 Good morning, and so at ECOP, welcome to CSIS. I'm Ernie Bauer. I'm the Symmetro Chair for Southeast Asia Studies here at CSIS, and it's a great honor today to welcome you all to our conference on Thailand and Crisis Policy Recommendations. We have at CSIS recognized that there seems to be a dearth of intelligent, in-depth, well-advised discussion on what's happening in Thailand in Washington, among the track 1.5, track 2, and in policy circles, although certainly the people who are speaking today from the government will tell you that they have been focused like a laser beam on this, and that's true. But I think there is a need to look at what's happening in Thailand. Some have described this as a once-in-a-century sort of political point of determination in the country, redetermining how political power will be ordered. I don't know if that's true. It's something that we've been looking into over the last couple of days. And today's conference, the purpose of it is to dig into some of these issues with what we think are some of the best Thailand experts in the world. Several are here from Thailand, from Europe, from around the world, and we're really looking forward to digging into this. Today's event was made possible with the strong support of the Henry Loos Foundation and Chevron Corporation. I'd like to thank both of them. This event is live, and on the record, there will be a live webcast through the CSIS website. For those of you following us on Twitter, you can follow at Southeast Asia DC, which is the Southeast Asia Chair's Twitter handle, or at CSIS, and the hashtag for today's event is CSIS Live. And we have, we're going to start with the two of our top policy makers in the Asia-Pacific region. I'll introduce them in a moment, but when we have questions and answers, I just ask that you identify yourself and your organization and ask a question. We're not really looking for sort of statements or speeches at this point. So without further ado, please join me in welcoming Amy Searide and Scott Marceal, and thank you all for coming. Sorry about that. My first act will be to douse the Deputy Assistant Secretary. Sorry about that, Amy. I'd like to say that there's an old Thai saying for that, but... Sure, it's good luck. There isn't. I'm sorry, Amy. Our first speaker is the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and the Pacific, Scott Marceal. Scott is an old friend. He has been at state in this position for about a year now after returning from Jakarta, where he was U.S. Ambassador for three years, and before that was held very senior positions in the department of the East Asia Bureau and was DAS for the ASEAN region, known Scott for a long time, and we're very lucky to have him with us here today. Scott, I'll turn it over to you to make your opening remarks. Thanks, Ernie. Whenever I sit next to Ernie, I always just make sure I just have water. Thanks for organizing this and giving me, along with Amy, a chance to speak, and I think we're both going to speak a little bit in terms of the big picture. Why does Thailand matter to the United States? I mean, looking around this room, I think I could learn a lot from everybody in this room probably more than I can tell you, but I'll just run through some thoughts for a few minutes. I think most of you know that our relationship with Thailand goes back to the Treaty of Amity in Commerce signed by President Andrew Jackson in 1833. So, I mean, there's just a tremendous history, and there's all kinds of cool things like elephants being sent over and stuff, but I won't bore you with all those details, but there's just a lot of history. Right now, for us at the State Department and for many years, Thailand has been, of course, a treaty ally and a close friend, an important trading partner. It's the site of one of our largest embassies in the world that's also responsible for a lot of things we do in the region. So a lot of our assistance programs, for example, in Southeast Asia, particularly in the Mekong region, are all run out of our embassy in Bangkok. We do a lot of our administrative work. It's a huge embassy. So in a very State Department sense, Thailand is critically important. But in a bigger picture sense, I mean, President Obama was the first country he visited after his re-election, which highlights the importance we attach to Thailand. We have a very close and enduring security relationship. I'll defer to Amy to talk about that more. We have very close trade relationship, about $37 billion in bilateral trade. Our MCham in Thailand has 800 companies. I have all kinds of statistics, but let's just say there's a lot of trade. There's a huge amount of U.S. investment. Thailand, for example, is the seventh largest market for U.S. agricultural export, seventh largest market in the world. So the economic and business relationship is a major pillar of our overall relationship. We do a lot, this doesn't get nearly enough attention. We do a huge amount of work on health, health research and health care, both in Thailand and, but more importantly, working with Thai health partners, do all kinds of research that's relevant for Thailand, but very much for the region as a whole and for the world. So it's a really good and close cooperation with the Centers for Disease Control, having a pretty big contingent out there, working with their Thai counterparts. We do a