 and thanks so much for joining us at the United States Institute of Peace today for the first and what will be a series of events we are going to host on conflict and cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region. Today we are kicking off with a discussion of China-India dynamics, particularly in the last couple of years since the deadly clash in Gowan and the Himalayan Mountains changed the trajectory of the relationship between Asia's two largest powers. We also have a distinct opportunity to showcase some of the somewhat newly arrived talent, additional talent that is filling out the incredible Asia team here at the United States Institute of Peace. I'm very happy to have a bunch of new members of our team joining us. You can follow along online. You can submit questions directly through the USIP web portal on your mobile device or on your computer. Our hashtag is Indo-Pacific USIP. So please follow us online and join me in welcoming our panelists who I will introduce as before I start the program. Hi everybody. Hello. Good to see you all, new friends at USIP. So for our discussion today we're joined by three distinguished scholars of Asia starting with Andrew Scobel who is now a distinguished fellow on the China program at the US Institute of Peace. Andrew joins us from I think more than a decade at the Rand Corporation. He is an extremely prolific analyst, writer, editor of things most of our audience will have read largely on China's military power and China's foreign relations throughout the region. And Andrew was born and raised in Hong Kong so he's well versed in all the changes that are happening in the Asia Pacific at a very personal level. To Andrew's left is Dr. Dan Markey. Dan joins us from CICE, a great source of talent for us in recent times. Carla as well. Dan is a senior expert, a senior advisor for South Asia for the center now. He came to us from CICE and from the Council of Foreign Relations. His most recent book is China's Western Horizon which is an extremely interesting and in-depth look at China's relations with its neighbors to the west in Central Asia and South Asia. And to Dan's left is Carla Freeman. Carla also joins us from CICE. She previously ran the Foreign Relations, she previously ran the Foreign Policy Institute at CICE and has most recently published really interesting work on China's policy with regards to both oceans and space. And it's tremendous to have these new colleagues on our team here at USIP. I'm really thrilled they could join us for this discussion. And so we're going to dive right in. The place I wanted to start our talk was at what was sort of I think has been seen as a pivot point in Sino-Indian relations which is the early 2020 clash high in the Himalayan mountains which claimed the lives of 20 Indian soldiers and at least four but perhaps as many as several dozen Chinese we don't yet know. The fact that the Chinese turned to force and combat and caused casualties for the first time in two generations up along the line of actual control really drove a shift in India's policy. They did not go back to a rapprochement. They started to shut down Chinese investment in India. They banned Chinese apps. They took a pretty firm response. We didn't see sort of this an effort to patch things over quickly. And the Chinese while both sides have had talks and discussions and military talks even as recently as the Olympics they decided to feature a Gawan hero as one of the torch bearers leading India to join in the so-called diplomatic boycott of the games. So I thought Andrew might help us zoom in and just sort of discuss what is going on at that disputed border? What's the military situation look like? And then we'll have a discussion about how it features into both countries strategic thinking. Okay. Thanks Vikram. Yeah, you perfectly teed me up. The event, the incident you talked about happened in June 2020 and what I called what I dubbed the rumble in the Himalayas and it sounds a little trite but it's it was brutal hand-to-hand combat between Chinese and Indian troops. As you mentioned at least 24 casualties likely more deaths I should say killed and many more injured. It was the most serious violence between China and India since the 1962 Sino-Indian war. It's unusual in terms of the size of the clash and the high body count but it's not an isolated or out of the blue episode. Clashes and confrontations periodically occur. Why? I think they it really boils down to a long-standing unresolved territorial dispute. The boundary between India and China was never properly surveyed and delineated. Historically empires and kingdoms have intended to be very interested or very concerned about precisely fixing where one empire ends and where the other and other begins. This is especially true in isolated and remote desolate frontiers like the Himalayas. Indeed the rulers of the British Raj and the Qing dynasty weren't very interested weren't at all really interested in demarcating boundaries. Very low priority by contrast contemporary nation states are much more concerned with territorial sovereignty and clearly defining and controlling borders. So why haven't the People's Republic of China excuse me and the Republic of India taken taking care of their unfinished border business? On the face of it this failure is all the more surprising given that China has been remarkably successful at resolving its land border disputes with many other countries and so India stands as a glaring exception. I think the answer in a nutshell is that there's been an enduring climate of distrust and suspicion between Beijing and New Delhi and that's really gotten in the way of multiple rounds of negotiations over the years that have come to nothing. That said Beijing and New Delhi have been able to manage the tensions and deescalate confrontations and clashes along their disputed borders. There have been some noteworthy accords and confidence building measures just want to highlight one that's no use of firearms. So this bloody border battle of 2020 in the Galwan Valley was waged without a single shot being fired. But can Sino-Indian border tensions continue to be managed? I think it's certainly possible but I think it's dangerous to assume that this will continue. I think there are reasons for grave concern advances in technology and military capabilities on both sides both conventional and strategic. Both India and China have modernized their nuclear arsenals and improved the capabilities of their delivery systems. On the conventional side we've seen an increase in the number and capabilities of forward deployed forces along this disputed frontier region. So I think that tees up in my mind what I've called a shift from what I've dubbed the Himalayan standoff which is stable if chronic to a more Mexican style standoff that's much more acute and escalatory in nature. So that is a cause for concern. That said, Beijing and New Delhi have worked hard over the years to cooperate where their mutual interests intersect and that's included trade. China has been India's largest trading partner for a good number of years now. That said there's a whole laundry list of grievances including the disposition of Pakistan, the status of Tibet, maritime issues, the Belt and Road Initiative to name but a few. So at the end of the day India and China are two rising powers that increasingly perceive each other as great power rivals locked in long-term competition. Thanks. Yeah that's you know it's really interesting in a way you wonder if this the severity the out you know this is extremely high altitude extremely harsh environment it's very difficult to sustain forces and it may be as each country's increased its capabilities it's become just more possible to clash right rather than you know they're not they're not prevented because they're able to be up there but but the question then becomes sort of why and Carl I might turn to you next what is where does this one issue fit in the broader way in which India approaches China and was this was this sort of you know at some level if India if China wants this good trading relationship with India wants