 1 There are few circumstances among those which make up the present condition of human knowledge more unlike what might have been expected, or more significant of the backward state in which speculation on the most important subjects still linger, than the little progress which has been made in the decision of the controversy respecting the criterion of right and wrong. From the dawn of philosophy, the question concerning the summum bonum, or what is the same thing concerning the foundation of morality, has been accounted the main problem in speculative thought, has occupied the most gifted intellects, and divided them into sects and schools, carrying on a vigorous warfare against one another. And after more than two thousand years, the same discussions continue, philosophers are still ranged under the same contending banners, and neither thinkers nor mankind at large seem nearer to being unanimous on the subject than when the youth Socrates listened to the old Protagoras and asserted, if Plato's dialogue be grounded on a real conversation, the theory of utilitarianism against the popular morality of the so-called Sophist. It is true that similar confusion and uncertainty and, in some cases, similar discordance exist respecting the first principles of all the sciences, not accepting that which is deemed the most certain of them, mathematics, without much impairing, generally, indeed, but impairing at all the trustworthiness of the conclusions of those sciences. An apparent anomaly, the explanation of which is that the detailed doctrines of a science are not usually deduced from nor depend for their evidence upon what are called its first principles. Were it not so, there would be no science more precarious or whose conclusions were more insufficiently made out than algebra, which derives none of its certainty from what are commonly taught to learners as its elements, since these, as laid down by some of its most eminent teachers, are as full of fictions as English law, and of mysteries as theology. The truths, which are ultimately accepted as the first principles of a science, are really the last results of metaphysical analysis practiced on the elementary notions with which the science is conversant, and their relation to the science is not that of foundations to an edifice, but of roots to a tree, which may perform their office equally well though they be never dug down to and exposed to light, but though in science the particular truths precede the general theory, the contrary might be expected to be the case for the practical art, such as morals or legislation. All action is for the sake of some end, and rules of action, it seems natural to suppose, must take their whole character and color from the end to which they are subservient. When we engage in pursuit, a clear and precise conception of what we are pursuing would seem to be the first thing we need instead of the last we are to look forward to. A test of right and wrong must be the means one would think of ascertaining what is right and wrong, and not a consequence of having already ascertained it. The difficulty is not avoided by having recourse to the popular theory of a natural faculty, a sense of instinct, informing us of right and wrong. For, besides that the existence of such a moral instinct is itself one of the matters in dispute, those believers in it who have any pretensions to philosophy have been obliged to abandon the idea that it discerns what is right or wrong in the particular case in hand, as our other senses discern the sight or sound actually present. Our moral faculty, according to all those of its interpreters who are entitled to the name of thinkers, supplies us only with the general principles of moral judgment. It is a branch of our reason, not of our sensitive faculty, and must be looked to for the abstract doctrines of morality, not for perception of it in the concrete. The intuitive, no less than what may be termed the inductive school of ethics, insists on the necessity of general laws. They both agree that the morality of an individual action is not a question of direct perception, but of the application of a law to an individual case. They recognize also, to a great extent, the same moral laws, but differ as to their evidence and the source from which they derive their authority. According to the one opinion, the principles of morals are evident a priori, requiring nothing to command assent except that the meaning of the terms be understood. According to the other doctrine, right and wrong, as well as truth and falsehood, are questions of observation and experience. But both hold equally that morality must be deduced from principles, and the intuitive school affirm as strongly as the inductive that there is a science of morals. Yet, they seldom attempt to make out a list of the a priori principles which are to serve as the premises of the science. Still more rarely do they make any effort to reduce those various principles to one first principle or common ground of obligation. They either assume the ordinary precepts of morals as of a priori authority, or they lay down as the common groundwork of those maxims some generality much less obviously authoritative than the maxims themselves, and which has never succeeded in gaining popular acceptance. Yet, to support their pretensions, there ought either to be some one fundamental principle or law at the root of all morality, or, if there be several, there should be a determinate order of precedence among them, and the one principle or the rule for deciding between the various principles when they conflict ought to be self-evident. To inquire how far the bad effects of this deficiency have been mitigated in practice, or to what extent the moral beliefs of mankind have been vitiated or made uncertain by the absence of any distinct recognition of an ultimate standard, would imply a complete survey and criticism of past and present ethical doctrine. It would, however, be easy to show that whatever steadiness or consistency these moral beliefs have attained has been mainly due to the tacit influence of a standard not recognized. Although the non-existence of an acknowledged first principle has made ethics not so much a guide as a consecration of men's actual sentiments, still, as men's sentiments, both of favor and of aversion, are greatly influenced by what they suppose to be the effects of things upon their happiness, the principle of utility, or, as Bentham laterally called it, the greatest happiness principle, has had a large share in forming the moral doctrines even of those who most scornfully reject its authority, nor is there any school of thought which refuses to admit that the influence of actions on happiness is a most material and even predominant consideration in many of the details of morals, however unwilling to acknowledge it as the fundamental principle of morality in the source of moral obligation. I might go much further and say that to all those a priori moralists who deem it necessary to argue it all, utilitarian arguments are indispensable. It is not my present purpose to criticize these thinkers, but I cannot help preferring for illustration to a systematic treatise by one of the most illustrious of them, the metaphysics of ethics by Kant. This remarkable man, whose system of thought will long remain one of the landmarks in the history of philosophical speculation, does, in the treatise in question, lay down a universal first principle as the origin and ground of moral obligation. It is this. So act that the rule on which thou actest would admit of being adopted as a law by all rational beings. But when he begins to deduce from this precept any of the actual duties of morality he fails almost grotesquely to show that there would be any contradiction, any logical, not to say physical, impossibility, and the adoption by all rational beings of the most outrageously immoral rules of conduct, all he shows is that the consequences of their universal adoption would be such as no one would choose to incur. On the present occasion, I shall, without further discussion of the other theories, to contribute something towards the understanding and appreciation of the utilitarian or happiness theory, and towards such proof as it is susceptible of. It is evident that this cannot be proof in the ordinary and popular meaning of the term. Questions of ultimate ends are not amenable to direct proof. Whatever can be proved to be good must be so by being shown to be a means to something admitted to be good without proof. The medical art is proved to be good by its conducing to health. But how is it possible to prove that health is good? The art of music is good, for the reason, among others, that it produces pleasure. But what proof is it possible to give that pleasure is good? If then it is to be asserted that there is a comprehensive formula, including all things which are in themselves good, and that whatever else is good is not so as an end but as a means, the formula may be accepted or rejected, but is not a subject of what is commonly understood by proof. We are not, however, to infer that its acceptance or rejection must depend on blind impulse or arbitrary choice. There is a larger meaning of the word proof, in which this question is as amenable to it as any other of the disputed questions of philosophy. The subject is within the cognizance of the rational faculty, and neither does that faculty deal with it solely in the way of intuition. Considerations may be presented capable of determining the intellect, either to give or withhold its assent to the doctrine, and this is equivalent to proof. We shall examine presently of what nature are these considerations, in what manner they apply to the case, and what rational grounds, therefore, can be given for accepting or rejecting the utilitarian formula. But it is a preliminary condition of rational acceptance or rejection that the formula should be correctly understood. I believe that the very imperfect notion ordinarily formed of its meaning is the chief obstacle which impedes its reception. And that, could it be cleared even from only the grosser misconceptions, the question would be greatly simplified and a large proportion of its difficulties removed. Before, therefore, I attempt to enter into the philosophical grounds which can be given for assenting to the utilitarian standard. I shall offer some illustrations of the doctrine itself, with the view of showing more clearly what it is, distinguishing it from what it is not, and disposing of such of the practical objections to it as either originate in or are closely connected with, mistaken interpretations of its meaning. Having thus prepared the ground, I shall afterwards endeavour to throw such light as I can call upon the question, considered as one of philosophical theory. This recording is in the public domain, utilitarianism. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Utilitarianism by John Stuart Mill Chapter 2 What Utilitarianism Is Section 1 A passing remark is all that needs to be given to the ignorant blunder of supposing that those who stand up for utility as the test of right and wrong use the term in that restricted and merely colloquial sense in which utility is opposed to pleasure. An apology is due to the philosophical opponents of utilitarianism for even the momentary appearance of confounding them with anyone capable of so absurd a misconception, which is the more extraordinary and as much as the contrary accusation of referring everything to pleasure, and that too in its grossest form, is another of the common charges against utilitarianism, and, as has been pointedly remarked by an able writer, the same sort of persons and often the very same persons denounce the theory, quote, as impracticably dry when the word utility precedes the word pleasure, and as too practiceably voluptuous when the word pleasure precedes the word utility, unquote. Those who know anything about the matter are aware that every writer, from Epicurus to Bentham, who maintain the theory of utility, meant by it not something to be contradistinguished from pleasure, but pleasure itself, together with exemption from pain, and instead of opposing the useful to the agreeable or the ornamental, have always declared that the useful means these, among other things. Yet the common herd, including the herd of writers, not only in newspapers and periodicals, but in books of weight and pretension, are perpetually falling into this shallow mistake, having caught up the word utilitarian, while knowing nothing whatever about it but its sound. They habitually express by it the rejection or the neglect of pleasure in some of its forms, of beauty, of ornament, or of amusement, nor is the term thus ignorantly misapplied solely in disparagement, but occasionally in compliment, as though it implied superiority to frivolity, and the mere pleasures of the moment. And this perverted use is the only one in which the word is popularly known, and the one from which the new generation are acquiring their sole notion of its meaning. Those who introduced the word, but who had for many years discontinued it as a distinctive appellation, may well feel themselves called upon to resume it, if by doing so they can hope to contribute anything towards rescuing it from this utter degradation. The creed, which accepts as the foundation of morals utility, or the greatest happiness principle, holds that actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness. By happiness is intended pleasure in the absence of pain, by unhappiness, pain, and the privation of pleasure. To give a clearer view of the moral standard set up by the theory, much more requires to be said. In particular, what things it includes in the ideas of pain and pleasure, and to what extent this is left an open question. But these supplementary explanations do not affect the theory of life on which this theory of morality is grounded, namely, that pleasure and freedom from pain are the only things desirable as ends, and that all desirable things, which are as numerous in the utilitarian as in any other scheme, are desirable either for pleasure inherent in themselves or as a means to the promotion of pleasure and the prevention of pain. Now such a theory of life excites in many minds, and among them, in some of the most estimable and feeling and purpose, inveterate dislike. To suppose that life has, as they express it, no higher end than pleasure, no better and nobler object of desire and pursuit, they designate as utterly mean and groveling, as a doctrine where the only of swine, to whom the followers of Epicurus were, at a very early period, contemptuously likened, and modern holders of the doctrine are occasionally made the subject of equally polite comparisons by its German, French, and English assailants. When thus attacked, the Epicurians have always answered that it is not they, but their accusers, who represent human nature in a degrading light, since the accusation supposes human beings to be capable of no pleasures, except those of which swine are capable. If this supposition were true, the charge could not be gained, said, but would then be no longer an imputation, for if the sources of pleasure were precisely the same to human beings and to swine, the rule of life which is good enough for the one would be good enough for the other. The comparison of the Epicurian life to that of beasts is felt as degrading precisely because of beast pleasures do not satisfy a human being's conceptions of happiness. Human beings have faculties more elevated than the animal appetites, and, when once made conscious of them, do not regard anything as happiness which does not include their gratification. I do not indeed consider the Epicurians to have been by any means faultless in drawing out their scheme of consequences from the utilitarian principle. To do this in any sufficient manner, many stoic as well as Christian elements, require to be included. But there is no known Epicurian theory of life which does not assign to the pleasures of the intellect of the feelings and imagination, and of the moral sentiments a much higher value as pleasures than to those of mere sensation. It must be admitted, however, that utilitarian writers in general have placed the superiority of mental over bodily pleasures chiefly in the greater permanency, safety, uncostliness, etc. of the former. That is, in their circumstantial advantages, rather than in their intrinsic nature. And on all these points, utilitarians have fully proved their case, but they might have taken the other, and as it may be called, higher ground with entire consistency. It is quite compatible with the principle of utility to recognize the fact that some kinds of pleasure are more desirable and more valuable than others. It would be absurd that, while in estimating all other things quality is considered as well as quantity, the estimation of pleasure should be supposed to depend on quantity alone. If I am asked what I mean by difference of quality in pleasures, or what makes one pleasure more valuable than another, merely as a pleasure, except it's being greater in amount, there is but one possible answer. Of two pleasures, if there be one to which all or almost all who have experience of both give a decided preference, irrespective of any feeling of moral obligation to prefer it, that is the more desirable pleasure. If one of the two is by those who are competently acquainted with both, placed so far above the other that they prefer it, even though knowing it to be attended with a greater amount of discontent, and would not resign it for any quantity of the other pleasure which their nature is capable of, we are justified in ascribing to the preferred enjoyment a superiority in quality so far outweighing quantity as to render it in comparison of small account. Now it is an unquestionable fact that those who are equally acquainted with and equally capable of appreciating and enjoying both do give a most marked preference to the manner of existence which employs their higher faculties. Few human creatures would consent to be changed into any of the lower animals for a promise of the fullest allowance of a beast's pleasures. No intelligent human being would consent to be a fool. No instructed person would be an ignoramus. No person of feeling and conscience would be selfish and base. Even though they should be persuaded that the fool, the dunce, or the rascal is better satisfied with his lot than they are with theirs, they would not resign what they possess more than he for the most complete for the most complete satisfaction of all the desires which they have in common with him. If they ever fancy they would, it is only in cases of unhappiness so extreme that to escape from it they would exchange their lot for almost any other however undesirable in their own eyes. A being of higher faculties requires more to make him happy, is capable, probably, of more acute suffering, and certainly accessible to it at more points than one of an inferior type. But in spite of these liabilities he can never really wish to sink into what he feels to be a lower grade of existence. We may give what explanation we please of this unwillingness. We may attribute it to pride, a name which is given indiscriminately to some of the most and to some of the least estimable feelings of which mankind are capable. We may refer it to the love of liberty and personal independence, an appeal to which was with the Stoics one of the most effective means for the inculcation of it, to the love of power, or to the love of excitement, both of which do really enter into and contribute to it. But its most appropriate appellation is a sense of dignity which all human beings possess in one form or other, and in some, though by no means in exact proportion to their higher faculties, and which is so essential a part of the happiness of those in whom it is strong that nothing which conflicts with it could be otherwise than momentarily an object of desire to them. However it supposes that this preference takes place at a sacrifice of happiness, that the superior being, in anything like equal circumstances, is not happier than the inferior, confounds the two very different ideas of happiness and content. It is indisputable that the being whose capacities of enjoyment are low has the greatest chance of having them fully satisfied, and a highly endowed being will always feel that any happiness which he can look for as the world is constituted is imperfect. But he can learn to bear its imperfections if they are at all bearable, and they will not make him envy the being who is indeed