 Good morning, everybody. Welcome. We're delighted to have you. Thank you very much for coming. My name is John Hamry, and very pleased to have you here for our second Asia-Pacific forecast conference. I'm sorry. I'm a little groggy. I was up most of the night rereading the President's speech trying to find that pivot part. Didn't quite get that. So we decided instead we would hold a little conference here on looking at the Asia-Pacific. It's hard to think of a more dynamic place in the world right now. There is no more dynamic place in the world right now than Asia. So many confluences. I was in Tokyo last week and just amazed at the depth and vibrancy of debate, which is exciting. It's very interesting. It's far more engaged than we are in Washington. So we thought we need to do something. And of course, Mike Green and the Asia team here has our strongest cadre. And we wanted to show that off a little bit and to engage with all of you in how we're looking at this region and the challenges that are in front of us. I do want to welcome Rick Rossow. He's our new Wadwani chair for Asia and Southeast Asia studies. Rick, we're glad to have you here. I hope you do good today. This is his first outing. I'm going to keep track of that. I want to make sure I'm sure he'll be okay. I want to say special thanks to Fred Hyatt. I'm Fred's here. I know it's Mr. Bussey here? John here? I haven't seen him yet. I'm very grateful that you could do both. Well, you do. I should think that's probably right. I'd like to say welcome to Ambassador Sasai, Mirpoori, and Kong who are joining us here today as well. And we'll hopefully add some of their perspective and insight through the day. As a reward for you all coming, you're going to do a little bit of work. And that's what that little white clicker thing is in front. We're going to ask you to vote on a few things. I do want to give you a word of warning that there's a very small explosive charge in it and it'll go off if you leave with it outside the room, okay? So leave it on the table when you're done. I don't want anybody to get blown up. That's just a joke. I mean, it's just a joke, but just please leave them when you're done. So, Mike, why don't we turn it over to you? Let's get this started for real. Thank you all for coming. We're delighted to have you here. Mike, why don't you come on? So, thank you. Thanks for coming out in the snow. It wasn't much snow, but we appreciate any Washingtonian stepping out in even a centimeter of snow. We started this last year as an Asia forecasting conference. Last year, our staff recommended we call it the annual Asia Palooza, which was fun, but we thought we needed to be a little bit more serious in tone. And the point was to try to get a sense of what events we should be watching over the coming year. This is useful for us inside CSIS as we pool our resources and look at cross-cutting themes across the region, think about programming events, research projects. And we thought it would be interesting and helpful to you and to us to unveil some of our thinking about what's coming up and include you in the process. We're going to take our A team on Asia and put them up against two of the leading journalists on American foreign policy and economic policy and also all of you. So in the first panel, we will focus on leadership and security. The panel will be moderated by Fred Hyatt, the editorial page editor of the Washington Post. An old Asia hand. Fred was living the life of luxury as the Washington Post bureau chief in Tokyo when I was a poor starving graduate student at the same time, eating instant ramen and has had a steady eye on Asia ever since. I actually remember very well when he began writing the editorials for the Washington Post on Asia in 1996 and I think it's the most consistent, balanced and strategic take on what's happening in the region that you can find. I read it every time there's something on Asia in particular. He'll be joined by Ernie Bauer, our senior advisor and Sumitra chair for Southeast Asian Studies, Victor Cha, senior advisor and Korea chair here at CSS and Chris Johnson, our senior advisor and Freeman chair in China Studies to look at leadership and security issues across the region. In the second panel, John Bussey who's coming down from New York. I hope he's not going through what I went through. I came down from an event in New York and got in at 3 a.m. this morning. Amtrak is struggling but hopefully he'll be here in time and John, as many of you know is the assistant managing editor and executive business editor for the Wall Street Journal. Also, someone who writes columns on international economic policy and especially economic developments in Asia that is consistently spot on and John's also an old Asia hand having spent time in Hong Kong as a loose fellow early in his career. And on that panel, I will have Matt Goodman, the Simon chair in political economy here, Scott Miller, senior advisor and Skoll chair in international business and our newest addition we're delighted to have Rick Rasao, the Wadwani chair in US Indian policy studies. This is his first event, he'll have to step out to be suited for his chicken outfit and practice his number but we're really looking forward to Rick's debut. And then over lunch, I'm going to lead a panel discussion with three of the most distinguished ambassadors in this town Kenichiro Sasai, the ambassador of Japan to the United States Ashok Mirpuri, the ambassador from Singapore and Nyen Kwakwong, the ambassador from Vietnam. When the panels are up here we are going to ask you also to make predictions either to correct what the panelists say or to prompt some discussion and Fred and John will ask you at several points throughout the panel discussion to use your clickers. I don't have one but you should all have a clicker in front of you. If you've been here before you've used these we'll ask a question about developments in the region expectations over the coming year you get to click I think, I'm looking for my ticker you can click multiple times you can switch but you only get one vote it's kind of like musical chairs, if you're clicking wildly whenever he stops it, that's your vote so you can change your mind but you don't want to meander for too long but you only get one vote so if you feel very very strongly in the war in Asia, you're not allowed to just click click click click click to try to drive up the vote you'll see the vote moving but that's not how it works and to get started and test our thumb muscles a little bit on the clickers I have three broad questions I want to ask just so we can practice about the region and about US relations with the region so the first question is a yes and no question, we're starting easy we like to ask audiences about the rebalance the so-called pivot to Asia every time we ask it the general answer is the most common answer is it's the right idea it's not being fully implemented so we thought we'd ask a much simpler binary yes and no question which is this one is the United States living up to the expectations of the rebalance to Asia so you can vote now yes or no yours or whoever you choose to represent in your clicking today so the president the White House has some work to do the president is going to the region in April Japan Philippines, Malaysia we hope Korea the itinerary hasn't been set but it's an important visit and maybe afterwards when we do this those results will reverse or maybe not we'll see second question how concerned are you about the potential for military conflict in Asia this region in this year in 2014 a extremely concerned b somewhat concerned c neither d not concerned at all or e don't know that's a high number am I doing that right b somewhat concerned about the potential for military conflict now granted we are the center for strategic and international studies and there may be selection bias in the audience but I recently spoke at a Goldman Sachs investors conference where the audience was almost entirely hedge fund managers large investors of pension funds and so forth and they had clickers they asked a question like this do you think there will be a conflict between Japan and China this year and over a third said yes and then I did the things you do at these conferences where you meet with the investors afterward and the big institutional investors wanted to know how could they hedge and the hedge fund managers wanted to know how to position themselves to make more money if there's a war so not just because of the comments by Prime Minister Abe and Chinese leaders in Davos but in general this is this is a big concern this year we'll talk about this on the next panel and Fred will sort it out for us and the last question on broad trends on the economy which of the following best describes your expectations for regional economic growth this year significant growth A B limited growth C no change D limited decline and E significant decline limited so limited growth so the the summation of the forecast from the audience is rebalance not at expectations were possible but moderate returns on investment this is just to sort of get your clicking thumbs ready we're going to dive deeper into all of these questions the president's trip security and leadership trends in the economy and to get us started if I could ask Fred and Ernie Chris and Victor to come to the stage thank you well thank you Mike for the nice introduction thanks for having me good morning everybody last year when we did this as I recall we were at some slum over on the street and so this is very elegant and congratulations to CSIS on this beautiful new building my memory of my time in Tokyo is not quite the same I was paid in dollars and we felt like we were poor students from a third world country we'd go by the store look at the apples and wish we could afford one for our children but the computers are the fruit this is fruit nicely wrapped fruit so we have great experts here but why don't we start out with just to keep you guys warmed up and in the game with the first real question which is can we get it I don't know who I'm talking to here there we go all of domestic politics this year will increase remain the same decrease don't know your answers do not get reported to the Chinese so or the NSA this is purely anonymous wow so I guess we can say the audience thinks that what's been happening will continue to happen only more so which one would you have checked Chris I did