 What you're about to see are the events that led to the Rainbow Springs fire burn over on April 25th, 1984. There were two fatalities. The Rainbow Springs fire occurred on the Mina Ranger District of the Wachita National Forest. The fire was ignited by a skitter working in a Forest Service timber sale on Dallas Mountain located three and a half miles southwest of the town of Mina in West Central Arkansas. Dallas Mountain runs east and west and is approximately one mile long. The elevation at the point of origin is about 1,300 feet. The top of the mountain is at 1,800 feet. Slopes on Dallas Mountain in the accident area average 50%. The predominant fuel at the point of origin was six-week-old pine slash. The fire burned out of the slash into an area of mixed pine and hardwood timber with needle and leaf litter surface fuels. The 1984 spring fire season on the Wachita National Forest had been uneventful until April 25th. Spring fire season was almost over. The transition from cured vegetation to green-up was well underway. Note the green fields in the background. Little had been done on the Mina District that spring in the way of fire preparedness. When the fire was discovered, the general feeling was that the fire would not amount to much. It was too late in the spring to present a problem. Elsewhere on the forest that day there had been a 100 acre fire in the pine regeneration area. Crews on that fire had difficulty keeping the fire contained even though it was on a north slope and backed into the wind. The fire required forces from three ranger districts to bring it under control. On that same day the Arkansas Forestry Commission reported 42 fires for 2,080 acres. This was well above the normal fire activity for that time of year. Fire weather observations at 1,300 at the Mina weather station on the day of the fire were temperature 82 degrees, relative humidity 27%, 10-hour fuel moisture 4%. Wind 30 miles per hour from the south. The fire danger rating that day was extreme. Without exception the fires on April 25th were all difficult to contain and control. This information was never conveyed to the initial attack personnel on the Rainbow Springs fire. In addition the information about the extreme fire danger rating was not provided to district personnel at any time that day. The Rainbow Springs fire was discovered by a Forest Service aerial observer at 1355 and he called it into the zone dispatcher's office in Mina. The Mina district dozer crew plus two other firefighters were dispatched for initial attack. These initial attack resources and the incident commander arrived at the bottom of the fire near the point of origin at 1410. Numerous reinforcements were dispatched and would arrive at various times throughout the day. The IC was operating with an inexperienced group of firefighters. The individual serving as the Mina dozer boss was not red carded for that position and the Mina dozer operator was working his first wildfire. Fire behavior when the initial attack resources arrived was not threatening. The head of the fire had burned out of the logging slash and into standing timber on the west flank. Flame lengths were estimated at two to three feet in the standing timber. The rate of spread was estimated at five to eight chains per hour. The fire was a narrow finger approximately ten acres in size at the time of initial attack and was burning on the south side of Dallas Mountain. There were homes on the north side of the mountain but they were not in immediate danger and did not strongly influence the plan of attack. The IC's plan was to use the Mina dozer to clean out a logging road on the south side of the fire and then to construct an indirect dozer line along a spur ridge to the top of Dallas Mountain. The two other firefighters from Mina were to function as line scouts. The first hand crew reinforcements were to work up the east flank to the top of the mountain. From there they were to continue to build hand line west along the main ridge formed by Dallas Mountain conducting burnout operations as they progressed. The IC's main concern was the west flank of the fire. While the west flank was not described as the head of the fire he recognized it as having the greatest potential because of the strong southeast wind pushing the fire in that direction. The IC did not have a good map of the area and he gave some very brief verbal instructions to the initial attack resources as soon as they arrived. By 1430 the Mina dozer had begun clearing the logging road moving west. At 1525 reinforcements began to arrive which included a second dozer and 12 more firefighters from the adjoining Poto district. At that time the IC was unsure how best to use the Poto dozer. The terrain was thought to be too rough on the east flank of the fire. The IC then received word from the Mina dozer boss that the second dozer could be used on the west flank helping them build line. The IC then told the Poto dozer to proceed down the freshly bladed road on the south side of the fire and up the west flank until they made contact with the Mina dozer. The IC also sent the 12-person Poto hand crew up the same dozer line behind the Poto dozer. They were to tie in with the line scout and Mina dozer and initiate the hand line construction along the main ridge. A short time later the Mina dozer boss notified the IC that they had completed the line to the main ridge. As the Poto hand crew neared the end of the dozer line they passed the Poto dozer. Once on the main ridge the Poto hand crew began to build hand line to the east. At 1610 the IC received word from the other line scout that a dozer would be able to work the east flank after all. The IC then ordered the Poto dozer to return back down the dozer line on the west flank and move over to the east flank of the fire. What the IC did not realize was that the actual dozer line was put in on much steeper ground than what he had envisioned. This course of action had put the inexperienced Mina dozer crew into terrain they were not accustomed to working in. As a result their dozer line was poorly located off the spur ridge toward the fire. It had many sharp turns and at least one section that was not complete. The lack of a good topographic map and thorough scouting contributed to this confusion. As the Poto dozer began working its way back down the west flank in response to the IC's request they were told by the line scout that there was an incomplete section of line needing attention. As the fire moved west being pushed by a strong southeast wind it became established in some very steep shoots that ran straight up toward the main ridge. The fire behavior had been moderate up to that point but now the intensity began to pick up as the strong wind and steep slopes came into alignment. This increase in fire behavior went unnoticed except for a newly arrived local volunteer firefighter who observed a half-acre spot fire at 1620 in a shoot below the dozer line on the west flank. This firefighter did not have radio contact with any of the Forest Service resources. Soon after the spot was observed the fire began to make a rapid run up the steep slope. At about 1645 the IC observed a tremendous buildup which appeared to be inside the line. He began trying to reach fire personnel by radio to inform them of the increased fire behavior. He was unable to contact the poto dozer. After the fire finished its run search efforts began. The bodies of the two crew members of the poto dozer were found near the northwest corner of the fire a few hundred feet below a saddle on the main ridge. The fire had run up a steep shoot below the main ridge line. The topography had created a chimney effect for the fire. The poto dozer crew had stopped to work on the section of incomplete dozer line and they were overrun by the fire at that location. They were unaware of the fire below until it was too late to escape. Both firefighters were found within a 100 foot radius of the dozer. Neither of them had deployed a fire shelter. The IC immediately ordered all personnel off the line. Additional resources were ordered but suppression activities were discontinued until an overhead team took charge later that day. The fire only burned one more drainage to the west of the dozer line where the fatalities occurred and did not spread over the ridge onto the north slope of Dallas Mountain. The fire was controlled at 450 acres the following day. You have just seen the events that occurred on the Rainbow Springs fire. The instructor will now facilitate a discussion about the use of fire safety guidelines by the involved personnel, the strategic and tactical decisions that were made, and the human factors that contributed to this burn over incident.