 أشكرا جزيلا, This is a very appropriate introduction into the topic directly into the workings of regional capitalism with even the Iron Fist. Although we are in a time of uprising so I'm not sure it can really work, but good luck. شكرا جزيلاً for having hosted this event as London Middle East Institute and for accepting to share it and many thanks to my very good friends for accepting to be part of this event which I wanted to be more open discussion about the events themselves than just purely as may happen often a kind of presentation or summary of my own book, so that's why we have this kind of very, I'm sure very interesting panel as you will see now a few words on the book and therefore as I just said on the events beyond the book well, I mean from the subtitle of the book you will see that this is and as the title of this event also refers to this is a book about the Arab uprising and that's already a choice it's not the Arab spring as it is so often described in the media and this is also an attempt at giving radical exploration and therefore explanation of this uprising I mean the two if you want are I mean these issues are narrowly connected because I think it's only through a superficial impression that people could believe at least at the beginning that this would be a rather brief episode with the regime fallings like Domino's like we had in Eastern Europe in the late 80s early 90s and opening the way for rather smooth transitions so the Eastern European model was very much evoked at the beginning of the events in 2011 in the region now the fact is for I guess for people who are really familiar with the region with its social economic political structure and the rest and for at least I for one as one of them was convinced from the beginning that what we were facing of course was at least potentially a much more complicated and one should say also alas a much more violent process and I insisted from the beginning on the fact that far from being a spring or whatever which are indications of a rather short lived brief moment in history what started at the end of 2010 and beginning of 2011 and the region is a long term revolutionary process and that's why the term process here is important it points to I mean the revolutionary character of the process but it is a process which is not a finished revolution anywhere until this this this point and the process that that will carry on for a very long time for several years and very very probably actually decades given the complexity again of of the overall setup that exist in in the region and the meaning precise and that's where the the the connection exist it is when you get in a radical exploration of of of this of these events that you understand I believe what I just explained that is the process the complexity of it and all that and by radical I'm taking here radical in in the in the the the etymological meaning of of the term which is going back to the roots and if if we explore really the roots of of these these events then we understand why it's not anywhere near of of reaching any kind of and and presently and I mean for someone based in development studies as I am I mean this this kind of radical analysis is almost the the natural inclination for in the sense that we are we give we are accustomed to give much attention major attention to social and economic conditions and that's one of the the peculiarities of words singularities of this book compared to so many other books that have been produced on on these events it is that it starts from an exploration of of the the social and economic conditions and from there it goes into analyzing the social and political dynamics of what I call therefore a revolutionary process and a long term one in the sense that if we understand the causes the root causes of what exploded in 2011 then we understand that it won't stop before these root causes are addressed before they find any kind of solution and that's why again we are not anywhere near this kind of of of conclusion. Now the purpose of the book is precisely to to to analyze us and give the readers keys to understanding what is unfolding it was not meant as let's say just a congenital book analysis of just one year of events or whatever it was meant as precisely that giving a prism through which or a grid through which you could analyze the events the unfolding events and of course this also is of is a means also going through the test of of of these events I mean and so it's up to every reader to see whether the the book stands this test of events or has been or not turned or obsolete with with the events my of course as a as a as an author I would tend to believe that it gives on the contrary it has been in a way confirmed by by the by the unfolding events but of course I leave it up to each one of us to reading the book to come to any any conclusions of the sort now the roots that are anyhow analyze in the book which are permanent I mean as long as this is going on starts from as I said that the social and economic roots the most obvious aspect of which I don't have any time to get into details but the most obvious aspect of which is is the the the massive unemployment that characterizes the region with the highest rates of unemployment in the world and it has been like that for several decades. And especially female and youth unemployment and of course when we say use it's female and male that is gender and and age determination of of this massive unemployment and the youth dimension of this unemployment is is one of the key roots of the uprising because as usual and some people behaved as or or or mentioned or or commented as if this was very particular to these events that that you had the youth in the streets but the truth is that there are no third age revolutions and usually all revolutionary movements are movements of of I mean led by young people where young people represent the core of of the movement. And so this the connection here is direct and this unemployment which itself is one symptom among others as I said I'm not getting into into a long explanation here is related to the economic blockage that the region have been going through for the last few decades with an exceptionally slow rate of of economic growth especially when compared to demographic the demographic rate and this translates into this massive unemployment. And this slow growth or lack of it this fetter development as I call it is the title of the first chapter is connected is related to a particularly low investment rate in the region. And when we explore the reasons for that we get into what I call for lack of for want of a better word but it sounds heavy but that's I think the most precise I call that the regional modalities of the capital the regional or let's say the specific modalities of the regional capitalist mode of production. And these are determined by the characters of the social political structures that prevail in this region where we have the highest concentration in the world of frontier states is a well known feature of the region on which there have been so many many comments and sometimes a stretch beyond beyond what is useful but it is nevertheless an obvious feature of the states in the region and the patrimonial character of these states and I'm not saying even neo-patrimonial actually the neo-patrimonial states in the region are those which are relatively you know have relatively some kind of semi-liberal conditions and are very rare very few. The characteristic of the region is that you have full or let's say patrimonialism so much present in whether in monarchies or so called republics where with families owning fully owning the states and behaving as owners of the state and transmitting in hereditary and the rest. And this comes also under conditions of politically of what Max Weber called politically determined capitalism that is a capitalism that is very much dependent on the political connection which leads therefore to what's called chronic capitalism and the rest. Creating conditions which if you combine them with the unpredictability of governments because of arbitrariness because of the despotic character with the unpredictability of conditions because of the fact that this is one of the most unstable and violent throne regions in the world leads to a specific form of dominant form of private capitalism in the region which is seek only short term quick profit investments and this is one of the major keys to explain everything I mentioned. Now if we add to this structure which is a heavy one that is dominating the societies of the region these political social political structures the historical major role of foreign powers and also the intra regional role of regional powers then we understand why this is not Eastern Europe but a region where the revolutionary process is much more complex will take much more time and will be and is already much unfortunately much more violent. And this revolutionary process is actually facing as I called that in a recent article one revolution several I mean at least three counterrevolutions are several forms of counterrevolution in the region. One is the most obvious the old regimes everywhere where you have the revolutionary process and uprising it is facing old regimes which are in most cases much more present than the the term Fool which has been popularized in Egypt would indicate this much more than Fool and that we have seen it recently the the deep state which is another formula which comes from Turkey