 CHAPTER X PART C. CHAPTER IV. ORDER OF PREEMONANCE, AMONG MOTIVES Of all these sorts of motives, goodwill is that of which the dictates. Footnote When a man is supposed to be prompted by any motive to engage or not to engage in such or such an action, it may be of use for the convenience of discourse to speak of such motive as giving birth to an imaginary kind of law or dictate, joining him to engage or not to engage in it. And footnote Taken in a general view are surest of coinciding with those of the principle of utility. For the dictates of utility are neither nor less than the dictates of the most extensive and enlightened, that is, well-advised benevolence. Footnote for extensive C. CHAPTER IV. VALUE and CHAPTER VI. SENSIBILITY, PARAGRAPHE XXI. Footnote for well-advised C. CHAPTER IX. CONSCIOUSNESS and footnote The dictates of the other motive may be comfortable to those of utility or repugnant as it may happen. In this, however, it is taken for granted that in the case in question the dictates of benevolence are not contradicted by those of a more extensive, that is, enlarged benevolence. Now, when the dictates of benevolence as respecting the interests of a certain set of persons are repugnant to the dictates of the same motive, as respecting the more important footnote or valuable C. CHAPTER IV. VALUE and footnote The more important interests of another set of persons, the former dictates, it is evident, are repealed as it were by the latter, and the man, were he to be governed by the former, could scarcely, with propriety, be said to be governed by the dictates of benevolence? On this account were the motives on both sides sure to be alike present to a man's mind. The case of such a repugnancy would hardly be worth distinguishing, since the partial benevolence might be considered as swallowed up in the more extensive. If the former prevailed and governed the action, it must be considered as not owing its birth to benevolence, but to some other motive. If the latter prevailed, the former might be considered as having no effect. But the case is that a partial benevolence may govern the action without entering into any direct competition with the more extensive benevolence, which would forbid it, because the interests of the less numerous assemblage of persons may be present to a man's mind at a time when those of the more numerous are either not present or if present make no impression. It is in this way that the dictates of this motive may be repugnant to utility, yet still be the dictates of benevolence. What makes those of private benevolence comfortable upon the whole to the principle of utility is that in general they stand unopposed by those of public. If they are repugnant to them, it is only by accident. What makes them the more comfortable is that in a civilized society, in most of the cases in which they would of themselves be apt to run counter to those of public benevolence, they find themselves opposed by stronger motives of the self-regarding class which are played off against them by the laws, and that it is only in cases where they stand unopposed by the other more salutary dictates that they are left free. An act of injustice or cruelty committed by a man for the sake of his father or his son is punished and with reason as much as if it were committed for his own. After good will, the motive of which the dictates seem to have the next best chance for coinciding with those of utility is that of the love of reputation. There is but one circumstance which prevents the dictates of this motive from coinciding in all cases with those of the former. This is that men in their likings and dislikings, in the disposition they manifest to annex to any mode of conduct, their approbation or their disapprobation, and in consequence to the person who appears to practice it, their good or their ill will, do not govern themselves exclusively by the principle of utility. Sometimes it is the principle of asceticism they are guided by, sometimes the principle of sympathy and antipathy. There is another circumstance which diminishes not their conformity to the principle of utility but only their efficacy in comparison with the dictates of the motive of benevolence. The dictates of this motive will operate as strongly in secret as in public, whether it appears likely that the conduct which they recommend will be known or not. Those of the love of reputation will coincide with those of benevolence only in proportion as a man's conduct seems likely to be known. This circumstance, however, does not make so much difference as at first sight might appear. Acts in proportion as they are material are apt to become known, and in point of reputation the slightest suspicion often serves for proof. Besides, if an act be a disreputable one, it is not any assurance a man can have of the secrecy of the particular act in question, that will, of course, surmount the objections he may have against engaging in it. Though the act in question should remain secret, it will go towards forming a habit which may give birth to other acts that may not meet with the same good fortune. There is no human being, perhaps, who is at years of discretion, on whom considerations of this sort have not some weight, and they have more weight upon a man in proportion to the strength of his intellectual powers and the firmness of his mind. As in restraining a man from acts towards which, from the view of the disrepute annexed to them, as well as from any other cause, he has contracted an aversion. The influence of habit in such cases is a matter of fact which, though not readily accounted for, is acknowledged an indubitable. Footnote, strictly speaking, habit, being but a fictitious entity, and not really anything distinct from the acts or perceptions by which it is said to be formed, cannot be the cause of anything. The enigma, however, may be satisfactorily solved upon the principle of association, of the nature and force of which a very satisfactory recount may be seen in Dr. Priestly's edition of Heartly on Man. After the dictates of the love of reputation come, as it should seem, those of the desire of amity. The former are disposed to coincide with those of utility, inasmuch as they are disposed to coincide with those of benevolence. Now those of the desire of amity are apt to also coincide in a certain sort with those of benevolence. But the sort of benevolence with the dictates of which the love of reputation coincides is the more extensive, that with which those of the desire of amity coincide, the less extensive. Those of the love of amity have still, however, the advantage of those of the self-regarding motives. The former, at one period or another of his life, disposes man to contribute to the happiness of a considerable number of persons. The latter, from the beginning of life to the end of it, confine themselves to the care of that single individual. The dictates of the desire of amity, it is plain, will approach nearer to a coincidence with those of the love of reputation, and thence, with those of utility, in proportion, ceteris paribus to the number of the persons whose amity a man has occasion to desire. And hence it is, for example, that an English member of parliament, with all his own weaknesses, and all the follies of the people whose amity he has to cultivate, is probably, in general, a better character than the secretary of a vizier at Constantinople, or of a naib in Hindustan. The dictates of religion are, under the infinite diversity of religions, so extremely variable that it is difficult to know what general account to give of them, or in what rank to place the motive they belong to. Upon dimension of religion, people's first thoughts turn naturally to the religion they themselves profess. This is a great source of miscalculation, and has a tendency to place this sort of motive in a higher rank than it deserves. The dictates of religion would coincide, in all cases, with those of utility, were there being, who is the object of religion, universally supposed to be as benevolent as he is supposed to be wise and powerful, and were the notions entertained of his benevolence at the same time as correct as those which are entertained of his wisdom and his power. Unhappily, however, neither of these is the case. He is universally supposed to be all-powerful, for by the deity, what else does any man mean than the being, whatever he be, by whom every thing is done? And as to knowledge, by the same rule that he should know one thing he should know another. These notions seem to be as correct for all material purposes as they are universal, but among the votaries of religion, of which number the multifarious fraternity of Christians is but a small part, there seem to be but few, I will not say how few, who are real believers in his benevolence. They call him benevolent in words, but they do not mean that he is so in reality. They do not mean that he is benevolent as a man is conceived to be benevolent. They do not mean that he is benevolent in the only sense in which benevolence has a meaning. For if they did, they would recognize that the dictates of religion could be neither more nor less than the dictates of utility. Not a title different, not a less or more. But the case is that on a thousand occasions they turn their backs on the principle of utility. They go astray after the strange principles it antagonizes. Sometimes it is the principle of asceticism. Sometimes the principle of sympathy and antipathy. Footnote. Chapter 2. Principles and verse. Paragraph 28. And footnote. According to them, the idea they bear in their minds on such occasions is but too often the idea of malevolence. To which idea, stripping it of its own proper name, they bestow the specious appellation of the social motive. Footnote. Sometimes, in order the better to conceal the cheat, from their own eyes doubtless as well as from others, they set up a phantom of their own which they call justice. Whose dictates are to modify, which being explained means to oppose, the dictates of benevolence. But justice, in the only sense in which it has a meaning, is an imaginary personage, feigned for the convenience of discourse, whose dictates are the dictates of utility, applied to certain particular cases. Justice then is nothing more than an imaginary instrument, employed to forward on certain occasions and by certain means the purposes of benevolence. The dictates of justice are nothing more than a part of the dictates of benevolence, which, on certain occasions, are applied to certain objects, to wit, to certain actions. And footnote. The dictates of religion, in short, are no other than the dictates of that principle which has been already mentioned under the name of the theological principle. Footnote. C. 2. Principles Adverse, etc. End footnote. These, as has been observed, are just as it may happen, according to the biases of the person in question. Copies of the dictates of one or other of the three original principles, sometimes indeed of the dictates of utility, but frequently of those of asceticism, or those of sympathy and intipathy. In this respect they are only on a par with the dictates of the love of reputation. In another they are below it. The dictates of religion are in all places intermixed, more or less, with dictates unconformable to those of utility, deduced