 United States Naval Representative on the Military Staff Committee of the United Nations. Admiral Struble, many of our viewers tonight will recall your leadership of the invasion at Normandy as well as your activities in the Korean War, your leadership of the Incheon Landing. And I'm sure that our viewers will appreciate some of your expressions tonight, sir. Now, first of all, about the recent developments, the lifting of the order to the Seventh Fleet as regards FAMOSA, and the contemplation of a naval blockade of the Red Chinese. Now, sir, do you think that this move by General Eisenhower and this talk of a blockade, do you think that this has increased the likelihood of a Third World War? No, I wouldn't think so. We have a war going on in Korea today. It's been going on for two and a half years, and it's my opinion that the order that the President issued has not increased the chance of a greater war. Now, you were in the Pacific, I believe, and were in command of the Seventh Fleet whenever the President Truman's order to protect FAMOSA was put into effect. Will you not, sir? Yes, I was the first commander of the Seventh Fleet to receive that order. There has been some misunderstanding in our country. A number of people have said that the Presidential Order now, President Eisenhower's order, as regards the Seventh Fleet, doesn't really change anything. Now, does it change anything? The Chinese Nationalists able to do anything now that they were not able to do when you were there, sir? The original directive both directed the Seventh Fleet to protect FAMOSA from a red Chinese invasion of the island, and also directed the Seventh Fleet to prevent FAMOSA being used as a base for operations against the Chinese mainland. The restriction against the use of FAMOSA as a base for operations against the Chinese mainland has been lifted by the Presidential Directive. Now, sir, what do you think about the possibility of a blockade? Number one, sir, if the President and our government should decide on a blockade, is the Navy now able to mount an effective blockade against red China? The Navy could mount an effective blockade against red China, the coastal line of the mainland. The complete effectiveness would, of course, depend upon the number of ships made available, the number of planes that were supplied, and, of course, the complete effectiveness of the blockade would be affected by any opposition that might develop to your blockade. Admiral, would a blockade weaken to any extent the naval forces in Korea or surrounding Korea? The forces in the immediate area of Korea would probably be, to some extent, reduced. However, one of the great things about a naval force is its mobility. And as China and Korea are adjacent, ships on the China patrol would still be readily available for use in Korea if needed. Admiral, to date, there's been little or no evidence of enemy submarines in the waters around Korea. Do you think a blockade might bring on an onslaught or retaliation with submarines? It's possible, but I don't believe it would. One of the problems of the new government in Washington is that they are trying to reduce expense, and at the same time they're discussing the possibility of a naval blockade. Now, sir, if the government should decide on a naval blockade, would it increase the expenditures of the Navy? Don't you think that other ships would have to be commissioned and that the Navy would have to be given more material? There would probably be some increased expenditures for a naval blockade. Well, sir, moving on to the larger subject, you, of course, have had a great deal of experience in the Far East, and a great many of our viewers, a great many of Americans have wondered as to whether we should have fought the war in Korea, as to whether we're doing right in becoming so deeply involved in Asia. Now, could you evaluate some of the positions in Asia for us? First of all, sir, do you think that we should have fought for South Korea? I do. I think that communist aggression started to spread in the Far East area as a whole to the point where it had to be stopped, particularly when it became exemplified as it was in Korea, by a very direct aggression against the South Koreans. I think that our move to stop the aggression of South Korea was the proper move. Do you think that Japan is an important island to retain in control of the West? It's my opinion that the communist action against Korea is primarily directed against Japan. I feel that the long-range objective of the communist is Japan and that Korea is simply an intermediary step, one that for the moment he will get something out of. He will do two things right away. If he takes over Korea, he will destroy to some extent free world collective security. And at the same time, there'll be another area of the Far East into which we will be precluded from going. It then becomes, Korea then becomes, a pincer against, one pincer against Japan. It's a little bit ironic then that the South Koreans are really fighting for Japan and they feel that the Japanese are making money out of this war. Well, of course the feeling between the South Koreans and the Japanese must be evaluated against the backdrop of many hundreds of years. And you can't settle it in five minutes. I hope that greater and better understanding will occur between them. But what about Japan itself, sir, that we spent so much blood and money destroying? Do you think that our people should now support a large-scale re-armament of the Japanese? I think we should assist the Japanese in preparing themselves for their own protection, which I am sure that they will clearly realize as time goes on. Do you think that it's perhaps desirable that we should help Japan become a sort of counterweight to Russia in the Orient? I think that Japan is very important in our overall strategic position in the Far East. Japan, the Ryutius, Formosa, and the Philippines are our Western ramparts. All are very important. Admiral, there's been some talk of creating an Asian NATO. Do you think that the countries of Southeast Asia and Japan and Formosa and so on can put up enough forces to pose an effective barrier to communism? I believe that they can in time. I wouldn't say that they could immediately. Well, about Formosa itself, sir, you'll recall that there was a great deal of argument in our country about whether we should retain Formosa or whether we should give it to Red China at one time. Do you think that Formosa is an important base for our operations in the Far East? I think Formosa is very important as one of our Western ramparts. From our point of view, we have no territorial ambitions. We don't want to take over Formosa, but we do want it in a free world, friendly hands. We would resist communist penetration because, again, they would penetrate our Western ramparts, their pressure would again be exerted both on the Philippines and on the Ryutius, and additionally, they would have another arm for employment against Japan. Admiral, do you think that if the communists waged a third world war and all-out war, that we could hold on to Formosa? We might possibly lose it during the course of the conflict, but it would be very important that we held it at first, and that would make a considerable difference in the action. You can never be sure that in any action that might occur during a great world war, but what any one part of something that you have today, if subjected to enough power by the enemy, would fall. But there you have the point of Japan. Japan has a great industrial might. If the communist, with his present control areas in Far East, were permitted to use their natural resources and their manpower, combined with the Japanese industrial power, we would have a tremendous power against us in the Western Pacific. Well, sir, Formosa has many fine airfields on it. Do you envision the Chinese nationalist acquiring some of our fast aircraft and perhaps attacking the Chinese mainland, the railroads from Formosa? I really have no particular, I have no knowledge as to our future aircraft production schedules and where they'll be delivered. I really can't answer that. That's a final question, Admiral. You've been with the UN now for about a year, and many Americans have been discouraged over the UN as an institution. Now, do you feel, sir, that we should continue to remain members of the UN and to try to utilize it in the political warfare now? Yes, I feel the UN has a place in our national existence. The president, Mr. Dulles, Mr. Lodge, have all come out strongly, not only for the United Nations, but for United States representation in it, and I feel that although some of the hopes which were originally raised at San Francisco have not been fulfilled, I believe it will fill a place that we should attempt to maintain for a little while. Well, thank you, sir, for being with us this evening. The opinions that you've heard our speakers express tonight have been those entirely at their own. The editorial board for this edition of the Lawn Gene Chronoscope was Mr. William Bradford Huey and Mr. Elliot Haines. Our distinguished guest was Admiral Arthur D. Struble, United States Naval Representative on the Military Staff Committee of the United Nations. For the Lawn Gene Chronoscope, a television journal of the important issues of the hour, broadcast on behalf of Lawn Gene, the world's most honored watch, and Wittner Distinguished Companion to the World Honored Lawn Gene. This is Frank Knight reminding you that Lawn Gene and Wittner watches are sold and serviced from coast to coast by more than 4,000 leading jurors who proudly display this emblem, Agency for Lawn Gene Wittner Watches. Twice a week, Jane Fromans USA canteen on the CBS television network.