 So, welcome everyone to this SEPHISES Life and Health Seminar session. And this year's seminar is organized by Juliette and myself. I am still partially here, at least for the seminar. The topic of the last year, we had a life and cognition seminar with Andrea. And with Juliette coming in, we had the idea of switching something to life and health, more related to philosophy of medicine. But of course it's the same track around the philosophy of biology, applied to something, or with a kind of appendix. That is, if we think of health, it's inclined to consider a social aspect of medical sciences much more strongly than we do in a philosophy of life. But in terms of what we want or what we are doing in terms of perspectives, you can consider health issues from many point of views, from many disciplines. And that is, that's one of the points of life. That's why it's getting interesting to focus on this kind of topic. Because if you start from philosophy of biology, you can think of HPS and what Charles is doing, for instance, you see that it's a slightly different perspective from philosophy of medicine. Even if medicine and biology are very related, it's okay, there is no research, it can be in series, kind of different. History of medicine is also a kind of tradition. We have a sociology of health, STS, so we will have a speaker from the sociology field. Biotics is yet another field again, right? And some bioticists are not even from philosophy, most of them are philosophers at the beginning. And recently I discovered the field of health technology assessment, the discipline in itself. And it has a very interesting connection to ethics, but most ethicists, I think, don't know how to do that. It's very technical. And of course you also have the biotics of committees, biotics of great intellectuals and so on, that is in the background of all these discussions and societal discussions. So what we are going to do in the seminar is mixing all these perspectives. And as you see, we have guests from many disciplinary horizons. We try to do that. That's a provisory program. I hope that we will stick to it, to this program. Today I am present, I myself am a philosopher, but as we've seen in the presentation, I am more and more talking about biotics, which is a kind of different interview. Next session we have a philosopher in the post-doc in philosophy. She also has a background in history. Okay, in the history of maybe only HBS, HBS Satellite, that's cool. Andrew is in K11, it was a local part, and he has already a bioticist. I don't even know, he has a training in biology, very good in biology, very good in training in biology, and then turning into a bioticist. He is a doctoral student of Chris Deans. Sarah Wheaton. The philosopher was also really strong in biotics. She is in the philosophy of science, strong and old. Kim and Brits are interesting, I don't know him personally, but I just discovered his research through papers, and he is very, very young as he was post-doc in last year, he has just been hired in India. And he is already a sociologist of health, and I am working in general genomics as well. It looks very interesting. Juliet will do the next talk, and so she is a perfect instance of a philosopher of medicine, and not of biology or whatever. David Thera will be the last speaker, because he was in Paris, but he is also a philosopher of medicine. He is back in Spain. I guess he is back in Spain. It's another story. Maybe Paris, Madrid, and all. I will discuss that later. Okay, so, whoops. For today, I am going to discuss brain organ rates and the consciousness issue. So, you know, I belong to the University of Oslo, and I applied for the status of collaborator external, and I guess I am still a brother of the status of Oslo. And this is... I am paid by the annual project, but this talk is definitely not about the project, because the project is very policy-focused, and it's a collective work, definitely not a philosophy work. So, what I am going to present here is not the output of the project, my own business on the topics that I discovered in the project, but it is going to be published in this kind of project. Okay. So, short outline. I will just present the context, the biological context, what our brain organ is exactly, of course. And I will then review the ethical issues that are raised by brain organ rates. And the core of the presentation is a kind of philosophy of science paper that I wrote, that is, it's a draft, and a philosophy of science in this issue of consciousness applied to brain organ rates. So, basically it's one paper embedded in a general review of ethical issues to see what the large stakes are in the region. So, what are organiser? Organisers are cellular cultures, three-dimensional cellular cultures that look like small organs in vitro, small in vitro organs in a petri dish, people's stem cells, and if you have good substrates, the good matrix, the cells will self-organize, stem cells will develop, because that's what stem cells do, they differentiate, they grow, they multiply, but instead of just spreading into random tissue, they will organize into some small biological systems. So, it has more physiology than just cell culture. It has more physiology than cell culture, and so scientists call them models, models of organs. Because they can take the shape, or at least some functions of organs in the body during development. So, you have many definitions today. So, one of the scientific breakthroughs behind this is the 3D structure, the three-dimensional structure, right? Because most stem cells, most cell cultures in the 50s, it's close to two-dimensional plates. So, the three-dimensional thing is very important. Because you have a three-dimensional aspect, you get something that looks like, that can look like an organ, or some sort of physical system, right? So, then you can put the stem cells as mini-organs, you can see them as mini-organs, so we can discuss this issue. So, here you are first, you have a brain organ, which is an organ made of stem cells differentiating into neural tissue. It looks like a brain development in a few weeks, this is a kidney, and this is, I guess, a lung, because it's wrong. So, it's not perfect, it's not a lung in a petri dish, of course, but it's like one organ that you wouldn't have in a lung, that is, the cells are by themselves, organizing in this kind of shape that is typical for the organ. And of course, you have organories from all kinds of organs, that can be developed from the new script of stem cells, or from other stem cells, when it comes to organ, so we have a lot of new stem cells like neural tissue. Why are they miniature organs? I mean, they're simply parts of organ, or copies of parts of organs, rather than mini or, I mean, they're not the mini version of a lung, right? No, it can be, it can be, because it has complicated structure now. Yeah, you don't have all the complicated structures, but they are tiny compared to the difference. If you do, if you want to try a lot of work, for instance, for the liver, of course, it is that you want to build the liver from scratch, but all that we can do yet is having something like that. But you have all those structures, I mean, you have many of those structures, and you have the regular organ, okay? But of course, it has to do with the shape, it's not miniature like that, right? Of course, and it's especially true for the brain. That's why the term is, we should not talk about mini organs, but most, a lot of them do. Are they supposed to be more for the whole organ, or for the parts of the brain? They are more for development, because what we model is from the epistemic. So that would be a point for a talk in epistemology, that what you model is development at the fatal stage. But the more complex you get, because you can future this for several months, the more complex you get, the closer you get to the real, mature organ, of course. And yes, also the idea is that some point, if you have a mini liver, or an organ of a liver, of a pancreas, that is a secretive insulin, so you would have a function of the adult organ to fulfill, that would be fulfilled. So it would be, but in terms of what you study, most of, in terms of just this organogenesis, right? In terms of just basic research, could be basic research on organogenesis. So it's a very recent technology, 2010s, and it's very booming since the age, right? And many, in terms of tissues, most in terms of organs that are modelled, it's chronology. And it's not only, with this technology, it's not only mini organs, but also, for instance, all embryos. If you take stem cells that can differentiate all type of tissue, you can have, let's say, embryoids, or gastroids, because gastroids are one step of the embryo development. And also, a lot of work is done on cancer. If you take stem cells from a tumor, you can have a mini tumor, like a replica of the tumor that is in the patient, and it's very important for personalized disease. So it's very, at the same time, it's booming, and it's also raising a lot of issues of standardization, circulation of laboratories, and so on. And so what do, what do, what's the use and what are the prospects of these models? But first, they are models of development for basic research. If you want to study organogenesis, especially in the crisis in developmental pathologies, because you can induce, if you induce a genetic modification in your stem cells, then you can study how the organ, how the embryo will be developed. And it's very important for human disease modeling, because we have most of this, not so much research on disease modeling based on animal models. And there is the idea that as we are using human cells, it's more genetically, it's more informative