from test, well or ill interpreted, of the writings held for sacred by each sect, unconformable by imposing practices sometimes inconvenient to a man's self, sometimes pernicious to the rest of the community. The sufferings of uncalled martyrs, the calamity of holy wars and religious persecutions, the mischiefs of intolerant laws, objects which can hear only be glanced at, not detailed, are so many additional mischiefs over and above the number of those which were ever brought into the world by the love of reputation. On the other hand, it is manifest that with respect to the power of operating in secret, the dictates of religion have the same advantage over those of the love of reputation and the desire of amity, as is possessed by the dictates of benevolence. Happily, the dictates of religion seem to approach nearer and nearer to a coincidence with those of utility every day. But why? Because the dictates of the moral sanction do so, and those coincide with or are influenced by these, men of the worse religions influenced by the voice and practice of the surrounding world borrow continually a new and a new leaf out of the book of utility, and with these in order not to break with their religion, they endeavour, sometimes with violence enough, to patch together and adorn the repositories of their faith. As to the self-regarding and the social motives, the order that takes place among these and the preceding one, in point of extra-regarding influence, is too evident to need insisting on. As to the order that takes place among the motives of the self-regarding class, considered in comparison with one another, there seems to be no difference which, on this occasion, would be worth mentioning. With respect to the dissociative motive, it makes a difference with regard to its extra-regarding effects, from which of two sources it originates, whether from self-regarding or from social considerations. The displeasure you conceive against Taiman may be founded either on some act which offends you, in the first instance, or on an act which offends you no otherwise than because you look upon it as being prejudicial to some other party on whose behalf you interest yourself, which other party may be, of course, either a determinate individual or an assemblage of individuals, determinate or indeterminate. It is obvious enough that a motive, though in itself the social may, by issuing from a social origin, possess a social tendency, and that its tendency, in this case, is likely to be the more social, the more enlarged the description is of the persons whose interests you espouse. Displeasure venting itself against Taiman, on account of a mischief supposed to be done by him to the public, may be more social in its effects than any good will, the exertions of which are confined to an individual. When a man has it in contemplation to engage in any action, he is frequently acted upon at the same time by the force of diverse motives, one motive or set of motives acting in one direction, another motive or set of motives acting as it were in an opposite direction. The motives on one side disposing him to engage in the action, those on the other, disposing him not to engage in it. Now any motive, the influence of which tends to dispose him to engage in the action in question, may be termed an impelling motive. Any motive, the influence of which tends to dispose him not to engage in it, a restraining motive. But these appellations may of course be interchanged according as the act is of the positive kind or the negative. It has been shown that there is no sort of motive but may give birth to any sort of action. It follows therefore that there are no two motives but may come to be opposed to one another. Where the tendency of the act is bad, the most common case is for it to have been dictated by a motive either of the self-regarding or of the dissocial class. In such case the motive of benevolence has commonly been acting, though ineffectually in the character of a restraining motive. An example may be of use to show the variety of the contending motives by which a man may be acted upon at the same time. Berlin, a Catholic, at a time when it was generally thought meritorious among Catholics to extirpate protestants, was ordered by his king, Charles IX of France, to fall privately upon colony, a protestant, and assassinate him. His answer was, Excuse me, sir, but I'll fight him with all my heart. Footnote. The idea of the case here supposed is taken from an anecdote in real history but varies from it in several particulars. End footnote. Here, then, were all the three forces above mentioned including that of the political sanction acting upon him at once, but the political sanction, or at least so much of the force of it as such a mandate from such a sovereign, issued on such an occasion, might be supposed to carry with it, he was enjoined to put colony to death in the way of assassination. By the religious sanction, that is, by the dictates of religious zeal, he was enjoined to put him to death in any way. By the moral sanction, or in other words by the dictates of honour, that is, of the love of reputation, he was permitted, which permission, when coupled with the mandates of his sovereign, operated he conceived as an injunction, to fight the adversary upon equal terms. By the dictates of enlarged benevolence, supposing the mandate to be unjustifiable, he was enjoined not to attempt his life in any way, but to remain at peace with him. Supposing the mandate to be unjustifiable by the dictates of private benevolence, he was enjoined not to meddle with him at any rate. Among the confusion of repugnant dictates, Krulin, it seems, gave the preference in the first place to those of honour, in the next place, to those of benevolence. He would have been accepted, as it was not. He remained at peace. Here a multitude of questions might arise. Supposing the dictates of the political sanction to follow the mandate of the sovereign, of what kind were the motives which they afforded him for compliance? The answer is, of the self-regarding kind at any rate. Inasmuch as, by the superstition, it was in the power of the sovereign to punish him for non-compliance, or reward him for compliance. Did they afford him the motive of religion? I mean, independently of the circumstance of heresy above mentioned, the answer is, yes, if the notion was that it was God's pleasure he should comply with them. No, if it was not. Did they afford him the motive of the love of reputation? Yes, if it was his notion that the world would expect and require that he should comply with them. No, if it was not. Did they afford him that of benevolence? Yes, if it was the notion that the community would upon the whole be the better for his complying with them. No, if it was not. But did the dictates of the political sanction, in the case in question, actually follow the mandates of the sovereign? In other words, what such a mandate legal? This, we see, is a mere question of local jurisprudence, altogether foreign to the present purpose. What is here said about the goodness and badness of motives is far from being a mere matter of words. There will be occasions to make use of it hereafter for various important purposes. I shall have need of it for the sake of dissipating various prejudices, which are of the service to the community, sometimes by cherishing the flame of civil dissensions, at other times by obstructing the course of justice. It will be shen that in the case of many offenses, the consideration of the motive is a most material one. For that, in the first place, it makes a very material offense in the magnitude of the mischief. CHAPTER VII DISPOSITIONS AND FOOTNOAT In the next place, that it is easy to be a certain, and thence may be made a ground for a difference in the demand for punishment. But that, in other cases, is altogether incapable of being a certain. And that, were it capable of being ever so well a certain good or bad, it could make no difference in the demand for punishment. That in all cases, the motive that may happen to govern a prosecutor is a consideration totally immaterial, once may be seen the mischievousness of the prejudice that is so apt to be entertained against informers. And the consequence it is of that the judge, in particular, should be proof against the influence of such delusions. Lastly, the subject of motives is one with which it is necessary to be acquainted in order to pass a judgment on any means that may be proposed for combating offenses in their sources. But before the theoretical foundation for these practical observations can be completely laid, it is necessary we should say something on the subject of this position, which accordingly will furnish matter for the ensuing chapter. End of Part C of Chapter 10. Chapter 11 of an Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Recording by Adam Ringeth. An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation by Jeremy Bentham. Chapter 11. Human Dispositions in General. In the foregoing chapter it has been shown at large that goodness or badness cannot with any propriety be predicated of motives. Is there nothing then about a man that may properly be termed good or bad when, on such or such an occasion, he suffers himself to be governed by such or such a motive? Yes, certainly. His Disposition. Now, disposition is a kind of fictitious entity feigned for the convenience of discourse in order to express what there is supposed to be permanent in a man's frame of mind where, on such or such an occasion, he has been influenced by such or such a motive to engage in an act which, as it appeared to him, was of such or such a tendency. It is with disposition as with everything else. It will be good or bad according to its effects. According to the effects it has in augmenting or diminishing the happiness of the community. A man's disposition may accordingly be considered in two points of view. According to the influence it has either one on his own happiness or two on the happiness of others. Viewed in both of these lights together or in either of them indiscriminately, it may be termed, on the one hand, good, on the other, bad, or in flagrant cases, depraved. Viewed in the former of these lights, it has scarcely any peculiar name which has as yet been appropriated to it. It might be termed, though but inexpressively, frail or infirm on the one hand, sound or firm on the other. Viewed in the other light, it might be termed beneficent or meritorious on the one hand, pernicious or mischievous on the other. Now of that branch of a man's disposition, the effects of which regard in the first instance only himself, there needs not much to be said here. To reform it when bad is the business rather of the moralist than the legislator, nor is it susceptible of those various modifications which make so material difference in the effects of the other. Again, with respect to that part of it the effects whereof regard others in the first instance, it is only in as far as it is of a mischievous nature that the penal branch of law has any immediate concern with it. In as far as it may be of a beneficent nature, it belongs to a hitherto but little cultivated and as yet unnamed branch of law which might be styled remuneratory. A man, then, is said to be of a mischievous disposition when, by the