 Hey everybody today. We're debating Trinity versus Tahit and we are starting right now with Jake Muslim metaphysicians opening statement Thanks so much for being with us Jake. The floor is all yours. Are you able to see my screen there? Yes Ready. All right. Bismillah ar-Rahman ar-Raheem. Alhamdulillah ar-Rabbi al-Alamin Wasaratu wa-salaamu ala Rasulillah Amma ba'ad. As-salamu alaikum wa-rahmatullahi wa-barakatuh Welcome everyone. So the debate before us tonight is the orthodox Trinity versus Etherty creed To be clear This is a debate over polytheism and the belief in three gods on the one hand and Monotheism or the belief in one God on the other hand in the first half of my opening statement I will explain and offer defensive Etherty creed in the second half of my statement I will explain what the orthodox concept of the Trinity is and offer arguments against this position First and foremost unlike orthodox Christians, we Muslims believe in one God falhu Allahu ahad Allahu samad lam yalad wa lam yulad wa lam yakullahu kufwan ahad Say he Allah is one Allah the eternal the self-sufficient He neither begets nor is he begotten nor is there to him any equivalent Allah is one God does not rely on anything other than himself and everything in creation relies upon him He does not be get nor is he begotten or cause to exist and there is nothing equal to him The great Etherty scholar Ibn Khuzayma summarizes Etherty creed saying and I quote Our doctrine or Medheb as well as that of all of our teachers is as follows We ascribe to God everything that he ascribes to himself We acknowledge it verbally and hold it to be true through interconviction within ourselves Though without thereby comparing God's face to the face of any creature or created entity for our Lord is above being like onto creatures So we affirm real attributes for Allah based on the apparent meaning of the text and ascribe to him what he ascribes to himself We know the meaning of his attributes But we do not know the haqqika or the kaifiyah or the precise reality of the attributes Keep in mind that when we say we affirm the apparent meaning of the text This takes into account the surrounding context of the verses mentioned as well as the entire corpus of revelation We do not deny his attributes nor do we liken his attributes to the creation We reject divine simplicity or the notion that God does not have any real distinct attributes However, his attributes are inseparable from his essence. He is not composed or cause to exist by something outside of himself We also affirm that Allah is an active dynamic creator that is genuinely capable of acting in succession He creates different things at different times and speaks to his creation whenever he wills by his will and power We believe his actions can have a beginning and time and yet are uncreated the legendary scholar of Hadith Imam al-Bukhari states and I quote Fufi'l Allahi Sifatullahi wa l-Mafgholu ghayruhum min al-Khalki So Allah's action is his attribute and that which is acted upon is distinct from him being part of his creation He also says his occurrences exalted be he are not similar to the occurrences of creatures according to the saying of Allah most high Laysa commit lihi shay there is nothing like him and he is the hearing the scene Lastly al-Bukhari states that Allah's command which has a beginning and time is uncreated So as we can see al-Bukhari affirms that Allah's actions are his attributes and they are distinct from creation His actions also can have a beginning and time and yet they are uncreated Some may argue that we ethnic ease affirm that Allah has a hand and thereby liken him to creation They may claim that we cannot attribute the same name to God and creation without ascribe ascribing the same Montology for God and creation this principle is falsified if one affirms God and humans can possess an essence without being Similar ontologically the same bears true for every other predicate given to God Also looming behind the charge of teshbi is an assumed realism regarding universals for example God and humans both have knowledge this universal knowledge must be partially identical in God and man the objector assumes However, if we reject the realist notion this argument assumes we cannot affirm the conclusion of teshbi There is no ontological sharing between God and creation because ontological sharing does not exist Every object including its essence and attributes is particular and not universal Universals merely exist as concepts in the mind The claim that at the traditionalists Represent an overtly anthropomorphic theology has been refuted countless times and most recently by Fareed Suleyman when he states and I quote Wesley Williams Attempted in a 2002 article to show that Ibn Hanbal's conception of God was blatantly anthropomorphic an Untanable claim in my opinion close quote Suleyman also cites numerous other academics who have refuted this falsed and goes into more detail Substantiating his claim we ought we should also keep in mind that Jay and the Eastern Orthodox have no problem with teshbi In fact, they consider it necessary given their concept of theosis described by Maximus to confessor as and I quote a Sure warrant for looking forward with hope to deification of human nature is provided by the incarnation of God Which makes God hence God which makes man God to the same degree as God himself became man Let us become the image of the whole one God Bury nothing earthly and ourselves so that we may consort with God and become gods receiving from God our existence as gods close quote So as we can see Orthodox Christians do not have a problem likening God to creation or creation to God. I Now turn to my opponent's theology of the Trinity I will argue that Jay believes in three gods based on what is known in the literature as the logical problem of the Trinity To put it simply the father the son and the Holy Spirit are each God But are