because I'm studying mice and so on. There is a very specific, very important development in personalized precision medicine. If you take organoids, not a generic cell that is going to develop pretty well, but if you take a very specific cell from a patient, tell the cell of the patient, or a tumor or cell from one tumor, then you can use this organoid as a target for toxicity tests or drug testing, so you can conduct a battery of individual tests on the organoid or the tumoroid instead of just giving the patient, for six months, tries the drug and comes back in six months. So we can put individual, we call it mini-patients, or avatars, patients avatars. Patients avatars, and you can have 20 patients avatars and you test 20 different drugs for one month, two months, and you say, OK, so right one for you is this drug. And this is very, this is fascinating. We have a work ongoing on that topic in the hybrid project. I was thinking of that, but it's not advanced. Because it's raising a lot of patients in terms of human space medicine, how do you test that? If you have a drug that is working only for one patient, how do you assess your standard of evidence? How do you decide that you can reimburse this drug? This is very complex, very complex issues. And you have one vision of regenerative medicine. Regenerative medicine is also a drug that has been derived from stem cell research. But generally, cell therapy just is injecting stem cells. But here we can have something much more technologically advanced than just injecting stem cells. Maybe we can develop something like organs, functions, plants, or parts of organs for repair, much more precisely than, and much more developed than we do with just basic stem cell therapy. And this is going to be very problematic as well. This is one in both. There is a big limit to this field. The most advanced field today is universal medicine. This one is quite far away. But it's always an issue that you see, that stem cell therapies are stimulated, and they're all going to switch to more than stem cells to, like, ordinary therapy. It's going to be very, very difficult to assess again. So, why brain organics? If you take stem cells, and if you control them, so that they develop into neural tissue, you may have brain organics. So that's one of the first pictures of brain organics that has been ever taken in the Lancaster, which was an orchestra at the time, and we did the research, and maybe it's in the paper, so it's less than 10 years ago. So you have stem cells, you give them signals so that they differentiate into neural stem cells, into neural tissue, and they got into, they take the shape of something like a brain of a number, of a couple of weeks from a couple of weeks inside. So the cells do just organize themselves so that they take shape, right? But then if you control even more precisely, so you can have models of all the brain, this would be the Lancaster methodology, but you also have models of parts of the brain, of course you can issue as a right signals, because cells differentiate by responding to the signals, chemical signals that are received in the environment, and that's part of the, so by controlling these signals you can induce the cells to differentiate into something like one part of the brain or another, right? So the forebrain is a cortex in the real stage, or the stem is subcortical structures, so you can have organoids of brain organoids of the world, or of parts of the brain, so basically it's important. So what does it look like? So basically it's a species of neural tissue, but not just flat tissue on the petri dish, it's more organized and functional, right? It's an electric activity, a few millimeters, so now the scientists, like you say, it's the size of a bee, four or five millimeters, and it's equivalent to the brain of a bee, in terms of number of connections, number of neurons. Brain of a what? Bee. A bee. So more than a mosquito, a lot more, but not still normal. But I'd say it can be maintained in the future for years. You can have your own petri of neural tissue, an electric activity for one year or more, in the petri dish. And you have certain limits to the development, but it's not clear exactly where the limits are, because the field is moving very fast. So for instance, for the first year of the technology, there was a theory that the tissue is not as colorized, so you don't have the brain's fortune because you have the blood flow, the blood flow is irrigating the neurons, so you don't have this in these kind of structures. So it's a limit, of course, and inside the ball of cells that you see here, we have electrodes because we don't have those cells, they're not flat. So some say that for the first years of the technology, this would be a definitive limit. We are not going to go over five millimeters because you have no blood flow. But then it turns out that maybe we can have an organoid of vasculature and we can connect them, or we can develop them on other structures so that they can be irrigated. So maybe this wasn't a problem, but I guess it's almost admitted. So two years ago it was impossible to develop, but now it's kind of already perceived as a past. And this is an interesting thing for the students. There is almost no, as I said, sky is the limit. The sky is advancing very fast and the limit of one day is that, maybe the year after it's going to come. And that's why it's very, particularly it's very problematic. And for instance, recent enhancements include, as I said, assemblies. Assemblies of organoids. You can, if you put them together, they will connect because it's still developing cells like in the number here. And you know, for instance, in the developing brain we have projections, no-nonsense connections that are going to be, that are shaped during the development. So if you put two brain organoids together, they will connect and they will grow together. So using this kind of strategy it will overcome the limit in size or the limit in terms of capacity You can get a more and more complex physical system. So parts of the brain can be connected together because you can get several brain organoids into a kind of more realistic brain. Or you can connect a brain organoid to a heart, to a muscle, and this has been done in this work. You have a brain organoid and you have a muscle organoid and if you put them together, they grow connections and then if you stimulate the brain organoid it will contract on the cell. Or you can connect them to a synthetic body, that's what's a lab called medium brain connecting to a robot. You say that it will be one way of overcoming this kind of limitation. And also another problematic entity are chimeras. Chimeras is when we are mixing human cells with animal cells. So we have organisms that are mixed from at the top at the same time human cells and non-human cells. So for instance if you put human cells in an animal embryo or you should brush the brain organoids in an organism like a post-metallic life system and then you brush the brain organoids the brain of this mouse and it will survive and it will develop, extend more than it will have developed but it would have developed in the petroglyph. So why are brain organoids problematic after all? Switch to the ethical part. But the more an organ should complicate the function of the organ, the basicism, the goal of science. So a muscle organoid is tensing. Her organoid is beating. A mammary gland organoid maybe is producing milk, something like that. Plant-gum-synch, I have this one. Plant-gum-synch organoid is producing insulin. If it's working it's producing insulin. So what would a brain organoid do? What's the function of the brain? In a way it's to think, to be sentient, to feel something. Can we replicate this kind of thing in a vitro? For instance, this is one of the first papers that attracted the attention of biopathicists from 2018-19. Complex oscillation of the brain and the gene from cortical organoids model a human by natural language. So they recorded the kind of EEG, electroencephalography, proposed for the brain organoid. And they recorded electrical activity and they wanted to compare with EEG of non-born fetus, of neonatal features. At some point in time. We have similarity here. We have the kind of electrical wave that we record in our brain organoid is similar to the electrical wave that we record in a fetus. So does this mean that a brain organoid has a kind of multi-capacity of a fetus? And should this change the way we treat these entities? Because we know that fetus are not totally, they don't have a full status, but we know that they are sentient at some point. We consider them as sentient at least. We know that they react to the environment since they are sensitive to the voice of the premises. So we keep saying that about fetuses and then we have a structure that has the same medical physiology. That would be problematic. So this paper has been a lot of criticism because they say many scientists say no, this is not going too far. It's not exactly good. And it would be across research. It's so bad. That's part of the problem. So of course, it is a very individual possibility. The first thing is that you have different kind of issues. I won't discuss all these issues here, but of course you have a conceptual issue. What do you mean by consciousness? What do you mean by sentience, experience, what is it like to have these expectations? You can discuss your ontology of consciousness or the depiction of consciousness for hours. And we are not going very far. If we do that, we could do that for hours but we are not going to advance the day, I guess. There is an epistemological issue that is what I find very interesting. How do we know that? How do we produce instruments