 Good morning everyone and welcome to the Center for Strategic and International Studies. My name is Heather Conley I'm senior fellow and director of the Europe program here at CSIS and I have to say every once in a while We do an event that is incredibly timely and topical and relevant And I cannot think of a more important discussion that we are going to have this morning We are very pleased to be able to Be a launch point for the release of the Trilateral Commission's latest report entitled Engaging Russia a Return to Containment question mark and Let me give you a few words about the Trilateral Commission It was formed in 1973 by private citizens of Japan Europe and North America to foster closer Cooperation among what I would call those G7 countries Who would we're looking for a shared leadership perspective in a wider global international context? Just like in 1973 there was a time of considerable friction between governments and it was designed for this Commission to be private citizens at the highest level to engage on common problems that faced all three regions at a time when it looked as if US leadership could not simply provide the singular answer So as this group grow it is now 390 members From Europe North America and the Asia Pacific region. These are leaders from business the media academia public service non-governmental organizations It's quite an impressive Organization so today's report Focusing on Russia is actually the third in a series of reports that the Trilateral Commission has undertaken Focusing on Russia since 1995 but this time is different this time the Trilateral Commission engaged a group of Russian Experts to comment on the report that the Commission was offering So again, we are incredibly privileged to have very for very distinguished colleagues who were very instrumental in co-drafting the particular chapters for this new report and what I'd like to do is very briefly Introduce them. This is the order that they will speak and then the we've saved a real Treat To have dr. Brzezinski provides some commentary. So let me begin and introduce Paula Dobriansky who is senior fellow at Harvard University's John F. Kennedy Belford Center for Science and International Affairs and Chair current chair of the National Board of Directors of the World Affairs a Council of America Formerly Paula was the Undersecretary of State for Global Affairs at the State Department from 2001 to 2009 and Paula was one of the principal writers of the North American Contribution to the report and the second speaker will be dr. Igor Juergens who again the group he led the group of Russians that provided comments on the report Dr. Juergens is chairman of the management board of the Institute of Contemporary Development in Moscow He's also a member of the Presidential Council for civil society institutions and human rights among many other distinguished titles and Then we turn to get my papers right here. We turn to Minister Andrzej Olikowski Who is the chairman of the Polish group in the trilateral Commission? Also a former minister of foreign affairs of Poland from 1993 to 1995 and a former minister of finance from 1992 he currently serves as chairman of the supervisory board of Bank of Lauday and Finally, we have a former Japanese Deputy Foreign Minister Shatara ishama ishama. Oh, I'm so sorry ishama And who is currently the chairman of the Institute for International Economic Studies former Japanese ambassador to Korea and we are delighted that he will provide the Asian Pacific concept and Perspective and then after our speakers are finished. We'll turn to dr. Zhabignov Brzezinski CSIS counselor and trustee and also co-chair of the CSIS advisory board Dr. Brzezinski is not part of the trilateral Commission Although he was at one time a director of the trilateral Commission from 1973 to 1976 dr. Brzezinski is going to provide some reflections on on the comments of our speakers and putting this into some greater context as I said We couldn't have a better group of speakers to help us understand the future Policy towards Russia and with that I'll welcome Paula to begin and again. Thank you for joining us Phone is on. Yes, it is Good morning to all of you and first Thank you to CSIS And to you in particular Heather as the director of the Europe program We're very very appreciative of being here this morning I'd like to make a few brief comments about the North America Chapter and some of its findings. Let me go right to the core recommendation that we put forward and that is that there is a need to have a fundamental reassessment of all aspects of US relations with Russia and In this context, certainly, it's important in the short term to be thinking about how we need to consider what our Our response to Russia's aggression in Crimea and in Ukraine how that's going to affect regional issues and also US vital interests abroad in some on this point Basically, there are two key aspects one is not only the regional considerations that are before us which are absolutely essential that need to be Considered and what the ramifications are for what we have witnessed in terms of Russia's actions but secondly the global ramifications and let me give you two examples of the global ramifications one is the Budapest memorandum of 1994 of which the United States the UK and Russia signed and basically it called upon Ukraine to Give up its nuclear weapons at that time Ukraine was in fact the third largest Nuclear power but in return for a protection of its territorial integrity and its sovereignty So why I put this before you in the particular it raises the question for those who care about Nonproliferation in terms of the validity and the importance of such agreements If you're in other parts of the world in the Middle East or you're in Asia that question Definitely is going to come before the minds of many There's also the broader point which is and I've already suggested by giving this one example is the question of Legal norms and the international order as we know it Certainly post World War two when we think about the various architectures that have been set forth and parameters and International legal order as we know it that has been disrupted and that will have direct ramifications as we've seen for peace and for stability and so the core point our core Recommendation it is absolutely essential for policy makers to step back and to vary specifically To have a fundamental reassessment of all aspects of our policy toward Russia Let me go to a second point of our our report and that concerns the issue of what are the premises that matter in Assessing Russia today There are many that one could cite and I'm not going to enumerate all that are cited in the report But I will pick out a few one is a term and a phenomenon that we cite Which is that of Putinism as we call it a phenomenon that we believe has significantly influenced our relations His assumptions worldview ideas basically have become an important Factor and important political force in Russia and clearly in this regard. It's an important factor in our strained relationship How does one define it? Well, it is highly personal. It's vertical. It also is grounded in what constitutes a very staunch nationalism populism social conservatism as well as Also anti-Americanism that we have have witnessed so this is I think an important element There were other elements that we also Cited in our report in terms of findings questions relevant to the human rights situation and the kind of erosion of Democratic institutions rule of law Issues also related to the economy the challenges of corruption Also the issue of demographics also, which certainly has bearing on On Russia the 20th year straight of a natural Population decrease when you even look at Russian statistics in this regard in terms of what is found There are concerns about what will happen with the population going forward But let me come back to this core point about Putinism because it's very relevant here One thing that has united us administrations when you look at it starting