 Good afternoon and good morning and good evening, everybody. I'm Massimo Tomazzoli, I'm the Permanent Observer for International Idea to the UN and the Retro Programs, Global Programs at the headquarters in Stockholm. I'm welcoming you to today's launch of the Global State of Democracy report in New York, where my Secretary General, Kevin Casa Zamora, is currently sitting. And we make an introduction with the key findings and recommendations from the report. This is an important opportunity for addressing a very topical issue of equality of democracy in the world. And it happens just the week after the Summit for Democracies held last Thursday and Friday. And it is also taking place at the time when the UN Secretary General launched a new vision for his work and the work of the system, our common agenda, which has also chapter addressing the issue of rebuilding a social contract, which is an element addressed also in the Global State of Democracy report of International Idea. The Secretary General Guterres on Friday also made a statement on democracy in which he said among other things populist, nativist, white supremacy, and other forms of racism and extremism are poisoning social cohesion, polarization is undermining democratic institutions. So there is a recognition by the UN Secretary General of the importance of acting in this area. And I'm pretty sure that today we'll have a conversation that will address many of these different issues from various angles. First of all, there will be welcoming remarks from the Deputy Permanent Representative of the Embassy of Sweden to the United Nations Ambassador Magnus Lennerson. In fact, Sweden is co-hosting today's launch together with the International Idea. Following the presentation by Secretary Generals having Casa Samora on the report, there will be two panelists, Dr Faiza Shahin in Equality and Exclusion Lead at Pathfinders, the New York University Center on International Cooperation, and Mandeep Tiwana, Chief Programs Officer at Civicles and Advisory Board Member of the UN Democracy Fund. Followed by two discussants, Mario Builmerse, Senior Political Affairs Officer at the Office on Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect at the United Nations, and Ann-Marie Goetz, Clinical Professor at the Center for Global Affairs School of Professional Studies at the New York University. So this is our program for today and without further ado, I'll give the floor to Ambassador Magnus Lennerson. Magnus, you are the floor. I see that there may be a technical problem there, so we may resume perhaps with Magnus in a few minutes. Meanwhile, I would like to give the floor then to the Secretary General of International Idea, Dr Kevin Casa Samora. Kevin? Thank you very much, Massimo, and good afternoon and welcome also from my side to the New York launch of International Ideas Global State of Democracy Report 2021. I am very happy that we can gather here today, even if it's virtually. Let me take this opportunity to thank Ambassador Magnus Lennerson, Deputy Permanent Representative of Sweden to the United Nations, and I hope that we will be able to join the discussion in due course. Thank you also to the panelists and discussants here today who will provide important contributions to this timely discussion on democracy and how to protect and support it in these challenging times. Almost exactly two years ago, I stood not far from here at the launch of our previous iteration of this report. Little did we know then how much the world would change only a few months later. Two years ago, our analysis was pointing out that while the number of democracies was increasing, the quality of democracy was decreasing. The message nonetheless still had a hint of optimism. The number of countries holding credible and competitive elections had continued to grow. And previously on democratic regimes like Myanmar, Ethiopia, and Sudan, to name a few cases, were undergoing inspiring democratization processes. Then the COVID-19 pandemic broke out, threatening lives, livelihoods, but also democracies. And as with humans, the virus hit those with pre-existing conditions the hardest. The pandemic accelerated and amplified ongoing political trends while adding a new plethora of unprecedented challenges to democratic institutions and processes. Virtually overnight, all democratic systems found themselves dealing with enormous obstacles from holding safe and credible elections in the midst of a pandemic to ensuring the functioning of legislative and judicial institutions during lockdowns and limited circumstances. At the same time, governments all over the world felt compelled and also tempted to deploy wide-ranging emergency powers to confront the calamity that had befallen the world. As I'm sure you've guessed by now, the diagnosis is pretty dire. The two years since our last report have not been good for democracy. The monumental human victory achieved when democracy became the predominant form of governance now hangs in the balance like never before. Now, I'll share with you the most recent findings from our report, which presents trends in democratization for 165 countries around the world, beginning in 1975 and going through the end of 2020. The findings I'm about to present to you focus on global trends and patterns, and we encourage you to read our regional reports and thematic papers for more in-depth coverage. And since I see that Ambassador Lenardsson has joined us, perhaps this is a good moment to bring him into a discussion. Welcome Ambassador, so I'll give you the floor and then you give it back to me and we can go on with the, we can get on with the presentation of the findings. If you are fine with that. Thank you. Yes, thank you very much and apologies. There were some technical issues here, logging into the meeting. But let me just stop by saying Mr. Secretary General, their panelists, member state representatives, friends and colleagues. I'm very pleased and honored to join you at this New York launch of international ideas flagship report to the global state of democracy. Sweden is indeed very proud to be the host of idea, the leading organization for first rate analysis on the global state of democracy elections, political parties, gender and much more. For Sweden, it's been a long standing strategic priority to advance democracy around the world. Thank you as Secretary General and your excellent staff with whom we have, of course, a very close partnership for your work in this important field. The number of countries moving in authoritarian direction in 2020, as we have seen unfortunately outnumbered those going in a democratic direction. The pandemic has prolonged this negative trend into into a five year stretch really the longest such period, since the start of the third wave of democratization in the 1970s. Practically elected governments, including established democracies increasingly adopt authoritarian tactics and non democratic countries further closed, they're already reduced civic space during the pandemic. These developments are unfortunately not new. Even before the pandemic we saw how democratic principles were being threatened, how democratic institutions being weakened, and how democratic space for civil society was shrinking. Ideas flagship report examines and provides us with a clear picture of the current state of democracy as well as important key trends. The report also presents important recommendations with a three point agenda, namely to deliver, rebuild and prevent. With this, the agenda highlights the need for governments to in close consultation with civil society, recraft social contracts, reform democratic institutions to better cope with the challenges of the 21st century and prevent rising authoritarianism and democratic backsliding by investing in democracy education at all levels to mention some of the report conclusions. The this proposed agenda is indeed very relevant to our work here in New York and it connects to the important work that is being carried out in relation to the secretary generals are common agenda. With its findings, the report also represents and conveys an important signal that we now all need to step up our efforts to advance democracy around the world, perhaps more so than ever before. And that we as friends of democracy must