to have sort of this this win-win cooperation that it always highlights it seems like this kind of threw a through a bit of a hand grenade into that right and it was in a misstep or was it is it is it intended to show something to shift something in the longer term what are your what are your thoughts on where this fits for the Chinese you know thanks for the great the great question and it also I think segue is really nicely from from Andrew's comments Chinese themselves are now characterizing the relationship perhaps with reference to to the altitude at which the clash is taking place as a cold peace this is very very different from before where there was an effort to to emphasize cooperative aspects of the relationship you know the the timing of the conflict in Galwan raised a lot of questions about whether China's use of violence in that in that conflict after so long was not a diversionary tactic because of course at the timing of the conflict in spring of 2020 coincided not only with COVID and the lockdown of major Chinese cities but also with unrest in Hong Kong which picked up after some quiet quiescence and in early spring by May so there was there was that and and there was also a delayed national People's Congress from March to May at which important legislation national security legislation the anti-sedition law aimed at Hong Kong was also passed so there was a a sense that you know China China domestically had had a had a difficult agenda and that perhaps the violence on and the homilayas was it was would be used by the Chinese government to reinforce nationalist support but in fact as you you noted the the in your opening comments the the Chinese government actually in fact did not had has downplayed the number of of casualties which may as you said be in the in the new number in the dozens only releasing the the the number that the information that four soldiers died in the conflict in October in February of 2021 so many many months after the actual event and in statements although official statements certainly emphasize that and just and describe the conflict there wasn't there was an an effort to suggest that the conflict was caused by a lack of discipline on the Indian side so rather than make this a major conflict between two two powers China downplayed all of that that has changed more recently it it it it seems that China has now begun has pivoted after some months of trying to work with India to now using the crisis to stir up domestic nationalist sentiment against India in October released a video of the clash and inhaled a four dead Chinese soldiers as martyrs and there were also images released of the of the Chinese soldiers raising a Chinese flag in Galwan that those images have been recirculated more recently and as you mentioned commander who was injured at Galwan was made in the Olympic torch bearer and more recently there's now an emphasis even in the Chinese media on China's success in the 1962 border war something that really had not been not been featured in in Chinese discourse and also the emphasis on China's moral conduct in that war so you know what does all of this mean strategically it certainly means that China India relations are strained in a way they have not been in recent decades their border conflict may in fact now define the relationship that's really different and important for a couple of reasons one of the implications is that China is tightening its relationship with Pakistan ever an all-weather partner but now all-weather strategic cooperative partner and if you look at the recent joint statement between China and Pakistan issued just a few days ago following the meeting between Imran Khan and Xi Jinping that highlights a stronger defense and sovereignty cooperation between the two countries it's also notable that it's a very long statement in 0.27 of that statement it mentioned CPEC the China Pakistan economic corridor in the context of Jammu and Kashmir which makes a statement about Chinese opposition to action that complicates the territorial dispute which I know I I think is a shift by linking CPEC to the territorial dispute and that's followed by a point about an agreement to disc between Pakistan and China to discuss linking CPEC to Afghanistan also significant in the context of India-Pakistan relations second taking a point from an essay by a former Indian foreign minister that has been cited a lot it it has read the clash has recentered the China-India relationship as I said earlier on the territorial dispute in a way that focuses on territorial sovereignty rather than on as Andrew was saying on the lines drawn by colonial powers and the latter focus allowed the two countries to sort of make standing up to the west a shared dimension of their relationship one that facilitated cooperation at the global level it also means the direction of the of the Sino-Indian border dispute it really means that Xi Jinping has dug deep into a policy that he's led since he became China's leader in 2012-2013 of enforcing China's sovereignty claims all along China's long territorial land and maritime borders against what I think China sees as an increasingly hostile regional environment China has of course recently renamed mountains and other features in India controlled Arunachal Pradesh and has also built more military camps and air bases in the Himalayas reinforcing its position even as it initially suggested it would be willing to negotiate and this this salami strice slicing or silkworm nibbling strategy is all consistent with some new administrative tools that China's also rolled out including a new border land border law and a new court coast guard law which actually authorizes the use of weapons to stop illegal border crossings and threats across Chinese threats to Chinese infrastructure along the borders raising the prospect that firearms could actually be used although for decades the two sides have refrained from from using weapons against each other along their contested border so do you think that there's a sort of a more unity and China's approach to all territorial disputes are they where they is this is this an effort to have consistency i.e. we will not bend on Taiwan we will not bend in the South China Sea we will not bend on the line of actual control so maybe there's an openness to diplomacy but it's on our terms China had Xi Jinping one of the first meetings he held with his on foreign affairs was on periphery diplomacy and periphery relations has been a major focus I think you can see a reassessment of by China of the threats that it faces in its periphery and an effort to consolidate its territorial stakes wherever they may be so whether it's the Diaoyu Senkakus in Taiwan Hong Kong Xinjiang Bhutan and other and they the China India border China has been very clear that it won't yield one inch of territory and I so I think that just to add a point I think that the reason that that maybe there's a consistency growing consistency is because it's seen as from Beijing as being directly related to domestic internal stability whether it's in Tibet or Xinjiang or elsewhere so all makes it all the more important this peripheral yet you know one of the fascinating things about India China relations is that for so long despite the Tibet dispute and despite India hosting the Dalai Lama you know they they vote they both both countries focused on their cooperative aspects of the relationship for so long all the way to you know following another border dispute they had this you know summit in Wuhan and they had the Wuhan spirit you know pre-covid so the Wuhan you know and and so Dan I you know for India this is a pretty big pivot away from what seems to have been a leader level and consistent determination to have as constructive a relationship as possible with Beijing and you know this was sort of seemed like it was the thing that pushed them over into a different approach so how does it look from India's perspective now in your view and what are the implications for what India you know how India will behave in terms of its regional relationship and its relationship with China in the next you know several