influence of no matter what motives, he is presumed to be more apt to engage or form intentions of engaging in acts which are apparently of a pernicious tendency than in such as are apparently of a beneficial tendency, of a meritorious or beneficent disposition in the opposite case. I say presumed for, by the supposition, all that appears is one single action attended with one single train of circumstances. But from that degree of consistency and uniformity which experience is shown to be observable in the different actions of the same person, the probable existence, past or future, of a number of acts of a similar nature, is naturally and justly inferred from the observation of one single one. Under such circumstances, such as the motive proves to be in one instance, such as the disposition to be presumed to be in others. I say apparently mischievous. That is, apparently with regard to him, such as to him appear to possess that tendency. For from the mere event, independent of what to him it appears beforehand likely to be, nothing can be inferred on either side. If to him it appears likely to be mischievous, in such case, though in the upshot it should prove innocent or even beneficial, it makes no difference. There's not the less reason for presuming his disposition to be a bad one. If to him it appears likely to be beneficial or innocent, in such case, though in the upshot it should prove pernicious, there's not the more reason on that account for presuming his disposition to be a good one. And here we see the importance of the circumstances of intentionality, consciousness, unconsciousness, and mis-supposal. The truth of these positions depends upon two others, both of them sufficiently verified by experience. The one is that in the ordinary course of things, the consequences of actions commonly turn out conformable to intentions. A man who sets up a butcher's shop and deals in beef when he intends to knock down an ox commonly does knock down an ox, though by some unlucky accident he may chance to miss his blow and knock down a man. He who sets up a grocer's shop and deals sugar when he intends to sell sugar commonly does sell sugar, though by some unlucky accident he may chance to sell arsenic in the room of it. The other is that a man who entertains intentions of doing mischief at one time is apt to entertain the like intentions at another. There are two circumstances upon which the nature of the disposition, as indicated by any act, is liable to depend. One, the apparent tendency of the act. Two, the nature of the motive which gave birth to it. This dependency is subject to different rules according to the nature of the motive. In stating them, I suppose all along the apparent tendency of the act to be, as it commonly is, the same as the real. One, where the tendency of the act is good, and the motive is of the self-regarding kind. In this case, the motive affords no inference on either side. It affords no indication of a good disposition, but neither does it afford any indication of a bad one. A baker sells his bread to a hungry man who asks for it. This we see is one of those acts of which, in other cases, the tendency is unquestionably good. The baker's motive is the ordinary commercial motive of pecuniary interest. It is plain that there's nothing in the transaction, thus stated, that can afford the least ground for presuming that the baker is a better or a worse man than any of his neighbors. Two, where the tendency of the act is bad, and the motive, as before, is of the self-regarding kind. In this case, the disposition indicated is a mischievous one. A man steals bread out of a baker's shop. This is one of those of which the tendency will readily be acknowledged to be bad. Why, and in what respects it is so, will be stated farther on. His motive, we will say, is out of pecuniary interest. The desire of getting the value of the bread for nothing. His disposition accordingly appears to be a bad one, for everyone will allow a thieves' disposition to be a bad one. Three, where the tendency of the act is good, and the motive is the purely social one of goodwill. In this case, the disposition indicated is a beneficent one. A baker gives a poor man a loaf of bread. His motive is compassion, a name given to the motive of benevolence, in particular cases of its operation. The disposition indicated by the baker in this case is such as every man will be ready enough to acknowledge to be a good one. Four, where the tendency of the act is bad, and the motive is the purely social one of goodwill. Even in this case, the disposition which the motive indicates is dubious. It may be a mischievous or a meritorious one, as it happens, according as the mischivousness of the act is more or less apparent. It may be thought that such a case of this sort exists, and that to suppose it is a contradiction in terms. For the act is one which, by the supposition, the agent knows to be a mischievous one. How then can it be that goodwill, that is the desire of doing good, could have been the motive that led him into it? To reconcile this, we must advert to the distinction between enlarged benevolence and confined. The motive that led him into it was that of confined benevolence. Had he followed the dictates of enlarged benevolence, he would not have done what he did. Now, although he followed the dictates of that branch of benevolence, which in any single instance of its exertion is mischievous, when opposed to the other, yet, as the cases which call for the exertion of the former are beyond comparison more numerous than those which call for the exertion of the latter, the disposition indicated by him in following the impulse of the former will often be such as in a man of the common run of men may be allowed to be a good one upon the whole. A man with a numerous family of children, on the point of starving, goes into a baker's shop, steals a loaf, divides it among the children, reserving none of it for himself. It will be hard to infer that that man's disposition is a mischievous one upon the whole. Alter the case, give him but one child, and that hungry perhaps, but in no imminent danger of starving, and now let the man set fire to a house full of people for the sake of stealing money out of it to buy the bread with. The disposition here indicated will hardly be looked upon as a good one. Another case will appear more difficult to decide than either. Ravaillac assassinated one of the best and wisest of sovereigns at a time when a good and wise sovereign, a blessing at all times so valuable to a state, was particularly precious, and that to the inhabitants of a populace and extensive empire. He is taken and doomed to the most excruciating tortures. His son, well persuaded of his being a sincere penitent, and that mankind, in case of his being at large, would have nothing more to fear from him, effectuates his escape. Is this, then, the sign of a good disposition in the son or of a bad one? Perhaps some will answer of a bad one. For, besides the interest which the nation has in the sufferings of such a criminal on the score of example, the future good behavior of such a criminal is more than anyone can have sufficient ground to be persuaded of. Well, then, let Ravaillac, the son, not facilitate his father's escape, but content himself with conveying poison to him that at the price of an easier death he may escape his torments. The decision will now perhaps be more difficult. The act is a wrong one, let it be allowed, and such as ought by all means to be punished, but is the disposition manifested by it a bad one? Because the young man breaks the laws in this one instance, is it probable that if let alone, he would break the laws in ordinary instances for the satisfaction of any inordinate desires of his own? The answer of most men would probably be in the negative. Five, where the tendency of the act is good and the motive is a semi-social one, the love of reputation. In this case, the disposition indicated is a good one. In a time of scarcity, a baker for the sake of getting the esteem of the neighborhood distributes bread gratis among the industrious poor. Let this be taken for granted and let it be allowed to be a matter of uncertainty whether he had any real feeling for the sufferings of those whom he is relieved or no. His disposition for all that cannot with any pretense of reason be termed otherwise than a good and beneficent one. It can only be in consequence of some very idle prejudice if it receives a different name. Six, where the tendency of the act is bad and the motive, as before, is a semi-social one, the love of reputation. In this case, the disposition which it indicates is more or less good or bad. In the first place, according as the tendency of the act is more or less mischievous, in the next place, according as the dictates of the moral sanction in the society in question approach more or less to a coincidence with those of utility. It does not seem probable that in any nation which is in a state of tolerable civilization, in short, in any nation which such rules as these can come to be consulted, the dictates of the moral sanction will so far recede from a coincidence with those of utility, that is, of enlightened benevolence, that the disposition indicated in this case can be otherwise than a good one upon the whole. An Indian receives an injury, real or imaginary, from an Indian of another tribe. He revenges it upon the person of his antagonist with the most excruciating torment. The case being that cruelties inflicted on such an occasion give him reputation in his own tribe. The disposition manifested in such a case can never be deemed a good one among a people ever so far degrees advanced in point of civilization above the Indians. A nobleman, to come back to Europe, contracts a debt with a poor tradesman. The same nobleman presently afterwards contracts a debt to the same amount to another nobleman at play. He's unable to pay both. He pays the whole debt to the companion of his amusements and no part of it to the tradesman. The disposition manifested in this case can scarcely be termed otherwise than a bad one. It is certainly, however, not so bad as if he had paid neither. The principle of love of reputation, or as it is called in the case of this partial application of it, honour, is here opposed to the worthier principle of benevolence and gets the better of it. But it gets the better also of the self-regarding principle of pecuniary interest. The disposition therefor which it indicates, although not so good a one as that in which the principle of benevolence predominates, is better than one in which the principle of self-interest predominates. He would be the better for having more benevolence, but would he be the better for having no honour? This seems to admit of great dispute. Seven. Where the tendency of the act is good and the motive is the semi-social one of religion. In this case, the disposition indicated by it, considered with respect to the influence of it on the man's conduct towards others, is manifestly a beneficent and meritorious one. A baker distributes bread gratis among the industrious poor. It is not that he feels for their distresses, nor is it for the sake of gaining reputation among his neighbours, is for the sake of gaining the favour of the deity to whom he takes for granted such