originally is actually more accurate in in indicating what is this and that's one form of course the most obvious most direct form of counterrevolution. You have the counterrevolutionary the role of global powers of course the United States the the major hegemony in the region but at least in one circumstance which is the Syrian case Russia is also playing a very direct counterrevolutionary role. We have the role of regional powers of course the Gulf monarchies that the traditional bastions of of reaction and counterrevolution in the region but also and here again in the Syrian case Iran which is not to be forgotten in that in that regard and those I mean the regional powers and here I'm speaking that of the Gulf monarchies and the United States being behind them have been trying to co-opt the uprising by using the counterrevolutionary or as counterrevolutionary means some local forces in the countries where the uprising is going on and this has been the case of course very obviously of forces referring to Islamic fundamentalist forms of types of program whether the the Muslim brotherhood and behind them the Emirate of Qatar or or or the Salafis and behind them the Saudi kingdom and various other form of of of forces which may be linked to not necessarily state but also to some funding networks that exist in the Gulf Gulf countries. Now one thing is that it was obvious again for people familiar with the region that any elections organized shortly after the upheaval in countries like Egypt and Tunisia et cetera would lead to the results that we have seen. It's most obvious in the case of of of Egypt that the Muslim brotherhood was by far the most powerful organized force existing and had absolutely no match in any other element of the of the opposition and this I mean this was inevitable for elections held in that in that short term and I would say that the movements have had didn't have or haven't had the enough conscience of the issue of of of I mean understanding that any elections under such circumstances should be for very short terms and not for normal fourth year terms or whatever and we have seen the consequences in Egypt. Now faced with these victories electoral victories we have heard so many gloomy comments and people shifting from the euphoria of the first initial month of the uprising to a very very gloomy depiction of what's happening. The Islamic tsunami the Islamic winter the Islamic autumn they will you name it all kind of of formulas of this of this kind. Well this was again misunderstanding of what's happening very superficial impression be precisely because people had not understood that this long term revolutionary character of the process that I mentioned and it manifested itself quite quickly. In the very fast I mean much faster than even whoever might have expected the very fast downfall of the Muslim brotherhood in Egypt and now the the the massive opposition that another is facing in in Tunisia. Now of course this has led again to us another attempt at co-opting the uprising and the idea that the coup that co-opted the second uprising in Egypt after the coup that co-opted the first one is again the end of the process. So sometimes the same people sometimes different people are also proclaiming now it's another end it's now it's the end not the Islamic winter but maybe the military military winter or whatever season it is again a very superficial impression. I mean there are no conditions in the region for any progressive remake of of Bonapartism in the sense that there is no room for economic development under such conditions. Bonapartism the region has already seen it's behind it's not ahead and and whoever rules countries like Egypt and the rest. And no one appears to have any kind of solution and it takes radical solution other sense of radical to overcome this the economic blockage therefore whoever doesn't have such solutions will just fail and face the same thing. And likewise I would say the increasing role of Islamic fundamentalist forces in the Syrian uprising when it turned into military confrontation and civil war is no more the end of the revolution or the revolution process than for instance the Muslim Brotherhood electoral victories where in Egypt or Tunisia. The military weight of such forces which again is because they have better means and specially funding than the rest is not much matched by any mass adherence to their views and behavior and that's why. I mean of course it's an extremely tragic situation that what we have it's a terrible tragedy what we have in Syria but there is no basis in my view to just bury the revolution with the at the same time. The process is going on is going on as we can see and will continue in Egypt it's going on in Tunisia it's going on in Libya where the situation is has been continuously boiling with all sorts of mass demonstrations. Which the media don't report they prefer to report armed or violent incidents in Yemen which has been forgotten where the movement is carrying on with mass demonstrations mass mobilizations. In Bahrain where also the movement has been is carrying on and the movement keeps ripening in other countries where the uprising has not yet reached the same size. But it is going on struggles are going on in Jordan in Sudan where you saw the beginning of an uprising in recently in Oman for instance to go back to the Gulf where I mean these are not reported these are not seen so that's why also that's part of this kind of gloomy picture. And sooner or later Morocco Algeria the Saudi Kingdom where you have the potential where you have had already some episodes of protest. That's why I would say the process is going on. The key achievement of the Arab uprising until now is what is in my view encapsulated in the most famous slogan in the first part of it and that's which I chosen as a title for my book. The people want. This is the most important dimension. This is that the peoples of this region have learned that I mean that they can when they express their will and that by expressing their will they can realize some of their goals. And that's a very very important turn and I hardly see any possibility to reverse that at the very least not without a major disaster which of course cannot be completely excluded but is not yet fortunately on the agenda. Thank you very much. Thank you very much for those very insightful thoughts. Next is Professor Salwa Ismail who is professor in the department of politics and international relations and also the head of the department. And as our speakers are very well known to our audience I'm not going to introduce every one of them. Thank you. I'm very pleased to be part of this panel and to be engaged with the book which I've read and enjoyed very much. I was originally asked to be part of a discussion of the book but then I understand I was also asked to give some kind of a talk. So I'm trying to kind of balance these two requests or commitments at this point. I'll start just by saying how I see perhaps start the main elements from a book and then how I see my work in fact can speak to it. So I start by saying that I come to this book as someone who works on the micro level or everyday life politics. So I pay attention to mundane spaces alleyways streets street corners coffee shops and mechanic shops and that kind of what goes on these spaces and particularly the happenings in them when they come to interaction with government. So ordinary people when they meet and interact with agents and agencies of government. So that's very much a micro level. So for me Gilbert's book provides the macro picture that complements and help explain the aggregate of the daily events and episodes that take place in the interaction between citizens and government and also among citizens themselves. So when citizens relate to each other and engage in certain forms of interaction we can actually explain those forms of interaction by referring to the kind of macro picture that Gilbert offered us in the book. I think the people want furnishes us with the broad material grounds for understanding the small events the everyday events that I study in Cairo and in Damascus for instance. But I think this macro level is given in concrete forms. So the book starts with the facts and builds up a persuasive argument that is also simple. Over the last three to four decades the Arab Middle East experienced what Gilbert called the block development or feather development which I think is very up to capture what was going on over these decades in terms of government policies in terms of what elites and regimes did with the material resources of their countries. The figures are striking and I think one of the most important factors that Gilbert highlights and highlights also in comparative terms. So we know that actually what's happening what happened in the region is in a sense unusual if compared with what was going on in South Asia or East Asia. So for instance with the shift to liberalization economic liberalization and the wholesale sale of state assets that were the prescriptions of the international financial organizations like the World Bank and IMF. The private sector actually fails to step in as we were told and promised that well is what the problem was a big state what you need is a big large private sector. But in fact this private sector didn't step in didn't invest it only got hold of state assets. So it didn't really perform the scripted role and then we have all kinds of excuses for why it didn't. So we had a massive