check the same one increase why well yeah what's going on well several things I mean I think the thing I would highlight is it's clear now especially after last fall's third plenum that Xi Jinping has consolidated power more quickly much more quickly than I think most people would have expected I myself have always been an optimist about him but I have to say he's moved even more quickly than I would have thought as a long time watcher and analyst in many ways I love this guy because he's demonstrating that while there has of course been institutionalization within the system and so on it's still China and it's still Chinese politics and he's taking a very traditional approach to running the party and all the other key institutions and so what is the explanation for why he's been able to consolidate power so quickly I think there's three main factors the first is that his status as one of these princelings the children of the founders of the regime sort of sets him up with a what I would call a DNA map of how that system runs he has a very unique sense of where the key levers of power are how to manipulate those to his advantage as a Chinese friend put it to me some months ago imagine what it was like for him as a young boy sitting around the dinner table every evening listening to his father tell these stories about how Mao Zedong was beating the heck out of his various enemies it gave him a sense of how the place runs and I think that's really the second point is that unlike his predecessor Hu Jintao and in fairness to Hu I think it was not that he didn't understand this concept it was that others prevented him from realizing the concept but Xi Jinping clearly embraces our organizing principle of the regime which is that if you do not control the key levers of power you will not wield any authority inside the system so we see him grabbing hold of all of them very quickly the military the security services party bureaucracy and then the third element I think is what we're seeing in the strange mix of economic liberal talk and reform talk and political retrenchment serious political retrenchment and the toolkit there is pretty much anti-corruption which of course is and will continue I think this year to be huge party rectification efforts to use their terminology and it's easy for us to see things like the mass line education campaign and kind of laugh because they're jargony and so on this is very serious inside their system and then this ideological retrenchment it's a very chilly period right now for internet freedom for just discussion frankly of ideas in general and I think that's because the party knows they're going to undertake these very wrenching economic changes and as such they want to have really tight control on the politics let me push on that last one I think there's two schools of thought or at least one that well if you're going to do economic reform you need these tight levers and so let's get the constitutional lawyers under control and so forth the other would be you can't have economic reform without political reform the kinds of reform he want depend on rule of law and innovation and openness and so these things are contradictory and doomed what do you think well I think there's a middle road of those two schools I mean I agree fundamentally with the second one but let's not forget they've been doing it the other way for 30 years and have been doing so fairly successfully the only way I have been grappling with this since Xi Jinping came to power and started demonstrating this odd seemingly contradictory approach and I think the only way to really understand it is to get inside his head you know and see how he sees the problem because I think for western eyes it just doesn't make sense and if you look at if you understand the fundamental reason why he's there is because those who matter in the system have judged that he is most likely to preserve the party's leading role in the country that's job number one not improving the economy rising China it's keeping the party in power so they've judged that he's the best most capable person for doing that and then I think if you take his that is your organizing principle and then you say to yourself okay what do you do next well you look for threats right that will challenge that control and so an economic model that clearly has run out of gas is a threat to the party's continued control the social contract has changed dramatically it's not about ideological stuff or communist belief or any of this anymore it's the delivery of economic goods and so you then to fix it you do these reforms on the political side however the challenge is different it's how do we control how do we continue to use this let's face it stove piped leninist system that we have writing atop a very dynamic society while we're pursuing wrenching reforms I mean that's a recipe for disaster so I think they feel that they have to have that type little control does it make sense and is it going to work I think that's a whole separate series of questions but it doesn't mean that they don't believe it and I think you have to take it at face value then at that stage I was there a few months ago and was struck it seemed a lot of people in the elite were dubious about whether it would work I expected this was I went right after the US shutdown and I expected a lot of well you guys are finished we're number one and a little to my surprise I found a fair amount of you guys are finished or why can't you get your act together or whatever not dissimilar from what a lot of us were saying but not so much self-confidence that they were inevitably going to assume number one and a lot of it seemed to be people feeling as though we need to get to the next stage of the economy we need more economics but we don't trust that the leadership will have the confidence to do that do you think that's a widespread view and do you think once he consolidates he'll be able to open a little bit more or that's now off the table well a couple things there I think first and foremost that declineist meme it's still there but it is much quieter and I detect I think there was a very fundamental shift you know we had the period after the global financial crisis where you know the hubris stuff was pretty pretty high and writing high I think in the last year especially as the economy has slowed and the gears have been grinding and their traditional solutions have not been working and as they stare down the barrel of these very challenging things that they're trying to take on I mean this is the most dramatic reform proposals in several decades and this is all the stuff that Deng Xiaoping did you know they have to look at the hard stuff now Deng did all the easy things so my sense is then that staring down that barrel they're becoming more concerned about how is this going to go smoothly and so on so I don't think you see that dichotomy so strongly and frankly that is a huge opportunity for the United States to be thinking about how we can reassure them on the one hand that we want them to succeed with these economic reforms that's critical I mean all of us lose if this project goes south and two though to indicate to them where we can that in areas where we need their help we would like to you know press them more and I think they're willing to talk about these things and then thirdly we should be using things like bilateral investment tree negotiations more openness on the Chinese side about TPP to shape the outcome of that reform trajectory because internally there's a kind of end state and it's not privatization and it's not what we may necessarily want to see and so we should be using our influence through those negotiations I think to be able to help shape that outcome that's very very important well I think we'll come back to the question of US policy but why don't we go on to question number two which might give us a chance to involve the rest of our panel Chinese foreign policy will be marked by increased assertiveness a charm offensive both neither well if you put A and C together I guess we've got about 98% for at least increased assertiveness with or without charm so let me before I come to Chris and ask whether that's right or not ask our other panelists whether that's what you the people you talk to are sensing I think in Southeast Asia Fred there was a real question before she about what do the Chinese want you know how are they going to use their new economic power and I think a lot of those questions were answered in a sort of negative way when the Chinese drew the nine dash line around the South China Sea in 2009 and it became clear after that step forward that China was going to use its economic power to expand its regional power and to push its own sovereignty issues in the region and when she came in I think there was obviously was an opportunity to question you know will we have more clarity about who China is and what does China want and I think and now the layers are starting to peel back you know are we seeing that and I think Chris said before I think the Southeast Asians see a stronger leader in China one who is trying to get the Chinese economy in order I think what Southeast Asians want is two things they want China to feel secure and they want them to be economically successful on the other hand they do not want China to use that economic security to continue to push its own objectives and in fact they do not want to see Monroe Doctrine sort of rolled out in Southeast Asia Dr. What are you seeing? Well I said see as well I think from Korea's perspective there was a real honeymoon initially in the Pakkinae through the first year of both of their times in office which well pretty much overlapped there was a phrase that the previous South Korean government used to use for US career relations they said they would say it's the best it's ever been and you talk to people in the Pakkinae government last year and they were using that same phrase about China I think they really felt like the previous government did not have a good relationship with China both for political and strategic change that obviously for economic reasons but long term for Korea the brass ring with China has always been shaping Chinese attitudes on North Korean unification so I think they felt like they made real progress in that vein in 2013 I think the message in 2014 is a bit different in large part because of the ADIZ Chinese Declaration of the ADIZ which didn't