 Welcome to everybody to this, I think, potentially very interesting and timely discussion. I'm Tony Brown and I'm the founder of the Institute. I was for quite a long time the chair of the project on the Balkans, which I was looking back at a very long list of events and publications. It was a very intensive part of the work of the Institute, but unfortunately, a mixture of the recession and a slowdown in attention to the enlargement project and a question of where our own resources should be devoted meant that that project has ceased to be one of the frontline elements of the Institute's work. And of course, we had the declaration of President Juncker, a very outset of his commission, that there would be no enlargement during that mandate, which put many things on the back burner. But not, I think, the interests of many people, including, I think, looking around this room, quite a lot of people who are here this afternoon in both the issue of enlargement and also in the specific question of the Balkans. But in the last, about three months, we've had two important statements at which bring the matter back towards the centre of the agenda. Dr. Juncker in his this year's State of the Union address spoke about enlargement at some length, indicating that it wasn't going to happen in this mandate but almost inevitably would be on the agenda at the next commission. He did in that many other categorical statements about Turkey, which in the texts that was issued appears in bold. Basically, the Turkey is unlikely to be a member of any foreseeable future, but he talked about the western Balkans. And then Emmanuel Macron in the Sorbonne speech raised the Balkans issue specifically and talked about enlargement being basically an inevitable part of the next phase of the Union's development. So when those two presidents have brought these matters into the discussion, it's quite clear that they are going to be matters which we will have to give attention to in the next period of time. And that being the case, it was extremely timely that we made contact again with Erwin Fuere. Erwin has been a friend of this institute for many years. If I tell him back, he is, this must be your fourth or fifth visit going back into the last decade. Time doesn't permit to deal with the full dimensions of your CV, but Erwin has spent maybe 40 years in the service of the European Union, particularly in the external service of the Union. And if you just, if one looks down the list where he has been, I mean, the first head of the delegation, the South African, the first head of delegations in Mexico and Cuba, a major role in the delegation for relations with Latin America, and then moving into the area that we're talking about today, being a particularly special representative in Macedonia. He is now, of course, has left the EU service and is a senior associate of the Center for European Policy Studies, in Brussels, for which he does a substantial amount of research and writing. And he's very much the man to bring us up to date on this and to show, and to give us an insight into the situation in the Balkans, as it is today, an area of great strategic interest, not least in matters such as the migration issue for geopolitical reasons, and also the politics of the relationship between that part of Europe and both Russia and China, and also something we've just been discussing, the interesting relationships with Turkey. So we're very welcome, as always, and we look forward to hearing what you have to say. Before that, I realise I am mandated to say certain things for us to request that everybody disables or silences or whatever their various electronic communications devices, and secondly, that you note the fact that there were, to be an unlikely emergency, the way out is the way you came in. But maybe at a greater speed. Also, that Erwin's presentation will be on the record, but the discussion and question in the last two sessions will be subject to your post stroke chat and those rules. You can use the information, but with your parallel view mentioned, who said it or where they said it, and having carried out my duties over to you, Erwin, again, welcome. Thank you. Thank you very much, Tony, and it's a great pleasure to be here and to see many good friends around the table. I will start on a rather gloomy note, but I will end on what I hope you will regard as a more positive, hopeful note. Many of us in the think tank community in Brussels and elsewhere who have been focusing on the Western Balkans and indeed many, many people in the Western Balkans themselves have felt that the EU has been neglecting the Western Balkan region. Indeed, it has been taking it for granted. The argument being that because all the countries of the region are destined for EU accession, the reform process will be on track like an automated train journey guaranteeing stability along the way. And it was only when the EU high representative, Mrs. Federica Mogherini, travelled to the region in March of this year when she was confronted with the brutal reality of what was happening in the Western Balkans. For some of the countries, it was her first visit since she took up office in November 2014, even though it's Europe's nearest neighbourhood. In Macedonia, for example, she saw for herself the very dangerous standoff with the political crisis that had been going on for several years. While next door in Serbia, she came face to face with nationalist rhetoric which was more reminiscent of the Milosevic era. So she reported back to the ministers, to the leaders at the European Council of last March. And if you read their conclusions, you will see where they refer to the fragile state, fragile situation in the Western Balkans and again reiterated the commitment of the EU towards accession of the countries but that they had to do all the reforms and everything. And yet the warning signs that things were not well in the Balkans were there for quite some time. Warning signs with regard to a deterioration of the democratic process, of parliaments that were not functioning, that were there to