 the U.S., the U.S.-Japan Alliance Dynamic, and there's some other countries in the region that it could be affected by some of our topics today. Terrific. I'll say a quick word. Good afternoon. My name is Jim Schoff, and I'm a senior associate here at the Asia Program at Carnegie. I run our Japan Studies Program, and I use Doug Paul's run again there. I guess it's contagious. I too want to thank the Saskau Peace Foundation USA for the opportunity to work together on this and their support for this event today. It's been a real pleasure, and I've also really enjoyed taking advantage of this global think tank dynamic here at Carnegie to work with our Russia and Eurasia Program closely. Within the think tank community, it's very easy to get stove piped as well, and you focus only on your particular issue, but as we all know, the challenges that we address in foreign policy are always interconnected, interdisciplinary, interregional, and the ability to work with our Moscow Center has been terrific as well. As a matter of fact, I was there last week on a separate trip, so this has been a Russia intensive experience for me. An interesting tip that I listened to the news this morning, Prime Minister Abe met with President Putin at the G20 just overnight, early this morning, and essentially announced that there was no plan to have a summit in Tokyo this year or in Japan this year, so one of the questions I'll eventually get to in our discussion after our opening remarks is this due to U.S. pressure or a sense that now is not the right time for, quote unquote, business as usual with Russia, or is it because there's no significant or sufficient compromise or get from Japan's perspective from Russia or it could be a combination of the two, but those to me seem two of the major factors that are possibly in consideration when thinking about this. So we have a great panel to look at this last dimension for the day, implications for the region and the U.S.-Japan alliance. I'm pleased to welcome Dr. Dmitry Stroudsoff, whom I had the pleasure to meet in Moscow last week, and he is professor at Moscow State Institute of International Relations and also head of the Afro-Asian Department there and concurrently serves as a research fellow at the Center for Japanese Studies at the Russian Academy of Sciences. To his right is my good friend, Naro Shige Mitsista, Dr. Mitsista Sensei is a visiting Japan scholar, so we're happy to have him here in Washington at the Woodrow Wilson Center's Asia program and simultaneously professor at the National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies, GRIPS in Tokyo. Welcome back to the SICE arena here. We were colleagues together at SICE some years ago and also very pleased to welcome Frank Genuzzi, another good friend, president and chief executive officer at the Maureen and Mike Mansfield Foundation here in Washington. A long time, Asia Hand also previously served as deputy executive director of the Amnesty International, USA and policy director East Asia Pacific Affairs of the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee. So we're gonna begin with Dmitri and work our way down and then have a little conversation and invite the audience to join as well. Thank you. Thank you. So to save time, I prepared PowerPoint presentation so I just rely on these pictures. Well, today we discuss the prospects for Japan-Russian relations and implications on the US-Japan military alliance. So, first of all, I would like to dwell your attention on the raison-etre, deter of US-Japan military alliance which faces multiple threats in Asia like the matter of rising China, North Korea and the problems of uncertainty of the historical past and numerous territorial problems, et cetera. So from this point of view, from the point of view of the general strategic uncertainty in East Asia, what is the role, first of all, what is the role of Russia? And when we see the role of Russia, we understand that Russia does not matter very much in this paradigm because, first of all, Russia has a low status in economic relations of Asia as we have seen in previous section. Another thing is that Russia is hungry with foreign investment and so it looks like Russia is not an independent subject but rather an object of foreign, so to say, interference of foreign investment and so on and so forth. And besides, Russia demonstrates low presence in regional organizations, especially economic organizations. The discussion over TPP has shown that, that Russian voice is heard mostly, is loud mostly in organizations dealing with security matters like six-party talks which are frozen now, like Shanghai Cooperation Organization, ARRF, et cetera. And the third thing, the fourth thing is that Russia demonstrates neutral position in most regional conflicts. Therefore, it's, so to say, asset is to be a mediator, go between nation, and in this respect, Russia has no conflicts with other actors and it is not antagonized by other actors of East Asia. Therefore, my second point is what is the role of Russia-Japanese relations from the Washington perspective, from the U.S. perspective? So I would like to say that for the United States, the global context of the U.S.-Japan partnership is much more important. And the United States expect Japan to be a trusty ally and to pursue the policy at present, the policy of global diplomatic isolation of Russia. Therefore, the United States, as you see, are opposing not only to Japan's rapprochement with Russia, but even to the resumption of political dialogue with Russia as statements of various U.S. officials have shown that at present, at least at present, the United States are dealing with the problem of Ukraine and therefore the United States' rapprochement between Russia and Japan is not a welcome scenario. And another thing is that the United States understand the limit for such strategy because of possible risks connected with Russia-China rapprochement with their convergence, especially in the military sphere, which has seemed to be a nightmare. But actually, from the Russian perspective, Russia-Chinese military bloc is not possible in any way. Sometimes it's overestimated because first of all, China never pursues a policy of military blocs. It's a principle position of China for many centuries. Another thing is that Russia has a recent memory of military confrontation with Beijing and this memory is still alive. And one thing which cannot be underscored is the psychological aspect because if such military bloc emerges, Russia would be even inevitably in the position of a younger sister, which is not very popular, not only among the public, but also in the military establishment in the political establishment of Russia. Therefore, Russia also understands the meaning of the word China challenges and has certain reply, has certain strategies. For example, it's safe self-restraint and export towards China. And there are also discussions about China as a possible military confront of Russia, not very low, but still they exist. Another thing is the view from Japan. Japan hopes that Japan as Russia the presentation from Ambassador Togos has shown that Japan is quite a big use to fold position because it's on the one side is the member of the GE7 and is eager to show solidarity with the West. But another thing is that Crimea, the matter of Crimea, because Japan reads it as a violation of the post-war status quo and it was confirmed in various statements by the Japanese officials. But nevertheless, there is a clear difference on the part of Japan towards the Ukrainian issue. First of all, because this issue does not affect Japan's national interests directly. Japan is not European country. Another thing is that the relations with Russia are intervened with the North Territory's issue. And from Japan's point of view, Japan hopes that the North Territory issue will be treated as a new, there emerges a new window of opportunities for changing the situation with the Kuril Islands with the emergence of Ukrainian matter. Why? Because after the Crimean affair, Japan feels herself in a much stronger position. And why such logic appears? This is because there is a strong premise that in Japan many people think that Mr. Putin, who gained much high popularity in Russia with the Crimean affair, is capable of showing generosity to Japan and return back to Russia. And in Japan, and return back North Territories to Japan, because as Putin gained vast territory, losing small islands will not be a great sin for him. Therefore, at present day, the political agenda rotates around this North Territory's issue in the Russian-Japanese relations. And therefore, in Japan, many people still think that now, this year in 2015, there appears a very unique chance for settling this issue, the first such chance in 25 years. Because 25 years ago, Mr. Odzawa came to Moscow to negotiate the matter of purchasing these islands. And for the first time in 25 years, there is a unique situation to settle this issue. Though I will not comment on that, because in Russia, you know, the situation did not change much and the Russian approach did not change much. And I don't think that such an opportunity still exists because Russia treats it as a matter of World War II. Another thing is, I would like to say that what are probable Japanese calculations or motives towards Russia in connection with North Territory's issue? First of all, what