unconscious of the imperfections, but only because he feels not at all the good which those imperfections qualify. It is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied, better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied. And if the fool or the pig are of a different opinion, it is because they only know their own side of the question. The other party to the comparison knows both sides. It may be objected that many who are capable of the higher pleasures occasionally under the influence of temptation postpone them to the lower. But this is quite compatible with the full appreciation of the intrinsic superiority of the higher. Men often, from infirmity of character, make their election for the nearer good, though they know it to be the less valuable. And this no less when the choice is between two bodily pleasures than when it is between bodily and mental. They pursue sensual indulgences to the injury of health, though perfectly aware that health is the greater good. It may be further objected that those who begin with youthful enthusiasm for everything noble, as they advance in years, sink into indolence and selfishness. But I do not believe that those who undergo this very common change voluntarily choose the lower description of pleasures in preference to the higher. I believe that, before they devote themselves exclusively to the one, they have already become incapable of the other. Capacity for the nobler feelings is in most natures a very tender plant easily killed, not only by hostile influences, but by mere want of sustenance. And in the majority of young persons it speedily dies away of the occupations to which their position in life is devoted them, and the society into which it has thrown them, are not favourable to keeping that higher capacity in exercise. Men lose their high aspirations as they lose their intellectual tastes, because they have not time or opportunity for indulging them, and they addict themselves to inferior pleasures, not because they deliberately prefer them, but because they are either the only ones to which they have access, or the only ones which they are any longer capable of enjoying. It may be questioned whether anyone who has remained equally susceptible to both classes of pleasures ever knowingly and calmly preferred the lower, though many in all ages have broken down in an ineffectual attempt to combine both. From this verdict of the only competent judges, I apprehend there can be no appeal, on a question which is the best worth having of two pleasures, or which of two modes of existence is the most grateful to the feelings, apart from its moral attributes and from its consequences. The judgment of these who are qualified by knowledge of both, or if they differ, that of the majority among them, must be admitted as final. And there needs be the less hesitation to accept this judgment respecting the quality of pleasures, since there is no other tribunal to be referred to, even on the question of quantity. What means are there of determining which is the acutist of two pains, or the intensest of two pleasurable sensations, except the general suffrage of those who are familiar with both? Neither pains nor pleasures are homogenous, and pain is always heterogeneous with pleasure. What is there to decide whether a particular pleasure is worth purchasing at the cost of a particular pain, except the feelings and judgment of the experienced, when therefore those feelings and judgment declare the pleasures derived from the higher faculties to be preferable in kind, apart from the question of intensity, to those of which the animal nature disjoined from the higher faculties is susceptible? They are entitled on this subject to the same regard. I have dwelt on this point as being part of a perfectly just conception of utility or happiness considered as the directive rule of human conduct, but it is by no means an indispensable condition to the acceptance of the utilitarian standard, for that standard is not the agent's own greatest happiness, but the greatest amount of happiness altogether. And if it may possibly be doubted whether a noble character is always the happier for its nobleness, there can be no doubt that it makes other people happier, and that the world in general is immensely a gainer by it. Utilitarianism, therefore, could only attain its end by the general cultivation of nobleness of character, even if each individual were only benefited by the nobleness of others, and his own, so far as happiness is concerned, were a sheer deduction from the benefit. But the bare enunciation of such an absurdity as this last renders refutation superfluous, according to the greatest happiness principle, as above explained. The ultimate end, with reference to and for the sake of which all other things are desirable, whether we are considering our own good or that of other people, is in existence exempt as far as possible from pain and as rich as possible in enjoyments, both in point of quantity and quality. The test of quality and the rule for measuring it against quantity being the preference felt by those who, in their opportunities of experience, to which must be added their habits of self-consciousness and self-observation are best furnished with a means of comparison. This, being according to the utilitarian opinion, the end of human action, is necessarily also the standard of morality, which may accordingly be defined the rules and precepts for human conduct, by the observance of which an existence such as has been described might be to the greatest extent possible secured to all mankind, and not to them only, but so far as the nature of things admits to the whole sentient creation. Against this doctrine, however, arises another class of objectors who say that happiness, in any form, cannot be the rational purpose of human life in action because in the first place it is unattainable, and they contemptuously ask, what right hast thou to be happy? A question which Mr. Carlisle clinches by the addition, what right, a short time ago, hats thou even to be? Next, they say that men can do without happiness, that all noble human beings have felt this, and could not have become noble, but by learning the lesson of Entsagen, or renunciation, which lesson thoroughly learned and submitted to, they affirm to be the beginning and necessary condition of all virtue. The first of these objections would go to the root of the matter, were it well founded. For if no happiness is to be had at all by human beings, the attainment of it cannot be the end of morality, or of any rational conduct. Though, even in that case, something might still be said for the utilitarian theory, since utility includes not solely the pursuit of happiness, but the prevention or mitigation of unhappiness, and if the former aim become miracle, there will be all the greater scope and more imperative need for the latter, so long at least as mankind think fit to live, and do not take refuge, and the simultaneous act of suicide recommended under certain conditions by Novalis. When, however, it is thus positively asserted to be impossible that human life should be happy, the assertion, if not something like a verbal quibble, is at least an exaggeration. If by happiness be meant a continuity of highly pleasurable excitement, it is evident enough that this is impossible. A state of exalted pleasure lasts only moments, or in some cases, and with some intermissions, hours or days, and is the occasional brilliant flash of enjoyment, not its permanent and steady flame. Of this, the philosophers who have taught that happiness is the end of life are as fully aware as those who taunt them. The happiness which they meant was not a life of rapture, but moments of such, and in existence made up of few and transitory pains, many and various pleasures, with the decided predominance of the active over the passive, and having as the foundation of the whole not to expect more from life than it is capable of bestowing. A life thus composed to those who have been fortunate enough to obtain it has always appeared worthy of the name of happiness, and such in existence is even now the lot of many during some considerable portion of their lives. The present wretched education and wretched social arrangements are the only real hindrance to it being attainable by almost all. The objectors perhaps may doubt whether human beings, if taught to consider happiness as the end of life, would be satisfied with such a moderate share of it. But the great numbers of mankind have been satisfied with much less. The main constituents of a satisfied life appear to be, too, either of which, by itself, is often found sufficient for the purpose. Tranquility and excitement. With much tranquility, many find that they can be content with very little pleasure. With much excitement, many can reconcile themselves to a considerable quantity of pain. There is assuredly no inherent impossibility of enabling even the mass of mankind to unite both, since the two are so far from being incompatible that they are in natural alliance the prolongation of either being a preparation for, and exciting a wish for, the other. It is only those in whom indolence amounts to a vice that do not desire excitement after an interval of repose. It is only those in whom the need of excitement is a disease that feel the tranquility which follows excitement, dull, and insipid, instead of pleasurable, in direct proportion to the excitement which preceded it. When people who are tolerably fortunate in their outward lot do not find in life sufficient enjoyment to make it valuable to them, the cause generally is caring for nobody but themselves. To those who have neither public nor private affections, the excitements of life are much curtailed, and in any case dwindle in value as the time approaches when all selfish interests must be terminated by death. While those who leave after them objects of personal affection, and especially those who have also cultivated a fellow feeling with the collective interests of mankind, retain as lively an interest in life on the eve of death as in the vigor of youth and health. Next to selfishness, the principal cause which makes life unsatisfactory is want of mental cultivation. A cultivated mind, I do not mean that of a philosopher, but any mind to which the fountains of