drop in public investment in including in the oil producing countries but also in the non oil producing countries. And the comparison again with East Asia South Asia are very instructive for us. And private investment as I just mentioned remain weak. And of course we go of course the when we see private investment it goes to the most nonproductive economic activity. So the construction construction sector which also Gilbert talks about. And I remember in 2010 just to the year before the events in Egypt being there. And one of the things that I was thinking about this massive theft of public lands by a very small elite. And thinking how would the people ordinary people ever get hold of land for housing. Or for have their businesses and so on. That much of this public resources had been privatized and particularly in the real estate where there was this boom in construction for the elites. So we had the gated communities and the seven star resort in a beach resource and so on. So we have the facts about actually what was going on at that level in terms of state resources. But also the repercussions or their implication for the ordinary citizens. The figures for unemployment again they signal a massive social crisis. Particularly for the young that Gilbert talked about. When we look at the figure whereby of the for the the young's share of the labor force. So out of only 33 to 36 percent of the youth labor force was employed. The rest so on average of 65 percent unemployed youth. These are on the on the job market as in Gilbert indicates. So people young people on the job market with no jobs. And so they were the most affected. And the most important thing is to understand that within this particular modality of capitalism. Which Gilbert described as adventure capitalism. And as a speculative capitalism. Now this is the variant it took. But it is I think it was inevitable that it should be that variant. Given also the international context. Whereby and the region the role of international power supporting dictators. It's a it was possible for them to get away because they had cover. They had cover both locally through the arm the apparatuses of coercion. Through the militaries and the police. And they had covered internationally through the alliance. Particularly with the United States. So we know that the مباركس and the Ben Ali's and Ali Saleh and so on. Had their backers and the backers where gave them cover. So I think this is an important. A part of an important account for us at a macro level that is also very concrete. I want to now shift and say OK. But what was happening at the micro level. And I will just speak very briefly. About the context in the every every day. And I want to say that. And the context of the every day is the revolutionary context that also she'll bear talks about. And it's that context that helps us to explain the uprisings and the revolutionary activism. If we consider what was going on in the every day between citizens in the state. And that every day encounters whether it was in the markets on the streets in public offices and so on. Ordinary citizens that were excluded from the public wealth and resources. They were humiliated in their just and in the. While trying to earn their living. So the incidents of. Is not an exceptional incident. The humiliation of. Being slapped by the officer. Was a typical experience for. All of those who entered the job market. As informal laborers. As peddlers as. Squatters and public and. In state claimed the land. Putting a kiosk to sell some. Some kind of good. Whether it's imported from China or a local produced. Handcraft and then having to face. Public authorities saying you're not supposed to be there. You're not you shouldn't be earning your living that way. But not providing them with the alternative. But also becoming the subjects of humiliation. And here that's where I think. There is another. Part of this picture for us to think. In that micro level in the everyday. There was a development of subjectivities. A subjects of rebellion. A rebellious subjects were formed. Subjects who've decided they do not. Want to be governed that way. They do not want to be humiliated in the everyday. They do not want to be slapped. Pushed around beaten insulted. Whole to police stations where they're abused. Tortured. And. I say. The word. Humiliation. And what I was interviewing young people in Cairo. Were the most. Use terms to describe their condition. So it was the subject of humiliation deciding. But in collective and in the aggregate. They don't want to be humiliated anymore. And they expressed that as an anti-government. Anti-regime position. In the uprising. So I would say that the infrastructure. Of collective action were there. And. Of course. The objective conditions. That. Discussed. Very well. In the book. Regarding the mode of production. That existed. The control of the assets. Who control the assets. And the impact. That had. That had. On the average. On the. Overall population. But particularly. Creating this vast segment. Of disadvantaged. Increased poverty level. Exclusion from education. Exclusion from. Education. Exclusion. From. Health services. And also. Constraints. On. In. The individual's ability. To earn their living. Having. Already. Tried to. Circumvent. Government. But. Through this. Informalization. Of Labour. And Informal Labour. That even was being. Undermind. It's. In. In this. Everyday. Conditions. And in these. Citizens. Everyday. Encounters. With government. Also. In the forms. That they developed among themselves. To get around that. I think that we do. Find infrastructure. Of collective action. The fact that. In. Circumventing government. Ordinary. Citizens. Developed networks. To get around. Whether for jobs. Or to get. Access to service. Collectively. Mutual aid. Then help societies. There was a lot in the everyday. But also. Learning to confront. The police. On the streets. In the alleyways. And. And I'm not saying. That's the only thing. That was going on. There were also. Protest movement. Labour movement. Organizing. And. Talking. Particularly. In reference to Egypt. But there were also. Other kinds. Of. Organizations happening. But I think. Everyday. Experience of citizens. Whether it is. In meeting government. And. And. Forming a subject. That rejects. That mode of government. Or. In also. Organizing themselves. In the everyday. And I want to tell you. Why the revolutionary process. Is continuing. And the idea. That actually. The revolutions have failed. Or. Being judged. Right now. We have. In political science. To dominant paradigms. One is. Transition to. To. Democracy. And if you haven't done. The transition. Something is wrong. This is a confirmation. Of the exception. This account. Or. The failed state. Which is now. The. The. The. In the. In the market. Is. A. And. A. And. A. And. A. And. A. And. A. And. A. And. And. A. I want to tell you. For my. My recent experience in Egypt in. And I think I probably. Right. Out of time. But in April. ما يسمى مناسبة تقريبية، ومع ذلك أتكلم أقوى أحد هو التواصيل متواصيلة، ميديا that is not government control and that is not business control but done by ordinary citizens a kind of citizen journalism that seeks and it's been developing from the time of the uprising on that seeks to counter the dominant accounts لأصبحت من المعروف المشاهدات والماسات المعروفية when it comes to the confrontations with the police and the military and this happened in many, many of the confrontations whether it was in Mohammed Mohd's confrontations in November 2011 whether it was the military's attack on the Coptic protesters in October November 2011 by the Maspiro they had the footage, they organized street screenings ونصفوا في المدينة العامة المدينة العامة يدعوها شيء بشكل كافي than what the government and business elite are telling them هذا مجانا اكثر من المشاهدة that is developing across the country ونصفهم بشكل كافي not just in the cities but in the villages and towns ونصفهم بشكل كافي ونقولوا أننا لا نحاول أننا نحاول نقوم بشكل كافي وإنه يوم الملترا أو مسلم برادة أعضت أعضب جيدة عبر هذه هي الشخصيات ممانية مارضي، تيمان, ويساهم عميحات أخرى連د الم만وش، هي مارضي، والمسلما أنظمة هادئةً أخرELLA سأعط أ pancakes of the informals بقاءacking before the revolution ، المقلسة بقاء son thouk 25th of January 2011 but the revolution began before okes the revolution refuse before ڢرافس as before it continues ڢراص the informals the squatters ڢراص are still squatting ڢراص the informals the squatters are still squatting ڢراص the informals the squatters are squatting وعنس كايرو has been taken ڢراص the informals the squatters have been taken يجب أن يقوموا بكتبهم. يمكنك أن يقولون بأنه إلقائي. لكن كل شيء أخرى. المجموعة والرغمات التي تفعلها قبل was just as illegal. Now it's the ordinary people's term to reclaim their rights. Thank you. Thank you very much Salwa for that very complimentary elucidation of the micro perspective. To Gilbert's book. Next comes Adam Haniyeh who is a senior lecturer in the department of development studies. Thank you very much for the opportunity to speak here today and I want to say begin by saying it's a really great pleasure to be able to introduce this exciting book. I know many of you I'm sure you all know that Gilbert's work has been a major reference point for both activists and academics over the last few years. And this book I think is certainly no exception to that. I think it's important to realize that Gilbert's work doesn't just come out of nowhere. It's not something new. It comes