Russia expects from the United States? The Japan, one of the possible scenarios that Japan expects that the United States would support Japan in settling this issue by jointly pushing this issue to a wider diplomatic agenda. Probably one of the ideas is to put it to some international conference or other international event. And another thing is that Japan feels that it could play a role of a good cop in the dialogue with Russia, given the present situation with Russian isolation. And therefore, there could be a possible, so to say, package deal involving several issues like the Ukrainian issue, the Syrian issue, and the North Territory's issue. In one, so to say, package. And Japan could benefit the situation using its special connections with Russia and personal connections between President Putin and Prime Minister Abba for promoting such a deal. And also, there are also some expectations that Japan would break that blockade and Japan's broker ship in breaking that blockade would be rewarded by Russia in some way, by some new offers with this North Territory issue. What would be these offers? That would be another question, but still, there is such an expectation in Japan. So I would say that there is also, of course, a system factor driving Japan to Russia, towards Russia. It was already mentioned today that, first of all, is this the China factor. I would not comment on that. Another thing is that Japan fears that if it is too assertive on the other side, North Territory's issue, relations would be worsened with Russia. This chance would be lost. Therefore, there is a sort of self-restraint in criticizing Russia. And the third thing is that Japan is also jealous, not only over the relations between Russia and China, but also between the relations between China and the United States. So that Japan is anxious not to be left out of the new Asian order and fears of some secret deal between the United States and China. So what are the possible scenarios for Japan's stance towards Russia? Well, to my mind, the most probable scenario is that Japan will pursue a wait-and-see policy and still wait for the situation. First of all, Japan expects that Russian economy will slow down more considerably and that would make Russia more compliable and more manageable. Another thing is that Japan also foresees the situation over the Crimea, the Ukraine and Syria and also the situation in the sphere of personal contacts between Mr. Putin and Mr. Arbor. And also the situation in the United States because after the elections there would be some new perspectives in U.S. foreign policy towards Russia, so Japan is also looking for that situation. What is Russia's perspective of Japan? First, I would say that Russia's perspective, Russia does not feel too much hope that situation will change drastically. First of all, because Russia's policy towards Japan is motivated mostly by the global context, not by the regional context. And therefore, in the view of Russian policymakers, Japan is not an independent country, an independent cluster. And therefore, Japan is a satellite of the United States and these old stereotypes of Cold War are now reactivated. Therefore, policy towards Japan is sort of elaborated through the perspective, through the prism of the global perspective. Another thing is that Russia's view of the U.S.-Japan military alliance. Until now, Japan, perhaps like China, refrained because in 1990s, as far as I know, China also did not criticize U.S.-Japan military alliance too much. And Russia is also very conservative about that because Russia thinks that many people in Russia think that this alliance, so to say, retains Japan from becoming a military power and restricts Japan from taking the nuclear option and so on and forth and so forth. Not because there is a China factor and not because these alliance, so to say, gives a new balancing and new opportunities of balancing in the Asia Pacific, but because of the factor of the military threat from Japan, this stereotype is very strong in many, especially in the military establishment, but not only in the military establishment, but in the present day Russia, this idea is very strong. Therefore, my point is that, but still there is also a more rationalist point of view is that still U.S.-Japan security alliance is a balancing factor and there are some factors that drive Russia towards Japan, especially the situation on the Korean Peninsula, this nuclear program of Pyongyang, which is considered to be not only a challenge, but a threat for Russia. And another thing is that Russia and Japan are both declining powers, and declining powers are always driving towards each other, given the global situation like that was it, for example, after the October Revolution when Russia and Japan established their relations because they were both, so to say, discriminated by other Western powers or between Russia and Turkey, between Russia and Germany and so on and so forth. Therefore, the possible alliance between Russia and Japan could be seen through the prism of new, so to say, opportunities based on these alliance. So what are the further perspectives from the Russian point of view? First of all, Russia has no clear-cut strategy like Japan has no clear-cut strategy towards Russia, and Russia also takes the wait-and-see position, wait-and-see approach towards Japan, and also Russia's basis makes all decisions on the spot and these decisions are based on Russia's estimation of, so to say, global context of these relations. Therefore, Mr. Putin's agenda of visit to Japan is not settled yet and the agenda is not settled yet because of this, mostly because of this approach and so on and so forth. So two other things related to our section. First of all, historical issues because it's very important. And it was already said today that Russia does not criticize Japan on historical issues, though Japan was a country that was defeated and the world was a second, but Russia does not openly block side with China. First of all, there is a historical context because Russia views all these issues to be settled in both bilateral relations by the 1956 declaration. The other thing is that the USSR hoped to tear away Japan from the United States because, as I said, that Japan is not an independent country, it's a sort of satellite and it is an object of, so to say, a mutual struggle between two superpowers. Therefore, Japan should be torn away from the United States, from their influence. Therefore, Japan should not be criticized as a discriminated and, so to say, not quite independent country. And another thing is that, for example, there are such interesting things like territorial issue because territorial issue is too much for also Japanese relations. It's very sensitive and very poisonous and therefore, if we add some other things like historical grievances, these relations would be spoiled to the ultimate scale. It is not quite good. And another thing is that, for example, why Russia does not side China because in the period of conflict of 1960s, Russia did not want to support the Chinese due of history. And after that, it was already said that Moscow does not want to take China's side on the territorial problem with Japan, though such offers are made on the Chinese side so that Russia recognizes the Sankaku as the Chinese territory and in reply, in reward, China would recognize, would take Russia's position of the Kuril island problem. And Russia rejects these offers quite persistently. Therefore, Russia is very neutral towards Japan and sometimes it was already said that Russia prioritizes Japan on some regional policy affairs, regional policy issues like, for example, Arctic Council because Russia accepted the candidacy of Japan and rejected the candidacy of China in 2012. That is one of the examples. And the last thing I want to say, the economic ties between the two countries, it was already said that there is no evidence that Tokyo, Moscow economic ties would seriously affect the US-Japan alliance because this, as it was already mentioned that these ties are not significant, the trade, the share of trade is low and insignificant compared with China. Russia does not sell a considerable balance of oil and gas to Japan, unlike, for example, Europe or unlike China. And I would also doubt the main statement of the complementarity of Russian and Japanese economies because I would say that these economies are not mutually complementary because all items, commodity items that are exported from Russia to Japan could be easily bought by other, exported by other suppliers. So if something happens like sanctions or something like that, Russian and Japanese economies are not dependent on each other, unlike, for example, Japanese and Chinese economies. And so on and so forth. So that's why Russia is very, so to say, vulnerable towards domestic factors in Japanese policy because Russia could be easily, not only criticized by even some certain, it is quite easy to give Russia an extra bashing because it would not be domestically too poisonous to painful as Russia does not make much sense for Japanese national interests. And the only thing that Japan could do is to cut its modernization programs in Russia like high technologies, like in the sphere of energy saving, green technologies, electricity production and so on. This is the only, to my mind, very sensitive, Russia is very sensitive to these