 Good morning everyone and welcome to another in our series of discussions this year co-organized by CSIS Career Chair and the Global Peace Foundation. My name is Victor Chom, CSIS Career Chair and Senior Advisor here as well as Professor of Government at Georgetown University. And today's discussion is on China's policy towards Korean Peninsula unification. Our featured remarks today will be by Sid Seiler who is the Special Envoy for the Six Party Talks at the Department of State. That will be followed by a roundtable discussion involving myself, Sid Seiler and Professor John Chow from American University. So to help start us off I want to give an opportunity to my co-organizer of this series of talks, Mike Marshall who is the Director of Research and Publications at the Global Peace Foundation, an opportunity to say a few words. Thank you Victor. On behalf of the Global Peace Foundation, the co-sponsor of this forum series, I'd like to welcome you all and thank you for coming. I'd also particularly like to thank Victor, Ellen Kim and all the CSIS team for working together with us to put together this series which takes a fresh look at aspects of Korean unification and Korea's changing place in the world. This is the third of five joint forums and I hope you'll follow the subsequent sessions which will look at the roles of Russia and Japan respectively in relation to Korean unification. The Global Peace Foundation is an international non-profit committed to exploring and promoting innovative values based approaches to peace building and development. We're active in the US, in Korea and 13 other countries across Asia, Africa and Latin America promoting initiatives for community development and national transformation. The idea for this forum series originated in great part from this book, The Korean Dream, A Vision for a United Korea, published last September in Korea and written by Dr. Hyunjin Moon, founder and chairman of the Global Peace Foundation. The book proposes new approaches and a new framework for thinking about Korean unification. In particular, it stresses the Korean identity shared by the people of both North and South and based on the long span of Korean history and the principles and values that have informed it. Those of you familiar with Korean cultural history will know the concept of Hongik Ingen or living for the benefit of all humanity for example. Such a framework has the potential to transcend the political divisions within South Korea and the ideological divisions between North and South which are after all the products of a mere 70 years of recent history. The book also highlights the role of civil society organizations in building bridges across the nations and among the peoples of the region and ultimately as a key component of any successful unification process. This was the focus of our last forum last month. A practical expression of this idea is the formation in South Korea of Action for Korea United, a coalition of over 400 NGOs and civil society groups concerned with issues related to unification. The Global Peace Foundation was a key mover in setting up this organization. In the existing political and diplomatic stalemate on the peninsula, the book and the Global Peace Foundation are committed to finding new approaches to unification and new approaches to thinking about the Northeast Asia region as a whole. The emergence of a new geopolitical context out of the old Cold War framework offers new opportunities for economic development and security arrangements in Northeast Asia. China's role in unification will likely prove a keystone in realizing these opportunities. China's role will be critical for the future prospects of the region as it will for any unification process. We've already witnessed significant change in China's relations with both Koreas. I hope this forum will stimulate some new ideas about the relations of China with other key regional players that can further the peace and development of the region. Look forward very much to your discussions. Thank you. Thanks, Mike. And so our featured remarks today will be by Sid Seiler and let me properly, although I think he's well known to many of you here, let me just properly introduce him to you. Sid Seiler is currently the Special Envoy at the State Department for the Six-Party Talks. And in this capacity, he coordinates U.S. efforts on denuclearization of North Korea through the Six-Party Talks framework and leads the day-to-day engagement with six-party partners. Prior to doing this, Sid served on the National Security Council as a Director for Korea from April 2011 to August 2014. And there are basically any piece of paper that got near the National Security Advisor or the Vice President that anything to do with Korea had to go through Sid, based on my own past experience, that's been the job. But Sid also has been a member of the Senior National Intelligence Service and previously served as the Deputy DNI National Intelligence Manager for North Korea and worked on a variety of assignments across the intelligence community related to Korea. He is truly a veteran of the Six-Party Talks in the sense that there are probably, you can count maybe on one hand, the number of people in the U.S. government that have been involved in the Six-Party Talks from the beginning to where we are today with the Obama administration. There are not many. And Sid is one of those few who were involved from the very beginning. So in case that's not enough to convince you that he's a Korea expert and one of the top Korea experts in the U.S. government, he also has an MA in Korean Studies from Yonsei University's Graduate School. And he's written a book about Kim Il-sung, 1941 to 1948, the creation of a legend, the building of a regime, and a book that I cited quite a bit in my own book, The Impossible State on North Korea, because it was a fantastic source. So Sid, it's always a pleasure to welcome you back to CSIS. You're a good friend and a good colleague. And we want to thank you for taking the time to join us today. Victor, thank you so much for the very kind introduction. It's an honor to be here today to discuss this topic that's really grown so much in interest over the past few years. It's generated much discussion. It's even tickled the imagination of many people as we consider the current issues we face on the Korea Peninsula and how difficult as they may be. And but more importantly, what does the future hold? When Victor invited me to speak here today on this topic, he suggested and I agreed that we'd begin with a brief lay down of current U.S. efforts