 Question 120 of Summa Theologica Secunda Secunde. Triaties on the Cardinal of Virtues, The Virtue of Justice. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Summa Theologica Secunda Secunde. Triaties on the Cardinal of Virtues, The Virtue of Justice. By St. Thomas Aquinas. Translated by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province. Question 120 of Epicaea, or Equity, in two articles. We must now consider Epicaea, under which head there are two points of inquiry. First, whether Epicaea is a virtue. Second, whether it is a part of justice. First article, whether Epicaea is a virtue. Objection 1. It seems that Epicaea is not a virtue. For no virtue does away with another virtue. Yet Epicaea does away with another virtue, since it sets aside that which is just according to law, and seemingly is opposed to severity. Therefore, Epicaea is not a virtue. Objection 2 further. The Guston says in On True Religion, 31. With regard to these earthly laws, although men pass judgment on them when they make them, yet once they are made and established, the judge must pronounce judgment, not on them, but according to them. But seemingly Epicaea pronounces judgment on the law, when it deems that the law should not be observed in some particular case. Therefore, Epicaea is a vice rather than a virtue. Objection 3 further. Apparently it belongs to Epicaea to consider the intention of the law-giver, as the philosopher states in Ethics 5.10. But it belongs to the sovereign alone to interpret the intention of the law-giver, wherefore the Emperor says in the Codex of Laws and Constitutions, under Law 1, it is fitting and lawful that we alone should interpret between equity and law. Therefore, the act of Epicaea is unlawful, and consequently, Epicaea is not a virtue. On the contrary, the philosopher in Ethics 5.10 states it to be a virtue. I answer that as stated above in the Paris Prima Secundae, Question 96, Article 6, when we were treating of laws. Since human actions with which laws are concerned are composed of contingent singulars and are innumerable in their diversity, it was not possible to lay down rules of law that would apply to every single case. Legislators in framing laws attend to what commonly happens, although if the law be applied to certain cases, it will frustrate the equality of justice and be injurious to the common good, which the law has in view. Thus the law requires deposits to be restored, because in the majority of cases this is just. Yet it happens sometimes to be injurious, for instance, if a madman were to put his sword in deposit and demand its delivery while in a state of madness, or if a man were to seek the return of his deposit in order to fight against his country. In these and like cases, it is bad to follow the law and it is good to set aside the letter of the law and to follow the dictates of justice and the common good. This is the object of Epicaea, which we call equity. Therefore, it is evident that Epicaea is a virtue. Reply to Objection 1. Epicaea does not set aside that which is just in itself, but that which is just as by law established. Nor is it opposed to severity, which follows the letter of the law when it ought to be followed. To follow the letter of the law when it ought not to be followed is sinful. Hence, it is written in the Codex of Laws and Constitutions under Law 5, without doubt he transgresses the law, who by adhering to the letter of the law strives to defeat the intention of the lawgiver. Reply to Objection 2. It would be passing judgment on a law to say that it was not well made, but to say that the letter of the law is not to be observed in some particular case is passing judgment not on the law, but on some particular contingency. Reply to Objection 3. Interpretation is admissible in doubtful cases, where it is not allowed to set aside the letter of the law without the interpretation of the sovereign. But when the case is manifest, there is need not of interpretation, but of execution. Second article. Whether epicaea is a part of justice? Objection 1. It seems that epicaea is not a part of justice. For as stated above in Question 58 Article 7, justice is twofold, particular and legal. Now, epicaea is not part of particular justice, since it extends to all virtues, even as legal justice does. In like manner, neither is it a part of legal justice, since its operation is beside that which is established by law. Therefore, it seems that epicaea is not a part of justice. Objection 2 further. A more principal virtue is not assigned as the part of a less principal virtue. For it is to the cardinal virtue as being principal, that secondary virtues are assigned as parts. Now, epicaea seems to be a more principal virtue than justice, as implied by its name, for it is derived from epi, that is, above, and dicaion, that is, just. Therefore, epicaea is not a part of justice. Objection 3 further. It seems that epicaea is the same as modesty. For where the apostle says in Philippians 4-5, let your modesty be known to all men. The Greek has epicaea. Now, according to Tully in his rhetoric too, modesty is a part of temperance. Therefore, epicaea is not a part of justice. On the contrary, the philosopher says in Ethics 5-10 that epicaea is a kind of justice. I answer that as stated above in question 48. A virtue has three kinds of parts, subjective, integral, and potential. A subjective part is one of which the whole is predicated essentially, and it is less than the whole. This may happen in two ways. For sometimes one thing is predicated of many in one common ratio, as animal of horse and ox. And sometimes one thing is predicated of many according to priority and posteriority, as being of substance and accident. Accordingly, epicaea is a part of justice taken in a general sense, for it is a kind of justice, as the philosopher states in Ethics 5-10. Therefore, it is evident that epicaea is a subjective part of justice, and justice is predicated of it with priority to being predicated of legal justice, since legal justice is subject to the direction of epicaea. Hence, epicaea is by way of being a higher rule of human actions. Reply to Objection 1. Epicaea corresponds properly to legal justice, and in one way is contained under it, and in another way exceeds it. For if legal justice denotes that which complies with the law, whether as regards the letter of the law, or as regards the intention of the lawgiver, which is of more account, then epicaea is the more important part of legal justice. But if legal justice denotes merely that which complies with the law with regard to the letter, then epicaea is not part of legal justice, but of justice in its general acceptation, and is condivided with legal justice as exceeding it. Reply to Objection 2. As the philosopher states in Ethics 5-10. Epicaea is better than a certain, namely legal, justice, which observes the letter of the law. Yet since it is itself a kind of justice, it is not better than all justice. Reply to Objection 3. It belongs to epicaea to moderate something, namely the observance of the letter of the law. But modesty, which is reckoned a part of temperance, moderates man's outward life, for instance in his deportment dress or the like. Possibly also the term epicaea is applied in Greek by a similitude to all kinds of moderation. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Summa Theologica Secunda Secunde, Triatis on the Cardinal Virtues, The Virtue of Justice, by St. Thomas Aquinas, translated by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province. Question 121 of The Gift of Piety in two articles. We must now consider the gift that corresponds to justice, namely piety. Under this head, there are two points of inquiry. First, whether it is a gift of the Holy Ghost. Second, which of the beatitudes and fruits corresponds to it. First article, whether piety is a gift. Objection 1, it seems that piety is not a gift. For the gifts differ from the virtues as stated above in the Parsprima Secunde, Question 68, Article 1. But piety is a virtue as stated above in Question 101, Article 3. Therefore, piety is not a gift. Objection 2 further. The gifts are more excellent than the virtues, above all the moral virtues, as above stated in the Parsprima Secunde, Question 68, Article 8. Now among the parts of justice, religion is greater than piety. Therefore, if any part of justice is to be accounted a gift, it seems that religion should be a gift rather than piety. Objection 3 further. The gifts and their acts remain in heaven as stated above in the Parsprima Secunde, Question 68, Article 6. But the act of piety cannot remain in heaven. For Gregory says in his commentary on Job 1 that piety fills the inmost recesses of the heart with works of mercy. And so, there will be no piety in heaven, since there will be no unhappiness. Therefore, piety is not a gift. On the contrary, it is reckoned among the gifts in the 11th chapter of Isaiah, Verse 2. Translators