 Meeting will come to order. Thank you all for being here. Thank you for your patience while we finished a vote series the last few minutes. First of all, before we do anything else, I'm going to ask unanimous consent that non-subcommittee members be allowed to participate in today's hearing. After all, subcommittee members have had an opportunity to ask questions. Is there any objection? If not, so ordered. So non-subcommittee members will be recognized at the appropriate time for five minutes. Welcome to our hearing. And thank you for witnesses for being here. We have Mr. John Hill, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space and Missile Defense Policy. Joining him, we have Lieutenant General Thomas James, the Deputy Commander of the US Space Command, Lieutenant General Heath Collins, the Director of the Missile Defense Agency, and Lieutenant General Sean Ganey, the Commander of US Army, Space and Missile Defense Command. The subcommittee meets today to review the department's fiscal year 2025 budget request for missile defense capabilities. I have a number of concerns, just right off the bat here. First, the overall level of funding is inadequate given today's threat environment. The fiscal year 25 budget requests $10.4 billion for the Missile Defense Agency. That's more than $400 million less than last year, and almost a billion dollars below the level projected for fiscal year 25 and last year's FIDEP. I want to reiterate this point. The fiscal year 25 budget request for the Missile Defense Agency is $960 million, almost a billion dollars below the level planned for in last year's budget. Further, these draconian cuts are not limited to just fiscal year 25. The out year spending projections included in this budget envision continued reductions in missile defense spending. Compared to the spending plan in the budget submitted last year, this budget forecast cutting over $2.6 billion in missile defense funding between fiscal year 25 and fiscal year 28. To achieve these cuts, this budget would make several concerning decisions, including terminating the production line for SM3 Block 1B Interceptor and eliminating competition by prematurely down selecting to single contractors on both the next generation interceptor and glide phase interceptor programs. I know we'll get into these issues in greater detail, but in the case of the guide, excuse me, glide phase interceptor, I think it's important to know that this down selection is occurring five years earlier than planned. And before the preliminary design review is even held, I'm extremely concerned that we will simply not have enough sufficient technical data to make an informed choice between competing concepts for this program. The glide phase interceptor is the only capability in development specifically designed to combat the growing hypersonic threats we face. It is vitally important to our national security that we get this program right. We should be investing in a robust program that delivers an effective capability to our war fighters on a schedule that meets the threat. That is why Congress mandated in section 1666 of last year's defense authorization bill, but this budget would do the opposite. Overall, I'm concerned that these decisions simply accept too much risk and that missile defense appears to have become a bill payer for other capabilities in this budget. This is difficult to understand given the growth in missile threats, the extremely high demand for missile defense capabilities from combatant commanders, and the visible evidence of the value these capabilities bring to the fight on full display as we speak in the Red Sea. And in Israel and Ukraine. I look forward to hearing more from our witnesses about how this budget impacts their programs and their assessment of the risks contained in this budget. With that, I turn to the ranking member for his opening remarks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I'll just begin by echoing many of your concerns. This is obviously a time when missile defense is in use all around the globe, including by the United States in great, great quantity. This is not a technology that seems to be fading away. And I think my biggest concern is that I just don't understand the rationale behind many of these cuts. Now, I've asked a lot of tough questions of leaders like yourself, Mr. Hill in particular, about the purpose of hypersonics. It's in that same vein. We don't understand what exactly the operational concept is to use hypersonics. That makes us hard to understand the money we're spending on it. Well, likewise, as the chairman said, if we don't understand why, or we don't understand the rationale behind these cuts, it becomes very hard to support them, especially in this environment. I want to welcome both Lieutenant General James and Lieutenant General Collins, as this is the first opportunity to testify in front of the subcommittee in your new roles. Lieutenant General James, Space Command's role is increasing in both importance and consequence. And given that Space Command was recently given responsibility for department level missile defense coordination, it's critical that you and we understand the complex strategic role missile defense plays in our national security. You are the first Army space operator to reach the rank of Lieutenant General. So you must be doing something right. F-A-40s have been an exemplar in the department, and this milestone is well overdue. So congratulations. Lieutenant General Collins, your unique background across the spectrum of strategic programs, including space, nuclear weapons, and missile defense, makes you well prepared to be director of the missile defense agency. I'm encouraged by our initial discussions that it is imperative that we understand the larger policy implications of what MDA is developing before we blindly build new systems that could inadvertently further the proliferation of missile technology, or in the absolute worst case, result in destabilization, miscalculation, and escalation to nuclear war. As I shift to the topic of today's hearing, I want to remind the subcommittee that missile defense has a mixed legacy and continues to pose difficult questions about what its purpose is and should be, under what conditions it actually makes us safer, and how much and what kind of it we need. That's why these questions, including what the chairman started with, are so important. As I laid out last year, there are five basic scenarios or levels at which we consider using or not using missile defense. Behind me is a graphic depicting these levels, which I will use to frame the rest of my remarks. The highest level of missile defense has been longstanding policy across nearly every administration that we are not and will not pursue missile defense to defeat a near peer nuclear attack. Despite attempts to change U.S. policy during last year's NDA cycle to specifically do so, going down this road would be incredibly destabilizing, technically challenging, and prohibitively expensive. Until we can safely rid the world of all nuclear weapons, which I believe is ultimately necessary for the survival of humanity itself, we can neither unilaterally disarm nor unilaterally render useless our adversaries arsenals. If we were to try to render all of our adversaries missiles incapable through increased missile defenses, they would simply do what they have arguably already done, develop new, more complex missiles to defeat those systems. Mutually absurd destruction sounds like a crazy concept when you first read about it, but it's fundamentally kept us safe. The fourth level of missile defense is the area where there is the most debate. This is where we can argue that our advancements in missile defense over the past two decades, since pulling out of the ABM treaty, have provided a greater security blanket against aspiring nuclear powers like North Korea and Iran. However, as North Korea, the DPRK, continues to expand their ballistic missile in nuclear arsenals, we must continually evaluate when we view them as more of a strategic level threat and therefore rely on a policy of nuclear deterrence instead of simply trying to outnumber their ICBMs with interceptors, such as the Next Generation Interceptor Program intends to do. If we decide to continue to outpace their ballistic missile expansion, the question is how do Russia and China respond? I've argued that they will certainly see that growth as directly affecting the credibility of their own nuclear forces, which may have dire unintended consequences. I hope that in today's discussion, Mr. Hill, you can help us understand how the department continues to weigh those questions in that balance. As the subcommittee evaluates this year's budget request and the continued missile defense policy and posture of the United States, we must understand these implications for ensuring the strategic stability of America and the world for decades to come. Now, level three is a nuance that I think is important to distinguish from a rogue nation because the size of the system required to deal with it is very different, but continuing to have some capability to defend against a small, even single accidental launch should be maintained. At level two, the tactical level, the incredible support Ukraine has received from allies and partners in air and missile defense has enabled them to fight back against near nonstop Russian missile attacks for the past three years. Though if this body cannot get its act together and pass the languishing supplemental, this is the area in which Ukraine will suffer the most and will have direct impacts on their ability to maintain their sovereign country and territory. In the Red Sea, we are seeing what many thought was not possible, multinational, coordinated and effective missile defense, and obviously this is using a lot of missiles, which is one of the questions we have about reducing the budget. While US Navy ships have been at the center of defending deployed forces, allies, partners, and commercial shipping vessels from a wide range of air-breathing and ballistic missile threats, they have been working across a multinational task force. The French, German, and UK navies have all intercepted targets in the Red Sea. And while ideally I believe we need to move towards non-connected solutions that flip the cost curve of missile defense, something the chairman and I have been pursuing aggressively, no one can deny the incredible impact today's missile defense systems are having in the Middle East. Finally, at the foundational level of missile defense, simply detecting these threats, we still have much work to do. However, this past year has marked many successes in domain awareness. In February, MDA's Hypersonic and Ballistic Tracking Space Center prototypes were launched, and this budget supports their ongoing testing through 2027. The Space Development Agency also launched their wide field of view sensors, which will be a key component of the next generation of missile warning and missile track architecture, replacing the legacy, quote, big, juicy satellites currently on orbit. As we evaluate the FY25 requests for missile defense programs, I will continue to ask the following questions. How will expanding US missile defense today impact strategic stability tomorrow? We are already in an arms race. Will it make our world more safe? And does each investment stabilize or destabilize our strategic national security? These are the questions we must ask ourselves on this subcommittee, not just with an eye to this year's budget and the NDA, but in determining how our decisions will impact the world we leave for our children. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. Okay, thank you. We will now move to opening statements from our witnesses. I would note that your prepared statements will be made part of the record, but you'll each have five minutes to make some opening remarks. Mr. Hero, let's begin with you. Thank you, Chairman Lamborn and ranking member Moulton and distinguished members of the subcommittee for the opportunity to testify today. Thank you as well for including my full statement in the record. In brief, my written statement surveys threat developments in a deteriorating security environment. It stresses the unmistakable centrality of missiles of all types, including uncrewed aerial systems or UAS in modern warfare. And it underscores the indispensability of missile defense and missile defeat capabilities to deterring aggression and to defending our homeland, our forces deployed around the world and our allies and partners. It highlights how those allies and partners have come to similar conclusions, are increasing their own investments and are working with us to meet these challenges together. The administration's defense budget request for fiscal year 2025 includes $28.4 billion for missile defense and missile defeat programs. I want to acknowledge at the outset of this hearing the strong support this subcommittee has consistently shown for missile defense and missile defeat efforts for many years. And I stand ready to work with you to pass defense authorization legislation for fiscal year 2025, the 64th consecutive year, and with all of Congress to pass on-time defense appropriations legislation for fiscal year 2025. Today, I must also emphasize, perhaps more than anything else, the critical urgency of passing the national security supplemental request, which Congress has now had for nearly six months. That request includes desperately needed funding. Funding to support Ukraine in defending its democratic sovereignty and its very existence against Russia's illegal and ruthless invasion and Russia's authoritarian aggression, including relentless barrages of missiles and UAS attacks. Funding to support Israel in defending itself against the continuing missile UAS and rocket attacks by Hamas and other groups aligned with Iran. Funding to provide critical humanitarian assistance in Ukraine, Israel, and Gaza where innocent civilians are dying every day. Funding to support our Indo-Pacific partners in deterring aggression by the People's Republic of China. Funding to replenish our own military supplies of munitions and other material that we have had to draw down to meet the urgent needs of allies and partners. And funding to invest in the capacity of the American industrial base and workforce that is producing these munitions and weapons systems, including missile defense systems, that are so vital to all of these American national security interests. Chairman Lamborn, Ranking Member Moulton, and distinguished members of this subcommittee, there is simply no more time for delay. The time to act is now. I cannot overemphasize. As General Cavoli said just the other day, I cannot overemphasize the critical importance of Congress coming together in common purpose and acting with urgency to pass the national security supplemental request. Thank you again for convening this crucially important and timely hearing. Thank you for your attention. And thank you, each and every one of you, for what you do for your constituents and the nation. I look forward to your questions. Thank you, Lieutenant General Collins. Thank you, Chairman Lamborn, Ranking Member Moulton, and distinguished members of the subcommittee. I appreciate your continued strong support for the missile defense mission and look forward to the questions today. I'd like to start out by thanking the men and women behind the development, delivery, and sustainment of the missile defense system that I represent today, our MDA family, and the operators of the system, all key partners in this no-fail mission. As you mentioned, Chairman, we are requesting $10.4 billion to develop and deploy Homeland Missile Defenses and improve regional missile defenses against increasingly diverse and dangerous missile threats. Our prioritization of decisions will maximize missile defense system, capability, capacity, and readiness. We continue to work closely with our combatant commanders and services to help prepare them to fight for the fight of today and tomorrow. To defend our homeland from ballistic missile attack, the Ground Base Midcourse Defense, or GMD system, remains our nation's sole protection from limited attacks, with the primary focus being the advancing North Korean threat. The ongoing Ground Base Interceptor, or GBI, Service Life Extension Program, will continue to improve the GBI reliability and will help mitigate risk until the next generation interceptor, NGI, is fielded by the end of 2028. After 20 years, GMD stands ready, as shown in December of 2023, when we successfully executed a GMD intercept flight test using the two three-stage selectable Ground Base Interceptor in two-stage mode, a first. Demonstrating increased engagement battle space. We plan to deploy this capability to the entire fleet by the end of this year. The NGI program remains on track. Both prime contractors have successfully executed preliminary design reviews, or PDRs, and MDA is preparing in the near future to complete a best value determination and select a single company to continue NGI development, testing, production, and fielding. Soon we plan to add the Long Range Discrimination Radar, or LRDR, to MDA's operational capability baseline by December of this year. LRDR, delivered to the government last month, will enhance tracking discrimination and hit assessment against long range missile threats. Additionally, the Space Force and MDA are in the process of formally declaring LRDR ready for space object detection later this month. For regional defense, MDA continues to design improvements to the Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense Capability and procure the Standard Missile III Block IIA Missiles. In FY 2025, we will also test and deliver SPI-1 radar upgrades and support the Navy in future space domain awareness demonstrations. We will continue U.S. Terminal High Altitude Area Defense, or THAAD, interceptor procurement, fielding, and training support, along with reliability and cybersecurity improvements. In collaboration with the U.S. Army, we have fielded the THAAD 4.0 capability to batteries in Korea and on Guam and are in the process of fielding 4.0 to the all remaining THAAD batteries by the end of 2025. THAAD 4.0 integrates Patriot capabilities with THAAD to increase Patriot Defended Area and Engagement Opportunities. We will also begin design work to improve the THAAD system to take on ever advancing regional threats. The department continues development of a 360-degree layered missile defense capability for Guam. MDA construction on the Joint Command Center and TPY-6 radar site and launch site will begin in fiscal year 2025. And by the end of this year, we will execute a flight experiment with the SM-3 Block IIA against a medium-range ballistic missile target controlled with the initial Aegis-Guam system using the first TPY-6 transportable array unit. Looking forward, MDA continues to pursue end-to-end capabilities to defeat the serious challenge posed by hypersonic maneuvering threats. Today, our sea-based terminal defenses protect assets at sea and forces ashore from hypersonic threats. Working with the Navy, we anticipate delivering follow-on increment three capabilities in fiscal year 2025. The Glide Phase Interceptor Program or GPI Weapon System will enable layer defense against hypersonic glide threats. By the end of FY24, in coordination with our future international partner Japan, MDA will select a single GPI interceptor design to complete development. We will continue to develop and mature GPI capability and support the planned cooperative development of that Glide Phase Interceptor with Japan. On the detection and tracking part of the kill chain, as mentioned by ranking member Moulton, we launched the Hypersonic and Ballistic Tracking Space Sensor, or HBTSS prototype satellites in February to demonstrate fire control solutions generated against hypersonic maneuvering threats. Following successful demonstration of HBTSS, the responsibility for fielding HBTSS-like fire control capabilities will be transferred to Space Force. I'm honored by this opportunity and look forward to your questions. Thank you, Lieutenant General Ganey. Chairman Lamborn, Ranking Member Moulton and Distinguished Members of this subcommittee. I am honored to testify before you and represent this incredible one team organization of 2,300 soldiers and civilian, spanning 13 time zones in 19 locations worldwide. These professionals tirelessly provide space, high altitude and missile defense forces and advanced capabilities to the army and joint war fighter. I am honored to represent them and I thank you for your unwavering support for this team and their families. In January, I took command of the U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command and Joint Functional Component Command for Integrated Air and Missile Defense, also known as GIFIC