things, to these modernization items because this is the main expectation from Japan. And the strongest opportunity, of course it is, it has already been said that lying in the sphere of energy, infrastructure, agriculture, housing and so on and so forth. But the prospects for our cooperation, Russia-Japanese cooperation, will depend mostly on Russian domestic structural reforms and also of course on the general international situation like the problem of sanctions and so on and so forth. So my view, my point is the implication over the US-Japan military alliance is very limited. Thank you very much. Thank you very much. Thank you very much. Thank you Dimitri. Dishishita. Thank you very much. Thank you very much. Thank you very much, Carnegie Endowment and Sasaka Peace Foundation, USA for the kind invitation and also thank you, Jim, for the kind introduction and she said that we studied together some years ago but it's not, we studied together many years ago in 1992 and 93 and so the bad news is that we are old and good news is that we've been friends for a long time. Today I'm going to talk about three things. One is why Japan-Russia partnership is important. Two, why is it not doing very well? And three, I would like to make or suggest two or three policy recommendations. First, why is the Japan-Russia partnership important? It was actually, there was a great opportunity, we had a great opportunity before the Crimea and Ukraine for strengthening our partnership and there were mainly two reasons which had already been talked about in this today's conference but first is certainly we are ready, the two countries were ready to enhance cooperation on energy. After the nuclear disaster in Fukushima in 2011, all the Japanese nuclear reactors were shut down. So the Japanese reliance on liquid natural gas as a source of energy went up from 29% to more than 40%. And also there was a different discussion in the previous session but there was a demand for LNG in Europe had plateaued during that period. So it was, there was an expectation that Russia will shift its focus away from Europe to Asia. And also there was a, you know, share of revolution was still going on and doing very well, although now the share investment in share programs, rated programs are kind of slowing down because of lower oil prices. But this environment was there before the Crimea and Ukraine. Even though this, so it was lucrative and it was only 10% of Japanese LNG consumption was coming from Russia. So we thought that there was a lot of room for us to increase our, you know, an import of LNG from Russia. So Japan was interested in energy and Russia was interested in technology. I think it is already even now in technology and investment coming from Japan. In Russia sales of oil, petroleum products and natural gas constituted about two thirds of Russia's export. And so given the volatile oil prices and the share of gas revolution and energy dependence, dependent economy like Russia's would not be sustainable in the long run. So successful promotion of non-energy sectors was a key for Russia to become a true economy power. Second reason was a security imperative. Japan's, I think the most important security policy objectives at this moment is to maintain balance of power in the Asia Pacific region, but it's not easy. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, in the past 10 years, Japanese defense expenditure has declined by 3.7%. In the same period, the U.S. defense expenditure has also diminished by 0.4%. While in the same period, Chinese defense spending has increased by 167%. In the current Russia is in the third place as one of the world's largest spender on defense with annual spending of $84.5 billion in 2014. And Russia's defense expenditure has increased by 97% in the past 10 years. So if Russia can decide, it can be a more, can be an important positive factor in the security of the Asia Pacific region. Unfortunately, it hasn't done so yet, but I hope it will. Also, Russia is not necessarily sanguine about rising expanding expansion of Chinese power and influence in the Asia Pacific region. For example, when the Chinese ice-breaking research ship, Shilong, entered the Sea of Kotsk during its first trip to the Arctic Ocean in 2012, the Russian Navy conducted the anti-ship missile exercise in the area. I was not very, you know, you don't wanna see anti-ship missiles flying around when you are navigating at sea. On the nuclear front, while Russia is bound by the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, INF Treaty that the US and the Soviet Union concluded in 1987, China is not bound by it, therefore is building up its intermediate range nuclear and conventional arsenals. China is developing and deploying a large number of different types of intermediate range biostack as well as cruise missiles. And the problem is, some of them are targeted at Japan and we are very much concerned about it. And I think on this issue, Russia and Japan share interest and the concerns. Just one thing I read it, Dometry just talked about how Russia not selling some of the sensitive technologies, military technologies to China. I take one example, which is a 2.0 F-22M backfire bombers. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union was using those that aircraft to basically destroy US aircraft carriers, which admiral Blair commanded. And so that's kind of good news. But the kind of bad news is that because Russians didn't sell these aircraft to China, China decided to develop anti-ships biostack missiles and develop its own stealth bombers to probably fend off the approach of US strike forces. So in a way, Russian decision not to sell backfire backfired. It was in this context that Japan and Russia initiated two plus two foreign minister, defense minister talks in 2013. When the two countries initiated this process, Russia became the third country for Japan to have two plus two process after the United States and Australia, very important partners for Japan in the region. And Japan became the fifth country for Russia to do so after the US, Britain, France and Italy. And also as Professor Yasu talked about in his presentation before Ukraine and crime, well even now both leaders of both countries, Russia and Japan were interested and probably hopefully are or even now interested in enhancing the partnership between the two countries. And the good news is that Mr. Abe with his conservative credential might be able to make some concessions or make some deal with Russia involving territories. If it had it been for, for example, Prime Minister Hatoyama or Khan who are regarded as liberal, you know, very left leaning, if they started to talk about coming up with territorial deals, I mean, people would have been saying, oh, you are selling our country. It doesn't happen to Abe. So it was going to be a win-win process for both of us but unfortunately it didn't happen, mainly because of other reasons too but Crimea and Ukraine. And it was instead, it was China that obtained natural gas at affordable prices from Russia and it was China that has strengthened the strategies partnership with Russia. Why is this process not going too well? Well, first of all bad timing of the, you know, instant happened in Crimea and Ukraine. But another thing is I think the fact that the Europeans were not necessarily interested in security affairs or security issues in the Asia Pacific region, they just don't simply, don't feel that they are threatened by China. And several years ago I was in Spain talking to one of Spanish diplomats taking care of Asia policy and he was basically telling me, oh, you know, China is not behaving perfectly but I mean, if that will improve and if that improves, we might start selling weapons to them. So I was like, don't. But that's the mindset that the Europeans, some of them have. A third possible element is that Russia might think that the time is on the Russian side partly because Russia is currently pushing very strongly ahead with the development of Korean islands. And Russian government is currently implementing a U.S., in U.S. dollar term, 800 billion, sorry, 800 million dollar socio-economic development project for the Korean islands for the target period of 2007 to 2015 this year. Airports, hospitals, schools and paved roads has been constructed as a result as time goes by, the start of school will be more consolidated there. Also, currently these, on these four disputed islands in the Korean island chain, about 17,000 Russians are living. And also, as Yasu pointed out, Japanese former residents on this island are aging and becoming less interested in financial. It might help, this trend might actually help when it comes to making some kind of deal, but this trend that we are seeing are certainly undermining Japanese bargaining position. And finally, some of this might be coming from proliferation of populist politics in different parts of the world in the U.S., in Russia, in Japan. Political leaders in these countries, in many of the particularly democratic countries, simply cannot look weak in the eyes of their voters. In the U.S., if you look weak, you get attacked easily. In Russia, if you look strong as Mr. Putin does, you become very popular. Finally, let me, you know, make a two or three or maybe two policy recommendations. I wouldn't say policy recommendations, just suggestions. I don't have brilliant ideas, but I have suggestions. One is we might have to make efforts to de-link our policy toward Russia in European theater and our policy toward the country in Asia. As Japanese policy makers, specialists must be talking to their European friends and American friends and convince them to that this kind of approach, you know, the decoupling approach would be necessary to maintain peace and stability in Asia. And, you know, peace and stability in Asia in the long run will benefit Europeans and Americans. And also for that purpose, it is important from a security perspective for us to strive to maintain balance of power in the Asia Pacific region. Russia has to stay away from linking its relationship with Japan and the U.S.