 So you can either sit, spend your spare or read enough. Elections, let's do some predictions short. We'll sit. Okay. And I fear that we're not going to see. And you also have. Right. Right. Right. People are joining in. Julie Popworth, I see you're there. Could you tell us in the chat whether you can see us? I don't think you can. I'm assuming you can hear us. I see you, but can you. Right. Then let's try some different cameras. That's just to come on. Hello, everybody online, we are, we are planning to start. Okay. Okay. I'm going to turn off the camera of my own, you see, so it's hoping that. Doesn't do it here. Then we will. Presentation. Right. You're getting there. Right. If I had an excuse, it would be. It would be that I am. I have time zone. Well, I think. I think they can hear us, but they can't see us. Right. The powerpoint screen is now visible. Yes. So the PowerPoint screen is now visible. We're told by Josh. We're down so we can use this. From the beginning. And then we'll have to rely on. Welcome everybody to tonight's first maritime history. King's maritime history seminar. You all know you're in the Department of War studies here at King's of the law and the history unit. I think some of you know that you're also being hosted by the. Michael Howard Center for the history of war. And I'm delighted to meet you. I'm delighted to be a member of the United States. I have been dedicated to. Lloyd's British. And various others. And I am delighted. Tonight because we have a speaker who came to us very highly recommended. So we have Lee. A journalist. And the journalist who has specialized in insurance and risk. and three years of communications with the UK P&I Club. And she's the author of a book, Merchants, Mariners and Mavericks, Lloyd's Agents for the first 200 years. And Lee received an MA in the history of medicine in 2018 from Birkbeck and is now the facilitator of the History Fellows of the Society of Apothecaries. We know them well, actually indirectly. So there is no one better to welcome back to this final term or this final set of lectures and no one better to talk to us about the Witte Island disaster, which is why Lee is here. So it's been our thanks that I hand over to you. It's apologies to people online that they can't see you. If I dare, I might try to meddle while you speak, but I probably won't. So it's a thanks that I hand over to you and this will function as normal. Should I do with that? I can if you like. Or wave at it, because it's going to be a bit... Okay, you can wave. Go ahead. I'll do the next slide to you. So thank you all very much. I feel a slight intermovement from the medical historians. But as Alan says, I have spent some time dealing with things maritime and Julie Papworth encouraged me to come and talk to you. So this was a tragedy, a casualty that really sticks in my mind. A joyboid's list in 1978 in November. And on the 6th of January, 1979, 121,000 deadweight tons tanker battle tears had competed birthing at the offshore jetty about 400 meters off Whitty Island, Bantry Bay, County Cork in the Southwest of Ireland. On the 8th of January, shortly after midnight, fire enveloped a large section of the ship and the offshore jetty. There are a number of explosions and then an enormous one. The crew of the tanker, the wife of one crew member, two visitors to the tanker, the crew on the jetty and the ship's pilot, 50 people in all died. The vessel broke into three and there was extensive damage to the jetty and its installations. Tanker explosions were nothing new, but this was exceptional. It didn't involve a vessel under a flag of convenience in a remote country or indeed what one of the underwriters used to call crew of convenience. It was in Ireland. The owner of the battleships with the French oil major tactile, the jetty and terminal where the oil was discharged were under-operated by Gulf of Ireland. All the victims were French, Irish or British. The official inquiry that followed laid the major share of responsibility for the loss of the ship on tactile. But the tribunal also cascaded Gulf, the decisions and actions that led to the deaths. There was no rescue from the beginning of the fire at midnight 30 to the ultimate explosion at five past one. Only 27 bodies were ever recovered. Within a few months, sufficient flag states had ratified the 1974 International Convention for the safety of life at sea or so was 1974. And it came into force a year later on 25 May of 1980. This didn't stop tanker explosions because there were still many older tankers training without the safety measures required under so was. But change was underway. Today, there are still issues unresolved in Ireland. Even now, more than 40 years later, anger remains among the families of the victims and others who were affected, like the firemen. They blamed failures by the Irish government to enforce safety regulations with the Ireland. They say there was no focus in the subsequent official inquiry into these domestic regulatory failures and say that the state has failed to establish independent investigative procedures for maritime accidents. So that's what it looked like a day later. They continue to call for a formal state apology and to change the death certificates to unlawful death under the right to life provisions of Article II of the European Convention of Human Rights. At the time of the explosion, I was the insurance correspondent for its list. I didn't write the initial stories but followed the later developments. So in addition to the various sources I'll just describe, I've added some comments from my memory to the extent that