note, the word in Latin is pietas, whence our English word piti, which is the same as mercy. I answer that as stated above in the Parsprima Secunde, Question 68, Article 1, as well as in Question 69, Articles 1 and 3. The gifts of the Holy Ghost are habitual dispositions of the soul, rendering it amenable to the motion of the Holy Ghost. Now the Holy Ghost moves us to this effect, among others, of having a filial affection towards God according to Romans 8.15. You have received the spirit of adoption of sons whereby we cry, abba, father, and since it belongs properly to piety, to pay duty and worship to one's father, it follows that piety whereby, at the Holy Ghost's instigation, we pay worship and duty to God as our father, is a gift of the Holy Ghost. Reply to Objection 1. The piety that pays duty and worship to a father in the flesh is a virtue, but the piety that is a gift pays this to God as father. Reply to Objection 2. To pay worship to God as Creator, as religion does, is more excellent than to pay worship to one's father in the flesh, as the piety that is a virtue does. But to pay worship to God as Father is yet more excellent than to pay worship to God as Creator and Lord. Wherefore, religion is greater than the virtue of piety, while the gift of piety is greater than religion. Reply to Objection 3. As by the virtue of piety, man pays duty and worship not only to his father in the flesh, but also to all his kindred on account of their being related to his father. So by the gift of piety, he pays worship and duty not only to God, but also to all men on account of the relationship to God. Hence, it belongs to piety to honor the saints and not to contradict the scriptures, whether one understands them or not, as Augustine says, and on Christian doctrine too. Consequently, it also assists those who are in a state of unhappiness and although this act has no place in heaven, especially after the day of judgment, yet piety will exercise its principal act, which is to revere God with filial affection. For it is then above all that this act will be fulfilled, according to Wisdom 5.5. Behold how they are numbered among the children of God. The saints will also mutually honor one another. Now however, before the judgment day, the saints have pity on those also who are living in this unhappy state. Second article. Whether the second beatitude, blessed are the meek, corresponds to the gift of piety. Objection one, it seems that the second beatitude, blessed are the meek, does not correspond to the gift of piety. For piety is the gift corresponding to justice, to which rather belongs the fourth beatitude. Blessed are they that hunger and thirst after justice. Or the fifth beatitude, blessed are the merciful. Since it stated above in article one, third objection, the works of mercy belong to piety. Therefore, the second beatitude does not pertain to the gift of piety. Objection two, further. The gift of piety is directed by the gift of knowledge, which is united to it in the enumeration of the gifts in Isaiah 11. Now direction and execution extend to the same matter. Since then the third beatitude, blessed are they that mourn, corresponds to the gift of knowledge. It seems that the second beatitude corresponds to piety. Objection three, further. The fruits correspond to the beatitudes and gifts, as stated above, in the Parsprimisukunde, question seventy, article two. Now among the fruits, goodness and benignity seem to agree with piety rather than mildness, which pertains to meekness. Therefore, the second beatitude does not correspond to the gift of piety. On the contrary, Augustine says in his commentary on the Sermon on the Mount one, piety is becoming to the meek. I answer that, in adapting the beatitudes to the gifts, a twofold congruity may be observed. One is according to the order in which they are given, and Augustine seems to have followed this. Wherefore he assigns the first beatitude to the lowest gift, namely fear, and the second beatitude, blessed are the meek, to piety, and so on. Another congruity may be observed in keeping with the special nature of each gift and beatitude. In this way one must adapt the beatitudes to the gifts according to their objects and acts. And thus the fourth and fifth beatitudes would correspond to piety rather than the second. Yet the second beatitude has a certain congruity with piety, inasmuch as meekness removes the obstacles to acts of piety. This suffices for the reply to the first objection. Reply to objection two. Taking the beatitudes and gifts according to their proper natures, the same beatitude must needs correspond to knowledge and piety. But taking them according to their order, different beatitudes correspond to them, although a certain congruity may be observed as stated above. Reply to objection three. In the fruits, goodness and benignity may be directly ascribed to piety, and mildness indirectly insofar as it removes obstacles to acts of piety as stated above. End of question 121. Read by Michael Shane Craig Lambert, LC. Question 122 of Summa Theologica Secunda Secunde. Triities on the Cardinal Virtues. The Virtue of Justice. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Summa Theologica Secunda Secunde. Triities on the Cardinal Virtues. The Virtue of Justice by St. Thomas Aquinas. Translated by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province. Question 122 of The Precepts of Justice in Six Articles. We must now consider the Precepts of Justice. Under which head there are six points of inquiry. First, whether the Precepts of the Decalogue are Precepts of Justice. Second, of the First Precept of the Decalogue. Third, of the Second. Fourth, of the Third. Fifth, of the Fourth. Sixth, of the Other Six. First article. Whether the Precepts of the Decalogue are Precepts of Justice. Objection 1. It seems that the Precepts of the Decalogue are not Precepts of Justice. For the intention of a lawgiver is to make the citizens virtuous in respect of every virtue. That's stated in Ethics 2-1. Wherefore, according to Ethics 5-1, the law prescribes about all acts of all virtues. Now the Precepts of the Decalogue are the first principles of the whole divine law. Therefore, the Precepts of the Decalogue do not pertain to Justice alone. Objection 2 further. You would seem that, to Justice, belong especially the Judicial Precepts, which are condivided with the Moral Precepts as stated above, in the Parsprimisukunde Question 99, Article 4. But the Precepts of the Decalogue are Moral Precepts, as stated above, in the Parsprimisukunde Question 100, Article 3. Therefore, the Precepts of the Decalogue are not Precepts of Justice. Objection 3 further. The law contains chiefly Precepts about acts of Justice regarding the common good, for instance, about public officers and the like. But there is no mention of these in the Precepts of the Decalogue. Therefore, it seems that the Precepts of the Decalogue do not properly belong to Justice. Objection 4 further. The Precepts of the Decalogue are divided into two tables, corresponding to the love of God and the love of our neighbour, both of which regard the virtue of charity. Therefore, the Precepts of the Decalogue belong to charity rather than to Justice. On the contrary, seemingly, Justice is the sole virtue whereby we are directed to another. Now we are directed to another by all the Precepts of the Decalogue, as is evident if one consider each of them. Therefore, all the Precepts of the Decalogue pertain to Justice. I answer that the Precepts of the Decalogue are the first principles of the law, and the natural reason ascends to them at once as to principles that are most evident. Now it is altogether evident that the notion of duty, which is essential to a Precept, appears in Justice, which is of one towards another. Because in those matters that relate to himself, it would seem at a glance that man is master of himself, and that he may do as he likes. Whereas in matters that refer to another, it appears manifestly that a man is under obligation to render to another that which is his due. Hence the Precepts of the Decalogue must needs pertain to Justice. Therefore, the first three Precepts are about acts of religion, which is the chief part of Justice. The fourth Precept is about acts of piety, which is the second part of Justice. And the sixth remaining are about Justice commonly so-called, which is observed among equals. Reply to Objection 1. The intention of the law is to make all men virtuous, but in a certain order, namely, by first of all giving them Precepts about those things where the notion of duty is most manifest, as stated above. Reply to Objection 2. The judicial Precepts are determinations of the moral Precepts, insofar as these are directed to one's neighbor, just as the ceremonial Precepts are determinations of the moral Precepts, insofar as these are directed to God. Hence neither Precepts are contained in the Decalogue, and yet they are determinations