-Japan relationship because when we decided to impose these sanctions on Russia, Russian diplomats came out and said, you know, criticize Japan for being unable to pursue a independent foreign policy. You know, you shouldn't be saying this because if you link these two, you know, it means that the U.S.-Good U.S.-Japan partnership and good Japan-Russia relationship don't stand together but they have to stand together, right? So these two have to come in parallel. So you have to de-link these two and we have to actually, you know, if, you know, stronger, better Russia-Japan partnership means weaker U.S.-Japan partnership, we wouldn't take it. So Russians have to understand it. And Russia should be, you know, Japanese as well as Russia must be talking to the American friends, talking about how stronger partnership between Russia and Japan might be in their interest too. So in this context, I'm a little bit puzzled why there is not too much of a debate in the United States about possibility, possible policy option of kind of using Russia as a security kind of fact positive security factor in the Asia Pacific region. I know it's difficult and but at least there must be, you know, the discussions and debate but I'm not seeing it so I would like to ask Frank to talk about why not. One good news is that we have seen recently seen the fact that the Europeans can de-link policies. Recently when President Xi Jinping visited Britain, you know, the British government stayed away, didn't talk, you know, basically de-link economic issues and political issues. British leaders didn't talk about human rights issues in China, didn't talk about the environment issues in China for the sake of obtaining economic benefit. So Europeans can be realists. If Europeans can be realists, Americans can be too and we too. I'm not saying that we should kind of ignore the important values such as democracy of human rights but I'm simply saying we might want to be a little bit more realist for the sake of peace and stability, security in Asia. So one idea to invite back all the Dr. Kissinger into this but he is too pro-China so might backfire. We will have to be careful. So we would like to use his ideas without inviting him personally. Finally, Russia and Japan, this is actually suggested by Jeffrey, can cooperate in multilateral setting. For example, now both of us, Japan and Russia can work together, well maybe separately or with some coordination in our effort to provide capacity building kind of assistance to Southeast Asian countries. Russia has a good relationship, it's trying to sell submarines to Vietnam and strong traditional ties. Russia has a good relationship with India, it's not necessary about capacity building, we are trying to help Southeast Asian countries, I mean Japan is trying to help Southeast Asian countries to enhance its defense capabilities and also strengthen ties with India so we can do coordinate at least what are we trying to do together. So our most important objective remains to be an enhancement and creation of a strong strategic partnership between the two countries, Russia and Japan but it's not easy, we know that. So in the meantime, we can try to take steps where it's possible while hoping for the best. Thank you very much. Thank you very much, Michi. I'm not sure about the wisdom of coming here to Washington for a year and making an enemy of Henry Kissinger but besides that, I'm teasing. Frank, let me stand in solidarity and say that I think it would be very good to invite Kissinger but to not listen to his views. Yeah, I agree. And let me also make a disclaimer at the beginning of my remarks which is that this is the first time I've met Dr. Speltzahl and he did not ghostwrite my paper but if you read my paper you may discover that he could have ghostwritten at least sections of my paper because I in fact find myself sharing many views with him and I wanna emulate a little bit my old boss, Senator Biden this afternoon. Senator Biden learns through argument. So let me be deliberately provocative with the audience. I'm the last speaker this afternoon so I have the luxury of being deliberately provocative. I'd like an argument not because I'm truly 100% committed to everything that I'm gonna tell you but because I learn also by arguing and I think that Doug Paul was onto something this morning when he said that Washington is too often a strategy for his own. I think that Russia's rapprochement with Japan is something that is being looked at or the potential of rapprochement between Russia and Japan is something that is being looked at by Washington without sufficient strategic perspective. So I'm gonna urge a sense of greater strategic perspective. It's true that Russia today does not weigh very heavily in US thinking about the Far East and this is simply because Russia is not as present in the Far East as it was during the Soviet era. Militarily, strategically, even to some extent economically, I would say that Russia is a weaker player overall in the Pacific theater than it was during the time of the Soviet Union. But it was not always the case that the US Japan Alliance was oriented toward threats other than the Soviet Union. In fact, this room knows very well that the US Japan Alliance was forged at the height of the Cold War precisely because of concerns about the Soviet Union, its role on the Korean Peninsula, its fleet and much of the improvements in the early years of the US Japan Alliance were driven by Cold War considerations. Even into the Reagan era when the United States encouraged Japan to take responsibility for ceilings of communication out to 1,000 nautical miles beyond the Japanese islands, this was still driven in essence by concerns about the Soviet Pacific fleet and a burden sharing of responsibilities between the United States and Japan. So this historical perspective to me is significant because although today the US Japan Alliance is clearly not oriented against a Russian threat. It used to be and I think it is still, it's kind of like a memory pathway or a reflex reaction. It is still very easy for Americans to look to the US Japan Alliance as a counterweight to Russia in the Far East. Even though the realities of today are that the Alliance is clearly oriented against other threats or risks, namely the rise of China and the risk that China might become an irresponsible rather than a responsible stakeholder. And of course the North Korean threat which is a more immediate tactical threat but which to me does not constitute a long-term strategic threat to US interests. So the first point is simply that Russia may be low in its status right now. It was not always so and the US still thinks about Russia-Japan relations partly as an adversarial relationship rather than as one that should be complementary. The second point that I wanna make is that when it comes to all the disputes over territory in the Far East right now, whether it's the Diaoyu Senkakus or Toto Takashima or the Nansha, South China Sea Islands or the Kuril Islands, I think the United States cares more about process than it does about outcome. With maybe a few exceptions, with respect to the Senkakus, Obama has said very clearly that we consider those rocks to be under Japanese administration covered by the Alliance and that we would not tolerate the use of force to change that. But with respect to most of the other territorial disputes in the region, I think basic US attitude is, look, just solve it peacefully through negotiations without coercion, consistent with international norms and we will bless any solution that is reached. And this differs from the US attitude that existed in 1956 when clearly the United States did discourage Japan from solving the Kuril Island dispute according to a 2-2 formula. And I think the history is reasonably clear on this, although I'm not an expert on it, but the US essentially threw a roadblock up to make it more difficult for Japan to reach that agreement that might otherwise have been reached at that time. Why is this important? I think it's important because it says to me that there's no strategic disadvantage for the United States if Russia were to peacefully, through negotiations, settle the Kuril Northern Islands dispute with Japan. The United States does not consider that even if all four islands were somehow ceded to Russia forever, the US doesn't believe that this would be a strategic blow to US interests in the Far East so long as this was an agreement arrived at peacefully through negotiation. Now, clearly, would the US prefer a 2-2 split? Yeah, probably, because it's what Japan wants, at least. Maybe Japan wants more. And the US is going to be in solidarity with our