I can stand by. So there is the headline from the Irish Times. Those are the headings that I'm going to use. A significant primary source is the report of the official tribunal by the Irish Parliament, published on July 1980. I've consulted Lawrence Liz towards Cajun II reports and frustratingly, as you probably know, Lawrence Liz to this immediate period is not a digitized new index. So I haven't been able to search as assiduously as I would have liked. Neither are the annual reports of Gulf or Total easily available in this country at least. For some comments, I refer to a paper called The Strange History of Tank Inherty by Jack DeVaney of the Center for Tanks of Excellence in Florida. The center was basically in DeVaney with all the limitations that implies. I haven't been able to contact him but he did have a strong background in marine engineering, academia and tankers. What he says about the slow process of gas in the tankers reinforces my memory to the period and another industry commentator wrote similarly. Another important source is Michael Kinston. Michael is a maritime lawyer and also the son of one of the victims of the explosion. His father died when he was four. Michael has continued to campaign to reforms by the Irish government in its accident investigation processes, repeatedly stating that the Irish government has not learned the lessons of history. Michael currently works as a consultant for the International Maritime Organization and he's commented on this presentation. He's currently attending the Maritime Safety Committee meeting of I&O London. So I thought about the historical framework and I do think how one might look at it in a broader historical context. It seems to me that the losses that that ensures illustrates the slow speed of change in the maritime industry, even when there is clear limits of need and possible advantage. It's a long time since the risks of ensuring sea transport could be reasonably described in the language of the 18th century as the adventures and perils of a voyage to be ensured. This phrase from the 1779 Lloyds Hall form remained in use until 1978. I hope you can see that. The economics of shipping are clearly the major influence, especially when few members of the public are victims of an event. We also see inertia by the government of Ireland and dealing with its maritime regulatory and enforcement processes and maritime investigation. There are no reasons that I've been able to find out and Michael Kingston could not give me any reason of inertia. Finally, I'd add from the experience of researching this case, and I'll show you are all familiar with it, that a historian should be concerned about the reasonable availability of documents for future research, specialist libraries like the Caird at the National Maritime Museum around the financial pressure and may not be able to maintain holdings and subscribe to the valuable digital services that we'd be looking for. So, turning to the inquiry, I hope you can see, but it was the day following the explosion. The Irish minister for transport tourism appointed a severe in his department to carry out inquiry into the casualty. At the same time, an inspector was appointed by the minister for labor to require the disaster and it was also announced that the public inquiry would be held in the form of a tribunal inquiry and that's the report that I've referred. The first public sitting in the tribunal took place on the 6th of April, 1979. It had evidence for 65 days, took oral evidence or submissions for the six days. There were 184 witnesses who gave technical and expert testimony and evidence of the facts. On the 25th of July, 1980, the Irish Parliament published the report. It has 508 pages and makes 45 recommendations. Can you have some of the comment that we've got with this lecture? We'll see. Yes, there you are. You found some good practices between Tatar and Gulf, but much more strongly reported that there had been short-term economies on maintenance and upgrading, poor processes or failures to maintain good processes, negligence and sometimes gross negligence compounded by attempts to conceal or shift blame. The tribunal found that the major responsibility for the loss of the ship lay with the management of Tatar. It also revealed many factors under the control of Gulf that magnified its impact and resulted in the deaths on the ship and the jetty. I'll just read you a little bit. I was going to put it on the screen, but it's condensed. The report said the initiating event of the disaster was the buckling of the ship's structure out or about decadent and in the way of the permanent ballast tax for the ship's manifold. This was immediately followed by explosions in the permanent ballast tax and the breaking of the ship's back. These events were produced by the conjunction of two separate factors, a seriously weakened hull due to inadequate maintenance and an excessive stress due to incorrect ballasting on the light of the disaster. The report concluded, had the vessel been properly maintained, it is probable that the structure of the vessel would not have failed. Added to this the tribunal high light of the absence of two pieces of equipment that would have substantially reduced the risk of explosion. One was a load indicator and the other was an inert gas system. The report noted that it was virtually standard practice for large tankers even at that date to have an electronic component known as a load indicator or a mechanical means for calculating stresses during the moment of discharge. That just did not. I'll say a bit more about in that gas systems