conduct will be acceptable. The disposition manifested by such conduct is plainly what every man would call a good one. Eight. Where the tendency of the act is bad and the motive is that of religion as before. In this case, the disposition is dubious. It is good or bad and more or less good or bad in the first place as the tendency of the act is more or less mischievous. In the next place, according as the religious tenets of that person in question, approach more or less to a coincidence with the dictates of utility. It should seem from history that even in nations in a tolerable state of civilization in other respects, the dictates of religion have been found so far to recede from a coincidence with those of utility. In other words, from those of enlightened benevolence that the disposition indicated in this case may even be a bad one upon the whole. This however is no objection to the inference which it affords of a good disposition in those countries such as perhaps are most of the countries of Europe at present in which its dictates respecting the conduct of a man towards other men approach very nearly to a coincidence with those of utility. The dictates of religion in application to the conduct of a man and what concerns himself alone seem in most European nations to savor a good deal of the ascetic principle. But the obedience to such mistake in dictates indicates not any such disposition as is likely to break out into acts of pernicious tendency with respect to others. Instances in which the dictates of religion lead a man into acts which are pernicious in this latter view seem at present to be but rare, unless it be acts of persecution or in politic measures on the part of government where the law itself is either the principal actor or an accomplice in the mischief. Ravillac instigated by no other motive than this gave his country one of the most fatal stabs that a country ever received from a single hand. But happily the Ravillacs are but rare. They have been more frequent however in France than any other country during the same period. And it is remarkable that in every instance it is this motive that has produced them. When they do appear however nobody I suppose but such as themselves will be for terming a disposition such as they manifest a good one. It seems hardly to be denied that they are just so much the worse for their notions of religion and that had they been left to the sole guidance of benevolence and the love of reputation without any religion at all. It would have been but so much the better for mankind. One may say nearly the same thing perhaps of those persons who without any particular obligation have taken an active part in the execution of laws made for the punishment of those who have the misfortune to differ with the magistrate in matters of religion much more of the legislator himself who has put it in their power. If Louis XIV had had no religion France would not have lost 800,000 of its most valuable subjects. The same thing may be said of the authors of the wars called Holy Ones whether waged against persons called Infidels or persons branded with a still more odious name of heretics. In Denmark, not a great many years ago a sect is said to have arisen who by a strange perversion of reason took it into their heads that by leading to repentance murder or any other horrid crime might be made the road to heaven. It should all along however be observed that instances of this latter kind were always rare and that in almost all the countries of Europe instances of the former kind though once abundantly frequent have for some time ceased. In other countries however persecution at home or what produces a degree of restraint which is one part of the mistress of persecution I mean the disposition to persecute when so ever occasion happens is not yet at an end in so much that if there is no actual persecution it's only because there are no heretics and if there are no heretics it is only because there are no thinkers. Nine where the tendency of the act is good and the motive as before is the dissocial one of ill will. In this case the motive seems not to afford any indication on either side there is no indication of a good disposition but neither is it any indication of a bad one. You've detected a baker in selling short weight you prosecute him for the cheat it's not for the sake of gain that you engage in the prosecution but there is nothing to be got by it it's not from public spirit it's not for the sake of reputation for there is no reputation to be got by it it is not in the view of pleasing the deity it is merely on account of a quarrel you have with the man you prosecute. From the transaction as thus stated there is not seem to be anything to be said either in favor of your disposition or against it. The tendency of the act is good but you would not have engaged in it had it not been from a motive which there seems no particular reason to conclude will ever prompt you to engage in an act of the same kind to gain. Your motive is of that sort may, with least impropriety be termed a bad one but the act is of that sort which we're engaged in ever so often could never have any evil tendency nor indeed any other tendency than a good one. By the supposition the motive it happened to be dictated by was that of ill will but the act itself is of such a nature as to have wanted nothing but sufficient discernment on your part in order to have been dictated by the most enlarged benevolence. Now, from a man's having suffered himself to be induced to gratify his resentment by means of an act of which the tendency is good it by no means follows that he would be ready on another occasion through the influence of the same sort of motive to engage in any act of which the tendency is a bad one. The motive that impelled you was it a social one but what social motive could there have been to restrain you? None, but what might have been outweighed by a more enlarged motive of the same kind. Now, because that a social motive prevailed when it stood alone it by no means follows that it would prevail when it had a social one to combat it. Ten, where the tendency of the act is bad and the motive is a social one of benevolence. In this case the disposition it indicates is of course a mischievous one. The man who stole the bread from the baker as before did it with no other view than merely to impoverish and afflict him. Accordingly, when he had got the bread he did not eat it or sell it but destroyed it. That the disposition evidenced by such a transaction is a bad one is what everybody must perceive immediately. Thus much with respect to the circumstances from which the mischievousness of a man's disposition is to be inferred in the gross. We come now to the measure of that mischievousness or meritoriousness as resulting from those circumstances. Now, with meritorious acts and dispositions we have no direct concern in the present work. All that penal law is concerned to do is to measure the depravity of the disposition where the act is mischievous. To this object therefore we will here confine ourselves. It is evident that the nature of a man's disposition must depend upon the nature of the motives he is apt to be influenced by. In other words, upon the degree of his sensibility to the force of such and such motives. For his disposition is, as it were, the sum of his intentions. The disposition he is of during a certain period the sum or result of his intentions during that period. If of the acts he has been intending to gauge in during the supposed period those which are apparently of a mischievous tendency bear a large proportion to those which appear to him to be of the contrary tendency his disposition will be of the mischievous cast. If but a small proportion of the innocent or upright. Now intentions, like everything else are produced by the things that are their causes and the causes of intentions are motives. If on any occasion a man forms either a good or a bad intention it must be by the influence of some motive. When the act which a motive prompts a man to gauge in is of a mischievous nature it may, for distinction's sake, be termed a seducing or corrupting motive. In which case also any motive which, in opposition to the former, acts in the character of a restraining motive may be styled a tutelary, preservatory, or preserving motive. Tutelary motives may be distinguished into standing or constant and occasional. By standing tutelary motives I mean such an act with more or less force in all or at least in most cases tending to restrain a man from any mischievous acts he may be prompted to engage in and that with a force which depends upon the general nature of the act rather than upon any accidental circumstances with which any individual act of that sort may happen to be accompanied. By occasional tutelary motives I mean such motives as may chance to act in this direction or not according to the nature of the act and of the particular occasion on which the engaging in it is brought into contemplation. Now it has been shown that there is no sort of motive by which a man may not be prompted to engage in acts that are of a mischievous nature. That is, which may not come to act in the capacity of a seducing motive. It has been shown on the other hand that there are some motives which are remarkably less likely to operate in this way than others. It's also been shown that the least likely of all is that of benevolence or goodwill. The most common tendency of which it has been shown is to act in the character of a tutelary motive. It has also been shown that even when by accident it acts in one way in the character of a seducing motive still in another way it acts in the opposite character of a tutelary one. The motive of goodwill in as far as it respects the interest of one set of persons may prompt a man to engage in acts which are productive of mischief to another or more extensive set. But this is only because his goodwill is imperfect and confined, not taking into contemplation the interests of all the persons whose interests are at stake. The same motive where the affection it issued from more enlarged would operate effectually in the character of a constraining motive against that very act to which by the supposition it gives birth. The same sort of motive may therefore without any real contradiction or deviation from truth be ranked in the number of standing tutelary motives, notwithstanding the occasions in which it may act at the same time in the character of a seducing one. The same observation, nearly, may be applied to the semi-social motive of love of reputation. The force of this, like that of the former, is liable to be divided against itself. As in the case of goodwill the interests of some of the persons who may be the objects of that sentiment are liable to be at variance with those of others. So in the case of love of reputation the sentiments of some of the persons whose good opinion is desired may be at variance with the sentiments of other persons of that number. Now in the case of an act which is really of a mischievous nature it can scarcely happen that there shall be no persons whatever who will look upon it with an eye of disapprobation. It can scarcely ever happen therefore that an act really mischievous shall not have some part at least if not the whole of the force of this motive