with Reagan And you go on up to the present time with President Obama, whether it's a Republican or a Democratic administration All of these administrations have been united by a policy of the construct of a Europe Poland-free at the time even Gorbachev used the term of embracing a common European home in This case there's a distinction here in terms of President Putin's statements and in terms of the question of values and a Disassociation of this embracement of Western values and rather the construct of a Eurasian Union and Not as Gorbachev put it a common European home Let me go to a third point that we had and that is about Russia's foreign policy on Russia's foreign policy We've categorized it as an extension of domestic politics Here basically when you look at also President Putin statements He has cited foreign dangers foreign dangers in fact to justify a consolidation of power at home There have been a variety of issues. We've seen clearly in the case with Ukraine in terms of his ratings last year and his ratings now they've gone up From some 63 percent previously now to some 80 percent Basically here in terms of foreign policy There's also the issue of the creation of a geopolitical and geoeconomic demand if you will for Russia and here the the creation of a kind of sphere of states that are united in terms of their values And it's a post Soviet sphere and this is where Ukraine certainly comes into play and is a very important factor in that Let me mention the fourth point is the issue of energy We had a very robust discussion about energy and with the events of a recent time the Annexation the unlawful annexation of Crimea and the aggression in Ukraine This has become a more critical issue and has been very extensively Under discussion. I would say that this issue does matter in terms of our overall calculation energy does provide nearly 20 percent of Russia's GDP and also over half of its federal government revenue We also know the dependency of of of Europe and the interrelationships here So this is definitely an area that has to be part of This this discourse. I will say in Conclusion and keeping it brief with brief comments and conversational comments right up front In conclusion I'd say the underpinning for for the North America group is is that what is going on and what happens and in Ukraine and the the Russian policies it has again, not only regional ramifications, but certainly global ramifications What we do now is being scrutinized and it is being scrutinized by other kinds of Circumstances across the globe and other leaders who are looking at what is done here and What it could mean for other areas? I think that also we are witnessing President Putin Striving to redress what he deemed to be the most significant geostrategic loss of of the 21st century The dismantlement of the of the Soviet Union and in this regard You know the question comes back to what do we do? I was struck by a piece written by a journalist and Applebaum in the Washington Post She was talking about how for 20 years Nobody actually discussed the issue of or really thought about the issue of how to contain Russia And she concluded her piece by saying now they will and I would say that as part of a reassessment I think all of these issues are certainly on the table. Thank you Thank you very much and it's a great owner and Unique opportunity because Russians for the first time are invited first of all to comment on the trilateral report second to participate in in in the work of a trilateral and Third of all to create a chapter Russian chapter in the trilateral Which would be unheard of in the Soviet Union or even at the beginning of post-Soviet period So we formed up a chapter almost we we will we will be attending the these Trilateral as as already a group and I think that we will contribute to the common work A few words about our contribution to the report What are the main ideas the main idea number one is of course to stop at Crimea and not to go further Then abide by Geneva Agreements and we're proud that we were in our report in our little Position paper we were ahead of of intergovernmental agreement to form up a contact group in Geneva By three weeks or so and we didn't you know we didn't have any contact with Russian authorities on that So we called for the creation of the contact group. It was created Geneva agreement was a first first step Though timid one in being Reconciled now at the moment that this particular moment People are quarreling again within and outside of this group, but we think that the basic Principles of Geneva group are sound principles for the crisis resolution Then we called on the Russian side to made a very thorough assessment of the world system and the economic implications of both sanctions and its present economic policies The Russian economy slowed down to 1% and probably this year to minus 1% not because of the sanctions, but because of the economic situation both inside the country in Europe and In our in our own non-diversified economy, so we are calling for Very thorough analysis of what should be done and can Russia Sustain its growth in in in the sanctioned world so to say There are illusions about China and and other potential allies But those are illusions because Russian economy which faces the deficit of labor the deficit of Technology and the deficit of capital cannot rely on third tier technologies Second quality labor and and all of that stuff So we have to be a part of the global world which would be impossible if we continue the policies which call for sanctions and number four Proposal is of course to we understand that g8 is is no more, but G8 Track to NGOs contacts human rights watchers contacts the contacts between Scientific academic students or communities should be kept intact and should be developed further We think the trilateral and Russian chapter could be one of those instruments and channels and we think that the people who would join us are of high caliber intellectually and They can contribute to that My last point would be is west totally immune and or is west Nights in the arm in the shining armor in all of this conflict Did west contribute to to what happened in Ukraine or is it? Absolutely blameless. I think it's not and Historically, I can tell you in the presence of mr. Zhizinsky who in Munich conference, which I attended also rightly said that the situation can only be sold through compromise and then wrote his famous article about finlandization of Ukraine which made some things mad, but was right in the substance So in his presence, I would like to say that the conflict this particular one. Of course, it's a chain of many Conservative developments in Russian domestic policies. No question about that and probably during the Q&A I can elaborate on that but at this particular moment. I can tell you that the chain of this Events Were created by the so-called eastern partnership in 2007, you know European Union decided that it will help Ukraine Georgia Moldova Belarus Armenia and Georgia to to build up new societies It didn't invite Russia to participate it earmarked and spend between 2007 and 2013 less than four billion dollars to do this and Russia in the same period spend in the same countries About 20 times more and there were no correlation. They were no coordination They were not talk about that and when I asked one of the Ambassadors of the European Union, why can't we join forces? The answer was it's not in the books. We do not discuss such partnership with the third parties same happened with Ukraine Associate agreement when it was obvious that Yanukovych cannot sign this associate agreement because he lacks money to do that and He ran to to Putin and Putin says, okay, I'll buy Ukrainian bonds 50 billion Dollars worth and immediately bought 3 billion etc. Etc. Lavrov went back to Ashton European Union commissars asking To to to make it trilateral Let's talk he said about Ukrainian situation because it's they are in such dire straits in such difficult economic situation that Without us European Union and