Japanese ally, but we don't have a dog in the fight. We don't have a strategic reason to prefer one outcome over the other, as long as it's something that's acceptable to our Japanese allies. And I think this is true of the other territorial disputes in the region as well. Ultimately, I think, in fact, the United States would welcome a resolution of the issue between Russia and Japan. Why? Well, for all of the reasons that the other gentlemen have already mentioned, the United States has a strategic interest in Russian, foreign, and resources coming online on the global market and being brought online not only through Chinese investment, but through Japanese investment as well, but we have a strategic interest in oil security in having Russian Far Eastern gas and oil flow to Japan and perhaps to South Korea, not just to China. The United States also arguably has a strategic interest in trying not to drive Russia and China together, but in fact, to, if not, drive a wedge between them, at least to ensure that Russia is not pushed into Beijing's camp through US policies. Because clearly, Chinese in the Far East pose a much greater potential strategic threat to US interests than do the Russians in the Far East. And so why magnify China's influence and power by ensuring that Moscow and Beijing enjoy something more than a marriage of convenience? Why is that in the US strategic interest? Now, if this is so logical so far, if I haven't lost you completely, then why is it that the United States is so adamant right now in opposing Japanese, Russian, of rapprochement? And I pose that, assuming that you agree with me that in fact US is against Moscow, Tokyo, rapprochement. But I have at least a little bit of evidence. And I wanna point to one statement, but there are many others. But one statement was from Assistant Secretary Russell about a year ago, July 2014. And he said this about Japan-Russia relations. And I wanna interpret this for you. I used to work at the State Department. So let me interpret. This is from English State Department Language into English. Proper English. So first the State Department Language, Danny Russell speaking. The Japanese government clearly recognizes that the unity in the international community will ultimately be one of the factors that convinces Russia that it must adjust its behavior and stop the challenge to international law and values. First sentence. So what does this mean? It says clearly Japan recognizes that unity will help to prevent Russia and force Russia to adjust its behavior. What he means is we are very worried that Japan does not recognize. That this unity is important. And that they ought to recognize it. And so I'm putting them on notice that they should recognize it. Second sentence. I have a high degree of confidence that the Japanese government also recognizes that unity in this issue has significant implications for the Asia-Pacific region. Interpretation into English. It means I have no confidence that the Japanese government recognizes that unity is important, this matter. And I will point out this is the second time that he uses the word unity in two sentences in a row. So he's worried about disunity between the US and Japan. Third sentence. There are abundant analogies that can be drawn between Russia's behavior and threats to sovereignty and territorial integrity much closer to home for Japan. Unpacking this into English. Sovereignty and territorial integrity. These are the words of war. These are the words of alliance. The core of an alliance is to ensure sovereignty and territorial integrity. So now he's wetting this issue to the essence of the US-Japan alliance and he's deliberately making the analogy between China's behavior with respect to the South China Sea and the East China Sea and Russia's behavior with respect to Ukraine. So now Secretary Russell is invoking the high-minded, the core strategic element of the US-Japan alliance and he's linking it to Japanese solidarity with Washington and Ukraine. And the final sentence is that lesson has not been lost on the Japanese government and we're counting on them. Interpretation means I'm worried that they've lost it and I'm counting on them to remember it and to behave themselves as a good little brother. This is my interpretation for you of the US policy. And I think the policy while motivated by some reasonable concerns about the resilience of the international system in response to aggression by Russia with respect to Crimea. I think it's strategically misplaced. The Crimea is not the beginning of Nazi Anschluss, right? It is on the one hand a clear violation of international norms, UN Charter. On the other hand, in my view, it's not the beginning of some irredentist Russian land grab to be followed by an invasion of the Baltic states, Eastern Poland and Germany. Now, I invite an argument over this and about how important it is for the United States to stand firm against Russia and the Ukraine. But let me say that it was Washington and not Tokyo that initially argued for de-linking Russia's behavior in Europe from Russia's behavior in the Far East. When did it do this? With respect to North Korea. Senior US officials repeatedly assured the international community that Russia's behavior in Europe would have no bearing on the ability of the United States to cooperate with Russia with respect to the DPRK challenge. Oh, no problem said all of our East Asian officials, all of our White House and State Department officials, we can continue to work with Russia just fine with respect to North Korea because they share our commitment to denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula. So what gives the Washington audience a free pass to work with Russia on DPRK while explaining Tokyo that you're not allowed to work with Russia when it comes to the Northern Territories? There seems to me to be a disconnect there and I think it's wrong headed. So let me close and leave time for some Q&A by trying to be even a little bit more provocative. It seems to me that the United States needs to look at the potential for some strategic wins rather than just losses by at least permitting, if not encouraging, Tokyo to explore relations with Moscow. The fact is that Russia is working with the interests of the international community in Syria and not against it. The extremist elements that Russia is trying to kill in Syria are precisely the extremist elements that the United States is also waging war against. The difference is that they're gonna do it much more effectively. We've spent half a billion US dollars in order to train 150 fighters in Syria. I'm confident that Russia will do a much more efficient job of it. When it comes to Ukraine, for sure, the US should stand firm with Ukraine against the Russian occupation of Crimea but the reality is Crimea is not going back to Ukraine in my lifetime. It's 90% ethnically Russian. They like the fact more or less that they're part of Russia today. It's not gonna be resolved. So we can have a sanctions policy for the next 50 years against Russia for Crimea. It's not gonna solve the problem and yet the world strategically is gonna move on and we can't afford to have Russia be absent from that process. So I know that that's provocative, it's deliberately so. I believe at least about 85% of it. And I would invite your criticisms and your comments. Now let me close by saying that one of the strategic reasons why the US should, in fact, get out of the way of Japan, Russia, and rapprochement is precisely because of the DPRK situation. The DPRK today is not nearly as isolated as the Obama administration would have us believe. They're not economically isolated from China. They're not politically isolated in the world. And one of the reasons is because, although Russia agrees with us on denuclearization, Russia's not been able or had a reason or a motivation to play a very effective role in recent years with respect to the Korean Peninsula. Russia-Japan rapprochement would bring two potential partners back into the six-party game. Japan's been sidelined by the abduction issue. Russia's been sidelined because they don't really strategically trust the United States right now to work with us in a very cohesive way on the Korean Peninsula. Arguably, rapprochement between Russia and Japan would do a couple of things. It would create an economic incentive to solve the North Korean problem. It's one of the reasons why the North Korean problem persists, in my view, is that there has rarely been much economic reason for it to be resolved. There's no oil in North Korea. But what there are is trade routes. Trade routes connecting South Korean goods to Europe. Pipeline routes connecting Russian Far East and oil, potentially to the Korean Peninsula or even to Japan. We need an economic incentive to help solve this problem, a reason for the great powers to work more cohesively together to solve it. And rapprochement between Japan and Russia would add to the leverage of the international community, add to the potential benefit from resolving the North Korean nuclear crisis. And North Korea would truly be the odd country out if Japan and Russia were to improve their relations. North Korea would be the big loser. And that usually in Washington is argument to do something. So let me close there and invite questions. Great. Thank you very much, Frank. I'm glad we had you clean things up at the end to