come together and join forces. In line with these developments, Sweden decided in 2019 to launch our foreign policy initiative called drive for democracy to further integrate our efforts for democracy into all strands of our foreign policy. A broad range of activities have been conducted, including what we have chosen to call democracy talks. These are talks conducted by our embassies all over the world and reaching so far over 10,000 people. Sweden will continue working through the EU and the European Union partners to strengthen networks and joint programming of European democracy support. And increase the availability of expertise and data on democratic backsliding and effective democracy support activities in the coming years. Our upcoming EU presidency in the spring of 2023 next year, the year after next I'm sorry, directly following the follow up summit for democracy in December 2022. We think we'll provide a useful platform for this purpose, and we will keep doing our utmost in supporting those who are at the front lines, human rights defenders, journalists and media workers. To conclude, I wish again to congratulate idea for an excellent report and not least to the very strong recognition it has already received. And with these words, I wish to very much, I wish to very much look forward to continued fruitful discussions on the reports findings and the relevance to the UN in the multilateral system. Thanks again for organizing this and for listening. Thank you very much, Magnus. It has been great to have you with your opening remarks very insightful. Thank you. And now I give the floor again to having Kazas Zamora, our Secretary General, who was starting to present the results of the report. Well, thank you so much, Ambassador Lenardsson, for those kind words. And let me, before I get on with the presentation, let me just return the compliment and say how proud we are. That Sweden, a country that has made the advancement of democracy a priority of its foreign and development policies, is our host country. That's a batch of pride for us. Let me now share my screen so that we can start discussing the findings of the report. I seem to have a problem sharing my screen here. Yes, we can't yet see it. For some reason. Yes, something is happening. Okay. Can you, can you see the... Yes, we can. The way to the end. Can you see the presentation now? Yes, Kevin, we can. Okay, perfect. Well, as I was starting to say a few minutes ago, I'll share with you the findings of this recent report, which presents trends in democratization for 165 countries around the world, beginning in 1975 and going all the way to the end of 2020. And the findings that I'm about to share with you focus on the global trends and patterns. And I very much encourage you to spend some time with our regional reports and the thematic background papers. If you wish to have a more in-depth coverage of the findings. Okay, let me say right off the bat that at International IDEA we understand democracy as a broad concept and one that can have very different and many manifestations depending on a particular society's history, culture and set of priorities. And we believe that there are core tenants of democracy the way in which they are operationalized and the way they look in different places can vary widely. And there's no such a thing as a perfect democracy. In general, we measured the extent to which a country has realized various aspects of democratic ideals along five key attributes which we consider integral to the democratic growth. Representative government fundamental rights checks on government in partial administration and participatory engagement. You can see each of these attributes has a number of sub attributes and then a number of individual indicators belonging to each sub attribute. The first key finding is simply that the world is becoming increasingly authoritarian. And we see this in a couple of different ways. First, the number of democracies has been declining, as you can see from the chart. And during the pandemic, the world has lost at least four more democracies through either flawed elections or military coups. This includes countries like Mali, Serbia, Côte d'Ivoire and Myanmar in 2021. And by the way, this finding that the number of democracies is declining was not... This was not the case two years ago. So there's a change there. Two years ago, our report still could claim that the number of democracies was still climbing. Second, for the fifth consecutive year, the number of countries moving in an authoritarian direction exceeds the number of countries moving in a democratic direction. This graph that you're seeing here shows the number of countries moving towards democracy in green and towards authoritarianism in red starting in 1975 through today. Outside of 2020, the other notable peak in the move towards authoritarianism was in 2009 in the wake of the global financial crisis. Since 2016, the number of countries moving in an authoritarian direction is three times as large as the number of countries moving towards democracy. So that tells you a little bit the way the winds are blowing. Third, the authoritarian regimes are acting in ever more brazen ways. The pandemic has provided additional tools and justification for repressive tactics and for silencing dissent in a great number of countries. These regimes are propped up by a lack of sufficient geopolitical pressures and support from other authoritarian powers. Some of them thrive in the narrative that authoritarian governance is more effective for effective prosperity and pandemic management. Something that we have tried very hard to dispel in our report. In 2021, just to give you an idea of the new things and the new tools that authoritarian regimes are doing. We saw the president of Belarus ordered the rerouting of an international flight so that he could arrest an opposition journalist. And we have also seen authoritarian regimes expand their toolbox with the increasing use of transnational disinformation campaigns, including for the purpose of undermining the credibility and legitimacy of democratic elections often without any proof of irregularity. Overall, most of the world is struggling when it comes to democracy. This graph shows you the trend in regime types over the years. We're currently in a situation where hybrid regimes in blue and authoritarian regimes in green actually, sorry, authoritarian regimes in orange actually outnumber high performing democracies shown here in green. In fact, only 9% of the world lives in high performing democracies. Perhaps more worrying than the numbers, however, is the decline in the quality of governance in existing. More democracies than ever are suffering from democratic erosion. Which refers to a loss in democratic quality as observed through an statistically significant decline on at least one indicator one attribute of democracy in a period of five years. So defined democratic erosion was experienced in 2020 by 43% of democracies. If you take a look at the graph, you see that that figure 10 years ago was no higher than 12%. So that alone tells you in a very eloquent way the the very serious deterioration that democracies have experienced across the board. Some democracies have declined slightly in one area in particular others have declined deeply and across many areas. And this graph shows the democracies that have declined the most measured in terms of the average across all different attributes of democracy over the past 10 years. All countries in this list started out as democracies in 2010. Those that are green at the arrowhead side on the left remain democracies today and are involved. Those that are blue at the arrowhead are now hybrid regimes, while those that are orange are now authoritarian regimes. So for example, Turkey, Serbia and they now went from being democracies to being hybrid regimes today and Nicaragua moved from being democratic to authoritarian in this period. One of the most serious forms of decline is what we and many other people call democratic backsliding backsliding refers to the to the process whereby often democratically elected. Governments a dismantle gradually in a deliberate and for lack of a better word, strategic way when they dismantle basic democratic tenants in a in a deliberate way over a