 Good morning everyone and I'm very glad to contribute to this conference even if virtually and I would love of course to be in Helsinki and I have to say I'm also quite relieved to present this paper after Sir Vesley's keynote on trust and safety capacity because this is partly what is mostly this research is about and so at least now I don't have to convince you that trust matters for building capacity. So the core concern of the research I'm presenting today it's really that if trust for government is key to state capacity and trust is enhanced by government's performances as providers of public goods or security then the question that we should be asking probably is what happens when third parties sorry like the UN heavily support the government in providing these goods in developing capacities in a way that ultimately may make it difficult for citizens to distinguish who's been providing and so to attribute in a way the merits of that provision. So what I'm doing here I'm trying to think a little bit about whether there is a trade-off between building some capacities for the state to be able to better provide for citizens and also in a way undermining what could be another key pillar of state capacity which is again trust and then ultimately this is linked to legitimacy. So more specifically the way I think this is linked to the way peacekeeping particularly is done I think policy-wise we've seen how the practice of peacekeeping has become increasingly entrenched with peacebuilding and even state building. So you've seen that since the 90s I mentioned here a few key documents but I will focus particularly on the capstone doctrine where you do see how peacekeeping really is a tool for peacebuilding in the sense that it's the two of them are very much interconnected and you see these also in the things that peacekeeping operations now do on the ground. More specifically empirically you see a trend towards broader mandates longer missions and even in general a phase to UN presence where you have for example peacekeeping missions then then develop a more peacebuilding mandate and ultimately other plays by special political missions which are purely political tools that don't have any military component. So the question is should the UN be doing this I mean is that really a risk that externally led state building can undermine the legitimacy of state of government in the eye of populations. And here you can see how I mean these are all peacekeeping operations after the end of the Cold War you can see the extent that the breadth of the mandates that these missions have and if we were to draw a similar graph for years before the end of the Cold War probably you would only be seeing just few red orange and brown dots but nothing else which suggests how broad but also in a way intrusive contemporary peacekeeping mandates are and so the question is whether this could actually be a problem somewhat for governments that can also at the same time benefit from the presence of peacekeepers. So if state building is part in some way of the general peacekeeping goals then again the question is whether in facilitating effective governance so improving the performances of national governments in providing public goods but also security to citizens there could be an attribution problem from the perspective of citizens who who might not be who may ultimately be convinced that that the state is not able to provide for them because they need the presence of the international community of the UN in this specific case. So the general question this research is concerned with it's whether missions with strong peacebuilding components which are then particularly intrusive can threaten or maybe boost state legitimacy. So I think in principle it's not entirely clear our priority which will be the direction of our potential effect of peacekeeping operations in regards to trust towards national institutions. And what I do here I try to think about what the UN does on the ground in relation to three key pillars that have been identified by Rubin but also been used by other social scientists when thinking about state formation so focusing particularly on rebuilding in the case of post-conflict settings of course rebuilding coercion, capital and legitimacy. I think the UN does different things on the ground they try to tackle each of these pillars but I would like to say a few more things on the legitimacy aspect. So when it comes to coercion you're probably aware that UN does not only generally violence reduction which seems to be successful but also does the disarmament demobilization and ventriculation programs, demilitarization, reforming the security sectors. All these things the UN seems to be successful at doing them. When it comes to capital the presence of UN missions is also associated with higher with larger volumes of aid flows, implementation of development programs, quick impact projects and this is true not only at the you could say the national level or at the macro level but also at the micro level you see that peacekeeping operations seems to provide this economic boost even in local communities where you see for example higher household consumptions in general. When it comes to legitimacy however what the UN does and I think this relates nicely to the previous where the previous speakers have been talking about mostly the UN focuses on elections and democracy. So what they do they help organizing elections and basically assume that in some way this procedural approach to legitimacy will mean that the government ultimately because it's because the process with the democratic process ultimately is legitimate government. The take that I try to have here is one that focuses particularly however on the performance-based approach that thinks of legitimacy in terms of what the government asks for citizens is the government providing for them as