knowledge have been opened and which has been taught in any tolerable degree to exercise its faculties, finds sources of inexhaustible interest in all that surrounds it, in the objects of nature, the achievements of art, the imaginations of poetry, the incidents of history, the ways of mankind past and present, and their prospects in the future. It is possible, indeed, to become indifferent to all this, and that too without having exhausted a thousandth part of it, but only when one has had from the beginning no moral or human interest in these things, and has sought in them only the gratification of curiosity. Now there is absolutely no reason in the nature of things why an amount of mental culture sufficient to give an intelligent interest in these objects of contemplation should not be the inheritance of everyone born in a civilized country. As little is there any inherent necessity that any human being should be a selfish egotist, devoid of every feeling or care, but those which center in his own miserable individuality. Something far superior to this is sufficiently common even now to give ample earnest of what the human species may be made. Genuine private affections and a sincere interest in the public good are possible, though in unequal degrees, to every rightly brought up human being. In a world in which there is so much to interest, so much to enjoy, and so much also to correct and improve, everyone who has this moderate amount of moral and intellectual requisites is capable of an existence which may be called enviable, and unless such a person, through bad laws or subjection to the will of others, is denied the liberty to use the sources of happiness within his reach, he will not fail to find this enviable existence. If he escapes the positive evils of life, the great sources of physical and mental suffering, such as indigence, disease, and the unkindness, worthlessness, or premature loss of objects of affection, the main stress of the problem lies therefore in the contest with these calamities from which it is a rare good fortune entirely to escape, which, as things now are, cannot be aviated, and often cannot be, in any material degree, mitigated. Yet no one who's opinion deserves a moment's consideration can doubt that most of the great positive evils of the world are in themselves removable, and will, if human affairs continue to improve, be in the end reduced within neural limits. Poverty, in any sense implying suffering, may be completely extinguished by the wisdom of society combined with the good sense and providence of individuals. Even that most intractable of enemies, disease, may be indefinitely reduced in dimensions by good physical and moral education, and proper control of noxious influences, while the progress of science holds out a promise for the future of still more direct conquests over this detestable foe, and every advance in that direction relieves us from some, not only of the chances which cut short of our own lives, but what concerns us still more, which deprive us of those in whom our happiness is wrapped up. As for vicissitudes of fortune and other disappointments connected with worldly circumstances, these are principally the effect either of gross imprudence, of ill-regulated desires, or of bad or imperfect social institutions. All the grand sources in short of human suffering are, in a great degree, many of them almost entirely conquerable by human care and effort, and though their removal is grievously slow, though a long succession of generations will perish in the breach before the conquest is completed, and this world becomes all that, if will and knowledge were not wanting, it might easily be made. Yet every mind sufficiently intelligent and generous to bear apart, however small and inconspicuous, in the endeavor, will draw a noble enjoyment from the contest itself, which he would not for any bribe in the form of selfish indulgence, consent to be without, and this leads to the true estimation of what is said by the objectors considering the possibility and the obligation of learning to do without happiness. Unquestionably it is possible to do without happiness. It is done involuntarily by 1920th of mankind, even in those parts of our present world, which are least deep in barbarism, and it often has to be done voluntarily by the hero or the martyr for the sake of something which he prizes more than his individual happiness. But this something, what is it, unless the happiness of others, or some of the requisites of happiness? It is no will to be capable of resigning entirely one's own portion of happiness or chances of it. But after all, this self-sacrifice must be for some end, it is not its own end, and if we are told that its end is not happiness but virtue, which is better than happiness, I ask, would the sacrifice be made if the hero or martyr did not believe that it would earn for others immunity from similar sacrifices? Would it be made if he thought that his renunciation of happiness for himself would produce no fruit for any of his fellow creatures, but to make their lot like his, and place them also in the condition of persons who have renounced happiness? All honor to those who can abnegate for themselves the personal enjoyment of life, when by such renunciation they contribute worthily to increase the amount of happiness in the world. But he who does it, or professes to do it for any other purpose, is no more deserving of admiration than the ascetic mounted on his pillar. He may be an inspiring proof of what men can do, but assuredly not an example of what they should. End. Section 1. Chapter 2. This recording is in the public domain. Utilitarianism. Chapter 2. Section 2. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Utilitarianism. By John Stuart Mill. Chapter 2. What utilitarianism is. Section 2. Though it is only in a very imperfect state of the world's arrangements that anyone can best serve the happiness of others by the absolute sacrifice of his own, yet, so long as the world is in that imperfect state, I fully acknowledge that the readiness to make such a sacrifice is the highest virtue which can be found in man. I will add that in this condition of the world, paradoxical as the assertion may be, conscious ability to do without happiness gives the best prospect of realizing such happiness as is attainable. For nothing, except that consciousness which can raise a person above the chances of life by making him feel that, let fate and fortune do their worst, they have not power to subdue him, which once felt frees him from excess of anxiety concerning the evils of life and enables him, like many a stoic in the worst times of the Roman Empire, to cultivate in tranquility the sources of satisfaction accessible to him without concerning himself about the uncertainty of the duration any more than about their inevitable end. Meanwhile, let utilitarians never cease to claim the morality of self-devotion as a possession which belongs by as good a right to them as either to the stoic or to the transcendentalist. The utilitarian morality does recognize in human beings the power of sacrificing their own greatest good for the good of others. It only refuses to admit that the sacrifice is itself a good. A sacrifice which does not increase or tend to increase the sum total of happiness, it considers as wasted. The only self-reunciation which it applauds is devotion to the happiness or to some of the means of happiness of others, either of mankind collectively or of individuals within the limits imposed by the collective interests of mankind. I must again repeat what the assailants of utilitarianism seldom have the justice to acknowledge, that the happiness which forms the utilitarian standard of what is right in conduct is not the agent's own happiness, but that of all concerned. As between his own happiness and that of others, utilitarianism requires him to be as strictly impartial as a disinterested and benevolent spectator. In the Golden Rule of Jesus of Nazareth, we read the complete spirit of the ethics of utility. To do as you would be done by, and to love your neighbour as yourself, constitute the ideal perfection of utilitarian morality. As the means of making the nearest approach to this ideal, utility would enjoin first that laws and social arrangements should place the happiness, or as speaking practically it may be called, the interest of every individual as nearly as possible in harmony with the interest of the whole. And secondly, that education and opinion, which have so vast power over human character, should so use that power as to establish in the mind of every individual an indissoluble association between his own happiness and the good of the whole, especially between his own happiness and the practice of such modes of conduct, negative and positive, as regard for the universal happiness prescribes, so that not only he may be unable to conceive the possibility of happiness to himself consistently with conduct opposed to the general good, but also that a direct impulse to promote the general good may be in every individual one of the habitual motives of action and the sentiments connected therewith may fill a large and prominent place in every human being's sentient existence. If the impuners of the utilitarian morality represented it to their own minds in this its true character, I know not what recommendation possessed by any other morality they could possibly affirm to be wanting to it. What more beautiful or more exalted developments of human nature any other ethical system can be supposed to foster, or what springs of action not accessible to the utilitarian, such systems rely on for giving effect to their mandates. The objectors to utilitarianism cannot always be charged with representing it in a discreditable light, on the contrary. Those among them who entertain anything like a just idea of its disinterested character sometimes find fault with its standard as being too high for humanity. They say it is exacting too much to require that people shall always act from the inducement of promoting the general interest of society. But this is to mistake the very meaning of a standard of morals and confound the rule of action with the motive of it. It is the business of ethics to tell us what are our duties, or by what test we may know them. But no system