period of time. The striped countries on this map are backsliding. As you can see, many of the current backsliders are very large and relevant countries. We are in a situation now where more than two thirds of the world live in countries that are either backsliding or are straight up authoritarian or hybrid regimes. And research has shown that the most important indicators of democratic backsliding are executive actions against checks on government and civil liberties. The number of backsliding countries has never been as high as in the last decade. Our latest round of data shows seven backsliding countries in the United States, Brazil, Hungary, Poland, India, the Philippines and Slovenia. And as you can see, three of them are proud members of the European Union, which again should be enough to dispel with the notion that it's only young and poor democracies that are suffering declines in their democratic quality. The pandemic has only deepened the trend towards democratic deterioration, putting a halt to democratization processes that had seen promising and adding a new layer of challenges for democracy. The democracies that have experienced the most concerning development from a democracy and human rights perspective are those that were already ailing before the pandemic. And this is crucial to understand. Just as with people, COVID-19 hits the hardest, those democracies that have pre-existing conditions. But the pandemic has also impacted even stronger democracies. In fact, all countries in the world have imposed different kinds of restrictions and basic freedoms and democratic rights during the COVID-19 pandemic. Waringly, however, it was in less than half of those countries that these restrictions were temporary and imposed in the context of constitutionally defined states of emergencies. And according to our global monitor on the impact of COVID-19 on democracy and human rights, at the end of October, 45% of democracies had experienced at least one concerning development. And by that, we mean that they had enacted measures to deal with the pandemic that were either disproportionate or unnecessary in terms of the kind of emergency we're facing or illegal or indefinite. Still, there's reason I can't seem to make this graph work, but I can tell the story. There's reason to be hopeful if many democracies have proved resilient during the pandemic. Introducing or expanding democratic innovations and adapting their practices and institutions in record time. Countries around the world learn to hold elections in exceedingly difficult conditions and rapidly activated special voting arrangements like mobile voting, postal voting, early voting, proxy voting to allow citizens to continue exercising their democratic rights. What this graph is meant to show, unfortunately for some reason, I cannot make it work, but I'll tell you what the graph shows. What it shows is a remarkable story of learning. At the beginning of the pandemic, there was a very legitimate fear that the pandemic would upend electoral calendars. And that was the case. In the early days of the pandemic, a very high proportion of countries that were due to hold scheduled elections had to postpone elections or decided to cancel them all together. That was true for the months of March, April, May of last year. And then something dramatically, something dramatic happened. What happened was that countries and political systems and electoral management bodies learned to hold elections in the impossibly difficult conditions created by the pandemic. And as time went by, the proportion of countries that decided to either postpone or cancel elections dropped dramatically. And at this point, it is very much the case that the default options for countries that are expected to hold elections is to hold them on schedule. So this tells you that the electoral component of democracy is very resilient, even in very difficult conditions. And one example to point out here is that of South Korea. If you ask me, the South Korean election of April of last year was the turning point in this story. There, authorities use early voting and extended home voting provisions to COVID-19 patients in hospitals and those in self-isolation and introduce safety and hygiene measures in polling stations. And worth highlighting also was the use of augmented reality technology, the enhancement of real-world objects through electronic devices for virtual election campaigning. Candidates ran eye-catching campaigns with three-dimensional leaflets and virtual spaces. And this measure guaranteed the safety of voters and resulted in an overall turnout of 66%, the highest rate in parliamentary elections in South Korea since 1992. The way this special voting arrangements were deployed really gave us very interesting cues as to how to gain consensus between multiple stakeholders in a short time. How best to communicate with the public to retain public confidence in elections and how to work with new partners like health departments in the context of elections. In a way, it's now the default option to think creatively and with a spirit of innovation and strive to hold elections on time, even in the midst of a pandemic. The other piece of good news of the other very, you know, hopeful element in this story is that civic action is alive and kicking all over the world. All democracy movements have brave repressions even in inhospitable environments like Belarus, Myanmar, Eswatini, Cuba, and global social movements for tackling climate change and fighting racial inequalities have emerged. More than three-quarters of countries have experienced different kinds of protests during the pandemic, despite the often draconian restrictions introduced by governments to deal with the pandemic. And we know that protests matter, especially in the long term because in authoritarian context they can cast doubt on the legitimacy of a regime. But more generally they can direct tension towards different sorts of injustices. They can force a conversation about those injustices. They change the people that participate and they, in a way that turns them into activists. I mean some people call a protest a kind of a political gateway drug between being a casual bystander in a democracy and being a lifelong activist. It is clear to us that we need a new plan, one that builds on in response to the public energy that we have witnessed spilling over around the world. And that's why an Ambassador Lenardsson was kindly referring to this. We are proposing a three-point agenda for democratic renewal. First, deliver. We need to deliver a new social contract that closes the gap between the demands of people and what governments are currently delivering. We need to design responsive, inclusive, accountable, transparent institutions oriented towards achieving sustainable development. This social contracts must make commitments to constituents with regards to inequality, corruption, environmental sustainability to name a few basic tenants. In some, they must demonstrate that democracy can deliver the things that people need to live lives with dignity and to pursue the opportunities that are important to them. You know, if you ask me, we that believe in democracy can make the normative case for democracy until we go blue. For most people, this story is about the capacity of democracies to deliver real solutions for real problems for real people. That's what the future or the future of democracy will be decided. A compelling example of an effort to deliver a new social contract can be found in Chile. My part of the world or the people in the government are renegotiating the social contract in an institutional setting. And that's what's most remarkable about it. After decades of growing public anger over narrowing economic opportunities or a large segment of the population, segregated health and education systems and monopolistic business practices. Chile was rocked by mass protests in 2019. Protesters were demanding better and more equitable democracy in the form of a new constitution to replace the one that had been in place since the military regime of Augusto Pinochet in the 1980s. The constituent assembly, which is active as we speak, and which is responsible for drafting this new constitution is showing us that the process of coming up with a new social