keep us going into the Q&A. We started the last session a little bit late, so we're actually somewhat pressed on time. I want to squeeze in a couple of quick questions before I turn it over to the audience. First off, as I alluded to in my opening remarks, and I offer this up to anyone who would like to take a guess, we learned this morning that more likely than not, we're not going to have an Abe Putin summit in Tokyo later this year. Why? Is it a decision was made either by one party or the other or mutually? And which is a more important factor? Some of this dynamic that you're talking about in the context of US unhappiness with that prospect and pressure or concern or simply the unlikelihood of any significant movement on the most important issue to Japan that would then look like a real dud of a summit if they actually brought Putin and suffered that cost and got absolutely nothing? Well, from Japanese reports, which are just coming out now, so I don't know how authentic they are or accurate they are, but there are two issues that have been talked about. One is certainly putting reactants to make concessions or some kind of on from Russian side and also US reactants to accept this was for some way kind of conveyed to the Japanese government and that was a big factor. So those two interpretations have been reported. Well, maybe also there is a lack of some significant results possible potential results of the economic sphere because Russia relies on some concrete deal with Japan in some energy sphere or some other spheres and perhaps present day such results could not be expected. Therefore, it's quite inevitable. OK, moving on then, I accept that, but we'll find out more over time, but that paints a rather somewhat bleak picture in the context of prospects given these different dynamics. So I want to ask a question a little bit about leverage and what it means because certainly the pushback against the idea that we should follow some of the suggestions that Frank and others have put forward is if you delink, if you move forward with Russia in Asia, you lose pressure leverage on something else that we think is important. Or from the Japanese perspective, if we dive in more significantly with capital investment in Russia and develop, increase all of this trade, then Russia gets the benefit of a peace treaty without coming to terms with the issue that's most important in Japan and we lose that leverage. Is leverage important now? And then over time, when I was in Moscow last week, some Russian people that I interacted with talked about the idea that for the time being, we're living off our fat. We're under pressure, but we have enough store, enough reserves kind of built up. It hasn't really hit yet so hard. But as we learn today, the rest of the decade, potentially low oil prices, no big change going on there. So you've got multiple years out of significant economic pressure. We've learned supposedly no solution on the Ukraine situation straight line. Nothing's going to change that in the near term. So therefore, sanctions, another straight arrow out. So over time, does that dynamic of leverage change one way or the other or not? Let me take a first cut just to say that whatever impact US and European sanctions have had on Russia, it pales in comparison to the impact of going from $100 a barrel to $50 a barrel on oil. I mean, this is a much more crippling economic sanction on Russia than anything the US would wield. And arguably, bringing online Russian Far East oil and gas will only ensure that we keep that price of oil low for a longer time. And you could view it almost as a form of economic leverage against Putin instead of a gift to Putin. We've heard earlier today that the Russians in the Far East are scrambling, encouraging the center to subsidize and to give gifts to the Russian Far East. Well, I think we could really have some fun sowing some internal havoc in Russia by reaching out to the Russian Far East and providing them with a way to bring on those resources. So for sure, leverage has its place, but leverage isn't going to get Russia out of the Crimea. And if what we want, therefore, is for Russia to behave more responsibly overall in the international system, I think we might actually have more leverage by wedding them economically to our investment in the Far East than by continuing a straight line approach on sanctions. Any other thoughts from the panel? Well, my point is that I have already said that Russia has no click cut strategy. Mr. Putin is a brilliant tactician, but not a strategist. Therefore, at present day, the sort of say, wait-and-seek approach prevails everywhere in the Russian behavior. Also towards Japan, also towards the United States, and towards the global situation. There are much expectations in Russia that well prices will, to some extent, revive or bounce for a certain high level. But as these expectations are not valid enough, at present, I would say that Russia now teaches itself to survive within this new paradigm. And you have already said that there is a very strong potential of survival in Russia, given that Russian citizens support Mr. Putin. And the Russian economy is rather archaic. It is not globalized yet to the extent that this section could be very sensitive. And there is a psychological, so to say, transmission, transformation to the situation of Cold War in Russia, which is quite cozy for many people, because many people still remember this situation. And when Russia was, so to say, superpower, and therefore this superpower complex is quite comfortable for many people. And in this respects, many people are, most people are quite ready to sacrifice their living conditions for the sake of this global, so to say, sovereignty. Russia is right in the right position and so on and so forth. So therefore, you speak about leverage, but these rational arguments do not work. OK, thank you very much. Let me give people in the audience a chance to pose a question to our panel on this issue of implications for the region and for the US-Japan alliance. So I have a question in the back. Well, let's see. All right, we'll go back and then we'll go to Sam. Guy Thomas, independent consultant, Cold War warrior, obviously by the gray hair. I would just like to observe that I think they saved the best to last. Kudos to all of you. It really was, this last hour was extremely informative. But Frank, I just wanted to make the comment, my friend, that I hope you're right. I actually went back a year or so ago and reread the interwar years for the Nazi Auschwitz looks like, and it sure is scary. And we made the mistake then of thinking that Hitler was a rational person. We look like we're making the same mistake now, it appears. I hope I'm wrong. I hope you're right. I'm wrong. I'm not sure if there's a question in there. I'm glad we have NATO. Well, let me ask Sam. Do we have a microphone here? Same jar of ISS. Thank you all three for your very interesting remarks. I guess I have a comment and a question for Frank. Just a sort of point of information. It's actually the Japan-Russia territorial dispute is the only one where the US officially does take sides. I mean, I know you couldn't argue that they shouldn't, but it should be noted that even in the case of the Senkaku the IEU dispute, formally the US doesn't have a position on that, whereas at least since the Bush administration it does on the Northern Territory Square Alliance. I guess the question is, do we run the risk and the logic that you presented of your argument, much of which I agree with, about overestimating the role of US pressure or lack thereof in the lack of a resolution of the Japan-Russia territorial dispute. That is, if we present the US opposition as the, or the potential US support as the key that could unlock this treasure, we might be setting ourselves up, don't you think, in the sense that there hasn't at least been identified a clear win-win outcome that both sides have said that they could live with if we only knew what that alpha, I suppose, would be, but nonetheless, the least a risk to keeping in mind. I appreciate the question and I agree with your presumption that the US doesn't hold the key and ought not to present itself as either the impediment or the solution to the Northern Territory dispute. I agree with you and I think there is a danger. If the US government were to talk as I talk, which is why I'm happy I'm not in government, that people might think that the US was the obstacle and that the Japanese people would look to Washington as a bad actor. So let me say that I agree with you, I don't think the US holds the key and I think right now the main problems are the ones that our visitors from Moscow and Tokyo have pointed out, namely that on the Russian side, if you had a visit to the territories, I think sort of indicates that they don't think that the situation is right for solution today and for Abe, for his part, I think in part, bowing to US pressure and in part because he would like a maximalist win in any resolution of the dispute and maybe again, it's not right. I think those are the principal reasons rather than US obstacle but I do think the United States very clearly has said to Tokyo, look, this is one of those moments in our relationship where we expect you to toe the line with us in pursuit of global interests and whatever local parochial benefit you might derive, we expect you