 United States Army presents The Big Picture, an official report produced for the armed forces and the American people. One of the finest tributes to the military stature of any country may be indicated by the number and variety of published works on its military history, folks reflecting the entire spectrum of opinion on the experience, achievements, and merits of war's fought. Our country has been fortunate to have produced so many capable military critics and historians to chronicle every major action of every major war we have engaged in. The Korean War has been no exception. Many volumes have been written about this ideological conflict. Many more will be written to be sure. I'm Sergeant Stuart Queen, your host for The Big Picture. In two previous Big Picture issues, we presented the Korean War from its start in the summer of 1950 through Thanksgiving Day of that year. In this issue, we will present the final chapter of the Korean War. These two books contain some penetrating thoughts about the Korean War. They were written by a distinguished citizen soldier, Brigadier General S.L.A. Marshall. In these books and in other documents, he has written General Marshall recorded the Korean War as he saw and analyzed the conflict. In 1951, the Department of the Army sent General Marshall to Korea, the third major conflict in which he served as an Army officer. The result of his experiences in Korea and his long and valuable experience with our military establishment make him eminently qualified to comment on the Korean War. And now, The Big Picture presents this distinguished citizen soldier, Brigadier General S.L.A. Marshall. General Marshall? Sergeant Queen. General Marshall, against the background of your far-reaching experience in wars we thought, what are some of your observations and conclusions in regard to the Korean fighting? Basically, the tactics of the Korean War taught us a lot about mountain fighting, defense against night attacks and the like, but the fighting was essentially the same as World War II. That is, the battles were won by the infantry with the usual support from the other arms and services. But in one sense, the Korean War was different. In what respect, sir? Well, it was a total ideological war. That is to say, Communist North Korea, governed and supported by the Communist World, estimated that South Korea was ripe for the taking. In an ideological sense, the opportunity could not be overlooked to seize the territory and to extend communism over more of Asia. Obviously, the Communist World planned to benefit from the quick victory in South Korea at our expense. Does this in any way explain the entry of the Chinese Communist into the Korean War? In part, yes. Primarily, I believe it was because our advancing United Nations forces came within tactical reach of Red China. Our forces had become overstretched and vulnerable to the attack, and they grabbed the opportunity. Before the Red Chinese attacked, the United Nations command believed that Communist China would not enter the war if we can find our advance to the area south of the Yalu River. But it is a military fact, is it not, General, that it takes time, lots of time, to organize and move an army into position to attack? How did the Chinese communists do this without revealing their plans to us? Give them their due. They are masters of concealment and deception. It took them 60 to 90 days to organize their so-called volunteer army, and it required another two weeks or more to move the army into a position to attack. Before the Red Chinese sprung the trap, they had moved 80,000 troops across the Yalu and into positions deep into North Korea. There was a total of 120,000 Chinese Communist troops ready when they attacked, and all of this accomplished without the United Nations command realizing the intent of Red China. Deception or not, General, how did the Chinese communists keep our air reconnaissance from spotting the large concentrations of troops, vehicles, and equipment moving into North Korea? Before they entered the war full length, the Chinese forces moved only at night. During the daylight hours, they packed themselves into whatever buildings, houses, and huts they could find. They were jammed in like sardines. Their vehicles and equipment were camouflaged expertly. They were not highly mobile, however. They advanced at the marching pace of a man. But their columns stayed concealed in day, and the few who walked abroad made expert use of shadows to foil air reconnaissance. It is at this point, General Marshall, that we're going to present the photographic record of the Korean War, starting with the Eighth Army's offensive the day after Thanksgiving in 1950, an operation beginning with high hopes, but one which was quickly changed in its tactical complexion. Eighth Army's end of the war offensive was launched the day after Thanksgiving in 1950. It started out smoothly, but by nightfall of the second day, the UN was facing a new enemy in Korea, and a new war had begun. The Chinese rolled swiftly southward, splitting the allied line and cutting off Marine and 7th Division troops in the east near the Cho Sin Reservoir. We took turns sleeping in the daytime. It was too cold at night. I heard later we lost more people from freezing and from enemy action. The rounds froze to the casings. The Chinese had an awful lot of people between us and the beach, but the harbor at Hung Nam was our only way out. Our resupply came by air. Without that, we never could have made it. The close air support we got from the Marine Air Wing and the Air Force. They fought their way toward the sea through an enemy force which outnumbered them five to one, pausing only to evacuate wounded by air from Hagaru. They pushed on, reaching safety on December 10th. They found Hung Nam a busy town. Within the harbor's perimeter, heavy weapons worked around the