 Chapter 14 Part 1 of A History of Greece to the Death of Alexander the Great. Volume 2. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. A History of Greece to the Death of Alexander the Great. Volume 2 by John Bagnell Burie. Chapter 13. The Hegemony of Thebes. Part 1. Jason of Ferai. The Battle of Luctra. The balance of power in Greece had been swayed for a hundred years by the two rivals, Sparta and Athens, and now the peace of Caleus had formally adjusted in equilibrium between them. But this dual system was threatened from the very outset by formidable dangers. It was clear that new forces had arisen within the last few years, which would dispute the leadership of Hellas with the two older states. There had been a development of military power in the north, and two cities had come into dangerous prominence, Thebes and Ferai. Of the rise of Ferai we know less than of the rise of Thebes. At the time of the peace of Caleus we make the sudden discovery that the Thessalian cities which were usually in a state of feud have been united, and that Thessaly has consequently become one of the great powers of Greece. This was the doing of one man. There had arisen at Ferai at Despot, who was not merely vigorous and warlike, but whose ambition ranged beyond the domestic politics of Thessaly, and sought to play a great part on a wider stage of Hellas. Jason had established his dominion by means of a well-trained body of 6,000 mercenaries, and also dealtless by able diplomacy. The most influential citizen of Pharsalus exposed at Sparta the ambitious and menacing views of Jason and urged the importance of checking his career before he became too powerful. But Sparta, pressed by other more important claims, declined to interfere. Then Pharsalus yielded to the solicitations of Jason, and helped to install him as Tagus of Ann United Thessaly. The power of the Despot extended on one side into Epirus, where Alcetius' Prince of the Molossi became his vassal, and on the other side to Macedonia. A monarch endowed with uncommon political and military ability at the head of all Thessaly, with the best cavalry in Greece at his command, seemed likely to change the whole course of Hellanic affairs. That he aimed at becoming the first power in Hellas, and attaining the hegemony or leadership as it was called. There can be no question, nor considering the weakness and jealousies of the southern Grecian states with this object, with his resources, be difficult of achievement. But if his ambition was not bounded by Thessaly, neither was it confined to Hellas. His dream was to lead Hellas against Persia and overthrow the power of the Great King. How serious he was in his great projects is shown by the fact that he set about building a navy. Thessaly was again to become a sea power, as in the days of legendary story, when the Argo ventured forth from the landlocked bay of the Alcus. The power of Sparta had evidently declined, but she was still regarded as holding the highest position in Greece, and it was the first object of Jason to weaken her still further and to throne her from that place. His second immediate object was to gain control of the key of southern Greece, the Pass of Thermopylae, and as this was commanded by the Spartan forces of Heraklia, these two objects were intimately connected. His obvious policy was to ally himself with Sparta's enemy, Thebes, and Thebes in her isolated position leapt at his alliance. The treaty between the Beotian and Thessalian federations was probably concluded not long before the Peace of Chaleus. According to the terms of that peace, all parties were to recall their armaments from foreign countries, and their garrisons from foreign towns. Athens promptly recalled the faculties from Corsera, but Sparta on her side failed to fulfill the contract. King Cleoamortus had, shortly before, let an army to Phosas, and now, instead of disbanding it, he was ordered to march against Thebes and compel that state to set free the Beotian cities. One voice perhaps in the Spartan assembly was raised against this violation of the recent oaths, a violation which was also unfair to the allies who served in the Lacedaemonian army. But in this hour, Sparta was led on, as one of her admirers said, by a fatal impulse inspired by the gods. The feeling of hatred against Thebes, diligently fostered by Aegisolus, swept away all thoughts of policy or justice, and the voice which was raised for justice and policy was scornfully cried down. The duel between Thebes and Sparta was inevitable, and all Greece, confident in Spartan superiority, looked to see Thebes broken up into villages or wiped out from among the cities of Hellas. Even Thebes herself had hardly hoped for success, but Sparta would have done well to disband the army of Cleombertus and organize a new force with the help of those allies who were willing to support her. The object of Cleombertus, who was posted near Chironia, in the gate between Phosas and Beotia, was to reach Thebes. And as we have seen in the case of former military operations in this country, his direct road lay along the western and southern banks of Lake Copaeus, by Chironia and Haleartus. The aim of the Thebans was to prevent him from reaching his objective, and they posted their forces nigh to Chironia, where, nearly a quarter of a century before, a Confederate army had waylaid Agislus. But Cleombertus disappointed his enemy. He marched southward by a difficult road round Mount Helicon to Thisby, and thence pounced on the port of Creusus, which he captured along with twelve Theban ships in the harbor. And by this swift stroke having secured his rear, he advanced northward along the road to Thebes. When he reached the height of Lutra, he found that the way was barred by the Theban army. Lutra lies on the hills which form the south limit of a small plain, somewhat more than half a mile broad, traversed by the brook of the upper Asipus. The road from the coast to Thebes crosses it, and ascends the hills on the northern side, where the Beatarchs and their army were now drawn up. The round top of one of these low hills, just east of the road, was levelled and enlarged to form a smooth platform. Here the Theban hoplites of the left wing were posted, and the artificial mound marks their place to this day. The numbers of the two hosts are uncertain. The Lacedemonians, in any case considerably superior, may have been about eleven, the Theban about six thousand strong. But the military genius of one of the Beatarchs, now for the first time fully revealed, made up for the deficiency in strength. Instead of drawing out the usual long and shallow line, Epaminondus made his left wing deep. This wedge, fifty shields deep, of irresistible weight, with the sacred band under the captaincy of Pelopidas in front, was opposed to the Spartans who, with Cleombertus himself, were drawn up on the right of the hostile army. It was on his left wing that Epaminondus relied for victory, the shock between the Spartans and Thebans would decide the battle. It mattered little about the Beotians on the center and left, whom we could not entirely trust. The Thespians, who were present by constraint, were at the last moment permitted to depart, but their retreat was cut off and they were driven back to the camp by the Phocians and other of the Lacedemonian allies, who, by detaching themselves for this purpose, weakened their own army without affecting a useful result. The battle began with an engagement of the cavalry. In this arm the Lacedemonians were notoriously weak and now their horsemen, easily driven back, carried disorder into the line of foot. Cleombertus, who was confident of victory, then led his right wing down the slopes, the center and left being probably impeded in their advance by the cavalry. And on his side, Epaminondus with the Theban left moved down from their hill, deliberately keeping back the rest of the line. The novel tactics of Epaminondus decided the battle. The Spartans, 12 deep, though they fought ever so bravely, could not resist the impact of the Theban wedge led by Pelopetus. King Cleombertus fell and after a great carnage on both sides, the Thebans drove their enemies up the slopes back to their camp. In other parts of the field there seems to have been little fighting or slaughter. The Lacedemonian allies, when they saw the right wing retired without more ado. A thousand Lacedemonians had fallen, including four hundred Spartans, and the survivors acknowledged their defeat by demanding the customary truce to take up the dead. It might be thought that they would have immediately retreated to Creusis, the place of safety which the dead king had prudently provided in their rear. It is not likely that the enemy, whom they still considerably outnumbered, would have attempted to stop their way or even to harass them seriously from behind. The Thebans could hardly realize the victory which they had never expected. It was more than enough to have defeated the Lacedemonians in the open field, to have slain their king, and to have compelled them to evacuate Biosia. But the Lacedemonian army remained in its entrenchments on the hill of Luctra in the expectation of being reinforced by a new army from Sparta and retrieving the misfortune. A messenger was sent home with the inglorious tidings and the shock was born there with that studied self-repression which only the discipline of Sparta could inculcate in her citizens. The remaining forces of the city were hastily got together and placed under the command of Archadamus, son of Vigisulus. Some of the allied states sent aid, and the troops were transported by ship from Corinth to Creusis. But all this took time, and meanwhile Thebes had not been idle. Two messengers were sent with the good news, to Athens and to Thessaly. At Athens the wreathed messenger was received with an ominous silence. The Theban victory was distinctly unwelcome there. It opened up an indefinite prospect of warfare and seemed likely to undo the recent pacification, while the Athenians were far less jealous of Sparta than of Thebes. At Farai the tidings had a very different reception. Jason marched forthwith to the scene of action at the head of his cavalry and mercenaries flying so rapidly through Phosas that the Phosians, his irreconcilable enemies, did not realize his presence until he had passed. He cannot have reached Lutra until the sixth or seventh day after the battle. The Thebans thought that with the help of his forces they might storm the Lassidimonian entrenchments, dangerous though the task would be. But for the policy of Jason the humiliation already inflicted on Sparta was enough. The annihilation of the enemy, or any further enhancement of the Theban's success would have been too much. He dissuaded the Thebans from the Enterprise and induced them to grant a truce to the Lassidimonians with leave to retire unharmed. This the Lassidimonians were now forced to accept, notwithstanding the approach of reinforcements. For their position was totally altered through the presence of the seasoned troops of Jason, and it was clear that the foe would not wait to attack them till the expected reinforcements arrived. The retreat was carried out at night, for the leaders suspected the good faith of their opponents. On the coast the defeated troops met the army of Arcadamus, which had come in vain, and all the forces were disbanded. Such were the circumstances of the Lassidimonian evacuation of Biosia after the Battle of Luchtra, according to the historian whose authority we are naturally inclined to prefer. But the memory of Xenophon might have misled him in regard to some of the details, and