to set it aside and I guess my argument is that that may be tactically smart and strategically stupid. Although I think Japan really did struggle with this decision on the G7 sanctions and that there was some US encouragement, I'm sure, but I do think too that Japan looked at the Senkaku issue and thought if I'm not gonna support Ukraine and the West on the use of force to change the status quo on a territorial issue and China lands some commandos dressed as fishermen onto the Senkakus and who am I gonna turn to for support then and ultimately I think China did drive Japan to make that decision. Michi, just to follow up though quickly with you because I think Sam's question gets back to this issue of leverage and from Japan's point of view, how significant is the economic component of leverage there? Would, is it possible, we've heard there's kind of economic reasons why there's not a whole lot of investment necessarily right now in Russia, but is there a strong argument that we need to hold back on our economic engagement and exploring better Japan-Russia ties even if we put the territorial issue on hold? I mean, is there a battle in terms of how, how front and center to put that or link that? Well, I can't, I'm not in a good position to make a calculation as to how profitable or beneficial for both sides economically if we come to some kind of deal. But generally speaking, I think, I mean, we as Japanese government, because it's interested in enhancing relationship with China, Russia, it seems that it's kind of exaggerating economic, possible it can benefit that we can leap from enhanced investment and all that. But I would say the real objectives comes from geo-strategic calculations than economic calculations. So I think that's the key. And so I haven't really looked into our thoughts seriously about this, but I'm wondering whether there is a possibility or for us to come up with some kind of a roadmap where we take, you know, we have a kind of action to for action type of agreement so that we can take one step forward, you know, each side to take one step forward at some point in the next. I don't know, I would like to ask him also the total whether it's possible. Well, and the other potential is using multilateral frameworks in the region as a way to enhance cooperation with Russia, essentially kind of couch. And North Korea is a good example, but there are other regional commentations. Professor Tolore was talking about, let me go here and then go. Let me ask a Korean specific question. Would Russia and Japan be prepared to live with North Korea with a few nuclear weapons? Is the idea of denuclearization supporting the US by momentum or is it like Crimea, where we know that Russia is not going to discourage Crimea? Maybe North Korea will not give up its nuclear weapons. Should we all just live with that and get on? Russia, Russia's position is quite clear that Russia never declared its tolerance with this nuclear program of Pyongyang. And besides, there is the fact that Russia is anxious of some accidents concerning this program because there were some precedents when North Korean missiles were misactivated and they dropped in the Russian territorial waters, not far from Vadyvostok. This scenario, when some mistake lead to some extraordinary situation, that is the main reason for Russian concern. And also, of course, Russia's position towards nuclearization problem did not change much. Okay, well, we've actually run officially out of time, although we have some closing remarks, but I think I'll wait for them to actually come into the room from Admiral Blair and our president, Bill Burns. Togo-sensei, I'll give you the last word here, or question. Thank you. I think I need to say something about Mr. Januzi's presentation and his paper. Jeff made such a good job in distributing all papers before I left Tokyo. And so in the airplane, at least I had a look of all papers and all of them were interesting, informative. But your paper was shockingly interesting. And some part really, I thought that how could this person write things which I really wanted to write. And today I was also shockingly impressed by our luncheon speech, luncheon speech. And I'm now a bit confused feeling because this is very different from the image I had in Washington, or I had on Washington before coming here. So, but over lunch too, when I said something, then immediately someone said that this is not the majority view in DC. And I assume that your view is not the majority view in DC either. But my question to you and maybe to you, is there any practical way with which to reflect your views to the present government or in the future course of the US politics? And I really thank the whole organization to have prepared this meeting. Thank you very much. Well, look, let me, without retracting anything that I wrote, but qualifying it to say that I was trying deliberately to push the envelope. Let me say that one of the constraints on Washington when it thinks about situations like the Crimea or North Korea is that no decision in Washington is made with respect to how best to solve the issue in the region. In Washington decisions are made often, most of the time, in a global context. And so Washington cannot divorce the situation in the Crimea from their thinking about China's behavior in the South China Sea or aggressive behavior against UN norms anyplace else in the world. So this is why I think the United States has been so adamant in taking a tough line against Russia in Crimea. I think if you were to ask Americans, what's the best solution just for stability and peace in Eastern Europe? They might come up with a more nuanced policy, but they're really viewing this in a global context. And similarly, in the Russian Far East, I wish that the United States would be as flexible as I'm calling for in terms of advocating talks between Tokyo and Russia on the Northern Territories. But the reality is that it's very hard for the United States to approach this. And I don't think that my recommendations are politically practical, given where the US Congress is and the US body politic. I think that the practical approach is the one that the Obama administration has taken. Basically punish Russia, condemn Russia, take a hard line. So I can't offer you much encouragement that Washington, in a practical way, would behave in such a way that was so unconstrained by politics that they would grab for this creative approach on the Far East. I think it's very unlikely. So we're sorry to raise your hopes there, Togo-sensei, and dash that. Absolutely. Well, I just want to thank everyone for your participation today. We have some closing remarks, which I'm looking forward to from our president and from Admiral Blair. So please stay seated. But as they enter, please also thank our panel for... Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. I'm glad. Enjoy your presentation. Thank you. All right. I'd like to thank those of you who do not work for Carnegie or for Sasekawa or we're on a panel for staying. It's great to endure, but we have a treat for you because Ambassador Burns, who's the president CEO of Carnegie, and also one of our most distinguished and experienced diplomats and was our ambassador in Moscow was going to wrap it up. So you have a treat coming, but let me just summarize just a few points that I picked up out of this very interesting and sharp six hours or so that we have participated in. I'd say first I was reassured that there are some good reasons that not only should the Japan-Russia relationship continue to improve, but that the relationships among Japan, Russia, the United States, China, and other countries in the region should also continue to improve. I think Dr. Rumer reminded us at noontime that the developments of recent years have perhaps dug us into a hole that we never quite intended to be in, that there are incentives on all sides to pull out of that politically, that we are not in some sort of black-white world, but we're in a relationship among major powers in which you cooperate in some areas, you compete or your fierce rivals in another area, but nonetheless, there is a common stake in many areas that's diminished in recent years, and we were also reminded, I think, by some in our economic panel of the potential economic benefit of cooperation in that area, some of which is stunted by the lack of political agreements. So first for me was a reinforcement of some reasons that we should be working on these issues in a positive and determined frame of mind. On the other hand, we were reminded that if these issues were easy to solve, it would have been done already, and we were privileged to hear from a couple of ambassadors who've been working very hard on trying to make it happen, and if ambassadors Togo and Panoff could not succeed in pulling off this agreement, then there are some obstacles that are not easily overcome, and we were reminded of many of those, the lack of popular support for reconciliation in different countries, the low overall Japanese approval rate for Russia, not quite so low, but nonetheless negative Russian feeling about Japan, and our last panel talked about the sort of muscle memory from the Cold War, which has been reawakened recently in both the United States and in Russia. So there's a popular atmosphere out there in all of the countries that takes a fairly brave leader to work against or