years yeah I agree I mean a pivot you've you've identified this as a pivot point from say 2020 to the present sea change as described that way certainly a rude awakening for India about the nature of its relationship with China and from not mistaken talk about leader level meetings whereas in you know 2018 definitely an effort to cultivate a Modi she relationship of some sort you know to the extent that these things are ever possible now my understanding is in the haven't spoken in two years stunning right other reversals I mean I remember prior to 2020 individuals within close to the Modi in the Prime Minister's office near that discussing how the Prime Minister was committed to improving the relationship with China not so much because there was a certainly no ideological overlap or a meeting of the minds on so many different things but out of a sheer necessity and a recognition of the economic drivers of India's growth and the extent to which India is in many ways if not dependent upon China will benefit from that relationship economically I remember again say five years ago six years ago working on and asking questions about doing research on the potential for an India-China clash of some sort and visiting in Delhi and talking to assorted experts and so on and really having a difficult time convincing them that this was something needed to worry about and so this this shift really is a marker and I think that it will be in in hindsight assuming nothing even more dramatic happens in the near term this period will be seen in a way as a kind of a next chapter so if India and its view of the world its relationship with major powers in the world shifted dramatically after the Cold War I need to you know find an opening to the West and and reform its economics and opens to the US and Europe and so on and was only sort of delayed or sidetracked in a sense by the 1998 nuclear tests and then the subsequent say post Cold War and post 9 11 era of warming to the United States this offered an opportunity for India that persisted till 2020 to basically be friends with everyone I think this will be seen as sort of a golden period in India's you might call it multi vector approach to foreign policy but basically being courted on all sides so whether it was the United States or the Russians or the Europeans or even the Chinese who when Modi came into office perceived him as a welcome shift and as an opportunity to build closer ties with India because they had known him as Chief Minister they had visited China on numerous occasions they saw real opportunities there and so to see that and then 2020 hits to see this change one Chinese expert has described this recently to me as a period of finding a new equilibrium now in the India-China relationship and I think that's right but because the India-China relationship has been so thrown by the events of 2020 India is also I think going to be forced to find new equilibriums in a bunch of the other relationships that it was really enjoying over the past not nearly 20 years so that would include with Russia it's certainly fostering and building ties with a number of other states you know through the Quad and so on and then not least the United States where I think it's having a very direct implication for India's view of the world so this is an unwelcome change from India's perspective this is not something it sought or wanted but it is having it is being forced as I think we've already discussed to really turn a page in an important way you know so you guys are all hit on like seven issues that we could go into but stepping out to the region I actually want to really quickly touch on something you said in terms of how it's going to impact India with other relationships so Carla mentioned in Ron Khan and she and she having their meeting Putin and she also had a meeting and released a voluminous almost 6000 word statement that does seem to include some some shifts certainly was very forceful about not supporting NATO expansion where more so than I remember and things like that but on you know in terms of the implications for India which has long relied on Russia as its strategic partner certainly all of its major defense systems are of Russian origin in terms of you know strategic systems missiles submarines etc what does it mean that this what is the what is the the the sort of steady growth in the Putin she alignment mean for India and but before that Andrew or Carla either you jump in what do you what do you view as the changes in the in that Russia China relationship is it just sort of a you know say more of the same or is there something different going on I think it's it's relationship between you know Moscow and Beijing I think has has strengthened but I don't think it's qualitatively changed you know that said the there's certainly more cooperation strategically and military wise but but I think you know in terms of taking it to the next level which would essentially be a full-blown alliance in my view because it then I don't think they're going to go there barring some remarkable shift dramatic shift in their relationship say with with the US because they've tried that alliance before it didn't turn out so well so I think they're reluctant to go that way so they're friend friends with with benefits and without commitments right and so so that statement you mentioned the long statement it you know full of positive enthusiastic language but but short of short of a ironclad commitment to to support you know from the Chinese side to support the Russians but how it'll spill out on to you know and into South Asia that that's that's a really really interesting question but you know one the discussion what struck me about one one thing that struck me a bit down about what you said was you know the the Galwan in 2020 constituted a rude awakening for China and I think that really is to me brings up and it seems like a really strong parallel with the 62 war because I think that from what from the research I've done anyway that was a rude awakening for India so in that context you know the disposition of a long time friend in in in Moscow is a really interesting you know a really interesting question so I mean so China India so Carla dig a little more on the China Pakistan piece of this as well where does where does Pakistan fit into what China is thinking and is and how much is that connected to Chinese concerns about India and how much is that just about its economic you know plans under BRI and and access to the sea from the from the west you know what how does that factor and then Dan react on both Russia and the Pakistan fronts I mean the China Pakistan relationship predates BRI by many many decades and has had higher than the mountain higher than the mountains and is very much connected to India's India's the India Pakistan tensions and and concerns but the you know China had been very very careful to try to keep the BRI and and its relation its economic relationship and CPEC out of the out of its out of the below the strategic level and really focus on economic development and as and CPEC is an as a way of of strengthening cross border ties and improving stability between China and Pakistan across the border opening up new opportunities for economic development and in China's impoverished west and so on but I think I do think it's worth paying attention to the implications of this latest statement whether it actually changes how China is looking at CPEC or how it will present CPEC India of course has always seen CPEC as a strategic move a a slice through contested territory down the Karakoram Highway so I think that's that's a it's something to watch very carefully you know pre-statement a lot of reports about the trouble I mean China's faced attacks it's had its people killed that are working on CPEC projects by terrorists inside Pakistan and there was you know some question but the statement that meaning was a was a doubling down they were not you know we're not backing off we're committed to to CPEC was the message out of out of that last meeting so Dan what are the implications for India of both the China Pakistan and the