there was another account from which it might be inferred that the advance moved more rapidly. There is something to be said for the view that the army of Arcadamus was not dispatched as a relief force after the Battle of Luchtra, but was already on its way before the battle was fought. That Cleobartus had the alternative of waiting for Arcadamus before he ventured on an action, and that his visit to Curiusus was in fact connected with the expected arrival of reinforcements. That Jason too was hastening to support the Thebans, and that the messenger who bore the news of victory met him on his southward march. On this view, the truce might have been concluded on the moral of the battle, and we avoid the difficulty of supposing that the defeated army decided to remain for a week on the hill of Luchtra when the road to Curiusus was open behind them. The question is of little moment. Save in so far as it concerned the movements of the Tagus of Thessaly. The significance of the sequel of the battle lies in the prominent part which he played as a mediator, and we should like well to know whether his original purpose was to fight side by side with his Theban allies. We also hear darkly of his avowed intention to bring help by sea, and we are tempted to speculate at what point the new Thessalian navy would have acted at this crisis. Jason returned to his northern home, but on his way he dealt another blow at Sparta on his own account, by dismantling Heraklia, the fort which controlled the Pass of Thermopylae. He thus compassed an object of great importance for his further designs. These designs he soon began to unfold. He fixed on the next celebration of the Pythian festival as a time to display his greatness and his power to the eyes of assembled Helus. He sent mandates around to the Thessalian cities to prepare oxen, sheep, and goats for the sacrifice at Delphi, offering a gold crown as a prize for the fairest ox, and he issued commands that the armed host of the Thessalians should be ready to march with him to keep the feast. He proposed to usurp the rights of the Amphictheonic board and preside himself over the games. A rumor was that afloat that he intended to seize the treasures of the temple, but it is hard to believe that an aspirant to the hegemony of Greece would have perpetrated an act so manifestly impolitic. Apollo told the Delphians, who were fluttered by the report, that he would himself guard his treasure. But the priests were soon to breathe freely. The Phocians were to be spared the mortification of seeing the hated Thessalian in their land. One day Jason held a review of his cavalry and afterwards sat to hear petitions. Seven young men, to all appearance wrangling hotly, drew near to lay their dispute before him and slew him where he sat. The death of Jason was the knell of all his plans. The unity of Thessaly, the high position which it had attained among the Grecian powers, depended entirely on him. The brothers who succeeded to his place were slight insignificant men, without the ability, even if they had possessed the will, to carry out his far-reaching designs. It is the bare truth to say that the blades of the seven young men changed the course of history. Jason was well on his way to attain in eastern Greece the supreme position which his great fellow despot Dionysius held in the west. Nor is it extravagant to suppose that under him Thessaly might have accomplished part of the work which was reserved for Macedonia. Politically indeed his work is to be condemned. He had not laid the foundations of a national unity in Thessaly. The unity which he had compassed was held by military force only and his own genius. We cannot congratulate a statesman on a result of which the stability hangs on the chances of his own life. In this respect Jason stands in the same rank with Epaminondas. The death of the Thessalonian potentate decided that of the two northern states which had recently risen into prominence Biosia not Thessaly should take the torch from Sparta. The significance of the battle of Lutra is perhaps most clearly revealed in the fact that during the wars between Sparta and Thebes which followed it the parts hitherto played by the two states are reversed. Thebes now becomes the invader of the Peloponnes. As Sparta before had been the invader of Biosia. Thebes is now the aggressor. It is as much as Sparta can do to defend her own land. The significance of Lutra is also displayed in the effect which it produced upon the policy of Athens and in its stimulating influence on the lesser Peloponnesian states especially Arcadia which was wakened up into new life. The supremacy of Thebes was the result of no over mastering imperial instinct and was inspired by no large idea but it brought about some beneficial results. Sparta had grievously abused the dominion which had fallen into her hands and the period of Theban greatness represents the reaction against the period of Lassodemonian oppression. The two objects of Theban policy are to hinder Sparta from regaining her old position in the Peloponnesus and to prevent the revival of Jason's power in Thessaly. Although no express record has been handed down as to constitutional changes there is some evidence which has suggested the belief that the Thebans drew tighter the bond which united the Biosian communities by transforming the Federation into a national state. Thebes seemingly became in Biosia what Athens was in Attica. The other cities Coronia, Thespiae, Halearchus and the rest were unsidied and became as Marathon and Elusis. Their citizens exercised their political rights in an assembly at Thebes. If this be so we may suspect that Epaminondas played the part of legendary Theseus but the new constitution had no elements of stability and it endured but for a few years. End of chapter 14 part 1 recording by Phil Serrette Ottawa Ontario. Chapter 14 part 2 of a history of Greece to the death of Alexander the Great volume 2. This is a Librivox recording. All Librivox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer please visit Librivox.org. Recording by Morgan Scorpion. A history of Greece to the death of Alexander the Great volume 2 by John Badnell Bury. Section 2 policy of Thebes in southern Greece Arcadia and Messinia. The defeat of a Lackerdemonian army in the open field by an enemy inferior in numbers was a thrilling shock to the Greeks who deemed it part of the order of nature that the Spartan hoplites should be invincible except in front of an overwhelmingly larger force. The event was made more impressive by the death of King Cleon Brotus a Spartan king had never fallen in battle since Leonidas laid down his life at the gates of Greece. The news agitated every state in the Peloponnesus. The Hormosts whom Sparta had undertaken to withdraw three weeks before when she signed the peace were now expelled from the cities. There was a universal reaction against the local oligarchies which had been supported by Sparta and had excited universal discontent and these democratic revolutions flooded the land with troops of dangerous exiles. The contagion spread even to Argos though Sparta had no influence there and broke out with such violence that many citizens were cuddled to death by the infuriated people. But it was in Arcadia that the most weighty political results followed. A general feeling which had perhaps been growing for some years back now took definite shape, that the cities of Arcadia must combine together to oppose a united front to the Lachodemonian pretensions. The only way in which each city could hope to preserve her independence against the power of Sparta was by voluntarily surrendering a portion of that independence to a federal union of her sister cities. The most zealous advocates of the Pan Arcadian idea was the Mantenean Lycomides, a native of the district which had been more cruelly used in all others by the high-handed policy of Lachodemon. The fall of Sparta was the signal for the Manteneans to rebuild their walls, desert their villages, and resume the dignity and pleasures of city life. The old king Agasileus had the insolence to remonstrate. He requested them at least to ask the gracious permission of Sparta, but he had no power to enforce his request. The Manteneans resolved that their city should not again be captured, as King Agasileus had captured it by means of its own river. They dug a new bed, so that the opus, when it approached the southeastern wall, parted into two channels, and having described a great loop, reunited its waters on the northwestern side. In this loop the city of Mantenea rose again, and by this means the river, which had proved itself a danger, was forced to become a fortification entirely encompassing the walls. The stone foundations of the wall enable us to trace the circuit of the city, but they were only the base for a superstructure which, like the buildings of the town, was of brick. The Ten Gates were curiously constructed, no too alike, yet all elaborations of a principle which was adopted by the builders of the Fortress of Tirrens, the principle of exposing the undefended right side of an approaching enemy to the defenders who manned the walls and flanking towers. The general design may be best grasped by conceiving the wall not as a continuous circle, but as composed of ten separate pieces, which did not join but overlapped, while the gates connected the overlapping ends. Mantenea, a risen from her ruins and the other towns of Arcadia, with the important exceptions of Taghia or Caminas and Heria, now agreed to form a Pan-Arcadian union and constitute a federal state. Several reasons made it expedient to establish a new seat as the federal capital of the country. The Arcadian cities were too small for the purpose. The selection of one of them would have excited the jealousies of the others, and it was intended that there should be no thebes in the Arcadian state. The site chosen for the new city was in the western of the two large plains which defined the geographical character of central Arcadia. It lay, in a long, narrow, irregular shape, on both sides of the river Hellison. Not far off Roselecaion, the mountain to which the Arcadian folk attached their most sacred associations, and in the centre of the marketplace was built a shrine of Zeus, of that holy hill. The town was entitled to its name of Megalopolis, or Great City, by the large circuit of its double wall, a circuit of five miles and a half, a somewhat rough piece of work, built of stone in the lower courses and rick above and furnished with towers at intervals. It must be kept in view that Megalopolis had a double character. It was to be the federal capital, but it was also to be one of the federal cities. Apart from its relation to all Arcadia, it had a special relation to its own plain. The change which had come to pass in the eastern plain, so long ago that no man could tell when, by the founding of Tegea and Mantanaea, was now brought to pass in the western plain. The village communities of the surrounding districts were induced to exchange their separate existence for a joint life in the city. Lying close to the northwestern frontier of Laconia, Megalopolis would be a bulwark against Sparta on this side, corresponding to Tegea on the north. It is natural to compare it with Mantanaea, which arose in its new shape at the same time. Both cities seemed to have had a similar system of fortification, double walls of stone and brick strengthened by towers, but Megalopolis, which was the larger, was also the stronger by nature. For Mantanaea lay on a dead level, all its strength was due to art. Megalopolis lay on sloping irregular