overlap as much as in the case of Japan but certainly covered something that Korea saw as there as a small couple of rocks that had a weather station on it and what was not very well reported in the press but happened was that the Koreans actually tried to cut their own deal on that first to get the Chinese simply to revise that piece of it which probably isn't good alliance politics and the Chinese outright rejected them and I think that was a real wake up call so for 2014 I expect that the South Koreans will continue to pursue things like a bilateral FTA with China they'll continue to see cooperation on North Korea but on these broader strategic issues I think they'll be more of a more of a real politic realist lens on things and less of this honeymoon sort of feel in the relationship Chris what did you click number two? I also click C and I think that fundamentally represents what we're seeing I mean the most important point to make is it's clear that the new leadership is taking a different approach on foreign policy than their predecessors you see very little discussion any more internally or otherwise of Deng Xiaoping's long standing guidance to you know hide your strength and buy your time and someone I was speaking to recently I thought put it very well which is that we're not going to hide our strength anymore but we are going to continue to buy our time and so I think that's a good way of thinking about it but underneath it represents this fundamental kind of contradiction between their desire as manifested in some meetings that they had in October late October of last year to improve relations with the regional neighbors I mean that's clearly a goal there's no doubt about that and you see again sort of especially towards Southeast Asia the tilt again toward a sort of smile diplomacy approach and this desire to more assertively defend what they believe is their sovereignty claims and the question is can they have both and make it work and I think most people would say no but again somewhat like the political economic dichotomy they seem to think it's manageable and if you look if you look at what's transpired over the last couple of years they've made some gains you know Scarborough Shoal is the first observable land feature to change hands in 20 years so that's a significant point so I think we just have to watch how it rolls out going forward let me just follow up and then I'll come back to you what have we learned in the last year about Xi's relationship with the military and who's leading this policy yeah thank you for raising that because I think it's very important after the ADIC was announced as is typical there were a series of articles that came out Xi Jinping's not control of the military that yet again they were doing things on their own this is ridiculous this is a very different very different period now and I think it's abundantly clear that he has brought them to heal in a way that Hu Jintao's predecessor was never able to do so the best evidence frankly of that is the Mil-Mil relationship with the United States which was terrible up until Xi Jinping came into power and basically ordered the PLA that they were going to fix that that the Mil-Mil relationship was too important for Xi Jinping to lag so substantially behind the overall relationship so any question that he's not in control of his military is just foolhardy and the tools again as I mentioned earlier they're very similar you know he has a strong personal network through this princeling status in the military which Hu Jintao never had strangely enough he has what passes for military experience in their system he was a secretary to the defense minister in the early 1980s and you know that sounds kind of silly the official Chinese news service when they started publishing his biography when he was first elevated to the pull of your standing committee before he became to power they made a point of noting that he was an active duty PLA officer during that time and I think that was designed to do that and then third is anti-corruption it's not as visible in the military as it is in the civilian sector but I'm told it's every bit as intense so I just wanted to close a loop here which is that for the rest of Asia these facts on the ground that Chris is talking about with she sort of consolidating and the charm offensive combined with assertiveness is is you know really is creating a big demand pull for stronger and more focused American engagement and you know they're not getting that you know a southeast Asian watching the state of the union address last night would have been really disappointed that the lack of focus on Asia the lack of focus no mention of southeast Asia a passing mention I thought on trade didn't mention the TPP mentioned TPA in sort of a one line sentence about the rest of sort of economic empowerment so this is really such a brief address it's not surprising you can't get to everything what would they like to see from the United States you know I think what Asia really wants to see that the Asia that's concerned about some of the facts that Chris is talking about they'd like to see the president of the United States talk about why Asia is important to Americans to talk about why Asia is important to your the jobs that bring home the mortgage money that pay for the kids school talk about the fact that Asia whether your kids are competitive and able to thrive and prosper that Asia is absolutely critical we saw it from our first questions here most of this audience is a pretty well advised audience thinks there is a potential for real conflict in Asia so it is the number one concern I think for American security but our political leaders aren't talking to Americans about that and I think that's what Asia is looking for the military engagement has been pretty consistent I think policy has been pretty consistent between parties and leaders but what needs to change is an American leader who will tell Americans that Asia is important and that is why we're going to step up our level of engagement there that's what I think they're looking for Victor what are you seeing in terms of the U.S. presence is desired in the presence of the people they are seeing I wouldn't disagree with what Ernie said obviously the metric is if you see the president out there talking about trade or security or any of these things with Asian allies and partners to a broader audience not an audience like this but a broader audience in the United States in middle America now of course I understand given where they are in their second term this is not necessarily the priority in terms of the messes they're trying to send it home but I would just say that the administration should look back to its first term in office where whether it was the secretary of state or the president himself Asia was very much a part of both obviously her travel schedule but in his speeches here in the United States he'd weave Asia into his discussions and that's pretty much absent now and I think like so I look at the Korean Peninsula and when I talk to about security folks and financial folks in terms of forecasting we clearly have problems on the Korean Peninsula North Korea being one of them but markets and things don't move based on what North Korea does they move based on how the U.S. responds they're always looking for the U.S. response again whether it's investors or whether it's the policy makers and I think they feel like they're knocking on a door and nobody's answering these days let me just push and any of you can answer because I think if somebody from the administration were up here they would probably say well you know maybe it wasn't in the speech and we don't have anybody quite as visible as Kurt Campbell but Mike Froman is out there we're negotiating the most far-reaching trade pact ever and Chuck Hagel's been there four times you know we're proceeding with our basing changes and so the actual meat of Pivot is still on the bone I mean I would just say can you imagine the scene you know where Obama the president comes back from the State of the Union address comes back to the White House and there Mike Froman's in his office saying you know when I left the White House and walked across the street to USTR you promised me that you would spend political capital to get trade agreements done specifically TPA and the European agreement TTIP now come on I'm expecting a little more in the speech to Congress I would expect you guys to follow through on your commitment to me your good friend Mike Froman so that I can get this done and it's good for the United States we both know that I believe the president knows that and you know where's the beef man I think that's the discussion I don't know how it happened but I think that was an important part of what we're missing so obviously I mean yes TPP is very important it has not only huge trade implications but I think it has brought a long-term strategic implications particularly if other countries join after the initial framework agreement but having said that I mean it's not done yet and yes certainly they deserve a lot of credit for trying but you know administrations and their policies in different parts of the world are not remembered for trying it's just being remembered for what you got done and so I think this obviously is a big part it is the pivot is TPP right now I think and so there's a lot riding on that in terms of the other things you mentioned Fred I mean I you know yes trips to the region are important they're quite important in Asia you know finishing implementation and timing agreements and a very important step was made on the Japan side with regard to Futenma but again I think you know metrics for administrations like in Asia are not really grounded in the agreements they try to get or the agreements they finish it's what they do that's new and and right now that's TPP but there really isn't much else let me ask one more thing on this because it strikes me that I think everybody here clicks see and Victor talked a little bit about charm offensive in the Korea context but if I wonder if you the others could say specifically where else I mean we see the assertiveness with the our identification zone give us an example of charm offensive if you've seen one in Southeast Asia well I'll tell you nothing is as charming to Southeast Asians as it is very charming especially when you look northward and you see what will be the world's largest economy