contract can look like. The assembly is mandated to contain equal numbers of men and women and to reserve seats for groups representing indigenous peoples. All decisions must be approved by a two thirds majority of members and the vote in which members were selected resulted in a major victory for non mainstream blocks. The president of the assembly remarkably is an indigenous woman from the Mapuche group. And of course, it remains to be seen what the new constitution will look like. We don't know that, but at the very least, we know that this is a good example of a deliberate effort to rethink the social contract through institutional needs. And it should be commended. Second, rebuild. We need to bring existing institutions into the 21st century by updating practices and establish democracies, building democratic capacity, new democracies and protecting electoral integrity, fundamental freedoms and rights and the checks and balances. Essential to thriving democratic systems. Political institutions and electoral processes, respect for human rights, checks on power and pathways for participation must be redesigned or amended so that they are citizen and people center rather than elite center. This is the time to be old and to disrupt the status cool and those whose interests are tied up in retaining the status cool so that more people and more kinds of people have access to the levers of power at all levels. And one example of this is what we've seen a in recent years, particularly in Europe, but not only there. The, the use and the rise in the use of citizens assemblies through which a randomly selected group of citizens come together and hear from experts competing interest groups and people personally impacted by the issue at stake. They then deliberate together may recommendations on a way forward evidence suggests that this kind of deliberative democracy mechanism works. The balance and structure process tends to result in more informed preferences. And the deliberation context has been successful at breaking through that lock and, and, and the broader public seem to have confidence in the judgments of that emerge from these bodies and examples of this include Ireland, where this has been used to decide the constitutional status of abortion, gender equality and addressing climate change and also in France, Germany and the UK on issues connected to climate change. Third and finally prevent. We need to prevent rising authoritarianism and democratic backsliding by investing in education at all levels of schooling. Investing on civic education by supporting independent civil society and media, and by addressing the behaviors that contribute to the spread of this information. This has to be done by an increased focus on accountability and empowered civil society a robust and independent media environment, and also through an investment education at all levels of schooling. And I'll give you an example of what accountability to prevent the deterioration of democracy. It means in practice in May of 2021, the economic community of West African states equal was suspended Mali from the block after the coup. After the after the country second coup in nine months. And at that time neighboring countries also closed their borders and suspend the financial transactions with with Mali. Also, days after a military coup in Guinea. Echo was suspended that country demanding an immediate return to constitutional order and the release of precedent alpha conduct. This are good examples of accountability mechanisms to protect democracy. Let me just finish by saying that with this report. We hope to convey a sense of urgency about the plight. Of democracy globally, but also a sense of opportunity. We want to press upon our audiences the message that this is the best time for democratic actors to be bought. This is the time to revitalize the democratic project in order to prepare it for the even stoner challenges that lie ahead, including those post by the climate crisis. This calls for a global endeavor. And that's why efforts such as the EU democracy action plan. The reason summit for democracy and the long standing efforts to support democratic institutions done by many countries around the world, including some member states of idea matter more than ever. We need to let democratic reformers know that they are not alone in this. And in the process of doing that, we should never forget why this work matters. This is about more than safeguarding abstract principles or winning geopolitical battles. It is about protecting the dignity of real human beings with democracy does better than any other political arrangement. Every democratic reversal is not a geopolitical battle lost. It is a constellation of lives that goes dark. As we are witnessing in Afghanistan today, it is a group of human beings that lose their opportunity to fulfill their potential and dreams. And that my friends is also our loss. This report is a small contribution to this global struggle. It is very small compared to the deeds that are performed on a daily basis by pro democracy activists all over the world. In this report is our small tribute to their sacrifices and our sincere pledge that we will use the knowledge we gather and the experience we accrue to help reformers improve democracy where it exists. To support those who fight for democracy where it doesn't exist. And to inspire the million others that need to join this cause if democracy is to endure and prevail. Thank you. Thank you very much, Kevin Kazasamura, Secretary General of International Idea. You provided us with the key findings from the Global State of Democracy report. Let me show you a printed copy. And my colleagues have posted also in the chat function a link so that you can have an answer from our website. Thank you very much, Kevin, especially for pointing out also the key trends. But the more importantly the three point agenda that should allow us to fight for a democracy renewal. I will now open up the panel and the first panelist, Faiza Shaheen. Thank you for joining us Faiza. Based on your experience as inequality and exclusion leader at Pathfinders at the New York University Center on International Cooperation. Actually, I see a question in the chat already that may link very much with your intervention. The question comes from Klaus Krompers and he asks which role does play increasing social inequality in backsliding democracies. The question is really about your assessment on the findings of the report. Do they resonate with your analysis on inequality and development? And how do you see the challenges and opportunities to democracy worldwide as related to the analysis and work that you're carrying out from the Pathfinders point of view. Thank you and congrats to the International Idea Team for this incredible report, which is incredibly alarming as well. Just listening to you there, Secretary General Kevin, I mean, it was, it really is really quite shocking to hear those statistics. Although we know it and we see it in the news every day to see the numbers brought together in this way is helpful because it's important for us to be honest about the way the wind is blowing because otherwise we can't take the issue seriously. Make sure we are taking the steps necessary to change and to move in the other direction. So very quickly, for those of you that don't know about Pathfinders, we are a multi-stakeholder platform. We bring together member states, multi-lateral organisations and some society and we consider how we can progress on issues of peace, justice and inclusion under a sustainable goal, development goal 16. And I lead the work on inequality and exclusion and it's from that perspective, yes, that I will give my comments and really start by making the connections between what we've heard on democracy today and inequality. And of course, the headline really is that when you have huge levels of inequality, when you have huge concentrations of wealth at the top, that also results in concentrations of power, which hugely undermine democracy. And whether it's our own work, whether it's Oxfam's figures that they put out every year, whether it's the World Inequality Report last year, we know that those have seen levels of wealth are getting worse. And the striking statistic during COVID, of