on the North Korea issue and the state of diplomatic play, because this would provide a helpful context for the discussion that would follow. And the reason that's so is because in many ways, the dynamics today, the coordination, the transparency, the habits of cooperation that the actors are developing in their efforts to resolve this very difficult issue of the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula will certainly have a direct bearing on how we together cooperate on the full range of issues related to the future of the Korean Peninsula, which we'll discuss today. But let me open with a bottom line statement. Our DPRK policy continues to be designed to explore and as possible create diplomatic opportunities toward negotiated denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, but at the same time, prudently ensuring deterrence and pressure to ensure the security of the United States and its allies. In other words, while we pursue diplomacy, where possible, we employ pressure as necessary and ensure deterrence. I've used other forms to emphasize our efforts and success of our policy, in slowing and impeding the growth of the North Korea nuclear and missile capabilities through pressures and sanctions, our success in neutralizing the emerging DPRK threat through our ongoing efforts to ensure deterrence. I refer you most recently to the April 15th announcement following the Korean Integrated Defense Dialogue of the formation of a deterrence strategy committee, yet further evidence and further evolution of our commitment to further strengthen the US ROK Alliance's capability to respond to whatever threat it may face as it has successfully for the last 60 years. That the US ROK Alliance remains strong that security on the peninsula is insured, that the region continues to prosper while North Korea's isolation and hardships continue. All this serves as a clear demonstration of the success of our overall response to the North Korea issue. But in the spirit of today's discussion, I'd like to examine specifically how our diplomatic strategy tackles both a near-term goal of returning North Korea to authentic and credible six-party talks marked by concrete denuclearization steps, while at the same time pursuing longer-term objectives related to the future of the peninsula. To do that, I'd like to review three principle, fundamental policy principles that have guided our policy over the past six years that remain relevant today. Policy principles are really a critical element in understanding our approach because they represent enduring precepts based upon our accumulated knowledge and experience working this hard issue, while at the same time avoiding dogmatic and flexibility and ensuring that we have creative yet managed risk-taking opportunities to try to move forward. The first of these principles is what we call our principle of sharpening choices. We've repeatedly demonstrated to the leadership of North Korea that it faces two paths going forward. The path of denuclearization that would lead to the prosperity and security it purports to seek for its people or its current path of ignoring its international obligations and commitments and facing as a result even greater diplomatic and economic isolation and pressure to sharpen those choices for North Korea to make sure they have a laser accurate understanding of the paths that are before it. The U.S. has left the door open for Pyongyang to move down the path of denuclearization of fundamental improvement of U.S. DPRK relations and integration into the international community even as we've been firm in holding Pyongyang accountable for its bad behavior. This sharpening choices principle requires engagement and we do this. We do this by regularly engaging Pyongyang as we have over the past six years by not being ideologically opposed to talking by being willing to probe North Korea's intentions and prod it to make the right decisions by testing propositions while taking calculated risks to explore new possibilities and to quote the president in describing his overall foreign policy strategy by engaging while preserving all of our capabilities. We've done this again repeatedly over the last six years and we'll continue to do so. Progress in our nuclear talks with Iran clearly demonstrates our willingness to engage countries with whom the United States has had longstanding differences. And there should be no doubt we continue to remain committed to negotiations and a negotiated resolution of the DPRK nuclear issue on the basis of the 2005 joint statement of six-party talks, the fundamental roadmap for achieving the complete verifiable and irreversible denuclearization. Of the Korean Peninsula. It is the DPRK, however, that has not yet decided to embark on this path. It has repeatedly rejected offers for dialogue. It has repeatedly and openly violated commitments made in the September 19th, 2005 joint statement to abandon this nuclear program. It continues to ignore its international obligations, particularly those under United Nations Security Council resolutions that call on the DPRK to halt its nuclear activities and to refrain from ballistic missile launches. And of course, it has openly declared an intent to attempt to expand its nuclear deterrent while pursuing economic development as part of its so-called Byung Jin policy. All that said, we are not deterred from our continued efforts to pursue denuclearization as our top priority. And we maintain a robust pace of diplomacy toward that goal. We remain in close contact with other six-party partners on our shared goal of denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in a peaceful manner. We continue to offer an alternative path for the DPRK. But with over two years of experience with DPRK, obfuscation and recalcitrance, and an absence of any sign Pyongyang is currently prepared to engage on denuclearization steps, we will continue to judge North Korea by its action and not by its words. This leads to our second principle, and I'll just touch on it very briefly, although it's very critical, and that is of putting alliances first, putting alliances first. Close, continuous and transparent coordination between Washington and Seoul, and of course with Tokyo as well, has been and will continue to be the centerpiece of our approach to North Korea. In this regard, we fully support President Park and her untiring efforts to move inter-Korea relations forward. Assistant Secretary Danny Russell in comments here back in December noted the strong U.S. support for President Park for her North Korea policy and the