of the Precepts of the Decalogue, and therefore, pertain to Justice. Reply to Objection 3. Things that concern the common good must needs be administered in different ways, according to the difference of men. Hence they were to be given a place, not among the Precepts of the Decalogue, but among the judicial Precepts. Reply to Objection 4. The Precepts of the Decalogue pertain to Charity as their end, according to First Timothy 1.5. The end of the commandment is Charity, but they belong to Justice in as much as they refer immediately to acts of Justice. Second article. Whether the First Precept of the Decalogue is fittingly expressed. Objection 1. It seems that the First Precept of the Decalogue is unfittingly expressed, for man is more bound to God than to his Father in the flesh, according to Hebrews 12.9. How much more shall we obey the Father of spirits and live? Now the Precept of piety, whereby man honours his Father, is expressed affirmatively in these words, honor thy Father and thy Mother. Much more therefore should the First Precept of Religion, whereby all honor God, be expressed affirmatively, especially as affirmation is naturally prior to negation. Objection 2 further. The First Precept of the Decalogue pertains to Religion as stated above an article 1. Now Religion, since it is one virtue, has one act. Yet in the First Precept, three acts are forbidden, since we read first, thou shalt not have strange gods before me. Secondly, thou shalt not make to thyself any graven thing. And thirdly, thou shalt not adore them nor serve them. Therefore the First Precept is unfittingly expressed. Objection 3 further. Augustine says that the First Precept forbids the sin of superstition. But there are many wicked superstitions besides idolatry, as stated above, in question 92, article 2. Therefore it was insufficient to forbid idolatry alone. On the contrary stands the authority of Scripture. I answer that it pertains to law to make men good, wherefore it behoved the precepts of the law to be set in order according to the order of generation, the order to it of man's becoming good. Now two things must be observed in the order of generation. The first is that the first part is the first thing to be established. Thus in the generation of an animal, the first thing to be formed is the heart. And in building a home, the first thing to be set up is the foundation. And in the goodness of the soul, the first part is goodness of the will, the result of which is that a man makes good use of every other goodness. Now the goodness of the will depends on its object, which is its end. Wherefore, since man was to be directed to virtue by means of the law, the first thing necessary was, as it were, to lay the foundation of religion, whereby man is duly directed to God, who is the last end of man's will. The second thing to be observed in the order of generation is that in the first place, contraries and obstacles have to be removed. Thus the farmer first purifies the soil and afterwards sows his seed, according to Jeremiah 4.3, break up anew your fellow ground and sow not upon thorns. Hence it behoved man, first of all to be instructed in religion, so as to remove the obstacles to true religion. Now the chief obstacle to religion is for man to adhere to a false God, according to Matthew 6.24. You cannot serve God and mammon. Therefore, in the first precept of the law, the worship of false gods is excluded. Reply to Objection 1. In point of fact, there is one affirmative precept about religion, namely remember that thou keep holy the Sabbath day. Still the negative precepts had to be given first, so that by their means the obstacles to religion might be removed. For though affirmation naturally precedes negation, yet in the process of generation, negation whereby obstacles are removed comes first, as stated in the article. Especially is this true in matters concerning God, where negation is preferable to affirmation on account of our insufficiency as Dionysius observes, and on the celestial hierarchy too. Reply to Objection 2. People worshipped strange gods in two ways. For some served certain creatures as gods without having recourse to images. Hence, Avaro says that for a long time the ancient Romans worshipped gods without using images, and this worship is forbidden by the words, thou shalt not have strange gods. Among others the worship of false gods was observed by using certain images, and so the very making of images was fittingly forbidden by the words, thou shalt not make to thyself any graven thing. As also the worship of those same images by the words, thou shalt not adore them, etc. Reply to Objection 3. All other kinds of superstition proceed from some compact, tacit or explicit with the demons. Hence, all are understood to be forbidden by the words, thou shalt not have strange gods. Third article. Whether the second precept of the Decalogue is fittingly expressed. Objection 1. It seems that the second precept of the Decalogue is unfittingly expressed. For this precept, thou shalt not take the name of thy God in vain, is thus explained by a gloss on Exodus 27. Thou shalt not deem the Son of God to be a creature, so that it forbids an error against faith. Again, a gloss on the words of Deuteronomy 5.11, thou shalt not take the name of thy God in vain, adds, that is, by giving the name of God to wood or stone, as though they forbade a false confession of faith which, like error, is an act of unbelief. Now, unbelief precedes superstition, as faith precedes religion. Therefore, this precept should have preceded the first, whereby superstition is forbidden. Objection 2 further. The name of God is taken for many purposes, for instance, those of praise, of working miracles, and generally speaking in conjunction with all we say or do according to Colossians 3.17. All whatsoever you do in word or in work, do ye in the name of the Lord. Therefore, the precept forbidding the taking of God's name in vain seems to be more universal than the precept forbidding superstition, and thus should have preceded it. Objection 3 further. A gloss on Exodus 20.7 expounds the precept, thou shalt not take the name of thy God in vain, namely, by swearing to nothing. Hence this precept would seem to forbid useless swearing, that is to say swearing without judgment, but false swearing, which is without truth, and unjust swearing, which is without justice, are much more grievous. Therefore, this precept should rather have forbidden them. Objection 4 further. Blasphemy, or any word or deed that is an insult to God, is much more grievous than perjury. Therefore, blasphemy and other like sins should rather have been forbidden by this precept. Objection 5 further. God's names are many. Therefore, it should not have been said indefinitely, thou shalt not take the name of thy God in vain. On the contrary stands the authority of Scripture. I answer that, in one who is being instructed in virtue, it is necessary to remove obstacles to true religion before establishing him in true religion. Now a thing is opposed to true religion in two ways. First, by excess, when to wit, that which belongs to religion is given to others than to whom it is due, and this pertains to superstition. Secondly, by lack, as it were, of reverence. When to wit, God is condemned, and this pertains to the vice of irreligion, as stated above in Question 97 in the preamble and in the article that follows. Now superstition hinders religion by preventing man from acknowledging God so as to worship him. And when a man's mind is engrossed in some undue worship, he cannot at the same time give due worship to God according to Isaiah 2820. The bed is straightened so that one must fall out. That is, either the true God or a false God must fall out from man's heart. And a short covering cannot cover both. On the other hand, irreligion hinders religion by preventing man from honoring God after he has acknowledged him. Now one must first of all acknowledge God with a view to worship before honoring him we have acknowledged. For this reason, the precept forbidding superstition is placed before the second precept, which forbids perjury that pertains to irreligion. Reply to Objection 1. These expositions are mystical. The literal explanation is that which is given in Deuteronomy 511. This precept does not forbid all taking of the name of God, but properly the taking of God's name in confirmation of a man's word by way of an oath because men are want to take God's name more frequently in this way. Nevertheless, we may understand that in consequence all inordinate taking of the divine name is forbidden by this precept. And it is in this sense that we are to take the explanation quoted in the first objection. Reply to Objection 3. To swear to nothing means to swear to that which is not. This pertains to false swearing, which is chiefly called perjury as stated above in Question 98 Article 1 Third Reply. For when a man swears to that which is false, his