ground, offering hills of which the architect could take advantage. The difference is illustrated by the fact that the little theatre in Mantanaea rested on a stone substructure, while the huge theatre in Megalopolis is cut out of a hill. The federal constitution was modelled on the ordinary type of democratic constitutions. There was an assembly which met at stated periods to consider all important questions. Every citizen of the federal communities was a member of this assembly, of which the official title was the Ten Thousand. The name indicates an approximate, not an exact number, like the Five Thousand in the Constitution of Theraminies at Athens. We have no information as to the working of this body, but from the analogy of other ancient federations it is probable that the votes were taken by cities, the vote of each city being determined by the majority of the votes of those of its citizens who were present. The Ten Thousand made war and peace, concluded alliances, and sat in judgment on offenders against the League. There was also a council composed of 50 members from the various cities, and this body had doubtless the usual executive and deliberative functions which belonged to the Greek conception of a council. On the south side of the river stood the Thercilion, the federal building in which meetings of the Arcadian League were held. The foundations of the spacious covered hall have been recently laid bare, and display an ingenious arrangement of the internal pillars, converging in lines whereby as few as possible of a crowded audience might be hindered from seeing and hearing. It is an attempt to apply the principle of the theatre to a covered building. The Thercilion stood close in front of the hill from which the theatre was hewn, and the place of political deliberation seemed part of the same structure as the place of dramatic spectacles. For the Doric Portico, which adorned the southern side of the federal house, faced the audience, the orchestra in which the chorus danced and the actors sometimes played stretched from the circle of seats up to the steps of the Portico. Such was the original arrangement, changed in later years, and it illustrates the fact that the stone theatres which began to spring up throughout Greece in the fourth century were intended as much for political assemblies as for theatrical representations. The River Hellison divides megalopolis into two nearly equal parts, and it would seem that this division corresponded to the double character of the place. The city of megalopolis in the strict sense was on the northern side. There was the market place on the bank of the river. There was the hall in which the council of the megalopolitan state met together, but the southern half of megalopolis was federal ground. Here was the federal hall of assembly. Here was the theatre, which was in fact an open air hall for federal meetings. Here, we may suppose, were the dwellings of the permanent armed force, five thousand strong, which was maintained by the federation. Here were the lodgings for the ten thousand, when they assembled to vote on the affairs of the Arcadian state. Taghia had hitherto been a sort of Laconian outpost, and a revolution was necessary to bring about its adhesion to the new federation. With the help of a Mantonian band, the Philo-Laconian party was overthrown, and eight hundred exiles sought refuge at Sparta. This blow stung Sparta to action. She might brook the resuscitation of Mantonia. She might look on patiently at the measures taken by the presumptuous Arcadians for managing their own affairs, but it was too much to see Taghia, her steadfast ally, the strong water of her northern frontier, pass over to the camp of the rebels. Aguesilaus led an army into Arcadia, and displayed the resentment of Sparta by ravaging the fields of Mantonia. Neither he nor the federal forces risked a conflict. In view of this Spartan invasion, which came to so little, the Arcadians had sought the help of foreign powers. To Athens their first appeal was made. The tidings of Lutra had excited in the city mixed feelings of pleasure and jealousy. The humiliation of Sparta opened up a prospect of regaining empire, notwithstanding the undertakings of the recent peace, but the triumph of Thebes was unwelcome and dangerous. These hopes and fears spurred Athens to new activity. Shortly after the battle of Lutra she showed her appreciation of the changed condition of Hellas by inviting delegates from the Peloponessian cities to pledge themselves anew to the king's peace, which it must always be remembered was the basis of the peace of Calius, and to pledge themselves to one another for mutual help in case of hostile attack. Elis, refusing to recognise the autonomy of some of her subjects, was forced to hold aloof, but most of the other states wore to the alliance. It was a contract between Athens and her allies on one side and the former allies of Sparta on the other. By virtue of this act of alliance, Athens was bound to help Mountaineer and the Arcadian cities whenever they were threatened by an invasion, but it appeared that, though ready to usurp the place of Sparta, she was not ready to renew the war with her old rival. Perhaps a change of feeling had been wrought in the course of the nine or ten months which had run since the Congress at Athens. The violence of the democratic movements in the Peloponnes may have caused disgust. Certain it is that Athens refused the Arcadian appeal. She seems to have contemplated a policy of neutrality. The rebuff at Athens drove Arcadia into the arms of Thebes. The battle which had been fought to secure the unity of Boricia had been the means of promoting the unity of Arcadia, and there was a certain fitness in the northern state coming to the aid of its younger fellow. But it was not mere sympathy with federal institutions that induced Thebes to send a Borician army into the Peloponnesus. To keep Sparta down and prevent her from recovering her influence was the concern of Thebes, and an united Arcadia was the best instrument that could be devised for the purpose. At this juncture, the situation in northern Greece permitted Thebes to comply with the Arcadian request. The Fokians and Ausolian Locrians, the Locians of Opus, the Malians, had sought her alliance after Luchta, and even the Ubeans had deserted her, so that all central Greece, as far as Scytheron, was under the Borician influence. But if the request had come some month sooner, it would have been impossible to grant it, for Jason of Ferai was then alive, preparing to march to Delphi, and the Borician forces could not have left Boricia. It was already winter when the Theban army, led by Epaminondas, accompanied by his fellow Boritaks, arrived in Arcadia to find that Agesa Leias had withdrawn from the field. But although the purpose of the expedition was thus accomplished, the Arcadians persuaded Epaminondas not to return home without striking a blow at the enemy. To invade Laconia and attack Sparta herself was the daring proposal, daring in idea at least. For within the memory of history, no foeman had ever violated Laconian soil. The unwalled city had never repelled an assault. There was little danger with an army of such size as that which was now assembled, and a march to the gates of Sparta would drive home the lesson of Luchta. The invaders advanced in four divisions by four roads, converging on Selassia, and met no serious attempt to block their way. Some neo-demos and Taghiet exiles were annihilated by the Arcadians. Selassia was burnt, and the united army descended into the plain on the left bank of the Eurotas. The river which separated them from Sparta was swollen with winter rains, and this probably saved the city, for the bridge was too strongly guarded to be safely attacked. Epaminondas marched southwards a few miles further, as far as Amiclae, where he crossed the stream by a fjord, but Sparta was now saved. On the first alarm of the coming invasion, messages had flown to the Perlepenessian cities which were still friendly, and these, Corinth, Sychion, Flios, Pelini, and the towns of the Argolic coast, had promptly sent auxiliary forces. The northern roads being barred by the enemy, these forces were obliged to land on the eastern shore of Laconia and make their way across Mount Parnon. They reached the Eurotas bridge after the invaders had moved to Amiclae, and their coming added such strength to the defense of Sparta that Epaminondas did not attack it, but contented himself with marching up defiantly to its outskirts. It was indeed a sufficient revenge even for Theban Hatred to have wounded Sparta as none had wounded her before, to have violated the precinct of the Laconian land. The consternation of the Spartans at a calamity which, owing to the immunity of ages, they had never even conceived as possible, can hardly be imagined. The women, disciplined though they were in repressing their feelings when sons or husbands perished in battle, now fell into fits of distress and despair. For unlike the women of so many other Greek cities, they had never looked upon the face of an enemy before. Old Agesilaus, who loathed the Theban above all other names, was charged with the defense, and his task was the harder, since he had to watch not only the foe, but the disaffected. Freedom had been promised to the six thousand helots who came forward to serve, but this aid was a new danger. It is needless to say that the loss of a few hundred soldiers on the field of Luchta had nothing to do with the impotence displayed by Sparta at this crisis, and if Luchta had been won by superior generalship, it was not inferior generalship that exposed Laconia. The disease lay far deeper. The vigor of Sparta was decaying from the mere want of men. It has been calculated that at this time there were not more than one thousand five hundred with false citizenship. Not merely constant warfare, but far more economical conditions, brought about this dispeopling. Since money had begun to flow into Laconia, and since a new law permitted citizens to alienate their holdings, the inevitable result ensued. The small lots which meagrely supported each Spartan were gathered into large estates, and with the lots the citizens disappeared. This disease which was sapping the energies of his enemy cannot have escaped the view of Epaminondas, and his next step is significant. Having ravaged southern Laconia from the banks of the Eurotus to the foot of Tegetus, as far as Gathaeon, where they failed, we know not why, to take the arsenal, the allies returned to Arcadia. But though it was mid-winter, their work was not over yet. A far greater blow was still to be inflicted on Sparta. Epaminondas led them now into another part of the Spartan territory, the ancient Messinia. The serfs who belonged to the old Messinian race arose at their coming, and on the slopes of Mount Athome, the foundations of a new Messinia were laid by Epaminondas. The ancient heroes and heroines of the race were invited to return to the restored nation. The ample circuit of the town was marked out, and the first stones placed to the sound of flutes. Athome was the citadel, and formed one side of the town, whose walls of well wrought masonry descended the slopes and met in the plain below. The Messinian exiles who had been wandering over the Greek world had now a home once more. Messini, like Megalopolis, was founded by Sinoisizing, the districts round about. But its political position was entirely different from that of Megalopolis. Messini was not a federal capital, it was the Messinian state, a city with the whole country for its territory. Coroni and Messoni