China Russia relationship yeah so the China Russia relationship you know puts India in a in a real bind where it you know New Delhi doesn't want to be in a position where its principal supplier of its highest end in some cases by a mile equipment nuclear submarines various missile systems including missile you know defense systems that they're that's 400 you're you're looking to Russia as your supplier and now Russia is increasingly in bed with your principal competitor and threat the kind of vulnerabilities that this creates for India particularly say at a moment where say China will be inclined to be helpful to Russia in a Ukraine scenario India of course has to sit silently on Ukraine watch Russia do whatever it can't make a peep and yet China could see this as an opportunity to to push India around because of course Russia isn't going to do anything that jeopardize its relationship with China in the midst of a Ukraine scenario so right so India comes out remarkable you know much worse as I was trying to say before you know it used to be just a matter of a few short years ago India could have it all it could have swimming you know relation it could be in in the bricks and in the quad it could you know fly to Moscow and be feted and Beijing as well and Washington and this is is crumbling and and I I would have to think that the the sense of vulnerability that this creates is is acute shifting over to the to the Pakistan piece and one of the things that that's so interesting about how this is evolved is that in many ways the China-Pakistan relationship as Karla rightly pointed out it's the CPEC portion of it and its new intensity was not intended at least it didn't seem by Beijing to result in a deterioration in Beijing's relationship with New Delhi to the contrary Chinese diplomats were attempting to cultivate better ties with India at the same time and they failed and so where that points to me is the extent to which say bigger powers like China get sucked into regional conflicts where they didn't really intend to to to go and I think it's it's getting worse and the one thing that we have to be sort of in a sense grateful for is the extent to which India-Pakistan hot conflict along their border hasn't brought in the Chinese neither has India-China hot conflict along their border brought in the Pakistanis but it almost feels like that's the next shoe to drop I mean that's an interesting question would either Andrew would China in a moment of India-Pakistan crisis rather than seeing its role as let's try to simmer things down we don't want the you don't want things to get out of hand would it potentially say well let's make a move in our natural predation because the Indians are tied down on that side or vice versa Dan would Pakistan do the same thing at some point to India it certainly I would think in both both would probably perceive it as in their interest to have India at least having to worry about that yeah what do you think Andrew do you think that would be a well I think no country right now certainly not China has an interest in a war and so and hence the policy is you know whether it's salami size slicing or nibbling or that it's it's you know to keep things below the threshold of war and and to the extent that you know we've we've we've we're talking about Galwan and and it's you know been this wake-up call for for New Delhi you know China's China's efforts have been not very you know have the success has has changed because you know over time I think for you know India was surprised we'd go along the border and in front patrols would find things that you know that China had changed the facts on the ground and and done so you know quote successfully below the radar but of course with Galwan that that's changed so so even though that that approach of has has not has been less than successful in recent years China doesn't want to switch switch to complex certainly not for the for the next 12 months or so you know Xi Jinping wants a successful 20th party congress this fall and and and I think in the greater scheme of things other areas other other territorial so-called territorial disputes have a higher priority than than than the Himalayas and and in particular of course Taiwan so I think Xi Jinping will be reluctant to to sort of shift be forced to shift focus to to South Asia Carly agree with that I do agree with that I I think we see and I've forgotten who initiated it but there is an effort to use the Russia China India trilateral mechanism to have talks maybe China I'm not sure if China initiated the last meeting or not but to put to at least to have talks through that that mechanism and you know at the same time you know China has certainly been not taken any steps to to hinder India's participation very important participation in the Asian investment infrastructure investment bank India has continued to take loans throughout the entire crisis and in fact I think maybe the largest recipient of AIB loans the the new development bank the BRICS bank continues to grow India is a critical critical part of that expanding now to I think include Egypt so there's there's work among the partners on in that area and so there's there are areas where China is still seeking to engage India these these are of course arenas in which China is a is a key player a leading player SEO would be another example where China has been trying to engage India as a as a partner through various projects so but again where it is in a position of leadership and this is this is a you know this is a difficult for for India politically and but so far at least where AIB and some of these other arenas are concerned India has has not pulled back and has continued to to participate which seems to suggest certain pragmatism on the on the Indians part not wanting to be iced out of all these multilateral fora that China has been creating and building in the region although it stayed shied away from the trade ones are sep and in particular that's right yeah and and what do you think about the just that Pakistan dynamic there in Pakistan hoping that China sort of backing it up or or complicating things for India they relying on that I think that look in in 2019 as far as I understand when India and Pakistan were we're going back and forth and things looked like they might at least from Washington they look like they might spiral out of control one of the concerns that the United States had you asked if China would play a restraining role you know China is playing a mixed role in fact the United States I think it would be fair to say is playing a mixed role to the extent that the United States to take us first we have an interest in making sure that India doesn't come out the worse from a scuffle with Pakistan we want to support them we also recognize that generally they've been a victim of of terrorism Pakistan based terrorism and they ought not to suffer the consequences of that and they ought to have the capacity to defend themselves from that kind of an attack from the Chinese perspective they see Pakistan as a friend and a and legitimately concerned about its own defense and its capacity to maintain a deterrent against India and so that has been that's the initial message US support to India legitimate grievance against Pakistan Chinese support to Pakistan legitimate concern about India going too far and in 2019 India went pretty far direct strikes on Pakistani territory for the first time in decades this so this initial move but then is I think correctly my my colleagues have pointed out neither the United States nor China wants to see India and Pakistan actually go to war so there's this push so far but not so far as to get into a point that you actually find yourselves in a true war and least of all a nuclear war which is possible playing that in the midst of a crisis playing that balancing game of we'll push this far we'll support this much but we think we know enough not to support so much that they would take that and push and escalate this is a tricky business and I'm afraid that not only do we have a trouble with that but I think the Chinese have trouble calibrating and