of ethics requires that the sole motive of all we do shall be a feeling of duty. On the contrary, ninety-nine hundredths of all our actions are done from other motives, and rightly so done if the rule of duty does not condemn them. It is the more unjust to utilitarianism that this particular misapprehension should be made a ground of objection to it. Inasmuch as utilitarian moralists have gone beyond almost all others in affirming that the motive has nothing to do with the morality of the action, though much with the worth of the agent. He who saves a fellow creature from drowning does what is morally right, whether his motive be duty or the hope of being paid for his trouble. He who betrays the friend that trusts him is guilty of a crime, even if his object be to serve another friend to whom he is under greater obligations. Footnote. An opponent whose intellectual and moral fairness it is a pleasure to acknowledge, the reverend J. Llewellyn Davies, has objected to this passage, saying, Surely the rightness or wrongness of saving a man from drowning does depend very much upon the motive with which it is done. Suppose that a tyrant, when his enemy jumped into the sea to escape from him, saved him from drowning simply in order that he might inflict upon him more exquisite tortures. Would it tend to clearness to speak of that rescue as a morally right action? Or suppose again, according to one of the stock illustrations of ethical inquiries, that a man betrayed a trust received from a friend because the discharge of it would fatally injure that friend himself or someone belonging to him? Would utilitarianism compel one to call the betrayal a crime as much as if it had been done from the meanest motive? I submit that he who saves another from drowning in order to kill him by torture afterwards does not differ only in motive from him who does the same thing from duty or benevolence. The act itself is different. The rescue of the man is, in the case supposed, only the necessary first step of an act far more atrocious than leaving him to drown would have been. Had Mr. Davies said, the rightness or wrongness of saving a man from drowning does depend very much not upon the motive but upon the intention. No utilitarian would have differed from him. Mr. Davies, by an oversight too common not to be quite venial, has in this case confounded the very different ideas of motive and intention. There is no point which utilitarian thinkers and bentham preeminently have taken more pains to illustrate than this. The morality of the action depends entirely upon the intention, that is, upon what the agent wills to do, but the motive, that is, the feeling which makes him will so to do, if it makes no difference in the act, makes none in the morality, though it makes a great difference in our moral estimation of the agent, especially if it indicates a good or a bad habitual disposition, a bent of character, from which useful or from which hurtful actions are likely to arise. End footnote. But to speak only of actions done from the motive of duty and in direct obedience to principle. It is a misapprehension of the utilitarian mode of thought to conceive it as implying that people should fix their minds upon so wide a generality as the world, or society at large. The great majority of good actions are intended not for the benefit of the world, but for that of individuals, of which the good of the world is made up. And the thoughts of the most virtuous man need not on these occasions travel beyond the particular person's concern, except so far as is necessary to assure himself that in benefiting them, he is not violating the rights, that is, the legitimate and authorized expectations of anyone else. The multiplication of happiness is, according to the utilitarian ethics, the object of virtue. The occasions on which any person except one in a thousand has it in his power to do this on an extended scale. In other words, to be a public benefactor are but exceptional. And on these occasions alone is he called on to consider public utility. In every other case, private utility, the interest or happiness of some few persons, is all he has to attend to. Those alone, the influence of whose actions extends to society in general, need concern themselves habitually about so large an object. In the case of abstinences indeed, of things which people forebear to do for moral considerations, though the consequences, in the particular case, might be beneficial, it would be unworthy of an intelligent agent not to be consciously aware that the action is of a class which, if practiced generally, would be generally injurious, and that this is the ground of the obligation to abstain from it. The amount of regard for the public interest implied in this recognition is no greater than as demanded by every system of morals, for they all enjoying to abstain from whatever is manifestly pernicious to society. The same considerations dispose of another reproach against the doctrine of utility, founded on a still, grosser misconception of the purpose of a standard of morality and of the very meaning of the words right and wrong. It is often affirmed that utilitarianism renders men cold and unsympathizing, that it chills their moral feelings towards individuals, that it makes them regard only the dry and hard consideration of the consequences of actions, not taking into their moral estimate the qualities from which those actions emanate. If the assertion means that they do not allow their judgment respecting the rightness or wrongness of an action to be influenced by their opinion of the qualities of the person who does it, this is a complaint not against utilitarianism, but against any standard of morality at all. For certainly, no known ethical standard decides an action to be good or bad because it is done by a good or bad man, still less, because done by an amiable, a brave, or a benevolent man, or the contrary. These considerations are relevant not to the estimation of actions, but of persons. And there is nothing in the utilitarian theory inconsistent with the fact that there are other things which interest us in persons besides the rightness and wrongness of their actions. The Stoics indeed, with the paradoxical misuse of language which was part of their system, and by which they strove to raise themselves above all concern about anything but virtue, were fond of saying that he who has that has everything, that he and only he is rich, is beautiful, is a king. But no claim of this description is made for the virtuous man by the utilitarian doctrine. Utilitarians are quite aware that there are other desirable possessions and qualities besides virtue, and are perfectly willing to allow to all of them their full worth. They are also aware that a right action does not necessarily indicate a virtuous character, and that actions which are blameable often proceed from qualities entitled to praise. When this is apparent in any particular case, it modifies their estimation, not certainly of the act, but of the agent. I grant that they are, notwithstanding, of opinion that in the long run the best proof of good character is good actions, and resolutely refuse to consider any mental disposition as good, of which the predominant tendency is to produce bad conduct. This makes them unpopular with many people. But it is an unpopularity which they must share with everyone who regards the distinction between right and wrong in a serious light. And their approach is not one which a conscientious utilitarian need be anxious to repel. If no more be meant by the objection than that many utilitarians look on the morality of actions as measured by the utilitarian standards, with too exclusive a regard, and do not lay sufficient stress upon the other beauties of character which go towards making a human being lovable or admirable, this may be admitted. Utilitarians who have cultivated their moral feelings, but not their sympathies, nor their artistic perceptions, do not fall into this mistake. And so do all other moralists under the same conditions. What can be said in excuse for other moralists is equally available for them, namely, that if there is to be any error it is better that it should be on that side. As a matter of fact, we may affirm that among utilitarians, as among adherents of other systems, there is every imaginable degree of rigidity and of laxity in the application of their standard. Some are even puritanically rigorous, while others are as indulgent as can possibly be by sinner or by sentimentalist. But, on the whole, a doctrine which brings prominently forward the interest that mankind have in the repression and prevention of conduct which violates the moral law is likely to be inferior to no other in turning the sanctions of opinion against such violations. It is true. The question, what does violate the moral law, is one on which those who recognize different standards of morality are likely now and then to differ. But difference of opinion on moral questions was not first introduced into the world by utilitarianism. While that doctrine does supply, if not always an easy, at all events a tangible and intelligible mode of deciding such differences, it may not be superfluous to notice a few more of the common misapprehensions of utilitarian ethics, even those which are so obvious and gross that it might appear impossible for any persons of candor and intelligence to fall into them. Since persons, even of considerable mental endowment, often give themselves so little trouble to understand the bearings of any opinion against which they entertain a prejudice, and men are, in general, so little conscious of this voluntary ignorance as a defect that the vulgarist misunderstandings of ethical doctrines are continually met with in the deliberate writings of persons of the greatest pretensions, both to high principle and to philosophy. We not uncommonly hear the doctrine of utility invade against as a godless doctrine. If it be necessary to say anything at all against so mere an assumption, we may say that the question depends upon what idea we have formed of the moral character of the deity. If it be a true belief that God desires above all things the happiness of his creatures, and that this was his purpose in their creation, utility is not only not a godless doctrine, but more profoundly