were not cities like Montenegro and Cretor, they were places like Barron and Marathon. Their inhabitants possessed the citizenship of Messini, but it was only under Mount Athome that they could exercise their Berger rights. The relation of Messini to Messinia was that of Athens to Attica, not that of Megalopolis to Arcadia. Thus not only a new stronghold, but a new enemy was erected against Sparta in Sparta's own domain. All western Laconia, all the land between Athome and the sea, except Assini and Siparissa, were subtracted from the Spartan dominion. All the Perioechi and Helots became the freemen of a hostile state. Under the auspices of Thebes, an old act of injustice was undone, and the principle of autonomy was strikingly affirmed. But besides the glory which Thebes won by so popular an act, besides the direct injury inflicted on Sparta and the establishment of a hostile fort, the policy of Epaminondas was calculated to produce a result of greater importance. The loss of Messinia would accelerate that process of decline in the Spartan state, which had already advanced so far. The fewer the lots, the fewer the citizens, according to the indistoluble connection between land and burger rights on the Lycurgian system. It was high time for Sparta to reform her constitution. The Arcadians celebrated this memorable invasion of Laconia by dedicating, with part of the spoil, a group of statues to the Delphian god. The verses of dedications signify that the indigenous people from Sacred Arcadia, having laid Lacodemon waste, set up the monument as a witness to future generations. The statues are gone, but the verses on their stone have come to light in our own day. In the meantime, Sparta had begged aid from Athens, and Athens had decided to depart from her position of neutrality. A vote was passed, strongly supported by the Orator Calistratus, to send the entire force of the city under Iphiquates to assist Sparta. This was evidently the most politic course for Athens to adopt. Sparta was a necessary makeway to against Thebes. Nor is it doubtful that, notwithstanding all their rivalries, no such antipathy parted Athens from Sparta as that which existed between the two states and Thebes. If Iiquates marched to the Isthmus and occupied Corinth and Sensorai, thus commanding the line of Mount Aeneon, his object, it must be clearly understood, was not to prevent the enemy from leaving the Polyponessus, but to protect the rear of his own army marching into a hostile country. He advanced into Arcadia, but found that the Thebans and their allies had left Laconia and Sparta was no longer a danger. He therefore drew back to Corinth and harassed the Boetian army on its return march, without attempting to bar its passage. For the object of the Athenian expedition was simply to rescue Sparta, not except if our Sparta's peril might demand, to fight with the Thebans. But the hasty vote to march to the rescue was soon followed by a deliberate Treaty of Alliance, and Athens definitely ranged herself with Sparta against Boetia and Arcadia. She was already meditating schemes of expanding her empire. She was nourishing the hope of recovering the most precious of all her former imperial possessions. Thracian amphipolis. With such designs it was impossible to remain neutral, and as we shall see, there was some danger of a collision with Thebes in Macedonia. Fighting went on in the Polyponese between the Arcadians and the allies of Sparta, and a few months later Epaminondas, who had been re-elected Boetarch in his absence at the beginning of the year, appeared again at the head of the Boetian army. The Spartans and Athenians had occupied the line of Mount O'Neon. This time the object was to keep out the Thebans. But Epaminondas broke through their lines, joined his allies, won over Scythion and Pelini, and failed to win Flias. A new Sucker for Sparta arrived at this moment from overseas. Twenty ships bearing two thousand Celtic and Iberian mercenaries came from her old ally, the Tyrant of Syracuse, to whom she had once sent aid in her hour of peril, and who had more than once sent Sucker to her. There coming seems to have decided Epaminondas to return home, though he had accomplished but little, and his political opponent Meneklides took advantage of the general disappointment to indict him for treason. The result was that Epaminondas was not re-elected Borotak for the following year. To establish her supremacy, Thebes was adopting the same policy as Sparta. She placed a harmless in Scythion, as the Boritian cities had formerly been garrisoned by Sparta, the Peloponnesian cities were now to be garrisoned by Thebes. Messinia and Arcadia were to be autonomous, but the Thebans desired to be regarded as both the authors and preservers of that autonomy. As a mistress, distant Thebes might be more tolerable than neighbouring Lekademen, but the Free Federation of Arcadia determined to be free in very deed. Sparta was now sunk so low that the Arcadians, with friendly Messinia on one side and friendly Argos on the other, could hope to maintain their liberty with their own swords, without foreign aid. Their leading spirit, like a medius, animated them to this resolve of independence and self-reliance. You are the only indigenous natives of the Peloponnesus, and you are the most numerous and hardiest nation in Greece. Your valour is proved by the fact that you have been always in the greatest request as allies. Give up following the lead of others. You made Sparta by following her lead, and now if you follow the lead of Thebes, without yourself leading in turn, she will prove perhaps the second Sparta. In this mood the Arcadians displayed a surprising activity and achieved a series of successes. The two important cities, Heria in the west and Orca Menace in the north, which had hitherto stood aloof, were forced to join the league, which now became in the fullest sense Pan-Arcadian. Some of the northern villages of Laconia were annexed and the Trifilion towns sought in the league a support against the hated domination of Elis. The federal forces were active in the opposite quarters of Argolis and Messinia. Against all this activity Sparta felt herself helpless, but a second armament of auxiliaries arrived from her friend the Tyrant of Syracuse and thus reinforced she ventured to take the field and marched into the plain of Megalopolis. But the expedition was suddenly interrupted. Time had been wasted and the Syracusan force, in accordance with its orders, was obliged to return to Sicily. Its way laid through Laconia in order to take ship at Guthaeon, and the enemy tried to cut it off in the mountain defiles. The Spartan commander Archidamus, who was in the rear, hastened to the rescue, and dispersed the Arcadians with great loss. Not a single lacquered Imonian was killed, and the victory was called the Tealist battle. The joy displayed in Sparta over this slight success showed how low Sparta had fallen. It may be thought that Dionysius might have kept his troops at home if they were charged to return before they had well time to begin to fight. But the truth is that these troops were for some months inactive in Greece, while an attempt was being made to bring about a general peace. The initiative came from Ariobartonis, the Persian satrap of Frigia, who sent to Greece an agent well furnished with money, and this move on the part of Persia was probably suggested by Athens. The Syracusan sovereigns also intervened in the interest of peace, and the stone remains on which the Athenians thanked Dionysius and his sons for being good men in regard to the people of the Athenians and their allies, and helping the king's peace. Thus the king's peace was the basis of the negotiations of the congress which met at Delphi. Both Athens, which was doubtless the prime mover, and Sparta were most anxious for peace, but each had an ultimate condition from which she would not retreat. Sparta's very life seemed to demand the recovery of Mestinia, and Athens had set her heart on Amphipolis. But neither condition would be admitted by Thebes, and consequently the negotiations fell through. They led, however, to independent negotiations of various states with Persia, each seeking to win from the king a recognition of its own claims. Pelopidas went up to Sousa on behalf of Thebes to obtain a royal confirmation of the independence of Mestinia. The Athenians sent envoys to convince the king of their rights to Amphipolis. Arcadia, Elis, and Algos were also represented. Pelopidas was entirely successful. The king issued an order to Greece. Embodying the wishes of Thebes, Mestinia, and Amphipolis to be independent, the Athenians to recall their warships. The question of Traffilia, whether it was to be dependent on Elis, or a part of Arcadia, was decided in favour of Elis. This decision in a matter of absolute indifference to Persia was clearly due to Pelopidas, and indicates strange relations between Thebes and Arcadia. Pelopidas returned with the royal letter, but it found no acceptance in Greece, either at the Congress of Allies which was convoked at Thebes, or when the document was afterwards sent round to the cities. Arcadia would not abandon Traffilia, and like Amides formally protested against the headship of Thebes. The answer of Thebes to this defiance of her will was an invasion of the Peloponnesus. The line of Mount Aeneon was still defended, but negligently, and a Permanon thus passed it with Argyve help. His object was not to depress Sparta further, for Sparta was now too feeble to be formidable, but to check the pretensions of Arcadia, and this could only be done through strengthening Theban influence in the Peloponnesus by winning new allies. Accordingly, a Permanon thus advanced to Achia, and easily gained the adhesion of the Achaean cities. But the gain of Achia was soon followed by its loss. Counter to the moderate policy of a Permanon thus, the Thebans had insisted in overthrowing the oligarchal constitutions and banishing the oligarchal leaders. These exiles from the various cities banded together and recovered each city successively, overthrowing the democracies and expelling the harmosts. Henceforward, Achia was an ardent partisan of Sparta. The unsettled state of the Peloponnesus was conspicuously shown by the events which happened at Sicion. When the Theban harmost was installed in the Acropolis, the oligarchy had been spared, but soon afterwards one of the chief citizens, named Euphron, wrought about the establishment of a democracy, and then, procuring his own elections general, organising a mercenary force and surrounding himself with a bodyguard, the usual and notorious steps of a despot's progress, made himself master of the city and harbour. The Arcadians had helped Euphron in his first designs, but the intrigues of his opponents were so skilful that Arcadia again intervened and restored to Sicion, the exiles whom the tyrant had driven out. Euphron fled from the city to the harbour, which he surrendered to the Lacodemonians, but the Lacodemonians failed to hold it. Sicion, however, was not yet delivered from her tyrant. He was restored by the help of Athenian mercenaries. Afterwards, seeing that he could not maintain himself without the support of Boetia, he visited Thebes and was slain on the Cadmira in front of the Hall of Council, by two Sicionian exiles who had dogged him. His assassins were tried and acquitted at Thebes, but at Sicion his memory was cherished and he was worshipped as a second founder of the city. The fact shows that under the rule of Euphron, the masses of the people were happier than under the political opponents whom he had so mercilessly