it's expected to do and more specifically when it comes to the relationship between UN and this performance-based legitimacy we know very little so we don't know exactly whether the UN makes service provision better in countries that post peacekeeping operations. The evidence we have is that these probably are null effects however we know that public the provision of public goods reinforces trust but it's not just the provision itself but also who's providing these goods. And other research that I've been impacted with Robler and Anna Smith suggests that actually bypassing the state rather than engaging with the state can be costly for the legitimacy process. We look particularly democratization but I think this nicely translates more generally to the case of public goods provision and more generally provision of security and basic needs for citizens. So in trying to mobilize the UN is providing by in a way replacing the states I feel empirical implication or observable implication some would expect the citizens for example that have been exposed in some way so they know that UN has been doing things for them and for the country in general for the government. So citizens exposed to UN in specific deployment areas will be more likely to trust the government and the police just because the government and the police as national institutions would have benefited from the capacity building that UN is been doing but at the same time this relationship is expected to be moderated or mitigated by factors such as the duration of the deployment with longer deployment ultimately signaling probably state weakness rather than an expectation that the state is actually building capacity and also the effectiveness of the deployment itself because the government consent to the deployment and so in some way it's possible to think about how do UN performs having spillovers in how the government is perceived in return. And the way I try to look at that is focusing on a mission that had a particularly strong peace building mandate was also a pretty long mission and its own that was deployed in Libya up until 2018 and it matched the location of deployment from the geo-procureo data with three ways from the alphabet that correspond pretty much to the withdrawal phase of the mission so basically units that or locations or respondents that were exposed to the presence of peacekeepers basically you don't have new ones that will be treated in the future so basically most of the exposure had happened for the team. And for those of you who are not familiar with the Afrobarometer this is a nationally represented survey based on the 2008 census that's at least the case for the ways I'm looking at and here you see the distribution of respondents across counties in Libya. Ultimately when pulling together these three different waves I have more than 3,500 reference respondents across the three waves and I mostly focus on explaining whether the trust particularly two types of institutions the president and the police I also include traditional leaders I wouldn't say much about this in the interest of time but I think this is just a juxtaposition that I would like to hear more about on and then I look at whether the presence of the duration of the deployment and the average size of the deployment matters in explaining trust for institutions and whether again the effectiveness of the mission and the perceived support that the citizens have that citizen perceive their receipt from the UN matters for this. I will I would say this that unfortunately I wasn't able to I was initially planning to do an expected event design that would allow me to say more about the causal relationships here but I hope the patterns I'm going to summarize in the next slide provide some insightful ideas anyway. So generally speaking you can see here president police and then official leaders as I said I'll focus on president and police particularly in the interest of time and mostly you see that exposure to peacekeeping operations before the survey was undertaken is associated with increased trust increase the chances of trusting the president and the police at the same time however this seems to be conditional on the length of the deployment you see that as the deployment gets longer and you move from for example six months to 12 months deployment we see 10 percentage point decreasing trust towards the president particularly. Also the performances of the mission seems to affect how governments and the police are perceived but in opposite way so when it comes to president again you could think of the case of the president. Basically that's the government so it's a presidential setting so ongoing violence in the aftermath of the deployment reduces trust for president possibly suggesting that the mission has not worked has not been successful in delivering and the government had consented to that and so in a way this could be the government might be getting the blame for that but you see increased trust towards police possibly linked to the fact that now the UN is not there anymore possibly the police is the institution that citizenly may perceive they can rely more upon and finally also find that citizens that are knowledge that the UN has supported Lebeba in the past so throughout the post-conflict phase are also more likely to trust the government and I think ultimately what this tells us is that possibly UN peacekeeping is not really undermining the legitimacy of national institutions however long deployments may have wrote trust because they may signal lack of capacity and also if violence lingers governments can get the blame although when it comes to security forces they may actually get a confidence boost. Jessica can you hear me okay? Can I give you 30 seconds to wrap up? Yes that's the last slide actually ended here so that was the last slide. Thank you. I just conclude that. Thank you.