religious than any other. If it is meant that utilitarianism does not recognize the revealed will of God as the supreme law of morals, I answer that a utilitarian who believes in the perfect goodness and wisdom of God necessarily believes that whatever God has thought fit to reveal on the subject of morals must fulfill the requirements of utility in a supreme degree. But others besides utilitarians have been of opinion that the Christian revelation was intended and is fitted to inform the hearts and minds of mankind with a spirit which should enable them to find for themselves what is right and incline them to do it when found, rather than to tell them, except in a very general way, what it is, and that we need a doctrine of ethics carefully followed out to interpret to us the will of God, whether this opinion is correct or not, it is superfluous here to discuss, since whatever aid religion either natural or revealed can afford to ethical investigation is as open to the utilitarian more or less as to any other. He can use it as the testimony of God to the usefulness or hurtfulness of any given course of action by as good a right as others can use it for the indication of a transcendental law having no connection with usefulness or with happiness. Again, utility is often summarily stigmatized as an immoral doctrine by giving it the name of expediency and taking advantage of the popular use of that term to contrast it with principle. But the expedient in the sense in which it is opposed to the right generally means that which is expedient for the particular interest of the agent himself as when a minister sacrifices the interests of his country to keep himself in place. When it means anything better than this, it means that which is expedient for some immediate object, some temporary purpose, but which violates a rule whose observance is expedient in a much higher degree. The expedient in this sense instead of being the same thing with the useful is a branch of the hurtful. Thus it would often be expedient for the purpose of getting over some momentary embarrassment or attaining some object immediately useful to ourselves or others to tell a lie. But in as much as the cultivation in ourselves of a sensitive feeling on the subject of veracity is one of the most useful and the enfeeblement of that feeling. One of the most hurtful things to which our conduct can be instrumental and in as much as any even unintentional deviation from truth does that much toward weakening the trustworthiness of human assertion which is not only the principle support of all present social well-being but the insufficiency of which does more than any one thing that can be named to keep back civilization, virtue, everything on which human happiness on the largest scale depends. We feel that the violation for a present advantage of a rule of such transcendent expediency is not expedient and that he who for the sake of convenience to himself or to some other individual does what depends on him to deprive mankind of the good and inflict upon them the evil involved in the greater or less reliance which they can place in each other's words acts the part of one of their worst enemies. Yet that even this rule sacred as it is admits of possible exceptions is acknowledged by all moralists the chief of which is when the withholding of some fact as of information from a malefactor or of bad news from a person dangerously ill would save an individual especially an individual other than oneself from great and unmerited evil and when the withholding can only be affected by denial but in order that the exception may not extend itself beyond the need and may have the least possible effect in weakening reliance on veracity it ought to be recognized and if possible its limits defined and if the principle of utility is good for anything it must be good for weighing these conflicting utilities against one another and marking out the region within which one or the other preponderates again defenders of utility often find themselves called upon to reply to such objections as this that there is not time previous to action for calculating and weighing the effects of any line of conduct on the general happiness this is exactly as if anyone were to say that it is impossible to guide our conduct by Christianity because there is not time on every occasion on which anything has to be done to read through the old and new testaments the answer to the objection is that there has been ample time namely the whole past duration of the human species during all that time mankind have been learning by experience the tendencies of actions on which experience all the prudence as well as all the morality of life are dependent people talk as if the commencement of this course of experience had hitherto been put off and as if at the moment when some man feels tempted to meddle with the property or life of another he had to begin considering for the first time whether murder and theft are injurious to human happiness even then I do not think that he would find the question very puzzling but at all events the matter is now done to his hand it is truly a whimsical supposition that if mankind were agreed in considering utility to be the test of morality they would remain without any agreement as to what is useful and would take no measures for having their notions on the subject taught to the young and enforced by law and opinion there is no difficulty in proving any ethical standard whatever to work ill if we suppose universal idiocy to be conjoined with it but on any hypothesis short of that mankind must by this time have acquired positive beliefs as to the effects of some actions on their happiness and the beliefs which have thus come down are the rules of morality for the multitude and for the philosopher until he has succeeded in finding better that philosophers might easily do this even now on many subjects that the received code of ethics is by no means of divine right and that mankind still have much to learn as to the effects of actions on the general happiness I admit or rather earnestly maintain the corollaries from the principle of utility like the precepts of every practical art admit of indefinite improvement and in a progressive state of the human mind their improvement is perpetually going on but to consider the rules of morality as improvable is one thing to pass over the intermediate generalization entirely and endeavor to test each individual action directly by the first principle is another it is a strange notion that the acknowledgement of a first principle is inconsistent with the admission of secondary ones to inform a traveler respecting the place of his ultimate destination is not to forbid the use of landmarks and direction posts on the way the proposition that happiness is the end and aim of morality does not mean that no road ought to be laid down to that goal or that person's going thither should not be advised to take one direction rather than another men really ought to leave off talking a kind of nonsense on this subject which they would neither talk nor listen to on other matters of practical concern meant nobody argues that the art of navigation is not founded on astronomy because sailors cannot wait to calculate the nautical almanac being rational creatures they go to see with it ready calculated and all rational creatures go out upon the sea of life with their minds made up on the common questions of right and wrong as well as on many of the far more difficult questions of wise and foolish and this as long as foresight is a human quality is to be presumed they will continue to do whatever we adopt as the fundamental principle of morality we require subordinate principles to apply it by the impossibility of doing without them being common to all systems can afford no argument against anyone in particular but gravely to argue as if no such secondary principles could be had and as if mankind had remained till now and always must remain without drawing any general conclusions from the experience of human life is as high a pitch I think as absurdity has ever reached in philosophical controversy the remainder of the stock arguments against utilitarianism mostly consist in lying to its charge the common infirmities of human nature and the general difficulties which embarrass conscientious persons in shaping their course through life we are told that a utilitarian will be apt to make his own particular case an exception to moral rules and when under temptation will see a utility in the breach of a rule greater than he will be able to see in its observance but is utility the only creed which is able to furnish us with excuses for evil doing and means of cheating our own conscience they are afforded in abundance by all doctrines which recognize as a fact and morals the existence of conflicting considerations which all doctrines do that have been believed by sane persons it is not the fault of any creed but of the complicated nature of human affairs that rules of conduct cannot be so framed as to require no exceptions and that hardly any kind of action can safely be laid down as either always obligatory or always condemnable there is no ethical creed which does not temper the rigidity of its laws by giving a certain latitude under the moral responsibility of the agent for accommodation to peculiarities of circumstances and under every creed at the opening thus made self deception and dishonest casuistry get in there exists no moral system under which there do not arise unequivocal cases of conflicting obligation these are the real difficulties the naughty points both in the theory of ethics and in the conscientious guidance of personal conduct they overcome practically with greater or with less success according to the intellect and virtue of the individual but it can hardly be pretended that anyone will be the less qualified for dealing with them from possessing an ultimate standard to which conflicting rights and duties can be referred if utility is the ultimate source of moral obligations utility may be invoked to decide between them when their demands are incompatible though the application of the standard may be difficult it is better than none at all while in other systems the moral laws all claiming independent authority there is no common umpire entitled to interfere