 Hello from Vienna and welcome to this live interview with International Atomic Energy Agency Director-General Raphael Grossi, who joins me from just across the Danube IAEA headquarters. DG, hello. Indeed. Good afternoon, we should say. Vienna time. It's a pleasure to be with you and this cold but sunny morning here in Vienna. Yes, it's a shame. I have a beautiful view of the Imperial Palace to my left, but we can't show it to you because there's all kinds of backlighting and it's a shame we can't see it. But anyway, it's a real pleasure to be able to speak to you for this actually the second time in a month. We had an interview, not so long ago, DG. So this is a chance for us to follow up on some of the things we discussed and also deal with some other issues that have come up in the meantime. You actually did me a favor earlier today by posting a video on Twitter of the many, many things that you have to deal with in the year ahead. You know, we often refer to your agency, you know, as a shorthand as the UN Nuclear Watchdog, which of course is and everyone knows your agency for its work with nuclear inspections and what's known as technically in the jargon is safeguards work, particularly in Iran, where you are releasing the JCPOAs, the nuclear deal with major powers. But that is a small part of your agency's work, a very important part, of course, your agency's slogan is Atoms for Peace and Development, which is modified under your predecessor, Yukio Amano. And so I just wanted to, you know, this video that you posted online, it's actually it's just two minutes, it's actually quite exhausting. So I'm getting through the many things that you have that you have to deal with just as a quick break, just a summary of the words you've touched on. You know, safeguards, as we mentioned, in Iran, preparing preparing for a possible return to North Korea, nuclear safety, 10 years after the Fukushima Daiichi accident, nuclear security, what's known as nuclear applications, so issues like water management, food security, nuclear medicine, women's cancers, and then also COP26 in Glasgow. So touching on the environment is another issue that's been very mentioned quite a bit so far at Roych's next. But then also touching on COVID, which has been another important theme of the discussion so far is one of your possibly your flagship project at the moment, known as Zodiac, dealing with diseases like COVID, which are so-called zoonotic diseases, jump from humans to animals. Perhaps you could tell us a little more about what you're planning there. Indeed, indeed. Like you said, this agency does a lot in different areas, and it's good to remind people of that, because I suppose that in an exercise like the one we are having today and Roychers is conducting of looking at what people is doing around the world and different leaders are doing around the world, this agency is busy with a number of issues that have to do with the welfare and with the improvement of life conditions of people out there. Apart from the hot political issues that we discussed normally with you and your colleagues, and we are going to be discussing in a few minutes, I'm sure, about non-proliferation situations, it is important that people know that we are also part of the efforts that are being carried out worldwide on a number of fronts. Let us put them like that. And of course, first comes to mind is the pandemic and what's happening, and here the agency has been helping, is helping many countries by providing RT-PCRs that are based on nuclear technology. These are the machines that allow us to go to an easier and faster diagnosis of a disease, in this case the COVID-19, and we are also by way of using the nuclear techniques that allow to work on zoonosis. These are the situations that go from the animal to the human in terms of health illnesses and bacteria and viruses and other things. We have put together a program with a catchy acronym, Zodiac, which stands for zoonotic disease integrated action. So it means that we are bringing together all these capacities and helping veterinary labs and other institutions in many countries from our side, from the nuclear, if you want, side. There are the efforts of course carried out by WHO and other international, sister international organizations, and of course every country. And this is a very important part of our effort that we are trying to put together for the benefit of countries. But we also work, as you mentioned, on nuclear medicine, radiotherapy. We are very active in the area of women cancer, in particular in developing countries, where there are incredible situations where not a single radiotherapy machine or unit exists in many countries, which is of course unthinkable at this day and age, but it happens. So the IEA is working on that one. It's also a busy year. It's the year of COP26 in Glasgow, as you know, where people are going to be tackling the climate change issue. And of course for us, from our perspective, nuclear, which is a clean dispatchable source of energy, is and can be part of the solution to that. So as you can see, in the new year, the IEA is trying to be as useful as we can be on behalf of our member states. We are providing a service as we should, according to our mission. It's also the interesting aspect of your mandate in that the IEA statute says that a central part of your role is to encourage the use of nuclear energy and essentially encourage the spread of nuclear energy. But in this case now you're faced with many developed countries actually reducing their share of nuclear energy in their mix. And you have said that you're also going to be helping those countries do that because that also requires a certain level of... That is