Ukrainians Without such triangles, we will not be able to solve Ukrainian problems The answer was no we will not discuss it with the third parties and then again I asked informally one of the colleagues in Brussels since he says Unfortunately, even those who sympathize with the opposition cannot do that because it has to be renegotiated because there is a format of associate membership agreements and third parties, especially Russia out of bounds. So Does that mean what the West is? Farsighted in this situation. No blames. No, no, no things to to to think about in the future I think it's not it's not true. We have to think about the trilateral quadruple or Whatever cooperation on Ukraine because even if we solve the problem now, let's let's think that we have a magic button and We strike it and tomorrow there is peace in terms of security and political settlement the most difficult part begins because re-ukrainian is Have no budget. They owe to the outside world more than 40 billion. They have no capital to start growing They have a lot of difficulties to to rebuild its institutions and with all my sympathy to those young people who Decided that they would be a comic cards as they said themselves said Running this this parliament that are running this government They have to have some money which can only come from European Union United States and Russia Russia through gas and other subsidies European Union institution building plus money United States has to contribute something apart from one billion dollars worth of guarantees Listen, it's it's not only a peanuts. It's it's it's ridiculous I Understand that American position is being elaborated now and I agree with Paula that total reassessment will not only help American administration and their lives it will help us to react accordingly because at the moment the message which Russians are receiving Russian leadership Is a very confused some in in European Union don't want sanctions at all and behind the back saying Everything will come down. Don't you worry? We will strike a deal the CEOs of the biggest European companies come and negotiate good deals and ask Mr. Putin to be a friendly hand in administrative Layer so to say Chinese Support by enlarge they contributed their report to to Trilateral they support Russian position Indians don't want to be Behind Chinese because they need us to rebalance the situation there in China and so on and so forth so reassessment and strong position and one voice of the West If it's possible will help us to reassess the position and to give policy advice to to Kremlin because Otherwise, they will play on divide and rule sort of a kind of situation So I will end up here and I'm of course I would be more than happy to answer the questions if I can Thank you, Dr. Juergen I want to join the other speakers in thanking for this invitation I need to mention however that the price is heavy because to speak about Russia and Ukraine in the presence of Dr Brazinski is a very stressful exercise Welcome to my world. I Want to congratulate you also for the new building very Impressive and one can see also comfortable for the staff and the guests I will not try to summarize the views European views on Russia. This are the views of the continent, which is famous for its variety slow food and slow decision-making so Samarizing it is is quite impossible, but I wanted to mention three Issues three points that emerge as the as the eras of consensus in Europe and as the eras for Necessitating action the first is give Ukraine a chance a chance to sort out from the collapse of the governance and of its economy and giving the chance means to insulate Ukraine to the extent possible from external pressure and external blackmail and also helping Ukraine in genuine efforts to To improve its economic situation The beginning for those efforts will come with the beginning of the IMF program Which will succeed only if it is supported Generously and patiently by by the West but also by Russia Russia decides to To sabotage this this program Ukraine will have very hard time to to implement it My second point is that nowadays contagion Spreads white and very fast as we know not only in finance in politics as well If not contained the illegal annexation of Crimea will have grave consequences for the EU firstly International law is of key importance for the EU the EU only exists Because there is an assumption that international treatise will be respected in all circumstances EU has no other means of governing than through the law no other force can be used so if if if illegal annexation of Crimea was accepted or tolerated that Would undermine the the rule of law in Europe and would result in more Ukraine's in the future But also secondly There are many places in in Europe where people say why should I be minority in your country if you can be minority in mine There's plenty of places like that So if one tolerates actions like Crimea one of course encourages nationalistic elements in nationalistic parties right wing parties in Around Europe East and West and we see it already Hungary on your big made Some statements about that that they do support Crimea and they want to claim some Hungarian Territories and in in in many countries Acceptance of illegal annexation of Crimea would encourage that kind of that kind of Ideas and that kind of aspirations Now my second my third point is that Sanctions are necessary, but sanctions are not substitute for a strategy Europe has to deal with new reality, which is that Russia is not Corporated that Russia presents itself as a rival rival who wants to actively work against European values and European interests and That has to be that's a relation has to be adjusted to The EU certainly should draw red lines for future Russian actions certainly you should Should increase its defense capacity certainly you should enhance its independence from Russia in energy and and trade Certainly also you should make sure that Russia doesn't draw benefits from European integration using European institutions and so on which were created which are which we are all benefiting from However, European Union and Russia are in many ways complementary and They both need each other. So long term. This is unsustainable Long term, we should be accepting the idea that company that continent will remain permanently divided this is To a depressing Perspective to resign to So we need and that has been mentioned by Igor and others certainly strengthen public diplomacy build bridges to ordinary Russians and civic society and the next generation of Public of policy makers But we also need to do something that we failed to do in the past that is to design a Place for Russia in European architecture that would be satisfying for Russians and useful for Europe That has been a big a big Failure as I said in the past that we were unable to do that to arrive to that though We have to find common voice on Russia common view on Russia, which we don't have yet because we are slow food slow decision-making and and very varied continent But as long as we don't have for as long as we don't have such a concept there is We missing we we are unable to offer a serious strategic debate to Russia and Russia is as we see Unable to think of itself differently than as a separate power Without our allies and without long-term commitments. Thanks Thank you very much. First of all, I would like to Join myself with the previous speakers in thanking the CSIS for this Meeting and also express my Feelings of a great honor being Dr. Bridgetzky. I Mean a little bit of a complicated situation because I'm supposed to be Sharing with you some of the ideas of the Asian Pacific group Which is so diverse and there's no one unified voice coming out of the whole process yet And I don't think it will be any time soon but there was a certain amount of coordination between Japanese, Korean, some of the Southeast Asian members of the group so that can be Represented a little bit in the whole process and then of course at some point Perhaps I need to share with you