treated. His son succeeded to his power. The expedition of Epaminondas was attended with results which were in the end injurious to Thebes. The relations with Arcadia became more and more strained, but in the same year Oropus was rested from Athens and occupied by Athean force. The Athenians were unable to cope alone with Thebes, they called on their allies, but none moved to their aid. The moment was seized by Arcadia. Lycomedes visited Athens and induced the Athenians, smarting with resentment against their allies, to conclude an alliance with the League. Thus Athens was now in a position of being an ally of both Arcadia and Sparta, which were at war with each other, and Arcadia was the ally of Athens and Thebes, which were also at war with each other. The visit of Lycomedes incidentally led to a disaster for Arcadia which outweighed the benefit of alliance. The ambassador on his way back was slain by some exiles into whose hands he fell, and the League lost its avarist statesmen. This change in the mutual relations among the Greek states, brought about by the seizure of Oropus, was followed by another change, brought about by an Athenian plot to seize Corinth. The object was to secure permanent control over the passage into the Peloponnesus, but the plot was discovered and followed by the Corinthians, who then politely dismissed the Athenian soldiers stationed at various posts in the Corinthian territory, but by herself Corinth would have been unable to resist the combined pressure of Thebes on one side and Argos on the other, and as Sparta could not help her, she was driven to make peace with Thebes. She was joined by her neighbour Flius and by the cities of the Argolic coast. All these states formally recognised the independence of Messini, but did not enter into any alliance with Thebes or give any pledge to obey her leadership. They became, in fact, neutral. It was a blow to Sparta, who still refused to accept a peace on any terms, save the restoration of Messina. The Messinian question gave political speculators at Athens a subject for meditation. Was the demand of Sparta just? The publicist Isocrates argued the case for Sparta in a speech which he put in the mouth of King Archidamus. Another orator, Archidamus, vindicated in reply the liberty of the Messinians and declared a principle which was far in advance of his time. God has left all men free. Nature has made no man a slave. If we survey the political relations of Southern Hellas at this epoch, we see Thebes, supported by Argos, still at war with Sparta, who is supported by Athens. Akia actively siding with Sparta, Elis hostile to Arcadia, the Arcadian League at war with Sparta in alliance with Athens, in alliance with, but cool towards Thebes and already, having lost its leader Lycomides, beginning to fall into disunion with itself. The peace with Corinth and others of the belligerent states marks the time at which Peloponnesian affairs ceased to occupy the chief place in the councils of Thebes, and her most anxious attention turns to a different quarter. For Sparta is disabled, and the mistress of Borecia recognises that it is with Athens that the strife for headship will now be. While events were progressing in the Peloponnesus, as we have seen, Athens was busily engaged in other parts of the world with a view to restoring her maritime empire. And we have now to see how she succeeded, and how Thebes likewise was pushing her own supremacy in the North. End of Chapter 14, Part 2 Chapter 14, Part 3 of A History of Greece to the Death of Alexander the Great Volume 2 This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org Recording by Dick Durett A History of Greece to the Death of Alexander the Great Volume 2 by John Bagnell Bury Chapter 14, Part 3 Policy and Action of Thebes in Northern Greece The same year which saw the death of Jason of Ferrai saw the death of another potentate in the North his neighbor and ally Amintus of Macedonia. We have seen how Amintus had to fight for his kingdom with the Chelsidian League, how he was driven out of his land and restored and how the League was crushed by the power of Sparta. Both Jason and Amintus were succeeded by Anaxlida. At Ferrai, the power first passed to Jason's brothers of whom one murdered the other and was in turn murdered by his victim's son Alexander whose reign was worthy of its sanguinary inauguration. The Thessalian cities refused to bow down to the supremacy of Ferrai now that Ferrai had no man who was worthy to be obeyed and to resist Alexander of Ferrai they invoked the aid of Alexander of Macedonia. The aid was given and Larissa Crennan and other cities passed under Macedonian sway but this was not the purpose of the Thessalonians to exchange a native for a foreign ruler and accordingly they invoked the help of Thebes against both Alexander's alike. It was sound policy on the part of Thebes to accede to the request. It was impossible to discern yet what manner of man the successor of Jason might prove to be and it was important from the Boetian point of view to hinder the reunion of Thessaly under a monarch. The conduct of an expedition was entrusted to Pelopidas who brought Larissa and other towns in the northern part of Thessaly under a Theban protectorate. At the same time the Thessalonians sought to strengthen their position by a federal union a political experiment which had been tried in Thessaly before. The little we know of the League which was established about this time suggests rather the revival of an old system than a new creation. The country was divided into four political divisions corresponding to the old geographical districts at the head of each was a polymark who had officers of horse and foot under him and at the head of the League was an Archon elected if not for life at least for longer than a year. Thus the organization was military but there are indications that it grew out of an old amphitheonic association. There is no reason to think that Lelopadis had more to do with the establishment of the Thessalian Federation than Epaminondis with that of the Pan-Arcadian League. The part of Thebes in either case was simply to support and confirm. Macedonia offered no obstacles to the operations of Pelopadis in Thessaly for it was involved in a domestic struggle. One of the nobles Ptolemy of Aloris rebelled against the king and was supported by the king's unnatural mother Eurydice. The two parties called upon Pelopadis to educate between them and he patched up a temporary arrangement and concluded a Theban alliance with Macedonia. Hardly had he turned his back when Ptolemy murdered Alexander and married Eurydice but it seems as if the paramours would not be permitted to reap the profits of their crime. Another pretender to the throne had gathered an army of mercenaries and occupied all the land along the Chalcedian Frontier. Help however was at hand and Athenian fleet was cruising in the Thermaeic Gulf under the command of Ephricrates. The queen visited the admiral on the coast accompanied by her two sons Perticus and Philip the brothers of Ephricrates since he had been adopted as a son by Amintus and persuaded him to help her in her need. By his exertions the pretender was expelled and a succession of Perticus was secured under the regency of Ptolemy. The interests of Athens on the Chalcedian and the adjacent coast had forced that state to keep and never watchful eye on political events in Macedonia and to seek influence at the court of Aegei. The intervention of Ephricrates was not the first case in which Athenian power had settled a dynastic question. His settlement was more abiding than that of Pelopidas. We may conjecture that the opportune appearance of the Athenian fleet was due to the circumstance that Thebes had interfered but Thebes was resolved to continue her interference and oust the Athenian influence. Pelopidas again dispatched to the north compelled the region Ptolemy to enter into alliance with Thebes and assure his fidelity by furnishing a number of hostages. Among the young Macedonian nobles who were sent as pledges to Thebes was the boy Philip who was destined to be the maker of Macedonia and was now to be trained for the work in the military school of Bolsia under the eye Ipa Minundas himself. Having thus brought Macedonia within the circle of the Theban supremacy Pelopidas on his way home visited the camp of the despot of Ferai but he did not know that Alexander had become the ally of Athens and inevitable the combination since it was the interest of both to oppose Theban expansions in the north supported by Athens the despot could defy Thebes and he detained his visitor Pelopidas as a hostage a Beocian army marched to rescue the captive but an armament of a thousand men arrived by sea from Athens and the invaders who were commanded by incompetent generals were outmaneuvered and forced to retreat Ipa Minundas was serving as a common hoplite in the ranks but for his presence the army would have been lost the soldiers unanimously invited him to take the command and he skillfully extricated them from a dangerous position and managed their safe retreat this exploit secured the re-election of Ipa Minundas as boy talk and he immediately returned to Thessaly at the head of another army to deliver his friend it was necessary to apply a compulsion severe enough to frighten the tyrant but not so violent as to transport him with fury which might be fatal to his prisoner this was achieved by dexterous military operations and Pelopidas was released in return for a month's truth it seems probable that at the same time Ipa Minundas freed fascilus from the rule of Ferai but it was not the interest of thieves to overthrow the tyrant or even limit his authority to his own city it was well that he should be there as a threat to the rest of Thessaly it was well that Thessaly should be unable to dispense with theban protection the power of alexander extended over Fethiotis and Magnesia and along the shores of the Pachacian Bay and to neighboring towns like Skotasa his tyranny and brutality seemed to have been extreme though the anecdotes of his cruelty cannot be implicitly trusted we read that he buried men alive or sewed them up in the hides of wild beasts for his hounds to tear we read that he massacred the inhabitants of two friendly cities we read that he worshiped as a divine being the dagger with which he had slain his uncle and gave it the name of Sir Luck an anecdote indicating a strain of madness which often attends the taste for cruelty accidentally invented if not true is the story that having seen with dry eyes a performance of Choyades of Euripides a drama on utterly sad the tyrant sent an apology to the actor explaining that his apparent want of emotion was due to no defect in the acting but to a feeling of shame that tears for the sorrows of Hecuba should fall from the eyes of one who had shown no pity for so many victims it has been said that the chief desire of Athens at this time was to regain the finest jewel of our first empire amphipolis the fleet under efficacy was cruising and watching with this purpose in view but the hopes of success which depended much on the goodwill of Macedonia were lessened by the ties which Ptolemy had contracted with Thebes and besides losing Macedonian support Athens was impeded by the cities of the Kelsidian League who now broke away from the Athenian Alliance and made a treaty with amphipolis meanwhile Athens began to act in the Eastern Aegean the opportunity was furnished by the revolt of her friend Hario Banzanis a satrap of Phrygia it was the policy of Athens to help the satrap without breaking with a great king