shortly. According to Woods List two days after the disaster, Bill Finnegan, chairman of Gulf War of Turner's in Ireland appeared at a press conference in Bantry Bay and put the responsibility of the exploding of art onto the ship. However, as I said, the report of the tribunal did not excel at Gulf War for previous decisions to put failures on the night and even active steps to conceal evidence. These conclusions appear in a chapter of the board headed suppression of the truth. This official report of the battleships explosion is a catalog of failures that will be familiar to those of you who read or perhaps even been involved in other inquiries into shipping and industrial disasters. It made me think of the Swiss cheese model of accident causation put forward by Professor James Reeson of the University of Manchester. He described an organization's defences against failure as a series of barriers lined up like sizes of Swiss cheese but with holes like Swiss cheese that represent weaknesses in parts of the system. In his book, Human Era, published in 1991, Reeson argued that accidents occur when these weaknesses coincide like having the holes in the Swiss cheese online. I don't know if this model of failure analysis has been used to examine historic maritime and neighbor disasters and near misses but it strikes me as having considerable potential, if not. That was once the file was out. You can see the damage on the jetty as well as the sectional issue. Dutch Salis Smith-Tak arrived in Bantree Bay with a survey team the day of the casualty. Total, the liability insurers and the Irish authorities wanted the remaining crude oil in the home and the rent removed as quickly as possible but it took many months to pump out the oil and shift this resection of the oil. At that time, the Bantree cheese was the largest ever salvage operation or of course, it's been overtaken since, I suspect by the cost of the quality of not having our oil. So like most salvage people, the class Reinigerd who oversaw the process, who I managed to speak to, is pragmatic. Yes, he says it was the largest ever today but it was not that exceptional. Well, you may feel differently if you watch the fascinating film Smith made at the ball process. It's available on YouTube and I can supply the links. So turning to the background, time for explosions were not new in 1987. They were in fact, the most frequently kind of non-walled tanker casualty according to Jack Devaney, who I mentioned. He recounts that at least in the United States, the first known conversion for wooden sailing ships carry oil was the Charles in 1869. She was fitted with 59 separate tanks. Three years later, the Charles got fired and was lost. The hydrocarbons carried by tankers produced volatile vapours. If the oxygen level in the air in the tank and the orange is above 10% or during the discharge, the mixture becomes combustible. Normal air contains about 21% of the cost. An ignition source, such as the cracking of metal plates, triggers and trigger an explosion. At its simplest, the process of inerting the tanks consists of diverting the portion of boiler exhaust gas to the scrubber, which is a little more than a large shower, which pulls the gas and extracts the sulfur. Then the combined, combusted low oxygen gas, the combusted low oxygen gas is pumped into the carbon tanks. If the system is properly maintained and operated, and that, you know, is not necessarily the case, the oxygen content in the tank atmosphere will be less than 5%. It will not support combustion, regardless of the amount of hydrocarbon in the tank. In 1932, and this goes back to the United States, a series of explosions took place in a sun oil tanker in the Delaware River. Sun oil knew they could make tankers much safer by inerting the carbon tanks. The technology was always in use of refineries, and they believed it could be adapted. By the end of 1933, all sun oil tankers were fitted with inert gas systems, and the company credited inerting, receding many lives on its ships during World War II. Sun oil also realised that proper inerting dramatically reduces steel corrosion rates in the carbon tanks. This was not only an important economic saving, but also another big safety and environmental factor, because tank corrosion can easily result from carbon leaking into balanced tanks with platforms where it becomes a major hazard. Amazingly, carbon-dejectivating, neither tanker owners nor tanker regulators seem to take any apparent notice of some success with inerting for nearly 30 years. After World War II, tanker explosions continued. The 26,972 dead-weight tanks down back to Japan was always certainly tanky when she blew up in the Arabian Sea in October 1958. The explosion ripped the deck off almost all the center tanks and tossed the midships' house into the sea, at least 19 people were killed, including everyone on the bridge. In 1956, the Suez crisis had triggered the demand for much larger tankers to carry crude oil from the Middle East to refineries worldwide. The 1960s brought even bigger ships, entering to service what became known as very large crude carriers, or VLCCs, with dead-weight tons of 200,000 or more. Three such vessel suffered enormous cargo tank explosions while tank-cleaning after cargo had been delivered within a three-week period in December 1969. Still very dirty. In 1974, the United States Coast Guard acted. It required tank inertia, although only on crude tankers above 100,000 dead-weight tons and built after 1974, so not to most on the store, the ships in service, and the regulation only applied to ships trading to the United