to measure the phenomena? How are scientists going to do that? I guess because they are going to, they are going down, I guess soon they will have to do that. But for the time being, they still do not want exactly to do that because they say, don't worry, they are not conscious. But we will have to get on that at this point. And of course you have an ethical issue and may have this has developed a lot of discourse on that in the last two years. That is, how should we treat these potentially conscious entities? Do they have rights? Should we do research on that at all? So I will start with a review of the ethical issue and then I will focus on this epistemological point. And I see... So the first ethical issue is of course that consciousness is ideally related to moral status. And it is one of the properties, but one of the properties that can justify that we attribute a moral status to an entity. Because since an entity feels is able to feel pain, so we are going to treat it with some consideration, consideration. And in this regard, organoids are challenging characterization of entities. So for example, what if we could do harm to brain organoids themselves? What if they suffer? And this is a challenge for biologists because biologists is in charge of protecting persons, those in tissue donors, or patients. But if organoids deserve some kind of moral status, some kind of moral status, and if we want procedures to monitor that, it would be the first time that biotics would be concerned with a well-being, not of the patient, or the donor, but well-being of the tissue itself. And that would mean that we would have to find something to deal with... to protect the tissue. And it's very different from like organolation. Of course, you have a heart transplant, so you don't surgeon. Of course, it's considering the heart as something that is going to be important for saving the patient, so you don't just for fun splash the heart with a knife because you know it can save your life. But here we have something else, right? We have a same culture that might be in itself suffering or deserving some kind of consideration. So, considering that, some scholars have argued that we should adopt a precautionary principle. They say, if there is any kind of such instance that should occur, we should stop immediately. We should not do that. We don't want to cause harm. And the precautionary principle here will stipulate that if we don't know, we don't do. If there is doubt, better to play on the side of the precaution. As soon as it looks like something that could have some mountain activity, just of course, you could have the for fun, you could have the other utilitarian perspective and say, we want, if they are well treated, they will produce a lot of utility, they will be very happy, we should develop them. If there is an argument, maybe it's a point for a neighbor. Or if you are a utility monster, I like that. All these examples of those that are against, they are used now, but we thought it was more good arguments against. The problem with a precautionary principle and arguments is that we don't know what we miss in terms of utility. We have seen that, again, it's a very exciting field. A lot of treatments are developed with that. So do we really want to cut all this research because of this doubt, of suffering in addition to aging? Because if we compare with time in our research, we are using my suffering for when we want, because it's useful for cancer. Why would we stop here? For instance, as soon as we have this kind of consideration, we have to assess much more specifically the kind of consciousness or content of mental contents that you have. Because for instance, if it's only comparable to the kind of level of consciousness that you attribute to a flying, there is no reason to restrain. So a full picture of the how many pressures should take into consideration not only the hows that you could do to the entity, but also what you miss if you don't conduct the research. And this is almost impossible to assess. It's just impossible to objectively assess what we can, what we could gain by conducting research, how much harm we could inflict, how much harm if you do patients who don't conduct the research and so on. It's just impossible. There is a nice connection with animal research as well. So if you are familiar with research ethics, you know the sweet hour policy that will replace animal this as much as possible. We find research doing animal research and so we do better research and reduce the number of animals in which you conduct your research. And organoids are an alternative to animal research because it's an alternative model instead of developing my models of cancer. We are developing organoids so of course this would be perfect scenario. Organoids are a better model and they are not better on the knowledge side because the model is fit for humans and it's better on the ethics side because it's not you're not making animal research. But again it's problematic if organoids do suffer or something like that but we still need animal research in parallel we still need animal material because a substrate to which organoids are grown is made from animals animal material from mice. And of course you have all these issues about chimeras or xenograft for instance this one and this is very, just to show topic of this is 2 days ago. So this is nature so brain organoids have been grafted into rats because it's a way for them to expand to maintain them longer and you see that they connect pretty well with the organism and if you excite them you can see the motor pattern motor pattern they will produce in the animal it's working and if you because it's a combative object and if you it was a rat so I guess if you do something with the whiskers you can observe an electrical activity in these parts so basically the brain, the human brain organoid is totally integrated in the system of the mice so what should we do with these animals? Are they still animals? Because they are part of a human because they don't have we cannot say that they have a partial human brain but they have parts of human states in that brain so how far can it get? It's just this kind of experiment is not primitive yet but how far can it get? How much can the rat at some point get some higher cognitive functions? And then you have vertical issues and indication how do we communicate with this research with the public? Of course we thought the reaction was very good because the level of mini brain has been widespread and it has been extensively used but it has also been criticized a lot there are not mini brains and almost all reports official reports begin with that kind of warning brain organs are not mini brains they can't measure brain there are partial indicators of parts of the European so it can be misleading to have a mini brain but at the same time it's still very very used and the idea is that maybe calling that mini brain is contributing to the hype that is solving the field that we are overseeing the technology and this can lead to this kind of misleading expectations can lead to confusion as well or a kind of backlash phenomenon but this being said, what can be done? Can you regulate communication? Yes, partially with guidelines maybe but you cannot avoid a scientist to publish a press release and put the world mini brain in that right? Of course you can You can You can fire people with a better science Yes, I guess But you have to fix You will have to fix precisely the brain and the limits It's tricky I don't say that Nothing can be done Yes, something can be done but this will have to be discussed And so you have a gap between what kind of reports in the last years a couple of reports was national like in your science I guess it's a pension We produce a report on brain organics I don't know because there is fantastic research in brain organics in Beijing as well in the Beijing So this is the US national This is a report from the international research professional society And all these reports I work today don't worry there is nothing to worry about I'm not conscious But we have to keep an eye on that because who knows maybe 10, 20, 50 years maybe But it's kind of this is by line and it's kind of it's not easy to first how should we keep an eye on that and how can we anticipate the kind of reports that you can say that's nothing to worry about today and the kind of issues that you can anticipate and a lot of issues that you can anticipate and I just made a small review of the issues How could from the issue of stewardship of conscious things who is going to own them who will be responsible for them is the researcher a kind of legal warden like a tutel for this kind of things for instance if I take some themself from my body I give them to a researcher do we have any specific connection to this I have a genetic connection to these cells and if there is I know that my brain ordinates my from it from my cells is suffering somewhere do we have a special connection with with that should I feel empathy for this something like that or what would be if we go to transplant or to organ repair what can we imagine a lot of things if I have a brain organ implanted in my brain is it still my brain we can imagine a kind of disruption of sense of agency that we observe already with deep by stimulation for instance so that was for the ethical review now I will shortly I will then go more precisely into the issue of conscious best research there will be a very interesting intersection of consciousness research with a very huge field of interdisciplinary field of cognitive science philosophy of mind and so on psychology of course so you have this huge field of consciousness and you have a very small field of brain organic