IMD. Also acting as the senior commander for both Fort Greeley, Alaska and U.S. Army Garrison, Quadjolin, Atoll. Additionally, I also serve as the Army's lead Enterprise Integrator for Air and Missile Defense and my organization, GIFIC IMD, provides operational level, missile defense expertise and integrates trans-regional missile defense functions across the Joint and Combined War Fighting Force. As the Army's Air and Missile Defense Enterprise Integrator, today I will use this role to leverage and highlight the Army Air and Missile Defense remains the Army's most heavily deployed force with the highest demand signal amongst the combat commands every year. This high op-tempo continues to provide a significant strain on our formations and families and we must continue to address their needs. As you know, the urgency for multi-domain trans-regional combat effects continues to increase exponentially. Our adverse air and missile defense related threats have rapidly expanded in recent years in quantity, variety and sophistication, rapidly expanding their space R&D, instigating cyber attacks and test complex missile systems. We see this today in Ukraine and Lumen on the horizon in the Pacific. It has never been more imperative that we and our allies and partners enhance our missile defense and space capabilities to impose costs on our adversaries, denying them the benefits of using these weapons and ensuring the safeguarding of our nation. As our adversaries increase their emphasis on space and missile capabilities, the U.S. Army grows in kind. In December, the Secretary and Chief of Staff of the Army and the Sergeant Major of the Army signed the Army Space Vision supporting multi-domain operations, specifying the Army's role in integrating space capabilities into joint and coalition operations while also interdicting the space capabilities of adversaries. It is also increasingly apparent that integrating our space operations and missile defense operations is of critical importance to our national security. Our integration is essential to effectively contribute to strategic deterrence and respond in crisis. What worked for yesterday's military must evolve. Today, we must integrate space and missile defense at the very onset of our prototyping, concept development, and application. And we do it all in this in concert with our Army, Joint, and Coalition partners, one voice together around the globe. Our allies and partners are critical for layered and tiered operations to degrade, disrupt, and defeat adversaries, share burdens, integrate technology, and protect our mutual homelands. But all these operational considerations pale in comparison to the will, determination, and the trust the amazing men and women that operate and sustain these advanced systems. These soldiers and their families make life-altering sacrifices to serve across the globe. Thank you for your efforts in supporting them with timely budget, caring for them and their families and building trust with the American people now and in the years to come. Caring for our soldiers and their families is paramount to win in any environment around the globe. Thank you for your support, supporting such an incredible mission-ready team. I look forward to addressing your questions. Thank you. Thank you. Lieutenant General James. Good morning, Chairman Lamborn, Ranking Member Molton, and distinguished members of this subcommittee. It is an honor to be here today representing General Whiting and the nearly 18,000. Soldiers, sailors, marines, airmen, guardians, DoD civilians, and contractors of the United States Base Command. Our expertly trained and mission-focused workforce remains our most valuable asset. As you've heard from our distinguished colleagues here on the panel, our strategic competitors, offensive missile systems are significantly increasing in capability and scale. They will challenge our ability to conduct operations and protect and defend U.S. and our allies' vital interest. Our competitors are rapidly evolving, diversifying, and proliferating their victories of advanced missiles and technologies. Hypersonic glide vehicles and cruise missiles pose diverse threats that will complicate our missile warning and missile defense missions. In April 2023, the Unified Command Plan assigned United States Space Command with the responsibility for trans-regional missile defense, planning and operational support. That decision was the culmination of a comprehensive study and alignment with numerous policy documents and with the 2022 Missile Defense Review. This was a natural fit given our Unified Command Plan responsibilities, such as space operations and global sensor manager, as the missile defense mission continues to converge with the space missions. Part of the transition of trans-regional missile defense planning and support missions included alignment of the Joint Functional Component Command for Integrated Missile Defense under U.S. Space Command, commanded by my good friend, Lieutenant General Sean Ganey. JFC-CIMD ensured the continued execution of the responsibilities during the transition without any mission degradation. We, United States Space Command, have integrated JFC-CIMD into our command structures and processes and are exploring ways to further optimize our execution of critical missions. As the global sensor manager, U.S. Space Comm is responsible for planning, managing and overseeing the operations of all assigned space domain awareness, missile defense and missile warning sensors. Our terrestrial sensors are a critical enabler to the combatant command and national level military command centers, most performing missile warning, missile defense and space domain awareness mission simultaneously. Our space base sensors provide the first alert of a missile launch from anywhere on the planet. They provide this to our national leaders, the national military command system, combatant commands and select international partners. U.S. Space Comm employs a joint combined and partnered approach to our operations, which expands our access to sensors and their information. This includes our combined space operations centers commercial integration cell and our national space defense centers joint commercial operations cell, commensurate with the department's recently published commercial space strategy. The JCO also includes 14 allied partners that are fully integrated into our space domain operations. It is vital that we keep pace with the emerging threats and technologies while ensuring that our center architecture remains optimized and modernized. While we pursue integrating new capabilities, we must still aggressively leverage and integrate our legacy centers in support of our critical missile warning and missile defense functions today as part of a comprehensive missile defeat strategy. Continued funding for research and development for the next generation of space based and terrestrial sensor systems is critical to keep pace with the competitors and the potential adversaries that we face today. These capabilities must be resilient and we must be able to defend and reconstitute them to achieve space and cross domain mission assurance for the joint force. In closing, the 2022 missile defense review states, it is a strategic imperative of the United States to continue investments and innovation in the development of full spectrum missile defeat capabilities to maintain deterrence and offer protection while hedging against uncertainty. Consistent with the missile defense review, the department must explore and enact the full range of capabilities to counter advanced adversary offensive missiles and hybrid threats across the spectrum of conflict. US Space Command with fellow combative commands, services, allies and interagency and commercial partners stands ready to perform our unified command plan responsibilities to maintain and expand our competitive advantage. US Space Comm appreciates Congress's continued support as we ensure the delivery of space based capabilities and achieve our foundational moral responsibility to protect the joint force, the nation and our allies through all levels of competition and conflict. I have submitted my written statement for the record. Thank you and I look forward to your questions. Thank you. We will now go to questions from the panel, from the committee. General Collins, as I talked about in my opening statement, I'm very concerned about the glide phase interceptor. Last year the program planned to continue development and to maintain competition between two industry teams for at least another five years. A preliminary design review or let's say, PDR was planned for 2029 with the potential down select decision following PDR. Now the program is planning to select a single contractor this year without the development activity to prove out new technologies and with a lot less information. First, a general question. Competition in a program reduces risk, drives innovation and helps ensure the government is getting a good value. Wouldn't you say that in general, that is a fair statement? Yeah, Mr. Chairman, as a career acquisition officer, competition within an acquisition strategy is does buy down risk, keeps both teams sharp throughout the acquisition and tends to, it's a best practice within the department. Yes, sir. Okay, thank you. So how concerned are you then that making a down select decision this early in the program will increase risk? Sir, that is a job that we will be attacking greatly now with the decision that will be coming later this fiscal year. There are other mechanisms to manage competition and risk within a program lower than the prime level. We certainly will be looking forward to keeping the program on pace and based on section 1666, look for opportunities to bring hypersonic capability to the fight much sooner. With the GPI program as established today, working with our soon international partner, Japan, we will continue to look for opportunities to buy down that risk judiciously, potentially with competition at a lower level at the component or subsystem level. Okay, so let's dive a little bit more into that. What concrete steps, and you've already alluded to some, can we take to mitigate this risk or to give ourselves options if the technology development doesn't go as planned? Yes, sir, much of this is as part of the decision to come with down selecting, we're in the midst of upgrading our acquisition strategy and finalizing the decision criteria for