from an engagement with the region over many decades. And this really is something that shines through in the book. If you haven't read it yet I'm sure you'll be struck by the way that it does cover enormous amount of variegated struggles and histories across the region from Yemen to Tunisia and to the Gulf. And that I think is one of the most rich aspects of the book. I want to just to begin by highlighting I think three things that Gilbert emphasized and he emphasized them again tonight. And then speak a little bit about if you like the dynamics of revolution and counter-revolution in the current period. I think the three issues that Gilbert emphasizes that really struck me were firstly the emphasis on imperialism. And I think this is something that often gets left out of accounts of the Middle East. Imperialism is seen as being something that ended in 1945 and not something that actually continues today. Or it's reduced to simply a military aspect. The notion of military intervention without actually understanding the myriad of forms through which imperialism operates in the region. Political and economic forms. And I think the historical context that is provided in the book helps to really bring out this aspect of imperialism. Secondly, and Gilbert again emphasized this in his talk, that we need to understand very much that these uprisings are not just about the question of democracy. They very much deal at the root with the way the region has been integrated into the global political economy. And as he describes it, the stalled development of the region. And thirdly, emphasis on the revolutionary process. And I think it's very interesting, and perhaps it would be interesting to talk more about this in discussion, about why is it that the Arab uprisings have so often, or debates around the Arab uprisings, have so often been reduced to questions of terminology. Spring or winter, is it a revolution or not a revolution was a debate I think we heard at the beginning of this phase. And now of course the debate should we call what's happening in Egypt a coup or not a coup. And these kind of reducing the process to simply a terminological debate. I think the emphasis on revolutionary process helps to guard against the kinds of pessimism that we often hear in the current period and realize that the setbacks that we are facing and that we do see today are actually an inevitable feature of a process that contains within itself both revolutionary and counter-revolutionary dynamic. And it's that struggle. And at the heart of this question is I think the question of state power, who controls the state and in whose interests is the state run. And I think if we start from this realization, then we can see that none of the root causes of the uprising have actually been dealt with or solved by the new political arrangements in the region. Despite the ways that the uprisings have been framed by the mainstream media and unfortunately I think much scholarly analysis, the root causes are not in single factors. It's not because of authoritarianism or because of unemployment or because of food prices, unemployment and so forth. But rather we need to see these roots in the way that capitalism has formed in the region and in particular the way that over the last few decades the outcome of development has been this highly polarized process where a tiny layer of the population has benefited from its control over key moments of accumulation and existing alongside a growing mass of poor and dispossessed populations through rural and urban areas. Authoritarian state structures have been the midwife of this lopsided development and I think without confronting and overcoming this totality and in this sense seeing both the political and the economic as being completely intertwined and inseparable then there is no long term solutions to the region's problems. I want you to emphasize one aspect of this totality though that I think has really come to the fore over the past three years and that is the salience or the importance of the regional scale. And there are two aspects to this that I wanted to highlight. This is not the only factors but there are two that I think often get missed in our analysis because I think there tends to be an approach that we can describe as being methodologically nationalist. We look at individual struggles within individual countries without actually situating what is going on in countries within the wider regional and also global context. So the two aspects of the regional scale that I think we need to bring to the fore are the ways that Western power in the region has operated through both Israel and the Gulf Arab states. I think Israel's special place in this system or in this structure stems directly from its character as a settler colonial state that is dependent upon the dispossession of the Palestinian people and this means that the alliance that Israel has with both the United States and European powers is an existential part of the state itself that uniquely insulates the state from many of the domestic pressures within Israeli society. So I think one of the central conclusions that we can draw from this is that the Palestinian struggle has an immense weight within the region as a whole and confronting Western domination and I think we can see this in the uprisings really must pass through and be directly integrated with the question of Palestine. We can see this in the sense of the way that Egypt is playing in the current period playing an essential role in enforcing the blockade for example on the Gaza Strip. This is not just true of Egypt today under the Muslim Brotherhood I'm sorry under the military it was also true of Egypt under the Morsi government. It's interesting to note for example that US funding to Egypt which the US government announced that it was going to look at or reduce the one category that was accepted from that was and the way they described it was funding related to the protection of Israel. That was the one that would not be touched. The second aspect I think to the regional question is the particular role of the Gulf Arab States and Gilbert has mentioned this in connection to its political role in supporting various political and social forces throughout the region. I wanted to emphasise the political economic role because I think this is also very important to look at. Salwa mentioned for example the sale or the theft of public land in Egypt. A major actor in this process of course has been the Gulf States. 80% of the land auctions for example that took place in Cairo were bought by Gulf based conglomerates in Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates in particular. So in many ways the Gulf States have become completely intertwined with the economic processes that exist across the region. Egypt is not the only example this we can find throughout the area and I think it's fascinating to observe that prior to the uprisings very few people actually took much interest in the Gulf itself. Gilbert is an exception to this but I think in general that's a case that it's regional influence and I think this has now changed. The Gulf's dramatic political ascendancy really does bear important consequences for the future of these struggles and I think what it means is that the kinds of strikes, labour movements, social movements that we still see in the region in places such as Egypt and Tunisia inevitably come up against the Gulf. Now I want to I'm running short of time so I want to just emphasise this point of the importance of the regional scale by noting that I think one of the consequences of this is that not only do struggles within the national level are important but also that without challenging these hierarchies at the regional level we won't see a different kind of Middle East. I'm not saying that these struggles will begin from the regional scale but I think what happens at the national scale inevitably is intertwined with these regional powers and these regional hierarchies and I think this is why these uprisings have caused such fear in the corridors of power in places like Washington, Riad, Doha and Tel Aviv. Now it is in the context of these regional power relations that I think we can also as well as the unfilled aspirations of the people themselves that we can pinpoint I think the brittleness of the straight structures that have arisen. It's a situation where ruling classes can't rule in the old way they remain divided they remain divided amongst themselves and the populations want to see real change so they do remain in this sense revolutionary times part of the revolutionary process to use Gramsci in this context I think there is very little consent that these state structures have been able to build over the past few years but there is a hell of a lot of coercion that is being employed by them and I think we can see various strategies that are used in an attempt to build this kind of consent. The rise of the Muslim Brotherhood I think was part of this and now of course we see the discourses of sectarianism and we see in places like Bahrain for example the pitting of migrant workers against citizens the cult around Sisi and the military in Egypt. All of these things are various attempts to build an armory to the state that goes beyond coercion to build a kind of consent in the state structures but I do believe that without providing any real improvement in people's lives that these attempts will be will fail and I think the weaknesses of the state structures have