rubber stamp decisions, proposals put forward by the ruling parties, media freedom which was being constantly violated in some countries, journalists in prison, in others, journalists being harassed, intimidated. Civil society similarly and any of those who raised their voice above the parapet to criticize the ruling parties were immediately categorized as traitors and whereupon then they were at the receiving end of armies of tax inspectors who would come to look into their books and then of course effectively preventing them from operating and from trying to promote greater government accountability. So in all of these areas there was a clear deterioration spread over a number of years. Even the reports from Europol highlighted the increasing trend in illicit trade, in traffic, in organized crime, in drugs, arms, and other illicit trade. And in the communication every year except this year was an exception of the European Commission issues in enlargement, communication, and progress reports in this country. And in this communication of November 2016 the European Commission set out very clearly its concern and it says the region continued to show clear symptoms and varying degrees of state capture. So this was probably the most category recognition of a situation that was already in existence for a number of years and was reported also in the State Department, annual reports, OSCE, Council of Europe, etc. And unfortunately these alarming trends were accompanied by an increased nationalist rhetoric reminiscent of the Balkan Wars of the 90s. And indeed if you look at some of those statements you will see that some of the leaders have not hesitated to use the language of hatred and intolerance as if they were trying to perpetuate the wars by means other than armed conflict. Convicted war criminals were welcomed back as war heroes. You saw the reaction from the Serbian Orthodox Church when Radko Mladic was convicted and sentenced by the international tribunal in the Hague. They said this was the work of the devil. So this was very much reminiscent and reflective of the attitude of ruling parties at the time and now unfortunately. And even some convicted war criminals who returned after their sentences were put on the candidates lists of ruling parties in their elections. And unfortunately this attempt at whitewashing the past and rewriting history goes deep down into society. In Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia for example you have incidents of rewriting history, of the school curricula being altered to bring in the agendas of ruling parties and you have an increasing trend and segregated teaching between the different ethnic communities. And this is despite the best efforts of the OSCE High Commissioner for National Minorities who has tried to promote a more integrated education, more integrated multicultural education system in these countries. But the damage for many of these communities has been done because if you have surrogation of schools you have exacerbation of tensions in society at large. Even the Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of Europe after his recent visit to the Western Balkans he underlined and I quote the concern that reconciliation has stalled and is being superseded by mounting ethnic tensions and polarization in the region. What has been the reaction of the EU? Well apart from the usual expressions of concern and exhortation to the leaders to maintain their commitment to the reform track and all that the EU and the member states have given the impression of really underestimating the extent of the malaise in the region and simply not wishing to get involved. Some of these member states of course are member states where public opinion is very weak. A majority are not in favour of enlargement so it's not something which leaders will mention. The less said on future enlargement of the EU the better. So whatever messages were conveyed were more of a technocratic nature. Reforms must carry on with the reforms etc. There were not really messages addressing the root causes of the malaise in the region and the political deterioration throughout society. And even the so-called Berlin process as you know Angela Merkel in summer of 2014 launched this process ostensibly to mark the 100 years since the First World War where of course you know the Balkans featured so much. So it was one summit a year for the next four years to try to promote cooperation and of course that initiative came just a few months after the statement that you mentioned of the President of the Commission saying that there will be no enlargement during my mandate. So even that Berlin process which saw a summit of Western Balkans with a number of EU, not all of them in Berlin 2014 in Vienna 2015 Paris 2016 and the last one in Trieste hosted by Italy in 2017 focusing on regional cooperation but very very little on the rule of law fundamental rights democratic standards etc. It was as if the EU were using the argument that regional cooperation will solve all the rule of law problems of their own. And it's quite clear that much more forceful and consistent political message from the EU could have reversed or at least stalled the backsliding but unfortunately that did not happen and even political agreements that were mediated by the EU such as in Macedonia to try to solve the crisis were not followed up because there was a lack of proper monitoring and enforcement mechanisms in place. And then the refugee crisis which you mentioned in 2015 where in particular the countries of the EU in the forefront, Hungary, Austria sought to negotiate with the countries of the Western Balkans who were at the receiving end of this massive wave of refugees coming through Greece negotiated with them so that they would close their borders to prevent passage even though many of these refugees were refugees who were fleeing from civil war in their own countries. And of course the government's concern, Macedonia and Serbia were only too happy to accommodate the requests from notably Austria and Hungary who in turn had no interest