making this decision. Part of that will be finalizing and taking a look at how to establish the program and going forward, depending on the selection and the risks associated with that particular prime, we will then have to take a look at with the prime the steps that would be taken. Each prime has a different set of risks based on their designs and that we would have to specifically identify based on the decision which one would drive what decisions and actions we would take going forward. Well, I still am concerned. I know that you'll do your best to play the hand of cards that you've been dealt, but I really am concerned about this. I just think we're taking on too much risk that we otherwise would be able to mitigate through continuing the competition more into the future. This leads to my next set of questions about the program schedule. You would think that if the program had advanced sufficiently and technology is mature enough for the government to select a single prime contractor five years earlier than originally planned, that we would be in a position to accelerate the schedule. But it looks like the opposite is happening. In last year's hearing your predecessor, Admiral Hill and I discussed the program's schedule and how delivering a capability in 2034 was not adequate. He agreed and said, quote, out in the mid-30s is almost irrelevant. We are not meeting the threat, unquote. But this year's budget would add additional delay and now does not anticipate deploying a capability until 2035. Do you share Admiral Hill's view that this makes it irrelevant to go more than 10 years into the future? Sir, I definitely agree with waiting 11 years to bring a hypersonic glide-based capability to the warfighter is too long and am looking into options within the GPI program and other options that could bring an interim capability sooner. We do have a requirement to come back with those options to you and we are working through that in a report will be provided by September that goes through those different option spaces, both within the GPI program and broader across the Missile Defense Enterprise to try to get any capability we can out of the weapons systems we have and also into the future with a GPI program. What can you tell us in this setting for the record that you will do specifically? You already alluded to the intention to try to accelerate some things, but what are concrete steps that you're gonna be able to take or plan to take? Yes, sir, right off the bat, one is we've engaged with both of our primes that we have on the GPI program today to identify opportunities that they see within their industry space and their broader enterprises to come up with acceleration options that we could be taking within the program, within the GPI program. Otherwise, I'm also looking across at other weapons systems that we have in place today to understand what, if any, residual capability they may have and or what potential developments, smaller developments could we take within those other weapons systems that could bring some type of residual capability or interim capability to the fight. Okay, thank you, all in my questions there, but I'll just quickly summarize my concerns. This budget, as proposed, cuts the funding, delays the schedule and adds risk to the acquisition approach. I understand that it'll save some dollars and is cheaper, but I'm just not sure it'll even lead to success in the long run, much less address the threats in the meantime. With that, I turn to the ranking member for any questions he might have. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I certainly share some of these same concerns. Lieutenant General Collins, Lockhees F-35 and Northrop Grumman Sentinel are two examples of programs that currently have zero competition and are grossly over budget and grossly behind schedule. Now you have extensive acquisitions experience. Can you cite an example of a program that benefited from down-selecting and reducing competition early? When has such a reduction in competition fielded a better technology faster and at reduced costs? Ranking member Molten, thank you for that question. Well, I think the silence speaks volumes. Let's move on. Mr. Hill, the department indicated to this committee that cancellation of the SM3 Block 1B was done in part to purchase more SM3 Block 2As. We will set aside that there are no additional 2As in this budget request and focus on the policy issues I've continued to raise. Is it accurate to say that SM3 Block 1B is solely a regional missile defense asset? SM3 Block 1B is for regional missile defense, gets medium range. Is it also accurate to say that SM3 Block 2A has been proven to intercept an ICBM range threat, the type of threat designed to be handled by the ground-based mid-course defense system? I believe from a kinematic perspective SM3 Block 1B has been shown to be able to intercept at that beginning edge, but the operational concepts for it are as a regional missile defense missile. It's mostly for medium-range. Right, but I'm just asking about its ability. I believe as a test, there was a test that was done. That's a very long way of saying yes. So my question is, was there a policy evaluation done on how our adversaries to include China, Russia and North Korea would respond to a further increase of SM3 Block 2As, which have capability against a strategic missile in lieu of the 1B variant, which does not? Yeah, that was done before my time doing this, but I think the implications of the SM3 2A, which you're talking about being deployed in fleets at different places around the world is not something that should logically cause China or Russia to have any concerns from a strategic stability perspective. Well, if you could provide that report to the committee, it would be helpful. You said there was some analysis done. No, the decision and that test was before I was doing the missile defense business, so I can look into the history of what was done there. Well, look, the point is that what matters here for strategic stability is not just what we think is perfectly logical, but what our enemies think. And we have to consider these concerns when we're making these budgetary decisions. I think SM3 Block 2As have an important role, but the quantities we're currently buying are about a third of what was intended for the 1B. If we suddenly reverse that and triple our 2A buy, we could very well embolden our adversaries to further proliferate and advance our technology in a way that not only makes our regional defense posture weaker at a time where regional missile defense is of prime importance, but also impacts stability at their strategic level. I also get the sense that this decision was not thought through on an operational business. I mean, General Collins, from your perspective, is a future Navy fleet equipped with primarily SM6 interceptors and some SM3-2A interceptors consistent with the direction you see the threat going. Sir, ranking member Moulton, good question. What I would take is I would be concerned with the capacity of capabilities that are in a fleet and our ability to support with enough 2As moving forward, given the capacity that we take from that production line today. Well, we obviously share those concerns. General Collins has MDA completed analysis of the impacts on this decision, on its ability to support and sustain the current inventory of 1Bs, meet the needs of allies, and support the Navy's requirements. Has that analysis been completed? Sir, we have not completed that analysis. We had been waiting for the 24 appropriation to understand the amount of money we were gonna get within the SM3-1B line to support the negotiation for an additional lot of 1Bs. That work is going on currently today to understand the impact to both the 1B final lot as well as the future of the 2A line. All of that to inform what type of sparing would we require within the 1B line to support the life cycle of 1Bs? Well, I think to quickly summarize as the chairman did, we both share a concern about the lack of competition that seemed to be echoed by your silence. We both share a concern about simply the magazine capacity that we have if we're reducing the number of regional defense assets we have at a time when we're using them quite regularly. And I have additional concerns about what this all means for strategic stability that it just sounds like had not been analyzed or even considered carefully. So we have a lot of questions, and I think that's important. Just one final question, Lieutenant General Collins, there have been a lot of discussions from the subcommittee about the potential need for a third CONUS interceptor site. Has JROC validated any sort of requirement for a third site? No, sir, there's no requirement. If they were to validate such a requirement, is the location that was looked at almost 10 years ago at this point still where you believe that third site should be located? As the last study explicitly indicated that MDA would need to relook at the analysis prior to moving forward with any sort of program once you had a requirement. Sir, that's correct. We would take a look as if a requirement for an East Coast site was identified as a requirement and validated as mentioned when the final report came out, we would take a look at the current threat, the current performance of the system, the current state of affairs to assess and evaluate what that optimal site would be. Right, so just to summarize, as of right now, you don't need a third site. If you were to need a third site, you wouldn't just go with what was selected 10 years ago, you'd do another analysis. And Mr. Hill, I would just add, I hope that we would, per my questions about strategic stability, look at the implications of a third site on the views of our adversaries. That's correct. The focus on a third site will be the things we're already investing in rather than a third site. Great, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. Thank you. Representative Dejarlet. General Collins, hypersonics have completely upended our prior conception of the global missile threat landscape with our ability to evade our legacy detection systems. And we are now in a position where we're playing catch up, both in our ability to detect and defeat these novel capabilities. Can you update our committee on how you're addressing the issue of detection first with the capabilities like hypersonic and ballistic, tracking space sensor satellites, and how are you