both the Indians and Pakistanis themselves you know I don't think they want to want to go to war either but they are playing the same game and put all these complexities together and it's it's recipe for more trouble yeah so China and and it has been building its network of regional structures and you know trying to institutionalize its relationships bilaterally and multilaterally throughout the region recently we've seen these a lot of new developments and a lot of new activity with India and largely western democracies so in particular the Quad right the Chinese are have been have been clear that they don't love the Quad and clear that they really hate the AUKUS which doesn't include India but is another new western oriented security structure which is the Australia UK US agreement on nuclear submarines and other sophisticated capabilities India seems to welcome that where do you see a start with Dan what is India's sort of game plan here when it comes to broadening out how it's engaging with more like-minded countries and and how that helps it you know stand up to China to the degree that's what it's seeking to do and then for Andrew and Carla what how concerned is Beijing about these other mechanisms or does Beijing sort of feel like it has the momentum and the the weight of history behind it and will be the one to set the terms you know I think the the history of the Quad such such as it as it is is kind of a good way to chart the progress of Indian attitudes about China and about its relations with other powers in the region and you can see that you know the Quad having having been born all the way back in what 2003 2004 I guess you know at the time just a kind of an ad hoc organization in response to to international humanitarian crisis but over time an attempt certainly spearheaded at the outset by the United States to turn it into something more and a reluctance a clear reluctance for many many years on the Indian part to accept that why because they were trying to play this balancing game and people in India Shivshankar Menon among them have pointed out that for a very long time India's goal strategically has been in the triangular relationship between India the United States and China to be closer to both the United States and China than either of them were to one another right okay that's been the the core feature of India's approach but over time with the deterioration in relations with China and the warming of relations between India and the United States that triangle has gotten out of whack and that's what India is trying to deal with now now to be clear the Quad is still on paper and in words intended not to be a security relationship and I think India is comfortable with that so where does that leave us I think the Quad is good a number of these other organizations good for the softer stuff and then I think India will be looking to resolve what I described as it's kind of a conundrum with respect to Russia as a military supplier looking to other bilateral relationships to fill in the gaps whether it's with the United States or with France or with Israel these are going to be I think priority suppliers looking into the future with Russia potentially fading particularly if the Russia-China relationship tightens yeah absolutely how seriously does the China side Carla you first how seriously does China take these innovations how much are they worried about the Quad or do they see it as you know a poor imitation of what China's been doing yeah I mean the the Chinese initially dismissed the the Quad is I think maybe it was the Wangyi who called it sea foam but I think they they take it a lot more seriously and and are really concerned about India's deepening commitment to this this partnership and some of the new partnerships that are emerging out of it like India's growing ties they've been growing for a while but strengthening with Japan for example the two countries are engaged in economic development projects in India but also in Myanmar and in other places and are are doing some naval drills and that kind of thing together so I think China is very concerned about that China though has has taken has sort of looked at the Quad and it's still its focus on public goods and responded in a way in turn by strengthening its trying to trying to increase its own profile in other regional organizations CPTPP stands out for me and in China's application to the CPTPP way of of getting in forming new partnerships with countries particularly since the United States isn't isn't part of that that that important economic organization or agreement as you touch on a very interesting point which is that in terms of economic statecraft in the region it's been sort of an open field for the Chinese at least on trade agreements of varying degrees of utility and value but you know the US has been largely absent Europe to a large degree has also been absent there's been some bilateral things India and the UK are trying to negotiate a trade deal for example but for the most part not so just Andrew how would you see the touch on two things with the Quad and then just overall this sort of economic order that's shaping up in the region and whether that plays more to China or more to India in the West. Yeah on the economic side of things I'm you know honest answers I'm not sure but you know I guess on that front it depends how how effectively the US and Europe are good at ramping up their initiatives in the region because they for better or for better for worse the kind of conceded ground to to or conceded you know the the region to China as being the being the dominant economic economic engine for the region on the as to the Quad and other other structures you know I think the the irony is that as China's grown stronger and more and more and its security position has become stronger its its leaders have have continued to be insecure and in some ways have become more insecure so viewing viewing things like the Quad as as threatening and in in two ways one in terms of hard power they're they're concerned about other countries under the under the leadership of the US sort of ganging up and containing China but they're also concerned about the soft power dimension they see you know it's hard for us in the US and other countries other other democracies are worried about Chinese influence operations well I think the funny thing is the Chinese assume that's what we're doing to them right and so the Quad is an alliance from a Chinese perspective seen as an alliance of democracies and and something so they're concerned about that that dimension of course who's not in favor of democracy even the Chinese Communist Party is in favor of democracy but it's you know democracy with Chinese characteristics right it's a special special kind of democracy so all but all these all these efforts whether it's the Quad or other other multilateral efforts by the US and and allies and and partners and and and when they include you know major countries in the region like like India I think this is this is concerning to China because because also from a from a Chinese perspective they why are they having so many problems now with so many countries why are relations so bad with so many countries you know with a few notable exceptions right Pakistan and and and Russia stand out here but the Chinese are convinced the answer to that question is it's because the US is orchestrating things behind the scenes I think there's there's no willingness to entertain the idea maybe this is happening because of what China is doing right yeah that is really interesting and you actually bring me to the last area I'd like to touch on before I do want to turn to audience questions we've had a bunch a bunch coming in we've have 25 or so minutes left so multilateral everyone's touched on it a little bit but when it comes to India and China for quite a long time they kind of as Dan referenced could be in the anti-colonial anti-imperialist camp be on the side of the g77 developing world global south you know and they would and they would probably more often than not you know we would we might more often than not find them