lot of law enforcement cooperation, including very important regional training through the International Law Enforcement Academy called ILEA, where we bring police and other law enforcement people from around the region to Thailand to train. So I guess the point I would make here is that the bilateral relationship is very mature, very long lasting. And it's evolved to be one of those actually pretty rare relationships, where mostly a lot of the work we're doing with Thailand is not about bilateral issues per se, but how we work together to deal with problems, challenges and opportunities in the broader region. So that makes Thailand, frankly, one of a very small number of countries, certainly in Asia, where we have that kind of relationship, where we're truly partners. As I was coming over here and looking at the notes with lots of statistics and so on, I realized that it's hard to capture the essence of this partnership with statistics or just pure facts. I think for those of us who have been in the State Department or in government for very long or in business for very long, we just feel like Thailand's always been a close friend. It's always been a country we could go to, not only to enjoy, but a country we could go to and have serious conversations about real issues and always feel like we had a partner to work with. So certainly that was true back during the Vietnam War days. But after that, I think people forget what an extraordinary burden was placed on Thailand in the form of refugees, particularly after the Vietnam War and then after the Khmer Rouge came into power. And we worked very closely with the Thai for many, many years and still today with Burmese refugees. It's been an area where I think Thailand deserves a lot of credit for what it's done over the years. It's been an area of good cooperation. But even more than that, just for us, it's Thailand's always been a friend we could count on. And I don't mean that to imply that whatever we said, the Thai agree. I don't mean it in that kind of relationship. But when we really needed to do something or there was a problem, we could always go to the Thai and still can go to the Thai and feel like we're going to have a good partner. And I'll just give one brief example. In 2008, when Cyclone Nargis hit Burma, Myanmar, had caused great devastation. I happened to be in Singapore at the time. So I flew up to Thailand and met with Admiral Keating, who was then the Paycom commander. And Henry had a horseman four who was then the head of USAID. And we met, and to see what we could do in terms of offering assistance. And we met with General Nepot, who I just saw again in Hawaii a few weeks ago. And we flew out of Utapau on a C-130 into Rangoon to talk with the Burmese about whether we could provide some assistance. And then based on that, we were able to send it. I don't remember the numbers. But it was something like 150 flights on C-130s of humanitarian assistance supplies through Utapau in a joint US Thai effort. And there was no bureaucracy. We sat down. We said, we need to do this. The Thai said, yeah, we want to help. How can we work together? And we got on a plane and we did it. And that's to me the essence of the relationship with Thailand is really spectacular and something that I'm glad you're having this conference so we can say it so bluntly. It's something that unfortunately is sometimes underappreciated, that this really close partnership with a lot of trust where we actually can get things done together. And that's why Thailand is so important to us, as well as it's a huge role, of course, in ASEAN and the region. I don't mean to ignore that. It's a critical player, a hugely important region. Again, we don't always agree. But we always can count on a good discussion with a Thai, good ideas, and a constructive approach. And so as we look at the current political situation in Thailand, we very much, the Thai, of course, will work this out themselves. But it's something where we wish them great success. Their success is important to the region and it's very important to us. So I'll stop and let Amy comment on the security side. Thank you. Thanks, Scott. Amy Searite is the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for South and Southeast Asia. Before that, she was a senior advisor and to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for East Asia and the Pacific. And before that, she was a senior advisor to the Assistant Administrator of USAID for Asia. So when I think of Amy, I think of sort of she's everything that policy special forces should be for Southeast Asia. And she does sort of represent a portfolio that's near and dear to my heart, which I would call the Indo-Pacific. She's got South and Southeast Asia, very important set of countries there. Amy, thanks for joining us today and I'm sorry for dousing you with your coffee before you started. Thank you, Ernie, for that very warm introduction. Whenever I sit next to Ernie, I wear a coffee colored suit. So we're all good. But thanks, I will focus my remarks on why Thailand matters for the Department of Defense, although I certainly echo everything that Scott just said about our relationship with Thailand. And I think the way he focused on the friendship that we have, the kind of really good working relationship that good friends have is very much, I very much want to echo those remarks because