to oppose it nor therefore that this motive should not act with some degree of force in the character of a tutelary motive. This therefore may be set down as another article in the catalogue of standing tutelary motives. The same observation may be applied to the desire of amity though not in altogether equal measure. For notwithstanding the mischievousness of an act it may happen without much difficulty that all the persons for whose amity a man entertains any particular present desire which is accompanied with expectation may concur in regarding it with an eye rather of approbation than the contrary. This is but too apt to be the case among such fraternities as those of thieves, smugglers and many other denominations of offenders. This however is not constantly nor indeed most commonly the case. In so much that the desire of amity may still be regarded upon the whole as a tutelary motive were it only from the closeness of its connection with the love of reputation and it may be ranked among standing tutelary motives since where it does apply the force with which it acts depends not upon the occasional circumstances of the act which it opposes but upon principles as general as those upon which depend the action of the other semi-social motives. The motive of religion is not altogether in the same case with the three former. The force of it is not like theirs liable to be divided against itself. I mean in the civilized nations of modern times among whom the notion of the unity of the god head is universal. In times of classical antiquity otherwise. If a man got Venus on his side Pallas was on the other. If Aeolus was for him Neptune was against him. Aeneas with all his piety had but a partial interest in the court of heaven. That matter stands upon a different footing nowadays. In any given person the force of religion whatever it be is now all of it on one side. It may balance indeed on which side it shall declare itself. And it may declare itself as we have seen already in but too many instances on the wrong as well as on the right. It has been at least till lately perhaps is still accustomed so much to declare itself on the wrong side. And that in such material instances that on that account it seemed not proper to place it in point of social tendency on a level altogether with the motive of benevolence. Where it does act however as it does in by far the greatest number of cases in opposition to the ordinary seducing motives it acts like the motive of benevolence in a uniform manner not depending upon the particular circumstances that may attend the commission of the act but tending to oppose it merely on account of its mischievousness. And therefore with equal force in whatsoever circumstances it may be proposed to be committed. This therefore may also be added to the catalog of standing tutelary motives. As to the motives which may operate occasionally in the character of tutelary motives these, it has already been intimated are of various sorts and various degrees of strength in various offenses depending not only upon the nature of the offense but upon the accidental circumstances in which the idea of engaging in it may come in contemplation. Nor is there any sort of motive which may not come to operate in this character as may be easily conceived. A thief for instance may be prevented from engaging in a projected scheme of housebreaking by sitting too long over his bottle by a visit from his doxy by the occasion he may have to go elsewhere in order to receive his dividend of a former booty and so on. There are some motives however that seem more apt to act in this character than others. Especially as things are now constituted now that the law has everywhere opposed to the force of the principle seducing motives are an official tutelary motives of its own creation. Of the motives here meant it will be necessary to take a general view. They seem to be reducible to two heads. Viz. One. The love of ease. A motive put into action by the prospect of the trouble of the attempt. That is the trouble which it may be necessary to bestow in overcoming the physical difficulties that may accompany it. Viz. Two. Self-preservation. As opposed to the dangers to which a man may be exposed in the prosecution of it. These dangers may be either one of a purely physical nature or two dangers resulting from moral agency. In other words from the conduct of any such persons to whom the act, if known may be expected to prove obnoxious. But moral agency supposes knowledge with respect to the circumstances that are to have the effect of external motives in giving birth to it. Now the obtaining sure knowledge with respect to the commission of any obnoxious act on the part of any persons who may be disposed to make the agent suffer for it is called detection. And the agent concerning whom such knowledge is obtained is said to be detected. The dangers therefore which may threaten an offender from this quarter depend whatever they may be on the event of his detection and may therefore be all of them comprised under the article of the danger of detection. The danger depending upon detection may be divided again into two branches. One. That which may result from any opposition may be made to the enterprise by persons on the spot that is at the very time the enterprise is carrying on. Two. That which respects the legal punishment or to other suffering that may await at a distance upon the issue of the enterprise. It may be worth calling to mind on this occasion that among the tutelary motives which have been styled constant ones there are two of which the force depends, though not so entirely as the force of the occasional ones which have been just mentioned yet in a great measure upon the circumstance of detection. These it may be remembered are the love of reputation and the desire of amity. In proportion therefore as the chance of being detected appears greater these motives will apply with the greater force. With the less force as it appears less this is not the case with the two other standing tutelary motives of benevolence and that of religion. We are now in a condition to determine with some degree of precision what is to be understood by the strength of a temptation and what indication it may give of the degree of mischievousness in a man's disposition in the case of any offence. When a man is prompted to engage in any mischievous act we will say for shortness in an offence the strength of the temptation depends upon the ratio of seducing motives on the one hand and such of the occasional tutelary ones as the circumstances of the case call forth into action on the other. The temptation then may be said to be strong when the pleasure or advantage to be got from the crime is such as in the eyes of the offender must appear great in comparison of the trouble and danger that appear to him to accompany the enterprise. Slight or weak when that pleasure or advantage must appear small in comparison of such trouble and such a danger. It is plain the strength of the temptation depends not upon the force of the impelling that is of the seducing motives altogether. For let the opportunity be more favourable that is let the trouble or any branch of the danger be made less than before it will be acknowledged that the temptation is made so much stronger and on the other hand more favourable where in other words let the trouble or any branch of the danger be made greater than before the temptation will become so much the weaker. Now after taking account of such tutelary motives as have been styled occasional the only tutelary motives that can remain are those which have been termed standing ones but those which have been termed the standing tutelary motives are the same we've been styling social. The strength of the temptation in any case after deducting the force of the social motives is as the sum of the forces of the seducing to the sum of the forces of the occasional tutelary motives. It remains to be inquired what indication concerning the mischievousness or depravity of a man's disposition is afforded by the strength of the temptation in the case where any offence happens to have been committed. It appears then that the weaker the temptation is by which a man has been overcome the more depraved and mischievous it shows his disposition to have been. For the goodness of his disposition is measured by the degree of his sensibility to the actions of the social motives. In other words by the strength of the influence which those motives have over him. Now the less considerable the force is by which their influence on him has been overcome the more convincing is the proof that has been given of the weakness of that influence. Again the degree of a man's sensibility to the force of the social motives being given it is plain that the force with which those motives tend to restrain him from engaging in any mischievous enterprise will be as the apparent mischievousness of such enterprise that is as the degree of mischief with which it appears to him likely to be attended. In other words the less mischievous the offence appears to him to be the less averse he will be as far as he is guided by social considerations to engage in it the more mischievous the more averse. If then the nature of the offence is such as must appear to him highly mischievous and yet he engages in it notwithstanding it shows that the degree of his sensibility to the force of the social motives is at slight and consequently that his disposition is proportionably depraved. Moreover the less the strength of the temptation was the more pernicious and depraved does it show his disposition to have been. For the less the strength of the temptation was the less was the force which the influence of those motives had to overcome. The clearer therefore that has been given of the weakness of that influence. From what has been said it seems that for judging of the indication that is afforded concerning the depravity of a man's disposition by the strength of the temptation compared with the mischievousness of the enterprise the following rules may be laid down. Rule 1 the strength of the temptation being given the mischievousness of the disposition to be manifest by the enterprise is as the apparent mischievousness of the act. Thus it would show a more depraved disposition to murder a man for a reward of a guinea or falsely to charge him with a robbery for the same reward than to obtain the same sum from him by simple theft. The trouble he would have to take and the risk he would have to run being supposed to stand on the same footing in the one as in the other. Rule 2 the apparent mischievousness of the act being given a man's disposition is the more depraved the slider the temptation is by which he is being overcome. Thus it shows a more depraved and dangerous disposition if a man kill another out of mere sport as the emperor of Morocco Muley Muhammad is said to have done great numbers than out of revenge as Silla and Marius did thousands or in the view of self-preservation as Augustus killed many or even for Lucre as the same emperor is said to have killed some. And the effects of such a depravity on that part of the public which is apprised of it run in the same proportion. From Augustus some persons only had to fear under some particular circumstances. From Muley Muhammad every man had to