research but brain organic research is not done by conscious as research it's done by basic neurobiologists interested in development in stem cells and those are not cognitive psychologists cognitive scientists for instance they think they're not so there are two fields that we'll have to communicate at some point but I do not have have not done this kind of connection yet actually it will be a very near thing that this small piece of issue of recognition will become conscious they're just very objective and even if you don't like the word conscious I'm not going to enter this discussion but we can replace by this engine have any kind of experience feel some pain maybe it's more maybe you can imagine you can feel some pain even if they are not totally conscious of their environment so we would have to start from the basic position that the function of the system is to produce so it's like that so it's something that has emerged because it allows the organism to interact with its environment to learn to react and something like that but and then as this interaction of these two fields there are two issues the first issue is the issue of conscious assessment in brain organics if we want to study whether brain organics are conscious or not we would have to import all the field of conscious studies but then you have the other way you can go see other things around our brain organics is going to teach us anything on consciousness maybe we're not here yet but we can imagine that at some point it will be okay so we just develop the first side and we'll just mention one side and we'll just have one more try so my issue here is the issue of conscious assessment how do we know how scientists will in a couple of years I guess we'll have to do that at some point if we want to build a tool that's going to tell us whether this piece of tissue is conscious or not how are we going to do that so the first the first the first truth is that you have a biological system that have a certain degree of complexity so we have this don't they look like some part of the brain so we wonder we search we are wondering whether at some point some kind of interactivity can be but we have already and theories to detect and measure consciousness in human beings we know how to do that we have electroencephalography we have we have a lot of theories that are teaching us that when this part of the brain is active it's because we have this kind of interactivity and so we know a lot of things about that but this truth none of these theories is fully consensual and none of them is tailored for the new entity of interactivity of course nobody has done that on brain organics all the tools that we have they are tailored to full scale grow human brains so this will be the issue of conscious assessment how do we develop a tool, measurement tool that will help us assess whether or not this new visual entity is developing a form of consciousness so here I make an analogy with the particular consciousness in comatose patients comatose patients it has been quite a field in the last 20 years actually the outcomes of the field have been surprising and consciousness research has learned a lot from that and they were that against primary theories some comatose patients some totally unresponsive patients have been declared have been discovered as conscious and this has been done in the Steven Lawrence University in Asia this research has been this research has been connected in nature this is what the people in the reimagining they call the reverse influence program so let's see how can you infer the mental state the mental state of a participant in an experiment business from only the neural data you have data only that come from the brain like an array data, EEG data something like that from this data the mental state and for 20 years scientists have trained machines to do that and they have refined tools and now they can do that pretty well for a certain kind of behavior a certain kind of mental state and then here it will be perfectly the same for organism and for instance in the case of recommended patients just a precision in imaging tools especially MRI and the refined protocols for patients in the scanner or the treatment of the data that we do all this has a role a kind of robust MRI is known as a kind of robust tool to assess whether the patient is conscious on that some patients that where they live to be in a vegetative state that is having a low consciousness at all have been diagnosed as having a kind of consciousness because it will answer questions through the MRI the patient can move anything so it's basically in a bed for 10 years if you put the patient in MRI and you say no imagine that you are playing tennis and then if your name is X then imagine that you are playing tennis if your name is Y then imagine that you are working around in your house and then we compare the patterns and it works right so patients are delivering the good answers some of the some of the patients so they are diagnosed as eventually they were conscious for this time all along and this has deep implications for my retics and for the way we deal with these patients but they are still debated in the sense that it has not become a routine tool for this diagnosing around this there are still other issues but here but still the tool has made a lot of progress so here the gradation is a difficulty in this detection of consciousness tasks the gradation of difficulty is that in the lab, in the experimenter psychology lab participants can report on their experience if you have a regular person entering a scanner and you make a test then you can say when the patient is out and the person is exiting the scanner I was thinking of that ok so we have the pattern, we can check whether there is a tool in this machine in this case of conscious detection in the country called the space insurance it is much more difficult but it is still on regular still we base the assumptions the assumption is based on the same kind of nervous system that we have mandated for the regular persons that can subjectively report their conscious experience and then we have added a real difficulty because in organoids the target system the biological system is far from being equivalent to the full mature human brain that we have so these tools are designed for right? so you have two levels of difficulty and on the practical side and on the theoretical side the difficulty is the consciousness zone I was I think this is from Charles but I was helping but in the fact that there are so many theories of consciousness on the market and you have two reviews saying both if you take only two reviews of the theory of consciousness you won't have the same 20 main theories of consciousness so ideally we should take the best theory and build from this theory better tool from that but there is no best theory and it's very reflective of trends nothing is consensual and they all identify neural collective consciousness but if you get two theories you don't have the same neural collective consciousness so basically it's a total mess and you can ask which of these theories is true which is possible which of the theory of consciousness is true in general in terms of consensual approach but you could also get some of these theories as saying which one is going to be used for my purpose which is really something for organizing consciousness assessment maybe you can have a good theory of consciousness for a regular being that is not going to work for really the truth for consciousness and it's true we try all of them you take maybe it's to pick for a PhD student you take all theories of consciousness and then you look at one by one whether it's going to fit the organization structure or something like that but I think it's not it's not even possible to do that so the argument here that I learned in this in this M-based paper is that there is a view in the neuroscience community that among neuroscientists several organizers are not going to develop consciousness very soon I think this is a kind of claim that you have from those scientists this kind of assumption that prevails but I think this is due to the implicit assumption that today the dominant theories of consciousness are what we call global theories of consciousness that is neural correlations of consciousness are composed of massive connections long distance network, feedback loops these kind of catchwords that are going about the keywords that are repeated all along and because we have this implicit I would say preference in the field of reading neuroscience neuroscientists will say we are not going to see consciousness emerge very soon because all brain organelles are too tiny for that kind of assumption but if you look at all the theories on the market and if you look at even 20, 30 years ago maybe we would not have the same intuition we would not have the same intuition and for instance I will just just say very shortly here I would like to look at theories of consciousness and and I would choose that it would say something different from what is what is the mainstream today so for instance different theories of consciousness propose different neural correlations of consciousness and we just insist on one position that is known between global theories see that neural correlations of consciousness extended to large parts of the brain in a broad network long distance connections and secondary activity so this is the theory of global consciousness in our view from the and local theories are by contrast insisting that maybe you need only one short part of the brain to be active of some kind of conscious experience and the idea that if we focus on global theories it would be easy to discuss the possibility of conscious images