we certainly see it that way on the defense side. There are a lot of reasons why Thailand's really important to us and I'll run through, I'll run through about four reasons. First, Thailand contributes to both regional and global security. Second, Thailand enables the United States to have a very strong regional presence. Third, Thailand facilitates multilateral opportunities for the United States in Southeast Asia. And fourth, Thailand provides very valuable insights and advice on the region, again, as a good friend would. To put these in context, though, let me just begin with a little bit on some historic ties and the long history of defense cooperation that we've had with Thailand. Of the five U.S. treaty alliances in Asia, our alliance with Thailand is the oldest, dating back to 1833, which is more than 180 years ago. So this long history that we've had with Thailand has really forged deep and enduring bonds and friendship and trust between our military and the Royal Thai Armed Forces, which continue today. Thailand has been one of the staunchest supporters of the U.S. rebalance to Asia in the region. And as you all know, one of the key pillars of the rebalance for us at DOD has been to strengthen and modernize our alliances. And we're taking significant initiatives with all of our treaty alliances, Japan, Korea, Philippines, Australia, and Thailand as well. In 2012, we signed a joint vision statement with Thailand, which really was all about redefining and modernizing the alliance for the 21st century. And the joint vision statement promotes Thai leadership in Southeast Asia, recommits both countries to support stability in the Asia Pacific, and really deepens our alliance cooperation in a number of ways. And I want to note that this statement was signed, you know, signed in 2012 by Secretary Panetta and former Minister of Defense, Sue Kampan. This was the first document that, you know, first strategic document that outlined our alliance activities and goals for 50 years, half a century. The previous one was the 1962 Rusk-Tanit communique, which was a Cold War era document that talked about the United States vital national interest in preserving the independence and integrity of Thailand and talked about aiding Thailand in resisting communist aggression and subversion. So it was high time to reorient our alliance in terms of the region that Asia is today and the security challenges, both hard security and non-traditional security challenges that the region faces. So a lot of our cooperation with Thailand has really focused on areas of non-traditional security cooperation. And in that vein, Thailand has been a real partner and a very strong contributor to both regional and global security. So regionally, the Thai military provides important counter-narcotic enforcement. The Royal Thai Army routinely interdicts large shipments of metamphetamines bound for the international market. Just in the last two weeks alone, there were two drug raids in and around Bangkok that led to the confiscation of more than 500,000 metamphetamine tablets. We also do a lot of work on HADR with the Thai military and the Thai military is a real contributor to regional efforts. In the aftermath of last year's Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines, Thailand used their own C-130 aircraft to send supplies, medical personnel, and search and rescue teams to assist recovery in the Philippines. On the global security front as well, the Royal Thai Armed Forces participates in anti-piracy efforts, including taking command of the Combined Task Force 151 in 2012, which monitors a very large swath of ocean in the Gulf of Aden and Somali basin and has really led to a reduction in piracy in the region. Thailand contributes to international peacekeeping missions. It deploys dozens of military personnel and police officers globally. And Thailand is home to a national peacekeeping training center that has hosted a variety of UN peacekeeping training events. So having a close ally like Thailand, one that significantly contributes to regional and global security is very much in our national interest, especially at this time, that's very fiscally constrained where resources are tight. But Thailand also matters to DOD because it helps strengthen our military presence in the region. You know, we conduct extensive bilateral mill-to-mill engagements with Thailand, which include joint exercises, ship visits, officer training exchanges, and military hardware sales, all of which increase U.S.-tied military interoperability, which of course is very important in regional and global contingencies. There's no better example of building interoperability than our International Military Education and Training, or IMET program, which in the last three years alone has brought more than 450 Thai officers to study in the United States. Given our long history of close cooperation and shared security interests, Thailand has become a true partner in regional efforts and an important facilitator of U.S. multilateral defense engagement in Southeast Asia. So this is really the third reason that Thailand matters. It really strengthens, it sort of operationalizes our multilateral cooperation in the region and has really become a true partner in many efforts that the U.S. engages in. It's no coincidence that the flagship event with Thailand is the Cobra Gold military