from whom she still hoped to obtain a recognition of her claim to amphipolis a fleet of 30 galleys and 8,000 troops were sent under her other experience general Timotheus and he accomplished more in the east than than ificcities had accomplished in the north he laid siege to Samos on which Persia had hands contrary to the king's peace and took it at the end of 10 months at the same time he lent assistance to Hario Banzanis who had to maintain himself against the satraps of Lydia and Caria and as a reward for these services Athens obtained the session of two cities in the Thracian Cursonese Cestos and Cthoth all of these acquisitions Cestos was of special value from its position on the helispont securing to Athens control at this point over southern extremity thus Athens began to revive her old empire but in Samos she revealed her designs even more clearly this island was not treated as a subject ally but was appropriated as Athenian territory out settlers were sent from Athens to occupy Samos and thus the system of clericies which had been the most unpopular feature of the first confederacy and had been expressly guarded against that the formation of the second confederacy was renewed it did not indeed violate the letter of the constitution of the league which only bound Athens not to force out settlers upon members of the league but it was distinctly a violation in spirit the treatment of Samos showed Greece that Athens was bent on rising again to her old imperial position while the second confederacy was based on the principle that she had renounced such pretensions forever delighted with the achievements of Timothyus the Athenians appointed him to command the fleet which had been operating for years on the Macedonian coast under Ephikrates whose failure was strikingly contrasted with the success of Timothyus it must be remembered that while Ephikrates was hindered by the hostility of the regent of Macedon Timothyus was helped by the friendship of the setrap of Phrygia but Timothyus possessed a diplomatic dexterity which Ephikrates never displayed and now Fortune favored the diplomatists shortly before his new appointment the regent Ptolemy was assassinated by the young king Pyrticus who thus avenged his brother Alexander the change in the holders of power led to a change in policy Macedonia freed itself from the influence of Thebes and the young king sought the support of Athens and so Timothyus not only untrammeled by Macedonian opposition but even aided by Macedonian auxiliaries set about the reduction of towns around the Thermaic Gulf he compelled Methon and Pidnia to join the Athenian Confederacy and in the calcidic peninsula he made himself master of Portidia and Tauron the acquisition of these calcidic towns was valuable in itself and Portidia was occupied by Athenian outsettlers but the main purpose of the general was to weaken the resources of Olinthus which at the head of the calcidian states gave powerful support to its ally Amphipolis the supreme object covered by Athens whose rights to it had been recently recognized by the Persian king a famous mercenary captain named Caridemus who had previously served under Ephicrates was now secured again by Timothyus but two efforts to capture Amphipolis were repelled the work of Brassidus was not destined to be undone it was high time for Thebes to interfere if the successes of Timothyus were allowed to continue Athens would soon recover Jobia and the adhesion of that island was from its geographical position of the highest importance to Beotia but in order to check the advance of her neighbor it would be necessary for Thebes to grapple with her own on her own element by the advice of Epaminondus in spite of the advice of Meneclates it was resolved to create a navy and enter upon the career of a sea power this was a momentous decision which demanded a careful consideration of ways and means given the problem to break the power of Athens there can be no question that Epaminondus advised the only possible method of solving it but it might be well to consider whether its solution was a necessity for Thebes the history of Beotia had marked it out as a continental power and it would have been wiser to consolidate its efforts which could not be sustained by any but a great commercial state and the cities of Beotia had no trade it was the natural antipathy of the two neighbors far more than any nature mature consideration of her interest that drove Beotia to take this indiscreet step yet the step had immediate success a hundred triremes were built and manned and sent to the propontist under the Bocotarch Epaminondus the sailing of this fleet was a blow to Athens not from any victory that had gained there was no battle but from the support and encouragement which gave to those members of the Confederacy which were eager to break their bonds the establishment of the clergy's of Samos had created great discontent and apprehension among the Athenian allies and they wanted only the support of a power like thieves to throw off the federal yoke Byzantium openly rebelled Rhodes and Chaos negotiated with Epaminondus and even Kios close to Attica itself defied Athens when the Theban fleet returned home Cabrios recall Kios to its allegiance and a new act of treaty was drawn up but a second rebellion had to be put down at Jules before the island the acquiesced in Athenian sway the expedition of Epaminondus also served to support the enemies of Athens who opposed her advance in the Cursonese namely the free city of Cardia and the Thracian kings Cotis who was aided by his son-in-law Ephicrates this general superseded by Timotheus had not ventured to return to Athens and now cited with her enemies while the young Theban navy sent forth to oppose Athens in a prepontus a Theban army had marched against the ally of Athens Alexander of Ferai whose hand strengthened by a mercenary force had been heavy against the Thessalaniens once more but for the last time Pelopidas entered Thessaly at the head of an army to assist the federation before he left Thebes the sun suffered an eclipse and this celestial event interpreted by the prophets as a sign of coming evil cast a gloom over his departure At Pharsalus he was joined by forces of the Thessalaniens League and immediately advanced against Ferai itself Alexander came forth to meet him with a large force and it was a matter of great importance for the purpose of barring the Theban advance to occupy the heights known as dog's heads on the road from Pharsalus to Ferai the armies reached a critical spot nearly at the same time and there was a rush for the crests the Theban cavalry beat off the cavalry of the foe but lost time in pursuing it and in the meantime the infantry of Alexander seized the hills in the battle which followed the object of the Thebans was to drive the enemy from this position having been repeatedly repelled Pelopidas by a combined assault of horse and foot at length won the summit and forced the enemy to give way but in a moment of victory the impetuous general aspired the hated despot in whose dungeon he had languished and yielding to an irresistible fit of passion aggravated by the excitement of battle he forgot the duties of a general and rushed against his enemy Alexander withdrew into the mists of his guards and Pelopidas plunging desperately after him was overwhelmed by numbers it was even so that Cyrus threw away his victory at Kunaksa the death of Pelopidas was not fatal to his followers who routed the enemy with heavy loss but it was a sore blow both to his own thieves of which he had been the deliverer and strong pillar and to Thessaly of which he had been the protector in the following year an army was sent against Ferai and avenged his death Alexander was obliged to relinquish all his possessions except his own city and submit to the headship of thieves it was about this time that thieves shocked the Hellenic world by the destruction of a venerable rival the Minyan or Communist some Theban cities induced the horsemen of or communists to join them in a plot to subvert the Constitution but the hearts of the principal conspirators failing them before the day of action came they informed the Botox the horsemen who were promptly seized and condemned to death and the assembly passed a resolution to raise or communists and enslave its people the Thebans rejoiced at a fair pretext to wreck hatred of ages upon their unhappy neighbor they marched forth and executed the doom the men were slain because they resisted the rest of the folk were enslaved it was a deed on which Greece cried shame and if the moderate and humane Biotach who was then in a hella-spaunting regions had been present to control the councils of his country it would possibly never have been committed End of Chapter 14 Part 3 Recording by Dick Durrett Manchester, New Hampshire Chapter 14 Part 4 of A History of Greece to the Death of Alexander the Great Volume 2 This is a LibriVox recording All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain For more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org Recording by Morgan Scorpion A History of Greece to the Death of Alexander the Great Volume 2 by John Bagnell Bury Chapter 14 Part 4 Section 4 The Battle of Mantinia While Thebes was intent on opposing Athens now her only serious rival she had kept a loop from the Peloponnesus but the course of affairs there was soon to demand a new intervention The interest no centres on the relations of Elis with Arcadia and the decisive element in the situation is the rift in the Arcadian League perceptibly widening every month Her rights over Trifilia were the chief question of political importance for Elis They had been recognised in the Persian Rescript but Arcadia refused to admit them and Thebes did not interfere Thus Elis found herself in the same plight as Sparta in regard to the Arcadian League It had always been a principle of lack of demonion policy to preserve against Elis the independence of her two southern neighbours the Persatans and the Trifilians But now Sparta was only too ready to renounce this party and recognise the Elian claim for the sake of winning an ally It was in the nature of things that the two states should combine to recover Messinia and Trifilia Thus there came to pass a change for the better in the prospect of Sparta Enemies had risen up against Arcadia on the north and on the west and Thebes held aloof The Spartans had recently gained a welcome success in the recovery of Selassia with the help of a force which had been sent to their aid by the second Dionysius of Syracuse Besides Trifilia there were certain places on the mountainous frontier between Elis and Arcadia to which Elis professed to have claims One of these was Lassion in the high platter of Paloi northeast of Olympia The Elians occupied the district but were speedily driven out by the Pan-Arcadian Apparatoi who were always ready for such emergencies The plains of Elis were far more assailable than the highlands of Arcadia and the Arcadians were able to carry the war to the very heart of their foe The Olympian festival would fall next year and they were resolved that it should not be celebrated on the time-honored presidency of Elis They marched to Olympia and occupied and fortified the hill of Cronus which looked down upon the Altis Then they made an attack on the unwalled city of Elis in concert with the Democratic faction But the attempt at a revolution failed and the Arcadians were repulsed In the following year a second invasion reduced the Elians to such distress that they implored Sparta to make a diversion and draw off the Arcadian forces In answer to this prayer