very interesting because in reality what we see in the world is that there is an increase of the use of nuclear energy, not a decrease. So here I think it's very important to have opportunities like this because there's a narrative or an impression out there that there is a reduction in nuclear energy. Here in Western Europe, even here in Western Europe, there's still a good number of countries that are using nuclear energy at a large scale. There are also very important countries that have reduced or decided to face out the nuclear energy. But in a larger context, when you look at the emerging south or you look at China, you look at Russia, you look at the United States and other places, nuclear energy is not going down, it's going up. So I think it's good to stick to the facts and to try to show what that is. That being said, we are not nuclear lobbyists. What we are doing is making sure that countries that are using nuclear energy do it in a safe and secure way. And that all countries have access to the technologies, especially developing countries. As you know there, we have a promotional side to it. You should remember that. And today perhaps is a good day. Today is the 75th anniversary of the first session of the General Assembly of the United Nations. And one of the first in London, and one of the first agencies that was created was the IAEA in 1957 already. And in the first set of resolutions for those who are interested in history, they will see that atomic energy, nuclear energy was part of that. Of course it was the end of the Second World War and people saw this as an emerging factor. So I don't want to get into too much into history. To say that it's a reality, it's something that is there to improve the life of people, which is basically what we all want, whatever we do. Yes, and it's true that that is the more overlooked side of what the agency does. It was mentioned when the IAEA won the Nobel Peace Prize in 2005. It was mentioned by the Nobel Committee, but the thrust of the reason the agency was given the Nobel Peace Prize was because of its work in Iran at the time. And Iran is still with us. And we were both sucked into Iran just on New Year's Day. Since we're talking about a new year, Iran has kept us busy a lot of the time. And so even since the last time we spoke, we're faced with new developments, new facts on the ground in Iran. And your reports that was issued to member states on New Year's Day said that Iran had told you that they plan to enrich uranium to a higher level than they have at any point since their deal with the JCPOA went into force. And only a few days later, you confirmed that they have begun this process of enriching uranium to 20 percent. It's their declared target. The level, the highest level they've reached since the deal we went into force in 2016 is 4.5%. And your report was quite, quite specific in this, and it says they started at 4.1% at Fordo, this site dug into a mountain. So how rapidly are they progressing? Have they gone over the 4.5% yet? Well, quite rapidly, I would say. As you were mentioning on the 31st of December, they told us that they were planning to do this. We didn't know whether this was just an intention or an actual decision to move into this. A couple of days later, they indicated that they were proceeding with the start of the process. And so there were a number of technicalities, we're not going to annoy the audience here with that, that we had to perform in terms of adjusting the work of our inspectors, send our inspectors to the place. And they started feeding, putting into the cascades through which the centrifuges that enrich the material are organized. UF6 and the process indeed started. So, yes, we are in a new reality because, as you rightly say, we are under the conditions of an agreement. They are under the conditions of an agreement, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, signed in 2015, which indicates that Iran should be enriching only up to 3.67 the uranium they have. We know that as a result of the sort of tit-for-tat logic that came into play when the United States announced its withdrawal from the agreement, they were enriching at a higher level, but the difference was not as big. The delta was simply to show that they were above the agreed limitation. Now, 20% is a different thing, of course, is a much higher degree that requires important changes in the operation, and of course attracts a lot more attention internationally because of the correlation that exists between the enrichment of uranium and the ability to get to levels that are potentially of military use. Right, so my question, DG, was how quickly they have advanced from 4.1% in the time since you mentioned. So are we looking at, first of all, have they gone over 4.5% already? How soon can we expect them to get in the vicinity of 20%? Can you give us any sense of their progress? The process has started and we have to see each day how much they can produce. With this installed set of cascades, we are talking about a few kilograms per month, but this could increase. I cannot tell you a figure now, not because it's a secret, it's because they have just started, but if we were to project the estimated volumes of production against the capacity of the machines there, we are talking about something like that, 10 or a little bit more per month. Sounds like you're saying it's too soon to say how quickly we're going up in terms of enrichment purity. We can estimate that they are going to be at that level. With that installed capacity, they could decide to add more. If you allow me to add another layer to the discussion, you maybe recall that this is in answer or answering or in compliance with a law that was passed