in looking behind the curtain to see the increasing degradation in human rights and fundamental freedoms in those countries of the Balkans. Strong and stable governments were the buzzwords of EU leaders at the time. And you even had elected government officials from the EU such as Prime Minister Orban or Foreign Minister Kurtz from Austria going down to attend political party rallies of those same ruling parties even when one of them, his leader, has been and is under criminal investigations. So obviously the ruling parties saw no reason to change their behaviour and just continued as before with even greater impunity. So faced with all this, it is quite clear that there needs to be a far greater effort by the EU to match commitment to the Western Balkans with action. So you mentioned the statement of the President of the Commission Junker in a State of the Union address to the Parliament last September where he says, if we want more stability in our neighbourhood then we must also maintain a credible enlargement perspective for the Western Balkans. And he added in his letter of intent which always accompanies the statement a phrase which says one of the priorities for the Commission in the next year the preparation of a strategy for a successful EU accession of Serbia and Montenegro as frontrunner candidates in the Western Balkans. So this was manner from heaven in a way to many of us who have felt that the Western Balkans was totally forgotten and was warmly welcomed by the Western Balkans themselves even though only two countries were mentioned in that. But it does underline that there is now finally a recognition that there needs to be far greater attention to the Western Balkans than here to form. And this is all the more important when one considers that the EU is not the only actor in the region at the moment. You have Russia who is using whatever influence it has through its soft power to create problems and you saw their involvement, alleged involvement in the attempted coup in Montenegro over a year ago. They were also very active during the crisis in Macedonia. You have Turkey of course increasing its influence using its cultural ties and its own particular brand or authoritarian rule and then you have China which is increasing its investment imprint with its One Belt One Road initiative which is bringing a lot of investment but it's not necessarily the investment which is to the advantage of the country's concern because a lot of it is tied aid. So the list of initiatives we have now is looking, I must say, very hopeful, very positive. And it comes at a time when I think, as I said, there really needs to be far greater attention and hopefully it will mean that the EU will have a much more hands-on, more determined approach towards its nearest neighbourhood, towards the Western Balkans and also much greater visibility in the region to address the issues there. So I will take the initiatives one by one very briefly. So first of all there is the strategy paper which was announced by Junker which will be presented on the 6th of February. It will be, we were told, a strategy paper covering all of the Balkan region but it will be the first of many initiatives so hopefully it will set the tone of what the EU's vision for the long term for the Western Balkans will or should be. And I would hope that it will, of course, first of all underline the broad principles of the EU integration process which is the fundamental... Fundamentals first, I would call, rule of law, human rights, democratic standards should be at the heart of the accession process and the paper should not shy away from pointing to some of the serious examples of deterioration and democratic standards. It should, I hope, this paper address the root causes of the malaise in the region and come forward with some really very innovative approaches. In other words, it should address the people, society in the Western Balkans who have felt totally let down by their elected leaders, by this entrenched elite who are more adept at strengthening their personal power than at resolving the many serious political and economic problems facing the individual countries. And many of these countries, I would say, the vast majority, with the possible acceptance of Serbia, have still a very strong majority of support for accession to the European Union. So the paper should respond to that and should highlight the tangible benefits of EU accession and also try to put forward various ideas to prevent this phenomenon of state capture occurring again. I mentioned some innovative suggestions. I just mentioned two, because I think they could help in attacking the root problems. Education, first of all. How to create a climate to end this segregated teaching of different ethnic communities. And there's a lot that could be done there to help already existing civil society initiatives in promoting integrated and intercultural education, particularly in multi-ethnic societies. Second area, I think, of importance is reconciliation. As I mentioned, this real problem worsening in the region where leaders are trying to whitewash the past or to rewrite history. So there are a number of initiatives, because as we know and as short notes from South Africa, you cannot impose reconciliation on the outside. It has to come from the inside in order to be successful. And so there are some very good initiatives, the RECOM initiative, which brings together civil society organizations throughout the region to promote a reconciliation process. And this could help in dealing with the transitional justice, which is so necessary. Now that the Hague Tribunal is closing its doors, leaving a lot of evidence, gathered thousands and thousands of testimonials, hopefully this will help in dealing with the still many, many areas that have not been addressed within each country and where you have former victims who see every day still their former torturers or those who kept them in jail or those who raped them while they were in camps in the worst time of the wars, which was only just over 20 years ago. And there