distinct from one another the normal method by which we would count would mean that they are three gods Eastern Orthodox scholar Bo Branson states and I quote the doctrine of the Trinity is central to mainstream Christianity But in so far as it posits three persons father son and Holy Spirit who are one God It appears as inconsistent as the claim that one plus one plus one equals one So the common so-called Muslim meme of one plus one plus one is right on target I expect Jay to attempt to respond reply to this argument But as we will see later his responses will not help him and will only create further difficulties My second argument is that the father son and Holy Spirit cannot be one God because they do not possess the same power and knowledge Orthodox Christians claim the father son and Holy Spirit are one God because they possess the same energies However, power and knowledge are energies and they do not possess the same power and knowledge For any power or knowledge that they do not share they make an exception to this so-called rule in an unprincipled manner For example, the father alone has the power or ability to produce or cause another divine person to exist According to Jay the father alone causes the son and spirit They cannot have the same power if one divine person has a power that the other two lack Therefore they cannot be the same God if they do not have the same power The father son and Holy Spirit also do not have the same knowledge The father alone knows that he has the power to cause the son and spirit to exist The son alone knows from a first-person perspective that he is the word who became flesh was born and died on the cross Therefore they cannot have the same knowledge if they do not have the same knowledge Then they must be three gods according to Jay's own standards My third argument is called the epistemological schizophrenia of orthodoxy Jay and the so-called orthobroses make a transcendental argument claiming that orthodox theology is a necessary precondition for knowledge logic argumentation, etc What exactly is the argument or justification for this claim now? Here's where the epistemological schizophrenia of orthodoxy comes into focus Jay's good friend Ananiasauram states and I quote Obtaining the necessary conditions for the possibility of knowledge cannot be logically or epistemically contingent Upon logic or epistemological arguments since this would result in question begging an amount to epistemic bootstrapping Neither would the veracity of the claim that such and such conditions are necessary for the possibility of knowledge The necessary conditions that would provide justification for our knowledge must be both Metaphysically and epistemically prior to epistemology and arguments close quote It seems the response that is that there is no argument or justification for the claim that orthodox theology is a necessary precondition However in the same article Ananiasauram contradicts himself stating and I quote Therefore the only condition that will satisfy the possibility of knowledge in bridge to gulf between man and truth is a unique idea of God Coherently articulated in the theology of the eastern orthodox church who has preserved the correct doctrine of God Received in divine revelation from the holy trinity for only in the orthodox doctrine of God Will we see that God the necessary condition is rational omniscient transcendent non-contingent or necessary intentional in his creation as opposed to creation being accidental a personal and communal being having Paracoresis within his trinity close quote and he continues on listing all of the reasons why the eastern orthodox church alone Can serve as the necessary precondition? He contrasts himself again just a few sentences later saying and I quote in Presupposing God as the necessary condition for the possibility of knowledge Man surrenders his autonomy to the revelation of God not as a conclusion that has met the standards of his Epistemological criterion itself close quote, so which one is it does Jay and and have an argument and justification for the claim that orthodox theology is the necessary precondition for knowledge and argumentation and if so then what exactly is the argument if not then the claim is equivalent to stating that a banana is the necessary precondition for knowledge and argumentation and when you ask me to justify that I can simply say that you are missing the whole point as This argument is beyond justification Let's see which direction Jay goes and if he can remove himself from this state of epistemic schizophrenia My final argument is what I call the problem of orthodoxy in orthodoxy by this I mean that early church fathers and saints and Jay's tradition rejected a doctrine of the trinity Jay denies this and claims that not only were the early church fathers Trinitarians, but so were ancient Jews he cites authors like Alan Siegel Daniel Boyoran and others to support his claim However, he does so either out of complete ignorance or does so dishonestly These scholars simply point out that there were intra Jewish theological disputes regarding how one should interpret certain texts Some Jews interpreted passages in the Old Testament in support of a theology similar to similar to logos theology Where the logos is a divine or semi-divine figure that serves as an intermediary between the most high God and creation Boyoran quotes Daniel Abram saying and I quote No one view dominated the spectrum of Jewish interpretations since the biblical text is the only common frame for the wide variety of Speculations close quote. So logos theology was not the only view or even the dominant view in early Judaism Also, these same sources Jay loves to quote Represent Justin Martyr as a proponent of logo theology and not Trinitarianism Boyoran against states and I quote many of these passages served as the origin and proof text for logo theology as Manifested in Justin Martyr's