also shaped the forms of the counter-revolutionary wave that we are now witnessing and both Salwa and Gilbert have spoken about this but I want to emphasise I think one aspect of the counter-revolutionary wave that I think has become much clearer since the time that Gilbert has written this book and that is I think there is a conscious strategy of brutalisation that is taking place through a state of permanent war and dispossession in many parts of the region. Syria I think is a clear example of this but I think it's also true in the case of Yemen and I think this is something that we often underestimate the effect of this process on everyday people. I think the experience of Iraq through the 2000s earlier in Algeria through the 1990s and in many respects Palestine in the post or through the second interfather we can see the effects that this has on populations. I don't think it's accidental that these three places in these three places Iraq, Algeria and Palestine we haven't seen the same levels of struggle that we have in other countries despite the fact that the objective level all the ingredients exist so having pointed this out I don't think that and I agree fully with the way that this is that the Arab uprisings are not in any sense over or in terminal decline and I think there's many aspects of hope that we can point to. One of these and Salwa brought this out very well is the efflorescence of new political and cultural and expressions that often will mock Arab leaders and the kind of language that they use and Salwa mentioned this I think one other interesting example is the spread of political graffiti and street art through the region Particularly Egypt is a very good example of that We have to I think also acknowledge the growth of the left and Tunisia the left remains very small of course and it remains divided unfortunately but it certainly moved much further than it was prior to 2011 Again the labour movements and this is brought out very nicely in Gilbert's book again most notably in Egypt and Tunisia the kinds of new labour organisations that have formed the waves of strikes that continued are accelerating in the case of Egypt and in many cases wildcat strikes that are taking place outside of even the independent trade unions that formed in the earlier days and I know the other kinds of social movements I'm sure Nadia will talk in more depth in particular the women's movement in Egypt So I would end by saying I think there is a tendency to underestimate the impact of struggle on people themselves and I think when we're assessing where we're at in the Middle East we can't just look at what is going on at the level of the state we can't just ask who's in power which political party appears to be hegemonic in the state apparatus but actually see how has this processes how is the involvement in struggle involvement in demonstration strikes the myriad of activities how has this actually changed people themselves and I think these implications are ignored often where it's concentrated just on the top levels of political success or temporary alliances at the top of the state the uprisings have irrevocably I think changed the political consciousness of an entire generation and this I think is the primary legacy and I do believe very much that the process will continue the changes that we have seen in people's consciousness the new kinds of social movements will leave us I think and I hope in a better place in the future. Thank you Thank you Adam for your presentation and last but not least is Professor Nadia Al-Ali who is a professor of gender studies at SOS. Thank you Hassan well thank you very much for inviting me to be here now after Salwa and Adam already so eloquently engaged with Joubert's book and really drawn out the main points and the main contributions I'm not going to go over that I mean I very much agree with the points made I guess from my perspective what stood out for me are three points one is that I strongly feel that too much work on the Middle East especially that is written sort of on the moment and trying to capture current events fails to historicize and Joubert's book is really refreshing in that because of the fact as Adam already pointed out that he's been working for so long on the region and also because of specific political economy approach and methodology there is this historical context that is so important secondly as someone who is mainly working on women and gender issues I'm always confronted with what we might call the culturalization of issues and it is so useful to have an in-depth political economy approach that really speaks against that challenges this whole notion of exceptionalism and Arab culture Middle East culture and thirdly and it has already been mentioned by both Salwa and Adam what really speaks to me is that you know while Joubert is not one of those people who sort of overly optimistic or the point that I really that really resonates is what is so impressive and what is so big and revolutionary is the expression of want what we want what people want having said that I think where I would squabble a bit with Joubert and this is where I'm going to focus on now is the idea of the people I mean clearly from a feminist and gender perspective I would argue that the people are always they're a man and woman and they're gendered interests and so what I'd like to do is to really maybe build on Joubert's radical analysis and try to complicate the picture a little bit by saying that I think it is really important to look at gender not as something that is sort of marginal to what is happening but very key and I think feminist scholars for a long time we've moved away from privileging gender as an ethical category and we are incorporating we are recognizing intersectionality in the way gender intersects with class how it intersects with ethnicity and I think this is a time maybe to open up a debate with colleagues as Joubert although I know Joubert is very open to feminist analysis but in more general terms that maybe also for Marxist scholars it is important to recognize gender not simply as something that happens on the side but actually essential certainly in terms of the unfolding of events now I would say that of course that gender would be central to both evolutionary and counter evolutionary processes in the region and I'm actually going to focus on Egypt as well did not come as a surprise to many of us I mean certainly feminist scholars or activists with historical knowledge of the region clearly after the initial phase of Antimo Barak and national sentiments sort of initially in Egypt there was very much the sense of we are here as Egyptian citizens we are not here as women but that changed very quickly it changed from the 8th of March 2011 International Women's Day and as we saw developments unfolding it became very clear that women and gender and body politics actually became a very central aspect to political contestations in post-Mubarak Egypt and when I say you know gender actually I don't just mean women I mean men as well and we have with us this evening Professor Denise Cagnotti who I think very convincingly argued at some point that well actually a year ago that many of the developments that we see unfolding in terms of the targeting of women the targeting of female protesters the most prominent examples of course the force virginity tests of protesters the incident of the woman the so-called woman with the blue braw and so on that these were not coincidental that these were very much part of a process where the state very much recognizes that sort of the old ways of authoritarian patriarchy the state doesn't really work anymore because women were very much part of political protest of public spaces very much part of trade unions all kinds of political parties and so on and in that situation the reaction the backlash is particularly strong and particularly violent and I would like to also say that at this point though as a feminist scholar and activist I have to admit that I'm a bit at a loss to try to not necessarily to analyze I still feel that I have the theoretical tool to analyze what is happening but in terms of positioning myself politically particularly in relation to what is happening in Egypt I have to say that I feel very astonished by what I call political acrobatics or intellectual acrobatics by many of my feminist friends right now in Egypt who in the context of the most recent coup have been in the context of being full of hatred of the Muslim Brotherhood have come out in support of the military and I have to say while I understand the hatred and disappointment and the resistance to the Muslim Brotherhood not on behalf of many feminists but secular intellectuals including many leftist intellectuals I find it very difficult to sort of follow the leap of supporting the military and also very much supporting that in the name of the will of the people and I think here we really have to ask the people in that context because clearly also the supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood are the people having said that I do feel uncomfortable sitting in London and passing judgment I mean I do realize that it's much more difficult when you are in Egypt and when you know you're faced I mean I don't have to I didn't have to live under the Muslim Brotherhood so I am deeply aware that things look different from the inside but yet again I like to sort of jump from one nuance to the other I do also disagree with people like recently Judith