trust-building process with its balance of principle and pragmatism. Of President Park's vision and the positive and vivid picture that she has painted are the benefits the North Korean people could reap from reconciliation and denuclearization and indeed the benefits to the region unification would bring. It is disappointing though, perhaps not surprising that Pyongyang continues to ignore important opportunities for restoring inter-Korea relations, for moving down this path that President Park has laid out. All that said, we will continue to work closely together with our Republic of Korea partners, extending a hand to Pyongyang leaving a door open but at the same time balancing principle and pragmatism. The third principle of our North Korea policy approach is that of close coordination with China, one of our topics for today. Over the past two years, in fact, particularly following North Korea's egregious provocations in the late 2012, early 2013 time period that included a long-range missile launch, its third nuclear test, military shows of force, the United States and China have worked closely to align and confirm and reconfirm our common goals. Like the United States, and I would actually suggest our close allies and Republic of Korea and Japan, China seeks peace and stability in Northeast Asia, so do we. China seeks denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula as a foundation upon which lasting peace and stability is peace and stability is truly attainable, so do we. China understands the economic benefits of a peaceful and stable Korea Peninsula, so do we. That's what we've been doing for 60 some years through the US ROK Alliance. And as a path toward these broader goals, China seeks a return of North Korea to authentic and credible denuclearization negotiations, so do we. This consensus can, I believe, serve as a solid foundation for moving forward in the months and years ahead. These three goals are inseparable. There really can be no true peace, stability, tension reduction on the Korea Peninsula without denuclearization. Authentic and credible negotiations leading to concrete denuclearization steps alone will lead to sustainable reduced tensions. Negotiations, on the other hand, not marked by clear progress on denuclearization are of little value, particularly to the degree that they put at risk the important pressure and deterrence capabilities we have in place. Such talks for the sake of talks are far from being cost-free. But I tend to be bullish when it comes to the longer-term prospects for cooperation in this regard. In addition to the shared consensus with China I just described, another equally encouraging development has been the improvement of PRC-ROK relations over the past two years. Increasingly, there's a clear recognition in Beijing of the value of a close and productive relationship with Seoul that is in China's interest and indeed the interest of all parties involved. Beijing's two-way trade alone with the ROK is approximately 45 times as much as PRC-DPRK trade. President Xi has now met on several separate occasions with President Pah Kunei, including reciprocal state visits to each other's capitals. The improvement in relations between these two important neighbors is clear to everybody. The linkage of interest between these two neighbors is well-known. Indeed, it's a foundation about which this very discussion we're about to have maybe had. So we do go forward with a shared goal for the Korea Peninsula of denuclearization, peace, stability, and prosperity. And it's increasingly clear that in a Seoul and not Pyongyang, that is a natural partner for Beijing as it looks to the future in the region and on the peninsula. So our policies, the policies of Washington, Seoul, and Beijing must by design have a bold and wide-ranging vision that looks beyond the immediate issues before us. Yes, we'll continue to exert all efforts to bring Pyongyang back to authentic and credible negotiations that lead to concrete denuclearization steps to restore and bring to consummation the letter and spirit of September 19th, 2005 joint statement. To be sure, we will continue to sharpen Pyongyang's choices, making clear that moving down the path that is the true way to security and prosperity it seeks, one of denuclearization is one choice. Well, the nuclear path that it is on is the arduous dead-end path that will lead to continued diplomatic isolation and economic hardship. As we sharpen these choices, we do so with a vision toward the future, toward a future Korean peninsula that is marked by stability, denuclearization, political and economic freedom and a respect for human dignity. There's no reason why the people of North Korea don't deserve this. There's no reason why the people of North Korea should be denied the growth, prosperity, advancement, respect for human rights that we see growing throughout the region. But even as we do this, we certainly cannot and will not wait. We can't wait for Pyongyang to come to its decision. We must continue to plan, to collaborate, to brainstorm, and yes, even debate issues, such as we plan to today. To do so demonstrates a sense of realism about the future, transparency about our intentions and boldness to prepare and shape events before they unfold. Only by doing so can we lay the groundwork for the type of unification that leads to a peninsula free of war, free of nuclear weapons, and just plain free. Thank you. Great, thank you. Thanks, Sid, that was a fantastic way to get us started. We'll now begin a discussion on the points you've raised as well as others. And first, we have to give apologies for Chris Johnson, who was the Senior Advisor and Freeman Chair here. He has an illness in the family and was not able to join us at the last minute and he sends his apologies. But alongside Chris, we have John Chow, who's Professor of International Relations at American University. Let me properly introduce him to you as well. He is the Chair of the Asian Studies Program Research Council at American University and has served as Director of the Division of Comparative and Regional Studies. He is a Specialist in International Relations and Comparative Politics, focusing on East Asia. He's the author of Interpreting Chinese Foreign Policy, which won the Best Academic Book Award by the Ministry of Culture of the Republic of Korea. And he's also the author of Japanese Policymaking. His most recent book is Managing the China Challenge, Perspectives from the Globe. Dr. Zhao spent one year as a Senior Fellow at the US Institute of Peace in Washington and at the East West Center in Hawaii. He's testified on China's economic development at the US Congress and has served as a consultant for the United Nations. He received his BA from Peking University and MA and PhD from the University of California at Berkeley. So we'll begin the discussion by having Dr. Zhao offer some remarks and then we'll have more of a roundtable discussion. Dr. Zhao, thank you for joining us this morning. Sure, thank you. And thank you for your wonderful lecture. Thank you. Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. It is my task to give some of my own thoughts over China's foreign policy toward Korea Peninsula in connection with the earliest presentation. I did send a PowerPoint file, but our story is not necessary here, so just a free discussion would be better. My thinking of Chinese foreign policy evolution toward Korea Peninsula, I used the term so-called three approaches. The first one, what I called is a history embedded, namely, Chinese foreign policy toward Korea and Peninsula very much influenced by not only century's long history between China and Korea. We can trace back all the way to early relations, but also to the very recent, like the Korean War and among others. The second approach I developed is national interest-driven that is when Deng Xiaoping started open-ended reform policy, then modernization became the top priority of Chinese foreign policy. And along that line, China's national interest priorities changed. So we started in that particular landmark development was 1992, normalization between South Korea and China, so-called at that time, so-called eco-distance with Pyongyang and with Seoul. But the third approach, what I called is co-management approach. That is in response to the development, is China rising and then the so-called responsible stakeholder and China need to develop and to exercise more global governance perspective. In that particular case, the co-management approach. When I say co-management approach is very much to do with six-party talks that China to begin with China was reluctant, but then China and United States played a leading role and together with other partners. And then even though we is on and off picture six-party talks, but I use that as an example of China's co-management approach. So that is the three approaches. What I would say is evolution of Chinese foreign policy toward Korea Peninsula. It's very much clear that it's nowadays national interest driven and co-management, global responsibility has become a priority thinking of Chinese foreign policy toward Korea Peninsula. I fully agree with Sydney's early comment about the consensus between Washington and Beijing in terms of stability and peace. And nuclear free Korea Peninsula. I think that's indeed is top priority as well for Beijing. Now the key point up to early this spring and the even summer 2015 is how we would approach to the six-party talks. I'm glad that you is a special envoy. I understand that there are still uncertainty about a different assessment about the utilities of six-party talks. And if you look at the most recent development that is very clearly that Beijing's approach is really continue to develop close relations with Washington cooperation over Korea Peninsula. And in particular with Pagan has government. If you look at the just a couple of weeks ago, the development of AIIB is also very clear that is Beijing, South Korea together with all together 57 members to become a founding member of AIIB at the same time according to a report. I'm not sure I have not confirmed that that is North Korea's application was rejected as a member of AIIB given with the reason that is North Korea is not enough transparency in its financial practice. I don't know internal details between Pyongyang and Beijing regarding this particular episode. But to me it's very clear because I understand there was also internal debate in Beijing and in China that is whether North Korea this particular juncture China should either accept or not. But of course in reality China rejected that policy. I guess I mean the application from Pyongyang is a very clear signal that is China would continue to work with other partners, particularly United States work together to make North Korea, Korea Peninsula nuclear free, particularly when facing the new leadership of Kim Jong-un. We understand that Kim Jong-un already assumed power a few years but never had at least openly, never had any official visit to Beijing. So the two leaders Xi Jinping and Kim Jong-un are still not met. But we know that President Park Gung-hae developed very close relations with Xi Jinping. So all of that indicate recent development. Having said that I'm not saying that China will sort of speak give up North Korea. There are still a lot of internal debate policy. Some old thinking like North Korea served as a buffer state that kind of still maybe still around with some sentiment among certain parts of Chinese policymaking and the society even though that may not be a dominant or mainstream thinking. So nowadays what I'm saying here is Chinese society has also become much more pluralistic compared to the era of Mao. So there are indeed different schools of thought. Now my final point just back to Cindy's early comments. It seems like Washington's policy from my understanding from your lecture is that now has become a bit more proactive toward Korea-Palestinia. There was a saying that Obama and Beatrice's policy toward Korea-Palestinia is a so-called strategic patience. I did not hear any reference toward this particular. So actually I do have questions with you. That means Washington has switched a little bit and toward a bit more proactive and any preconditions for the resuming 640 talks. I guess that's still a huge question because now even though North Korea has mixed signals, sometimes they say, oh no, we're not part of 640 talks anymore. But then sometimes they say, oh no, yes, we are interested, let's resume. So with all those kind of uncertainly different mixed signals, so what exactly Washington's position? So those are my questions. Thank you. Great, thanks Professor Zhao. So you have those questions and let me just throw a couple more out for both of you. First for Professor Zhao, you spoke about the evolution of China's policy towards the Korean Peninsula and what I would like to ask you is about how you think the current leadership, Xi Jinping in particular, how his views on the Korean Peninsula are similar to or differ from that historic trend that you mentioned earlier. Because clearly he has not met with the North Korean leadership yet. And it almost seems