collaborating with SDA on these and other efforts pertaining to hypersonic missile defense? Thank you, Congressman, for the question. Hypersonic missile defense is certainly a key focus of the missile defense agency in protecting our war fighters as we move forward. The hypersonic ballistic tracking space center that I mentioned in my opening statement and you just mentioned, that is a prototype set of satellites to demonstrate our ability and the technology to from space detect, track, and close the fire control loop against a hypersonic threat, to take a hypersonic threat and track it throughout its entire launch, from launch to intercept. That's a key aspect of our future ability to detect and eventually intercept hypersonic weapons anywhere on the planet in the future. To get there, we have worked very closely with the space development agency. They would be the operational transition agent for us to take HBTSS and include it within the future proliferated war fighting space architecture. We have been working very closely with them. Also the space war fighting analysis center, the SWAC part of the space force, we have been working with them to ensure that our long-term fire control requirements are included within the force design of any future space architecture. And so with those relationships within space force, we are ready when we complete the demonstration later this year to transition into the proliferated war fighting space architecture tracking layer to pick up on the hypersonic fire control tracking requirements for missile defense agency. On the glide phase interceptor, where are we at? Yes, sir, we have two primes awarded on other transaction authority agreements and both are proceeding post system requirements review and working to finalize designs as well as tech maturation for each of their designs. There's a good amount of tech maturation of the design and the integration of the system that we worked on. Okay, is an acceleration research on hypersonic defense options necessary and is it technologically feasible? Sir, we believe hypersonic defense is feasible. We have today a terminal case ability, capability to intercept hypersonic threats. Within the SM-6, sea-based terminal capability within the Aegis Weapon System. So we are already fielded capability to intercept hypersonics in the terminal phase. Glide phase interceptor, we've identified the technology areas that need to be matured within that program to do glide phase intercept farther away from the intended target. And we are in the midst of burning down all of those technologies to be able to field this capability. So yes, we believe that technology exists with some maturation to come, but we do believe hypersonic glide phase intercept capabilities is feasible. Okay, Mr. Hill, what is the department's policy on how the US will address near-peer hypersonic threats to the homeland? As General Collins just described, we're investing in capabilities. As Congress directed, we created, we designated the Secretary of the Air Force for leading the cruise missile defense of the homeland project. And of course, glide phase interceptors, many of them are cruise missiles. So we will defend against that, recognizing that in many cases, this is something that an adversary is using and developing not in the context of a nuclear strike, but in the context of potentially defeating our ability to respond. We want to demonstrate that now we have the ability to follow up on the commitments we've made, and that means we will defend critical infrastructure in the United States. Thank you, yield back. Thank you, Representative Norcross. Thank you, Chairman Rankin-Mentor for today's hearing and certainly the witnesses. We've had a number of discussions on this committee that talked about the ability to produce the weapons we need, the interceptors, and quite frankly, the entire industrial base. Mr. Hill, today you talked about the investment in that industrial base. So just for the sake of an argument, let's assume we have the technical expertise to design and build, and we might be able to build a prototype. When you look across the US missile industrial base and the workforce, are you comfortable with where we are in terms of being able to produce the numbers that we're talking about? I think, Mike, I am concerned that we have taken a bit of a holiday and that we're playing some catch up here. I am concerned that we have an adversary in Russia that is on a war footing in Ukraine, and we and our allies in Europe all need to look more carefully at the investments and improve our abilities to replenish when we draw down munitions and other key systems. So you talked about the investment in the industrial base. What specifically would you point to that in this budget that is actually going to mitigate some of those concerns? Yeah, I think there are focused, particularly on munitions area, in expanding capacity. And some of that is a function of when you are buying in larger quantities, when you're buying using the authority that the committee has given us to have multi-year procurement, now you're creating an environment in which you're not just relying on the government's money, but companies are also willing to put their money into expanding their capacity. So what are we doing to address that exactly? What signals are we sending industry? And I'm very familiar with the, much of the ammunition, what we're doing over there. I'm more concerned at least at this hearing at our missile industrial base. When you start talking about investing in our workforce, what does that mean? You can send a signal, but unless a contract follows it, it's a hollow signal. Right, the contract following it is gonna be the question of the recourse allocations in finite budgets. This is the question that we've been discussing earlier today about how many are we acquiring? Well, I'm not trying to pin you, well actually I am trying to pin you down because we're doing this to address exactly what we're talking about. And I get, we make the decision and all the complexities in dealing with that. And then we say we need it yesterday. I mean, that's historically what we do. And if we look at some of the numbers that were requesting, and particularly Mr. Moulton and what he was saying, even if you change your mind, they cannot ramp up in time. So when we start looking towards investing in that industrial base, we have to send the signals that are true to industry and we have to build it ahead time because the longest lead item is not a piece of material. It's a human. And that is why I continue to bring this up meeting after meeting. But with that, I will yield back to the chairman. Thank you. Thank you, Representative Bacon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you gentlemen for being here. Could you help me understand why the budget, overall budget numbers have gone down significantly for a sort of fence in the upcoming budget versus what we did last year. That's what it appears to me. Is it because of the budget caps or maybe there's other priorities? So try to understand that. Sure, I'll start. Definitely the Fiscal Responsibility Act did set a ceiling. We had to work within that ceiling. You had must pay bills, payroll increases, healthcare programs, child support, a lot of those things that go on in the Defense Department. And then you find you're having to make some choices in your end game. My readiness today for the things I'm working on, my investment for the future, not easy choices, the general environment. I think it's something for the Armed Services Committee to maybe review. Seems like missile defense is an area that we do not want to be cutting. I mean, I know the budget's going up a little bit, but I was just surprised to see the amount of the cut going on for missile defense. A second question, I'm not sure who's appropriate best to ask this to. It's concerning when you see the bases, particularly like Iraq, being repeatedly hit out of, from Iran. What could we be doing better to protect our forward bases from this? Or what are we not doing? I know this could be a theater commander's question too, but you have a great insight. Congressman, thank you, I'll take that question. And in my current role, in previous roles specifically, is the Army is providing the preponderance of missile defense and counter-US defense for those bases forward. Again, continuing to add funding for the forward warfighter to employ capabilities. You heard General Krilla advocate for the additional funding that he's requested for additional counter-US capability to proliferate across all of our bases forward. We do have capability there now that is proven successful. We are putting in technology and directed energy and also other type of kinetic systems and continuing funding of those systems will allow us to put in volume additional capability on those bases. Thank you, it's alarming to see the amount of targeting Iran's doing at our bases in Iraq and seems like we should be doing everything we can to protect against that. Now on the last NDA, we put some missile defense measures in for Kurdistan. How will that look, you think, or will that be a hard challenge for you all to accomplish? There was a provision to help the Kurds get missile defense in the last NDA. Yeah, I'm sorry, I actually heard Kurdistan. Well, Kurdistan, no, that's just my hearing. Absolutely, support to the Kurds have been part of this, balancing that relationship, their relations in the region is also part of that question. One of the other, to add to some of General Ganey's comments as well, we have also, in the Red Sea context, obviously struck back at some of those sites where some of these Iran-aligned militia groups operate the Houthis, most notably, and that is an essential compliment to the force protection that missile defense provides. Thank you, one last question for General Ganey, if I may. We've been reading some reports of fatigue and burnout because of the high ops tempo for your servicemen and women. What can we do to help mitigate that? The Army has taken a holistic look and, as you heard me earlier, highlight the significant strain on the force, but what I will tell you is I'm amazed at how those soldiers continue to respond and continue to maintain a positive attitude and a high re-enlistment rate moving forward. As the Army looks to get after, how do we improve the quality of life and improve the ops tempo goes to our modernization efforts in continuing