where Japan stands being from Japan And I may have to say a few things to reform our personal point of view having said that Most striking Fact that I would like to stress when we talk about the Asian Pacific angle is that as you see it on the map Asia is Vast Asian has so many different countries and therefore each of these countries have have had Different relationship with Russia or Soviet Union whether whenever you take in terms of history so they have Totally different Perspectives are even now with respect to what's happening in Russia what is happening in Ukraine But I Think we can say at the outset that there is one point Which we in Asia are concerned about and what NASA do with the points already raised And that is the fact that the recent events do go against the basic principles of international law UN Charter by using force or that they have to Change territory borders, which is a miracle to our interest Our main interest meaning members of the international community including those of us in East Asia now But from a very each day Asian angle the other interesting angles sometimes not mentioned by others because of this Fact that this is an East Asian angle and that is This is not a coordinated position, but it could have a demonstration effect There are other members of the international community who sometimes are stressed the importance of nationalistic Emotions and stoke it in order to proceed with international police policies sometimes Coming close to either dentism So we were a bit concerned about what kind of impact the Russian actions in Ukraine would have in that respect and there's also another interesting angle for us in East Asia is that US which has been a very much of a stabilizing force in East Asia with the Pacific And which has recently introduced this notion of Asian pivot stress on Rebalancing or maybe distracted by what is happening in Europe on the European theater So This kind of a demonstration effect you if you will or somebody use this from Asia this notion and distraction On the part of United States which are very much much of a concern There's another angle Mostly Japanese angle Having had difficult to be honest relationship with Soviet Union over for many many years Even before the war and during the war and after during the cold during the Cold War times We are very happy to see New Russia emerging out of the collapse of the Soviet Union and we are seeing in Russia As a stabilizing force in the global affairs, but also in in East Asia Now we are not quite sure where Russia is heading Because of the fact that they defy the basic rules of international relations are submitting itself to the principles of territorial integrity and whatnot so Even from the East Asian angle or at least from the Japanese angle Station is has revolutions very much so a very deep one and which is very discuser now at the end what we are doing in Japan, of course aside from these basic concerns I mentioned we are in Together in in in close cooperation with the G7 countries and We are at the end of day. We are hoping for a diplomatic resolution of the situation So therefore we have been supporting the Geneva agreement that this will be implemented through peaceful means And aside from these political sides We are also concerned about the economic situation in Ukraine that was already mentioned so we will be joining forces with other G7 member countries in Providing economic decisions. We have already committed the 15. I'm sorry 1.5 billion. So Even from the eastern end of the Eurasian continent, we are very much concerned about what's happening in Ukraine and that would be my comments. Thank you very much Thank you. Dr. Brzezinski Thank you very much for having me here Let me start by simply saying That I view what is happening today in the relationship between Ukraine and Russia and In the larger perspective between the West and the East and specifically the United States and Russia and has a very serious development Which poses the risk that we will be Somebody obviously wants to listen to a concert I fear that we are in effect Stumbling into a serious crisis a serious crisis, which is somewhat unpredictable But what one which does involve at least on the part of one side the explicit use of force explicit use of force I Have no way of knowing How the Russian leadership was assessing its actions regarding Crimea and What its risk analysis was? But it's quite clear from the manner in which was undertaken that The action contemplated the possibility of some explosion some use of force And therefore retained for itself the option of Denial ability The Russian military the Spetsnaz that went in were camouflaged in a variety of dramatic ways But it was the Ukrainians who refrained from shooting and in effect surrendered That made this action peaceful and successful at the same time That's a good combination But it's also a dangerous combination Peaceful fine, but it's successful Then it's tempting and Therefore there is the risk that what we may see Subsequently in the foreseeable near future is the expansion of such tactics involving a more direct collision between Russia and Ukraine and Externally between Russia and the United States That is obviously to be avoided But one also has to look at its deeper sources and Why Western policy? Has not been faultless and some of the preceding speakers have alluded to that including our colleague from Russia The fact is that there has been a significant change in Russia in the last several years Away from a democratic evolution, which was underway And which when Medvedev was president seemed hopeful and possible But which has been retracted Gradually step by step, but increasingly clearly in recent times Involving not on a turn away from democracy as a near-term prospect for Russia But for increasing emphasis on a kind of chauvinistic nationalism Which was well expressed in the speeches by mr. Putin in the middle of March Has the operation in Crimea was being consummated? It was a remarkable statement in which Russia assumed the right to use physical force To protect any Russians living outside of Russia and of course that it does not apply to the risk That some Russians living in Paraguay May be faced by Russian military intervention, but it does apply very directly to some countries that neighbor on Russia and Recovered its independence from Russia relatively recently though peacefully though peacefully and That is a serious problem It also is a problem which is strangely one-sided Because Russia currently has 145 million people of Whom approximately 20 to 25 million are not Russians Suppose the reverse of that doctrine was to be pursued. What would it imply? In other words, we're dealing here with a Pandora's box, which if opened would become increasingly difficult and dangerous in the meantime, of course the United States is getting drawn in and Pressures are rising for a more visible assertion of the American position on this subject Or I think that raises serious serious and very difficult issues. I don't anticipate they can be resolved dramatically and in their totality For example, I think mr. Putin's commitment to Eurasian Union is a very real one and It stems from his openly proclaimed regret that the Soviet Union fell apart But it is also incidentally encountering more serious opposition from its would-be candidates Just look at who supported Russia in the UN vote Armenia Because of geopolitical concerns. It is dependent on Russian support as well as historically his support and Belarus None of the other would be candidates for the Eurasian Union not a single one of them voted with Russia and Some of them have become increasingly Explicit in the reservations about the notion of the Union President Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan for example has emphatically emphasized the term Eurasian economic Union And referring here to the free trade arrangements that could be contrived And indeed they could be on an individual basis with the different former Soviet republics But that dream is part