but who knows not because global theories are quite trendy today maybe in 10 years or in 20 years and that one I will go maybe I will move faster or if you want to go into details this is a little bit technical so maybe if I don't I can skip that but there is only one paper series of papers on this issue of conscious assessment and it relies on the IIT which is one of the popular theories of consciousness today and the idea of IIT is an element of our it has its own definition of consciousness it has been criticized because it is a bit weird you can have but what the Lanza has done is to this colleague he is a global scientist involved in IIT development so maybe we can try to adapt IIT tools to well-organized and they do not do that in detail it is just a statement of principle and I think the reason for that is that even for full-scale human rights IIT is not able to produce an operational tool also they are trying to do that for 10 years but they say that they have never been able to calculate but the idea of IIT is that you can calculate what they call PHI and PHI is a measure of complexity of the system and the more you understand it is complex the more you understand it is conscious because consciousness is a kind of is related to the complexity of the system for instance if you have two modular tools like this one you have two subsystems they are cut in two maybe of two to five systems and here you have the same content but you have a couple of connections so this one will be much more integrated and as a consequence it would be more it would have they according to the definition of consciousness and so PHI is intended as an index of consciousness and the idea is that well if PHI can apply to all cognitive systems whether they are artificial or natural whether they are human animals and so on and if PHI is only a measure of the degree of consciousness well maybe we can apply PHI to brain organics but maybe we have a lot of problems with what exactly how to be a measure of PHI for instance in the paper they don't even rely on PHI, they just develop on the perfumational complexity index which is a derivative of PHI so it's basically it's a statement of my people who don't really prefer the kind of so IT would be one ideal candidate for this kind of really this kind of tool because you can see it as a kind of a kind of consciousness and as it's not true and you have also different according to IT different levels of consciousness and it could be standardized so for instance I said that you got um um you could have um you could have equivalency for instance in terms of of consciousness from one kind one form of life to another because maybe the suffering of the mosquito is not at all comparable to any kind of suffering that I have as a human being but it's not so IT is not I guess it's not the only transition IT is processing because it's a kind of global consciousness and I will just quote a kind of forgotten consciousness um that I revived here it's a micro-conscious theory it's a great neurologist and and he was specializing in vision research anatomy of vision physiology of vision and his argument is that you can have several it's consciousness is everywhere in the visual system um so consciousness is not a global and neuratory phenomenon but it involves multiple consciousnesses distributing in different processing stages different processes in science so for instance so that was a the idea that for instance you can be to take the next example for instance you can have a patient who is able to see motion if you have a neurological patient with a vision with a very specific vision in the brain you can be conscious of movement without being conscious of shape like if you close your eyes and you see your hand moving in front of your eyes right so you are conscious of the movement of your hand you don't see the shape of your hand you don't see the color and you can multiply this is a very basic psychophysiology you have the type of precision is not precision is not exactly synchronous in terms of you can perceive location before color or at some point if you manipulate the conditions for instance location is before motion you can see that all these different processing stages processing sites in the brain that we know that the visual system is very modular but under very specific conditions all these modular parts of the visual system can manifest themselves consciously at some point independently if you take the phenomenology side if you experience the world and the world is a whole thing and we see everything in the same picture that that would be for the regular starting from the regular you are being at the perspective but if you look at the actually in the visual system a kind of microcosm that are emerging and then of course at some point in the regular microcosm of emerging to the binary phenomena that kind of things together but if you look under this maybe we can imagine that at some point you have partial consciousness emerging in some very small parts of the visual system so that would be very interesting that we would have subsystem responsible for motion detection color analysis and so on maybe that maybe these subsystems are kind of conscious by themselves is very interesting and it could be applied if you look at the binary phenomena of course the binary would not have the consciousness of a visual world like the one we perceive but maybe it could be conscious of movement if you and what would that mean for in terms of mental content only conscious of movement of limits of seeing a scene so that would maybe lower the threshold for our question of how the artificial system can be can be conscious and you have other local theories that are worth exploring so that would be the point for this kind of epistemic issue so my conclusion is you have also the other side of the issue that is when we are going to change the way we study our epistemic consciousness for the first time consciousness still is one eyes on human participants participants in the scanner or something like that disorders of consciousness in which we can disorder we learn a lot from consciousness from schizophrenia but then for the first time we have a tool that we can design and we can manipulate to study consciousness those are brain organweeds from which one is it I guess it exists one as a regular one and it was a scientist but so-called neonatal gene into brain organweeds to change the brain in order to to express a gene that is suspected to be involved in autism and then you have your autistic brain organweeds and you see that they are in a different shape than the regular brain brain of course we don't have we don't have access to neonatal states of course but it would be maybe as a new tool for the site of consciousness and of course it's a little bit of a debate on philosophy of mind on neuroscientic standards with an internalist approach of consciousness I think as the brain is consciousness is something that is produced by the brain and on the other side we have all these four E embodied and active approaches and and of course brain organweeds will be a kind of experimental process in this debate if we succeed in producing a brain organweed that is conscious providing that we agree on what consciousness is and then we agree on a question on a new tool maybe we will have something that can say oh ok the brain without a body can't be conscious so we can just throw all this literature to the garbage or we can just study at some point we need to embody the brain organweed if we want to develop this to reach this stage development here we have to embody the brain organweeds so you see all the connections with these events have to be done as well with these conclusions final considerations for bioities and especially for the development of an ethical framework for research because it's equal so would you trust a neuroscientist who is claiming that he, she has brain organweeds in his lab that they are not conscious after boundaries they are not conscious that is part of the question and that's why we want at some point we will need to understand this kind of claim this kind of possibility so and that's why we do this kind of speculative or participatory ethics and because it's part of speculative ethics has been criticized because all that I have said and all the review of ethical issues in a sense seems futuristic like asking the status the moral status that we will give a conscious entity the dish if neuroscientists are saying that we are not going to see that coming before 20 or 15 years how useful is it do we really need this debate maybe this kind of debate can only be harmful to research because we are going to to distract from serious issues and so on you can imagine all kind of considerations here but I think it's worth doing it because at some point we will need to discuss that and here it's not only anticipation it's not just anticipation that is required but I will say not only speculative ethics but speculative field of science and epistemology for instance we should not wait for this issue of conscious assessment development of tools that I developed we should not wait until scientists develop this kind of tool to ask what kind of questions this will raise because I guess no they are kind of restraining from developing this kind of tool because they don't want to just do it very precisely about what they are doing and so they say don't always too far in the future but when it will be out maybe it's worth to have this debate on this issues similar coordinates I will thank the guest and I will turn them to the room to ask whether there are any questions hopefully they will speak I am very naïve when you see that there are models of real organs you mean that there