 If a broken arrow message is ever flashed, signaling a nuclear weapons accident within the United States, will we be ready to cope with it? Will we be ready? That's the question we sought to answer in the Nevada desert. On the occasion, a joint Department of Defense Department of Energy nuclear weapons accident exercise. The doctrine for response forces at such an accident is straightforward enough in outline. You put out the fire, remove and treat casualties, establish command and control, contain the contamination, render the weapons safe and start recovery operations. And what a tremendous effort lies behind those simple words. What a potential for serious complications. For we're talking about an event that literally explodes in the news media and in the public mind. Our government, from the White House on down, demands a quick, competent response to contain the danger first, then eliminate it and finally recover from it. Now here is the Air Force Unseen Commander at the exercise site. Roger, the exercise you are about to see was the first of its kind, unique in scope and duration and consequently unique in its great importance to all who share responsibility in nuclear weaponry. Its purpose was to test our responses, to play out from the first May Day call to the final cleanup, the complete scenario of actions required by a major nuclear accident. From this exercise, we all learned valuable lessons. It showed how critically important is each individual's function and the total effort. It proved that your personal response, your decisions, your recall of what you learned in training can make the difference between a widespread calamity or a swiftly contained local incident. The basic facts were these. An Air Force C-141 with seven crew members crashed and burned in the Nevada desert. A board was a group of nuclear weapons being ferried to a depot, six complete weapons and components for two more, from the inventories of the Army, the Navy, the Air Force and the Marines. The D-Day clock thus began ticking at 0955 hours with a potential broken arrow message from Nellis Air Force Base. Information went out within half an hour when a reconnaissance helicopter from the nearby Army Camp, Fort Mercury, found the wreckage 30 miles away. The grim message was, no evidence of life, aircraft badly broken up. The first word of a nuclear weapons accident goes to the National Military Command Center. Then to the top most levels, including the Secretary of Defense, the White House Situation Room and the JNACC, the Joint Nuclear Accident Coordinating Center. Follow-on alerts in this case went to over 50 different agencies, commands and units in the armed services, the Departments of Energy, Justice and State and several Nevada offices. The nature of the event is such that a shockwave runs through our whole government structure, which unless contained can soon expand into a state of public alarm. First response was from the nearest military unit, which happened to be the Army. By helicopter and ground vehicle, their response team arrived at the site by noon. Craters near the wreckage showed that high explosive detonations had occurred. The question of contamination was quickly answered when the first readings showed 2,000 counts per minute on the Alpha Radiation Detectors. Anti-contamination suits and masks must be worn. That radiation was real, not simulated. It was radium-223 with a half-life of 11 days. It had been spread in a calculated pattern over the crash site at a level that ensured against health hazards, but at the same time gave real instrument readings. We should note at this point that this exercise included all services and the Department of Energy and was evaluated by umpires from these agencies. Army Brigadier General Carlson, as senior military officer present, assumed responsibility as the initial on-site commander. Military police set up a partial security cordon and would complete it as soon as the contamination profile could be drawn. Army control team members now properly suited up, taped and masked, moved onto the crash site and within an hour found three bodies of crewmen and two nuclear weapons. One army weapon pinned under the wing and one Air Force weapon half-buried in the ground. Now two civilians appeared in the area unexpectedly. They were promptly stopped by the MPs, but proved to be the owners of this land and soon wanted to talk about damage claims. One of them had picked up some contamination and had to be held for his own safety until the decontamination unit was set up. Meanwhile, a steady stream of reports, notifications and requests for additional support were going out from the Army's Field Command post. Among them was a request to the Federal Aviation Administration to create a prohibited air corridor over the crash site, 10 miles wide and 10,000 feet high. Normally, we have no authority on private property, but a national defense area may be established in an accident like this where nuclear weapons are involved. Now the complexity of the operation was growing by the hour. The question arose as to whether the county coroner could handle contaminated bodies. Explosive ordinance disposal teams from the Army, Navy, Marines and the Air Force were called for since weapons belonging to each service were involved. The Department of Energy alerted weapons design people from the Livermore Laboratory, Sandia and Los Alamos. At Nellis Air Force Base, their disaster response force assembled and departed for the crash site to support the Army team. By late afternoon, a Navy EOD team arrived from China Lake Naval Station in California. Shortly after, the Army's Alpha team came in from Fort Bragg, North Carolina to aid in the Radiation Survey and Contamination Control Line operations. The newsmen were not far behind, asking for interviews and for a look at the wreckage. They wanted names of casualties, cause of the crash and details on potential radiation hazards to civilians living downwind. An official statement from General Carlson's Public Affairs Officer, cleared by higher authority, was issued to the news media. It stated the basic facts