clock, throwing up a curtain of fire through which the enemy divisions dared not pass. Behind the guns, a near miracle of planning, organization, and teamwork was taking place, a massive amphibious landing in reverse. In the space of ten days, more than 100,000 fighting men were evacuated. North Koreans, by the tens of thousands, flocked to the dock area to plead for evacuation. From this one area, more than 90,000 North Koreans deserted their homes, rather than return to the life they had experienced under communism. We were the last to leave. When we were gone, the harbor would be too. We set blocks of TNT and laced hoses filled with jelly explosive all along the waterfront. When we left, the harbor was one big ticking time bomb. The evacuation convoy steamed southward toward the free ports of Pusan and Pohang. Their troops would re-land, regroup, and move back to engage the enemy. The military withdrawal by land was orderly, as the rest of the 8th Army pulled back once again across the 38th parallel. But for hundreds of thousands of civilians trying desperately to outrun the advancing communists, the journey southward was a nightmare of cold, weariness, and confusion. Old people pulled loads meant for oxen or carried their precious few belongings on their backs. Children who had no part in the causes of war received full measure of its hardships just the same. On December 27th, General Ridgway arrived to replace General Walker, killed in a tragic jeep accident. He was just in time for the enemy's New Year's Eve offensive. Once again, UN troops pulled out of Seoul, blowing the Han River bridges behind them. Incheon-like Hongnam was evacuated by sea. Here too, we took pains to leave nothing behind which the enemy could use. In the south, the troops which had been taken off the beach at Hongnam were regrouped, and despite bitter weather, took advantage of a welcome opportunity to catch up with themselves. By mid-January, the enemy offensive had bogged down. Using fire-hardened troops, Ridgway launched a series of short, high-powered thrusts called Operation Killer. The enemy held a huge numerical advantage. Ridgway was out to eliminate it. Assault units moved up, expecting to meet great strength. They found surprising weakness. Under the pounding raids of Operation Killer, the enemy fell back. Ridgway pressed the advantage. No rest for the enemy, and not much more for 8th Army. If anybody ever invents a mattress that feels half as good as a patch of frozen ground fell then, you'll make a million dollars. Although destruction of enemy forces remained its prime objective, Operation Killer had evolved into a ground-gaining operation. The way things were going, we couldn't stay outnumbered for long. The word was they were losing 10 men to R1. For six weeks, the seasoned fighters of 8th Army scoured the countryside, inflicting fantastic losses on the retreating Reds. On March 7th, the enemy's main stronghold, East of Seoul, was smashed. The next step would be Seoul itself. On March 15th, Korean troops entered the city. They found a few old people and children. The communists had fled. Across the full width of the peninsula, the enemy was retreating. Look at this one out, we're chasing them and they're leaving surrender posters behind for us. In April, General James Van Fleet arrived to take over the 8th Army. A canny tactician, he replaced General Ridgeway, who had been appointed Supreme Commander when General MacArthur returned to the United States. Within a week, a big Jim's arrival, he was fighting off the communist spring offensive. The communists concentrated their parishes on the east-central front, probing for a weak spot into which to pour their tides of humanity. All available U.N. forces were needed to slow the enemy's human wave tactics. We had a routine. Oh, until the ammo ran out and pulled back and called for an airstrike. All weather grounded the Air Force. Units north of Seoul were forced back across the Imjin River. Seoul was fortified against the coming second wave of the Red Offensive. Van Fleet was determined not to lose the capital city again. Whoever said the worst part about war is the waiting was right. Still, we didn't have to wait long. Every road, every valley approach had been zeroed in beforehand. The enemy lost thousands of men, breaking through the curtain of fire, then faltered and lost his advantage. As the enemy turned once again to retreat northward, Van Fleet followed with mobile firepower. By June 2nd, we had recrossed the parallel. The enemy had spent 200,000 men, a third of his entire force, and gained nothing but the knowledge that numbers were not enough. Operation Killer continued without let up. Within a month, truth-spielers materialized into the first meetings at the red-held city of Kaesong, World Peace Holds Sword. The chief U.N. negotiator was Vice Admiral Turner Joy. His opposite number, North Korea's chain-smoking General Nam Il. Pessimistic correspondents predicted the talks would drag on for as long as six weeks. With the opening of truth negotiations, the line became stabilized. With minor fluctuations, it would remain much the same until the ceasefire. New battle techniques were developed. In the Eastern sector, a Marine battalion made history by securing a hill and no man's land from the air by helicopter. The first wave landed a shore party which would clear the small landing area needed. In a matter of minutes, the first copter load of aerial cavalry was arriving, fully equipped, fresh, ready for action. By using copters, the Marines secured commanding high ground within enemy territory without having to fight their way to it. Copters supplied the operation and evacuated troops at its completion, opening the way to a new concept and tactical truth movement. In Kaesong, the truth talks were already bogging down, deadlocked over the issue of a ceasefire line. We didn't