on the same side us wishing that India would would would be on the on the on the side of the US or the West and in multilateral fora and and at this point I think that's extends to rule setting you know and very technical things like the ITU it extends to you know general assembly resolutions but China and India are no longer neatly aligned in multilateral forum but India and the United States are also not neatly aligned and I there does seem to be a sense I think widely held that China is trying to set establish some dominance in multilateral settings across the board we just saw the EU announce that they're gonna monitor Chinese actions in multilateral settings and try to be ready to to push back I think the United States when it comes to standard settings once you sling similar so two questions you know how successful is China going to be at this how how central is this sort of resetting adjusting tweaking of the global order to Xi's vision and where will India be will India end up deciding to strategically throw in with Europe Japan the United States who all won't always agree but will sort of be more more in the same place well let me first I mean China has a policy of approaching global governance on on what it calls two legs I mean one is by developing its own institutions that that can advance its interests and reflect its values and its values and its its characteristics if you will and the other is by motto modifying existing rules and norms to align with China's interests and also those of the the developing world highlighting that it is speaking for a developing country so this is a really interesting question and it's a it is going to be a challenge because China and India have aligned on so many of the of so many issues in in multilateral form so where is India going to find itself especially as China uses its economic clout to expand its voice uses its just sheer number of personnel to to take important positions in in the United Nations and and and and in in many ways gets ahead of even the West in drafting laws on everything from AI to to data data sovereignty that it then can put forward and put into multilateral for so it's it's becoming a leader in global governance how successful is it it's it's having some it's making some inroads it is it is it is it is it is effectively setting some agendas you know I don't think it's taking over the United Nations I think we have to look at that more carefully there's some good scholars who are working on this to to assess this subjectively but it is having an impact and you start to see reflected in UN statements phrases another language that are promoted by by China by Xi Jinping himself you know shared future for all mankind that sort of thing which advance an ambiguous vision but certainly something that China can use to set a distant guidepost and then build toward through its its work in these global fora yeah absolutely if I could pick up on the on the India angle it would be if you're India as you're growing you want to make sure that whatever doors were open to China ahead of you remain open after China has gone through them and with respect to to multilateral multilateral context things like a nuclear status nuclear suppliers group and so on these are areas where China is eager to jump through the door and then slam it behind and leave India out in the cold and I think that so strategically India has to position itself and will be sort of opportunistic and I think sees the United States and others as potential partners in making sure that China doesn't close the door behind it or maybe India can just wedge its way through and close the door behind it keep Pakistan out but but that's a big part of the the answer the other part of the answer is that India's identity and this is what you're getting at its identity in a sense will help to determine its aims on the world stage and its identity is mixed it is not a western liberal democracy like western Europe or the United States it has a different historical and cultural ideological background to it and it will bring that to the table as it approaches these organizations and Vikram as you pointed out you know the United Nations hasn't been a place where the United States and India have aligned on many votes in the General Assembly to the contrary we're finding ourselves more often than not at odds and so as the you know as American policymakers look at India as a partner on the world stage in multilateral organizations the answer to what India sees as its aims will be critically important to us and if India defines itself more in say civilizational terms then the answer will continue to be very mixed democracy or not form of government will only define aspects of how India relates but if India sees itself again you know as China does in civilizational terms often then it will often just as often disagree with the United States as agree and I think that's going to be maybe a way to at least for the United States to rethink a bit I think over the past 20 years or so we've seen India as a natural follower in the succession of liberal democratic order and defender of it into the future and I think we have to at least keep open to the prospect that that's not quite the best way to see India yeah that's a really interesting that we could have a whole discussion just on that I do want to turn to our audience once again if you're joining us online you can you can submit a question on usip.org right there in right below where you're watching the video and you can also use the hashtag Indo-Pacific USIP if you want to comment or pass up a question that way we have folks monitoring and they'll they'll get them to us here on the screen so we can read them out so there's a there's sort of a theme in some of the early questions which relates to Kashmir so I'm gonna I'm gonna bundle a couple together and just to set the table with them um so China has done a couple of things that that sort of moved it to towards taking a position on the Kashmir dispute more so in recent years than previously one is of course related to CPAC where from the Indian standpoint the Chinese have essentially ratified the Pakistani position on one disputed piece of terror of territory in in Kashmir because they're having a project run through it the second is the Chinese came out vocally in opposition to the revocation of Article 370 of the Indian constitution which gave Kashmir autonomy the Indians of course said this just affects Indian controlled Kashmir so it's completely a domestic issue and it was one of those times when you sort of saw the Chinese in a funny mirror because wait a minute they're saying no this this is of concern to us and so one of the questions from the audience is will and I would say is China becoming more actively involved in the Kashmir dispute be by virtue of CPAC and where it is where it is sort of siding with with Pakistan and I would twin that to to to another border question which is how does the historic level of unrest that India's had in its own border regions especially in the northeast how does that play into China's thinking and in into sort of the overall dynamics of settling border disputes so I open that up to anybody I can let me just pick up on a piece of that and then others can maybe fill in on on how China sees its involvement in Kashmir but I would say that you know you mentioned the the Article 370 revocation shifting Indian policies in Kashmir India's management of its northeast in terms of administratively and in terms of government governance its response to local grievances and so on frankly I would say all of these things have in a way exposed potential vulnerabilities of India to whether it's Pakistan or to China I I think they're intended these policies are intended by the central government in India to actually clamp down and to impose greater centralized authority over these regions where there has been unrest unfortunately I think the way that they've been managed leads to I think lingering and long lasting underlying grievances that will spill over into violence for years perhaps generations to come and when you are India