fear at all times. Rule 3 The apparent mischievousness of the act being given the evidence which it affords of the depravity of a man's disposition is the less conclusive the stronger the temptation is by which he is being overcome. Thus if a poor man who is ready to die with hunger steal a loaf of bread it is a less explicit sign of depravity than if a rich man were to commit a theft to the same amount. It will be observed that in this rule all that is said is that the evidence of depravity is in this case the less conclusive it is not said that the depravity is positively the less. For in this case it is possible for anything that appears to the contrary that the theft might have been committed even had the temptation been not so strong. In this case the alleviating circumstance is only a matter of presumption. In the former alleviating circumstance is a matter of certainty. Rule 4 where the motive is of the dis social kind the apparent mischievousness of the act and the strength of the temptation being given the depravity is as the degree of deliberation with which it is accompanied. For in every man be his disposition never so depraved the social motives are those which wherever the self-regarding one stand neuter relate and determine the general tenor of his life. If the dis social motives are put in action it is only in particular circumstances and on particular occasions. The gentle but constant force of the social motives being for a while subdued. The general and standing bias of every man's nature is therefore towards that side to which the force of the social motives would determine him to adhere. This being the case the force of the social motives tends continually to put an end to that of the dis social ones. As in natural bodies the force of friction tends to put an end to that which is generated by impulse. Time then which wears away the force of the dis social motives adds to that of the social. The longer therefore a man continues on a given occasion under the dominion of the dis social motives the more convincing is the proof that it has been given of his insensibility to the force of the social ones. Thus it shows a worse disposition where a man lays a deliberate plan for beating his antagonist and beats him accordingly then if he were to beat him upon the spot in consequence of a sudden quarrel. And worse again if after having had him a long while together in his power he beats him at intervals and at his leisure. The depravity of disposition indicated by an act is a material consideration in several respects. Any mark of extraordinary depravity by adding to the terror already inspired by the crime and by holding up the offender as a person from whom there may be more mischief to be apprehended in future adds in that way to the demand for punishment. The article of disposition is of the more importance in as much as in measuring out the quantum of punishment the principle of sympathy and antipathy is apt to look at nothing else. A man who punishes because he hates and only because he hates such a man when he does not find anything odious in the disposition is not for punishing at all. And when he does he is not for carrying the punishment further than his hatred carries him. Hence the aversion we find so frequently expressed against the maxim that the punishment must rise with the strength of the temptation. A maxim the contrary of which as we shall see would be as cruel to offenders themselves as it would be subversive of the purposes of punishment. End of chapter 11 Recording by Adam Ringuth of an introduction to the principles of morals and legislation This is a LibriVox recording All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org Recording by Claude Banta An introduction to the principles of morals and legislation Chapter 12 Of the Consequences of a Mischievous Act Shapes in which the mischief of an act may show itself. Hitherto we have been speaking of the various articles or objects on which the consequences or tendency of an act may depend. Of the bear act itself of the circumstances it may have been or may have been supposed to be accompanied with of the consciousness a man may have had with respect to any such circumstances of the intentions that may have preceded the act of the motives that may have given birth to those intentions and of the disposition that may have been indicated by the connection between such intentions and such motives. We now come to speak of the consequences or tendency an article which forms the concluding link in all this chain of causes and effects involving in it the materiality of the whole. Now such part of this tendency as is of a mischievous nature is all that we have any direct concern with. To that therefore we shall here confine ourselves. The tendency of an act is mischievous when the consequences of it are mischievous. That is to say, either the certain consequences or the probable. The consequences, how many and whatsoever there may be of an act of which the tendency is mischievous, may such of them as our mischievous be conceived to constitute one aggregate body which may be termed the mischief of the act. This mischief may frequently be distinguished as it were into two shares or parcels, the one containing what may be called the primary mischief, the other what may be called the secondary. That share may be termed the primary which it sustained by an assignable individual or a multitude of assignable individuals. That share may be termed the secondary which is taking its origin from the former, extends itself over the whole community or over some other multitude of unassignable individuals. The primary mischief of an act may again be distinguished into two branches. One, the original, and two, the derivative. By the original branch I mean that which elites itself upon and is confined to any person who was a sufferer in the first instance and on his own account, the person for instance who was beaten, dropped, or murdered. By the derivative branch I mean any share of mischief which may befall any other assignable persons in consequence of his being a sufferer and no otherwise. These persons must, of course, be persons who in some way or other are connected with him. Now the ways in which one person may be connected with another have been already seen. They may be connected in the way of interest, meaning self-regarding interest, and again persons connected with a given person in the way of interest may be connected with them either by affording support to him or by deriving it from him. The secondary mischief again may frequently be seen to consist of two other shares or parcels. The first consisting of pain, the other of danger. The pain which it produces is a pain of apprehension, a pain grounded on the apprehension of suffering such or inconveniences whatever they may be as it is the nature of the primary mischief to produce. It may be styled in one word the alarm. The danger is the chance whatever it may be which the multitude it concerns may in consequence of the primary mischief stand exposed to of suffering such mischiefs or inconveniences for danger is nothing but the chance of pain or what comes to the same thing the loss of pleasure. An example may serve to make this clear. A man attacks you on the road and robs you. You suffer a pain on the occasion of losing so much money. You also suffered a pain at the thoughts of the personal ill treatment you apprehended he might give you in case if you're not happening to satisfy his demands. These together constitute the original branch of the primary mischief resulting from the act of the robbery. A creditor of yours who expected with part of that money and a son of yours who expected you to have given him another part are in consequence disappointed. You are obliged to have recourse to the bounty of your father to make good part of the deficiency. These mischiefs together make up the derivative branch. The report of this robbery circulates from hand to hand and spreads itself in the neighborhood. It finds its way into the newspapers and is propagated over the whole country. Various people on this occasion call to mind the danger which they and their friends as it appears from this example stand exposed to in traveling especially such as may have occasion to travel the same road. On this occasion they naturally feel a certain degree of pain slider or heavier according to the degree of ill treatment they may understand you to have received. The frequency of the occasion each person may have to travel in that same road or its neighborhood the vicinity of each person to the spot, his personal courage the quantity of money he may have occasion to carry about with him and a variety of other circumstances. This constitutes the first part of the secondary mischief resulting from the act of robbery, viz, the alarm. But people of one description or another not only are disposed to conceive themselves to incur a chance of being robbed in consequence of the robbery committed upon you but as will be shown presently they do really incur such a chance. And it is this chance which constitutes the remaining part of the secondary mischief of the act of robbery viz, the danger. Let us see what this chance amounts to and once it comes how is it for instance that one robbery can contribute to produce another. In the first place it is certain that it cannot create any direct motive a motive must be the prospect of some pleasure or other advantage to be enjoyed in future but the robbery in question is passed nor would it furnish any such prospect were it to come for it is not one robbery that will furnish pleasure to him who may be about to commit another robbery. The consideration that is to operate upon a man as a motive or inducement to commit a robbery must be the idea of the pleasure he expects to derive the fruit of that very robbery but this pleasure exists independently of any other robbery. The means then by which one robbery tends as it should seem to produce another robbery are two. One, by suggesting to a person exposed to the temptation the idea of committing such another robbery accompanied perhaps with the belief of its facility. In this case the influence it exerts applies itself in the first place understanding. Two, by weakening the force of the tutelary motives which tend to restrain him from such an action and thereby adding to the strength of the temptation. In this case the influence applies itself to the will. These forces are one, the motive of benevolence which acts as a branch of the physical sanction. Two, the motive of self-preservation an agent of the punishment that may stand provided by the political sanction. Three, the fear of shame a motive belonging to the moral sanction. Four, the fear of the divine displeasure a motive belonging to the religious sanction. On the first and the last of these forces it has perhaps no influence worth insisting on, but it has on the other two. The way in which a past robbery may weaken the force with which the political sanction tends to prevent a future robbery may be thus conceived. The way in which this sanction tends to prevent a robbery is by denouncing some particular kind of punishment against any who shall be guilty of it. The real value of which punishment will of course be diminished by the real uncertainty as also, if there be any