exercise, which began in 1982 and has grown to be the largest military exercise in Asia, perhaps even the world. We had some debate on this about which is the largest exercise in the world, but Cobra Gold certainly comes close. Initially, this was a very bilaterally focused exercise, but over the years it has become larger and larger, more and more multilateral, so that this year's Cobra Gold included more than 7,000 personnel from nearly 30 countries, which highlights the important role that our alliance plays in building security for the region. Thailand's initiative is also seen in a recent ASEAN humanitarian assistance exercise, which it initiated and co-hosted along with Malaysia and involved 19 nations actively addressing one of the region's most critical transnational threats. Thailand has also taken initiative to help us in terms of facilitating mil-to-mil engagement with Burma, which we have very limited ability to engage. We have very limited and calibrated mil-to-mil engagement with Burma, but Thailand has offered and has conducted a number of trilateral exercises and discussions with Burma, which has very much facilitated our ability to engage with Burma on the mill side. And Thailand is also, as Scott mentioned, Thailand has been a real partner on the Lower Mekong Initiative, something I was very involved in when I was at USAID. This was an effort launched in 2009 to really give more sustained focus to mainland Southeast Asia, so it includes Thailand, Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam, and now Burma. And Thailand, really from the beginning, stepped up and was eager to become a real partner in that effort and become a real contributor, a real donor on a number of activities that we do under LMI rather than just being one of the recipient countries. So I think it's a real example of Thailand's initiative and support for U.S. multilateral engagement in the region. And Thailand has also demonstrated real regional leadership in a number of ways, most notably perhaps in recent years, as China's country coordinator, Thailand has played a lead role in convening the ASEAN governments around working towards a code of conduct in the South China Sea. So that's a role that we certainly support as well. And finally, let me touch upon the fourth reason that Thailand really matters to us, which is that we really rely on Thailand for important counsel advice and to get their perceptions and views of the region. The United States, of course, has long been engaged in the Asia Pacific, but there's no substitute for hearing firsthand from good friends, a real key ally, trusted regional partner, and DOD representatives in Bangkok, as well as senior officials here in Washington, have regular communication and an open line with their Thai counterparts. And this enables us to hear firsthand and to better understand regional dynamics, whether it's dynamics in ASEAN, with China, with Burma, whatever the case may be, we can always turn to our Thai friends and get their views and perspectives, which makes us ultimately much more effective in our security initiatives. Of course, we know that Thailand is in the midst of a political crisis. I wanna reiterate that the United States government respects Thailand's need to address its internal issues and find a path forward that works for the Thai people. But in the midst of the crisis, DOD commends royal Thai armed forces restraint and professionalism that they've shown throughout. It really demonstrates the evolution of Thai civil military relations in a positive direction. So as we stand by our ally during this difficult period, I'm pleased to say that our defense cooperation continues unabated, and in fact, it's really never been stronger. The important work that our two militaries do is wide ranging and far reaching, and it's a relationship that benefits not only Thailand, but the United States, and also advances our security throughout the Asia Pacific and beyond. Thank you. Thank you very much, Amy and Scott. The first panel, as you can see, sort of lays the foundation for our discussion today. And I think both speakers have very expertly outlined why Thailand is important to the United States. After this panel, we're gonna talk about putting modern Thai politics in context. We're gonna look at the crisis and how it's shaping future political order. And then our last panel over lunch, we'll look at policy options for the United States in response to the crisis specifically. But I'd like to open the floor to questions for Scott and Amy. Murray, you got the first question. So you could have a microphone up here. Yeah, and please just remember to introduce yourself in your organization. Hi, my name's Murray Heber from the Southeast Asia program. This is not a planted question. But Scott and Amy, thanks. I would like to ask you, Amy alluded to this at the end, but has the crisis affected bilateral relations and some of the regional stuff you're talked about at all? And if so, how? Thanks. Murray, I'll start. I would say that the relationship remains strong. We continue to do our regular work with the Thai government in all the areas we discussed. It's sometimes a challenge over the last several months. It's been a challenge for some Thai government agencies even to operate given what's happened. But in terms of the tone and the warmth of the relationship and what we're able