particular the Arab-Israeli question I know you were getting close to it last week when you spoke to the CSIS group my question is given the fact that you're describing the US and the world kind of standing on precipice here looking at this UN resolution that will be debated in September in some way and that you've come up with what I consider a counter proposal to walk us back from that precipice and given the fact that the Saudis back in 2002 had an effort to find some resolution between Israel and Palestine is there a role that we can see that possibly the Saudis coming back in to making, coming to assist in this and I ask this also because I see this as domestic politics is always shaping all these foreign policies. In Israel you're now seeing the former head of Mossad, the Shin Bet and the military intelligence who have now all retired critiquing and criticizing Netanyahu. Is there a role here for other actors to help reinforce what I see you sketching as a proposal? Well I think the Saudis can play a supportive role simply by essentially reiterating a position which they articulated in 2002 which is the Beirut proposals which in effect were a step by the Arab side towards acceptance of the formula of the grant compromise and that is something that also the majority of the Israeli public opinion has tended to support including the principal political actors in Israel from let's say slightly right of center all the way to the left thereby isolating the extreme right but that is not the current reality in Israel and insofar as the Saudis are concerned they no longer have much confidence in our willingness to see this problem all the way through to its constructive resolution because they have been fed a diet now for 20, 30 years of repeated American commitments and recommitments and then at critical moments backing off. President Clinton didn't really address that issue seriously until the last months of his presidency. President Bush went in a different direction altogether and President Obama articulated prospects of such commitment but on the two occasions in which he had a confrontation with the Israelis on the subject well not with the Israelis with Prime Minister Netanyahu specifically on the subject he backed off and thereby not in a sense validating the depth of his commitment to what he articulated in speeches which were meant to create a kind of international consensus on behalf of peace process. So I don't expect the Saudis to become terribly active provided there's no retrogression. I think the real risk is that in many respects the political upheaval in the Middle East which on the one hand may be the beginning of a long-term process of democratization can be in the shorter run a process of populist self-assertion. And the fact is that in the case of governments such as the Egyptian, perhaps the Jordanian in some respects even the Saudi have taken a more moderate position than the street is likely to take when it begins to influence national policy of these states. And therefore I don't think we should really underestimate the degree to which we may be at the end phase of our ability to shape positively what happens in the Middle East. And if we are not in a serious international supported effort now I think our leverage on this whole set of issues is going to now more rapidly decline. And this is why I think there is a sense of urgency. Now some of them might say, and people have said this in the Congress, this is throwing Israel under the bus to quote a leading Republican candidate. I really don't think it's throwing it under the bus. I think it's averting a situation in which it's long-range prospects in the Middle East will become increasingly problematical. Because in the long run Israel's survival as a viable part of the Middle East is really dependent on the degree to which it can become part a creative even energizing part of the transformation of the region. And that can only be done in the context of some acceptance of mutual accommodation between the Israelis and Palestinians with the Palestinians being politically more advanced than most of the other Arabs in the region. So in a sense it's not only an economic but very much a political opportunity that should not be missed. And my sense is that in the United States itself the majority of Jewish opinion is moderate on the subject. But that moderation is not articulated by the institutions that claim to speak for the American Jewish community in this country. But there is a real gap between the positions taken by these institutions and the public opinion polls regarding such issues as do you favor two-state solution? What about territorial compromise? Even the question of Jerusalem which is the most sensitive of all when it is viewed in this larger context. Of course viewed by itself it is understandably unacceptable. Right here. Good afternoon. My name is La Lola from the Center of Justice and Peace Building. Since Sahara and Africa has not mentioned I thought I should just throw a question. In recent years we have witnessed some active China's presence in Sub-Saharan Africa and it has increasingly built some or building some sphere of influence. My question is to what extent does the United States consider Sub-Saharan Africa of any strategic significance or to what extent is Sub-Saharan Africa of relevance to the future U.S. strategic trajectory? Thank you. I'm sorry I didn't understand your question. I think you're asking the degree to which South Africa figures in our Sub-Sahara Africa. Sub-Sahara Africa. Figures in what? Yeah, could you, could you speak slowly and loudly? Okay, I was saying in recent years we have witnessed so on and we're gonna hear individual words. Okay, we have witnessed China's presence in Sub-Saharan Africa. China's influence in Sub-Saharan Africa and they are increasingly building a sphere of influence particularly when it comes to because of their passive policy towards issues of governance. So my question was to what extent do you consider Sub-Saharan Africa of strategic significance to the U.S. future foreign policy or trajectory foreign policy? Is that clear or? It's, I think, if I might rephrase, I think he's asking China has been increasingly active in Sub-Saharan Africa and the degree to which we see this as a strategic risk or threat or a competition. You know, I think it could be a strategic threat if we get into a strategic conflict with China. It's not an issue over which we're likely to get into conflict. In the short term, in any case, the Chinese motivation is obviously self-serving but also of some local benefit. I think this is why the African governments are entering into some of these arrangements and China's role in Africa certainly is not negative. In some respects, it's quite constructive. But if we get on a larger scale things into a strategic rivalry and then strategic hostility with China, then obviously China's role in Africa will be viewed by us as a source of conflict. But I don't think it itself is likely to precipitate a conflict. That's much more likely to arise if it does, either directly over economic financial issues. That's a question, for example, of international currency in the short run or the indebtedness involving American China or some issues such as Korea, for example, or South China Sea or Pakistan where there could be conflicting American and Chinese strategic interests thrust into a direct conflict. The young lady sitting in the back and then across the aisle will