of the dream that the president of Russia currently entertains and he does it With means that give rise to serious concern camouflage use of force and threats for example that if the Gradually self-defining Ukrainian government which confronts enormous internal difficulties is to use some form of compulsion To reestablish its authority over territories seized Allegedly by Ukrainian citizens or Russian Speakers of Ukraine, but in fact with visible support of the same Instruments of violence that were injected into Crimea, but did not have to be used as instruments of violence We may see a collision that is becoming more and more dangerous and That concerns me obviously because at stake of course is international stability precedence for the use of force Commitments and the likelihood that misunderstandings will deepen accusations will become sharper and the room for accommodation increasingly tenuous I Still think however that there is a residual chance for seeking some accommodation and I Harken back to the ideas that have been articulating since the vercoondae meeting in Germany In late winter this year namely that there should be some arrangement contrived Regarding a special status For a self-governing self-defining increasingly democratic Ukraine that wants to be part of a democratic Europe Without any likelihood that in the near future. It will be a direct member of the European Union Turkey has been moving towards Europe over the last 50 years step-by-step So it's a long process but the desire to be part of Europe and particularly to adapt its political socio-economic institutions to Ukraine is pervasive in Ukraine and it cannot be denied by some dubious claims of an ethnically based right to intervene by force in Ukrainian affairs on the other hand it is perfectly reasonable for Russia to object to Ukrainian membership and NATO and I think it is perfectly reasonable for us to say to the Russians Instead of sliding into a conflict which could become a conflict of arms a Little bit maybe on the model of the Spanish Civil War Where external countries were helping one or the other of the two parties in that civil war? And we would certainly be not immune to public pressures To help the Ukrainians resist if they resist and If they don't have an army that can go into the field to match the Russian army that enters they do have cities With strongly nationalistic young people in it who like being independent and want to be in Europe and Taking cities by force is a prolonged painful and bloody affair and Russia is no condition To engage in it. Yes, something like Crimea is feasible Something like Crimea on the Ukrainian scale if it were feasible Russia could afford but the prolonged draining conflict especially supported against Russia from the outside would really destroy the currently very tenuous Process of transforming Russia modernizing it and turning it into an entity that can then evolve successfully into democracy. I Would favor an effort to convince the Russians that that kind of a status For Ukraine could be beneficial to Russia and Russia itself could be a party To the process of putting Ukraine on its feet that would be in Russia's own interest the government that it supported in Ukraine and the Yanukovych was probably one of the most kleptocratic governments in the history of modern times on a scale unprecedented draining a potentially rich country of any of its residual wealth or prospects But the remains in Ukraine and in eastern Ukraine a strong industrial base from which Russia benefits itself for example Russian aviation industry is heavily based on aircraft engines produced by Ukraine Russia still buys rockets from Ukraine in other words the opportunities for a transactional three-way relationship do exist and One should explore that in my view. It may not work But I think it is important to invoke the possibility of an accommodation and to point to its benefits because in the absence of that The dynamics and the emotions involved here could become self-sustaining Mr. Putin has unleashed a form of nationalistic chauvinism in his recent public statements for which there is some strong social support in Russia from the sort of less successful elements of Russian society for the more primitive elements of Russian society and They confront potentially in Russia an alternative the new middle class Which is cosmopolitan which is European which is creative which wants to be like the West and It's prepared to be a democracy. I think the future is theirs Provided we do not succumb to passive fatalism Which lets events drive us and then embroil us Inter-tragedy which will damage Russia much more than us, but will hurt all of us collectively So that is my central message to my former colleagues at the trilateral Commission I hope they spend some time on considering that option rather than debate in the pros and cons of a situation Which shouldn't have arisen Which doesn't deserve to be tolerated which is extremely one-sided and very emotional but collectively self-destructive Thank you Dr. Brzezinski, thank you so much. Thank you to you all. What an powerful and rich discussion while our audience is Absorbing that richness and I hope everyone's starting to think their own questions I'd like to just throw one or two questions out to our panelists, and then I will turn This over to our audience if you do have a question When we get to that point, please raise your hand wait for a microphone to come sometimes You have to speak very directly into that microphone for our colleagues to hear you Please state your name and affiliation, and we like our questions short and provocative. So with that Paula if I A bit of clarification. I'm sure our audience is quite interested. When can we see this report? When are we going to? Have an opportunity to review it So if you could just provide us with a bit of a understanding of the product and when it will be coming out And how colleagues can can access it that would be terrific. So that's my first sort of good housekeeping question to you Dr. Juergens You you made a very focused point about the lost opportunity on a new Architecture and as you were talking not only the eastern partnership but I was thinking of the core food process and at then then time president mid-vietive had offered sort of a new European security architecture and and our our problem with this New architecture is we're not always convinced that Moscow wants to Support the process rather than diminish it or be as we'd like to say a skunk at the picnic not Providing the accommodation and I would like your reflections on on what that new Architecture looks like and can that possibly happen under president Putin? I have my serious doubts that Putin ism and a new accommodative architecture is Is possible and then finally and all colleagues can can comment on this but pulling on dr. Brzezinski's point on expansion Understandably we are very focused on Ukraine at the moment and the very serious Crisis, but to to be clear we have Moldova in Georgia that have their own European aspirations They have territorial challenges Transnistria South of study at Georgia that we still have in June a signing of the Association agreement and the deep and comprehensive free trade agreement We're going to be back at this again and again, and how do we reflect on? The neighborhood not just Ukraine obviously Ukraine is is pivotal here But there are others and I would welcome colleagues reflection as we look towards June and other Monumentous events, so that'll I hope you got you some time get your questions going Paula, please. Thank you I'm actually very glad you asked that question because to put this report in context We began last year in the summertime approximately and At that time each of us North America Russia Europe Asia Pacific We had brought together experts, so let me just give a quick thumbnail North America brought together a wide range of Experts in the in the field and representing different perspectives. We met twice and In which we were debating the content of the of the of