Archidamus occupied Cromnon a fort which commands the road from Megalopolis to Messinia with a garrison of 200 men The importance of this step is shown by the fact that not only did the Arcadians promptly leave Elis but they were also joined by allies Argyves as well as Messinians to besiege Cromnon A Spartan poster cut off the communication between the Arcadian and the Messinian capitals and was a threat to both Archidamus at first tried to create a second diversion by ravaging northern Laconia which was now politically part of Arcadia When this failed he made an attempt to relieve Cromnon but was driven back with some loss A second attempt at rescue would have been successful if it had been concerted but it led to the capture of almost the whole garrison an event which 10 years before would have sent a shock through the Hellenic world but now seemed an ordinary occurrence The Arcadians were again free to continue their designs in Elis The time of the Olympian games was approaching and the people of Pisa the ancient possessors of the sanctuary who had by no means forgotten the rights which Elis had usurped in the days long gone by were installed as presidents of the festival It was fully expected that the feast would not pass without battle and bloodshed The Hill of Cronus had been occupied for a year by the Arcadian garrison but now the whole army of the federation as well as 2000 spearmen from Argos and 400 cavalry from Athens arrived to protect the solemn celebration The day came round and the games began The horse race was run and won The next contest was the Pentathlon which demanded excellence in five different kinds of athletic prowess in running, wrestling, hurling the javelin throwing the disc and leaping The first event, the race, was over when the company became aware that the men of Elis were marching up to the bank of the Cladius which bounded the western side of the Altis The soldiers took up their position on the opposite bank but the games went on Those competitors who had not failed in the race proceeded to the wrestling As the spectators, when the alarm was given moved from the race course into the Altis to be nearer the scene of action the wrestling match was held in the open space between the race course and the great altar under the terrace of the treasure houses The aliens who were supported by an Archaean force performed a sacrifice and then, charging across the stream with unexpected boldness drove back the Archaean and Argyve line into the Altis A battle ensued in the southern part of the Holy Precinct between the Hall of Council and the Great Temple of Zeus but the colonnades of these and other adjacent buildings gave shelter and points of vantage to the defenders and the aliens, when their captain fell, retired across the stream to their camp The Archaeans improvised a fortification on the western side of the Altis using for this purpose the tents of the spectators and the men of Elis, seeing that it would be useless to repeat their attack, returned home obliged to content themselves with declaring the festival to be null and void and marking the year in their register as an Analympiad The religious sentiment of Greece was outraged by these violent scenes at a sanctuary which belongs to all Greece rather than to any single state and there can be no question that the general sympathy independently of all political considerations was on the side of Elis, whose presidency was regarded in Hellas as part of the order of nature and was strongly adverse to the Archaean intruders supporting with arms the antiquated rights of Pisa but it was far worse when the Archaeans began to make free use of the sacred treasures of Olympia for the purpose of paying the federal army This was an act of sacrilegious spoliation which could not be defended and it was disastrous to the Archaean Federation It was inevitable that, when the first impulse of enthusiasm which drove the Archaean cities to unite together had spent itself the old jealousies would emerge again and empower the Pan-Archaean idea So it was that the two neighbours, Mantania and Tagia whose common action had been the chief cause of the Federal Union began to assume something of their traditional enmity The scandal of Olympia gave Mantania who was jealous of Megalopolis also a fair opportunity to secede from the League which had put itself so signally in the wrong This step necessarily involved the consequence that Mantania would definitely range herself with the other camp in the Peloponnesus with Sparta, Elis and Akia and thus the traditional policies of Mantania and Tagia were reversed Tagia, the support of Sparta had become the life and soul of the anti-Spartan movement Mantania, the state which Sparta had unsittied was now Sparta's support Though the Arcadian Assembly resented and tried to punish the protest of Mantania the pressure of public opinion induced it to forbid any further plundering of the Olympian sanctuaries When this resolution was taken the weakness of the Arcadian League was exhibited There was no money in the Federal Treasury to pay the standing army and without this army it would be impossible for Arcadia to maintain herself against enemies on three sides not to speak of disaffected Mantania without the protection of Thebes But there was a strong feeling throughout the country against a Theban protectorate and a large number of wealthy Arcadians who shared this feeling proposed to solve the difficulty by enrolling themselves in the core of a paratoi and serving without pay Occupying this position they would be able to dictate the policy of the League There was little doubt that the predominance of this party would soon bring Arcadia into alliance with Sparta which was no longer dangerous to Arcadian liberty but such a political revolution would be fatal to Theban influence which rested on the antagonism between Arcadia and Sparta it might even imperil the independence of Messinia To meet this danger of an alliance between Sparta and Arcadia Thebes was constrained to send a fourth expedition into the Peloponnes It was imperative to support the Theban army in Arcadia Both parties alike were probably satisfied with the resolution of the assembly to make peace with Elis and acknowledge her rights at Olympia Each city swore to the peace At Taghia the solemnity of the oath led to an incident Arcadians from other places had gathered together for the occasion which they celebrated by feast and merriment The commander of the Baishan garrison ordered the gates to be shut and arrested the leaders of the anti-Theban party Most of the mountaineans present had left the town at an early hour but there were a few among the prisoners and the energetic protests of mountaineia frightened the faint-hearted harmost into releasing all his prisoners and excusing his act by a false explanation The coup had doubtless been planned long beforehand and consent obtained from the highest quarter Epaminondas, when complained was made at Thebes approved the act of arrest and condemned the act of release At the same time he declared to the Arcadian League that it had no right to make peace with Elis without consulting Thebes We will march into Arcadia, he said, and assist our friends The threat was seriously meant and the friends and enemies of Thebes prepared for war Athens, an ally of both Sparta and Arcadia, could now fulfill without difficulty the double obligation by supporting those Arcadians who were on Sparta's side The common dread of Thebes was reflected in the quintuple alliance which Athens, with her allies Mantonea, Elis, Achaea and Phyllis formed for the sake of mutual protection Part of the text of this treaty is preserved to us on fragments of one of the original marble copies It is worthy of remark that the mountaineans who seem to have been the only Arcadian community that entirely dissociated itself from the government at Megalopolis appear in the treaty as the Arcadians Thus claiming to be the true representatives of their country The Boetian force in its full strength, accompanied by all the allies of central Greece who were pledged to follow Thebes into the field, went forth under Epaminondas to bring back the unruly Peloponnesians under Boetian control. The Focians alone refused to go. The terms of the alliance which bound them to Boetia obliged them to bear aid only if Boetia were itself attacked. When he reached Namia Epaminondas halted his army with the hope of intercepting the forces which Athens prepared to send to her allies. But the Athenian forces came not, and he advanced to Tagaea, the chief centre of Theban influence in the peninsula, which he had appointed as the meeting place for all his allies, Arcadian, Argyve and Messinian. His enemies were also gathering to the rival city at Mantenea, a Spartan army under old Aegeus Aelaus was expected there. Epaminondas marched to attack them before the Spartans and Athenians arrived, but found their position too strong and returned to his camp in Tagaea. Learning that Aegeus Aelaus had already set out, he determined to strike a second blow at Sparta. He would have found he the place as unprotected as a nest of young birds if his plan had not been thwarted by a Cretan runner who carried the news to Aegeus Aelaus. The king immediately returned on his steps, and when Epaminondas after a night's march reached Sparta, he found it prepared and defended. Baffled in this project by an incalculable chance, Epaminondas promptly resolved to attempt another surprise. He foresaw that the army at Mantenea would immediately march to the rest of Sparta, and that Mantenea would consequently be inadequately guarded. His camp at Tagaea commanded the direct road from Mantenea to Sparta, so that the enemy would be obliged to march by the longer western road. Moving rapidly, he reached Tagaea, where he rested his hoplites, but he sent on his cavalry to surprise Mantenea. The army had departed, as he calculated, and the people were out in the fields busy with the harvest. But in the same hour in which the Theban horse approached from the south, a body of Athenian cavalry had reached the city. They had not yet eaten or drunk, but they rode forth and drove the assailants back. The conflict between the two weary troops of horsemen was sharp, and was marked by the death of Gryllus, the son of Xenophon the historian. The allied army, learning that Sparta was no longer in danger, soon returned from its fruitless excursion to its former post, now reinforced by both the Spartan and the Athenian contingents. Foiled in his two projects of surprise, Epaminondus was obliged to attack the united enemy at Mantenea. The difficulty of supplying his army with provisions, and the anxiety of his allies to return home as soon as possible, rendered it imperative to bring the campaign to a swift decision. The enemy occupied the narrow part of the plain, south of Mantenea, where ridges of the opposite mountains approach each other. The object of Epaminondus was to sweep them out of his way and take the city. But instead of marching straight for the gap, he adopted a strategical movement which puzzled his antagonists. He led his army north-westwards to a point in the hills near the modern Tripolitsa, and then moved a short distance along the skirts of the mountain so as to approach the right wing of the foe. He then halted and formed in battle array. The enemy were deceived by the indirect advance. Seeing him march obliquely towards the hills, they concluded that he would not attack that day, and even when he changed his direction and advanced towards them, persisted in their false opinion. Epaminondus adopted the same tactics by