like the setup in Kaesong. It was the enemy's home ground and he knew it. Nam Il used the talks as a propaganda loudspeaker. The so-called neutral area was crawling with armed Red Soldiers. We broke off the talks. Air Force Sabrejets ruled the skies. At this point in the fighting, the U.N. had lost less than 80 aircraft. Verified kills on Communist planes numbered 510. On the sea, as in the air, United Nations firepower went virtually unchallenged. Near the end of October, 1951, truth talks were resumed at the tiny farming village upon Munjong. The U.N. delegates offered a compromise. They would accept the Communist proposed ceasefire along the present battle lines if all other problems could be ironed out within 30 days. If not, all bets were off. The war virtually stopped, except for the constant blooming of artillery. Winter came, the deadline was passed, the war was on again. The deadlock issue now was the right of prisoners to free choice in the matter of repatriation. Both sides were adamant. Meantime, across the breadth of Korea, were fought the bloody hill battles, names not difficult nor pleasant to remember. Wooded slopes were laid bare, pitted almost beyond believing. This war had reverted to the style of 1914, opposing trench lines facing one another, night patrolling and local attacks across the no man's land which lay between. It was costly, but there was no clear way out. The big break came in April 1953 with little switch. Stalin had died in March, and Malenkov had taken over. Immediately, he launched his worldwide peace offensive, and the Chinese agreed unconditionally to General Clark's standing proposal to exchange sick and wounded prisoners. The exchange went smoothly, and true talks were resumed. Encouraged, the world listened for news of the final signing that would mean cease fire in Korea. It came on July 27th, 1953. While the communists signed at Fanmunjahn, General Clark, in ceremonies at the U.N. Base Camp in Munsan, signed six copies of the document which would end the bloodshed. There was excitement, but little rejoicing. We have stopped the shooting. That means much to the fighting man and their families, and it will allow some of the grievous wounds of Korea to heal. Therefore, I am thankful. The task now is to put the cease fire agreement into full effect and get down to working out an enduring settlement of the Korean problem. I cannot find it in me to exhaust in this hour. Rather, it is a time for prayer that we may succeed in our difficult endeavor to turn this armistice to the advantage of mankind. Yes, the free world was happy to see the truth concluded, and the need ended for more white crosses in those faraway military cemeteries in Korea. General Marshall, few of us possess your extensive background from which to draw when evaluating military affairs. In the light of your experience, would you tell us some of your thoughts and conclusions with regard to our country's participation in the Korean War? One of the most unusual is what might be called our psychological experience, the long truce negotiations, the seemingly interminable haggling by the communists. These things could have been foreseen by us. Red China's leader, Mao Zedong, published in 1945 his outline of Communist doctrine. In it, Mao stated clearly that if he ever had to negotiate with a capitalist country, he would use the same delaying and demoralizing tactics used by Trotsky for Lenin at Brest-Latosk in 1917 and 18 when the Bolsheviks were negotiating with the Germans for an armistice. Now these same techniques were used by the Chinese communists in Korea. The negotiating table was employed as another battlefield to demoralize us. General, were there any other aspects of our psychological experience in Korea? Well, indeed there were. American troops were the best fighting men the United States has ever delivered to a battlefield. And they fought better than any troops before them. But they had no training in the ideological aspects of war, and so when American troops were captured, they were not prepared for the psychological warfare techniques of communist prison camps. We now know that they don't observe a civilized code and will resort to anything to break a prisoner of war. As a result of this experience, we have taken positive steps to correct this area of training the American soldier. The relatively new code of conduct for the armed forces is one of the results. Is it not, General? Yes, a direct result of the Korean War. We all know how important that code is today. Now, General, what are some of your other conclusions with regard to the war in Korea? One other point. We learned again in Korea that a trained reserve and ready national guard are essential to our scheme for survival. I saw hundreds of reservists flown in and fitted into broken units, in the great emergency of the 1950-51 winter. These citizen soldiers had been suddenly lifted from their homes, but they kept their chins up. They fought bravely. The Eighth Army couldn't have rebounded otherwise. At one time in Korea, our forces were about 50% reserve and national guard. There's a great payoff in these civilian component programs, and why not? Men fight well because they're Americans. And of course, the harder the training, the better the product. On behalf of all of us associated with the Big Picture television series, we thank you Brigadier General S. L. A. Marshall for your noteworthy comments on the Korean War and your timely recognition of the continuing importance of the reserve and national guard programs, which are today an important segment of our military establishment. Now, this is Sergeant Stuart Queen, your host for the Big Picture. The Big Picture is an official report for the armed forces and the American people, produced by the Army Pictorial Center, presented by the Department of the Army in cooperation with this station.