as they were then known and acknowledged that nuclear weapons were involved. Now it's obvious that a very large logistical effort was needed to feed, shelter and sustain our forces here. In a real nuclear accident, the crunch would be felt in a few hours. Food, clothing, tents, water, vehicles, fuel, sanitation, expanded communications, all would be urgently needed right now. To save exercise time, a tent city had been set up previously to shelter 400 people. It's true that such a camp wouldn't exist until several days later at a real accident site, but its presence didn't affect the central objectives of the exercise. And in fact, there would still be plenty of discomfort, sleeplessness and cold rations to go around. A second Navy EOD team had arrived by now from Hawthorne, Nevada. After the third and fourth nuclear weapons were found, first damage assessments were made and render safe procedures were started. All seven of the aircrew casualties were located by the search teams. Telephone lines were laid to ease the problem of communication with security guards far out in the field. By the end of D-Day, a good start had been made, but only a start on controlling the situation. The radiation survey had not yet been completed. Two weapons and most of the separate components had not yet been found. Communications were minimal, but situation reports to higher headquarters had started. But the needs were great, and among the urgent requests that flowed from the command staff were these. Aerial photos of the site, an aerial radiation survey, the long-range communications package called Jackpot, the Air Force's Occupational and Environmental Health Lab and the Army's Radiological Assistance Medical Team. The Army was still in command at the site since they responded first from the nearest military installation. But the Air Force, by regulation, would soon take over responsibility, since they had possession of the weapons at the time of the accident. In fact, the 22nd Air Force Disaster Response Force was now assembling at Travis Air Force Base, California, and would soon be airborne. At about midnight of D-Day, the lead party of 23 scientists and technicians from the Department of Energy's Weapons Design Laboratories arrived. They were briefed at once by General Carlson's staff, then sent off a status report to their headquarters, and finally tried to get a few hours' sleep in the desert cold. We can close out the first day of this exercise with one further comment. The three major television networks and most major newspapers carried stories on this operation right from the start. We were definitely in the public eye. The next day began with a planning meeting of unit leaders. Render safe procedures of the weapons had first priority. Early in the day, an EOD team found more of the classified weapons components near the wreckage, and reported a high radiation count near the aircraft tail. There was by now a steady influx of technical personnel. The radiation control or RADCON teams arrived from several locations throughout the United States. They were joined by Marine EOD and RADCON personnel from California and Arizona. By mid-morning, render safe procedures on the two Navy weapons were completed. A large mobile crane had been requested on D-Day, and it now came onto the site to help in weapon recovery. One of the Army's weapons was pinned under a wing and an engine. As soon as these were lifted off, EOD personnel were able to electrically save the weapon. The situation report that went out from the Army's field command post before noon placed the count at 206 military personnel now present, plus the 30 from the Department of Energy's weapons laboratories, with more to come. Communications were in danger of being swamped. But the arrival at the airstrip of the JCS jackpot mobile communications package from McDill Air Force Base in Florida promised some relief. Next to arrive was the EOD team from Hill Air Force Base, Utah, to perform render safe procedures on the two Air Force weapons. Meanwhile, the ground radiation survey pressed ahead toward a complete map of the contaminated area. But then a distraction. A crowd of noisy pickets descended on the command post. They were testing the presence of nuclear weapons. I don't let anybody move. The television news crew came along to record the fracas. And a lawyer spokesman demanded to see the commander and threatened a court injunction. The security forces were kept busy containing the more aggressive pickets. The county sheriff sent a deputy to help deal with these civilians. And in due time, they departed. It's clear that at any nuclear weapons accident, the on scene commander and his staff are under tremendous pressure from all sides. The urgent work of a large and diverse force of specialists has to be organized and prioritized. A flood of requests for special equipment, communications and logistical aid have to be met. There are demands from the press, from local officials, the next of kin, and from alarmed citizens. Higher headquarters tracks the situation continuously. All this is in the context of a situation that can be physically dangerous to all present and possibly to nearby residents. More than that, public confidence in us turns on how we conduct ourselves under stress. To put it bluntly, we're expected to know what we're doing and we'd better show that we do. Early in the afternoon of the second day, the specialists from the DOE's weapons laboratories processed across the contamination control line and joined in the work. They were a welcome addition. First for their expertise in weapons design and secondly because of their sophisticated radiation detection instruments. By mid-afternoon, shipping documents had been found in the wreckage, giving important confirmation of weapons specifics. A department of energy contractor now made the first aerial survey. Photos were taken from which a more accurate plotting could be made of weapons locations and debris. During the afternoon, field operations were momentarily suspended so that mortuary affairs personnel could remove casualties to a decontamination