buying your stuff and now starting to invest we have to be honest though I mean if you look at countries in Southeast Asia and even Australia Chinese investment hasn't really been a top line story it probably will be but it hasn't been yet but the promise of investment is very hopeful the thing that the Chinese could offer to Southeast Asia that Japan had not been able to offer was we will increase our purchases of your goods in other words your exports to China will increase and they have and I think that's extremely charming the most charming part of Chinese diplomacy I would say also let's be honest I mean Chinese diplomats since the real charm offensive started which was just after the Asian financial crisis Chinese diplomats in Southeast Asia have become much more become listeners talking about alignment with Southeast Asian goals a little bit of edge on that now but man I mean compared to the early 90s Chinese diplomacy in Asia has done very well I mean I think that's a big it's a big new feature you can really feel it if you're around in Southeast Asia so those two things would be on the top of my list I agree with all that I just include as well an equally charming thing that they've done which is the development of the ASEAN infrastructure bank and China's willingness to put a large amount of money in there you know one thing I think Southeast Asia needs badly is infrastructure you know the Chinese are willing to pour significant assets into that entity they don't have some of the regulatory concerns that other countries may have and so on so that's a big deal alright let's put the audience back to work number three Japan China tensions over the pick your name islands will increase remain the same decrease don't know I just hope the war doesn't start before 11 a.m. so I get back to the office Victor what did you click I clicked a increase a couple of them first there's I see nothing in the trend lines either in China or Japanese domestic politics that leave one to believe we're getting closer to a solution or even an agreement on the status quo I think in addition to that there is the you know there's this broader dynamic where in a sense structurally we have these two countries in the region that both see themselves one is in recovery and the other is on the rise and if it's not the Senkaku island there will be something else that we see quarrels between the Japanese and the Chinese on so for that reason I think for both structural reasons and political reasons I don't see this thing getting any better and perhaps getting worse precisely because of things like the IZ and the increased activity that we're seeing in that area and talk us through a little bit what does worse look like is there a real danger of conflict and how would that happen how can it be avoided? I mean Chris can also say I think the primary thing that everybody's worried about is some sort of miscalculation or accident and whether that could then spiral into something worse nobody really knows but certainly a miscalculation or some sort of accident would spark a crisis that I think would affect not just policy I think would affect markets too I mean people would be quite concerned about something like that Chris I don't know how you I just had two broad points and just echo what Mike said in his opening about how investors to echo your point Victor and hedge fund people are thinking about this I mean they're definitely concerned I guess the big concern that I have with regard to this is listening recently in conversations with Japanese people and senior Japanese people the worry that I have is that increasingly I think it's fair to say both sides have are now subscribing to the worst possible character a caricaturing of the other side's intentions and so on and to me it's very hard to have dialogue when you have dehumanized the other guy and so that makes things very difficult I think it increases the bar for trying to make progress on the situation the second point I guess that I would make is that I personally hope and would feel that if there were this kind of an accident scenario both sides would have extreme desire for restraint as of course the US would be right there trying to cause the temperature to come down the problem is that in the past Japan and China had some very effective back channel mechanisms very senior people on both sides had a kind of in case of emergency break glass person that they could go to that has really gone by the wayside now long period of cool political relations and so without those kind of mechanisms you do see these nationalist trends that we've been talking about you can see a situation where the respective leaderships get handcuffed pretty quickly if there were some sort of accident scenario and I think this is where Vice President Biden was correct in his visit to suggest we got to figure out some mechanism for doing this there were events in both countries recently that sort of underscored how cool the relations are Prime Minister Abe's visit to the shrine and the one that fascinated me was the Chinese agreement to build the Memorial Hall in Harbin and let me ask each of you what do you think were the calculations in the leaders minds in taking those steps which they had to know would start with Yasukuni if you would well let's put this way I don't think that Prime Minister Abe was not aware of the repercussions from going to Yasukuni I think he was fully aware of the repercussions from going and and I think he got advice from all sorts of people about what he should and should not do I think the decision was very much a personal one and I mean I'm probably going to offend all my Korean friends but I think and at the same time I think he knew that it would be harmful to relations and so he had that passage in the statement about how he didn't wish to offend the other countries does this mean he's not going to go again I don't think anybody knows I don't think anybody knows whether this is what he's done or whether he'll go again but I think this was very much a personal decision and one he obviously strongly believes in because he was fully aware of the costs that would come with doing this do you think it's partly you know well like we've tried to reach out to China and Korea we don't get anything back so why bother there's nothing to lose I certainly on the tactical side I certainly think there were you know there was that you know you could argue that they did try to in 2013 tried to do things that attempted to reach out to both the Koreans and the Japanese even if some of them were just gestures there were still things that they tried to do and also things that Prime Minister Abe did not do whether it was on other historical issues and I think by the end of 2013 they figured tactically again just get this done get it out of the way start 2014 anew but again I don't think the tactical the tactical calculations may have mattered for his advisors but I think for him it was a very personal decision how about the Harvey Memorial Hall I have to say I'm kind of surprised they did that myself because I talked to people about this and I think most people said no we're not going to do it so it says something I spoke a minute ago about the caricature problem and the Yasukuni visit just plays right into that very very deeply and as Victor suggested it has resonance with other players and I agree 100% from the Chinese side to Victor's earlier points about how the Chinese see an opportunity to try to peel South Korea off and use this issue as an opportunity to do that and so I presume that was in the back of their minds on the Harvey decision Let me ask you Ernie after these two incidents the two ambassadors to the United States each wrote op-eds in the post and part of their themes seem to be persuading Southeast Asia that the other country is the bad guy or persuading Americans that Southeast Asia views the other country as the bad guy and I wonder what's your perception of that I really think that the whole tension in Northeast Asia that we've been talking about really concerns Southeast Asia because it does it's a huge concern and it makes it hard for Southeast Asia to know where to put its foot but I think what is really important here and I hate to go back to this theme is that I think that part of what we're seeing with Abe's actions with Chinese actions I think part of the title of this panel is leadership if you don't have sort of a strong and evident and engaged American leadership engaging in the region I think it actually helps cause some of these leaders to take steps that in a way I mean you could argue I think you could argue from my perspective and perhaps the Southeast Asia perspective that Abe has to define himself as his own man because Japan has to have an identity they've got to have sort of a confident view of what is Japan and I think that in a way that's a behavior that is created I believe in part because we haven't been as active in those places and I think that's that Fred worries Southeast Asia I mean when I sit down with the guys who run the countries in Southeast Asia they are really concerned about what the implications are of having the Chinese sort of build this narrative that it's their time they can push three years of sort of taking as much as they can I think most Southeast Asians that I talk to believe there could be an ADIC somewhere over all of or part of the South China Sea is the next step this worries people and so yeah I think I am not obviously you can sort of connect the dots here I'm not okay with where we are in terms of our levels of engagement right now and you're saying if Japan's identity can't be close U.S. allies and it's going to be something else I mean I would really love to have Mike Green up here talking about this because he knows the man, he knows the country well but that's my sense that this is that Abe's visit to Yakisuni is some sort of a way to say I'm my own person Japan's going to be its own country we have to be in a way I see it as sort of cry for more attention more help and I'm not a Japan expert but I think from Southeast Asia's point of view I don't think ASEAN can be sort of this strong core this fulcrum for regional security and trade architecture that will help bring the Chinese in to play by the rules and make the rules with everybody else Japan and the United States and Australia really look at ASEAN and say this is our expectation of you to be that strong core