course, is that billionaire wealth increased at a historically fast level, increased by 54%. And that's the biggest ever increase that billionaires have had during COVID when we know that so many were thrown out of work, were thrown into poverty. And that inequality is a huge interest and concern. But there's various methods in which that connects and mechanisms by which that connects back to democratic outcomes. And the first is, I guess, thinking about that directly in the way in which elite power and money can go to particular political candidates through the media, through lobbying, that very direct way in which people with money, if there are not checks and balances in place, can have an influence on our democratic outcomes or on our non-democratic outcomes even. And so, you know, one of the ways in which we were really looking at this through the work we've been doing, we did a poll of some of the key countries we work with, so eight countries, around 17,000 people we were polled. And it was looking at where they want to see policy action and then comparing to where, you know, where governments are acting. And I think in this case, you know, you look around the world and you see what people want versus what they get versus what the elite want and what they get is very, very telling. And I think there was a great study from Princeton, which focused in on the US that found that if 80% of the rich supported a particular policy, that it was, the chances of it happening were about 50%. And there was absolutely no similar effect for the average Americans. And, you know, like if you had 80% of Americans supporting a policy, you would think it was very likely to happen. But not at all. That was very, very different for the rich. So you see that inequality, that concentration of wealth paying through the democratic system and who's pushed to the top, who's elected, how they're lobbied, and policy outcomes. And that's really important relating back to what, you know, a point that we just heard. People need to see that democracy is delivering for them. So when that money is concentrated, that power is concentrated, and then you see that the things that they, politicians said they were going to deliver or the things that would make a visible material change in your life aren't happening. You know, people get angry, and sometimes they don't just blame the way in which the rich are behaving. They see that the system is rigged against them. And that's a key way in which, you know, essentially democracy is undermined in the minds of everyday people. And this is key to understanding that backsliding, key to understanding, you know, the dynamics that some of those stats today. I think deeper still, we look at both economic inequality and group based inequalities. And I think here, we see even more worrying connections to democracy, you know, how prejudice is used group based inequalities are used to divide. How can you get away with only delivering disproportionately for rich groups unless you find ways to distract people. Of course, it's a very old trick, you know, the divide and rule tactic. But it, you know, it's, it's really came out in our polling we found strikingly whether it was, you know, rich country on middle income or low income, around 80% of the public fold were worried about divisions in their society. And the way in which that division was affecting the way in which people live together and get on together. And that can be, you know, a different divides, whether that's about ethnicity, whether that's about religion. And also actually, in fact, one of the things that came up in the interviews there was about vaccines as well. And about arguments being had over that and how that was being used as a political tool to divide people. But there's something that happens alongside that division, which is a dehumanization is a dehumanization of certain groups who are, you know, explicitly or implicitly made out to deserve less to, to have less legitimacy in our democracies. And so, you know, it, that process of group based inequality dehumanizes and it allows for this polarization that happens to justify leaving some people out, leaving them behind and really breaking the whole point of democracy in the first place. And so, you know, I think there's so much in this report and it's a really excellent report. I think, you know, relating back to the UN Secretary General's comments about ethno nationalism about racism, we have to be very, very clear about the connections there. And, you know, we can think about this as a vicious cycle as, as more inequality, which undermines democracy, which then in turn leads to more inequality. But, you know, I think one of the things and I, you know, I'm going to draw that I'm not completely like devoid of hope right now, you know, it sounds like a dire assessment that I'm giving but, you know, I do take heart that there are so many protests that people are coming out on the street that they are fighting back and I'm sure many people speak to this point. And, you know, there is a very clear breakdown of social of the social contract in people's minds and that's why they are coming out on the street and they are trying to push. And, but I guess I can come back and talk about solutions in a minute but I think that's really where we need to understand and support people in that civil civil civil society action. Thank you very much. Faisal actually you introduced already. Very well. The question. I wanted to pose to Monday, Monday, T1 chief program officer at Civicus and advisory board member of the UN democracy fund. These elements that was recalled already by Ambassador Lenerson in his introduction, the shrinking space, civic space. And the protests that were also mentioned by our secretary general Kevin Kazasamura when describing the first pillar, the deliver pillar on which actually Faisal elaborated in their intervention now. Do you think the report of international idea goes in the same direction as your analysis on the civic space worldwide. Massima. First of all, congratulations you produce an excellent report and there's several points of resonance with your report and our findings at Civicus. In fact, on 8 December, we just released our civics monitor findings, you know, our annual review of global civic space conditions. And the civics monitor for those who don't know it is a participatory platform, which includes a research partnership with some 20 plus organizations. Where we look at the fundamental civic freedoms of expression, peaceful assembly and association, which are really the lifeblood of democracy which allows civil society to, you know, to act to engage to shape decision making and also enforce accountability. And our findings actually present quite a sorry picture around the world, nine out of 10 people in the world to not live in countries where the living countries where sorry live in countries where these civic freedoms are severely restricted. So, which is the real challenge for us and which, you know, which fits into your overall trajectory of democracy. So, 89% of the world's population living in countries with serious restrictions on civic freedom shouldn't worry us all because that really speaks to us about the adverse state of democracy across the world. But but but I do want to bring out to two particular points, you know, and which are a matter of concern for us. One is that, you know, democracy just does not happen in parliaments, it does not happen in, you know, in cabinet meetings democracy happens on the streets democracy happen through civic activism. And what we are seeing increasingly is that the right to peaceful protest is coming under attack. They're public protesters are being subjected to increasingly stigmatizing language in many, many countries in democracies to where they are being called anarchists where they're being called, you know, disruptors of law and order where they are sometimes being called threats to national security and, and, and our findings on the civic monitor relate to to what you know what you what you've talked about. While the challenges on the right to peaceful protest, and we find that protesters are being detained, they have been subjected to security legislation and worse in many parts of the world so that remains a big challenge, because