are organ models in the structural sense both because it's only part of the of the organ so when you test stuff how can you be sure that the test will apply to the full structure of your organ because the function is maybe the same but the structure is not the same exactly but the same for structural function you can have parts from your organs composed of different kinds of tissue different substructures so you can maybe mimic one substructure in your petri dish but not all the substructures but you just know what they are doing when they know precisely what they want to model they all try to model some part of the organ or part of the organ and these subparts are connected to functions as well because I thought it was kind of flowing to your local global distinction because if the function is higher it's only part of the organ it's hard to copy it's very nice and then the problem is of course the function of the nervous system because it's kind of assuming that the consciousness is the function of the nervous system as a whole but then you would have so of course you could say if you assume this as from this so you could criticize not only from the you could criticize from the embedded collision part for instance it's not only that but it's also relevant to the partial global distinction because it would mean that until we don't have a full organ there is nothing to worry about which is not true so you said at the beginning so you don't want to attack the definition problem consciousness sentience and stuff like that then you only mention tools to measure human consciousness what about tools that we use to measure sentience for instance would they be useful and relevant or are you focusing on human consciousness research because those are human brain cells I guess that would be the case with the moral statuses the most obvious one but for instance what do you mean well you know animals because it's like pain like looking for pain in animals but when you have some noscitos like biomarkers I guess for pains I'm not just asking I just know that there are research and sentience specifically because of animal ethics usually we don't really care about consciousness we care about sentience and I'm wondering why are the scientists they say oh they are a bit conscious but are they also as sure of themselves yeah yeah yeah that's a question yeah that's a nice question you have tools to monitor pain in mice for instance I guess that would be biomarkers but that would be biomarkers like molecular ones I guess the cytokine that would mean that you look specifically for pain in your and if it's my if it's not the same species it's difficult to extrapolate as well but one thing that that would be a very interesting part of literature to look at actually my idea is that it's more ethically valuable to the countries but I don't because then some of the animal I mean some of the animal consciousness literature too like some of Jonathan Burch's recent stuff is very much like so there's some radical kind of gradational theories that show up in these in the animal literature to try to say look okay it's not just going to be binary part of the problem is that perceptual richness and experiential richness and integration and unity over time are all going to come in different amounts and different kinds of animals and it seems to me that just makes your problem that's grist for your argument that just makes the problem worse because now it's like well what the heck are we validating anyway which one of these I think Burch Burch at all they've got five axes for consciousness instead of one up and down like there was there they actually draw these like star circular graphs where like you could have up to we presumably are maxed out on all five axes but like elephants have really good memory and persistence through time but it doesn't seem like they have some other features and like crows are really good at perception but they seem to be probably pretty bad at memory they may not have a sense of self and so like how do you yeah so like again like which one of these which one of these different characters are you going to try the privilege yeah animal animals got animal ethics people I think are going to be a great source for just being worried about that they're all really worried about that I don't remember which I they're already killing animals so who cares about the other names it would be like actually we may need to hurt animals yeah but they wouldn't the idea that scientific use justify harm usually they would say that's not an ethical argument that's it actually it's like it's the mainstream project framework and it's basically the most accepted the most commonly accepted assumptions which we post your research today and maybe we can research we still listen that's not necessarily a good argument no no no but it's a prevailing view usually animal ethics will say it's a bad it's not even an ethical argument it's a it's a naturalistic policy we have to do research so we have to cure no it's not exactly that the benefit from that you will get is higher than the we get no benefits so that's not yes but that's why you have this committee that are assessing the applications and when you have to you have to give a specific number of animals that you are going to kill and you have to justify why you are going to kill 10 animals 20 animals and not 10 and then you have to justify everything because most of the animal testing we do it's not going to have any kind of impact on humans so just the members you can say that but the basic assumption in ethics committees all over the world and animal research for the committees is that some of them some of them but but a lot of when that more Kentian they just prolong to animals the idea of rights but it's true that this is mostly not the people in the committees they are more another tradition of ethics that's true but you are using an argument of authority against an argument of authority now you said most of them would believe blah blah blah because they are the and then they prolong the notion of human human rights to animal I'm just saying she got the literature because your argument seems to me a little bit it was not an argument right but yeah it's something to I don't say that I would defend all of that I don't say that I would defend this point no I don't because we decided about this but for instance we don't need to say for instance take this personal example if you have so basically we don't want binaries to suffer especially if it's all binaries but at some point the only you have a right to know the only solution to cure you is to screen the treatment that you are going to do the drugs that you are going to give you on on brain organics or tumor organics it turns out that the technology is so advanced that this tumor organics can be conscious my issue was this with the point 2 because basically but comparable to that of a laboratory animal that's not an argument I don't say that it's an argument I just said that it's a kind of analogy that you can draw and you can take it as an argument you can do that you can do that actually it has surfaced in the in the public many public workshops that have been conducted with in the contextual projects we have all kinds of scenarios asking people, lay people and questions about this thing and basically people are concerned with the fact that this entity can be conscious it's a concern and we should take care of that but if it's like the conscious of the fly they say I don't when a fly is buzzing or when we are at night so if the brain organics as a conscious of the fly why would we at this point I would not object to free conduct research as I can and it was kind of a constitutional view in the many public but I don't say it's an argument some animal is just worried about the flies now you're you're just trying it's true for some of them there's always people that do not want to kill anything but most of them fly maybe it's a problem, maybe it's a bad argument but you cannot say as an argument of authority most of them try like the argument or muscles there are arguments that don't work if you say if you say we can look at that you can try to assess the consciousness of your organoids if you could make a comparison that would be wonderful if I can say that my organoid is suffering as a mice or as a bee maybe it's a tool for me after that but if you say at this point I cannot reflect somehow to this entity it could be a long work for us as a cognitive tool I'm asking you to guess so face difficulties to the epistemological problem would you say that probably best way or at least a part of the way to check if they are whatever conscious is to connect at least a system to a perception system to be able to see some effect or something outside because now they are closed they are completely black they are completely black box so it's very difficult even technically to think a way to test whatever capacity they have so would you say they still have to have a certain minimal connected this organic brain with a minimal whatever simple perception to test I mean if we are biologically procedurally it would be very difficult to implant or maybe on blinded patients if you are blinded patients and I just don't I just don't know how to test even in this consciousness if it's a black box this is connected to the question that I wanted to ask so let me spring word off of that because that's you mentioned this is a possible you know problem slash objection but I sort of sort of got stuck on it because it feels to me way more fatal than even you gave it credit for like how the heck do you ever validate these models right how what would it take for me to again as you mentioned what would it take for me to believe