because ASEAN won't do it on its own it just can it's too diverse but if its role if it believes that everyone else depends on it to play this role I think ASEAN will really step up and surprise us that's my view that's my attitude for Mike Green too bad he's not here although he's turning really red I see I don't think that Prime Minister Abe does things like go to Yaskoony because he's trying to cut an identity that's somehow separate for the nation under his leadership from the United States I think very much his core is still very much of a pro alliance view despite many you know Chinese mean other efforts to try to paint him a different way I mean I do think that he obviously he believes that Japan is back he believes that at least some of the arrows of his economic policy are working and that things like visiting Yaskoony or reinterpreting the right of collective self defense are for him I think contextualized in a view of Japan playing a larger role as a global citizen sort of this idea of nationalism as a citizenship in a global context rather than some sort of resurgence of pre-war nationalism now I know obviously many in the region don't see it that way but personally it's hard for me to imagine anybody in their right mind thinking that the themes or even believing in their core that somehow pre-war Japanese nationalism is the right path for Japan it's just very hard to imagine even for someone like maybe some of the advisors feel that way I certainly don't think the prime minister feels that way I think something that sometimes gets lost in the reporting also is particularly when China or others talk about this resurgence of nationalism is how the Japanese people have always had to be dragged toward a more active role and toward changing the constitution and toward increasing the military it's not like there's this huge popular groundswell to become what Abe considers a normal country even I would say for the if we take something like reinterpreting the right of collective self defense you talk to Koreans and they start banging the table and they're like this is ridiculous the United States is basically making Japan their proxy in Asia now because they're not interested in Asia in the second term of Obama and yet at the same time they understand reinterpreting the right of collective self defense leads to a better functioning U.S. Japan alliance with regard to contingency like North Korea and they're like oh yeah that's true too okay well let's move on to something where things are going really well North Korea question number four do you believe North Korea has a deliverable nuclear capability undefined or we'll achieve it in 2014 well I guess that's a bit of optimism from the audience any of you any of you want to give what the correct answer is to that question so I'm going to disagree with the audience and of course you know you have to define what you mean by deliverable nuclear capabilities so there are three major steps here and they've crossed one of them which is to be able to put a payload vehicle into orbit the other two are to miniaturize a warhead and to be able to do a successful reentry vehicle and while we don't have very good information on exactly how far along they are I am always impressed about how we underestimate their capabilities I mean when they did the last rocket test that they were successful in putting a payload vehicle into orbit nobody had expected that at the time I think 2014 is actually going to be a very important year in terms of the North Korea problem on the military side I mean it was Secretary Gates who three and a half years ago said he believed that North Korea would have a capability to threaten the continental United States within five years and I certainly do expect more testing by the North Koreans in 2014 both of their missiles and of their nuclear weapons they're the big concern now of course is they have an old rickety plutonium program which Mike and I spent hours and days and weeks negotiating over but the real concern now is this covert uranium program which could be much more plentiful as a source of fissile material for weapons and they're constructing renovating major missile sites from which they could do testing so I am quite concerned that they will make further steps along this path in 2014 and of course there's nothing in the ideology or the statements of the North Korean regime under this young fellow that lead one to believe that they are somehow going to give up or move away from this path I mean that leads to another question which is sort of what difference does it make you know it's been US policy since before you were running it that this is intolerable and we're not going to allow it and North Korea is not a nuclear state and Secretary Perry was almost ready to go to war over it and yet you know here they are and life goes on and so will we just keep going that way or well I think so I think the things that are different are that if we're actually talking about a demonstrated capability to miniaturize warhead and to target the United States with a long range ballistic missile that's different we've not really had that situation before it's been much more of a local threat the threat of proliferation has and will continue to be there but the concept that a country like North Korea would be the first weapon state outside of China and Russia to be able to actually target the United States with a nuclear warhead I think would be quite concerning the other thing is that although there's a bit of head in the sand when it comes to how the North Korean drive for nuclear weapons is changing the balance of forces or the strategic context of the region I think it would have an impact if this were a demonstrated capability and then the third thing that I think makes this different is the leadership in North Korea we don't know anything about this guy aside from Dennis Rodman knows the most about this guy nobody else knows more about Kim Jong-un than Dennis Rodman and so you can't he's talking he's in rehab somewhere so I mean you cannot seriously you cannot make up a more frightening scenario than this so is there more the U.S. or different that the U.S. could or should be doing unfortunately there isn't I mean I think the main action right now and for the future is to work with the Chinese to try to put together an even more much more robust set of sanctions in response to the next North Korean provocation we did an event here at CSIS a couple of months ago where we looked at the sanctions on Iran and the sanctions on North Korea and one of the scholars who participated built this graphic that had that was a timeline of the evolution of sanctions on Iran and it was it was based on sort of the number of participants and the scope of the sanctions and compare that to North Korea and so we think that we have sanctions on North Korea luxury goods and all this stuff but when you put up the graphic on North Korea the circle was about this big when you put up the graphic on Iran it was like this big so there's a lot more I think that can be done with regard to North Korean sanctions and you know I think Glen Davies is in the region right now trying to move a diplomatic process forward and we should continue to do that but I think the real action is going to be in terms of seeing if there can be any progress made with the Chinese and with the Russians on really stepping up the sanctions in response to the next provocation Chris I mean this is the perennial question but to the Chinese really care and could they do more and if so why don't they third question is the hardest one of course they care of course they could do more that's known I think what's interesting you may recall last year around the same time there was a huge debate in the commentary as to whether or not China under the new leadership had changed their policy toward North Korea and that phrasing in itself was a loaded term but I think it is fair to say that we've certainly seen a reordering of priorities with the new leadership I think we've seen a willingness to push the North Koreans a little bit harder but obviously not to do anything that they might consider destabilizing one thing that's been interesting in recent discussions is the Chinese as Victor just suggested have been starting to talk about a larger Russian role in concert with us and in concert with themselves and that's interesting you know something we should consider there's a way to draw that line in the region you know standing nuclear powers or standing members of the UN Security Council you know however you might do that that then allows you to draw a clean line without having to get messier by but it may be a place to start I mean the problem is my feeling is and I'm no rush expert but it seems to me they're sitting on the sidelines either because they're distracted or they think now is not the right time or whatever the case may be or maybe they're just disinterested I don't know but I think we've been seeing some unique signs that they're willing to do more the hard part is getting to you know what do they mean by that what are the concrete steps and proposals I think one thing that we should not lose sight of and speaks to the point Victor was making about 2014 is a busy year the Chinese populace especially in the border region in the northeast they're becoming very concerned about these nuclear tests and they use the same test site every time and it's causing seismic disruptions there's a lot of theories about potential for earthquake you know problems and things like this so at least there's more pressure on the Chinese regime at the popular level to deal with this problem you know nuclear fallout coming across the border all of these sort of issues I think though right now they're just as shocked and surprised as everybody else about the recent domestic you know how do you see that oh well I mean I'm going to defer to Victor largely but on the Chinese side you know Chang Song-Tek was kind of their guy and they've seen this movie before when Kim Jong-un's father basically executed all of the generals in the North Korean system that were perceived as close to the Chinese you know and so on so to the degree that someone they thought was trustworthy somebody that they thought embraced the idea that they're always flogging with the North Koreans which is follow our model of opening the system and so on is now gone I think causes them to one worry just