like China's being strategically patient on North Korea, not just the US. And then for Sid, I guess the question is, is as we watch, the Obama administration has done some pretty big things with Cuba and with Iran and with Burma. And the only country left is North Korea in that sense. And I guess there are two questions. One is what do you think the prospects are? Do you think there's anything that you see coming from North Korea that even mildly suggests that there's some opportunity to do something before the end of this administration? Or because of Iran and Cuba and Burma and many other issues that the administration doesn't have the bandwidth in the time that's left to actually engage because presumably they would not just wanna start a negotiation, they would wanna finish it. And that would be a heavy lift given all that is going on. So one question for each of you. Maybe Professor Zhao, if you might go first on. Sure, yeah. Before I forgot, I would like to say thank you for Victor organizing such family forum and panel and thank you for Korea Peace Foundation working together. I think this is really significant and I would like to see more proactive activities from Korea Chair at CSIS and among others. The question about Xi Jinping and the current Korea policy, I would say that it's in line with early and talk the three approaches, evolution. However, we do see a bit more assertive of Chinese foreign policy under Xi Jinping over a number of so-called whole national interest. Having said that, specifically with Korea Peninsula, we do see a little bit detachment between Beijing and Seoul. It's not necessarily out of Beijing's choice. Between Beijing and Seoul or Beijing. I'm sorry, Beijing and Pyongyang. Beijing and Pyongyang, sorry. My argument is not necessarily out of Beijing's choice. Some with unpredictable development within Pyongyang. So sometimes also called Beijing in surprise in many different functions, like the deal with Conjuring's uncle, Changchun, you know, situation like that. So what I'm saying here is Beijing clearly recognized its limitation that both relationship and influence. So in that case, would rather almost like the United States. The U.S. also recognized limitation by its own. That's the very foundation for the beginning of six party talks, so need for fellow countries to work together. So in that particular case, and the Pyongyang, for example, always emphasize, we want to work together. Always emphasize, we want to talk with Washington. So it seems like a Pyongyang put top priority with Washington. In that case, Beijing would say, okay, if that's your choice, we can wait to see. Having said that, we do understand that there are some economic leverage in particular, like food and energy. I don't know details exactly, you know, because that's always changing in terms of supply. But nevertheless, one of the arguments from international community is that the very survival of North Korea largely depends on food and energy supplied from China. But the situation may change, and in particular, like I already mentioned, the limitation, the limit Chinese foreign policy influence over Pyongyang. In that particular case, I think right now, the hope is to work with U.S., with Japan, Russia, South Korea together, and possibly, if possible, to resume six party talks. An ultimate goal is to maintain peace and stability with Korea Peninsula. Okay, thanks. Sid? Well, I think the cases of Cuba, Iran, and Burma really prove parts of my presentation in terms of the willingness, the flexibility, the creativity that the United States can show when it has a credible dialogue partner, when it has a counterpart, with whom we've long had difficulties that makes a decision that breaking out of their isolation and engaging the United States, exploring a different path is in its national interest when the leadership of that country makes that decision. And in each of those cases, you know, skeptics could argue the jury's out, but in any case, we had three instances where, you know, the country responded to, you know, our offer to reach out a hand to those who would unclench their fists. I think it shows U.S. intent and bandwidth. Lord knows we've put together a team on North Korea that has a lot of experience. Sung Kim, Danny Russell, myself, Evan, Medeiros, and Allison Hook over at the NSC, not to mention, you know, the relentless pursuit of diplomatic solutions that our leadership has demonstrated repeatedly. There is no question a bandwidth on North Korea. You know, the challenge we face now and have faced over the last six years is Pyongyang's responsiveness and their commitment to return to what we have called authentic, incredible six-party negotiations. We have shown a flexibility, as you know, toward talks with North Korea. We're not afraid of talking to North Korea. We're not ideologically opposed to talking to North Korea. There's a value exploratory talks. My probe prod and prove that we would probe their intentions, prod them to make the right decisions, and prove propositions that we assume about North Korea's intent. We've shown that flexibility to engage the DPRK unilaterally. To such a degree, I think, one can conclude that, you know, clearly the statement that Pyongyang wants nothing more than a bilateral relationship with the United States really has to be questioned at some point. And indeed, the lesson that we've learned through our past two decades or so of denuclearization diplomacy is the need to make this a multilateral issue, to work cooperatively with China to engage the other six-party partners, critical partners, the Republic of Korea, Japan, and Russia at the six-party talks table are the five countries that whose commitments to the DPRK provide the most opportune optimal environment in which it could move down the path of denuclearization and secure the security assurances, the assistance, the development that it purports to want through this process. So at the same time, for six-party talks to be authentic and credible, they have to be about denuclearization. We need to be at the table talking about how the program is halted, how we move beyond a halt to disablement, get back on the road that you had worked so hard during the Bush administration, which Chris Hill brought to, you know, as far as we could move in the 2008 period to resume that path has been our goal. And that's why, again, we have stated that National Security Advisor Rice back in November, I believe, at Georgetown, you hosted that, you know, said that it would be hard to see negotiations as being credible well, you know, the program