swearing is vain in itself, since it is not supported by the truth. On the other hand, when a man swears without judgment through levity, if he swear to the truth there is no vanity on the part of the oath itself, but only on the part of the swearer. Reply to Objection 4. Just as when we instruct a man in some science, we begin by putting before him certain general maxims, even so the law which forms man to virtue by instructing him in the precepts of the Decalogue which are the first of all precepts. Gave expression by prohibition or by command to those things which are of most common occurrence in the course of human life. Hence the precepts of the Decalogue include the prohibition of perjury which is of more frequent occurrence than blasphemy, since man does not fall so often into the latter sin. Reply to Objection 5. Reverence is due to the divine names on the part of the thing signified, which is one and not on the part of the signifying words which are many. Hence it is expressed in the singular. Thou shalt not take the name of thy God in vain, since it matters not in which of God's names perjury is committed. Fourth article. Whether the third precept of the Decalogue, concerning the hallowing of the Sabbath, is fittingly expressed. Objection 1. It seems that the third precept of the Decalogue concerning the hallowing of the Sabbath is unfittingly expressed. For this, understood spiritually, is a general precept. Since Bede and commenting on Luke 13-14, the ruler of the synagogue being angry that he had healed on the Sabbath says, The law forbids not to heal man on the Sabbath, but to do servile works, that is, to burden oneself with sin. Taken literally, it is a ceremonial precept, for it is written in Exodus 31-13, See that you keep my Sabbath, because it is a sign between me and you and your generations. Now the precepts of the Decalogue are both spiritual and moral. Therefore, it is unfittingly placed among the precepts of the Decalogue. Objection 2. Further, the ceremonial precepts of the law contain sacred things, sacrifices, sacraments and observances. As stated above in the Bar's Primus Akundek, Question 101, Article 4. Now sacred things comprised not only sacred days, but also sacred places and sacred vessels and so on. Moreover, there were many sacred days other than the Sabbath. Therefore, it was unfitting to omit all other ceremonial observances and to mention only that of the Sabbath. Objection 3. Further, whoever breaks a precept of the Decalogue, sins. But in the old law some who broke the observances of the Sabbath did not sin. For instance, those who circumcised their sons on the 8th day, and the priests who worked in the temple on the Sabbath. Also Elias and 3 Kings 19, who journeyed for 40 days unto the Mount of God Horab, must have travelled on a Sabbath. The priests also who carried the Ark of the Covenant for seven days, as related in Joshua 7, must be understood to have carried it on the Sabbath. Again it is written in Luke 13.15, Doth not every one of you on the Sabbath day loose his ox or his ass and lead them to water? Therefore it is unfittingly placed among the precepts of the Decalogue. Objection 4. Further, the precepts of the Decalogue have to be observed also under the new law. Yet in the new law this precept is not observed, neither in the point of the Sabbath day, nor as to the Lord's day, on which men cook their food, travel, fish, and do many like things. Therefore the precept of the observance of the Sabbath is unfittingly expressed. On the contrary stands the authority of Scripture. I answer that the obstacles to true religion being removed by the first and second precepts of the Decalogue as stated above in Articles 2 and 3. It remained for the third precept to be given, whereby man is established in true religion. Now it belongs to religion to give worship to God, and just as the Divine Scriptures teach the interior worship under the guise of certain corporal similitudes, so is external worship given to God under the guise of sensible signs. And since for the most part man is induced to pay interior worship, consisting in prayer and devotion by the interior prompting of the Holy Ghost, a precept of the law is necessary respecting the exterior worship that consists in sensible signs. Now the precepts of the Decalogue are, so to speak, first and common principles of the law, and consequently the third precept of the Decalogue describes the exterior worship of God as the sign of a universal boon that concerns all. This universal boon was the work of the creation of the world, from which work God is stated to have rested on the seventh day. And sign of this, we are commanded to keep holy the seventh day, that is, to set it aside as a day to be given to God. Hence after the precept about the hallowing of the Sabbath, the reason for it is given. For in six days the Lord made heaven and earth, and rested on the seventh day. The precept about hallowing the Sabbath, understood literally, is partly moral and partly ceremonial. It is a moral precept in the point of commanding man to set aside a certain time to be given to divine things. For there is in man a natural inclination to set aside a certain time for each necessary thing, such as refreshment of the body, sleep, and so forth. Hence according to the dictate of reason, man sets aside a certain time for spiritual refreshment, by which man's mind is refreshed in God. And thus to have certain time set aside for occupying oneself with divine things is the matter of a moral precept. But insofar as this precept specializes the time as a sign representing the creation of the world, it is a ceremonial precept. Again, it is a ceremonial precept in its allegorical signification as representative of Christ's rest in the tomb on the seventh day. Also in its moral signification as representing cessation from all sinful acts, as mind's rest in God in which sense too it is a general precept. Again, it is a ceremonial precept in its analogical signification as foreshadowing the enjoyment of God in heaven. Hence the precept about hallowing the Sabbath is placed among the precepts of the decalogue as a moral but not as a ceremonial precept. Reply to Objection 2. The other ceremonies of the law are signs of certain particular divine works, but the observance of the Sabbath is representative of a general boon, namely the production of all creatures. Hence it was fitting that it should be placed among the general precepts of the decalogue rather than any other ceremonial precept of the law. Reply to Objection 3. Reply to Objection 4. Two things are to be observed in the hallowing of the Sabbath. One of these is the end, and this is that man occupy himself with divine things and is signified in the words, remember that thou keep holy the Sabbath day. For in the law those things are said to be holy, which are applied to the divine worship. The other thing is cessation from work, and is signified in the words, quoted in Exodus 20 verse 11, on the seventh day thou shalt do no work. The kind of work meant appears from Leviticus 23 3. You shall do no servile work on that day. Now servile work is so called from servitude, and servitude is threefold. One, whereby man is the servant of sin, according to John 8 34, whosoever commiteth sin is the servant of sin, and in this sense all sinful acts are servile. Another servitude is whereby one man serves another. Now one man serves another, not with his mind, but with his body as stated above in question 104 articles 5 and 6. Wherefore, in this respect those works are called servile where by one man serves another. The third is the servitude of God, and in this way the work of worship, which pertains to the service of God, may be called servile work. In this sense servile work is not forbidden on the Sabbath day, because that would be contrary to the end of the Sabbath observance. Since man abstains from other works on the Sabbath day, in order that he may occupy himself with works connected with God's service. For this reason, according to John 23, a man receives circumcision on the Sabbath day that the law of Moses may not be broken. And for this reason too we read in Matthew 12 5 that on the Sabbath days the priests in the temple break the Sabbath, that is, do corporal works on the Sabbath, and are without blame. Accordingly, the priests in carrying the ark on the Sabbath did not break the precept of the Sabbath observance. In like manner, it is not contrary to the observance of the Sabbath to exercise any spiritual act, such as teaching by word or writing. Wherefore a glass on Numbers 28 says that But the reader or teacher of the divine law does not cease from his work. Yet he profanes not the Sabbath, even as the priests in the temple break the Sabbath, and are without blame. On the other hand, those works that are called servile in the first or second way are contrary to the observance of the Sabbath insofar as they hinder man from applying himself