you one way or the other and it's the same it's the same question in different words essentially and like that I hadn't put it before in quite those kinds of terms but it's the kind of argument that like as soon as I read that sentence like oh we're screwed and like cool we're done like game over man it's game over so I I really wonder like how how even theoretically do you get to even if we let ourselves science fiction for a second what is validating these models look at animal research we have never had this problem of other minds that we are never going to completely overcome but we have a lot of insights and scientists are trying to build tools or to map the territory in a sense I don't know I feel like looking at nociception in other verbs is like a child's play compared to this though right I can just see if their opioid systems light up and I'm pretty sure that I think they're in pain right I mean there we go where there's evolutionary homology I start to feel like maybe okay I can I have a lever anyway this is why I teach to the veterinarians in the vet ethics class right this is the lever evolutionary homology is your way in maybe it's my background in creative science but I will have the same concern with artificial intelligence I cannot believe it's cannot the Turing test is like not an objective measure have you yet I will have exactly the same objections that come it's impossible but for this kind of system based on your physical system so for you the evolutionary the evolutionary you have this yeah I have been trained in creative science if we are the same basically the same creative system the same neural system the same nervous system that's all and if we take care of all this of course environmental signals if you have a system that is reacting that has some delay between the perception and the motor reaction and that is a process that can process something spontaneous but all you are describing is not applyable to your no I'm not as chemical as Charles but even the Turing system you need a communication of a perception system you need to have a way to enter to interact to the machine so we can have for the time but the EEG is a very safe system it's just measuring but because you don't have a protocol yet our stimulation the only organism together this one it's already a nice sensory motor it's integrity in the body it's already a nice sensory motor system so we can imagine a system that is connected to if you have a refined procedure for asking it's a question so you would need to do something like that and this is exactly what happens in MRI in the skeletal space it's not only the refined method it's just basic everything is in the procedure it's a cycle neuroimaging important to all this procedure mental psychology from the 60s and 70s of mental psychology important to all these tools and those you have this kind of complex procedure when you put your patient in a scanner but it's only the idea of Leo Stephen Loris in the EEG who has to ask for instance imagine that you play tennis it was a good question I would say we have to imagine this kind of procedure so this is very related but it seems to me that this input output issues are not just practical ways to evaluate it or something maybe I'm too inactive it seems like you cannot even be close to sentient or conscious or something like that if it doesn't react in the environment then it doesn't to some extent move in the environment and you don't need to plant it into mice for that like the robots you showed already I assume it it will react to electric stimuli and then move that's already an input output but it seems to be quite essential it has always been in the way we conceived computational systems also for our brain we are always thinking in terms of input output they are probably never just locked in systems because you are feeding them and so on even if it's not very visible what the processes are or something and if there is really no computation going on then there is no brain there is no I cannot see how you can even call those but here the problem is that maybe you have computation you will have computation in a dish but mainly not so the question will be if you have a computation if your brain doesn't have it in a dish and it's very developed so you can have computation because you have computation that you don't if you don't have input outputs but there is an input output and there is computation just that maybe you are that's because you are a functionalist you are coming from cognitive science so if there is a function there even if you have nothing in there could be but of course you are not no but if you have this kind of if you have this kind of this kind of system for you it's not a good development kind of but even in a different dish I mean you are observing not just cells you are observing the electricity going from one cell to another one I guess and you are feeding it you are you are you are maybe we don't have good insights in the input and output that doesn't mean that they are not there I think they are an essential into understanding what it's about how it's reacting to this environment you know the brain flow I guess from some radical and activist I guess from some even from some the brain flow is already kind of shaping the environment of the system so if you take the the brain you will have to consider the first embodiment is the basculature the blood flow yeah and so maybe we have different kind of if we don't have a blood flow if you are on nutrients in a petonich it would be already a kind of different kind of that's interesting to be interesting if we could talk to them of different different embodiment talking to them can be very minimal just if they react to some stimuli they go away from some painful things and they might be enough as a for that you need to know something already to your last point the genre of consciousness when you decide what it should be to spring up some physical theory you can have a circle because what you want to measure is just what you would have inputed how you define the nature is based on what you would think because you have you can have a circle you wouldn't spring anything it's just that you measure what you want to measure right the way you have a green and one measure of the success you can spring up some physical theories but the I agree this is why I don't know this is why I took the issues the other side I developed most of my arguments on this consciousness this as one tool because it's the most interesting issue we can have a lot of debate but at some point still maybe we can learn something it's important for the circle but I guess if we look at the details we are able to learn a lot of things in terms of what the embodiment actually does what it does not how it does not that's not the impact of development for instance because the concept is how you define your measure so that it's neutral enough so that you can test some stuff because it seems to be there doesn't seem to be just a criterion a criterion to have a point of view having strong commitments in your measure that you can measure stuff that is empirically insignificant and not just measure what you want to measure but you just measure what you see there is no other box that's the significance of a measure outside of just measuring it that's precisely a very important point in the discussion because how much territory do we need to build this kind of tool for instance the IIT the integrity of the territory and the fee is very territorial because they have these two which is magic because they have a few fee indexes between 0 and 1 and at 0.6 you are full you are standard German being is supposed to be at 0.0607 and if you are vegetative state you are at 0.2 and if you are flying you are at 0.01 but it's very sometimes it looks like fantastically operational but it's very territorial as well but for instance the Trujillo paper that I mentioned the guy saying that he had brain organoids in his lab and he scanned them and they had the same EEG pattern of a preterm infant there is no territory behind and observationally we know that the EEG pattern of a prenatal infant is that and I recently EEG had the electrical pattern of my organoid so it's the same and I guess in the end we are going to when we are going to refine tools we are going to find something in between I guess my guess is that it's going to converge you will see what will emerge do we have synchronization of patterns some kind of pattern some kind of activity will be looked for even if we don't know exactly that's what consciousness is very you don't have one specific marker of consciousness but we have different depending on the kind of tools that you use you can expect this kind of EEG is functioning like you are working and this train drive is supposed to be run it's enough we have different stages of excitation and I guess at some point when the tool will be developed between mix this kind of measures from different fields which are already very very practical all the theories do not agree on the significance of the P3 references we all agree that this is reaching consciousness 100 milliseconds after after impacting the vaginal but but it's not but it's always what exactly are the secrets or what does it mean we don't need a consensus to say that this signal to be detected at EEG is important for that so in the end you will have a mix of signs like this this is a good sign we don't exaggerate this is a good sign and because of that we are able to sharpen more questions we don't have to it's probably already I have partly treated my question but that was struck by a sort of difference pattern that was involved in this reading of the mental states because you it might be sort of induction