traditionally speaking in the modern era, a lot of democratic gains have actually been one through the right to peaceful protest, you know, whether it's the dismantling of apartheid, the, you know, the achievement of gender justice and gender equality, highlighting the community urgency, and also of most recently highlighting racial justice issues, you know, drawing from the tradition of the civil rights struggle so so that's a big big challenge. The second thing that we're really concerned about is that civil society organizations activists that speak truth to power that uncover serious violations of human rights uncover high level corruption. They are being persecuted in many parts of the world governments are using false cases, security legislation and all sorts of, you know, legislation that is in relation to national security offenses or sedition and so on and they're using the full force of the law, albeit in, in, you know, in on savory and, you know, unpalatable ways against activists. So that's another big challenge. And the third is COVID-19 like, you know, as I was saying has exacerbated a lot of the fault lines in our societies. There was more inequality, COVID-19 has increased that inequality where there was more oppression, COVID-19 has increased that oppression, but there are three things that we've remained really, really concerned about. One is overarching censorship, you know, in the early days of the pandemic and doing the pandemic many governments have tried to put the best foot forward so they started to censor information, you know, sometimes using benign justifications like you know people cannot get false information about pandemic spread, and they ramped it up with their own propaganda trying to put the best foot forward and this was particularly prevalent in countries with authoritarian macho style leaders, you know, who wanted to show that they're doing their best to curb the pandemic, although the statistics show a different thing and many of them also tried to hide the statistics. The second big challenge from COVID-19 came is overarching surveillance. So in the name of contact tracing containing wire spread, they started to use digital means to, you know, to clamp down on those who offer democratic dissent, those who expose their wrongdoing. So the illicit surveillance has become a major issue at the time for those who seek to promote democratic values and democratic rights. And the third issue is, you know, there's been, you know, harsh, you know, measures, public safety measures, you know, to deal with COVID spread and some of them are justifiable. But law enforcement agencies in some instances have been given excessive coercive powers and they have misused these powers, and this can have some serious ramifications going forward when law enforcement agencies act with impunity, and which is already seen on how the right to peaceful protest is being suppressed in many parts of the world. Thank you very much, Mandeep. You raised the many points that are also covered by the report and I see many synergies between the analysis of civics and the convergence on the use and abuse of power. There was a thematic chapter in our work on emergency powers that goes in the same direction. Thank you, Mandeep. I would now turn to our discussants and maybe I will get also back to you also, Faiza and Mandeep, quickly in the end on what the role of the UN could be. But first, let's give five minutes to our discussants to address their own views and perception of the presentation, your comments and the report itself. I will start with Mario Builmerse, Senior Political Affairs Officer at the Office of Genocide Prevention and the responsibility to protect at the United Nations. Mario, thank you for being with us. Thank you very much and thank you for the opportunity of speaking to all of you today. Congratulations for the excellent report, which I would agree with the previous speakers points to very concerning trends, but it's also a call of action for all of us to try to address those concerns and try to together improve not the quality of those democracies that can still be considered as such and certainly turn the trends when we're talking about other types of regime. And for those of you who don't know our office, I'm speaking on behalf of the Office of Genocide Prevention and the responsibility to protect the UN. And perhaps the key message that we wanted to transmit today is that all the deficits and gaps and problems that have been identified are a problem for all the obvious reasons that have been described already. But from our perspective, they also constitute a problem from the perspective of prevention of atrocity crimes. And by that we mean genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. And it has been pointed out by one of the previous speakers that when we enter trends of dehumanization, for example, we enter a realm of concern that goes a little bit beyond a normal status of concerning human rights violations. We're entering a different phase where the sort of crimes that our office tries to prevent can become possible. So all those concerns are certainly very important. I should also like to recall the point made by a previous speaker on the pandemic, COVID-19, as the pandemic itself, having an impact more on those who have existing conditions. From the types of risk factors indicators that our office looks at, for example, when it comes to hate speech, we do see that the instances of increasing concerns are measuring countries that are already vulnerable from the perspective of the democratic institutions. So, you know, when many of the points that have been raised relate to elements that we look at from the perspective of risk factors or indicators of atrocity crimes. For those of you who don't know our office, we have a framework of analysis for atrocity crimes that list a number of risk factors and indicators. Let me just list a few of those because you will be able to connect them very well with elements that have been pointed out in the report. We look at records of serious violations of international human rights and humanitarian law. So anything related to impunity, anything related to fragility of judicial institutions, those institutions that can provide accountability for past crimes is something that we look at with concern. One of the key risk factors for us is what we call weakness of state structures, which, you know, could relate to many of the democratic governance institutions that we've been talking about. What is the national legal framework in terms of incorporating key universal human rights treaties? Are national institutions independent, the judiciary? Is there effective civilian control of security forces? What is the level of corruption? What is the level of governance? Do we have poor governments in the country mechanisms of oversight? What's the situation of those institutions that in a democracy can serve as dispute resolution mechanisms? National electoral commissions come very much to mind and are obviously very central to the sort of elements that your report looks at. But we also pay a lot of attention to the office of the onwards person in a country. Are these offices well-equipped? Are they independent? Can they play this dispute mechanism role? We also look at what we call mitigating factors, the absence of which could point to an increased risk of atrocity crimes. What about the media? Can the media operate freely in a society? What is the presence of international actors, regional organizations, think tanks, national and international civil society organizations? To what degree a state has cooperation with other institutions internationally or in this region? We also look at what we call enabling circumstances or preparatory action and among the indicators that are relevant for this risk factor for us is emergency laws. How do states define the process whereby an emergency legislation can come into the fore of what mechanisms exist to control the extent to which these emergency laws are put in place? That's also relevant from our perspective. Just for the sake of example, I'll finish with the risk factor that's more related to the crime of genocide in their group tensions or patterns of discrimination against protected groups. Here we would