to do, no. I mean, I think people in the Thai government will be able to give you a better idea of the extent to which it's constrained them on, say, foreign policy initiatives. Maybe there's something there. But in terms of our relationship, we're continuing to work in, I think, all the areas we were working with before. Yeah, I'll just echo that. On the defense side, the answer is no, it is not, you know, to date. It has not affected our security cooperation, our alliance activities, our interaction with the Thai armed forces. So we monitor the situation closely. We continually offer our positive feedback to the military for their professionalism and restraint, but it has not shaped anything that we're doing. Hank and then Andre. Thank you very much. Good morning. Hank Hendricks in the US Philippine Society. Amy mentioned that Thailand is a supporter of the rebalance and at the same time, China's assertiveness in the area and the region, particularly with respect to maritime territorial disputes. What if you could comment on how we see Thailand's approach on these disputes and in terms of the US position on trying to achieve some sort of a peaceful reconciliation there and solutions. Thank you. Yeah, Scott may have a better answer than I do for this. I mean, we don't engage directly with Thailand in terms of their reaction to disputes in the region on a regular basis. So we certainly work well with Thailand in terms of, you know, our Cobra Gold exercise and other exercises is a venue to incorporate China as an observer on some humanitarian assistance parts of the exercise, which is a way to, you know, begin to work with China in terms of laying down how we expect, how we like to work together, what our expectations are in terms of norms, principles, all that sort of thing, but we don't engage in a deep way in terms of their position within ASEAN on those disputes. Hank, maybe I just add a couple of thoughts. We do talk to the Thai and Thai Foreign Ministry and others as we do with all the ASEANs about the importance of maintaining principles and how the issues in the South China Sea are dealt with. We always have very good conversations with the Thai. They don't have a deep understanding of the issues. I would say our approaches are, you know, there's a lot of similarities. We tend to approach it not surprisingly in kind of an American way and they tend to approach it more of a Thai way, but also they play the role as ASEAN country coordinator for China where they have a very important behind-the-scenes role in trying to get the ASEANs and the Chinese to work on the code of conduct, and I think they've been quite effective in that role. Andre, in the red hat. Gee, thank you. I'm Andre Silverzo and I represent the Interstate Traveller Company in Vietnam. And as the panelists know, I worked a lot with Thailand from the East Asia Bureau and also for Ambassador Donohue during his tour there. I agree with everything you've said on the analysis of Thailand. I greatly respect Thailand. But my question is this. I was puzzled during the ASEAN ministerial meeting that Cambodia hosted. And it was the first time, as you know, that they failed to have a joint communique after about 44 years of having them and then they couldn't. And the reason was that, as I understand it, was that Cambodia, the host, would not agree to detail the Chinese violations of the exclusive economic zones of China in the Philippines and Vietnam and others. So my question is, what were the dynamics in Bangkok that they didn't seem to step up at all to take a position to help the Philippines and Vietnam? And after the meeting broke up, it seemed it was more Indonesia than the Thais that went around to try to pass things up. And that's my question. What were the dynamics in Bangkok that led to that inaction? Thanks, Andre. Nice hat, by the way. I like that. Yeah. You know, look, we weren't there. We weren't in the meeting. What we heard was, I mean, you know, ASEAN, it operates by consensus. And so I think there were a number of countries that were very concerned, wanted to come out with a stronger statement and at least one or more that were more cautious and clearly Cambodia fell into that latter group. I think, and as you said afterwards, the ASEANs were quite upset that they had not been able to publish or issue a statement, a joint statement. And I know former Minister Nalagawa did a quick tour of the region. Why him and not the Thai, you know, it hard to say. I mean, the Indonesian to just come out of being chair, as you know, and I think we're still, had some momentum from that. I'm not sure if that was the only reason, but I think you saw the ASEANs quickly try to get back into a position of unity, which is something, you know, their influence depends on their unity. ASEAN's influence without unity is minimal. So I think a lot of them recognize that. And I think the Thai recognize that as well. I'd just add to this. I think there's a lot of pretty bad analysis in the media lately on the ASEAN summit that says that the ASEAN statement, because it didn't, you know, call China out on the Vietnam issue somehow means ASEAN has passed on this issue. That's not true. ASEAN is actually, China, through its actions on the South China Sea, through its aggressiveness, is really welding ASEAN together at a rate faster than I think would have happened otherwise. And