area. Now the Air Force's disaster response force arrived to take over from the Army. The new on-scene commander was to be Brigadier General James Gardner from Max 22nd Air Force. After he and his team had been briefed, the change of command was sealed with a friendly handshake and all forces were placed at General Gardner's disposal. At Nellis, the air transportable radiac package called ATRAP arrived from Kelley Air Force Base, Texas. Its capacity for instrument calibration and repair was urgently needed. The last of the weapons was now located. It had suffered a low-order detonation on impact. Parts of this and other weapons were also found during the afternoon. All of them contaminated, but many of the components were still missing. By late afternoon, the teams processed out for the day hot, tired, and sweaty. A nighttime staff meeting was inaugurated to brief everyone on the day's results, the problems that had surfaced, and the plans for tomorrow. While that meeting was going on, another was held, bringing together the scientists and specialists from the weapons labs on the one hand and the EOD and RADCON personnel from the services on the other. Most of them had never met before. A new little of one another's capabilities. A great deal of helpful information was exchanged, and some initial confusion about differing procedures was laid to rest. The second day closed with considerable work having been accomplished, but a lot remaining to be done. Three weapons had been found, two weapons had been saved, one was still buried, and many components still missing. A question remained as to the full extent of the area's contamination. We now had over 250 people on site. We had added a complete radiation analysis lab, a mobile decontamination facility, and the Lawrence Livermore Labs, ARAC, Atmospheric Release Advisory Capability. This would be used to predict any possible downwind contamination hazard. The Air Force's occupational and environmental health lab was here from Book's Air Force Base also. The aerial photos were being developed, and an aerial radiation survey was on for tomorrow. So ended the second day. At Nellis, more expert help arrived from the east coast. This was the Army's Radiological Assistance Medical Team from Walter Reed Hospital. They'd helped define health hazards and analyze air and water samples around the crash site. As the hotline opened on the third day, Department of Energy specialists were joining the Air Force, Navy, and Army EOD teams to continue the weapons recovery work. Meanwhile, the on-scene commander's staff was in touch with many agencies in the outside world. The local sheriff, the OSI, the state attorney general and the Air Force Inspection and Safety Center. Now began the first radiation survey from the air by a Department of Energy contractor. Within an hour, they reported finding a new hotspot southeast of the crash site at a previously unsuspected location. The ground team was sent out to define its size and boundaries, and security was expanded to include it. Soil samples were taken outside the courten and down the public road to the south. The analysis showed nothing above normal background radiation. Shortly after noon, two civilians in a dune buggy decided to try to cross the security line and pick up a few souvenirs. They didn't get very far. After they identified themselves and were checked for contamination, they were allowed to go on their way. The demands of the news media were a constant pressure on the commander and his public affairs officer. News releases were given out periodically, but the reporters always had further questions. There were queries on the possible threat to public health, property damage, the whole matter of transporting nuclear weapons safely, the specific cause of this accident, and many more. Meanwhile, the recovery work went on. A joint Navy DOE team found a heavy component of an exploded weapon in its crater, contaminated. The mobile crane was called in once more to stabilize the Air Force weapon so that the sand could be dug away. Then the render safe procedure on it was finally accomplished. As to the Army weapon, it presented some delicate problems that would be talked over far into the night. Late in the afternoon, the mother of one of the dead crew members came to the site. She wanted to claim his body for burial. She wanted to know how it happened and why, whose fault it was, and what her son had died for. It all comes down on the commander and his staff, the big crises and the small ones, the individual sorrows, the public fears. By the end of the third day, we had a pretty good radiation survey in hand. The perimeters were now defined and security was set. A request had gone out for more respirators, an airlift of seven jeeps and more heavy equipment. At the evening conference, the list of work to be done seemed almost as long as ever, but the list of accomplishments was now quite respectable. Early on the fourth day, a team of Army and DOE weapons lab people took radiographs of the damaged Army weapon. It could not be safely moved until its internal components had been stabilized. In mid-morning, the Cactus Alliance was heard from. This was a group of environmentalists who wanted everything stopped and had a state court order to enforce it. The onsite judge advocate stepped in. He advised the commander that the issuance of the restraining order was outside the state court's power. This judgment was later sustained by the state attorney general. The staff judge advocate relayed the decision by telephone to local civil authorities and operations continued. The Air Force's contamination disposal team now arrived from Kelly Air Force Base, Texas. Their work could not begin until all weapons had been recovered, but it was not too early to start planning. Now, a second aerial survey of radiation was made and an unexpected hotspot was discovered in the north part of the site. A team of Department of Energy specialists deployed there found high radiation counts and updated the plot of the area accordingly. So far, there hadn't been any wind, but we knew the dead-com conditions seldom