to divine things. And since man is hindered from applying himself to divine things, rather by sinful than by lawful, albeit corporal works, it follows that to sin on a feast day is more against this precept than to do some other but lawful bodily work. Hence Augustine says, It would be better if the Jew did some useful work on his farm than spent his time sediciously in the theater, and their women folk would do better to be making linen on the Sabbath than to be dancing lootily all day in their feasts of the new moon. It is not, however, against this precept to sin venially on the Sabbath, because venial sin does not destroy holiness. Again, corporal works, not pertaining to the spiritual worship of God, are said to be servile insofar as they belong properly to servants, while they are not said to be servile insofar as they are common to those who serve and to those who are free. Moreover, everyone, be he servant or free, is bound to provide necessaries, both for himself and for his neighbor, chiefly in respect of things pertaining to the well-being of the body, according to Proverbs 24-11, deliver them that are led to death. Secondarily is regards avoiding damage to one's property, according to Deuteronomy 22-1. Thou shalt not pass by, if thou seest thy brother's ox or his sheep go astray, but thou shalt bring them back to thy brother. Hence a corporal work pertaining to the preservation of one's own bodily well-being does not profane the Sabbath, for it is not against the observance of the Sabbath to eat and to do such things as preserve the health of the body. For this reason, the Maccabees did not profane the Sabbath when they fought in self-defense on the Sabbath day in 1 Maccabees 2, nor Elias when he fled from the face of Jezebel on the Sabbath. For the same reason our Lord in Matthew 12-3 excused his disciples for plucking the ears of corn on account of the need which they suffered. In like manner, a bodily work that is directed to the bodily well-being of another is not contrary to the observance of the Sabbath. Wherefore it is written in John 7-23, Are you angry at me because I have healed the whole man on the Sabbath day? And again, a bodily work that is done to avoid and imminent damage to some external thing does not profane the Sabbath. Wherefore our Lord says in Matthew 12-11, What man shall there be among you, that hath one sheep, and if the same fall into a pit on the Sabbath day, will he not take hold on it and lift it up? Reply to Objection 4, In the new law, the observance of the Lord's day took the place of the observance of the Sabbath, not by virtue of the precept, but by the institution of the church and the custom of Christian people. For this observance is not figurative, as was the observance of the Sabbath in the old law. Hence the prohibition to work on the Lord's day is not so strict as on the Sabbath, and certain works are permitted on the Lord's day which were forbidden on the Sabbath, such as the cooking of food and so forth. And again, in the new law, dispensation is more easily granted than in the old, in the matter of certain forbidden works on account of their necessity, because the figure pertains to the protestation of truth, which it is unlawful to omit even in small things. While works, considered in themselves, are changeable in point of place and time. Fifth article. Whether the fourth precept about honoring one's parents is fittingly expressed. Objection one. It seems that the fourth precept about honoring one's parents is unfittingly expressed. For this is the precept pertaining to piety. Now, justice piety is a part of justice, so are observance, gratitude, and others of which we have spoken in questions 101 and following. Therefore, it seems that there should not have been given a special precept of piety, as none is given regarding the others. Objection two further. Piety pays worship not only to one's parents, but also to one's country, and also to other blood kindred, and to the well-wishers of our country as stated above in question 101 articles one and two. Therefore, it was unfitting for this precept to mention only the honoring of one's father and mother. Objection three further. We owe our parents not merely honor, but also support. Therefore, the mere honoring of one's parents is unfittingly prescribed. Objection four further. Sometimes those who honor their parents die young, and on the contrary those who honor them not live a long time. Therefore, it was unfitting to supplement this precept with the promise that thou mayest be long lived upon the earth. On the contrary stands the authority of Scripture. I answer that. The precepts of the Decalogue are directed to the love of God and of our neighbor. Now, to our parents, of all our neighbors, we are under the greatest obligation. Hence, immediately after the precepts directing us to God, a place is given to the precept directing us to our parents, who are the particular principle of our being, just as God is the universal principle. So that this precept has a certain affinity to the precepts of the first table. Reply to Objection one. As stated above in Question 101 Article 2, Piety directs us to pay the debt due to our parents, a debt which is common to all. Hence, since the precepts of the Decalogue are general precepts, they ought to contain some reference to Piety rather than to the other parts of justice, which regard some special debt. Reply to Objection two. The debt to one's parents precedes the debt to one's kindred and country, since it is because we are born of our parents that our kindred and country belong to us. Hence, since the precepts of the Decalogue are the first precepts of the law, they direct man to his parents rather than to his country and other kindred. Nevertheless, this precept of honouring our parents is understood to command whatever concerns the payment of debt to any person, a secondary matter included in the principle matter. Reply to Objection three. Reverential honour is due to one's parents as such, whereas support and so forth are due to them accidentally, for instance, because they are in want in slavery or the like, as stated above in Question 101 Article 2. And since that which belongs to a thing by nature precedes that which is accidental, it follows that among the first precepts of the law, which are the precepts of the Decalogue, there is a special precept of honouring our parents. And this honour, as a kind of principle, is understood to comprise support and whatever else is due to our parents. Reply to Objection four. A long life is promised to those who honour their parents, not only as to the life to come, but also as to the present life, according to the saying of the Apostle in 1st Timothy 4-8, piety is profitable to all things, having promise of the life that now is and of that which is to come. And with reason, because the man who is grateful for a favour deserves, with a certain congruity, that the favour should be continued to him, and he who is ungrateful for a favour deserves to lose it. Now we owe the favour of bodily life to our parents after God, wherefore he that honours his parents deserves the prolongation of his life because he is grateful for that favour, while he that honours not his parents deserves to be deprived of life because he is ungrateful for the favour. However, present goods or evils are not the subject of merit or demerit, except insofar as they are directed to a future award, as stated above in the Parsprima Secunde, Question 114, Article 12. Wherefore, sometimes in accordance with the hidden design of the divine judgments, which regard chiefly the future award, some who are dutiful to their parents are sooner deprived of life, while others who are undutiful to their parents live longer. 