that's the truth. Sean. Thank you. Sean Tandon, I'm a journalist with AFP. You mentioned, Dr. C. Wright, you mentioned restraint, a plotting restraint showed by the Thai military. I wanted to see whether you think that that's a strategic decision that's been taken by the Thai military, whether you're confident that that's going to last, regardless of political developments. And how much you think the U.S. reaction to the 2006 coup factors into the Thai military's planning? Thank you for the question. Yes, we do think that the Thai military is being strategic in its restraint. And it's been pretty open about the fact that it has no interest in getting involved in terms of running Thai politics again. I think, so I think it's certainly reasonable to think that there were lessons learned from 2006. And so that that has shaped their thinking, but that is speculation on our part to some degree. Are we confident that they will continue to be restrained and professional in all of this? We are reasonably confident in the sense that we, I mean, look, it's a complex situation and a lot of things can happen. And we're monitoring, for that reason, we're monitoring it closely and keeping in close touch with our Thai counterparts. So I don't want to say we're overconfident about any outcome. I'm sure the rest of the day, today you'll talk about all of the various things, the various dynamics that are at play. But at this point in time, we don't have reason to expect that the Thai military will change their current stance. Mike Massetic, PBS Online NewsHour. Mr. Ambassador, you said that the Thais are going to work this thing out themselves. What signs or indications do you have at this time of any willingness to compromise or reach some kind of accommodation? And what kind of suggestions is the United States giving to the Thais these days or is it a matter that, given our own internal political dynamics, foreigners don't pay much attention to the American government when they suggest compromise? Oh, thanks. I think. What I meant is that in our view, like most internal political impasses in this case and divisions, it's not something that foreigners can come in and magically fix. It really has to be a Thai solution. And I think there are a lot of people in Thailand who are working. I mean, I think they, my experience when I've traveled to Thailand is a lot of Thai are very frustrated with the situation too. And so there are a lot of people trying. I'm not gonna make any predictions about how this plays out. I think it's very dangerous to make predictions. In terms of the role of the United States and others, we haven't sought to impose a US prescription. We don't think that would be appropriate. We've certainly, what we've said is, we care a lot about Thailand. We care a lot about its political stability and its democracy. And we very much hope that it's able to resolve these problems soon. And we've stressed that in our view, it's important that the problems, we're not saying this is how they should be resolved, but the manner in which to resolve it's important that it be done constitutionally and democratically and of course, peacefully. That leaves a lot of room, of course, which is the way it should be. So we're stood for basic principles. Some of our friends here from Thailand could comment better than I could on the extent to which our advice has been helpful or not. But again, what I would stress is we've tried to stick to some fundamental principles and support for the Thai nation and the Thai people rather than going in and try to prescribe a specific solution, which we don't think is what the Thai people want. This is the last question. Michael Yehuda from George Washington. In the last few years, a number of states in the region have sought to improve or establish new forms of bilateral relationships to meet China's assertiveness. This includes some allies of the United States as well. To my knowledge, Thailand has not openly participate in such activity, but nevertheless it seems as if leaders of countries such as Japan, Vietnam, and so on have sought to establish a new kind of relationship with Thailand. Does the United States take any view about these kinds of new, well, I wouldn't say alliances, but new attempts to work together in view of the increasing perceived threat from China? I guess the short answer is we're not, I mean, we generally, our position generally is to welcome countries working to improve the relations in the region, whether it's Vietnam and Japan or others, or with China. We're not trying to build networks or alliances against anybody and whether on South China Sea issues, for example, what we've said consistently is to highlight the importance of respect for international law and that all countries, all climates should avoid certain types of behavior that are provocative that raise tensions. It's not about being anti-China or anti-anybody else, but about trying to encourage certain forms of behavior. And what we do in our diplomacy is really work to try to build our own relationships with countries, all countries really in the region. We certainly welcome the different countries in the world, in the region working more closely with each other, but we're not trying to cobble together some network. That's how I would put it. Please join me in thanking Ambassador Marciel and Dr. Sira. Try it for that one.