some incentives to work against it, and we had talk about building up political credibility in order to take a move that's the right thing for your country and for other countries. We also heard very clearly about the lack of real business involvement, very low levels of business interaction between Japan, and Russia, the anachronistic model of resources going one way, cars going the other way, the lack of a more complex and integrated economic business interaction between Japan and Russia, which could be the basis of having at least a business community that supports strengthening this relationship. So although we heard some good reasons that Japan and Russia should cooperate and that the United States should be interested in that happening, we also heard why it's so difficult. We also, I think, learned, or at least I learned several interesting things. I know we all have our own lists, but I'll give you mine that I was jotting down during the course of the day. I was happy to learn that the Siberian vacuum sucking Chinese influence in is a myth. I wouldn't have believed that if I'd heard the Chinese saying it, but I do believe it when I hear the Russians telling me that. So I think that's very reassuring. That would be one more factor that it would be just as good if we don't have to deal with it. So I was reassured in that sense. I was also reminded, and perhaps not, should not have been a surprise, but that we shouldn't take every business, every economic mega project that we hear about and immediately extrapolated into some huge moving of the tectonic plates of political relationships. So to hear from experts like we had in our economic panel that maybe the Chinese Russian gas deal is not moving ahead as quickly or moving ahead at all as we thought, the difficulty of some of these other mega projects. It's easy for op-eds to talk blithely about running power lines from the Korean Peninsula or from Russia to Japan or Sakhalin project inevitably becoming greater and resupplying Japan. But when you hear from the people who really have been studying this, you see how difficult some of these things are and how it's not just political permission that makes them go forward. They have to make business sense. There are all sorts of economic considerations that come into play and we should look a little bit below the hood when we think about these things. I think that was a good reminder to all of us. I was personally interested to see the catalog of the number of cases in which Russia has in fact balanced its policy decisions between China and Japan. I suppose I knew it, but I never really thought carefully about the way that China had favored Japan over Russia in admission to the Arctic Council, for instance. The position that China had taken on non-recognition or non-favoritism towards Chinese territorial claims over those of Japan. And I think it was good to be focused on the nuance of Soviet policy towards the east. And then again, I mentioned this at lunchtime, but I was also struck, as I said, about the way these 19th century sort of Bismarckian, Machiavellian, Metternichian ways of thinking still persist in East Asia and how we think in terms of leverage and power relationships and political interactions and so on. And that we have a hard time raising our eyes to the larger issues in most of which I believe the United States, Japan, China, and Russia are all on the same sides dealing with climate change and the possibility of catastrophic damage to all of our countries combating violent extremist Islamist elements cooperating on disaster relief in the other areas in which we have a common interest. Even a common interest like North Korea was mentioned by my count by only one speaker from each of the three countries who were represented here and it did not seem to have that power of pulling us together for a common concern that you would think. So I think part of our mission as think tanks is really to influence the intellectual atmosphere among our countries and I take it as a charge to try to keep our eyes a little bit more towards the future and the issues that we ought to work together rather than simply being experts on what terrible events from the past got us to where we are. So where does that bring us all? I think the consensus of our experts here was that probably on all sides, Russia, Japan, the United States, if you had to bet on one course of action it would be the wait and see. Nothing's gonna happen for a while, things are going to sit there. But I for one was convinced that that shouldn't be just a passive wait and see and see what happens. But that we should be looking, we as non-governmental but knowledgeable observers should be looking for ways when the time is right, when the leverage relationships are right to try to be more active in turning around this downward spiral of relations if we can find goodwill and people on the other side who recognize that and try to move the relationships among the major powers in a more positive direction to solve the issues among them and to work cooperatively on some of these other issues which may be more important on the future. Sometimes I have this sort of dream that in 100 years our successors will be sitting around saying, back in 2015 they were worried about these little rocks around East Asia and they didn't realize that they were gonna lose a quarter of their cities and half of their agricultural land and what in the world were they thinking back then? So I think we just need to keep our eyes higher while we're not stupid, we're not naive, we don't give away the store to other countries but we need to continue to move forward. So anyway, thank all of you for your contributions for traveling so far and for being so honest in your time up here and then I'd like to turn it over as I say to a uniquely qualified American on these issues, Ambassador Burns. Good evening everyone. As the last speaker at the end of a long and very productive day, I wanna just assure you that my first priority is brevity. So let me just say that it's a real privilege to host today's conference with my friend, former colleague and an extraordinary public servant at Bodenny Blair. I wanna thank Denny and his team at the Sasakawa Peace Foundation USA for your partnership and for everything that you do to strengthen the U.S.-Japan Alliance. I also wanna thank my Carnegie colleagues and our presenters and moderators, especially those who have traveled from Tokyo and Moscow and whose jet lag is probably getting the best of them at this late hour. And finally, I wanna thank the audience, all of you, for being part of today's conversation, a conversation about a vitally important set of relationships and a vitally important part of the world. Russia, Japan, and the United States, as all of you know very well, are Pacific powers with a real stake in the Pacific century that's unfolding before us. As all of you know very well, this region is defined by both economic dynamism and significant competition and security challenges. It's a region that is at once trying to contend with yesterday's ghosts while realizing the promise and potential of tomorrow. And it is a region that will have to define for itself the rules of the road that will mitigate the possibility of conflict and reap the dividends of cooperation. The U.S. and Japan have a deep stake in shaping those rules of the road and making sure they reflect our shared interests and values. One of the key elements of U.S. policy and the region over the past decade or so has been to build a web of alliances, partnerships, and regional structures to protect and update regional order. This includes the management of threats to regional stability like North Korea or festering territorial and maritime disputes. And it includes the equally important task of strengthening the foundation of a rules-based, free, transparent, and market-oriented economic order. This architecture of cooperation is not meant to exclude or contain regional powers, but rather to demonstrate the continued benefit and stake in preserving the regional order that the U.S.-Japan alliance has worked so hard over so many years to preserve. The truth is that there are sound and unsanimental reasons why improved relations between Japan and Russia can contribute to that objective. And I know many of these were discussed in depth over the course of today. But I think the reality of the past few years serves as a reminder that the overall challenge before us in the Asia-Pacific will not be easy. There remain significant hurdles to overcome, wide divides to bridge, and substantial changes to manage, whether the rise of China, Russia's reassertiveness, or the emergence of significant new global players like India. Managing these and other transformational dynamics in the Asia-Pacific and beyond will be a big test of the alliance in the years to come. Understanding this rapidly changing landscape and examining it not from the narrow perspective of Washington but from regional perspectives is precisely what animates our Asia program and Carnegie more generally. And it is precisely what animates today's conference and the conversations that will flow from it. So I'm very pleased, once again, and proud that Carnegie and Sasekawa USA joined hands in this effort. And I very much look forward to continuing this partnership for a long time to come. Thank you all very much again.