and abduction reasoning to go from the fact that people who have certain mental states and then build some theory around it and infer from the fact that they have some great state that they will probably have some that's kind of probably problematic but it's an induction reasoning like any other but it seems like you cannot, I mean I don't see any reasonable way to go beyond humans for that because all your basis for the induction is based on humans or animals or whatever and then you are going to apply the same tools or the same theoretical stuff on something completely different quite different of which we don't even have no other mental states at all I mean what arguments do you have to take your induction further than what their basis of it was I mean we think you have the same function at least the fact that if you take that the function of the nervous system is that and that if it functions this way then you will have this if we have the same kind of pattern it depends on the it's an analysis but I don't see this as impregnable on what happens in detection of consciousness for comatose patients and actually this issue of detecting consciousness in comatose patients is not solved it's for a couple of years this research is going on we perfectly know that there is a consensus in the community people still in the US people doing that have a lot of over art for their research I guess there is a consensus in the research community that patients some comatose patients are in fact conscious and that's a tool for assessing that is working but then if you look at the procedures you don't have a routine we are not going to allow them to vote for instance maybe we should screen all the comatose patients in the world or at least in our country but it's going to be very expensive but this tool is already more validating so everything is here for the induction the induction is quite secure but there are still steps that we don't trust so I don't see this as impregnable difference I'm really by my context of a financial assistance that's of course a practical question whether it's expensive or not but once we have relative if these things are sort of confirmed by empirical results, namely that after coma, patients as there are things then that this gets better and so on at some point maybe not for elections because the stakes are too low but for other important decisions maybe we will consult the opinion of people in coma why not I mean but this can be confirmed you know because it's healthy to speak at some point but some of them will speak afterwards no, those are those are definitely validated as permanent visually state okay, there is no a confirmation of this no, no, no no, it's not like when you're after that the patient is waking up and saying oh yes and when you scan me I'll go and remember and that happens and then we need that and scan it so this is pure speculation no what's the basis for it why do we think that this is on the right track because there aren't the right patterns that we call are totally consistent with everything if you have their names better than random more better than random but there is no if you have your own pure optimistic you think that scientific proof changed the world but it's very an uncomfortable situation I understand how as a research it's great research and decades of calibrations and techniques but the only fact that now we should test all of them the cost of an MRI to do it knowing that there are maybe humans in distress and in problem everybody has a strong interest just to close their eyes and say maybe it's bad research maybe it's not that confusing it's unfortunate it's not this is not bad research we are sure at least in the scientific community we all say it's good research but the jump to political change or even to change your diagnostic because I would be surprised that did they change the diagnostic of these people so they are still which is not one because we agree that this issue can on the other hand if you connect your brain with a system that's sophisticated that it comes to talk and you put a journalist in the room that would be very powerful but now it's not easy to ask them questions you have to ask them to yes, no, I can think about this and the other one was moving along in your own but at some point you need an intuition when you want to addiction back to the induction problem at some point you need to base your intuition on something and here you base your intuition on we base the intuition on the fact that they are they have full care in the brain since they were conscious a couple of seconds before their accident for their the and every single thing they had and of course we cannot do this so we don't we say the odds are lower for organism but it's not that they are nothing it's not that they are and no that doesn't mean that you can do the inferring you know they showed a certain behavior before they producted and then you can see that they can actually apparently confirm that they show similar behavior at least get their names right and so on this is behavior after they are in vegetative state so that's that's something that is stable through from one state to the other so you can do an induction that maybe other things could be but I don't see how this would work if you go beyond that to be traditional brains that's my problem there is no behavior that's constant constant through the this is a big job the last one is can we say just a bigger job you would have I was going back to this slide because you still have a job at this point so it's not that you don't have a job tell me if you answered that when I was outside I would justify the specific case when the cells comes from you and you needed to test some kind of disease or some personal medicine in what way this problem is similar to the status of a clone so you clone yourself but you don't let it develop the brain or something so it's not an individuals and you use it and in that way it would be in the same track I don't know I'm asking you because I don't know much about bioweakings cloning is but this issue is very totally science cloning is not a not for research but we cannot clone we thought about that would it be okay to produce your own clones to have a reserve of organs if this clone is never never wake up has no life maybe this is going to circumvent the issue because we can grow organs we don't need a clone if we had the right it's like an exit individual so you would say it's less a problem than the clone it would be less a problem why would you want the clone to have some spare organs you want the clone to be ready for you to call for a liver or to ask for a hair transplant but if we can have those parts made in a petri dish the problem with the clone would be that it has a body it looks like you and it looks like you it's only the organ I don't say that it's nothing but I guess it's azure if it's only the organ it's like this so the question would be how far is it from how distant is it from stem cell cell like when you take stem cell there's this basic procedure for stem cell therapy that you take some something that gets still kind of experimental that you take some cells and process them and they become fresh themselves and they are implanted again a couple of days after that you are still so I guess it distributes with the intuitive your factor with this clone is that you would have this image of a body with dead bodies that you are going to cut into pieces if it's only like the fact that most of the arguments you just gave it's aesthetic it's just I don't know because it has a body I never had such a good brain I'm a generator but in the current set of magneticity it's closed theoretically the problem is between it's just cells it's a complete body and this is somewhere between and the question is is it more on the stem side or in the bunch of cell sides so it's where the ethical crux is and first when you say this when it comes to these cloning analogies it's a project which is a major science organ you have this image of organ farms but we have laboratories that are turning to organ farms liver production and you can send them to your stem cells for a couple of weeks or months so that you get the fresh liver and this would be very real as well in terms of outsourcing outsourcing your body to a company but we are not here yet this is very very fast as you said but this is very fast at some point you want to change the possible iteration relating to if you need to have a pattern for a stem cell that grows out of organics that grows out of your own stem cells in this way how it would be different from a child's one because for a child we need to get a stem to make a child in the same way in ours not anymore if you grow in two years from the one stem cell it's the same stuff as having a child right? the basic concern is that of course it's not definitive as I've seen I raise my children even if I don't know if there is a sensitive background as me I have never tested right? and because we share we share the environment and they grow with me and so on and they will say that's a very liberal thing to say I had very strong discussion with people that say that you have no attachment to someone that is not from your blood so it exists you don't exist you can imagine that that's why first of all maybe the scientist has more connection with them because he spends all day at the lab but then you have the genetic and this can be more complex because of course why I am more related to my sister than to anyone else is the world not only because we live together but also because we have the same inner-wrestling deep background maybe for first of all empathy it might matter so we wouldn't matter for the judge I don't know thank you very much