 Felly i'r leisio, mae wedi'i gweithio'r gyda'r ffamilion benedig o'r terorism ym 9.11 ar y sefydliadau a'r ddweud. Rwy'n gweithio'r ddweud eich dweud o'r terorism yn y cyd-aeth o'r ysgrifetau dyma'r rhagorau a'r rhan o'r relasiadau mewn terorism yn islam ar y ddweud ym mhwg o'r hystydd. Nine eleven left America and the world in a state of shock. This was partly because of the number of dead, partly because of the unexpectedness of it all, and partly because the attacks on the World Trade Center in New York were so spectacular, with the impact of the second plane captured so clearly on television, scene time and time again. New York, a sunny day, an airplane, three quite normal things, all of them symbols of the desirable. Then the totally abnormal happens and the symbols of the desirable come together in one symbol of evil. Shock was an appropriate reaction to the number of dead. No other terrorist attack has killed so many. Even military attacks in war rarely kill as many as 9-11 did. The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941 killed slightly fewer people, 2,400, rather than 2,973. The search for similar numbers of people killed in one attack leads in the direction of Hiroshima. 9-11 should not, however, have been quite so unexpected. After all, a terrorist group made up of similar people with similar motivations had already attempted to destroy the World Trade Center and its occupants in 1993, though they failed in their objective and killed only six people. The same terrorist group that carried out the 9-11 attacks had previously attacked American targets outside the United States. It was related, both ideologically and in terms of membership, to terrorist groups that had conducted major campaigns in Egypt and Algeria in the 1990s and in Afghanistan in the 1980s. The effects of those campaigns had been felt mostly in the Muslim world, but not only there. The Algerian conflict, for example, had killed 25 and wounded 110 in three separate terrorist incidents in Paris during 1995. Over history, conflicts involving terrorism in one country have often spilled over into another, and Al Qaeda was far from being the first terrorist group to decide that it was better to fight on a global stage than on a purely local stage. Radical socialist terrorists of the 1970s had made the same decision, as had other radical socialists, the original anarchists, in the 1890s. Maoist revolutionary theory, like Soviet Marxist theory before Stalin, looked to world revolution. Though I must admit that not all terrorism experts would agree with me on this, it seems clear to me that the immediate cause of 9-11 was that a well-established movement with a well-established policy of using terrorist tactics modified the detail of those tactics and shifted targets, and then succeeded in carrying out, at its second attempt, an unusually bloody and an unusually spectacular operation. Not all terrorism experts would agree with me because there is a continuing dispute about whether so-called religious terrorism is or is not fundamentally different from the forms of terrorism that preceded it. Some argue that religious terrorism is different because it's unusually bloody and unusually irrational. Some, including myself, argue that it only looks unusually bloody because of the impact on the statistics of one highly unusual event, the deaths in New York on 9-11. Casualties from other Islamist terrorist attacks are comparable to casualties from other non-Islamist terrorist attacks. Certainly, the expectation of paradise as a reward for carrying out a suicide bombing is irrational in terms of the rationality of most academics, but it's not the rationality of the individual suicide bomber that matters most. It's the rationality of Islamist terrorism as a whole that matters, and there's clearly a rationale there when one looks at the bigger picture. Terrorism did succeed in starting a general uprising against the Soviet puppet government of Afghanistan, and that uprising did succeed in forcing the Soviets to withdraw with a little financial and technical help from outside, of course. Terrorism did not, in the end, work in Algeria in the 1990s, but it had worked there in the 1950s, and it might have worked again. There are many objections to Islamist use of terrorism, but they do not include irrationality. Although 9-11 should not have been unexpected for those whose business it is to think about these things, that is not the business of the American people as a whole. A 9-11 shocked America. George W. Bush, a new and until then untested president, had to respond. Although I myself would not have liked to have been in his shoes in 2001 and would in fact probably have been quite incapable of leading the United States through any sort of crisis at all, I have the gift of the hindsight that is the chief luxury of the historian, and I will use that gift to argue that President Bush came up with the wrong response. It now seems that what President Bush's response to 9-11 was designed to achieve was to reassure the American public, squash the Islamist threat to America, show America's actual and potential enemies that America was not to be trifled with, spread American values, and perhaps allow Bush to go down in history as a great American president. These were perhaps fine objectives, but they were not achieved. It's not even sure that the American public was reassured. Some events, like the nationwide run on duct tape in January, February 2003, after the US government included it in a list of key products that could provide protection against chemical or biological attack, suggest that many Americans were anything but reassured. In my first lecture in this series, I discussed the theory behind the use of terrorism as developed in the late 19th century. The idea is to provoke your enemy into action that will give you a propaganda victory, discrediting them and perhaps allowing you to appear as a defender against oppression. Another idea is to get rid of the middle ground by forcing people to make up their minds either for you or against you. This is known technically as polarization. Immediately after 9-11, President Bush made two extremely unfortunate statements. First, he described his response to terrorism as a crusade, a metaphor that sounded fine in the United States, but sounded in the Muslim world rather as it would have sounded to Americans if an Arab leader had at that point announced a jihad. Jihad, like crusade, can be used metaphorically, but it's not a good metaphor to use in English. President Bush backtracked quickly, announcing that what he had called a crusade was not directed against Muslims, but to an awful lot of Muslims it looked as if it was. The crusade then became a war on terror, but that looked to many Muslims like a war on Islam. The US attack on Afghanistan was understood by some Arabs as a reasonable act of revenge against the government that had harbored Al Qaeda. But when it was followed by an attack on Iraq, which had nothing at all to do with Al Qaeda or 9-11, that could hardly be seen