difference, the apparent value by the apparent uncertainty. Now this uncertainty is proportionally increased by every instance in which a man is known to commit the offense without undergoing the punishment. This of course will be the case with every offense for a certain time, in short until the punishment allotted to it takes place. If punishment takes place at last, this branch of the mischief of the offense is taken at last, but not till then put a stop too. The way in which a past robbery may weaken the force with which the moral sanction tends to prevent a future robbery may be thus conceived. The way in which the moral sanction tends to prevent a robbery is by holding forth the indignation of mankind as ready to fall upon him who shall be guilty of it. Now this indignation will be the more formidable according to the number of those who join in it. It will be the less so, the fewer they are who join in it, but there cannot be a stronger way of showing that a man does not join in whatever indignation may be entertained against a practice than the engaging in it himself. It shows only that he himself feels no indignation against it, but that it seems to him there is no sufficient reason for apprehending what indignation may be felt against it by others. Accordingly, where robberies are frequent and unpunished, robberies are committed without shame. It was thus against the Grecians formally. It is thus among the Arabs still. In whichever way then the past offense tends to pave the way for the commission of a future, hence whether by suggesting the idea of committing it or by adding to the strength of the temptation. In both cases it may be said to operate by the force or influence of example. The two branches of the secondary mischief of an act, the alarm and the danger, must not be confounded. Though intimately connected, they are perfectly distinct. Either may subsist without the other. The neighborhood may be alarmed with the report of a robbery when, in fact, no robbery either has been committed or is in a way to be committed. A neighborhood may be on the point of being disturbed by robberies without knowing anything of the matter. Accordingly, we shall soon perceive that some acts produce alarm without danger, others danger without alarm, as well the danger as the alarm may again be divided, each of them into two branches, the first consisting of so much of the alarm or danger, as may be apt to result from the future behavior of the same agent, the second consisting of so much as they may be apt to result from the behavior of other persons, such others to wit as may come to engage in acts of the same sort and tendency. The distinction between the primary and the secondary consequences of an act must be carefully attended to. It is so just that the latter may often be a directly opposite nature to be the former. In some cases where the primary consequences of an act are attended with a mischief, the secondary consequences may be beneficial, and that to such a degree as even greatly to outweigh the mischief of the primary. This is the case, for instance, with all acts of punishment when properly applied. Of these the primary mischief never intended to fall but upon such persons as may happen to have committed some act which it is expedient to prevent the secondary mischief. That is, the alarm and the danger extends no further than to such persons as are under temptation to commit it, in which case in as far as it tends to restrain them from committing such acts it is of a beneficial nature. Thus much with regard to acts that produce positive pain and that immediately. This case, by reason of its simplicity, seemed the fittest to take the lead. But acts may produce mischief in various other ways which together with those already specified may all be comprised by the following abridged analysis. Mischief may admit a division in any one of three points of view. One according to its own nature. Two according to its cause. Three according to the person or other party who is the object of it with regard to its nature it may be either simple or complex. When simple it may either be positive or negative. Positive, consisting of actual pain. Negative, consisting of the loss of pleasure. Whether simple or complex positive or negative it may be either certain or contingent. When it is negative it consists of the loss of some benefit or advantage. This benefit may be material in both or two ways. One by affording actual pleasure or two by averting pain or danger which is the chance of pain. That is, by affording security. And as far then as the benefit which a mischief tends to avert is productive of security the tendency of such mischief is to produce insecurity. With regard to its cause mischief may be produced either by one single action or not without the concurrence of other actions. If not without the concurrence of other actions these others may be the actions either of the same person or of other persons. In either case they may be either acts of the same kind as that in question or of other kinds. Lastly with regard to the party who is the object of the mischief or in other words who is in a way to be affected by it such party may be either an assignable individual or assemblage of individuals or else a multitude of unassignable individuals. When the object is an assignable individual this individual may either be the person himself who is the author of the mischief or some other person. When the individuals who are the objects of it are an unassignable multitude this multitude may be either the whole political community or state or some subordinate division of it. Now when the object of the mischief is the author himself it may be styled self-regarding. When any other party is the object extra regarding when such other party is an individual it may be styled private when a subordinate branch of the community semi-public when the whole community public. Here for the present we must stop to pursue the subject through its inferior distinctions will be the business of the chapter which exhibits the division of offenses. The cases which have been already illustrated are those in which the primary mischief is not necessarily otherwise than a simple one and that positive present and therefore certain producible by a single action without any necessity of the concurrence of any other action either on the part of the same agent or of others and having for its object an assignable individual or by accident an assemblage of assignable individuals extra regarding therefore and private. This primary mischief is accompanied by a secondary the first branch of which is sometimes contingent and sometimes certain the other never otherwise than contingent. Both extra regarding and semi-public in other respects pretty much upon a par with the primary mischief except that the first branch vis the alarm though inferior in magnitude to the primary is in point of extent and therefore upon the whole in point of magnitude much superior. Two instances more will be sufficient to illustrate the most material of the modifications above exhibited. A man drinks a certain quantity of liquor and intoxicates himself. The intoxication in this particular instance doesn't no sort of harm or what comes to the same thing none that is perceptible but it is probable and indeed next to certain that a given number of acts of the same kind would do him a very considerable degree of harm more or less according to his constitution and other circumstances for this is no more than what experience manifests every day. It is also certain that one act of this sort by one means or another tends considerably to increase the disposition of a man may be in to practice other acts of the same sort for this also is verified by experience. This therefore is one instance where the mischief producible by the act is contingent in other words in which the tendency of the act is no otherwise mischievous than in virtue of its producing a chance of mischief. This chance depends upon the concurrence of other acts of the same kind and those such as must be practiced by the same person. The object of the mischief is that very person himself who is the author of it and he only unless by accident. The mischief is therefore private and self-regarding. As to its secondary mischief alarm it produces none. It produces indeed a certain quantity of danger by the influence of the example but it is not often that this amount to a quantity worth regarding. Again a man omits paying his share to a public tax. This we see is an act of the negative kind. Is this then to be placed upon the list of mischievous acts? Yes, certainly. Upon what grounds? Upon the following. To defend the community against its external as well as its internal adversaries are tasks not to mention others of a less sensible nature which cannot be fulfilled but at a considerable expense. But whence is the money for defraying this expense to come? It can be obtained in no other manner than by contributions to be collected from individuals. In a word by taxes the produce then of these taxes is to be looked upon as a kind of benefit which it is necessary the governing part of the community should receive for the use of the whole. Before it can be applied to its destination requires that there should be certain persons commissioned to receive and to apply it. Now if these persons had they received it would have applied to it its proper destination it would have been a benefit. The not putting them in a way to receive it is then a mischief. But it is possible that if received it might not have been applied to its proper destination or that the service in consideration of which it was bestowed might not have been informed. It is possible that the under officer who collected the produce of the tax might not have paid it over to his principal. It is possible that the principal might not have forwarded it on according to its farther destination to the judge for instance who is to protect the community against its clandestine enemies from within or the soldier who is to protect it against its open enemies from without. It is possible that the judge had they received it would not however have been induced by it to fulfill their respective duties. It is possible that the judge would not have sat for the punishment of criminals and the decision of controversies. It is possible that the soldier would not have drawn his sword in the defense of the community. These together with an infinity of other intermediate acts which for the sake of brevity I pass over from a connected chain of duties the discharge of which is necessary to the preservation of the community. They must every one of them be discharged ere the benefit to which they are contributory can be produced if they are all discharged in that case the benefit subsists and any act by tending to intercept that benefit may produce a mischief. But if any one of them are not, the benefit fails. It fails of itself. It would not have subsisted although the act in question, the act of non-payment had not been committed. The benefit is therefore contingent and, accordingly, upon a certain supposition, the act which consists in the averting of it is not a mischievous one. But this supposition in any tolerably ordered government will rarely indeed be verified. In the very worst ordered government that