6th Article Whether the other six precepts of the Decalogue are fiddlingly expressed, objection one, it seems that the other six precepts of the Decalogue are unfiddlingly expressed, for it is not sufficient for salvation that one refrain from injuring one's neighbour, but it is required that one pay one's debts, according to Romans 13.7, render to all men their dues. Now the last six precepts merely forbid one to injure one's neighbour. Therefore, these precepts are unfiddlingly expressed. Objection two further, these precepts forbid murder, adultery, stealing and bearing false witness. But many other injuries can be inflicted on one's neighbour, as appears from those which have been specified above in Questions 72 and following. Therefore, it seems that the aforesaid precepts are unfiddlingly expressed. Objection three further, concupiscence may be taken in two ways. First as denoting an act of the will, as in Wisdom 621, the desire, concupiscencia, of wisdom bringeth to the everlasting kingdom. Secondly as denoting an act of the sensuality, as in James 421, from whence are wars and contingents among you? Are they not from your concupiscences, which war in your members? Now the concupiscence of the sensuality is not forbidden by a precept of the decalogue, otherwise first movements would be mortal sins, as they would be against a precept of the decalogue. Nor is the concupiscence of the will forbidden, since it is included in every sin. Therefore, it is unfitting for the precepts of the decalogue to include some that forbid concupiscence. Objection four further, murder is a more grievous sin than adultery or theft. But there is no precept forbidding the desire of murder. Therefore, neither was it fitting to have precepts forbidding the desire of theft and of adultery. On the contrary stands the authority of Scripture. I answer that, just as by the parts of justice, a man pays that which is due to certain definite persons, to whom he is bound for some special reason, so too by justice properly so called, he pays that which is due to all in general. Hence, after the three precepts pertaining to religion, whereby man pays what is due to God, and after the fourth precept pertaining to piety, whereby he pays what is due to his parents, which duty includes the payment of all that is due for any special reason, it was necessary in due sequence to give certain precepts pertaining to justice properly so called, which pays to all indifferently what is due to them. Reply to Objection 1. Man is bound towards all persons in general to inflict injury on no one. Hence, the negative precepts, which forbid the doing of those injuries that can be inflicted on one's neighbor, had to be given a place as general precepts among the precepts of the Decalogue. On the other hand, the duties we owe to our neighbor are paid in different ways to different people. Hence, it did not be hoove to include affirmative precepts about those duties among the precepts of the Decalogue. Reply to Objection 2. All other injuries that are inflicted on our neighbor are reducible to those that are forbidden by these precepts, as taking precedence of others in point of generality and importance. For all injuries that are inflicted on the person of our neighbor are understood to be forbidden under the head of murder as being the principle of all. Those that are inflicted on a person connected with one's neighbor, especially by way of lust, are understood to be forbidden together with adultery. Those that come under the head of damage done to property are understood to be forbidden together with theft. And those that are comprised under speech, such as detractions, insults, and so forth, are understood to be forbidden together with the bearing of false witness, which is more directly opposed to justice. Reply to Objection 3. The precepts forbidding concupiscence do not include the prohibition of first movements of the concupiscence. They do not go farther than the bounds of sensuality. The direct object of their prohibition is the consent of the will, which is directed to deed or pleasure. Reply to Objection 4. Murder in itself is an object not of concupiscence, but of horror, since it has not in itself the aspect of good. On the other hand, adultery has the aspect of a certain kind of good, that is, of something pleasurable, and theft has an aspect of good, that is, of something useful, and good of its very nature has the aspect of something concupiscable. Hence, the concupiscence of theft and adultery had to be forbidden by special precepts, but not the concupiscence of murder. End of question 122. Read by Michael Shane Craig Lambert, LC. End of Summa Theologica of Parse Secunda Secunde. Treaties on the Cardinal Virtues. The Virtue of Justice. Question 123, Part 1 of Summa Theologica Secunda Secunde. Treaties on the Cardinal Virtues. The Virtue of Fortitude. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Summa Theologica Secunda Secunde. Treaties on the Cardinal Virtues. The Virtue of Fortitude. By St. Thomas Aquinas. Translated by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province. Question 123 of Fortitude in 12 Articles. Part 1, Articles 1 through 6. After considering justice, we must in due sequence consider fortitude. We must, one, consider the virtue itself of fortitude. Two, its parts. Three, the gift corresponding thereto. Four, the precepts that pertain to it. Concerning fortitude, three things have to be considered. One, fortitude itself. Two, its principal act, notably martyrdom. Three, the vices opposed to fortitude. Under the first head, there are 12 points of inquiry. First, whether fortitude is a virtue. Second, whether it is a special virtue. Third, whether fortitude is only about fear and daring. Fourth, whether it is only about fear of death. Fifth, whether it is only in war-like matters. Sixth, whether endurance is its chief act. Seventh, whether its action is directed to its own good. Eighth, whether it takes pleasure in its own action. Ninth, whether fortitude deals chiefly with sudden occurrences. Tenth, whether it makes use of anger in its action. Eleventh, whether it is a cardinal virtue. Twelfth, of its comparison with the other cardinal virtues. First article, whether fortitude is a virtue. Objection one, it seems that fortitude is not a virtue. For the apostle says in 2 Corinthians 12-9, virtue is perfected in infirmity. But fortitude is contrary to infirmity. Therefore, fortitude is not a virtue. Objection two, further. If it is a virtue, it is either theological, intellectual, or moral. Now, fortitude is not contained among the theological virtues, nor among the intellectual virtues, as may be gathered from what we have said above. Parts Prima Secundae, question 57, article 2, and question 62, article 3. Neither, apparently, is it contained among the moral virtues. Since according to the philosopher, in Ethics 3, 7, and 8, some seem to be brave through ignorance, or through experience as soldiers, both of which cases seem to pertain to act rather than to moral virtue. And some are called brave on account of certain passions. For instance, on account of fear of threats, or of dishonor, or again on account of sorrow, anger, or hope. But moral virtue does not act from passion, but from choice, as stated above, in the parts Prima Secundae, question 55, article 4. Therefore, fortitude is not a virtue. Objection 3, further, human virtue resides chiefly in the soul, since it is a good quality of the mind, as stated above, from Ethics 3, 7, and 8. But fortitude, seemingly, resides in the body, or at least results from the temperament of the body. Therefore, it seems that fortitude is not a virtue. On the contrary, Augustine, in his Of the Morals of the Catholic Church and On the Morals of the Manichaeans, 15, 21, and 22, numbers fortitude among the virtues. I answer that, according to the philosopher, in Ethics 2, 6, Virtue is that which makes its possessor good, and renders his work good. Hence human virtue, of which we are speaking now, is that which makes a man good, and renders his work good. Now man's good is to be in accordance with reason, according to Dionysius, on the Divine Names 422. Wherefore, it belongs to human virtue to make man good, to make his work according to reason. This happens in three ways. First, by rectifying reason itself, and this is done by the intellectual virtues. Secondly, by establishing the rectitude of reason in human affairs, and this belongs to justice. Thirdly, by removing the obstacles to the establishment of this rectitude in human affairs. Now the human will is hindered in two ways from following the rectitude of reason. First, through being drawn by some object of pleasure to something other than what the rectitude of reason requires, and this obstacle is removed by the virtue of temperance. Secondly, through the will being disinclined to follow that which is in accord with reason, on account of some difficulty that presents itself. In order to remove this obstacle, fortitude of the mind is requisite, whereby to resist the aforesaid difficulty, even as a man, by fortitude of body, overcomes and removes bodily obstacles. Hence, it is evident that fortitude is a virtue, insofar as it conforms man to reason. Reply to Objection 1. The virtue of the soul is perfected, not in the infirmity of the soul, but in the infirmity of the body, of which the Apostle was speaking. Now it belongs to fortitude of the mind, to bear bravely with infirmities of the flesh, and this belongs to the virtue of patience or fortitude, as also to acknowledge one's own infirmity, and this belongs to the perfection that is called humility. Reply to Objection 2. Sometimes a person performs the exterior act of a virtue without having to virtue, and from some other cause than virtue. Hence the philosopher, in Ethics 3.8, mentions five ways in which people are said to be brave by way of resemblance, through performing acts of fortitude without having the virtue. This may be done in three ways. First, because they tend to be in the form of a virtue, first, because they tend to that which is difficult, as though it were not difficult, and this again happens in