continues to operate. And that's the type of, they're not really preconditions, it's just what authentic and credible negotiations would look like. And we are working hard, and there's a, I think there's a five-party consensus that resumes six-party talks need to be about denuclearization, that the program needs to be halted and North Korea needs to resume down that path. And I think there's also a consensus that the multilateral way forward is the best possible solution toward that goal. And that's why we keep working at it. That's why we keep, you know, repeated diplomacy meeting with our other four-party partners and trying to meet with Pyongyang, but right now they're simply not responding. As our ROK colleagues are finding in their own efforts to try to engage in DPRK, they're simply not responsive right now. And then what about John's question about preconditions? Are there preconditions that are coming back? I wouldn't use the word preconditions. What we're looking for is six-party talks that are authentic and credible by the fact that they're leading the concrete denuclearization steps, that we're not going to the table in going through the litany of complaints and secondary issues that aren't directly related to denuclearization, but that there's a clear signal from the DPRK that it is, you know, its programs are gonna be halted, all of its programs, its uranium enrichment programs, plutonium program, its missile launches, including satellite launches, its nuclear tests that, well, authentic and credible negotiations are underway, these programs would be halted. And then we could move back down that path of denuclearization that, you know, the September 19th statement spells out so clearly in the commitments of all the parties. Yeah, I mean, I tend to agree with you. I mean, I think that there's a lot of speculation as to whether they're preconditions or things of this nature, but it's not like North Korea is new to the table. They've been in this negotiation for a long time and they know what the steps are. I mean, they know what the signals are and what the steps are to get back and it just seems like they're not interested in sending any of those signals right now. But before we go to the audience, let me just ask you one other question and it's kind of an unfair question, but I'm gonna ask you that anyway, which is what do you think the North Koreans have learned from the Iran negotiation and where we are on the Iran negotiation? Well, since you said the North Koreans, I'll open that up to maybe all 20 million of them, rather than trying to speculate on what Kim Jong-un has learned. Because I think the lesson of Iran, again, is the flexibility. It's the same lesson that Cuba and Burma brings. Flexibility, the creativity, the commitment to negotiations, the commitment to reach out to countries with whom we've had long had differences, to pursue opportunities, to maintain capabilities, not do so naively, to do so with pragmatism and principles, but pursue opportunities for dialogue, to imagine and begin to pursue transformation of a relationship that this is within the realm of possible. That whatever the internal and externally propagated narrative may be out of the DPRK leadership about hostile United States that is out to crush North Korea and refuses to talk that indeed, that is not the case, that we seek negotiations, that we seek a different path, that we and the other four parties, and indeed, the entire international community is looking for this type of policy shift in Pyongyang, and that policy shift would be positively responded to. Now, for those within DPRK regime that feel an undying commitment to pursue a capability, even if it brings with it great economic deprivation and diplomatic isolation, I really hate to think about what the lesson learned is. They may not have learned any lesson. If they would have learned any lesson, then we would have perhaps seen it earlier. And then Professor Zhao, in your comments, you mentioned that there's a very good relationship between Ji Jinping and Pak Ge Na. And I guess the question is from your perspective, so there's clearly a strong bilateral economic relationship. They signed the beginning of an FTA agreement recently. But is there a, in your mind, is there a strategic angle to China's courting of South Korea? Is there a strategic angle? Do they see this as, while there's strong economic interest in the relationship, do they see this also as an opportunity to try to move South Korea away from the sort of traditional U.S.-based alliance network that South Korea has been such a big part of, or is that something that is not really feasible in your opinion? Very good question, Victor. My early paper, a different topic, a developer notion called the due leadership in Asia Pacific. That is, U.S. and China have different strengths in different fields. That is, China emerging as a leading influence in terms of economic trade finance, which demonstrated by the most recent AIIB development. At the same time, United States still a dominant power in the dimension of military and security and a political influence. Many countries in the region, they may make a different choices. That is economically more dependent on relations with China, but the security and the politically aligned with the United States. Same, this kind of situation with Korea, South Korea, Australia very clear, Japan still debating the issue. So, to me, it's kind of a reality that is economically China and South Korea closer. But militarily, U.S. and South Korea still maintain its alliance. So, in that sense, we do see a rapid development and the improvement under Park Geun-hae. We understand the Lee Min-ba a little bit distant with Beijing, but Park Geun-hae, we, one example, not only FDA, last year Park Geun-hae took 71 member delegation to Beijing. Many cooperation leaders and others. Early last year when she visited Washington, it's only 54 members. It's a big delegation, but China even bigger. So, I would say that because of the economic stakes with that more than the development bilateral relations between China and South Korea, even more than that, there are so-called comprehensive relationship with culture and social interactions. We understand that Park Geun-hae literally, the only non-English, non-Chinese speaker who can deliver lecture in both English and Chinese. It's very rare, this kind of talent. And the Chinese society, at least, really like that kind of gesture. Park Geun-hae visited He An in one of her visits. So, all of that indicating close ties. I guess China also realistic enough, thinking that