between them their claims to precedence over one another rest on little better than sophistry and unless determined as they generally are by the unacknowledged influence of consideration of utility afford a free scope for the action of personal desires and partialities we must remember that only in these cases of conflict between secondary principles is it requisite that first principles should be appealed to there is no case of moral obligation in which some secondary principle is not involved and if only one there can seldom be any real doubt which one it is in the mind of any person by whom the principle itself is recognized and section 2 chapter 2 this recording is in the public domain utilitarianism chapter 3 this is a libra vox recording all libra vox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit libravox.org utilitarianism by john steward mill chapter 3 of the ultimate sanction of the principle of utility the question is often asked and properly so in regard to any supposed moral standard what is its sanction what are the motives to obey or more specifically what is the source of its obligation when does it derive its binding force it is a necessary part of moral philosophy to provide the answer to this question which though frequently assuming the shape of an objection to the utilitarian morality as if it had some special applicability to that above others really arises in regard to all standards it arises in fact whenever a person is called on to adopt a standard or refer morality to any basis on which he has not been accustomed to rest it for the customary morality that which education and opinion have consecrated is the only one which presents itself to the mind with the feeling of being in itself obligatory and when a person is asked to believe that this morality derives its obligation from some general principle round which custom has not thrown the same halo the assertion is to him a paradox the supposed corollaries seem to have a more binding force than the original theorem the superstructure seems to stand better without than with what is represented as its foundation he says to himself i feel that i'm bound not to rob or murder betray or deceive but why am i bound to promote the general happiness if my own happiness lies in something else why may i not give that the preference if the view adopted by the utilitarian philosophy of the nature of the moral sense be correct this difficulty will always present itself until the influences which form moral character have taken the same hold of the principle which they have taken of some of the consequences until by the improvement of education the feeling of unity with our fellow creatures shall be but it cannot be denied that christ intended it to be as deeply rooted in our character and to our own consciousness as completely a part of our nature as the horror of crime is in an ordinarily well brought up young person in the meantime however the difficulty has no peculiar application to the doctrine of utility but is inherent in every attempt to analyze morality and reduce it to principles which unless the principle is already in men's minds invested with as much sacredness as any of its applications always seems to divest them of a part of their sanctity the principle of utility either has or there was no reason why it might not have all the sanctions which belong to any other system of morals those sanctions are either external or internal of the external sanctions it is not necessary to speak at any length they are the hope of favor and the fear of displeasure from our fellow creatures or from the ruler of the universe along with whatever we may have of sympathy or affection for them or of love and awe of him inclining us to do his will independently of selfish consequences there is evidently no reason why all these motives for observance should not attach themselves to the utilitarian morality as completely and as powerfully as to any other indeed those of them which refer to our fellow creatures are sure to do so in proportion to the amount of general intelligence for whether there be any other ground of moral obligation than the general happiness or not men do desire happiness and however imperfect may be their own practice they desire and commend all conduct and others towards themselves by which they think their happiness is promoted with regard to the religious motive if men believe as most professed to in the goodness of god those who think that conduciveness to the general happiness is the essence or even only the criterion of good must necessarily believe that it is also that which god approves the whole force therefore of external reward and punishment whether physical or moral whether proceeding from god or from our fellow men together with all that the capacities of human nature admit of disinterested devotion to either become available to enforce the utilitarian morality in proportion as that morality is recognized and the more powerfully the more the appliances of education and general cultivation are bent to the purpose so far as to external sanctions the internal sanction of duty whatever our standard of duty may be is one in the same a feeling in our own mind a pain more or less intense a tendon on violation of duty which improperly cultivated moral natures rises in the more serious cases into shrinking from it as an impossibility this feeling when disinterested and connecting itself with a pure idea of duty and not with some particular form of it or with any of the merely accessory circumstances is the essence of conscience though in that complex phenomenon as it actually exists the simple fact is in general all encrusted over with collateral associations derived from sympathy from love and still more from fear from all the forms of religious feeling from the recollections of childhood and all of our past life from self-esteem desire of the esteem of others and occasionally even self abasement this extreme complication is i apprehend the origin of the sort of mystical character which by a tendency of the human mind of which there are many other examples is apt to be attributed to the idea of moral obligation and which leads people to believe that the idea cannot possibly attach itself to any other objects than those which by a supposed mysterious law are found in our present experience to excite it its binding force however consists in the existence of a massive feeling which must be broken through in order to do what violates our standard of right and which if we do nevertheless violate that standard will probably have to be encountered afterwards in the form of remorse whatever theory we have of the nature or origin of conscience this is what essentially constitutes it the ultimate sanction therefore of all morality external motives apart being a subjective feeling in our own minds i see nothing embarrassing to those whose standard is utility in the question what is the sanction of that particular standard we may answer the same as of all other moral standards the conscientious feelings of mankind undoubtedly this sanction has no binding efficacy on those who do not possess the feelings it appeals to but neither will these persons be more obedient to any other moral principle than to the utilitarian one on them morality of any kind has no hold but through the external sanctions meanwhile the feelings exist a fact in human nature the reality of which and the great power with which they are capable of acting on those in whom they have been duly cultivated are proved by experience no reason has ever been shown why they may not be cultivated to as great intensity in connection with the utilitarian as with any other rule of morals there is i'm aware a disposition to believe that a person who sees in moral obligation a transcendental fact an objective reality belonging to the province of things in themselves is likely to be more obedient to it than one who believes it to be entirely subjective having its seat in human consciousness only but whatever a person's opinion may be on this point of ontology the force he is really urged by is his own subjective feeling and is exactly measured by its strength no one's belief that duty is an objective reality is stronger than the belief that god is so yet the belief in god apart from the expectation of actual reward and punishment only operates on conduct through and in proportion to the subjective religious feeling the sanction so far as it is disinterested is always in the mind itself and the notion therefore of the transcendental moralists must be that the sanction will not exist in the mind unless it is believed to have its root out of the mind and that if a person is able to say to himself that which is restraining me and which is called my conscience is only a feeling in my own mind he may possibly draw the conclusion that when the feeling ceases the obligation ceases and that if he find the feeling inconvenient he may disregard it an endeavor to get rid of it but is this danger confined to the utilitarian morality does the belief that moral obligation has its seat outside the mind make the feeling of it too strong to get rid of the fact is so far otherwise that all moralists admit and lament the ease with which in the generality of minds conscience can be silenced or stifled the question the question need I obey my conscience is quite as often put to themselves by persons who never heard of the principle of utility as by its adherents those whose conscientious feelings are so weak as to allow of their asking this question if they answer it affirmatively will not do so because they believe in the transcendental theory but because of the external sanctions it is not necessary for the present purpose to decide whether the feeling of duty is innate or implanted assuming it to be innate it is an open question to what objects it naturally attaches itself for the philosophic supporters of that theory are now agreed that the intuitive perception is of principles of morality and not of the details if there be anything innate in the matter I see no reason why the feeling which is innate should not be that of regard to the pleasures and pains of others if there is any principle of morals which is intuitively obligatory I should say it must be that if so the intuitive ethics would coincide with the