supportive funding for our modernization efforts because Patriot system is the most deployed system because it is our workhorse system. As we modernize with the integrated battle command system as the core point inside of that modernization, we will then integrate several different effectors and capability that provides the range of capabilities across several threats, so you'll no longer have to deploy just a Patriot batter. You can now deploy several different components and the Army's growth of that capability in the last r-struck will also add additional capacity. So that will help moving forward. Well, we appreciate the men and women who are serving your command and in that matter for all of your house commands and missile defense is such an important mission and it's in high demand everywhere so we're grateful to you and your people. Perfect timing. We will now go to Representative Vazquez. Thank you Chairman. Thank you to the ranking member. Thank you to our witnesses for being here today. This morning, I have the privilege of representing New Mexico's second district home to White Sands missile range. It's the birthplace of America's space and missile program and though White Sands continues to be the Department of Defense's premier research and testing facility for our nation's most important weapons programs, they also continue to face struggles maintaining modern technology and facilities. Now during my visit to White Sands this January, base leadership shared with me that their long range radars which are supposed to provide critical tracking capabilities for weapons testing have been in service and have not been upgraded since the 1960s, posing significant challenges to keeping them operational and in line with modern missile technology. Beyond these maintenance challenges, I've understood that these radar challenges and the failures during tests have become increasingly frequent occurring as often as five times per month and with tracking inaccuracies that are off by hundreds to thousands of yards. Not being able to accurately track weapons during testing not only poses a safety risk to the folks that are working there but also to surrounding communities but threatens our readiness and national security and I think that's completely unacceptable. We should do everything in our power to ensure White Sands has the necessary equipment to safely and accurately track weapons tests so that we're providing our war fighters with the best tools and information possible to accomplish their mission. Lieutenant General Ganey, are diminished testing conditions like these acceptable to you and how do deficient testing standards pose a threat to our national security? Congressman, thank you for the question. White Sand Missile Range remains an integral part as you know to our testing in the Army's Air and Missile Defense Program. As the senior mission commander for Quadri-Lena Toll I also have strategic testing at those sites where I also maintain an infrastructure and sensors to be able to get after that. And I believe continuing funding and improvements of all of those capabilities are critical to continue to ensure that we have the best capability as we test our critical systems moving forward. Thank you so much and New Mexico, as you know Lieutenant General, we have a long legacy of not just missile testing but a lot of research and development that has contributed to the strength of this nation's national security. We also have a toxic legacy of impacts to the local surrounding communities from testing activities which is one of the reasons I'm fighting and others here in Congress are fighting to reauthorize RICA. And so we just wanna make sure that those technologies are updated and that we don't make the same mistakes of the past at the same time protecting national security. Now, Mr. Hill, given the importance of White Sands testing capabilities, what is stopping the department currently from updating these critical testing systems? I'll come to some, Vasquez, I'm not familiar with the specific decisions on those but we can certainly take the question. And in the general sense, obviously the previous discussions about the overall top line and making trade-offs within finite resources I'm sure is part of the calculation that's happening. Thank you, Mr. Hill. I appreciate you paying attention to this issue in future budget requests. Now, beyond the missile testing and evaluation done at White Sands, we're also home to the largest manufacturer of space-grade solar cells that are key component to providing power to our satellites. Producers in my district power a significant portion of our nation's national security satellites directly contributing to the strength of our missile warning fleet in space. Mr. Hill, for components like solar cells that are critical for our missile defense and warning infrastructure, what does it mean to the department to have a reliable domestic supply chain and how can Congress help support robust production capabilities like those in my state? I think these reliable domestic production chains, we see how important they are across a number of fields. One of the things that we've done, this most recently issued our commercial space integration strategy, recognizing how much innovation is being driven by the commercial side of space and the understanding that we in the Defense Department need to shift from trying to contort them into meeting our requirements to being flexible about our requirements so we can leverage what they're doing. That would be an example of creating an environment in which more innovation happens inside domestic production capacity. I appreciate that, Mr. Hill. And we certainly are at the forefront, I think of that commercialization, both in the research and development phase, but also now in light assembly and manufacturing when it comes to all these different components that are going into these modern systems. And I appreciate your continued attention and investment to New Mexico's second district. Thank you so much. Chairman, I yield back. Thank you, Representative Strong. Thank you, Chairman Lamborn and Ranking Member Moulton and thank each of you for being here today. General is great having each of you in my office last week. It was interesting to learn that not only is Huntsville the rocket city, but it's also apparently the city of love since this is where you met your wife, General James and I also found out that General Ganey's parents met at Redstone Arsenal. So it was interesting to hear that. Redstone Arsenal is truly making a name for itself. I've said it before and I'll say it again. We've got some great things coming out of Huntsville. General Collins just a few weeks ago, General Geo with Northcom reconfirmed to this committee that the next generation interceptor is critical for defending the homeland. Last spring, your predecessor testified to the benefits of keeping multiple contractors on the NGI program through critical design review. But since late last year, we've learned that this is no longer the plan. This really concerns me and many others. Looking back to 2019, when the redesigned Kiel vehicle RKV program was canceled, we had all our eggs in one basket. There wasn't a backup plan. And because we didn't have a backup plan, we had to extend the life of our interceptors and start an entirely new program. This cost taxpayers a lot of money. It cost us capability and it cost us time when there's a ticking clock over in the Indo-Pacific and throughout the world. What changed? Why is MDA now making an earlier than planned down select decision before critical design review next year? Congressman, thanks for that question on NGI. It is absolutely our foundation for homeland defense into the future and we have continued to focus the agency very much on NGI and its incorporation in no later than 2028. The two things of note, one we've talked about is certainly the fiscal realities and the decisions that needed to be made across the missile defense portfolio has been far-reaching. But second, we've also been keeping the NGI program on track. Both primes have completed preliminary design review. Both have completed full qualification of all their parts for the radiation environment and many of the subcomponents have been taken to the critical design review stage of design. All that brought together, the agency believe we have a full in-depth understanding of the designs from the two primes, we fully understand and the transition to production plans and the risks that are still involved with both primes and we believe that the level of risk is well below the department's standard of making a decision such as this. So we believe we have the technical depth and knowledge and understanding of risk as we move forward to make that decision. Thank you. I know that some very smart people have done great work to keep our current interceptors in the game longer, but we cannot keep life extending the fleet. Is that right? That is correct, sir. Thank you. I know that the confidence in NGI is succeeding is high. I credit a big part of that to the incredible work being done at Redstone Arsenal with both industry teams in Huntsville, Alabama. But the consequences of something going wrong with NGI are much higher now than it was back in 2019. Would that be a correct statement? Yes, sir. There's still additional risk ahead of us on the program and we will continue to stay very focused on where that risk is. Sorry. We will continue to stay focused on where that risk is and focused on mitigating that risk as best as possible. I totally agree. They're much higher this time because just as you said, we can't fall back on doing another life extension of the current system. We've already used our get out of jail free card with the RKV. I worry that the Biden administration is wanting to dismantle the significant industrial capacity that has been built up over decades and MDA's budget and plans are taking a detrimental hit due to some short-sighted decisions here. Is there a report or study that MDA has conducted that supports down-selecting before critical design review over sticking with the original acquisition strategy? No, sir. We do not have any report or assessment on that. Thank you. So we're budget constraints, the primary or initial reason for the change in strategy or is it because the teams have progressed better than expected? I'd say, sir, it's a combination of both teams. Both teams have progressed very, very well but there was a catalyst that was driven by the fiscal decision as well. I thank each of you for being here. Mr. Chairman, I yield back. Thank you. Representative Carvajal. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Hearing all the nexus that you have to representative Strong's district and not Paradise, which is my district, makes me start questioning your judgment, I must say. We know our adversaries possess hypersonic capabilities. Defending against and defeating this threat is proving to be challenging, both technically and physically. General Collins, how are advanced manufacturing technologies such as additive manufacturing being utilized to reduce costs and acquisition timelines for future hypersonic defense programs? Thank you, Congressman, for that question. And fully agree with your notes on the difficulty in developing an industry base to accelerate our hypersonic offensive and defensive weapons as we move forward. And in my previous job within the Air Force buying hypersonic weapons, we had the same challenges as developing the industry base to produce the critical technologies we require for hypersonic weapons. At the Missile Defense Agency, we're very focused on bringing any of the new advanced manufacturing capabilities and technologies to bear to help one reduce cost of building hypersonic weapons in the future, as well helping to scale and increase pace of capacity of lines going forward. We're very much looking into advanced manufacturing, additive manufacturing, as you mentioned. We have a group within our S&T division that is closely looking at and investing in small business maturation capabilities of additive manufacturing in particular capabilities that are required within a hypersonic weapon. One in particular is carbon-carbon additive manufacturing, which is key to the front-edge thermal protection systems of our hypersonic weapons, a key technology and a limiting factor within our ability to scale the industry base. And so we're very much investing across the traditional and non-traditional bases to ensure we have the manufacturing capability for hypersonic weapons. Thank you. General Collins, earlier this year, the Missile Defense Agency, MDA launched two hypersonic and ballistic tracking space satellites, HBTSS. MDA received additional funds in fiscal year 24 Defense Appropriations Bill to do calibration testing and training on threat representative hypersonic targets. Can you please describe the status of the satellites and how MDA is going to execute the additional 25 million for calibration provided in fiscal year 24 Omnibus? Yes, Congressman, absolutely. It was a major activity on Valentine's Day of this year when we launched the 2018... That's my anniversary, by the way. It's a great day. Sir, those satellites are still progressing through launch and early orbit testing. We have a very slow methodical process whereby we turn on the satellites, we turn on the payload. Over the last month, we have had First Light, what we call the first time we've turned on the payloads and actually looked with them and started taking a look at the data to calibrate. That calibration continues. We've started to do a number of cooperative activities where there may be a launch or a test that somebody else is executing, and we've been using those as capabilities, as opportunities to calibrate that payload. Later this summer, we will be executing our first HTB, Hypersonic Testbed 1 launch in June. That is a launch specifically designed for our HBTSS satellites to look at a hypersonic threat and track it through its time of flight. There'll be another HTB2 test later in the summer. Those are the two main wickets that we're looking at to calibrate and certify the fire control solution and technology that we have. Back to the earlier conversation, another opportunity we're getting is the Space Development Agency for Wide Field of View satellites. We're launched on the same booster. They're in plane with our two satellites, and so we're actually going to be able to utilize some testing of the Wide Field of View capability in concert with our HBTSS technology as well. A key capability as we look forward to a future missile warning, missile defense, and missile defense space architecture. Thank you, sir. Thank you. General James, the value add of HBTSS is that it will provide fire control quality data to track and intercept hypersonic threats. Can you speak to the importance of fire control quality data, the importance of using threat representative of hypersonic targets to calibrate and train against and how Space Command plans to do that across future year defense programs? Yes, Congressman. Sure can. Thanks for the question. I came a long way. I have a few things to say, so thanks for a question. Absolutely important and incredible. As Space Command continues to flesh out its trans-regional missile defense mission, and we continue to press on that, and we see those natural links between what you've heard the other colleagues say here about the convergence of the space and the missile defense mission. How we use our space assets and develop those to get at the technology changes we see to your point, the hypervelocity for the cruise missile threats that we see, we're going to have to use space-based systems, we're going to have to be able to provide that level of targeting quality information. And so that's exactly the things that we're working on as we continue to develop the net-centric command and control systems and the information systems like C2BMC as we continue to press for that. You'll see that in our UPAL list as an important factor that we need to continue to press on to increase our ability to command and control and pass that information from closest sensor to best shooter to be able to make those connections. And there's a lot of work that's happening more than just in US Space Command. We're tying into all of that with MDA, with SMDC, Army's Convergence, Nimble Titan, lots of different exercises, J-AMDOS, Nimble Fire, we exercise all of those to continue to build our expertise in that. Absolutely critical because terrestrial sensors are not going to allow us to track and target the threats that we see coming the way we have in the past. That will have to be space-based and all the things that General Collins just talked about from SDA and the work with HVTSS from the Space Force and other capabilities, absolutely important. And integrating commercial and integrating the allies. That is an area that US Space Command has done tons of work with over the years and it falls naturally in to how we're going to move forward with missile defense. Thank you. And thank you, Mr. Chair, for the additional time. Mr. Chair, you'll be back. Well, it was really more for Lieutenant General James. Thank you. Representative Wilson. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And indeed, I hope, Mr. Secretary-General, as you see that incredibly, this is bipartisan with the leadership of our term and ranking member and even including Congressman Carbohal. And so, but truly, we want you to succeed and I have a personal interest. I served 31 years in the Army Guard and Reserves and I really appreciate military service and I'm grateful my oldest son served in Iraq, field artillery. My second son was a doctor out of track. He was in the Navy, but I still claim him serving in Baghdad. My third son, a signal in Sinai, and my youngest a year, Afghanistan as an engineer. So I all credit to my wife, Roxanne, for actually training these guys. But the bottom line is we want you to succeed and equally, it's more important than ever, Mr. Secretary-General, we're in a conflict we did not choose. And to me, it's a conflict, a war between dictators with the rule of gun who are invading democracies with rule of law. Sadly, it began February 24th, 2022 when war criminal Putin just motorously invaded Ukraine just seeking out civilians to murder civilians. I've been there, Tabucha, to see the inhumanity of what's been done. I actually was in in Kiev in August last year, possibly for the first hypersonic missile attack. And the tactic of war criminal Putin is so inhuman and that is to attack a civilian target like an apartment complex. And then that's not the real attack. 20 years, 20 minutes later, when the first responders to there, the fire service, the EMRS personnel law enforcement, that's when the real attack occurs. And it's just shocking to think of the tactics that Putin has to try to intimidate the people of Ukraine just as they did the people of Aleppo and Syria and then to come back and try to intimidate first responders. Then, of course, it continued on October the 7th when the puppets of Iran, of the regime in Tehran invaded, and again, 1,200 innocent civilians mercilessly murdered intentionally without any sense of propriety or concept. And indeed, not in uniform, just everything that could be a violation of laws of war they conducted. And then, of course, sadly, we've had over 150 attacks that have occurred in the Red Sea as correctly identified by Karsten Moulton in Iraq. Over and over again, we see these attacks over 150 and then culminating on January the 28th with three young members of the Army Reserves from Georgia who were killed by a Hezbollah, again, another puppet of Iran killing three of our personnel and wounding 40 others. And so it's just incredible to me the challenges that we have and we want the best. And wanting the best, General Ganey in particular, I am concerned with the level of deployment of such an important branch, the Air Defense Artillery. And actually, I want to commend its no surprise, General Congressperson Don Bacon was the head of the curve and that is the deployment level that's being conducted. And I know with the leadership we have by partisan, we would like to back you up in any way to try to address that. With all of this in mind, General Ganey in particular, how are we addressing the technological development of the Chinese Communist Party, war criminal Putin, the regime in Tehran, the Pyongyang, how are we addressing this? Congressman, thank you for the question and appreciate your thoughts. As I'll speak first on the Army perspective, the Army is undergoing its most modernized effort in several years. We are moving from a Patriot-centric force and I highlighted earlier how we are asking Patriot to essentially do everything in the fight, get after tactical ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and in some