talk about all the instances in which we would find discrimination, segregation is that legally enforced or not legally prevented to what extent that can lead to a process of dehumanization that history has shown that tends to precede the commission of this type of crimes. And again, hate speech could come to the fore here as a particular instance of concern, which has increased in the context of the pandemic. Now, when we consider all of this, of course, it's not only about alerting of the presence of these elements, which again we see from the perspective not only of deterioration of democracy, but also of enhanced risk of the types of crimes of commission and the types of crimes we're talking about. We also look at these risk factors as a way of trying to identify recommendations for action in addressing them. And as you know, in the UN, there are different ways we can try to do this. Obviously, agenda 2030 is very significant when it comes to addressing the structural components of all these concerns, especially SDG 16, but not only SDG 16. But then, of course, different mandates of the UN will try to address some of these things in different ways. We have protection of civilian mandates, as you know, special political missions often support elections, often support constitution making. Of course, our human rights colleagues provide assistance to many national human rights commissions to the development implementation of national human rights, of human rights legislation at the national level from the side of our office. You know, we have a plan just to go back to the topic of HPEACH, which is quite central to all of this. And by no means this is the only example we can give, but perhaps it's the most pertinent given the description that has been given. The UN has developed a strategy plan of action on HPEACH for which our office has been tasked to implement. So we're supporting many UN countries on the ground and those countries that have requested this assistance in setting up a national action plans on HPEACH. I will leave it at that because I know we're pressed by time, but essentially the point being all these concerns go beyond concerns for absence of the duration of the quality of democracy themselves. They can lead to very concerning trends where genocide war crimes, crimes against humanities might be possible. And the diagnostic of what the concerns are also provide us with an agenda of action that we are all trying to collectively work towards too. So I will leave it at that. Thank you very much. Thank you very much, Mario. It has been very interesting to listen to your analysis all and the reference to dehumanization, which was also recalled by, in fact, FISA when talking about group based inequalities, a very, very interesting element of convergence there. And again, another entry point for the next speaker, the next discussant, Annemarie Goetz, who has been among other things also working at UN women on issues of accountability and gender equality. And she's currently clinical professor at the Center for Global Affairs School of Professional Studies at the New York University. So, Annemarie, what is your view about what you heard today and the report that you had? Thank you so much, Massimo, and you quite correctly guessed exactly my jumping off point, which has to do with inequality and dehumanization. First, let me congratulate you and international idea, Kevin, and everyone on an excellent report. And for those of you who haven't looked at it, just look at the executive summary if you're busy. It's admirably, cleanly and clearly presented, very, very accessible. So it will surprise no one that I'm going to talk about gender specifically as one element of the kind of inequality that erodes democracies. And I will ask, is it an accident? Is it a coincidence that so many of the erosions of democracy that we've seen have been spearheaded by leaders who profess or express a flamboyant and extreme masculinity and actually patriarchy, a kind of a lawless masculinity? Misogyny goes hand in hand with some of the, in particular, right-wing neopopulisms, but left-wing also, as we've seen in some countries. And this misogyny is about deep, is about privatizing, actually, or deinstitutionalizing some of the advances in women's rights. And it's actually part of a politics of a masculinist restoration that we've seen around the world or hardline masculine fundamentalism. So what does this mean? I mean, it's been explained in many ways as being part of a backlash by middle-class men against the erosion of their employment certainties in a globalized world. Sure. And it's also a very easy, a handy mobilization tool that want to be autocrats use. And they link it to xenophobia, anti-immigrant sentiment and racism as a very kind of quick mobilization tool. Now, this is really problematic. And I would say it's great. I actually did see plenty in the idea of report on gender, and that's good news. But we sometimes have to kind of get the big picture in mind. There is a 75% gap between women and men in public decision making. And that is an extreme democratic deficit. In the countries where we're seeing erosion of democratic liberties, we're also seeing an erosion of protections on women's rights. The United States and Russia, both in different ways, for example, have clawed back certain aspects of domestic violence, which is a really serious red flag. Because if you want to talk about dehumanization, if you start to normalize violence against half of the population, that is a pure sign of dehumanization. If it's okay to be violent towards them in private spaces. So I would say the gender dimensions of democracy erosion are extremely important and not accidental. And I would ask, I think it's excellent that the report looks at the conditions under which there has been a resistance to the backlash or a reversing of the reversal, if you like. And I think it's very, it would be valuable for the authors of the report perhaps to respond about whether there is any correlation between women's rights and democratic resilience, whether there's a correlation between the size and strength of feminist mobilization and democratic resilience, because of course it's hard to measure that in particular feminist mobilization. But there are some attempts to do so and where we have large and powerful feminist organizations well connected to other civil society groups, we are finding global goods such as democracy and peace well defended. And of course, you know, just one other feature of all of this is that during at least the initial waves of the pandemic countries, some countries with female leadership did very well at pushing back the pandemic but we do know that there are many other reasons for that. My second comment only because I know time is short is I'm going to just say a word about the UN and its role in democracy promotion. And again, I'm sorry, but I am going to link the politics of masculine restoration to the erosion of multilateralism. The Australian sociologist Ray Winn Connell noted 20 years ago that quote, hardline masculine fundamentalism goes together with a marked anti internationalism. Why? Because of course a lot of these autocratic movements go together with nationalism, closing of borders closing of minds. Now the United Nations has always been a little bit tentative on for claiming that democracy is the way to go if that's what we want to do is promote human rights and the rule of law but in 2007. When I was involved in this process me too. The UN started to become much more assertive about democracy promotion, indicating September 15 as International Democracy Day, supporting the setting up of the UN Democracy Fund and we've heard from them today. And so you know the UN does have a role and of course SDG 16 carries that forward as we've heard from FISA and the work of the Pathfinders. But you know next year is going to be the 15th year of the declaration of International Democracy Day. Maybe that's a good time. Given the huge erosions, the swelling tide of autocracy and the hollowing out of democratic institutions. Maybe next year is a really good time for the UN to step forward and say 15 years of working on this much more explicitly than before. Maybe this is a good moment to defend democracy more robustly. And then