a first draft We also had the occasion to also meet with the business community a part of our report also Integrates specifically the perspective of those doing business in Russia So the meetings all last year were focused on on this We also in the context of the trilateral Commission We each have regional meetings, so we had our North America meeting in Mexico City and On the occasion of that we also had Canadian and Mexican views integrated into this process Each I won't itemize but each area did comparable things then this year we met the four of us in In March and it was very clear that before us there was a very changed situation with the Annexation of Crimea and also with the troops amassed on the Ukrainian border, so We discussed the need to go back to the drawing board, so this answers your question revamp our Chapters which we did we've updated them and also summarize them as to when it gets released We've actually been discussing this, and I'm giving my my perspective of the four I think that what we have is quite relevant, and I think that at least a goal I see is an issuance into early May We'd like to have this for policy makers, and I think the value of this as you could see Each of us don't have precisely the same recommendations, but policy makers will have the great value of being able to look and Assess for themselves. Well, these are the views of North America This is the compilation of European views Russian views and no less Asia Pacific so in some our goal is soon and I think it's certainly mandated by a great interest in the in the in the topic and also the desire for policy input Lost opportunities there were plenty You're starting with the gobo chops common European home And then you mentioned Corfu process, which was the follow-up of the Medvedev's then president proposal to conclude a new security treaty in Europe It was immediately Treated as an attempt of Russians to divide NATO and to push United States out of Europe, which was not at least In our view those who were involved The main idea the main idea was to after Kosovo and everything which happened on the continent after the collapse of the Soviet Union to present New picture of how Helsinki to if you wish or Helsinki 3 would work So there were lost opportunities at the moment your direct question is whether accommodative Architecture is possible. This is not the right moment to start any kind of a negotiation on that but Definitely one of these days will come back to the idea and we'll start talking about this and People remember that after Cuban crisis we had salt agreement in three four years Nobody could have thought after the Cuban crisis Which brought us to the threshold of the term a nuclear war that we will be able to do that we were and then after Russian invasion of Czechoslovakia Soviet invasion and Czechoslovakia in 1968 in 1972 we had a text of the Helsinki agreement so I never say never and the future probably could be right bright and I applaud the proposal of mr. Brzezinski to think positive But to keep all alternatives open We'll see what happens and I hope that will contribute in our small and modest way about a week from now Poland will celebrate its 10th 10th anniversary of its membership in European Union It's also 15th anniversary of our membership in NATO ten years ago We had a trilateral meeting in Warsaw where dr. Brzezinski had a keynote Presentation and he saw a good future for for Europe However with two conditions one that Russia as he said will not be distracted by its imperial ambitions and secondly assuming that the process of Further extension of EU and NATO will go ahead. It didn't go ahead Eastern policy was the first Was the first policy of European Union directed to to to Eastern Europe? It is only only then that European Union recognized that Eastern Europe is in its sphere of interest and it should be somehow somehow Somehow worked with It's amazing that it took so long, but you know what you hear about fatigue and and political political Dynamism and lack of interest of political leaders in that issue Is is behind it? This is a little bit long answer to what you've asked but Specifically The process with Georgia and Moldova it goes according to to establish kind How it's gonna end up who knows you know what happens in Moldova Georgia is slightly different all other all other All other projects all other ambitions are now up in the Eastern partnership policy is subject to criticism revision Probably quite fundamental The whole the whole policy towards Eastern Europe Russia and so on is being written. You're taught so I can't I can't say it's truly just a couple of comments It's very interesting to learn from our European North American colleagues about how We should proceed from here and now On basis of what has been happening over the past Decades in Europe, but one point I would like to emphasize from a different perspective My part of the world is that to my understanding the global situation has changed so much over the past decade or two From the ones we have been used to Immediately after the war or throughout the decode the Cold War is where you're you as Soviet relations or you as I'm sorry Soviet the West the West Relationship was predominant which was the axis of all of the International order now the situation is changing. So whatever it's going to happen in the European region with all the issues being mentioned here from this Table will have to be sort of we put We assessed in the new global Situation power balance if you will on the ground You have to input the fact the point I mentioned earlier that the Americans are now pursuing the people to Asia No, why was this necessary? without having that elementing included in the Policies to be followed in the European region. It would not be a sustainable initiative And it was very good. So you you don't need to absolutely don't thank your eyes But I make sure you want to chime in so we're going to do a flash round of questions So we'll take a several and bundle them up. So if you could raise your hand great I see one right in the back. Please sir right there. We'll get a microphone to you Thank you very much. My name is Miu Miu Zuzul. I work here with Peton box But I am former minister of foreign affairs of Croatia and I really thank you for very thoughtful and very great insight in what's going on I am afraid that I share rather a pessimistic picture that was so clearly presented by dr. Brzezinski and I am surprised with the only one fact that we are That we should be surprised and that is that the world is surprised with what's going on because there is nothing in Putin's Politics that should surprise us. It is quite clear and it was quite possible to recognize in what direction is going for Several years now. I have two questions. One is related to Organization that I think contributed significantly to stability in European pastime and can contribute again But was mentioned only once today and that is NATO I'm afraid that Marginalization of NATO that it is happening is not helping to the situation like for example as minister from Poland said very correctly Kind of pet was established with all new member of EU countries first to enter the NATO and after a while to enter the European Union although that was never formal decision That was the reality which I think was very good reality when they consider instant policy of European Union Nobody was really thinking about that. So there was a confusion of those two things in European Union Even in this moment they are talking about strengthening joint European forces Although clearly there is no time to do that and to have Forces that can be instrument not instrumental but positive and when we look into The newest development that we have president new secretary general of NATO elected that in no Western media There is a reflection of that that we don't know except for those who are very closely following What is his agenda potential agenda? It's a former norwegian prime minister Stoltenberg, but in the same time we have mr. Putin who doesn't do