States. The battleships was already 11 years old in 1979. She did not trade to the United States. So she wasn't under pressure from that Coast Guard regulation. The inquiry report indicates that Total wanted to sell her. According to the Lord's list article, Louis-Bouguzeau, president of Total and the ultimate ownership, also attended the press conference immediately after the disaster, and he commented that IGS in our gas systems had not been standard equipment in 1978 when the battleships was built. Although, as we've seen, Sonoma had them for much earlier. Jack DeVayne asked the obvious question, why was the industry so slow to adopt an obvious, effective safety measure, which probably pays for itself in the reduction of tank conversion? His cynical view was that with few notable exceptions, tanker owners did not see it in their interest. Certainly not to retrofit older tankers with low haul values. Nor, as I remember, was there a great insurance incentive. Hull insurance premiums were competitive. The insured value could be more than a second-hand market value. I certainly remember hearing such conversations in the insurance market at the time. Sonoma's 1974 sets minimum standards for the construction of equipment ships compatible with their safety. The flag states are responsible for ensuring ships under their flag comply with its requirements. The new version of Solas 1974 had been adopted on the 1st of November 1974, and it included measures for minimizing the possibility of admission of flammable cargo vapor, including requiring inert gas systems. At the time of the battleship's disaster in 1979, however, it had not received enough signatures to enter into force. That changed within a few months. By 25 May 1979, the minimum number of countries and monitored ratified sellers in 1974 and it came into force 12 months later. Initially, the Solas requirement for inert gas systems applied to tanks over 100,000 dead weight, but the threshold was reduced to 20,000 times dead weight per year. However, this was a period of significant tanker casualties because much of the tanker fleet was aging and many ships were either not inert or without good inert systems. For instance, and these are two I remember very well, two very large combination oil, bulk or carriers belonging to the Norwegian company Bergesen disappeared within four years of each other, one in 1975 and one in 1979, with a loss of 70 lives. Both are believed to have suffered catastrophic explosions, due to problems with inert gas system. I believe that it was the second ship, the Berge Vanger, that was rang the lutein bell for an overdue ship for the last time. In the early 1980s, there were three major tanker explosions on the LCCs within a few weeks of each other, the Maria Alejandro, the Alba Habi and the Heisei. By contrast, when the energy concentration broke about discharging in Rotterdam in 1980, the inert gas system worked. She was a total loss in insurance terms, but there was no explosion. Well, this is something of a diversion. I'd like to know the two other casualties from the period that I remember, and some of you may remember as well. One is the Darvishan, another combination carrier that was lost on the 9th of September 1980, south of Japan in Typhoon Orchard, all aboard her, which was 42 crew and two spouses died. At 91,655 gross tons, she was and remains the largest UK ship to have been lost at sea, I believe. The wreckage was only located in 1994. It turned out that the consequences of damage by storm waves to the ventilation pipes were blamed for the ship's loss. Another tanker loss was one of the most fascinating stories I worked on on Lloyd's list. Lloyd's first thought that the reported loss of the tanker sail on the coast of Senegal on the 17th of January 1980 was yet another tanker disaster of all the crew. Under Rogers became suspiciously quickly however, the ship was supposed to be fully laden with crude oil for genuine, which was unlikely to explode, but it was good and apparently the crew had the bags and packages ready when picked up another tanker which was conveniently in the vicinity. This was at a time of oil sanctions against the apartheid machine in South Africa and it soon emerged that the crew had secretly offloaded the cargo of 192,000 tons of crude oil in Durban before attempting to conceal the evidence by scouting the ship. The insurance claims which followed went all the way to the House of Lords and I enjoyed reporting them. So returning finally to the battleships. As far as I can find out, total insurance claims for the battleships amounted to $120 million. This would have included the hull and the lost cargo. The owners of the jetty internal reached an adequate settlement with the French owners of the vessel for their damages and as usual a P&I club ensured the ship owners liabilities. In this case it was the western England P&I club and it paid for the oil pollution response costs and the removal of the wreck. The ship's crew were covered by the French merchant marine scheme. In addition, there were out of port settlements to the families of the other men who died. There were no trials for manslaughter of gross negligence related to the disaster nor convictions for any offenses. In France and Ireland, this is not the end of the story. More than 43 years later, the families of the victims do not feel the Irish government has dealt with the issues properly. An argument articulated clearly and frequently by Michael Kingston. There you see the memorial service for the 40th anniversary on the island and the memorial is put up. As recently as July 2020, the