just last point, last point that so many excellent points have been made about truth and hate speech and media. You know Maria Reza, the journalist from the Philippines was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize and on Friday gave a remarkable speech about the defense of democracy. And I'm just going to end with a quote from her regarding how democracy needs truth and actually truth, social compacts and social resilience need truth as well. And she says, without facts, you can't have truth. Without truth, you can't have trust. Without trust, we have no shared reality, no democracy, and it becomes impossible to deal with our world's existential problems. So I'll end there with that remarkable statement from a remarkable woman. Thank you. Well, and you are a remarkable woman as well. Let me tell it. You made in a very short intervention a lot of great points. One wearing my heart as director of global programs is interesting when you say that we should look into any correlation between women's rights and democratic resilience. And since we are thinking about the program for next year, this is a very good suggestion that I will turn to the team over to the team that produced the global state of democracy report. And thank you also for your comments on the UN. I would like to give an opportunity, in fact, to both Kevin and the panelists to get back if you want to say anything on what each of you has said before we wrapped up. We tried to accommodate also for some questions. We do have questions from the floor that were submitted at the time of the registration. So let me pick two or three of them. And then maybe you can get back depending on which ones you want to answer to. There was one rather technical about the compatibility and complementarity with other indices like the Freedom House and the Economist Intelligence Unit. This is from Mikiko Sawanishi, deputy executive head of the UN Democracy Fund. Mikiko, this is a very technical one, but the short answer is yes, we base the analysis also on VDEM and Freedom House data and they are compatible. They are telling a very similar story. And of course, we'll continue to refine our indices in order to make the analysis more and more integrated. Then there is a question from the delegate from the permanent mission of Cuba to the UN, Richard Thur. He made a very long question based on the Vienna Declaration on Programme of Action. Essentially the question is how can we qualify a political design as democratic when the winner of the elections can be the candidate with a lower amount of votes or when elections are held with more than half of the electoral role not participating in the process. This is from the Cuban delegation. And there was also a question from Pamela Tika, executive director from Women in Democracy and Governance. Can civil society in countries which are going to elections during the COVID-19 pandemic ensure democracy is upheld and that the elections are free and fair and credible? So I would like to know whether there is any other panelists who want to react and even to Kevin or perhaps even Magnus if he wants to get back with a few words before we wrap up. We have another eight minutes to go. Who would like to start? Well, Raider. Yes, yes, Kevin. I didn't see you. Yes, go ahead. Well, thank you so much for all the comments and the interesting and insightful things that have been heard here. And thank you for the questions as well. I mean, just two or three very quick comments because we are short on time. Number one, let me just say that I fully agree with the point raised by FISA about the importance of inequality in all this story. I mean, this is, well, I mean, democracy is many things, but one of those things, a key one is an instrument to distribute power. It's an instrument to disperse large concentrations of power. So grotesque levels of inequality such as the ones we are seeing globally and that have been made worse by the pandemic are simply incompatible with the basic ethos of democracy and we have to accept that. So that for starters, number two, I fully agree with the points raised by several of the panelists and discussants that perhaps the big story that comes out of this report amidst all the doom and gloom. There's a huge positive story in the resurgence and the vitality of civic action. That's where the energy to renew the democratic project is to be found these days is not really in governments to be frank. That's, that gives us something to work with that and the resilience of the electoral component of democracy as I mentioned in my presentation so I mean fully agree with with that. Third, the very interesting point raised by a by Ann Marie on the potential links between women's rights and the resilience of democracy. I mean, we have to look into that. Let me just state for the record something that we know. And actually, this was explicitly covered at some length in our previous report two years ago that in terms of the prevalence and the robustness of women's rights democracies are much better than any other political arrangement. And that has another, you know, another implication, which, which I think is crucial and is seldom mentioned. If we know that the robustness of women's rights. And if we know that gender equality is essential for achieving the sustainable development goals. Hence, it flows from that, that the vitality of democracy is an essential component of achieving the sustainable development qualities. Yet, this three step argument is seldom made and seldom recognized, I have to be saying, particularly within the UN environment. But it's about time that we start recognizing that connection between democracy women's rights and sustainable development goals. Last, I can't resist the temptation of engaging with the question from the representative from Cuba. Well, it's a, it's an important question. Let me just, let me just say that if you if you read the clause that he quotes in his question about the Vienna declaration. It reads democracy is based on the freely expressed will of the people. Creative concept being here, the freely expressed will that for starters, number two, the notion that we are prescribing one model of democracy. Well flies in the face of what I said at the start of my presentation, you know, that we try very consciously not to be prescriptive. That we recognize that democracy has, you know, comes in many different varieties and shapes on the basis of a share on the standing of a few basic tenants, one of them being a credible and competitive elections. And number three, he asked what kind of instinct, you know, international instrument is used to to defend a notion of democracy that put selections at the center of it. Well, I would suggest that we check article 21 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. That's where the answer is to be found. And it's a very clear one. Thank you. Thank you very much, Kevin. These remarks are actually an excellent wrap up also of the whole meeting. I have to say that I found it very engaging. I heard and learned about the convergence on the analysis on inequality provided by pathfinders and the analysis that our researchers produced on the state of global democracy. I was amazed at seeing at how the analysis by civics through its monitor goes in the same direction when addressing issues of civic space and its shrinking. I welcome Mario Mario's comments about the possibility of using some of these data for assessing risks as they are doing in their work on the prevention of genocide and mass atrocities. And I would say that Ann Marie Goetz also highlighted the many important elements of what the UN could also do and is trying to do more in this area by placing at the center of this conversation, the critical role of women's rights, which I think are the best indicator for assessing the quality of democratic institutions and processes. And thank you to Sweden for hosting us, Ambassador Magnus Lennerson, with your introductory remarks. Very insightful. Thank you for the panelists engagement. Thank you for the discussions and many, many thanks also to Kevin Kazasamura for making his presentation on a very topical report. That is apparently attracting a lot of media and audience interest. Thank you to everybody. And have a nice day. Thank you all.