about the core issue of stability inside the system as Victor said nobody knows anything about this guy but more importantly they've lost touch with is this guy manageable as he said the debate continues inside China just like it does here and I've heard Victor say several times which I think is right you know younger Kim's father he knew where that red line was he knew how to dance right around it but you know not go across it and it doesn't seem that the son has that level of fidelity I I mean I don't disagree with that I mean I think the main thing that we're watching for China is is so Chang Sung-Tek you know the uncle he was not just China's guy I think he was everybody's guy outside of North Korea anybody who had any sort of contact with the North Korean Chang Sung-Tek was their guy so and I think you know prior to that happening I think U.S. policy makers were quietly feeling like they were making a progress consulting with the Chinese about sort of you know sort of raising the temperature in North Korea little by little and you know doing I think they felt like they were making quiet progress and then after Chang's execution you know I think as Chris said nobody has a feel including the Chinese for what's going on inside of North Korea so from a U.S. policy perspective the question is is China going to work in this very quiet and begrudging way to raise the temperature you know Allah Iran or are they going to double down and basically say we held this young punk at arms length up until now since we have nobody else maybe we have to embrace him and so I think that's a big question going forward in terms of in terms of the North Korea problem in China interesting okay let's we have a bunch of other questions we have one more in Japan Korea and then we want to get up to Southeast Asia a little bit and I want to have some time for questions from the audience so Japan Korea political and historical tensions will well given the current situation I don't think we can call that optimism but not total gloom maybe Victor I'm sorry to come back to you but let me ask two questions in this context one is do you think well I think the Japanese have been surprised that the President Park has been so unwilling to respond to what they see as their overtures how do you see her policy what's the origin of it is she leading or following public opinion and more broadly I think a lot of Americans would say okay it's been a long time since Japanese colonialism most of the people were polling in South Korea have no memory of it why is there more antipathy now than 20 years ago if in fact there is well all good questions I don't know whether she's leading or following public opinion I think her record thus far shows that she really doesn't care about public opinion she's got her own very strong views and in this case whether it was and all of us are trying to figure this out whether it was the first interaction between President Park and then Special Envoy also when he came for her inauguration we went off to a very bad start and public opinion actually we've done some polling public opinion in Korea is actually not as bad as people think on Japan we did some polling where we asked folks to rank what issues matter to them most in terms of their support for their government and we put a number of things history being one of them and it did not rank highly at all so I think in that sense she's got her own views I mean I think I clicked B remain the same and I think that's a pessimistic assessment actually because I too don't think this can go on forever after Yasukuni basically a timeout has been called on all exchanges for now I think that'll probably last through till the spring March April and then I think both sides responsible individuals are trying to do it now but both sides are going to try to work really hard to read some sort of reconciliation by the fall because that would be a potential opportunity in New York at UNGA that would be a potential opportunity for the two leaders to meet I think the one issue where there is a great deal of emotion in Korea aside from the larger colonial issue the one issue that has been most politically salient has been the comfort women issue where if you talk to South Korean folks Yasukuni the visit happened it's done and in a sense they've kind of moved beyond that I think the Koreans unlike China I think the Koreans were not willing to be as vocal the Yasukuni visit and really have sort of said it's done it's over with but the comfort women issue remains a salient one and I think that's going to be the primary obstacle going forward I do think that both both are Japanese and Korean friends have come to the United States asking for help in terms of not mediating perhaps being a good listener to both sides but I do sense I mean there's fatigue about Korea and Japan there's fatigue about Japan and Korea and I think there's some fatigue now in the United States about this constant griping between the two sides so I guess when it's at rock bottom the only place you can go is up and I think that's sort of where we are in the Japan-Korea relationship but again for 2014 I would say that the important thing is responsible individuals on all three sides understand that this is a priority that needs to be worked on and I think they are going to work on it quietly behind closed doors and the other is you know when everything gets as bad as it does you can always rely on the North Koreans because there's a good chance I think that the North Koreans will you know they really haven't tested Park Geun-ae yet she's been in office more than a year and they really haven't tested her and I think they're going to and you know that can be an opportunity to sort of put a shock into the system and get everybody to focus on cooperating on things that really matter I shouldn't say really matter but certainly matter in the present day from a political and military security context. There have been some people who have said on the comfort women that Japan really needs to take another step and there's more that it could do or its companies could do and then I hear some Japanese even Japanese who acknowledge that their first round of apology sounded grudging or that well how can we take another step when there's no guarantee that that will be the last step and they'll always ask for more do you see a role for diplomacy there yeah I think that there were well I think on comfort women very specifically I think the a pretty clear line has been drawn and I don't think it's one that's difficult to achieve in the sense that I think what people are looking for is essentially a reaffirmation of the Kono statement and the Muriyama Apologies in other words getting back to the status quo how difficult that will be for the Abe administration I can't really say in terms of the concern that these historical issues are resolved only to reemerge the following year I mean this I think is a very valid concern on all sides whether it's the apologizer or the apology I think both feel that these issues can reemerge and there unfortunately I don't think there's a good answer I mean there can be political commitments made by both sides but you know the fact of the matter is these are two democracies leadership change and we could see you know some Japanese official that says something that is offensive or another supreme court ruling Korea that decides that more Japanese companies are liable for conscripted labor that unfortunately is the nature of this and again the view I think my view has always been we're never going to solve these problems we just have to avoid them having an impact on sort of actual alliance functions and clearly they're having an impact now whether it's military information sharing currency swap agreements these are having a real impact smart okay question number six which of the following best characterizes Myanmar also known as Burma's approach to its chairmanship of ASEAN in 2014 A produces concrete agenda for regional cooperation B responsible custodian C benign neglect D lean tilt toward China E don't know I guess there's no option for malign malign intervention alright a big don't know well it's good we have an expert tell us what the right answer is did you say Burma I did so did the president last night in his speech he mentioned two Asian countries Japan and Burma but look I think I think Myanmar is going to surprise people and it's in the process of doing so I picked B here Fred I think that Myanmar is actually working very hard to play the role of responsible custodian they want to they want to be exactly that they want to be a responsible and respected part of ASEAN we've done a lot of work on Myanmar here at CSIS and sort of the core question that everyone had when Myanmar made the decision to sort of go for political reform really ahead of economic reform the very un-Asian model of reform sequencing to do politics before economics but we asked just about everybody current leaders the military the opposition the president the parliament people who've been in jail civil society the diplomatic core why did Myanmar make this move towards reform and I think at the core of it was a desire for the country to return to its role and historically they remember in the 40s and 50s when Myanmar was moving out of its independence from the UK from Britain and then Japan and then from Britain again Myanmar was one of the countries that was seen as the bright lights of Southeast Asia had the best medical school the best university its leader was the head of the UN Burmese was the head of the UN and I think they had a really good job with this this coupled with the fact and another factor was a certain sense of claustrophobia with a dependence on China the Chinese had had over two decades of really dominant control over Myanmar their supply lines from a military point of view and certainly economically and they really want some balance there the real task will be for Myanmar to in its role as ASEAN chair to avoid what is already a very strong campaign by the Chinese to push enough money into Myanmar to make like they did in Cambodia to make and gain assurances that certain things will not be on the agenda in the meetings for ASEAN and the East Asia summit which President Obama will hopefully attend this fall with the other leaders I think Myanmar is absolutely committed to avoid that sort of trap and I don't think Myanmar will be anywhere near where Cambodia