Butler she gave a talk in Istanbul in late September 2013 she gave a talk to a group of students about the freedom of assembly but Butler refused to comment directly on the Gazy protest and she was proclaiming her lack of legitimacy as a foreign commentator on local events and I have to say while I appreciate Butler's humility and sensitivity in avoiding the frequently patronizing commentaries of western based academics and so called experts I'm personally troubled by the idea that you can only comment on it if you're from there and the kind of construction of an authentic voice and I am also very troubled by the way that many of my friends and colleagues in Egypt right now do discredit some critical voices on the basis that they are western voices and I think that is certainly I think western media and western academics do get it wrong we all get it wrong at times but there is not one voice there is a range of different voices as there are also different voices so I think that in Egypt has translated in a vilification or many people are vilifying western media and western academics and in that context well I mean the argument goes the west does not understand and blindly supports the brotherhood by calling what was another instance of revolutionary coup so that has been a widespread argument so I think that as I already mentioned from a feminist perspective the idea that the people often glosses over a range of different interests including gender interests and in terms of what I would prescribe to as a transnational feminist perspective it looks more carefully at how gender intersects with other hierarchies of power and systems of inequality and I would say that in the current political context I would argue that the struggle against gender based inequalities in legislation the widespread sexual harassment of women the exclusion of women from decision making processes etc. intersects with the prevailing political culture and practices of authoritarianism as well as neoliberal economic policies and practices that contribute to profound crisis and here I would say that I felt troubled by the focus on sexual harassment only on behalf of many feminist organizations clearly it's a huge issue clearly it's a very important issue but sexual harassment does not exist in a vacuum and sexual harassment has to be linked to other forms of violence it has to also be linked to structural violence related to economic inequalities and so I guess what I'm sort of sharing with you is sort of my own troubles and dilemmas as a feminist looking at what is happening in Egypt not wanting to be patronizing and passing judgment but at the same time also refusing to be silenced in the name of you out there you don't understand recognizing that of course aside from the fact that in the west there are very different voices including the media that of course also in Egypt and also in the region there are very different voices and there are of course many Egyptians who refuse to be drawn into this either we support the brotherhood or we support the military and I think there should be space to do that to have this criticism but also to have some humility and to recognize that it's easier for us to do it here than if you actually live in Cairo thank you well thank you very much Nadia for that illuminating perspective and for very frankly and forthrightly sharing with us your dilemmas this leaves us with a fair amount of time for discussion which as I said at the outset is very much the purpose of gatherings like this I'd like to take questions in batches of three at a time and if you can keep your questions brief to the point and also if it is directed at anybody specific on the panel please feel free to specify so we'll go in batches of three and I already apologize if I cannot because of lack of time accommodate everybody who puts up their hand but I'll do my best so we're going to have two roaming microphones wait till the microphone reaches you and then ask because as I said we are being filmed so I'm going to go with you Alyssa and one from there you gentlemen there yeah and one here and we'll come back thank you very much for all of you for all the panel for this very stimulating discussion and especially for engaging in this initiative sorry to engage in this initiative of the book which I really much looking forward to read while glancing at the table of contents I was surprised not to see a chapter on social mobility and maybe my surprise is misplaced and maybe I have to read the book I have to say my surprise may comes from an emerging literature informed by behavioral economics which put forward the argument that certain situation certain policy such as the guaranteed employment in Egypt may create reference points in people minds and then the disappointment or the deception not to be able to fulfill that reference point in answer certain movement so I was I would be interested to know if you had consider writing that section on social mobility or if it wasn't needed okay thank you and the question yeah there thanks for thanks Gilbert and Dave panels for for illuminating and complimentary presentations which further elucidated the book for me and I'm really looking forward to completing the reading my question is about the regional context but I want to change the wording a little and talk about Pan Arabism now if and I'm talking about a Pan Arabism which is very different from that of the 50s and the kind of Pan Arabism of the regimes or Pan Arabism of the zero model but a Pan Arabism of what I consider a social democratic genuine movement of the globalized age which you've described because you selected political economy as an important basis and my question is this if it is important that the social classes the ruling classes the ruling classes of the Arab East are collaborating with each other in order to disenfranchise the masses is it not also important for the mass the people whoever they are and Nadia is right to come together across borders across national borders and national separations in order to achieve a fairer and more just society across the region and I'm referring here in one sentence to Adam's question about the Gazans of course and how they were treated by all the post-Mubarak regimes thank you and the third question gentlemen over there yeah for all the presentations and for the book as well which I really enjoyed until the conclusion and I wanted to ask you about the conclusion and to be honest anybody on the panel and whether you think about the conclusion maybe differently since the coup in Egypt and the development I hope I don't misrepresent you but I think you end by talking about the need of a نسر or a kind of a developmental program in the region and you see the kind of main people to be able to deliver as the usually it is in Tunisia and the kind of in the independent trade unions in Egypt and I mean certainly in Egypt the speed at which both and I kind of jumped into the government with the army and I mean maybe a slightly different role of the usually it in in the negotiations now in Tunisia whether you see that differently and I mean I was kind of surprised I thought the book incredibly painted the picture of the region and showed how the movements from below are kind of shaping the event and I wasn't really sure about that kind of conclusion coming from that picture you painted okay I think it's appropriate to go back to because a lot of these comments are directed at you and then if anybody from the panel wants to add comments thank you very much for your question I'll try to to address them as briefly as possible so that we have time to carry on and if my colleagues want to say something very quickly I want to on the issue of a gender and I enjoyed listening to all three of you but I mean the kind of critical remarks or addition that Nadi put forward is something I fully appreciate and I should say that when I describe the fundamental feature of the states and the region as patrimonial this is already gendered patrimonial is the same root from patriarchy and all that this refers to the nature of the setting that exists in the region and of course everything you said therefore flows from that I would say on the issue of social mobility if you mean the Galel Amin kind of explanation I've never not been convinced in his analysis of that but if you mean what you refer to that is this perspective of employment and all that well it's not called there's no section called social mobility but there's a section called graduate unemployment and it explains these issues and why this issue is very acute in the region I spoke of use unemployment the region is characterized because of the relative richness of the region this is not the poorest region of the Asian African ensemble on the contrary it's one of the richest and it is characterized by a high level high rate of of high ratio of enrollment in high education and therefore produces a high proportion of graduate who used to be indeed in previous regimes taken in I mean given jobs by right or automatically and this this has been cut off and this is one of the the key roots of this massive anger and the role of these youth these young people among the overall youth in all that on the issue of of the regional connections of the struggles I mean from below well you don't have it maybe in the pan arabist form because when you use such term people will think of the or whatever but you have it at a much higher degree thanks to the I don't know Facebook internet and