by the machlis by the Iranian parliament, which already in the month of December, early December mandated the government, the executive, to take a number of actions in different areas of the nuclear activity. One of those was to enrich at 20% and to have a volume of uranium at 20% in storage and among other things. So I suppose this is the beginning of this process, if it continues like this, we will see. Well, it's interesting that you mentioned that because that's just one element of what is in that law. And so there's another interesting aspect. So I have it printed out here. It says that two months after the enactment of the law, which was in December, they will stop allowing inspectors inspections beyond the safeguards agreement, which to cut through the jargon here, part of the JCPOA, the deal with major powers is that they're enforcing what's called the additional protocol, which gives your agency the power to carry out snap inspections at sites that are not declared to the agency, the power that you've used quite a lot. You've carried out quite a few inspections. And so that would mean that they would stop granting you snap inspections and the like by February. Is that something you take seriously or do you see here some more piecemeal? I must take it seriously because it's a law and the government seems to be intent in complying. Even with that aspect then not allowing anything beyond the safeguards agreement? Well, it's part of the law and I cannot ascertain or speculate into whether the government is planning to implement the law in full or partially. Well, but that's the interesting thing though, because you issued a report on the first of January saying that you had been informed about one part of that law, what was happening at Fordo. So does that mean that you haven't been informed? You have no indication that they're going to do what they say about inspections? So far we haven't this particular indication. But this is a new situation in so far as we've never been confronted with a comprehensive law. And the government informs us piecemeal whether they are going to be. So I cannot have a pattern or a background. What I can tell you is that we are in constant dialogue with the Atomic Energy Agency of Iran and with the Foreign Ministry. I think it's a constructive dialogue that we are having so far. I hope this will be the case and we will continue in this way. Of course, all of these things take place against the background of bigger or the wider political developments ongoing. And I suppose that they are also connected with this reality. But if you ask me whether we have been informed of an impending suspension of our inspectors activities. No, but they are in the law, but these provisions are in the law. So when you ask me, do you take it seriously? I take it seriously and I'm concerned. Good. That's clear. Thank you. Because as you say, this does tie into something broader, which is the arrival of a new US administration. The last time we spoke, you said in terms of Iran's overall activities, nuclear activities. What I see is that we're moving full circle back to December 2015. December 2015, it was just before the deal was eventually put into effect. Now, and since then we've had this new declaration on photo, which is even an extra layer because they weren't enriching to 20%. They didn't reach 20% before the deal, but they weren't doing that in December 2015. You said this in the context of having to reach some kind of ancillary agreement to the deal in terms of saying how do we put the toothpaste back in the tube if and when Iran decides to come back into full compliance. I don't want to bring in mind that the breaches were done in response to the US withdrawal. But so my question to you is, you didn't give a timeframe saying, you know, what you see is we're moving full circle back to December 2015. But it does seem like we're moving increasingly fast. Do you see a window for talks here? Yes. What's your view on the timeframe for getting something done? Well, there's always a window for talks. I'm a diplomat and I believe, you know, very sincerely and very honestly in this. So I think we must have and find a way from our perspective. Of course, we are the inspectors. We are the ones monitoring and policing agreements that are made by politicians on both sides. I talk about sides here. I know we all know there have been statements on almost every side of the agreement. So we are expecting these people to sit around the table and we are going to contribute to that, not as a party, but as the technical supervisor of all of this. And when you were referring to our past conversations about how we go back to the agreement in its initial form or shape, what I was saying has been proven by the subsequent facts. It is obvious that the situation on the ground had changed and is changing and is going to change even more. So there will have to be some clear understanding on how the initial terms or the initial provisions of the JCPOA, if it's so decided by the political parties to that are going to be recompiled with, like you were saying, putting the toothpaste back in the tube. I hope this is going to be easier than that operation. I'm trying to figure out myself how you would do that. I hope that in this case it would be a bit easier than that. But there are many, many different aspects ranging from the material, the actual material that you are going to have now at 20%. You have at 4%, you have at a little bit more, you have now another volume, another package at 20%. We will see, depending on where they get there politically, what happens, ship out or not, down blending or not, then you have the machines. So you have all of these elements that we are