three ways, for sometimes this is owing to ignorance, through not perceiving the greatness of the danger. Sometimes it is owing to the fact that one is hopeful of overcoming dangers, when for instance one has often experienced escape from danger. And sometimes this is owing to a certain science and art, as in the case of soldiers who, through skill and practice and the use of arms, think little of the dangers of battle, as they reckon themselves capable of defending themselves against them. Thus, Vegetius says, on the military institutions of the Romans 1, No man fears to do what he is confident of having learned to do well. Secondly, a man performs an act of fortitude, without having the virtue, through the impulse of a passion, whether of sorrow that he wishes to cast off, or again of anger. Thirdly, through choice, not indeed of a due end, but of some temporal advantage to be obtained, such as honor, pleasure, or gain, or of some disadvantage to be avoided, such as blame, pain, or loss. Reply to Objection 3 The fortitude of the soul, which is reckoned a virtue, as explained in the reply to the first objection, is so called from its likeness to fortitude of the body. Nor is it inconsistent with the notion of virtue, that a man should have a natural inclination to virtue by reason of his natural temperament, as stated above. And Barthes, Prima Secunde, question 63, article 1. Second article, whether fortitude is a special virtue. Objection 1 It seems that fortitude is not a special virtue, for it is written in Wisdom 7.7 Sheed teacher's temperance and prudence and justice and fortitude, where the text has virtue for fortitude. Since then the term virtue is common to all virtues, it seems that fortitude is a general virtue. Objection 2 Further, Ambrose says, on the duties of the clergy, one, fortitude is not lacking in courage, for alone she defends the honor of the virtues and guards their behests. She it is that wages an inexorable war on all vice, undeterred by toil, brave in face of dangers, steeled against pleasures, unyielding to lusts, avoiding covetousness as a deformity that weakens virtue. And he says the same further on in connection with other vices. Now this cannot apply to any special virtue, therefore fortitude is not a special virtue. Objection 3 Further, fortitude would seem to derive its name from firmness, but it belongs to every virtue to stand firm, as stated in Ethics 2. Therefore, fortitude is a general virtue. On the contrary, Gregory, in his commentary on Job 22, numbers it among the other virtues. I answer that, as stated above in Parse Prima Secunde, question 61, articles 3 and 4. The term fortitude can be taken in two ways. First, as simply denoting a certain firmness of mind, and in this sense, it is a general virtue, or rather a condition of every virtue, since as the philosopher states in Ethics 2, it is requisite for every virtue to act firmly and immovably. Secondly, fortitude may be taken to denote firmness only in bearing and withstanding those things wherein it is most difficult to be firm, namely, in certain grave dangers. Therefore, Tully says, in Rhetoric 2, that fortitude is deliberate facing of dangers and bearing of toils. In this sense, fortitude is reckoned a special virtue because it has a special matter. Reply to Objection 1. According to the philosopher, in On the Heavens 1, 116, the word virtue refers to the extreme limit of a power. Now a natural power is, in one sense, the power of resisting corruptions, and in another sense is a principle of action, as stated in Metaphysics 5.17. And since this latter meaning is the more common, the term virtue, as denoting the extreme limit of such a power, is a common term, for virtue taken in a general sense is nothing else than a habit whereby one acts well. But as denoting the extreme limit of a power in the first sense, which sense is more specific, it is applied to a special virtue, namely fortitude, to which it belongs to stand firm against all kinds of assaults. Reply to Objection 2. Ambrose takes fortitude in a broad sense as denoting firmness of mind in face of assaults of all kinds. Nevertheless, even as a special virtue, with a determinate matter, it helps to resist the assaults of all vices. For he that can stand firm in things that are most difficult to bear is prepared in consequence to resist those which are less difficult. Reply to Objection 3. This objection takes fortitude in the first sense. Third article, whether fortitude is about fear and daring. Objection 1. It seems that fortitude is not about fear and daring. For Gregory says in his commentary on Job 7, the fortitude of the just man is to overcome the flesh, to withstand self-indulgence, to quench the lusts of the present life. Therefore, fortitude seems to be about pleasures rather than about fear and daring. Objection 2. Further, Tully says in his On the Art of Rhetoric 2 that it belongs to fortitude to face dangers and to bear toil. But this seemingly has nothing to do with the passions of fear and daring, but rather with a man's toilsome deeds and external dangers. Therefore, fortitude is not about fear and daring. Objection 3. Further, not only daring, but also hope is of pose to fear, as stated above. Paras Prima Secunde, Question 25, Article 1, Second Reply. In the triities on passions. Therefore, fortitude should not be about daring any more than about hope. On the contrary, the philosopher says in Ethics 2, 7 and 3, 9, that fortitude is about fear and daring. I answer that, as stated above in Article 1. It belongs to the virtue of fortitude to remove any obstacle that withdraws the will from following the reason. Now to be withdrawn from something difficult belongs to the notion of fear, which denotes withdrawal from an evil that entails difficulty, as stated above. Paras Prima Secunde, Question 42, Articles 3 and 5. In the triities on passions. Hence fortitude is chiefly about fear of difficult things, which can withdraw the will from following the reason. And it behooves one not only firmly to bear the assault of these difficulties by restraining fear, but also moderately to withstand them, when to which it is necessary to dispel them all together in order to free oneself therefrom for the future, which seems to come under the notion of daring. Therefore fortitude is about fear and daring, as curbing fear and moderating daring. Reply to Objection 1. Gregory is speaking, then, of the fortitude of the just man, as to its common relation to all virtues. Hence he first of all mentions matters pertaining to temperance, as in the words quoted, and then adds that which pertains properly to fortitude as a special virtue by saying, to love the trials of this life for the sake of an eternal reward. Reply to Objection 2. Dangers and Toils do not withdraw the will from the course of reason, except insofar as they are an object of fear. Hence fortitude needs to be immediately about fear and daring, but immediately about dangers and toils, these being the objects of those passions. Reply to Objection 3. Hope is opposed to fear on the part of the object, for hope is of good, fear of evil, whereas daring is about the same object and is opposed to fear by way of approach and withdrawal, as stated above. Paras Primasekunde, Question 45, Article 1. And since fortitude properly regards those temporal evils that withdraw one from virtue, as appears from Tully's definition quoted in the second objection, it follows that fortitude properly is about fear and daring, and not about hope, except insofar as it is connected with daring, as stated above. Paras Primasekunde, Question 45, Article 2. Fourth article, whether fortitude is only about dangers of death. Objection 1. It seems that fortitude is not only about dangers of death. For Augustine says of the morals of the Catholic Church and on the morals of the Manichaeans, 15, that fortitude is love bearing all things readily for the sake of the object beloved. And in Music 6, he says that fortitude is the love which dreads no hardship, not even death. Therefore, fortitude is not only about danger of death, but also about other afflictions. Objection 2. Further, all the passions of the soul need to be reduced to a mean by some virtue. Now there is no other virtue reducing fears to a mean. Therefore, fortitude is not only about fear and death, but also about other fears. Objection 3. Further, no virtue is about extremes. But fear of death is about an extreme, since it is the greatest of fears, as stated in Ethics 3. Therefore, the virtue of fortitude is not about fear of death. On the contrary, Andronicus says that fortitude is a virtue of the Erasable faculty that is not easily deterred by the fear of death. I answer that, as stated above in Article 3. It belongs to the virtue of fortitude to guard the will against being withdrawn from the good of reason through fear of bodily evil. Now it behooves one to hold firmly the good of reason against every evil whatsoever, since