European Court of Justice found against Ireland in a case brought by the European Commission. The court said Ireland had failed to create an investigative body for maritime transport accidents that was independent in its organization and decision making of any party whose interest could conflate with a trusted to the investigative body. That was because officials from the Department of Transport served on the maritime casualty investigation board. They resigned, children resigned after the judgment. In January 2021, during pre-legislative scrutiny of the legislation that had to be backed to follow the judgment, Michael Kingston presented a new report by maritime consultant, Marine Hazardment, that highlighted the fundamental and repeated failures of Ireland's maritime investigation system. He says that a number of Irish politicians have now called for public inquiries. In September 2021, the Irish television and radio network RTE produced Fire in the Sky, which you can watch. It's a vivid account of what happened that night, mainly from Irish citizens and family members. It also includes criticism of the Irish government by former president of Ireland, Mary McLeasy, a Barra student who was working for RTE as a journalist and presenter in 1979. Parliamentary debate followed the area of the program. Deputy Minister of State, the Department of Transport responded to criticisms and argued that the government had updated its strategy for the Irish maritime directorate. She said work was continuing to amend legislation and consider the organizational structures in marine casualty investigation. However, Michael Kingston and the French Irish Association of the Friends and Families of the Battleships say the government has still more proposed fundamental changes required. He told me yesterday by email that he's actively preparing a formal request to the Attorney General of Ireland to direct a new inquest into the deaths. They say the victims of the disaster died unlawfully due to safety breaches and the failure by the state to ensure safe operations. They argued that as such, the original coroners' verdicts did not consider the surrounding circumstances of the deaths, which is a fundamental right under the European Convention on Human Rights. They may also include a simultaneous application for judicial review. So the noise of the original explosion of the accident continues to reverberate across the country. Thank you very much. Pressing you long ago as well. So we would hope that there will be more progress and so forth. So I'm going to invite everybody now to ask questions. I'm going to see if there are any online and there is. Please. Signature. Disaster. Fascinating research presentation. Thank you for your important work. Have you studied any other disasters in the same way? The same extent. Not recently. I remember working. That's not the same. Yeah. City. Explosion. Provider explosion. And that was one of the reasons like the herald of free enterprise. And there's another one where it was concealed. And these inquiries so often seem to involve familiar things. There are weaknesses and weaknesses are compounded and then often by attempts to shift lane to find evidence or at least not bring it forward. So that's certainly the case. And I suspect, Michael Casey talks about Hillsborough and I think we have a number of cases where Hillsborough never worked correctly where evidence was not correct. Where are Hillsborough? No. I don't know the details now. I don't know whether any of you have taken part in any of these inquiries. A number of a fascinating presentation with NCA for the health and safety department. It poses so many questions. Still one of the practical issues is small maritime states have very limited confidence in terms of investment before this. United States, UK, France Norway have very good maritime investigation for a professional event. Somewhere like Ireland similar with the hearts of lots of other types of convenience. They've got no capability and they often call world classification societies to assist with investigations. They're one thing you have mentioned here which is quite an important feature who are both a pillar of conservatism in maritime history but can also be ignored. My real question here is you're dealing with three different jurisdictions. You're dealing with the Irish part. So you're dealing with the French part. So you're dealing with the French part and also the Irish part. And also you're dealing with the American OK, as Y Fay reports the injustices. Yes, I have a great viewer about that. See my I would discuss on this but I did and actively invest to get to this. They certainly did pull in exteriors between much of which was from the UK. And I did think of looking at the most of the attention part, because that was applied state. But it's like more than a piece of thread on the part where you just keep scouting, thinking, never come to the end. But I'm sure there was a country investigation. I didn't really see anything in the states. What I wanted to do was to see what to tell and, God, what I'm putting around the reports at the time that I wasn't able to get those reports in London or easily in the UK. Turn to the class societies. Certainly Jack Vain was quite critical, because he said, as well as the foreign states, that they depend on attracting shipments. Is there a very task, by the way, for defections? They depend on attracting shipments. And so there is someone in the decision when it comes to some of their work. Who is it? Guy, here we go. The time I was in the pre-script of hell, which the Irish state, when