it's not able to even take a lead in military and the political dimension. So, China would accept the basic fact that South Korea is one of the very close allies to the United States. But at the same time, we do see in many policy choices South Korea may tend in a way it's kind of neutral and selective. I was told, for example, the most recent round of AIIB development. So, already, I was told, it's predecided that South Korea would join. But purposely waited until not only British, France, Italy, but also other members join. And then South Korea, at last minutes, announced that would not offend Washington in a way. So, I guess this reflect a kind of a clever of diplomacy but also reflect reality between China, United States, and South Korea. Thanks, thanks. Yeah, I mean, I think one of the reasons why the big difference between E-Myeong-Bak and Pak-Gene in terms of relations with China is that, of course, it was during E-Myeong-Bak that you had North Korean behavior that really tested the China-South Korea relationship like the Chan-An sinking and the Waipido shelling. And under Pak-Gene, we really haven't had the North Korea event that really tests the China-South Korea relationship. I mean, and that's a good thing. I mean, that's a good thing that it's been that way. So, well, thanks for those various student observations. We'll now go to the audience to have some questions and answer. The first question goes to Chris and then we'll go here. And we have Mike Runners who will give you a mic. Chris Nelson, Nelson Report, over here. Thanks so much, great discussion as always. Sid has repeatedly talked about something that's really important and that is how to sharpen the choices. So I wanted to ask a question with two parts about sharpening, first on the economic side of it and then second on something that hasn't come up yet and that's the human rights side. As long as China and now presumably Russia are going to continue fairly deep economic relations with the DPRK, what does sharper the choice mean? And aren't we sort of stuck in a contradiction there in a sense that we want them to develop a better economy because that opens things up and yet if they develop a better economy and they're nukes, then my God, we've got the worst of both worlds. We've got an economically successful legal estate. How do we do? So I think it'd be interesting to see how we think about how you think about that contradiction and our Chinese and Russian friends continuing their economics award. How do you sharpen it? And then is perhaps the human rights area, particularly with the UN report and all that, is that an area to sharpen choices for North Korea and if so, how? Because it seems like we're chasing our tails a bit and it's not anybody's fault. It's just what we're dealing with. So thanks. Yeah, very difficult but insightful questions and certainly ones that we talk about and think about often. You characterized the growing DPRK Russia, DPRK China economic relationships as fairly deep. And I think that is an important question to move beyond the headlines and to look at, first of all, what the true substance is and then secondly, to ask the question about whether, when we proclaim Byung Jin, this dual pursuit policy as a dead end as we have publicly and we say in more specific terms that North Korea will not attain its economic development objectives as long as it refuses to denuclearize. It's not a, it's meant to be intimidating or coercive language. It's just a conclusion that when you look at the international sanctions regime that DPRK is under as focused as it is on the WMD capabilities, you know, it's clear and the outlier status that the DPRK has, not only because it's denuclearization program but because of its ignoring of international norms and laws and standards and its human rights issue that we're all familiar with the package that DPRK will not be able to attain its broad economic goals unless it chooses a different path. And to the degree to which there will be rising expectations perhaps even with some of the development that we've heard is taking place, the improvement of economic conditions on the ground, the rising expectations of the North Korean people as information flows increasingly into the DPRK. The pressure that challenges, the pressure will grow that challenges the policy path that the leadership has chosen. And so, you know, what we need to make sure is that Pyongyang hears a stereophonic sound certainly from the other four members of the Six-Party Talks but from the international community is that the true peace and prosperity it seeks will only come through denuclearization. You raised the human rights issue and it's a very important issue. It's something that is obviously a very high priority to follow on the excellent commission of inquire report and the momentum that's been gained in that realm and my colleague, special envoy Bob King works extremely hard with the international community and that's a key point. This is an international issue. US is deeply concerned about the situation in North Korea but it's not standing alone as the only country. The international community has resoundedly pointed to the results of the commission of inquire report the need to hold those responsible for the atrocities contained in that report accountable. And that will also be first and foremost something we need to do. It's the morally correcting to do. It's what, you know, why the COI was stood up and conducted and the report issued. Most importantly, it sends another signal to the DPRK that it's behavior outside of the international system. It's near anachronistic behavior in this day and age is simply not going to be accepted by the international community. That's why we said that the pursuit of denuclearization and improved human rights situation in North Korea are not mutually exclusive goals and we can pursue both simultaneously and they're reinforcing. Thanks. Yes, any question here? Thank you very much for your great conversation. My name is Takahiro Motegi. I'm the CSIS Japan Affairs, Japan's chair visiting fellow. I'd like to ask you a question to Zhao Qiansheng, Laoshi. I'd like to ask you the question about the limitation that you mentioned. So I think China had a very big influence to North Korea and what I want to ask you is what is the biggest reason that China's influence has decreased to North Korea? Does it make sense? Yeah, thank you very much. So what's the biggest reason that China's influence has decreased? Yeah. It's a thing you early pointed out correctly. China has much bigger economic bilateral trade like