anything accidentally came publicly and said that that was very very good choice by NATO And then the new secretary general of NATO is Almost good friend of him. So that's one question that I have for Particularly dr. Brzezinski, but actually for all members of panel What is with the role of NATO and the second in her excellent analysis Paula mentioned As a number four factor and that is the energy and it is quite clear that the energy is the strongest Instrument in the hands of mr. Putin right now, not only because that makes Russian economy Solid and relatively strong, but also it is the instrument by which he is basically Influencing the rest of the Europe to do or not to do what that he doesn't want them to do So we could see several days ago Responsive president Medvedev who was basically sending the message to all European leader If you really believe that American gas will come in time to help you for the next next winter Then you are very naive We could see the pressure from the president of European Commission mr. Barozo to Bulgaria to stop with the south stream and to strength suddenly again TAP Pipeline, but that is a way way too slow So my question is is there any way really to make Europe particularly Europe less independent from Russian gas and Russian energy because unless that happens I do not believe in any possibility to stop Mr. Putin. Thank you, mr. Minister. We have a question right here I'll be much. I'll be brief. I had the honor to take for dr. Bridges He's course at Harvard when he was pushing 30 and I was pushing about 12. I guess or whatever But I think he's aged a bit. He's looking closer to 40 now My question really My question really is one that that has not been addressed by anybody and that is what do you think the role of? Religion is in this whole area as I understand it Western Ukraine looks to Rome and Eastern Ukraine looks to Moscow culturally religiously and in other ways you see and dr. Prisinski certainly had some some practice in dealing with Colleagues the Polish Pope was about to be saint someone or other in a couple of days I'm wondering whether you can see any any possibility of Cultural stroke religious interests Helping to resolve this issue Thank you very much, Heather. I'll do my best to be provocative and also concise My name is Edward Joseph from from across the street at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies and the first brief Congratulations to the Commission for the very far-sighted decision to include Russia in the process of drafting this report quite wise And indeed my question is for dr. Juergens both you and Ambassador Dobryansky Called for a reassessment and as you're probably aware and no doubt Encouraged dr. Juergens the Psalm in this country have taken the occasion of the crisis in Ukraine to reassess the wisdom of NATO expansion So my question for you have a very pointed question for you and that is How has NATO expansion? imperiled Russian security Not Russian hegemonic pretensions Not Russia's ability to dictate the strategic orientation of its neighbors, but its Security interests and of course as dr. Brzezinski mentioned at the core of these is at least The putative claim about imperiled ethnic Russians So how has the Baltic states by virtue of being in NATO? How are their rights and being in the EU as well? I should mention. How are their whites being imperiled? has Lithuania take an advantage of its NATO membership to Block Russian access to Kaliningrad Overall have the relations of these new NATO entrance been belligerent towards Russia or to the contrary Poland Baltic states the others actually Demonstrated that the relations with Russia are much more predictable and even productive as a result of being in the alliance Thank you very much. I want to make sure we get over here. We have one colleague right there in the back Yeah, oh, no, no, right there. Stop. I sort of have a Unrelated or two-fold question. I look at this from an economic standpoint. My name is you identify yourself Yes, my name is Ken Duckworth. I'm with the US Department of Commerce Office of Russia was recently our trade attache in St. Petersburg The the first side of this is dr. Brzezinski's Proposal for sort of a transactional relationship that Russia can benefit One of the problems I seem to run into when I was in in Russia for the last four years Is not a mindset that sees any issue as anything other than zero sum and how do you sort of get? What could influence mr. Putin and his other people around him to see anything other than Them trying to gain an advantage over other and seeing that there is a mutual there are mutually beneficial Benefits to be obtained from the type of relationship that mr. Brzezinski proposes Secondly in terms of thinking about how we go about implementing or non-implementing sanctions You know, even though the US volume of trade with Russia is exceedingly small compared to Europe We have some pretty companies with pretty significant Investments in the Russian Federation and I'm talking specifically in the oil and gas sector in the natural resources area whose Business interests are going to run up against Our national interest or what we're trying to achieve and how do we balance off? What it is they're trying to do versus sort of the bigger picture Well, they were wonderful questions I think I'm going to give our panelists because I'm very mindful of our time a chance to to respond I think we'll just start with Paul and just work the way down just when it has NATO been marginalized the role of energy the role of the Orthodox Church Wisdom of NATO expansion according to Russia is can we move beyond zero some thinking and sanctions policy? It actually harms the democracies that are pushing forward the sanctions. So Fire away at anything you'd like to fire away. I think I was I was going to focus on the first one on the on the energy question Very briefly the question was Europe less dependent on you know how to get Europe less dependent on Russian gas and I'd say very simply first of all the importance of a Political decision in this in the United States. I think that we have become very diversified in terms of our energy We've experienced obviously a energy boom which has ramifications for the kinds of policies Which in fact we're pursuing but it is and has to be a political decision taken in Europe by the various countries about it's in their Interest moving aside the current events of the day Let's say if we were all sitting here, and we were not discussing, you know What happened in and has happened in Ukraine? I would still make the same case to you in other words It is in Europe's interest period in having a more diversified energy approach And what does that mean? One of the most practical things is these kinds of things can't be done overnight because they require a certain change a modernization a shift in emphasis And every country's different in terms of what it gets is its energy sources, but simply put the United States obviously has a liquid liquefied natural gas and In working with Europe I think there are targeted approaches certain percentages of exports that we could render into into Europe for consideration And last point I'd make energy has very critical here because Two points Russia is heavily dependent when you look eastward for Russia. It doesn't have the same kind of structural Capacity that it does westward and so any changes in terms of Europe and any kind of cutting off certainly will very much directly impact Russia's economy and Secondly, there has been creative thinking in Europe Slovakia came forward recently with this reverse flow proposal to get gas into Ukraine Which is a creative proposal. It will help Ukraine in just a short term only for a few months But everything matters. So bottom line is it's a political decision. There has to be political will I think that Regardless of the situation on the ground. It's in Europe's interest to become more energy diversified. I'll just stop there for a moment NATO extension Is it a danger or a pretext for repositioning