the time was in. It was a huge, huge media on stuff here. But what you haven't mentioned, it shouldn't have been there for the first place, because it was originally meant to help the fortune. Although you put that up, but it's very difficult to see. The other thing is, at the time, it was 42,000 people died, 700. Yeah. One brick, that was a 30-bit. But only 27,000 people died. Simply because most of them were incinerated in the Bay. It's good. And goes on the actual jet itself, which is a huge thing. Well, I live in the Bay, but I'm just born off of it. When you're talking about it's so less et cetera, et cetera, et cetera, that's where the double-bottom style type of event of ships, right? But older ships were given about 15 years to be re-appointed. Simple because no one could agree with you mention it. But that's typical of the ship that we're talking about. Oh, yeah. I mean, I don't know. But the worst of the worst. As are most of the developed countries, and we're not afraid to put these things around and flag it in the United States. We should basically just take care of them. But the whole point of use is the European human rights legislation to cover the climate. It's all the exposed factor. Because Ireland wasn't in the United States. No. It's just a subsequent bit of work. So I don't see how they can actually do the big comments. Well, I rely on Michael Kingston totally. It is the most applied of countries in the Parisian water. So he has been pursuing it for 40, well, not quite 40 years. This is the difference for the time. But because you're not doing that for 40 years. But going back to your point about the double-bottoms, and I'm not sure I could be very specific. But I certainly remember. I mean, we've had Exxon Amica Cadets just before this. I thought about including the whole issue of pollution. But that was too much. We've had Exxon Amica Cadets with Exxon Feldes. We've had the Haven. We've had a number of times. And again, as you say, the same resistance to the double-bottoms, I think, was, as I remember, and this is after I left, what's this? It was the old pollution act in 1990 in the United States. But again, it forced the adoption of double-bottoms. But again, there are always these, they don't seem to be able to compel retrofitting. And that was certainly the case with the gas systems. Yeah, what do you think about that? So it was forced to do the opposite. It's like, especially critics from some of the other regions where the evidence is. Yes. I've had some dealings with the Liberians. With the Liberian acts of inter-estimation people. And they are my British experts, ex-masters. They were quite conscientious. They had to have quarters of rest in Virginia. I used to deal with them. And they were quite conscientious of the Liberians. I think they were the biggest flag at the time. A certain of the biggest flag of the Liberians. They used to call it the Pan Amica Cadets. Yeah. The Pan Amica Cadets. But the underage is other concerns. As I said, they called the crews the Cadets. Because they were very critical of the, you know, they said, you can have enough of the good ship under a flag of convenience. But if it's operated by a poor train, you know. Yeah, I've never seen that with P.E. in all of this, President. Now, that's my case. They will do anything to go to the bottom like, Shackle was always doing. The bottom line is safety. Well, we'll forget about it. And tell them. Yeah, but there's a comment, I think, following in on this. Ireland during the EU in 1973. Now, also, this point of the European Convention of Human Rights is a world convention over and above the EU, albeit in China, the fundamental charter of the EU. So there might be no. No, no, it's unfortunately European, not worldwide. And it was founded in 1849, about the EUCHR. So it predates both the creation of the controversial common market and the British and Irish during the 19th century. OK, OK. But it wasn't really about the 19th century. What it said, it was the EUCHR decision was concerning the capacity of the court in Ireland to have two mental insurance. It was in the European Court of Justice judgment. No, it can't be the European Court of Justice judgment in the European Union. This was this was in 2020. Oh, 2020. The European Court of Justice case related to the structure of the maritime accident investigations, which included people to the public transport. And so the court said, this is not according to the European law, gave court of independent judge. The EUCHR's judgment, actually, they gave the technical same position of rationale, which caused the Supreme Court to move down the road and out of the House of Lords in the EUCHR. So that's great. And was the UK, I have to remind you, I can't remember the details, because the UK set up its hopefully independent relics investigation branch after the free enterprise, which I think was 86. Which is completely interesting. Yeah, it was after this. But Michael Kingston says that that's why we should follow that. They thought about the other side of the tree. Oh, yeah, I think there's a little difficulty of how we can get independence and competence together. Because the people, I mean, there's this concept of inspector of capture. But if you have people in particular centre who have the expertise, they have the mindset of that centre. And it's something I want to give a nature seeker. Where, again, those inspector of capture relics, you're not sure how people from those sectors in and the colour and enquire about that, I think that's very much about the needs of the touch. But it's a very legalistic fiction