no bodily good is equivalent to the good of reason. Hence, fortitude of soul must be that which binds the will firmly to the good of reason in face of the greatest evils. Because he that stands firm against great things will in consequence stand firm against less things, but not conversely. Moreover, it belongs to the notion of virtue that it should regard something extreme, and the most fearful of all bodily evils is death, since it does away all bodily goods. Wherefore, Augustine says in On the Morals of the Catholic Church and the Morals of the Manichaeans 22 that, The soul is shaken by its fellow body with fear of toil and pain, lest the body be stricken and harassed with fear of death lest it be done away with and destroyed. Therefore, the virtue of fortitude is about the fear of dangers and death. Reply to Objection 1. Fortitude behaves well in bearing all manner of adversity, yet a man is not reckoned brave simply through bearing any kind of adversity, but only through bearing well even the greatest evils. While through bearing others, he is said to be brave in a restricted sense. Reply to Objection 2. Since fear is born of love, any virtue that moderates love of certain goods must in consequence moderate the fear of contrary evils, thus liberality, which moderates the love of money, as a consequence moderates the fear of losing it, and the same is the case with temperance and other virtues. But to love one's own life is natural, and hence the necessity of a special virtue modifying the fear of death. Reply to Objection 3. In virtues, the extreme consists in exceeding right reason, wherefore to undergo the greatest dangers in accordance with reason is not contrary to virtue. Fifth article, whether fortitude is properly about dangers of death in battle. Objection 1. It seems that fortitude is not properly about dangers of death in battle, for martyrs above all are commended for their fortitude. But martyrs are not commended in connection with battle. Therefore, fortitude is not properly about dangers of death in battle. Objection 2. Further, Ambrose says in his On the Duties of the Clergy, 1, that fortitude is applicable both to war-like and to civil matters, and Tully in his On the Duties of the Clergy, 1, under the heading that it pertains to fortitude to excel in battle rather than in civil life, says. Although not a few think that business of war is of greater importance than the affairs of civil life, this opinion must be qualified, and if we wish to judge the matter truly, there are many things in civil life that are more important and more glorious than those connected with war. Now greater fortitude is about greater things. Therefore, fortitude is not properly concerned with death in battle. Objection 3. Further, War is directed to the preservation of a country's temporal peace. For Augustine says on the City of God 19, that wars are waged in order to ensure peace. Now it does not seem that one ought to expose oneself to the danger of death for the temporal peace of one's country, since this same peace is the occasion of much license and morals. Therefore, it seems that the virtue of fortitude is not about the danger of death in battle. On the contrary, the philosopher says in Ethics 3, that fortitude is chiefly about death in battle. I answer that as stated above in Article 4, Fortitude strengthens a man's mind against the greatest danger, which is that of death. Now fortitude is a virtue, and it is essential to virtue ever to tend to good. Wherefore, it is an order to pursue some good that man does not fly from the danger of death. But the dangers of death arising out of sickness, storms at sea, attacks from robbers, and the like, do not seem to come on a man through his pursuing some good. On the other hand, the dangers of death which occur in battle come to man directly on account of some good, because to wit, he is defending the common good by a just fight. Now a just fight is of two kinds. First, there is the general combat, for instance, of those who fight in battle. Secondly, there is the private combat, as when a judge or even private individual does not refrain from giving a just judgment through fear of the impending sword or any other danger, though it threatened death. Hence, it belongs to fortitude to strengthen the mind against dangers of death, not only such as arise in a general battle, but also such as occur in singular combat, which may be called by the general name of battle. Accordingly, it must be granted that fortitude is properly about dangers of death occurring in battle. Moreover, a brave man behaves well in face of danger and any other kind of death, especially since man may be in danger of any kind of death on account of virtue. Thus may a man not fail to attend on a sick friend through fear of deadly infection or not refuse to undertake a journey with some godly object in view through fear of shipwreck or robbers. Reply to Objection 1. Martyrs face the fight that is waged against their own person, and this for the sake of the sovereign good, which is God, wherefore their fortitude is praised above all. Nor is it outside the genus of fortitude that regards warlike actions, for which reason they are said to have been valiant in battle, confer office of the martyrs, and also, for example, Hebrews 11, 34. Reply to Objection 2. Personal and civil business is differentiated from the business of war that regards general wars. However, personal and civil affairs admit of dangers of death arising out of certain conflicts, which are private wars, and so with regard to these also, there may be fortitude, properly so-called. Reply to Objection 3. The peace of the state is good in itself, nor does it become evil because certain persons make evil use of it, for there are many others who make good use of it, and many evils prevented by it, such as murders and sacrilegies, are much greater than those which are occasioned by it, and which belong chiefly to the sins of the flesh. Sixth article. Whether endurance is the chief act of fortitude. Objection 1. It seems that endurance is not the chief act of fortitude. For virtue is about the difficult and the good. Ethics 2-3. Now it is more difficult to attack than to endure. Therefore, endurance is not the chief act of fortitude. Objection 2. Further, to be able to act on another seems to argue greater power than not to be changed by another. Now to attack is to act on another, and to endure is to persevere unchangeably. Since then fortitude denotes perfection of power, it seems that it belongs to fortitude to attack rather than to endure. Objection 3. Further, one contrary is more distant from the other than its mere negation. Now to endure is merely not to fear, whereas to attack denotes a movement contrary to that of fear since it implies pursuit. Since then fortitude above all withdraws the mind from fear, it seems that it regards attack rather than endurance. On the contrary, the philosopher says in Ethics 3-9 that certain persons are said to be brave chiefly because they endure affliction. I answer that as stated above in Article 3 and according to the philosopher in Ethics 3-9. Fortitude is more concerned to allay fear than to moderate daring, for it is more difficult to allay fear than to moderate daring, since the danger, which is the object of daring and fear, tends by its very nature to check daring but to increase fear. Now to attack belongs to fortitude insofar as the latter moderates daring, whereas to endure follows the repression of fear. Therefore the principal act of fortitude is endurance, that is to stand immovable in the midst of dangers rather than to attack them. Reply to Objection 1. Endurance is more difficult than aggression for three reasons. First, because endurance seemingly implies that one is being attacked by a stronger person, whereas aggression denotes that one is attacking as though one were the stronger party. And it is more difficult to contend with a stronger than with a weaker. Secondly, because he that endures already feels the presence of danger, whereas the aggressor looks upon danger as something to come. And it is more difficult to be unmoved by the present than by the future. Thirdly, because endurance implies length of time, whereas aggression is consistent with sudden movements. And it is more difficult to remain unmoved for a long time than to be moved suddenly to something arduous. Hence the philosopher says in Ethics 3.8 that some hurry to meet danger, yet fly when the danger is present. This is not the behavior of brave men. Reply to Objection 2. Endurance denotes indeed a passion of the body, but an action of the soul cleaving most resolutely, fortissime, to the good. The result being that it does not yield to the threatening passion of the body. Now virtue concerns the soul rather than the body. Reply to Objection 3. He that endures fears not, though he is confronted with the cause of fear, whereas this cause is not present to the aggressor.