cases with our partners even going after drones with the Patriot system. The US through our modernization program, the US Army is now looking at integrated battle command system as the cornerstone of that system. We have that system in test right now with our unit out at Fort Bliss. What that unit, that C2 system does is it integrates several components and not just a system. It takes a lower tier air and missile defense sensor as the cornerstone of that capability and then it adds in other sensors whether ground-based sensors or airborne platforms and it also add in shooters into that common C2. So now given the operator to leverage several different sensors to provide several different effectors against a range of threats. And also that lower tier air and missile defense sensor provides significant more capability than the current system does, which would allow it to now optimize most of those interceptors that are part of that C2 system. And if you look at this challenge from a joint perspective in my GIFIC IMD hat, that's where we look at how do you bring all of these systems together in a larger C2 construct? And that's something as we work towards the defense of Guam, one of the areas we're looking at is how do you take the Army integrated battle command system integrated with some of the systems that the missile defense agency is putting together on Guam. And so therefore we're looking at how we'll have an enduring solution that moves forward that essentially integrates all those several systems, leverages the sensors and the shooters together. That's the lower to medium range. Now if you look at the counter UAS in the protection to the maneuver capability, the Army has also significantly invested in that area also where we've added several maneuver short range air defense systems integrated into our division and BCTs to be able to provide capability against cruise missiles. Looking at technology like directed energy, 50 kilowatt directed energy that we have deployed out there right now testing that capability. And also refilled in high powered microwave into our formations to be able to get out the threat. So if you look at a capability, a system that's able to integrate all of these sensors, all of these effectors and then be able to put the proper fires on target, the appropriate interceptor or effect on the appropriate target, that's how we're moving forward in modernization. That's how it's gonna allow us to move forward. Thank you very much. Thank you, Representative Garamendi. Thank you. If there is ever a committee that is faced with a problem, it's this one. I'm on a lot of military committees and I've never had a committee that had so many acronyms. To try to understand what each and every one of these things actually is, it's a challenge. But I'm gonna try to take this in a different direction. Following on some of the work that my colleague, Mr. Moten put forward earlier in his remarks, we will forever be playing defense, trying to catch up with the offense. We can use the NFL, we can use the experience of what we're hearing here today. Much of this discussion today is about defense. And we know that in that defensive environment, there is great risk. What's happened over the course of the last 23 years is a very significant shift in this entire arena. Prior to 2002, there was an ABM Treaty, an anti-ballistic missile treaty. It would do well for all of us to understand the details of the actual language of the treaty. We usually think it only applies to intercontinental ballistic missiles. It didn't, it went beyond that. United States withdrew from that. To this day, Russia uses the withdrawal of America from the ABM Treaty to justify their continued buildup of intercontinental ballistic missile systems. And the weapons that go with it. Interestingly, in recent days, the last few years, China is using that very same withdrawal, American withdrawal from the ABM Treaty system to justify its buildup of intercontinental ballistic missiles, including silos, which this committee has discussed. It is fair to argue that that withdrawal from that treaty has led to the current nuclear arms race. And much of the discussion today has to do with how we are going to defend using the GMD system. And my concern here is that we are in a never-ending cycle of offense followed by defense that presumes to be successful against the then-known offense, and yet one more round. My point here is that as much time as we're spending on, in this committee, defense, we ought to be looking at how to break this cycle. Of an arms race. Now, you can add the nuclear peace to it, which you must do, and it becomes even more significant. It's never-ending. And I know the members of this committee, and certainly the gentlemen before us, understand in detail what this race is all about, the risks that are in it. And my question to you, Mr. Hill, is it useful for us policy makers, and for you and your team, to spend as much time thinking about how to stop the cycle, or at least slow down the cycle of offense, defense, defense, offense, and back and forth, all of which creates greater risk. Mr. Hill, I'd love to hear your thoughts on it. Sure. Congressman Garamendi, very, very key piece in the entire puzzle of what you're getting after here. Clearly there was a time that wasn't era when we had someone we could work with on the other side of the negotiating table. During the Soviet Union, there were different, that era in the Cold War, we did negotiate agreements with them successfully. We're in it, and that's a key piece to any kind of arms control situation. Do you have someone you can work with? Now you have three, and you have a very different Russia in some ways in terms of can you deal with them as a credible negotiating partner right now? So it's not, it's to say you always need to be thinking about that as one of the pieces of what you have to work with to try and maintain strategic stability. Defense, offense, as well as can you come up to a confidence level with somebody on the other side of the table? China's a third player in this now, which adds to the complications. But I think the tool never goes away, it's how do you use it in the environment you have? I'm out of time, and I'm gonna take five more seconds. Every one of the arms control mechanisms that went into effect during the Cold War occurred almost immediately after the most difficult of moments in that Cold War. I'll let it go with that, that's a historical issue, but thank you, I'm out of time, and for me, I'm gonna spend as much time talking about this as I do about offense and defense. Representative Stefanik. Thank you, Chairman Lamborn. First, I would like to correct the record earlier in this hearing. The ranking member said that the Department of Defense chose Fort Drum as the preferred missile defense site for the third homeland missile defense site nearly 10 years ago, that is incorrect. Despite the fact that you said that's correct, General Collins, you are aware that the date that that was designated was 2019, correct? Yes, ma'am. So the 10 years ago was incorrect? Yes, ma'am, 40 years ago. Great. You also are aware that just last year, General Milley and Vice Admiral Hill testified in front of this committee that the construction of a third site at Fort Drum will be strategically worthwhile, correct? Yes, ma'am. You're aware of that testimony? Yes, ma'am. Yes, and you're also aware that in multiple NDAAs, the language designating Fort Drum as the preferred third site for an East Coast missile defense site has been included in multiple NDAAs, you're aware of that? Yes, ma'am. And just let the record reflect, the ranking member voted in support of that language not once, but multiple times, as well as voted for appropriations as did the majority of the members of this committee. Now, in the FY14 Appropriations Act and the NDAA, we worked to secure $10 million in planning and design funds for the Missile Defense Agency to begin construction activities for a third homeland missile defense site at Fort Drum. My question to you, General Collins, is as the director of MDA, can you confirm to me that this $10 million is being used as dictated by Congress, as explicitly stated by Congress at Fort Drum to begin the planning and design of a third missile defense site? Ma'am, the $10 million has been authorized and appropriated for that purpose, and that's the purpose we're executing it for. And what are you using that for? That is to do the initial planning and development of design for continental interceptor site to take it to the 10% design level. At Fort Drum. We are pursuing an agnostic design that would support- That's not what the language said. By providing, by doing it as an agnostic site, we would not slow down the capability to do it at Fort Drum. That's not what the language that was passed by Congress said, and you understand that in the NDAA, for multiple years, it had designated Fort Drum. There were three sites under consideration in three different states. There was a process, an environmental impact study. This has been a very thorough process. And so you're saying to me today that the $10 million is not designated at Fort Drum for the planning and design? It supports a continental interceptor site at any location that's determined to be optimal in the future, in line with the 2019 memo that the department signed out. Designating Fort Drum. Fort Drum, and it also designated that when a requirement was set for a continental site, that there would have to be a readdress and a reassessment of location based on performance. Even though you said in my office when we met General Collins in my office that you understood that the $10 million would go to the design and planning at Fort Drum as specified by the NDAA. When a decision, if a decision is made to pursue a Fort Drum site, the $10 million will be 100% in line with being able to accomplish that. But you do understand that multiple NDAAs Fort Drum has been designated as well as by DOD. I'm aware, ma'am, of the report that the department signed out and the previous NDAAs. Okay, great. With that, I will yield back. All right, thank you. That concludes the public portion of this hearing. We have votes that will be called roughly 1145 or shortly thereafter. So we will be in recess, we will go into a closed hearing up in room 2371 until such time as votes are called and then we will adjourn the subcommittee at that point. We will be in recess and meet upstairs.