you've been detaching. So you still need to be able to understand the industry but understand it without being captured by sectional interests. And that I think is, again, you've been criticised, they are just about the customer. They probably didn't have anybody else in Ireland with that sort of expertise. And they probably didn't have two or three legal expertise in the market of customers. I mean, keep this a challenge to the trade terms. I was not slightly worried about going into it. Because you're working with people all the time, you understand what their concerns are. And if you're also, say, a consultant, you're going to be a part of that, you're going to be working with them, and you have personal relationships. Well, I remember very well, Mr. Lampus, when the tunnel collapsed, the huge road on the express. Everybody was bidding for the tunnel to help people with tunneling expertise and access their experience and arrow of all the other wing consultants. Agent, I remember, as I was the budget holder, HSE was spending, I think it was about 8,000 a day to purchase expertise, to accept all the expertise around that. I think the other one was you've got to look at the high and low, given that the payments into the high and low depend on the size of the fleet, and the big things are the size of convenience, and so there's a lot of best of the interest in making sure that life is good to their lives. And particularly then with one of the second-hand ships, rather than to the maritime nations who tend to buy new ships, and the island nations seem to be the same, I think, after this. So there's a lot of compromise even in the international bodies about what's on the agenda in what is, and double bottomings were not with the same bit of harmony, as in our case, if one was safe to be right, it seems the island was in harmony, but those two bits don't talk to each other like that. Can we return to safety measures and legalities and just follow up Joshua Downs' question? He's got Gordon Lightfoot going through his mind, the record, it's Gerald, and he's wondering if we've seen the memorial service. He's wondering if there's been other kind of popular representations of this or commemorations of this, and outside of the courts, how has it been remembered? That's the question, I think that's... Somebody just pushed the green button for you. Do you agree? The green button on the side, if you're to your right. And to push that, yeah. There's certainly been... I think every 10 years in that, I expect there are France, the French-Irish Association of the Relatives and Friends of the Britishers. It does various things. What else does there be? And certainly local things as well. I couldn't tell what they were, but it's getting through the court news pages. I certainly found references to events commemorating it because the people on the shore were very effective, to not just those who lost people. If you listen to the choir in the sky, and I very felt they'd send the links, you can get that for free, it's a radio program, listening to the eyewitnesses. Many of them were really shocked, traumatized, because there was this delay. It was people on the... And I'll say this because I didn't... I was a bit reluctant to put it into formal presentation. A lot of the criticism of God, then of the absence of the controller at the time of the accident. And he said he was there, and the evidence was that he wasn't, and it delayed the urgency for small schools. And again, what wants to follow it up, all 508 pages are available. Yes. One, two, three. Which I think you can download, or I can... Oh, if you wish. I didn't read it. I didn't read it. But nothing in song. That, I think, is a specific question. Maybe there ought to be. Christian or Brother or Sister, I think. You think so? There is one. All right, OK, so there is... This is when the violence just was like over. And I believe God has reopened the tunnel for 30 minutes. Right, OK. Very good. Sorry about the disruptions there with the decaying people, but when... No, no, not you people. No policies. You can do that yourself. No, no, the earlier ones. They came back to steal our wine glasses, and I didn't tell them that those wine glasses don't belong to them. So I don't know if I'm about to get reported to the college higher or above. Yes, I had to keep them away from our wine glasses, but they're there for us, specifically for you. And it might even be a time to partake if we're all agreed. I mean, if you are, then that's... May I? May I do a small commercial? Yes, please do. Just to say that... Thank you all very much for your questions about it. And may I invite anyone who's interested to come to the history films at the Society of Poppies. We're very glad to welcome, I guess, or to the people that you know. Excellent. And Louise Sanger and Barbara Jones are saying their hello from the... from the... from the eaters. Very good. Yes, the popper is there. They have to recommend it. Right. Excellent. Thank you. We can have a round of applause for you. Bringing the... bringing the... to America should be on the shooting menu. We'll have... We have a sub-credits... Just to take a look. Just a little bit of... a little bit of... just a little bit of... a little bit of... Which is a good... A little bit of... you know, for the sub-credits. But the... you know, the... you know, the... You know, the... Just to... or... all of these things... are represented. So... It was... It was... It was... given a story... You know, another story. I know, I know. Yes. A story. Critical. framework. Right. And it was kind of a hostage seat.