all that I mean the connection the way people follow what's happening in the region is unprecedented of also the role I mean the media has shifted the satellite TVs and all that I won't get back in that I speak of all that in detail and that's why actually I've seen something like the speed at which all this has spread to an entire region it started in the center of Tunisia and spread from there to practically not a single country in the region practically not a single country in the region except these extremely artificial statelets that are Qatar and United Arab Emirates only these two actually because all the rest of the GCC countries have been affected by the wave by the uprising and the strikes and this contagion is also part of a regional dimension and about the the conclusion well I'm not calling for Nazarism without this is not the issue I'm pointing to the Nazarist legacy in a country like Egypt as reflecting a progressive aspiration of the masses and this is something that I could notice in Egypt before the uprising through my travels to the country discussion with normal people I could see how much nostalgia there was for the time of Nazarism seen as a time of social and national dignity not by the political militants of course but for the vast mass of the people and so this this potential which expresses itself in the presidential election to the astonishment of everybody with a sabahi not betting on the person who said very silly things since then but the fact that he came third with no means I mean ridiculous means compared to at least four other candidates and number one in the two main urban concentrations of the country points to a very important potential and the same potential is there in a more organized and therefore better form and not Nazarist in Tunisia in the workers movement and of course it is I mean in some way in Tunisia they are lucky that the role that the army played in Egypt is being played by the union movement now I regret the fact that the union movement plays the role of Arbiter instead of aspiring to powers I won't get into this discussion but that's the point so no I very much stick to my conclusion that's the kind of mass potential that exist that will be crucial in bringing this revolutionary process to a conclusion and anyone that believes that the Egyptian will be led by Marxism or whatever I think is very much illusion the natural or let's say more normal form of progressive consciousness in the country is this reference to this kind of so I would say not Nazarism without Nazar but if you want Nazarism without the dictatorship Nazarism from below Nazarism under mass popular control that's the kind of aspiration that can mobilize the masses and combine the kind of as people perceive it there's a part of mythification that's clear but the way that people perceive and conceive this legacy and the people want this discovering that they are the heroes they're not waiting for a hero as Nazar said in his philosophy of the revolution are all waiting for a hero now the people are the hero and that's the key change thank you I just wanted actually to follow up on the last question because I had very similar question in my mind about the reference to a particular page page 66 of the book you say the path out of this fetter development is public sector investment in the state and the question that I wrote here to you are we going back to the 1950s and 60s and what does that mean in both economic and political terms I think in a sense that line appeared earlier in the book than the conclusion I mean you know page 66 well okay I think this discussion is now gaining some momentum so let me go back to you for three more questions and so you'll be first anybody from this side okay any other please don't raise your voice I had the courtesy everybody here remember I apologize in advance if I cannot yes please don't waste time if you be patient we may actually get to you as well so please show courtesy to everybody here and control your sentiment I am not please be patient okay that's for can you speak into the microphone please no just speak directly into it yeah and closer you very aptly narrow down the achievements and the outcome of Arab Springs to the people want if we further dissect it we can reduce it to the the people's want the want of the people because if we look at it the want which has been unifying element in that which brought diverse people from ideologically economically socially and politically diverse backgrounds they brought them together but one element I would like you to shed some light on any movement or any development in terms of organically a growth of political thought which could guide the people how to get what they want okay right thank you now please the microphone is yours but please be courteous and show respect for the panel and phrase your question for showing respect for my patients anyway two quick questions to the author specifically and I'm coming from a think tank the first question is do you think the Arab peoples you know uprisings as you call them can learn from the AKP in Turkey or are they totally you know divergent parallel strands the army and the deep state I think that's very important and secondly you touched on it the GCC when is this storm going to hit this region big time you did touch on it but you didn't expand on it thank you that was two questions but I'm happy to take another one the gentleman just behind the yes that's him I would like to thank the panelists for the insightful comments upon the topic I would like to turn your attention to the refugee crisis which resulted from the violent conflict in the region and especially like mainly having worked with Libyan refugees in Italy and Syrian refugees in Turkey and Greece I would like to for you to briefly comment on what exactly is the role of the diaspora in Europe whether they give legitimacy to some of the social movements whether they are counter-revolutionary forces as you said the youth unemployment is one of the root courses if they decide to flight and not fight really what is their role in the uprising and not only of the refugees post 2011 but also of the migrants who moved to Europe prior to 2011 okay let me invite others on the panel first and then come back to if he wants to respond Nadia the first question I think was the first one about the people yes I agree that at some point certainly at the moment of coming together because of the common goal of ousting a dictator there was the coming together of want and here I might differ I would say that right now what we see more is an expression of divergence and differences and actually a situation where different people want different things and also and this I realize that I make myself very unpopular here I would also say that sometimes the people whoever the people are might get it wrong and that it's not it's not quite clear right now who the people are I think that's I think that's my problem in terms of this phrase the people want did you have Iran in mind when you said that they might get it wrong no I didn't have Iran in mind actually but I didn't think about that I mean okay I don't you know I don't want to sort of sound elitist but I think there is a line between a populism that you know that people might I mean right now for instance I give the example what I mention in terms of Egypt and lots of people in Egypt right now glorify Sisi or lots of people you know glorify the military I mean okay there are lots of people that doesn't make it right Adam I just wanted to make a brief comment on the question of the Gulf and the GCC and you know can we expect change there if you like and I think and it's certainly true as you point out that you know there were struggles particularly in Bahrain but elsewhere in the GCC states but I do think one of the important factors we need to keep in mind here is the rate of migrant workforces within the Gulf in all these states all of the six GCC states at least 50% of the labor force is constituted by migrant workers who have of course completely differential rights in terms of that they don't hold citizenship they're not allowed to have any kind of residency in the country without a work permit these kinds of things and I think this casts a particular character to the nature of political struggle in the Gulf states in some cases such as the UAE and elsewhere you have up to 80% of the workforce made up with these if you like temporary migrant workers so I think this is something I think was often missed when we're talking about the Middle East we're talking about for example labor the working class if you like that we need to consider this other major component across as part of how we understand labor in the Arab world and so I think the earlier question that was raised around Arab unity or Pan-Arabism that's I think solidarity with workers who are not Arab who are in the Gulf is a very important aspect of trying to change this regional system I think let's go for the next round of questions I can see a hand up there anybody else my question is to Nadia thank you for your observations but specifically the many voices you know for example Hamd Yinsab Bahi was not just an atherist he was neither nor was he an Islamist and the same with Cici it's not just glorification of the military because Cici was portrayed in the beginning like you know the pious Muslim from one hand and on the other hand the progressive American eyes American educated PR machine behind him handsome spokesman to