utilitarian and there would be no further quarrel between them even as it is the intuitive moralists though they believe that there are other intuitive moral obligations do already believe this to be one for they unanimously hold that a large portion of morality turns upon the consideration due to the interests of our fellow creatures therefore if the belief in the transcendental origin of moral obligation gives any additional efficacy to the internal sanction it appears to me that the utilitarian principle has already the benefit of it on the other hand if as is my own belief the moral feelings are not innate but acquired they are not for that reason the less natural it is natural to man to speak to reason to build cities to cultivate the ground though these are acquired faculties the moral feelings are not indeed a part of our nature in the sense of being in any perceptible degree present in all of us but this unhappily is a fact admitted by those who believe the most strenuously in their transcendental origin like the other acquired capacities above referred to the moral faculty if not a part of our nature is a natural outgrowth from it capable like them in a certain small degree of springing up spontaneously and susceptible of being brought by cultivation to a high degree of development unhappily it is also susceptible by a sufficient use of the external sanctions and of the force of early impressions of being cultivated in almost any direction so that there is hardly anything so absurd or so mischievous that it may not by means of these influences be made to act on the human mind with all the authority of conscience to doubt that the same potency might be given by the same means to the principle of utility even if it had no foundation in human nature would be flying in the face of all experience but moral associations which are wholly of artificial creation when the intellectual culture goes on yield by degrees to the dissolving force of analysis and if the feeling of duty when associated with utility would appear equally arbitrary if there were no leading department of our nature no powerful class of sentiments with which that association would harmonize which would make us feel congenial and incline us not only to foster it in others for which we have abundant interested motives but also to cherish it in ourselves if there were not in short a natural basis of sentiment for utilitarian morality it might well happen that this association also even after it had been implanted by education might be analyzed away but there is this basis of powerful natural sentiment and that it is which one wants the general happiness is recognized as the ethical standard will constitute the strength of the utilitarian morality this firm foundation is that of the social feelings of mankind the desire to be in unity with our fellow creatures which is already a powerful principle in human nature and happily one of those which tend to become stronger even without express inculcation from the influences of advancing civilization the social state is at once so natural so necessary and so habitual to man that except in some unusual circumstances or by an effort of voluntary abstraction he never conceives himself otherwise than as a member of a body and this association is riveted more and more as mankind are further removed from the state of savage independence any condition therefore which is essential to a state of society becomes more and more an inseparable part of every person's conception of the state of things which he is born into and which is the destiny of a human being now society between human beings now society between human beings except in the relation of master and slave is manifestly impossible on any other footing than that the interests of all are to be consulted society between equals can only exist on the understanding that the interests of all are to be regarded equally and since in all states of civilization every person except an absolute monarch has equals everyone is obliged to live on these terms with somebody and in every age some advances made towards a state in which it will be impossible to live permanently on other terms with anybody in this way people grow up unable to conceive as possible to them a state of total disregard of other people's interests they are under a necessity of conceiving themselves as at least abstaining from all the grosser injuries and if only for their own protection living in a state of constant protest against them they are also familiar with the fact of cooperating with others and proposing to themselves a collective not an individual interest as the aim at least for the time being of their actions so long as they are cooperating their ends are identified with those of others there is at least a temporary feeling that the interests of others are their own interests not only does all strengthening of social ties and all healthy growth of society give to each individual a stronger personal interest in practically consulting the welfare of others it also leads him to identify his feelings more and more with their good or at least with an even greater degree of practical consideration for it he comes as though instinctively to be conscious of himself as a being who of course pays regard to others the good of others becomes to him a thing naturally and necessarily to be attended to like any of the physical conditions of our existence now whatever amount of this feeling a person has he is urged by the strongest motives both of interest and of sympathy to demonstrate it and to the utmost of his power to encourage it and others and even if he has none of it himself he is as greatly interested as anyone else that others should have it consequently the smallest germs of the feeling are laid hold of and nourished by the contagion of sympathy and the influences of education and a complete web of cooperative association is woven around it by the powerful agency of the external sanctions this mode of conceiving ourselves in human life as civilization goes on is felt to be more and more natural every step in political improvement renders it more so by removing the sources of opposition of interest and leveling those inequalities of legal privilege between individuals or classes owing to which there are large portions of mankind whose happiness it is still practicable to disregard in an improving state of the human mind the influences are constantly on the increase which tend to generate in each individual a feeling of unity with all the rest which if perfect would make him never think of or desire any beneficial condition for himself and the benefits of which they are not included if we now suppose this feeling of unity to be taught as a religion and the whole force of education of institutions and of opinion directed as it once was in the case of religion to make every person grow up from infancy surrounded on all sides both by the profession and the practice of it I think that no one who can realize this conception will feel any misgiving about the sufficiency of the ultimate sanction for the happiness morality to any ethical student who finds the realization difficult I recommend as a means of facilitating it the second of messiah combs two principal works the system the politic positive I entertain the strongest objections to the system of politics and morals set forth in that treatise but I think it has super abundantly shown the possibility of giving to the service of humanity even without the aid of belief in a providence both the physical power and the social efficacy of a religion making it take hold of human life and color all thought feeling and action in a manner of which the greatest ascendancy ever exercised by any religion may be but a type and foretaste and of which the danger is not that it should be insufficient but that it should be so excessive as to interfere unduly with human freedom and individuality neither is it necessary to the feeling which constitutes the binding force of the utilitarian morality on those who recognize it to wait for those social influences which would make its obligation felt by mankind at large in the comparatively early state of human advancement in which we now live a person cannot indeed feel that entireness of sympathy with all others which would make any real discordance in the general direction of their conduct in life impossible but already a person in whom the social feeling is at all developed cannot bring himself to think of the rest of his fellow creatures as struggling rivals with him for the means of happiness whom he must desire to see defeated in their object in order that he may succeeded in his the deeply rooted conception which every individual even now as of himself as a social being tends to make him feel it one of his natural wants that there should be harmony between his feelings and aims and those of his fellow creatures if differences of opinion and of mental culture make it impossible for him to share many of their actual feelings perhaps make him denounce and defy those feelings he still needs to be conscious that his real aim and theirs do not conflict that he is not opposing himself to what they really wish for namely their own good but is on the contrary promoting it this feeling in most individuals is much inferior in strength to their selfish feelings and is often wanting altogether but to those who have it it possesses all the characters of a natural feeling it does not present itself to their minds as a superstition of education or a law despotically imposed by the power of society but as an attribute which it would not be well for them to be without this conviction is the ultimate sanction of the greatest happiness morality this it is which makes any mind of well-developed feelings work with and not against the outward motives to care for others afforded by what I have called the external sanctions and when those sanctions are wanting or act in an opposite direction constitutes in itself a powerful internal binding force in proportion to the sensitiveness and thoughtfulness of the character since few but those whose mind is a moral blank could bear to lay out their course of life on the plan of paying no regard to others except so far as their own private interest compels end chapter three this recording is in the public domain