lasted long out here. When a little breeze came up, the Army RADCON team was tasked to get background air samples. Meanwhile, Marine EOD people were keeping up the search for missing weapons parts. Other teams found most of the classified parts of the Air Force weapon and the major classified component of the Army weapon. These critical parts were brought to a special holding area and covered. With over 400 people now at the site, there seemed no end to logistical needs. Requests went out for such items as generator fuel, rubber mats, tarps, brushes, and surgical gloves. As the wind gusted up and blew sand around the mess tents, the cooks broke out cold rations for dinner. Toward the end of the fourth day, the contamination plotting was complete enough to permit the contamination control line to be moved closer to the crash site. The major problem remaining was the damaged Army weapon, but that fix would take some doing. A charter flight was set up to bring in the two tanks of nitrogen gas plus a regulator and accessories to provide the container environment needed for shipping the weapon. Not all of the exploded or buried components of other weapons had been found, but persistence hopefully would pay off. Newsmen's questions were now turning more toward possible long-term dangers. How much did we know about plant and soil contamination? How far would the wind carry it? What about evacuation of residents downwind? Why didn't we warn the public? Such stories make newspaper copy and any commander in this situation must be careful in his answers. But he must answer and as candidly as possible. Early on day five, a team set out to take soil samples outside the security perimeter to see what effect the wind had on radiation dispersal. Water samples from wells in nearby towns were also taken and all results were negative. The Air Force weapon was examined again and found to be okay to remove. More contaminated pieces were found in and around the cratered areas and the Marines found more fragments of their weapons components. In mid-morning, the mayor of a nearby town demanded to know how much longer the cleanup was going to take. Local business was suffering. He was briefed by the commander and the judge advocate advised him on claims procedures. The weapons lab team shortly afternoon made a successful fix of the troublesome army weapon using the foam cure and nitrogen gas. Then the crane moved it to a holding area. The sheriff arrived in the mid-afternoon with a new surprise, a bench warrant for the arrest of General Gardner. The charge was contempt of court for ignoring the previous restraining order. It was a hectic day for the legal officer. After consultations, he advised the sheriff that the general would not submit to the arrest warrant on the grounds that there could be no contempt of the previous order since the court had no authority to issue it. The sheriff did not press the issue. A representative from the office of the secretary of defense now arrived to get a firsthand look at how we were handling the situation. He received a very thorough briefing on every aspect of the operation. He expressed general approval and asked for an outline of the cleanup plan before leaving. The wind kicked up to 30 knots late in the afternoon, hampering operations, foul-tenting, blowing sand and cold added to the general discomfort. The cooks did manage a hot ration dinner for all that evening. After that, there was the staff meeting to review the day's activities and most especially to plan the work of identifying weapons components, decontaminating and packaging. As the fifth day ended, personnel from the DOE's Pantex Assembly Facility were established in a separate tent to coordinate this final stage of the weapons recovery effort. By the sixth day, operations were going much more smoothly throughout the camp. One big item was the completion of the telephone system, linking all units at the site. The arrival of the 1,500-gallon water tankers was a big help. They were used to wash down contaminated vehicles as well as dampen the dirt roads and parking areas for dust control and best of all, the wind subsided. The news people were still on site receiving briefings and asking questions on our progress. One man reported that a congressional investigation had been demanded in Washington. The answer to that was that any accident involving nuclear weapons would naturally be investigated in every detail. The search for weapons components was narrowing down to the few pieces still missing. Fragments of an army weapon and some marine weapons parts. In mid-morning, a television news camera helicopter overflew the crash site. The on-scene commander at once ordered the legal officer to ask for an intercept of the chopper on landing. Now the Cactus Alliance was heard from again. Still another restraining order was delivered, this time from the federal court of this district. But calls to the United States Attorney and the Judge Advocate General cleared this obstacle as well. To put to rest any lingering fears about radiation, the commander sent letters to the mayors of all nearby towns that there was not and would not be any danger to the public health from this operation. By early evening of the sixth day, the recovery plan was completed. The identification of weapons components and packaging for shipment was proceeding well. The last remaining weapons recovery task was to find the still missing pieces. In the morning of the seventh day, a joint team led by personnel from the Los Alamos Scientific Lab made a sweep of the area north of the wreckage with radiation detection meters and found four of six missing parts. The other two were found and all EOD teams could finally say mission accomplished. And so this first of a kind exercise of our national response capability came to an end. The events that took place were staged and accelerated to compress what would take weeks or even months to do into a brief seven day period. After all the critiques were in, we saw that there is a continuing need for us to review and improve our response capabilities for nuclear weapons accidents.