you mentioned 45 times with South Korea than with North Korea, DPRK. So economically, China much closer to South Korea that is also conducive for China its own modernization from early time but now global so-called China dream and all those kind of... So in other words, North Korea, the portion of importance, I would say, decline over the time. By the same token, North Korea has increasingly indicate its preference to develop a relations with Washington and at the same time, China had internal policy debate, particularly over whether the amount of economic including food and energy would be maintained the same or would reduce. So a lot of this kind of a policy debate, I'm not sure about exactly what the amount now, energy and food, but I was told it's declined, reduced over the time. So the importance declined and the supply declined that also making I would say China's influence over Pyongyang also had limitation. So that's pretty much the current situation. Having said that, like I mentioned earlier, internally there are another school of thought emphasizing should restore or should recover the relations with Pyongyang. Nevertheless, it's not totally up to Beijing is pretty much to see whether North Korea as we mentioned earlier many diplomatic activities from Pyongyang is not stable, is sometimes not predictable. So one cannot rule out a possibility that is all of a sudden there is an improvement relationship between Pyongyang and Beijing leading to a top leaders meeting. But we have not yet seen that development yet. Mike. Following up on the last question, you talked about the internal debate over China's policy towards North Korea and you mentioned sort of old school approach of wanting to maintain North Korea as a buffer or a barrier. I'm wondering about the other side of that debate, the people on the other side of that debate, are they simply saying the negative, no, we need to reassess our relationship and move away from this old formula or are there positive concrete proposals they're putting forward for a new type of relationship with North Korea? And Ambassador Saylor, if related to that, I could ask you, obviously there's been traditional Chinese concern over the security of the Korean Peninsula, including American presence there. Do you think there's usefulness and prospect for some sort of exploratory talks where the cooperation between US and China actually starts to include some sort of agreement over future security arrangements that would address these Chinese concerns? Yeah. To answer your question about another side of debate, I guess one word can be used to make a summary that is liability. That group of thought, saying that North Korea may no longer be an asset to Chinese national interest, but rather liability. So China should further reduce its relationship with Pyongyang by meaning of that it's a nuclear test. This really disregard China's warning number of times so not do it, but Pyongyang just continue. And one of them even during the Chinese New Year time and then very close to North Korea-China border, that kind of behavior really upset many Chinese scholars, think tank, policy makers. So a few years back, there was a journal in China called a strategy and management. And there was even an article published proposing we should have a new thinking of a career policy. We should move away from traditional thinking. But of course that kind of thing was criticized. It's not really official, but the very fact, that kind of article even was published is kind of an interesting development. So what I'm saying here is we do see the over different the conference. That same journal also published a group of articles about Japan policy saying that we should have a new thinking of Japan policy. So like I mentioned earlier, there are already much more pluralistic in terms of different strategic thinking among scholars, think tanks, debating the issue. And particularly with another uncertain question is about the future development of North Korea. Remember, North Korea mentioned a number of times it would also emphasize in economic development to improve people's living standard. So a huge question is that whether North Korea would be able to so-called follow footsteps of China's reform, you know, China opening. In early time, the practice is whenever like a Kim Jong-un, Kim Jong-un, not Kim Jong-un, but Kim Jong-yoo. When leader from North Korea visit China, Chinese leaders always took them to Shanghai and Shenzhen as a showcase here. Same thing with Burma, Burma's leader, military leader. That is maybe this is the way you should. But so there's a huge debate whether North Korea would actually could be able to follow. So far now is we don't really see that happening, but that's always a potential. On the question of a future Korean Peninsula and what type of force posture there'd be, what type of deterrence would be necessary? It is the, you know, it stretches the hypothetical but, you know, that said, the September 19th, 2005 joint statement, you know, included language in there on the responsibility of the other five parties in response to North Korea moving down the road to denuclearization of showing mutual respect for sovereignty of normalizing relations and of course negotiating a permanent peace regime. As we began to make progress in implementing the September 19th statement with the first and second phase action statements. In fact, a working group called Northeast Asia Peace and Security Mechanism was established that was, you know, based upon the idea that once denuclearization began to unfold, we would begin work on those elements related to confidence building measures on the regime. And we've always asserted, of course, that it's very difficult to think of confidence building measures. It's impossible to think of tension reduction as long as North Korea continues to refuse to denuclearize and in fact, quantitatively and qualitatively attempts to improve its arsenal. So it's premature to discuss that but certainly in terms of the quality of the discussion that we have with China, you know, these types of things in an ideal, you know, scenario moving forward could be discussed but right now we're at a point where, you know, the North Korea threat is not decreasing and it's really impossible to begin to think about, you know, such a scenario. Well, unfortunately we've run out of time so I wanna thank you both for taking the time to join us this morning. Thank you all for joining us here at CSIS. Thanks to GPF for working with us on this and all of you have a nice day. Thank you very much. Thank you. Thank you.