and your borders are messy that creates all kinds of opportunities for others to play games in them India's experience that certainly with with the Pakistanis have done that both in these parts of India and then also in and elsewhere China has done that in the northeast historically funding Maoist organizations and so on so I think that's if you're India that's a worry that's going to continue to be worse whether China will seek to capitalize more and more I mean that's more on China's side than it is but if I'm if I'm Indian I'm nervous about that and Carla Andrew how do how does China look at whether it is or isn't taking a role in the Kashmir dispute based on based on what we see and it voicing a role a couple of times in recent years I think it's reluctant to step much further out from where it's been and and so you know things that we've talked about have not been where it's taken arguably taken a position but on on Kashmir it hasn't really explicitly you know stepped stepped into the into the limelight it's it's done things that that indicate that it's you know it doesn't you know it's willing to challenge India so you know the the Belton Road Initiative you know India is one of the one of the most prominent you know significant countries that's opted out of it and and excuse me a big reason is because of the of course the the central role or of Pakistan in the CPAC so I don't see India I'm sorry I don't see China going going more because I I don't think they're intentionally trying to antagonize antagonize India but of course that's that's happening anyway you know I think I think China would like to strengthen Pakistan's position without antagonizing India but it has in fact antagonized India through CPAC and and as Andrew was saying China is the only member of the SC sorry India is the only member of the SEO that isn't part of the BRI and it stands very much outside of that grouping it's going to be interesting to see whether it creates challenges for the SEO trying to make trying to try to support an integration of Pakistan and bringing them and India into the SEO I think is as one way to kind of send the message that that its interests in Kashmir in us in CPAC are really economic but that's not a message that India is hearing yeah no that's a it is really interesting in a way I think from the Chinese perspective so South Asia is sort of one of the least economically integrated regions on earth and from the Chinese perspective that's got to look like a big opportunity all these places that they can pick up the slack as it were and from for the Indians that become sort of an imperative to do to figure out ways to better integrate which brings me to tie into a question on how the neighbors respond so the questioners mentioned a few countries but I would say Bangladesh, Nepal you know even Sri Lanka which isn't a joint neighbor but and then you know Myanmar, Bhutan how are they how do they view Chinese Sino-Indian tension throughout the region obviously all of these countries have important relations with both China and India so what's the what's the sort of effect of Sino-Indian tensions in the region Dan jump yeah I think I think it's one of those areas where you know it's evolving actually and in some ways relatively rapidly and it's fascinating you know if we were to say historically say going back over decades one of the principal concerns of all of the so-called smaller states of South Asia and India's nearby neighbors was to avoid being dominated by the regional hegemon that being India right and so the principal concern for a lot of them whether it's Bangladesh or Sri Lanka was often how to get out from under the the vice grip or the thumb of the overbearing New Delhi so China has provided over the past couple of decades an opportunity leading with the economic foot you know an opportunity to escape from some of that dependency on India that was so a part of of these societies but I say it's evolving because the Chinese involvement has led in some cases we look at Sri Lanka at the moment to an Indian response and in some ways that Indian response has been eager to outdo the Chinese or to find opportunities to now displace the Chinese from what they had found to be a more dominant certainly economic and increasingly also political influence and so it's a it's it's a more open and fluid contest for outside influence than you know then we've seen in basically modern independent history of the region and that becomes quite quite fascinating you know one of the things that I'd like to do more of is and see more of would be surveys and more detailed studies of attitudes in the region among these smaller countries about both India and China which I think it is an important way for us to get a better window into how they're perceiving this competition certainly they're opportunistic in trying to take advantage of both relations when possible but where are there where's their skepticism where there's wariness and where there's a kind of an ideological or other compatibility would be something that we'll want to want to watch more closely I think that I've done a little bit of research on this and it does seem that smaller countries really have welcomed initially welcomed China's engagement economic engagement in the region which you know as you said Vikram the the integration of South Asia has been really really constrained partly because of the India-Pakistan conflict intentions so to have China come in as a as a new source of of with the vision for integrations very exciting for countries to smaller countries in the region who look to Chinese investment to sort of break that the stranglehold that the regional hegemon India had had on on that integration but now they are they they are also trying to take advantage of the India China strategic competition but are also worried about getting caught up in a global strategic competition so so you see you do see India pushing back you do see India starting to bring some concrete projects to the table starting to partner again with Japan and with other countries in the region to bring to address this need for a desire for regional connectivity to sort of challenge China there but at the same time I think smaller smaller countries in the in the region are also getting increasingly sophisticated and concerned about getting locked into some kind of broader geostrategic competition that ultimately doesn't serve their long-term interest they want to bet the benefit of being able to use their role as desirable partners to leverage as much as they can without getting caught up in some bigger drama that they they have little influence over do you guys any of you but think that China will continue sort of BRI is sort of there's a little bit of BRI for everybody right and so in this region you know Nepal Bangladesh Sri Lanka Pakistan they're all so is that do you think China will continue that or do you think China is going to sort of refine BRI over time and sort of maybe cut cut back in the areas that have been the most troublesome or you know what does that what does that look like I think they there one question I had it that when when BRI hit some bumps you know there was some problems was you know is there is there a feedback loop is is China sort of learning and adjusting and I think the answer is yes but the question is how far they've gone on that I think the larger question whether it's you know China's role in an influence in multilateral organizations or BRI or its involvement in South Asia is a question of you know how China's economy is going to be going to proceed and we we tend to assume a straight line that it's going to continue to grow maybe albeit at a lesser rate of growth but I'm not sure we should we should just assume take that for granted right you know China's going to China's economy is going through some turmoil right now and certainly it's doing better than many many other countries but I think there are other challenge domestic challenges that China's going to confront in in the coming years and that may influence the degree to which they're able to focus sustain things like BRI and and