as revenge. President Bush succeeded in convincing most Americans that the invasion of Iraq was a necessary response to threat and in some way also a suitable response to 9-11, but this argument was less convincing in Europe and not at all convincing in the Muslim world. Almost without exception, Arabs and many other Muslims saw the invasion of Iraq as an act of unprovoked aggression. Bush might claim that his crusade was not directed against Muslims, but the evidence seemed to show very strongly that it was. President Bush's second unfortunate statement was to declare that every nation in every region now has a decision to make. Either you are with us or you are with the terrorists. This challenge may have encouraged some waivers to join President Bush in his non-crusade, but it also had other effects. Removing the middle ground is, after all, a standard objective of terrorism, and it was not just at the rhetorical level that the middle ground began to vanish after 9-11 as momentum began to build up for the invasion of Iraq. In countries such as Egypt, where public disagreement with the regime of President Mubarak is not permitted and where demonstrations are not allowed, crowds gathered to object in effect that if President Mubarak was with President Bush, then he was against the Muslims. Terrorist tactics worked for Al Qaeda in two ways. Firstly, 9-11 provided a provocation that led to the Bush administration behaving in a way that made America appear to extraordinary number of Muslims as an enemy of the Muslims, and then as a nasty enemy too, once news of extraordinary renditions and photographs of Guantanamo and Abu Ghraib began to circulate. Secondly, 9-11 and American reactions to it produced widespread polarization. In one way, however, terrorist tactics failed for Al Qaeda. Only a very small minority of those who came to see America as their enemy ever came to see Al Qaeda as their friend. Al Qaeda never managed to do anything that was widely perceived as protecting the Muslims. That, in this third respect, Al Qaeda failed, is fortunate. It has made President Obama's task of repairing the damage easier as has the success of the revised strategy implemented in Iraq by General David Petrose, which started to work in the last years of the Bush administration and has allowed President Obama more or less to extricate America from one of the conflicts that looked rather too much like a crusade. Problems remain, however. One is the continuing conflict in Afghanistan and now parts of Pakistan which seems ever further from solution and looks to some more and more like a crusade as the original reasons for the invasion fade into the past. No one under the age of 25 today has any adult personal memory of why the United States first got involved in Afghanistan. Another is the far less intense but far longer running conflict between Israel and the Palestinians which 12 United States presidents have now tried in various ways to resolve and which all have failed to resolve. So far, I have spoken of America and not of Europe as it is America that has taken the lead role since 9-11. Europe too has played a part, however, and Europe too has problems to solve. European countries can do nothing about Afghanistan or the Palestinians except to decide whether or not to follow the American lead in these areas. European countries, though, do have to address the problem that is now known sometimes as homegrown terrorism and sometimes as radicalisation. Although only a very small minority of Muslims decided that Al Qaeda was their friend, some did. And curiously, nearly all of them were in the Muslim world or in Europe. Hardly any were in America. As the American terrorism expert Mark Sageman has famously pointed out, the rate of arrests on terrorism charges per capita among Muslims is six times higher in Europe than in the United States. Sageman's mathematics have been questioned but it is clear that Islamist terrorism is a European problem much more than an American problem and this requires explanation. Yes, continuing Islamist terrorism is a consequence of the polarisation that took place after 9-11. And yes, it is a consequence of the perception that America and her European allies are engaged in a crusade against the Muslims. But on their own, these factors would produce a general Western problem with Islamist terrorism, not a mostly European problem. There is no consensus about the reasons for the difference between America and the European experience. But there is some degree of consensus that it has something to do with the difference between America and Europe and something to do with the difference between America's Muslims and Europe's Muslims. America has much practice at being a multicultural melting pot and does not have an integration problem with Muslims. Yes, there are groups in the American population who are not integrated into the American dream. Americans will concede but fortunately they are not Muslim. Europe, it is suggested, might have something to learn from America when it comes to integration. Yes, it is conceded. Perhaps Europe might have something to learn from America. But America has an easy task. America can integrate a prosperous Indonesian dentist, a successful Pakistani lawyer and an Egyptian professor of chemistry who has just won a Nobel Prize. Europe has a different sort of Muslim population. As well as being less well educated and more likely to be unemployed, Muslims in Europe have different links with the Muslim world. Britain especially has a Muslim population of mostly Pakistani origin. Families in Britain retain ties to families in Pakistan and the Afghan conflict is spilling over into Pakistan. Some other countries have related problems. So-called homegrown terrorism then is partly an imported product. Whatever the reasons that Europe has more of a problem with Islamist terrorism than America does, one day it will go away. It will go away because in the end every group using terrorist tactics has finally either succeeded or given up. Islamist terrorism has so far succeeded in only one country, Afghanistan, and it succeeded there because of the same conditions that have made it possible for terrorism to succeed on other similar occasions, that is the existence of an ethnic divide often reinforced by a difference in religion. Afghan Muslims were the vast majority and the Soviet troops and advisors were a small minority, however powerful they were. Once terrorism created a major conflict between the Afghans and the Soviets, it would have been extremely hard for the Soviets to win. If terrorism succeeds in creating a major conflict between Muslims and non-Muslims in Europe, which is the worst nightmare of some experts, it would once again be the majority that would win. Islamist terrorism in Europe cannot possibly succeed. The real danger is not that it will succeed, but that there is a significant conflict before it fails. It is to be hoped, however, that European states will resist provocation and avoid polarisation, and then one day the problem will just go away.