which he had won at Lutra. On the left, he placed the Baritian hoplites and his own immediate command. In a deep column, destined to break through the right wing of the enemy before the rest of the armies could come to blows. The oblique advance, besides its chief purpose of deceiving the foe, had the further advantage of assisting the peculiar tactics of the general, for, when he formed his line, there was obviously a far greater distance between his right and the hostile left than that which divided his left from the hostile right. The mountaineans, since it was their territory, had the place of honour on the extremity of the enemy's right wing, and the Lacodemonians were next them. The Athenians were on the farthest left, and both wings were protected by a squadron of horse. Epaminondus placed his own cavalry in deep column, in front of the deep column of infantry, but there was one danger against which he had to guard. When the Boetian column charged, the Athenian left might wheel round and attack it on the unshielded side, a movement which could be executed owing to the distance dividing them from his own right. To meet this danger, he sent a body of horse and foot to occupy a rising ground out in the plain, considerably in advance of his line. This body could attack the Athenians in the rear if they tried such a movement. With an extraordinary lack of perception, the Lacodemonians and their allies witnessed these maneuvers without understanding their drift, and it was not until Epaminondus began to advance in full march against them that they realized his meaning and rushed tumultuously to arms. All fell out as he designed. His cavalry routed their cavalry, and the force of his wedge of hoplites, led by himself, broke through the opposing array and put the Lacodemonians to flight. It is remarkable indeed how the tactical lesson of Luke trust seems to have been lost on the Spartans. The men of Achaia and Elis and the rest, when they saw the flight of the right wing, wavered before they came into collision with their own opponents. It is not quite clear what happened, but here again Mantenea seemed to repeat Lugtra. The charge of the Theuan left undecided the battle, with the exception of cavalry engagements that there was but little endosultery fighting along the rest of the line. It was a great Theuan victory, and yet a chance determined that the victory should be the death blow to the supremacy of Thebes. As he pursued the retreating foe at the head of his Theuans, Epaminondus received a mortal thrust from a spear. When the news spread through the field, the pursuit was stade and the effect of victory was undone. The troops fell back like beaten men. So striking a proof has hardly ever been rendered on the part of soldiers towards their general of devoted and absorbing sentiment. All the hopes of this army, composed of such diverse elements, were centred on Epaminondus. All their confidence of success, all their security against defeat, were derived from the idea of acting under his orders. All their power, even of striking down a defeated enemy, appeared to vanish when those orders were withdrawn, and there was no one to take his place. In his dying moments before the point of the fatal spear was extracted, Epaminondus asked for Aeoladas and Diphantas, whom he destined as his successors. He was told that they were slain. Then, he said, make peace with the enemy. Peace was made on condition that things should remain as they were. Megalopolis and Messinia were recognized the abiding results of Theban policy. In this peace Sparta would not acquiesce. She still persisted in refusing to recognize the independence of Messinia, but her allies would not listen to her protests. The military genius of Epaminondus. The qualities of mind and character which distinguished him among his countrymen, and the actual work which he accomplished in the deliverance of Messinia and the support of Arcadia, must not be suffered to obscure the fact that his political faculty was mediocre. What could be done by the energy and ability of a general, or by the discretion of a magistrate, that he did? But he failed to solve the fundamental problems which demanded solution at the hands of a statesman who aimed at making his country great. It was necessary to create an efficient machinery, acting on definite principles, for conducting the foreign affairs of Borussia, like the machinery which existed at Sparta. This was the only possible substitute for brains which were not plentiful in Borussia. Epaminondus could not hope to communicate any part of his own virtue to his successors. It was necessary to decide whether it was possible or desirable for Borussia to enter into competition with Athens as a maritime power. If the decision were affirmative, it was of capital importance to organize the navy on a sound financial foundation. There is no sign that Epaminondus grappled with the problems of government and finance. His voyage to the propontus was an experiment which had no results. Nor does he seem to have taken steps to secure Borussia on the side of her dangerous Folkian neighbours, though he had the insights to organize anew the Amphithionic League and make it an instrument of Theban policy. Above all, he did not succeed in accomplishing the first thing needful, the welding together of Borussia into a real national unity. He aspired to expand Borussia into an empire. The worst of it was that no one had come before him to make it into a nation. That which mythical Lycurgus and Thesias had done for Sparta and Athens had never been done for Thebes by any of her numerous heroes. Epaminondus seems to have attempted to unify Borussia. If he had known how to build such a unity on solid foundations, he might have bestowed on Thebes a future of glory which he would not have lived to see. But his ambition for his country, not for himself, was too impatient and imaginative. The ardour of his patriotism impelled him to enter upon paths of policy which his countrymen felt no restless impulse to pursue. The successes of Thebes were achieved by his brains, not by her force. He brought his country aloft on the wings of his genius, but did not impart to her frame the principle of that soaring motion, so that when the shaft pierced the heart of her sustainer, she sank to the earth, never to rise again. Epaminondus was a great general. He was not a great statesman. Section 6 The Last Expedition of Agesilaus To no one in Greece can the supremacy of Thebes have come as a sore trial unto the Spartan king Agesilaus. He who had once dreamt of conquering Persia had lived to see his own inviolable land twice trodden by an invader, his own city quake twice before an enemy at her doors. But he had at least a consolation about living the triumph of the Theban and seeing the brief supremacy pass away. The death of Epaminondus, of which he could not mistake the significance, did not restore Mestinia or give Sparta any immediate power. But Epaminondus dead and Arcadia spent, Sparta had now a prospect of regaining something of her old influence. With her own diminished population she could do little. It would be necessary to follow the general example and take mercenary forces into her pay, but to do this a well-filled treasury was needful. Accordingly we find Sparta, as well as Athens, busy beyond the sea, taking part in the troubles which in these years agitated the western portion of the Persian kingdom, and lending help to the Satraps and Donasts who were rebelling against the great king. The object of Athens was territory, the object of Sparta was money. When Timotheus had been engaged in winning Samos, a guest Selaus had visited Asia Minor and done his utmost in support of Aureo Bardzenes for the sake of gold, and after the battle of Mantineia he again went forth in a guise which dipped little from that of a mercenary in foreign service. The borders of western Asia, from the Hellespont to the Nile, were in revolt against the great king. The expedition of Cyrus was only the first of a series of rebellions which troubled the reign of Artaxerxes. We have seen how Cyprus rebelled and was subjugated, but Egypt still defied the Persian power, and its success set a bad example to the Satraps of the adjoining countries. The Athenian general Cadreus had helped the Egyptians to strengthen their country by a scientific system of defences, but he was recalled to Athens after the king's peace, and the Athenian whom we next find in Egypt is fighting on the other side. The Freelance Iphicrates giving sound military advice to the Persian commander which the Persian commander does not follow. Soon after this the Satraps of Asia began to rebel, first in Cappadocia, then in Frigia, then successively in Ionia, Keria and Lydia, and the insurrection extended to Phoenicia and Syria. A scheme of cooperation was formed between the Satraps and the Egyptian king Tachost, who had recently come to the throne, and Sparta decided to support this coalition. Athens held a luth, but Cadreus went once more to Egypt as a volunteer. At the head of a thousand men, and accompanied by thirty Spartans as advisors, Agasileus set sail for the Nile. It is said that the small figure, the lame leg, and the plain dress of the experienced old soldier made a bad impression in Egypt, in any case he was not given the supreme command of the army as he expected. When a sufficient force was gathered, Tachos, accompanied by Agasileus and Cadreus, made an expedition to Phoenicia to act there against the Persian troops, but they were obliged to return almost immediately in consequence of a revolt against Tachos, headed by his cousin Nektanabos. The Spartan king, who considered that he had been slighted by Tachos, supported the rival, and Tachos fled to Sousa and made his peace with the Persian monarch. Another competitor then arose, but was defeated by the effective support which Agasileus gave to Nektanabos. In consequence of these struggles for the Egyptian throne, nothing was done against Persia, and the great coalition signally failed. Aureo Bartonnes of Frigia, the friend of Timothyus, was betrayed and crucified. Another satrap was murdered. The rest made their submission to their king. Within a year, Western Asia was entirely subject to Artaxerxes. But Sparta had won from the futile project what she really wanted. She might shelter her dignity under the pretext that she had gone forth to punish the Persian king for recognising the independence of Missinia, but everyone knew that her motive was to replenish her treasury. Nektanabos presented her with 230 talents in return for the support of Agasileus. It was the last service that the old king was destined to perform for his country. Death carried him off. He was eighty-four years old, at the harbor of Menelaus on the way to Cyrene, and his embalmed body was sent home to Sparta. Though not in any sense a great man, though not in the same rank as Lysander, Agasileus had been for forty years a prominent figure in Greece. There is something melancholy about his career. He could remember the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War. He had seen the triumph of Sparta and conducted her policy during a great part of thirty years of supremacy, and then, as an old man, he shared in her humiliation. He had begun by dreaming of the conquest of Persia. He had been forced to abandon such dreams, and he had translated his Arda into a bitter hatred against an Hellenic city. It is tragic to see him at the age of eighty-three going forth against Persia once more, not now for conquest or glory, but to earn by any and every means the money needed by his indigent country.