if I understand your question? In a way for the security community military community. It is a danger and the story in Russia History already which is enshrined into the into the textbooks is that mr. Govachev was promised when he Managed to help with the reunification of Germany He was promised that not a single soldier or military installation of NATO would be further than the dividing line of Berlin Now NATO commanders tell us that there is no such signed document. I once asked mr. Govachev To tell me personally whether it's true or not and he said yes, it's true But how can I sign anything with the living Honecker with all of my comrades in the socialist block still alive and still At the top of their governments. I had an oral confirmation and Retiration of this confirmation by call and American leadership that yes if I'm instrumental in reunification which was contrary to Mr. Thatcher and Mr. Mitterrand's wishes Then there will be no NATO advancement. I was present at the conversation with mr. Salana who was the general secretary of NATO at that time in 1993 in Moscow who confirmed that Yes, it was oral. But how can I base myself on oral when people want? NATO first of all NATO enlargement second NATO installations Advancement But having said all of this It's true. We feel a little bit Misguided by by the behavior of our colleagues in the west from this point of but in 2008 and 2011-2007 2011 when I worked for president Medvedev I thought and we made it as a think tankers. We made it absolutely clear to him That it's at that particular moment. It was more of a pretext than a danger showing Exactly what you tell us the the behavior of some of the Neofeats of NATO like Czech Republic Slovakia and Poland less so Estonia because the upbeat and very proud president of Estonia mr. Ilwis always poked the barren into the eye Including two I think fighters F-17 which are positioned someplace in the Baltic Sea and all of that stuff But for the rest of it We were telling the president trying to convince him to come to Lisbon summit in 2010. I mean NATO summit That it's more of a pretext than a real danger and he bought the arguments He he he went to Lisbon in spite of a very serious pressure on him not to go and I was I was very pleased to be part of Mrs. Allbright team on strategic rethinking of NATO concept I was invited as a visiting expert sort of to this thing and we discussed many interesting issues and in NATO in 2000 I mean in Lisbon in 2010 mr. Medvedev made a very good deal with NATO Which excluded Russia out of the threats which included into the potential partners and and he brought this this Element back to to Russia Everything went sour after Libya That I can tell you after Libyan crisis When instead of the open skies NATO started operation It was not NATO two countries supported by the United States from behind But then all of our efforts when we persuaded Medvedev to pass this resolution by abstaining in He he faced the criticism which you wouldn't believe Saying that now we know how you are duped by NATO mr. Medvedev. I wouldn't I wouldn't Say that it was the reason why Put in stage his comeback, but that was one of the elements of that. So I leave it at that Yes on NATO importance It is a highly charged situation and conflict with a lot of emotions and People would behave much more emotionally and less responsibly if we were not in NATO So in Poland Lithuania Latvia Estonia Emotions would be much much higher. We now understand What was meant by Chancellor Cole when he said that Knowing the German is in NATO NATO Helps him to sleep better. So this is a situation on religion. I don't think so, sir There is a distinctly different cultural heritage in these two parts of Ukraine Religion is certainly one of its elements, but It is not a distinction. There is no more a distinction between Catholic and Protestant world Greece Bulgaria Romania are in European Union Serbia is Is joining European Union? This are very important orthodox countries and It's not it's not the orthodox Versus Catholics on transactional another Of course if you do if you do if you implement Policies and actions that you believe are Imperative because of your history because of your responsibility to the history numbers don't don't matter but Once you stopped and think about it and others come to you and talk to your numbers do matter this nowadays We were talking today that numbers matter even much more today than in 1945 or at the beginning of the of the Cold War so it is Trade relation it is about trade relations about sanctions about Restraint of of private sector that happens Regardless of official sanctions. This is the situation that we seeing today with with Russia we can read in financial times almost daily about companies decisions to To to wait with their investment or trade decisions Because of the situation think Yes, please give us the benefit just like two points on this NATO issue one is a question of fact There there are two different versions of what was understood. There's no doubt that on the Russian side Mr. Gorbachev had a different impression of what he was being told on The US side the Secretary of State at the time mr. Baker explicitly says That what we told the Russian side is that NATO forces will not move east if Germany is reunified And it was specifically addressed to the question of Germany Because at that time no one was contemplating an overall upheaval in Eastern Europe in which countries members of the Warsaw Pact would become totally free and able to make their own decisions I think there's excuse me I think there may be a legitimate disagreement of interpretation rather than some willful deception In any case it is kind of interesting that on an issue of such enormous strategic importance This Russian side the Soviet side did not insist on a written Commitment if that was really so central to it and I think the reason is that events were assuming a dynamic of their own and It was clear that the process of change would not stop whatever is said So I think is one of those retroactive Arguments, which really don't tell us very much, but in any case it tells us something negative There was no deliberate deception and the flight into The NATO agreement from the Warsaw Pact developed subsequently in the course of several years There's a larger question. Let's assume that there was an agreement and Latvia Estonia Lithuania Poland, Romania, Bulgaria were not in NATO right now Would the Ukrainian problem be easier to address or would it be the beginning really of an all-European war? I think it's quite clear You know in international politics as in neighborhoods Strong fences make for better neighbors It's better to have some barbed wire supporting and dividing some countries It's just common sense. So I don't think again, that's a very relevant argument The fact of the matter is that historically particularly the Baltic countries Also Poland to some extent Romania have had experience with Russia Which was not all that delightful for them and and they have rather unfavorable memories of it And it's on the natural for them to be part of a larger European entity with which they can identify But to the extent that I can gauge I don't have a sense. They view it as an exclusive proposition This is what they really would like in the longer run Ukraine and Russia to be part of it but Russia to be part of it has to be a genuine democracy and That incidentally wasn't mentioned in the earlier discussion And Russia in recent years Sadly and in my judgment because I'm an optimist only temporarily is moving towards a kind of a nationalistic dictatorship Which makes it all together clear Why they wouldn't have been in the interest of the central European countries Not to be today in NATO Well, I all I can say is what a privilege it has been for the last hour and a half to listen to these Insights wrestling with today's most challenging crises I we look forward to the report Paula. We're holding new to it early May But again, please join me in thanking our panelists for a wonderful