take these last two. Thank you. Molly Williamson, American Academy of Diplomacy. Thank you for your analysis about the important loss of American prominence since 1991 following that through. My question is, how can we correct course? This town, as we speak, is in a major debate over whether or not we should honor our bills and pay our national debts and the like. How do you see us moving forward in a way that can be respected in the international scene and recoup some of our losses? Well, you know, that's a really enormous question because it combines, and rightly so, in the interaction between our domestic dilemmas and our foreign travails. But I do think that some aspects of each are subject to correction. Certainly some of our policies abroad can be adjusted, and I think some engagements can be modified. And we can draw at least some relevant lessons for the future that can help us avoid similar problems. We talked a little bit about the Middle Eastern problem which is posing for us an immediate challenge. We're likely to have a challenge as we disengage from Iraq because I don't think it's going to be such an easy disengagement. And no one has asked yet and what will happen after we leave to Iraqi politics? Are we going to be seeing a democratic pro-American Iraq, assuming one even exists right now with American troops there, and once American troops have left? Those are the kind of sort of immediate timeframe issues where some corrective steps can be taken. Similarly, domestically, we have to find an acceptable formula on the debt issue because that's paralyzing our governmental process. I assume we will because I think more and more people will realize that if we do not, the international consequences for the United States and the credit standing of the United States and the world will be in great jeopardy. And therefore the world economic and financial system could be very, very adversely affected. I think this kind of moment of truth is approaching. But beyond that, do I really expect a dramatic reversal? No, I don't. I think we're now in a situation in which the combination of insecurity, lack of understanding of the world, and the absence of serious alternative leadership is a problem that's going to confront us for some time to come. You know, what I find striking about international affairs is, and this is where my political bias comes up and I confess it openly, I find Obama's speeches to be fundamentally historically correct. I think he understands what is needed and how the world is changing today. What I think is lacking on his side is systematic strategic implementation of that comprehensive analysis for a variety of reasons, which this is not the time to go into. What is lacking on the other side is the absence of any alternative vision a rejection of his and a tendency to go into really irresponsible tangents by the sort of would-be candidates for president. If you look at their foreign policy prescriptions, the range from mystical to idiosyncratic to escapist to simply ignorant. And that's the situation that pertains to literally every single one that has stepped forward so far. And that is a very serious national condition because I think it reflects a little bit the public state of mind at the same time. And that I think is a very serious issue in this country which precisely this kind of discussion is needed on a huge scale because the fact of the matter is we don't have an intelligence discussion in this country about America and the world. And it is desperately needed if we were to play our role in the world which is needed because without us it's gonna be far more unstable. Sir, I'm gonna give you the last question and then I've got one little final thing on that. Thank you Dr. Brzezinski for being here today and thank you for your class of 1990. Can you speak up a little bit louder please? Thank you for being here today. I'm Michael McClosher from National Defense University. The National Security Strategy of 2002 stated that the greatest threat to U.S. national security comes from within weak and failing states rather than strong state adversaries. That led the Bush administration pretty reluctantly into the state building enterprises in Iraq and Afghanistan. Do you think, in your opinion, is state building an appropriate or a viable national security mission for the United States? I always thought it was absurd. I was marginally present at the decisions for example made right after 9-11 to go into Afghanistan. And I fully endorsed the necessity of going to Afghanistan to eliminate al-Qaeda. But at the end of the meeting, I told Rumsfeld that I thought we're to go in, wipe out the regime that is sponsoring al-Qaeda and pull out. Give them economic assistance, create an international umbrella, but not get engaged in anything of the kind that followed. And what followed was not on an escalating engagement but an escalation of objectives. Nation building, democracy and all of that. I don't think a foreign army in a country that is fundamentally different culturally and religiously is an instrument for creating a nation in that context. Because first of all, a nation incipiently exists already. It's an organism that has its own cultural, philosophical, political definitions. And a foreign army cannot change that except by crushing that nation completely. And yes, if we want to do that, let's send an army of two million people to Afghanistan and engage in a 10-year program of creating something else. That can be done. But I don't think anybody in this country is prepared to make that effort. So we want to do it on the cheap, borrow money from the rest of the world in order to do it, don't have a draft, so only have volunteers that we can somehow induce to go there and to do it in this kind of sleigh-of-the-hand fashion. And I don't think that's been productive. We can assist nations as they change themselves. And I think we have an opportunity to do that today in Egypt. But let's not try to go in and tell the Egyptians how to suck eggs. They have a sense of their own history, their own pride, their own contribution to civilization. They'll accept our technical assistance. They'll accept some of our initiatives to try to deal with the youth bulge. But if we go in there with the repetition of what our previous president tried to do in Afghanistan, we're going to fail massively. And of course, on top of it, we have to deal with some of the problems that are of concern to those people. And I keep repeating what is happening today in the Middle East does hinge in a significant degree on their ability to have a constructive, enduring, really historically important accomplishment in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It's an opportunity. It's not a negative hostile challenge. It's an opportunity to do something, to avert something that can become very bad for all concerned. Not just us, but also for the Palestinians and for the Israelis, for the Arabs, and therefore for the region. Dr. Brzezinski, you've written a series of books. They've always been the start of framing a new way of thinking about a problem. I've always marveled at that. So I'm asking you to share with us. You're writing something now, I'm sure. What most intrigues you right now that it's got your mind engaged intellectually to a future? Well, actually, the questions you posed. Well, that's lucky. Well, I want to say thank you. This has been a remarkable morning. Thank you very much, Dr. Brzezinski. Thank you.