engage as actively as they have been doing in the in the future so that's and that's on the on the soft power front I think in in terms of its influence in specific countries and in in multilateral fora it I think it's tied to China's hard power so if China's economy continues to be you know to continues to grow be an engine of growth and be an opportunity for so many countries then I think its soft power is likely to be sustained but if if its economy tanks or or goes into crisis or there's a political crisis that affects that then then I think that will adversely affect China's soft power yeah absolutely a question from the from the audience is what can China what can the US do so you're if you're advising the American administration the US administration to what can we do to respond to closer China Russia collaboration in the region and I might just add what could the United States working with India do to respond the Indians of course don't necessarily want to have that response but are there things beyond what we've seen the Quad and other things that could that could and do we really need to worry about more concrete China Russia collaboration in the region I mean certainly Russian naval you know engagement could be stepped up in the ensuing years they could collaborate militarily in the region Russia is also a Pacific power after all I think there's a there's a broader question about you know China Russia collaboration say forget about Indo-Pacific per se but globally you know I think Andrew made the point the next step would be a full-on alliance we're unlikely to see that so so how much of a of an effort could the United States make to drive a wedge into that I think most you know most of what I've seen suggests that any such effort would actually be likely to backfire the the alternative and and the logic being that basically we can't force them apart but because a big part of the reason that they've come together is their mutual concerns about us it's not their you know their their attraction between Moscow and Beijing it's the repulsion from us now in in this era of looming potential war in Ukraine it's hard to see that we're going to find a means to cozy up to Russia but only with some greater attraction to someone some alternative power than China will Russia I think be weaned away from China bottom line Russia doesn't have many options right now and so it's not a matter of say coercion or or pushing or pressure but a matter of finding alternative attractions that would find ways to pull them further apart that I think this and at the moment it certainly doesn't look like that and to build on what Dan was saying I think from from China's perspective they don't have a lot of options either I mean sure there are lots of countries that want to be friends with China and but not not not countries with clout the kind of clout that Russia has a nuclear arsenal a perm five seat so from China's perspective you know Russia's Russia's important too they need they need each other and a in a report that I lead off or one of the one was one of the lead authors on last year the conclusion of look of a study looking at China and Russia cooperation is sad sad to say uh disappointingly for for probably many of our readers was there's probably not much the US can do to to drive a wedge between Moscow and Beijing what I think we can do though is we can be active in multilateral fora where those two voices are very closely aligned and make sure that we we do our work there to continue to push for rules of the road that we that that reflect our interests and values so I think that's that's one one space where the those two partners where we can actually we can actually push against what their but their joint objectives are and these have important implications for the long term whether we're talking about space AI etc very important yeah absolutely and we hardly got into the the tech agenda and sort of the future future of uh of of military conflict we we we basically come to the to to the end of our allotted time I want to give each of you a chance to just reflect on one one one final question that is like so you know 2022 is a big year as you mentioned Xi Jinping is looking to get through a party congress and have a have a have a sort of probably establish himself as a longer term ruler than than others in the past are there any things we should expect between China and India you know any sort of major risks or made or opportunities for for any kind of a reset between the two any kind of a stabilizing of their relations that we should be on the lookout for over this year and I and I say this as we as you know our timing is such that Secretary of State Blinken is out in the region right now he's about to have a Quad Foreign Ministers meeting he's about to go to Fiji and probably announce some you know more details of of America's strategy in the region which clearly always hinges on India it is the Indo-Pacific now after all but in do you expect anything in 2022 or do you think we're going to see both sides sort of trying to keep things keep things quiet and and work the work on work more in the in 2023 and beyond Andrew the India and China will both be quite happy or to to maintain some kind of equilibrium uneasy uneasy stability I think the bigger issue is what might happen what unforeseen circumstance might happen and and one that just leaps to mind is everybody dies right at some point it's just a question of when but I think you know the Dalai Lama is a key figure and he's getting old and you know not that he's going to die in 2022 but I think in the next few years that that's likely and that could influence situation in Tibet that could influence China Russia China India relations in either a positive or a negative way probably negative given where we think succession is going to go Dan almost impossible to see how that ends up being a easily managed scenario but I think you're you're absolutely right to put your finger on it as a as one of critical and potentially near-term concern I mean we we've not really said the word COVID there are so many features of the international economic order right now that are pretty much up in the air yeah and so many aspects of the nature of the China India relationship that relate very directly to that and COVID is one piece of it but so many others that you know our problems with supply chains and so on are revealing the nature of the international economic order and the potential for at least aspects of it to be remade we talk about decoupling India's relationship with China right now I mean the the depths of their trading relationship it's vital to India but that vitality may wane if this economic order shifts this is not going to happen over the next year so I'm afraid it's not the answer to that question but I think things that happen over the next year may set in train set in motion patterns that will then shift the nature of their relationship that could you know for for a longer period of time with the economic foundation really being a driver well I I think after those those comments I'll end on a more of a whimper than a bang because I think I think that the two sides will will try to keep things fairly stable in the coming year for their own political reasons but I think it is important to recognize that that is a the world's longest border there's a lot that can happen along it and we haven't touched on water issues either China and India have managed to their water tensions pretty effectively but in the midst of all of this China's announced construction of a new dam up at the up there in the heights of the Brahmaputra so that could end up becoming another flashpoint that is one that I think we definitely need to keep watching I want to thank everyone in the audience for joining us I want to thank my fellow USIP teammates for taking the time out to have this great in-depth conversation we will continue to do these it'll be Indo hashtag Indo-Pacific USIP there'll be more in this series on probably a bunch of the issues we discussed today I hope you all have a great day and thanks so much for joining us at USIP