was I think Myanmar's chairmanship of ASEAN will look a lot like Brunei's which was and you can see that they're taking a lot of the same steps they've got a good group of advisors they've reached out for help they are setting the agenda early so that they can manage these issues well the biggest challenge for them is bandwidth and they just don't have the people the depth and the number of people who are in important positions to manage these roles so I think that's why ASEAN has provided a lot of help here and if you go to Yangon these days there will be a lot of ASEAN citizens people from Singapore, Bangkok, Indonesia and other places who are there specifically to help create the agenda get things sort of cemented in bureaucratically so that you can't be you can't get tilted by China I would say the other big question on Myanmar or Burma is internal those of us who think the administration's proclamations of victory for its democracy agenda in this country are a little premature and obviously it still has a constitution that enshrines the military as the controlling agent Anson Tsuqi can't run and now you've had this surge of Buddhist nationalism and violence against Muslims to what extent do you think they think their political reform has gone far enough and they can be accepted now by the US and inside ASEAN to what extent will there be domestic pressure to go further what will this year bring I don't see chest pounding sort of confidence or a sense of self-satisfaction among anyone in Myanmar I think quite the opposite I think if you talk to the current leadership particularly Tansen president he's a pretty humble guy he is working with Anson Tsuqi very closely behind the scenes to try to thread a needle and the needle that those two I think are trying to thread they're also political competitors so believe me this is not a complete partnership but they do have a common interest that the reform is effective and sustained and the threat to them would be reactivist groups in the military and it's a real threat that if things go sort of wrong or out of control that there could be sort of a recidivist campaign led by the military that would pull back the reforms so I think what I see in leadership the responsible parts of leadership there is a much more humble view of this a very sophisticated and nuanced dance that's going on between the current leadership and Anson Tsuqi and her party I think on the question of the Constitution where she can't run that she is pushing hard on that but I also believe that if the Constitution is not amended for a number of reasons before the 2015 elections the NLD will still run they'll win and then she will act from the view of an incumbent I think that the view I have is that the military is not won on this issue they're not a unified force on politics and I think Anson Tsuqi also believes that and that hopefully she can run in 2015 but if she can't I think that the plan is to find a way to win and then get that 25% of that some part of that 25% that you mentioned that is cemented into the parliamentary representation to come across the aisle and vote for amendments and so that she can then become she could be a leader of her party she could have more influence on the Constitution at that point I do want to get time for audience can we skip to question 8 is that let's go to question number 8 and do one more clicker and then open the floor which of the following best describes your expectations for President Obama's travel to the region this year a strength and regional solidarity to manage China see progress on TPP D renewed focus on Southeast Asia crisis over the debt ceiling forces him to cancel the trip so who's winning see let me just start and ask each of you to answer this one Chris why don't you go first I said none of the above because I think they're all they're all too definitive I guess I think we're going to see elements of all of those things on the trip I would say that the one thing that concerns me a little bit is just so far as Mike mentioned we have an emerging list of countries obviously it's a big issue as to whether China is going to be one of those countries it's not looking very likely and I don't think that's a problem in the China-U.S. relationship for say the Chinese certainly will understand they'll be disappointed but they'll understand the other picture is we all know how your colleagues in the media are going to spin that though if he just goes to the Philippines Malaysia Japan and possibly Korea this is the rebalance strangling it's grabbing a stranglehold on China so I think the administration has to think very thoughtfully about how they manage that perception because it's going to be out there and the Chinese will be those who are so inclined in the Chinese system will be grabbing onto that to make their case and will Chinese leaders be pushing hard? Their view is we owe them too we owe them a sunny lands exchange and then also the state visit from 2009 or rather from Hu Jintao's visit here when he was state president so definitely they would want to see that happen I said C and that was more of a hopeful C there'll be progress on TPP we all know that these sort of summit visits by the president become action-forcing events they give bureaucracies and negotiators something to work towards in terms of providing a deliverable for the president when they go to Asia and there's no bigger deliverable here I think than finishing the agreement on TPP so I'm hopeful in that sense the other thing that I know this is a panel about security but the other thing that I would just throw on in addition to the trade issue that I think we have to think about going forward is the stuff that's happening with I mean it's sort of the implications the ripple effects of the taper here because we're seeing it obviously in places like Turkey and Argentina and I think there's a lot of discussion concern emergency meetings behind closed doors in Asia about whether this thing is going to start eking into Asian markets I've already seen it cause some dropped in Asian markets and so I think that's a very real issue and I think right now many of the countries in the region have their head in the sand they don't really want to respond to it everybody's thankful for the Lunar New Year so that markets are closed until Monday and hope that it will all go away when they come back next week but for one the taper's not going away and I think there's an effect that could be that could have a real impact on the region as you know the president gears up for going there in the spring I also said because Victor wore a pink tie and I have one on I think the again and I would agree on the hopefulcy I think that one thing this town hasn't done well in the discussion about TPP particularly on the hill is talked about how absolutely fundamental an economic policy trade policy is to our security discussion with Asia you know you can't separate the two in Asia and I think you know if you look at the TPP debate around town it sounds like this is about just about jobs or something it is about jobs I think that's right it is about economic renewal it is about the Americans being part of a structure or rules that will integrate Asia's economies that are already happening it's going to happen with or without us if we're not part of that I think it's a problem but on economic engagement the president has to have his trip we should say two trips so Chris I think you were talking about April when you said he wasn't going to China he actually is going to Asia, China and Myanmar at least in November or October I guess it could be October now but one thing we should also say I think because all of us the Asia team at CSIS was really jumping up and down about the president missing his trip in November and one thing we all recommended was you know you've got to go out of cycle and you know what he's doing it so I think we should really give the White House and the president credit you know he better go if he goes we're going to give him credit I think that April trip is important but I think he can't afford to play small ball he can't go and have this trip be sort of a make up for not going in November and just pop into Malaysia which no US president has been to since Lyndon Johnson by the way and visit the Philippines where there's a very real security issues hopefully he'll be able to anoint a new agreement on the access to bases negotiation the Philippines and then Japan of course we've got the very big issues at stake I think he's got to elevate his game he's got to have something in his pocket hopefully a negotiated TPP agreement that he can then use his trip as a fulcrum to really start to spend that political capital and drive home the security link the geostrategic link to trade on Capitol Hill alright is there microphones or how do we we have a question right here please identify yourself and your organization hi I'm Donna Wells I'm independent can you talk about current levels as well as future trends and rates of popular internet access in the region let's start with China on that one well the rate of increase is through the roof in terms of the number of people on the internet in China as I tried to mention during the earlier remarks there's an unbelievable tightness obviously that we're all familiar with and I think that's only going to continue it can be very painful sometimes to plow one's way through the pages of People's Daily and so on there's often a lot of tough slogging there but if you read the articles that have been put out there by very authoritative people in the system especially from the propaganda side it's abundantly clear they see this as a war they talk of it in terms of warfare and that's I think not by mistake or by hyperbole they see it that way the internet as a whole well not just control but just the whole package I mean you know this very much is the center of this this sort of issue that I was discussing earlier which is how does this Leninist stovepipe bureaucracy right atop a very dynamic society right you know that's a big big deal internet is the war zone for that very issue and I think if you look at the messaging from the leadership especially the way the so-called big V's have been paraded out on CCTV to admit their errors and so on I mean it has a cultural revolution feel to it it really does and I can assure you that it has not only terrified those kind of people but even big players in the