I think the EU could help by financing investigative experts like it did for the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa. So it can do a lot of assistance that can help in moving the reconciliation process forward. A third area I think where the EU needs to be much more consistent is in its relations with civil society and the media. And if you look at the region, all of them are post-conflict societies. And it's quite clear that in those countries with the heritage of history, with weak institutions, the lack of or even absence of the normal checks and balances that we take for granted, the contribution from civil society actors can be enormous in filling the gap and ensuring much greater government accountability. So the EU should be supporting civil society at all levels and at all times in order to ensure this much greater inclusive approach in dealing with the problems there. Media as well. If you look, for example, at Macedonia, in the Reporters Without Borders Index, Macedonia was in the 34th place. Now it is in the 111th place. So it shows the dramatic degradation in media. And there have been cases where the OSCE, Freedom of the Media Representative, has spoken out against violations, but the EU has been silent. So there there needs to be much greater focus. And another important area is dealing with bilateral disputes. There are so many bilateral disputes within the region, border demarcation issues, name dispute between Greece and Macedonia, minority issues, Greece not recognizing, Albanian minority in Greece or Macedonian minority in Greece, Bulgarian minority in Serbia and Macedonia, vice versa, a lot of bilateral problems which are plaguing the entire region. And the EU cannot pretend to support EU perspective for the region if it leaves the responsibility for resolving these disputes to the countries themselves. Most of them lack the legal and technical expertise which could help them in finding solutions. And yet solutions remain vital. So hopefully the EU there can use its own experience. And together with OSCE, Council of Europe, the Venice Commission could put forward some proposals to help in addressing these bilateral disputes because if they were to say a condition that no country can join the EU until they have resolved their bilateral disputes then I think it won't happen. And I think it will only exacerbate even worse the problems in the region. And again, their support for civil society can be very important, particularly in the cross-border regions. I won't touch upon the economic reforms because I see I'm already running beyond the time. But the last report from the World Bank gives a fairly positive picture saying growth will rise from 2.6 in 2017 to 3.3 in 2018. As these growth figures are achieved, the level of economic development in the Western Balkans will not catch up with the average EU for at least 15, 20, 30 years. And of course unemployment there is a huge problem remaining and a lot of it is youth unemployment and that's why so many have left the Western Balkans seeking to make a new life elsewhere. So the next important event is the enlargement communication from the Commission which was presented on the 16th of April which will set out the progress reports for each of the countries concerned. And we hope that it will include recommendations for the opening of accession negotiations with Albania and with Macedonia because of the progress there in the last few months and hopefully that will continue up to June and June is the Council, the European Council which then takes the decision. Of course for Macedonia a big question is will Greece accept negotiations to start before the name issue is resolved? As we speak today there is a meeting in Brussels the first in three years with the UN mediator Matthew Nimitz who has the patience of an archangel and he still has been dealing with this for the past 18 years. He read his obituary he told me a few years back when I saw him in the newspaper. In 2025 a UN mediator found dead in a taxi commuting between Thessaloniki and Skopje tried to resolve the name issue. So and then we have the western Balkan summit. This is the first summit in many years between the European Union as a whole and the western Balkans which will take place hosted by Bulgaria and Sofia in the second half of May and hopefully that will also emphasise the important messages of reforms and the commitment from the EU. Then I mentioned the June Council and the next initiative, the next event on the calendar is already quite a lot for the western Balkans. The next event will be the fifth summit in the Berlin process. You remember I mentioned the four previous ones and believe it or not the next Berlin process summit with the western Balkans will be hosted by the UK. Now the irony of a country which is negotiating its exit from the EU, hosting a summit with countries that are negotiating their entry into the EU will not be lost on everybody and we still are not clear how and what they will focus on and everything. But my concluding point is that I do believe that now with all of these initiatives on the table that the EU will catch up and will demonstrate a renewed commitment of support for the western Balkans which will help in turn the reform process in the country themselves so that they will no longer feel that they are being taken for granted and that there will be much more determined efforts to achieve that reform agenda which is so important for them first of all but also of course is a condition for their accession to the European Union and I'm cautiously optimistic that this will really mark a change and a qualitative jump in the EU's commitment towards the Balkans and will really make a big difference and will strengthen the sense of stability in Europe's nearest neighbourhood and we mustn't forget that it's just next door to the European Union so progress in that area will help very much within the European Union but of course we need to convince EU public opinion on the benefits of this enlargement so I will end on that hopeful note thank you very much