the women so it's not really binary either or and the same with the people they're not just pro-military or anti-government they have Hezbo Kanaba who went to the street and they're neither you have so many different shades in there that it is an oversimplification to just you know say they're either this or that or or whatever there are so many different shades and this is maybe the reason why the western media or the antagonism against it is so you know these shades or they don't acknowledge them don't see them they don't want to acknowledge them because it's so much easier to have a dialogue that is binary right at the back and then you over there my name is Alex I don't very well speak English because now I am learning English I know the I know the I know you speak I look the name the Adam named Arabic or the Farsi all the you speaking about the revolutionary Arabic it's okay but you never speaking about the revolutionary Kurdish now in the in the Turkey in the Syria in Syria in Turkey in Iraq Iran there are revolution in Kurdish of people what in the in the Middle East they're living another the people why you only speak about the revolutionary Arabic revolution of the Palestinian why are you don't you speaking speak about the revolution Kurdish why thank you and the question up there yeah I wanted to see if to kind of restate the question about the regional level and the question about Pan-Arabism because it's also a question of the roots of revolution I mean I organize a conference Cambridge which try to imagine what revolutions might be like today in 2005 and there was a sort of widespread failure if you might like of imagination amongst some of the people who spoke Tony Negri being an exception but one of the people who was prepared to as it were offer something concrete was Robin Blackburn who linked the occupation of Iraq with a potential democratic revolution so where you have the so called revolutionary empire that exports revolution in fact generates revolutions against it and in a way I think that it's important to integrate this kind of insight into both the causality of revolution and not merely to see it as some kind of response to deep neoliberalism if we are to have a strategic perspective Adam mentioned Gaza but we could also mention the kind of interventions that have deformed revolutions for example in Libya and known potentially in Syria so in other words from the roots to some kind of strategy focusing on the region would seem to be quite important for radical thinking and I was interested in Gilles Beard's response particularly to that question but also Adam thank you right do you want to start I will start by saying excuse me but I haven't understood exactly your point the question so sorry if I can't reply because I didn't really understand what the question was maybe we can discuss it later on if you want very quickly again the Kurdish question I'm definitely not one that can be accused of not paying attention I've even got physically aggressed because of my support for the Kurdish cause but we are not facing unfortunately a Kurdish uprising we are facing an uprising in the Arab speaking region and I use Arab speaking also because precisely and I explained that the book I don't want you to give any impression that it is an ethnic definition or anything like that I know very well that and I'm taking into account the fact that there are important fractions or sometimes majorities of the population in the region who would not define themselves as Arab in North Africa in particular but again this is a question about a specific uprising that developed for various reasons in this region I don't discuss the 2009 green movement for instance as it was called in Iran in the book so I don't discuss what's happening in Turkey so there's no reason why unless you believe that there is an uprising specific an uprising in Iraqi Kurdistan which I have not seen and I was recently having lunch with a friend just coming from there who was one of the militants there and he was telling me about the situation doesn't look at all like an uprising unfortunately so anyhow the issue of the refugees I'm again here sorry but I'm not in a position because it's not something that I have I examined closely what the refugees specifically from here or there how they are divided politically but I guess that they reflect basically what's happening or who is victimized by in each country now as for the migrants they reflected the various kinds of trends that you find if you take the Tunisian immigration the Egyptian immigration or the rest they just reflect the same proportions of the political forces at home but they are basically crossed by the same the same current as for the learning from the Akape if you mean that there could be some ways in the region which would reproduce the way the Akape let's say pushed back in that context it's true the army in its barracks there are long developments in the book to explain why the Akape model does not apply doesn't have any of its real ingredients in the region starting with the fact that its social base is a really existing export oriented capitalism which does not exist in the region and finally to remain very quick about the whole issue of again the people want and all that first of all yeah well what I explain I put it and I quoted that here a speech I gave for the first anniversary of the Tunisian uprising in Sidi Bouzid in the city where everything started from in December 2011 I used the formula I said this is a region which had seen development with corruption I mean I added it and dictatorship it went from that into corruption and dictatorship without development what is needed now is development without corruption and dictatorship but that's the key point that is the kind of development perspective and again either you believe there's no way out except I don't know by some utopia call it however you want or you believe or you try to stress that there is no way out of the economy crisis without a massive involvement of the state in the economy that this is not a region where the neoliberal recipes of the World Bank can work they may work in this or that country where they have very specific conditions but definitely not in this part of the world where the private sector is not going and is even less now going to be the engine of of development and that's why you need a massive intervention of the state but not the kind of dictatorial state creating corruption and all that but under popular control this is the kind of really realistic utopia one can put forward in the region and not aim much higher than that so that's what I mean by this legacy and again at the level of the region this kind of aspiration I think the left would be very wrong in attacking this the necessary nostalgia one should on the contrary say well it has a lot of positive achievements which we want to to repeat at a higher and deeper level but it has a lot of there are a lot of problems which led to its failure and there you can explain what these problems are and finally the issue of the people want it's not it's populistic it's not a matter of saying everything the people whatever people wants is fine if the people want their own alienation by supporting a despot this is not what I mean by the people want the will of the people this is not the same and as a feminist you can have the parallel very clearly I'm very much for the self-determination of women okay but I want support women who interiorize patriarchal and male domination especially in our part of the world who would even argue fiercely for what you and I would consider terribly oppressive structures so this is the key point the people want here is taken in precisely this form this idea of the sovereignty to the people and let me say one thing I believe that one of the most radical moments in this whole process is the 30th of June in Egypt the recent one even though it has been again co-opted usurpated by the military as it was in February 2011 why was it like that because this is a very clear illustration of a more radical conception of democracy than that that we have here this cradle of democracy where the sovereignty of the people is just one day when they put the bulletin in the ballot box and that's it and then after that for whatever the length of the mandate of the elected they do whatever they want this conception of democracy is undemocratic and a real conception of democracy basically the condition for a real democracy is the right to recall and that's how the electors the people can exert control over the elected they should have the right to change those elected if those elected fail to fulfill their aspiration and that's I think it's a very important thing and you can see the cleavage in the comments on what happened in 30 June when the western governments all embraced a democratically elected government because they see themselves in that if tomorrow you have a mass movement in this country asking Cameron to step down and organize new elections I will definitely not defend Cameron because he is democratically elected I'm happy to give our panelists one minute each if they have final thoughts and if they don't join you in thanking Jilbert for a wonderful book and one which will obviously open up even more debates in the future days month years to come and my co-panelists and of course yourself for your patients and for your courtesy and for time keeping it's been a long day but I hope it has been very rewarding thank you very much