Chinese system in the internet world you know the leaders of the world and so on they're being very very careful and it's another thing to watch too that's very interesting in how the anti-corruption campaign is being used to target people in that space so this is a full out very well thought out strategy and I see no sign that it will abate anytime soon South Korea the most wired country in the world in terms of internet usage and cell phone usage for household enough said the interesting thing statistic to me about North Korea these days is not sort of about their nuclear weapons or their 1.1 million man army it's sort of internet usage and cell phone usage in North Korea because that's the one thing that's changing in the whole North Korea situation cell phone subscribers are now over 2 million in North Korea which is not large by comparison to other countries but it allows society to connect in a way that they haven't before people can text each other price of rice in different markets which is the government's primary hold on the country has been the control of information this is a brand new variable that's being introduced and has garnered a lot of interest I just say quickly in Southeast Asia you know also internet usage is way up but there's sort of there's sort of an irony right well there are digital champions now all over Southeast Asia where entrepreneurs are doing things they've never done before policy entrepreneurism is happening in terms of a greater commentary on policies but it's also escalating conflicts that always existed between religions and ethnicities so debates like over the use of the word Allah in Malaysia have become much bigger things because it's you could say heightened or exacerbated by access to social media and the internet well I think overall Southeast Asia has used the internet and access to markets and all the good parts of the internet very well governments ironically are starting to think about whether to nationalize the internet and there are policy moves to force companies to keep data inside of countries and this is an absolute non-starter for IT companies for banks it just doesn't work that way you can't afford to build data centers and keep or cash all the data that you're collecting in every country of the world if you want to do business in 100 countries so we're in for a real debate and some of the revolutions have made it easier for governments to try and make that case yeah I think so more so maybe in Northeast Asia I don't think obviously the Indonesians were deeply offended they've sort of plugged the Australians on this and given us a pass but we're jointly in that category we published an op-ed just before Rodman's second trip to North Korea by Mr. Shin the prisoner who escaped from camp 14 and it was one of those op-ed it happens once in a while that it got a lot of readers the first day but then it got even more the second day and it just kind of had a life and I jokingly said to one of my people are these readers in North Korea and actually there were four clicks from North Korea onto this piece maybe it was the uncle there were a lot of readers of it in China which was interesting anyway yes thank you very much my name is Jinning Wei with Voice of Vietnamese Americans I'd like to come back to Mr. Bauer regarding Southeast Asia because I think the rebalancing to Asia has the first focus in Southeast Asia and also the TPP is aimed to be the legacy of President Obama and I pointed out that it has everything to do with security and the future so two questions first it has everything to do with Vietnam because in the way in 1973 in 1974 and 1975 the US confirmed it's moving away from Asia from Vietnam and now coming back I would like to ask you about the Southeast Asia Sea the current fishing ban and fishing restrictions and the in effect control of China in that area with the fishing fishermen in the area what do you suggest the US take action because I think the State Department has made statement but does the statement have any weight in it the second part is the TPP where do you see Vietnam and its role in the TPP and listening to the list of countries that President should visit in April I did not hear Vietnam is there anything that any implications in it thank you thank you for the question I think on the South China Sea and what can the US do I thought Secretary Kerry's visit to Vietnam was actually quite good and he underlined during that visit that freedom of navigation in the South China Sea including for Vietnamese fishermen is a right it's not something that the Chinese can allow exactly thank you Chris so I think that's a good position for the United States to take I thought Asia is really hungry for more strong US statements on these types of actions for instance the flying the bombers through the ADIZ when it went up I think Southeast Asia loved that I mean they quietly loved that quietly being an important word there and then on TPP and Vietnam I think TPP for Vietnam TPP is a great tool because the Vietnamese have an economy that's not obviously smaller but not dissimilar from China and they've got a lot of the same problems they are addicted to to sort of easy credit that went to state-owned enterprises the state-owned enterprises didn't manage that well as we know now but the state-owned enterprises dominate their economy the Vietnamese know that they have to stay ahead of China and of the neighborhood in terms of their economy if they want to ensure their national security so TPP is excellent because it links them with the United States and other countries and it forces sort of an exogenous pressures to do levels of reform that I don't think you could do politically not within the communist party in Vietnam so they use the bilateral trade agreement the WTO accession to this effect and now TPP will take that up to a new level and we ask for where the Vietnamese are now to get to that level but it's I think it's a measure of the strategic perspective of the Vietnamese that they have to play in something like Vietnam even though it's almost an economically it's almost an existential challenge for them to meet that objective Mike Mike Massetic PBS Online NewsHour and we haven't gotten to mention yet is Thailand is there anything, any toolbox any kit in the toolbox that the United States, China, Japan can do to bring them back from the brink of what really looks like they're heading to civil war and then what are the security implications in the neighborhood if they do start a civil war there Yeah, that's probably me Victor Want that one This is tough because I bet all of you or most of you know really well educated ties who have cosmopolitan views and years of experience not only in Thailand but in international organizations but man, if you talk to any of them they on their own politics Thailand is so divided that everybody's is red or yellow or thinks that everyone else is some color it's a very difficult point that we find ourselves in Thailand and I describe it as we are still in the center of a hurricane so even though it's bad right now we haven't seen the other side of this hurricane and the other side of that storm could be very rough I would hate to say civil war but there are signs that the military is not one heard me say that again I don't know about Myanmar but if the Thai military doesn't stick together there's a real problem now what can the United States do or what can other partners do that's a real question we are going to do a conference here at CSIS in about a month looking at scenarios on three scenarios which way will Thailand go and then what are the US responses well I don't have the answer to your question I do think that some of the things we can do now is we should be strengthening our discussions our relations with the Thai military which have been traditionally very good but we need to elevate those engagements to an entirely new level sort of an urgency level that I don't think I don't see happening and we need to step that up I think going to Thailand although it's hard is important that you don't give the Thai's the sense that it's their problem they're going to fight it out or do whatever they do and we'll all be back when they figure that out I think it's important to get to the country and talk to the different parties but that's hard because what do you do if you meet with the wrong person you're damned by half the country so this is where quite frankly the United States needs really seasoned Asia hands the people that have been with Thailand for 20 or 30 years the guys like I'm thinking of Rich Armitage these are the guys that I would like to see the US government maybe deputize if they don't have them in their own ranks right now and send an eminent persons group into Thailand to start having these conversations and try to calm the parties down some of the most interest I think an interesting take on this is my colleague Jackson Deal has written how Thailand is not the only place where you have an urban elite that thought it was for democracy until the democracy turned out to have effects that it didn't expect and I mean you saw the same thing in Cairo when you have an elected government that behaves corruptly or maybe somewhat autocratically and then the long time ruling middle class is kind of flummoxed about how to respond you know Turkey, Egypt, Thailand I gotta say I mean I had a horrifying moment driving to work the other day where I was listening to NPR and they talked about the you know the attacks on police stations and I thought oh shoot this is is this about Thailand and then I realized this could be Thailand Egypt or Ukraine and in the end the story was about Egypt but for literally because I just turned it on at the right time for 30 seconds I didn't know if it was Thailand they were talking about and that's scary we're about out of time I just want to add a very brief comment I just would echo what Ernie said and I think actually that challenge you laid out is even higher from the fact that the Chinese are way ahead in this game they're mapping all those constituencies like they did after the toxin coup very effectively and they're way ahead of us I think on this one and I'm not sure that they'll be entirely helpful in working with us on that process well I know I got material I can steal for editorials for months to come from this very smart panel so thank you all and thank you very much thank you Fred see you back here at 11 o'clock