exists, the greatest part of the duties that are levied are paid over according to their destination and with regard to any particular sum that is attempted to be levied upon any particular person upon any particular occasion it is therefore manifest that unless it be certain that it will not be so disposed of the act of withholding it is a mischievous one. The act of payment, when referable to any particular sum, especially if it be a small one, might also have failed of providing beneficial on another ground and, consequently, the act of non-payment of proving mischievous. It is possible that the same services precisely might have been rendered without the money as with it. If, then speaking, of any small limited sum, such as the greatest which any one person is called upon to pay at a time, a man were to say that the non-payment of it would be attended with mischievous consequences. This would be far from certain. But what comes to the same thing as if it were, it is perfectly certain when applied to the whole. It is certain that if all of a sudden the payment of all taxes was to cease there would no longer be anything effectual done, either for the maintenance of justice or for the defense of the community against its foreign adversaries. That therefore the weak would presently be oppressed and injured in all manner of ways by the strong at home and both together overwhelmed by oppressors abroad. Upon the whole, therefore, it is manifest that in this case, though the mischief is remote and contingent, though in its first appearance it consists of nothing more than the interception of a benefit, and though the individuals in whose favor that benefit would have been reduced into the explicit form of pleasure or security are altogether unassignable. Yet the mischief's tendency of the act is not on all these accounts the less indisputable. The mischief, in point of intensity and duration, is indeed unknown. It is uncertain, it is remote, but in point of extent it is immense, and in point of fecundity pregnant to a degree that baffles calculation. It may now be time to observe that it is only in the case where the mischief is extra regarding and has an assignable person or persons for its object that so much of the secondary branch of it as consists an alarm can have place. When the individuals it affects are uncertain and altogether out of sight no alarm can be produced as there is nobody who sufferings you can see. There is nobody who sufferings you can be alarmed at. No alarm, for instance, is produced by non-payment to attacks. If, at any distance and uncertain period of time such offense should chance to be productive of any kind of alarm it would appear to proceed as, indeed immediately, it would proceed from a very different cause. It might be immediately referable, for example, to the act of a legislator, who should deem it necessary to lay on a new tax in order to make up for the deficiency occasioned in the produce of the old one, or it might be referable to the act of an enemy who, under favor of a deficiency thus created in the fund allotted for defense, might invade the country and exact from it much heavier contribution than those which had been thus withholding from the sovereign as to any alarm which such an offense might raise among the few who might chance to regard the matter with the eyes of a statesman it is of too slight and uncertain a nature to be worth taking into the account. Section 2 how intentionality, etc. may influence the mischief of an act. We have seen the nature of the secondary mischief which is apt to be reflected as it were from the primary in the cases where the individual who are at the objects of the mischief are assignable. It is now time to examine into circumstances upon which the production of such secondary mischief depends. These circumstances are no others than the four articles which have formed the subjects of the four last preceding chapters. Viz. 1. The intentionality. 2. The consciousness. 3. The motive. 4. The disposition. 5. It is to be observed all along that it is only the danger that is immediately governed by the real state of the mind in respect to those articles. It is by the apparent state of it that the alarm is governed. It is governed by the real only in as far as the apparent happens as in most cases it may be expected to do to quadrate the real. The different influences of the articles of intentionality and consciousness in several cases following. Viz. 1. Where the act is so completely unintentional as to be altogether involuntary. In this case it is attended with no secondary mischief at all. A bricklayer is at work upon a house. A passenger is walking in the street below. A fellow workman comes and gives the bricklayer a violent push in consequence of which he falls upon the passenger and hurts him. It is plain there is nothing in this event that can give other people who may happen to be in the street the least reason to apprehend anything in future on the part of the man who fell whatever there may be with regard to the man who pushed him. Viz. 2. Where the act though unintentional is unadvised in so much that the mischievous part of the consequence is unintentional but the unadvisedness is attended with heedlessness. In this case the act is attended with some small degree of secondary mischief in proportion to the degree of heedlessness. A groom being on horseback and riding through a frequented street turns a corner at full pace and rides over a passenger who happens to be going by. It is plain by this behavior of the groom some degree of alarm may be produced less or greater according to the degree of heedlessness betrayed by him according to the quickness of his pace the fullness of the street and so forth. Viz. 3. Where the act is misadvised with respect to a circumstance which, had it existed, would fully have excluded or what comes to the same thing outweighed the primary mischief and there is no rashness in the case. In this case the act attended with no secondary mischief at all. It is needless to molest the mischievous part of the groom. Viz. 4. Where the act is misadvised with respect to a circumstance which would have excluded or counterbalanced the primary mischief in part but not entirely and still there is no rashness. In this case the set is attended with some degree of secondary mischief in proportion to that part of the primary which remains unexploded or uncounterbalanced. Viz. 5. Where the act is misadvised with respect to a circumstance which would have excluded or counterbalanced the primary mischief in part but not entirely or uncounterbalanced. Viz. 5. Where the act is misadvised with respect to a circumstance which, had it existed would have excluded or counterbalanced the primary mischief entirely or in part and there is a degree of rashness in the supposal. In this case the act is also attended with a further degree of secondary mischief in proportion to the degree of rashness. Viz. 6. Where the consequences are completely intentional and there is no missupposal in the case. In this case the secondary mischief is at the highest. This much with regard to intentionality and consciousness we now come to consider in what manner the secondary mischief is affected by the nature of the motive. Where an act is pernicious in its primary consequences the secondary mischief is not obliterated by the goodness of the motive, though the motive be of the best kind for not withstanding the goodness of the motive, an act of which the primary consequences are pernicious is produced by it in the instance in question by the supposition. It may therefore in other instances although this is not so likely to happen from a good motive as from a bad one. An act which though pernicious in its primary consequences is rendered in other respects beneficial upon the whole by virtue of its secondary consequences is not changed back again and rendered pernicious upon the whole by the badness of the motive although the motive be of the worst kind. But when not only the pernicious consequences of an act are pernicious but in other respects the secondary likewise the secondary mischief may be aggravated by the nature of the motive. So much of that mischief to wit as respects the future behavior of the same person. It is not from the worst kind of motive however that the secondary mischief of an act receives its greatest aggravation. The aggravation which the secondary mischief of an act in as far as it respects the future behavior of the same person receives from the nature of a motive in an individual case is as the tendency of the motive to produce on the part of the same person acts of the like bad tendency with that of the act in question. The tendency of a motive to produce acts of the like kind on the part of any given person is as the strength and constancy of its influence on that person as applied to the production of such a facts. The tendency of a species of motive to give birth to acts of any kind among persons in general is as the strength, constancy and extensiveness of its influence as applied to the production of such a facts. Now the motives whereof the influence is at once most powerful most constant and most extensive are the motives of physical desire the love of wealth the love of ease the love of life and the fear of pain all of them self-regarding motives the motive of displeasure whatever it may be in point of strength and extensiveness is not near so constant in its influence the case of mere antipathy accepted as any of the other three a pernicious act therefore when committed through vengeance or otherwise through displeasure is not near so mystifice as the same pernicious act when committed by force of any one of those other motives as to the motive of religion whatever it may sometimes prove to be in point of strength and constancy it is not in point of extent so universal especially in its application to acts of a mystifice nature any of the three preceding motives it may however be as universal in a particular state or in a particular district of a particular state it is liable indeed to be very irregular in its operations it is apt however to be frequently as powerful as the motive of vengeance or indeed any other motive whatsoever it will sometimes even be more powerful than any other motive it is at any rate much more constant a pernicious act therefore when committed through the motive of religion is more mystifice than when committed through the motive of ill will lastly the secondary mischief to wit so much of it is hath respect to the future behavior of the same person is aggravated or lessened by the apparent depravity or beneficence of his disposition and that in the proportion of such apparent depravity of beneficence the consequences we have hitherto been speaking of are the natural consequences of which the act and the other articles we have been considering are the causes consequences that result from the behavior of the individual who is the offending agent without the interference of political authority we now come to speak of punishment which in the sense in which it is here considered is an artificial consequence annexed by political authority in one instance in the view of putting a stop to the production of events similar to the obnoxious part of its natural consequences in other instances End of Chapter 12