going to have to deal with to make it credible otherwise of course it doesn't make any sense. I realize I'm putting you in a difficult position which you're often in because your agency describes itself as mainly technical and there is a political role but it's hard for you to advance in it. So what you're saying is that you don't really want to say that there is a particular window of opportunity imposed by this law or that there's any particular time by which the deal needs to be reached? Well, I wouldn't say that. You mentioned this date in February. So I wouldn't like to receive a communication saying that because of the deadline on the 21st of February, the presence of my inspectors in Iran is going to be reduced. That would be bad news certainly. So within that, it's not for me to tell the President of the United States and the Presidents of France and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom and China, Russia, etc. Germany, what to do? But it's clear that we don't have many months ahead of us. We have rather weeks. Okay, so you do see this is a deadline you take seriously and one that you would like them to stick to then is to reach an agreement by the 21st of February. Otherwise, this is a law of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Okay. So there's a lot of, since we have a few minutes left and I don't see any questions coming up, I'm just going to jump in with some of my own. I hope you don't mind. Because there's still a lot of, I have one general and one more technical question for you, if I may. The more general one is there's still a lot of, you managed to get quite a significant deal out of the Iranians in your first trip to Tehran as Director General. I should mention you've only been in office a year and pretty much immediately after taking office, you were faced with the first ever denial of access on under the additional protocol that we mentioned, trying to go to these two undeclared sites. And you got a deal. You went there, you managed to get a deal out of them, you came back, and I have to say, you know, much as I've tried, I still don't have much information in terms of what actually happened. So I understand you can't necessarily get into that. Would you have any advice to the incoming US administration on how to deal with the Iranians on this particular issue? Well, I believe, I'm not sure if I could be advising the new administration, what we can continue to be doing is to tell things as they are. And I think this per se is invaluable for anybody who has a stake at international peace and security. And what we were able to achieve last summer was important, in particular, because it showed that we can see eye to eye and understand each other with Iran on what the agency should be doing. The situation there at that time was not easy because they didn't want us to have access to a number of places. And then when we explained the technical way in which we would be doing that, I think we could reassure them about the whole process. And so we were able to do that. And I think it is always possible when there is a clarity and there is goodwill on every side. So my opinion now is that we are going to, we are confronted with a difficult situation because quite clearly from August to now, there isn't any improvement in terms of complying with the JCPOA. So there is a clear erosion, a further erosion degradation of the situation, which means that there will be a lot of work politically. And I wouldn't, you know, get into that. I have my own opinions, but it's not for me. They have to decide what they want to do. What we are going to be very clear on is on the technical situation and on the ways to inspect this. So to make sure that there is predictability for all. It sounds like you're talking, you were saying when you mentioned how you got this deal done with the arrangements. It sounds like something very long-winded and drawn out. Do you really think it's possible to achieve the equivalent of that in the time that's needed by February the 21st then to get this ancillary deal? Yes, I think we can. I think we can. If there is a clear understanding and you shouldn't forget that I was not acting as a lone ranger on a white horse, you know, as flattering as that could be for my ego. No, I was the embodiment of the will of the agency and the member states that were supporting the director general. Everybody believed that it was important that the access to the IAEA should never be interrupted. And I think this message is valid today. The access of the IAEA inspectors and the cooperation, if you want to put it in a, you know, in a wider way, not in terms of access. The cooperation with the IAEA is indispensable. Without that, I'm talking not only about Iran, about any other country. It's very difficult to be in good terms with the international community. If you think about the countries that do not allow the presence of the IAEA, you will find one which has lots of problems. So I don't think Iran or any other country. You're talking about North Korea, I should say. I'm talking about North Korea, which did exactly what is said or threatened by some expelled. You can expel the IAEA. Of course, we don't have any divisions to cite some historical quotations. We are an international organization, so we are an easy target. Kick us out. But we are the embodiment of international law. So it depends. Well, I'm afraid we're going to have to end it there as our time is up. But Director General Raphael Grossi, thank you very much for your time. That was an interesting conversation. It's a pleasure to take part and to contribute to this very interesting series of events that you are holding. Thank you very much. Thank you, DG. Thank you.