dialogue on nearly every page close quote Alan Siegel states and I quote both Christianity and Gnosticism arose out of Hellenistic and apocalyptic Judaism by sharing heretical traditions of scripture interpretation which speculated on a principal angelic mediator of God close quote This is exactly what I've always claimed Leslie Boyoran acknowledges a stark difference between logo theology and Trinitarianism saying and I quote Nicene orthodoxy also effectively Crucifies the logos while not ceasing to be to speak of the logos in the move to a Trinitarian theology within within which the entire Trinity is both self-contained and fully transcendent Athanasius and his fellows insist that God alone without a mediator without an angel without a logos is the creator logos theology is Ultimately as thoroughly rejected within Nicene Christianity as within orthodox rabbinism close quote So logos theology so some Jews were logos theorists and others were not however none of them were Trinitarians also some early Christians were logos theorists and some were not Justin Martyr and other church fathers were Logo theorists, but logo theory is deemed heretical by orthodox Trinitarians Jay and his orthodox friends pray to dead Saints who held heretical positions and did not believe Jesus was the most high God it seems like orthodoxy has a problem with orthodoxy in Conclusion etady creed is the belief in one God who is the creator of all as for Jay and the orthodox Christians who suffer from Epistemic schizophrenia, I argued that they believe in three gods the father The father son and spirit do not have the same power or knowledge Rendering them three gods and lastly they have a problem with orthodoxy as their early church fathers held to a heretical theology By their own standards Bell noctifu bill happy a la the bottle if I had a maru hoofa either who was a hip Well, I can move away loom in my tassifoon. Thank you very much, and I look forward to Jay's presentation Thank you very much for that opening and folks if it's your first time here at modern-day debate Want to let you know we're thrilled to have you here We hope you feel welcome and don't forget to hit that subscribe button as we have many debates coming up But you don't want to miss them so hit subscribe right now We're gonna kick it over to Jay for his opening as well Thanks for being with us Jay the floor is all yours for your opening statement All right, can we see the screen? Yes All right, let's get into it. So I I'm glad for Jake. They're basically doing everything. I wanted him to do in his opening statement So he's handed me a lot of gems and it's gonna jibe perfectly with what I put my opening statement as to exactly where I knew he would go so let's talk about Salafi Islamic absurdity and that's of course the position that Jake represents here and we're going to look first at How one of his representative theologians that he said represents the Palamas of Islam Ibn Tamia Particularly in his book on the oneness of God We're gonna note that it's a massive Christian fail And we're gonna see the similar fails that Ibn Tamia makes an understanding Christian theology basics The Jake himself made when it came to the triad by example for example by reducing The idea of begetting to being an energy begetting is not an energy So for Jake's argument to hold that he made earlier about the triad Begetting would have to be a common energy and it's not first of all Ibn Tamia posits the outset of his book an eternal world Existing eternally separate from God based on an infinite regress of worlds Now Jake has made many critiques of this view and others So it'd be interesting to see if he rejects a basic idea in one of his basic Palamas like theologians of the Islamic tradition second is Ibn Tamia posits the Trinity as contradicting natural reason This is a problem They're going to notice later on in Ibn Tamia as well as Jake given that he doesn't understand the transcendental argument as he made clear in his Opening statement that's going to be very relevant for where we go here in a minute Arguing that the Trinity makes energies and attributes persons is a move that Ibn Tamia makes which is false He attributes to us the Nestorian view of Christ as to hypostasis, which is false And he attributes to us an Aryan modalist view of the Trinity collapsing person in nature and God on pages 22 to 24 now He may not believe those things and you may not believe those things, but that's not our position as orthodox So if we're gonna be arguing against orthodox position You can't set up a straw man and say that you're knocking down the orthodox position when it's the Aryan ornestorian position Thus Ibn Tamia and Islam in general fail to understand typically speaking the orthodox Trinitarian dogma when they create a strong man as a formula As formulated in our councils which reject Aryanism and the story in this would be like me basically calling Jake a Sufi and then we're proceeding to refute that position Jake's failed account of unity and multiplicity in Allah This has come up in a few debates now with Jake But what is being debated here between us is not actually a pure unitarian position of Jake versus the three-ness position That I have but rather two different ways of accounting for unity and distinction in God Jake would like to give the impression that his position is free from all Issues that relate to multiplicity, but in passing debates we will say that this fails Jake believes that the attributes of God are according to Ibn Tamia's two principles Really distinct amongst themselves from God's essence what applies to one attribute also applies to all the others and equally to God's essence This includes affirmation and negation true whether we know the meaning or not except the plain meaning as Jake said in his opening statement Attributes are comparable to creatures in terms of perfections Which creatures partially have while God maximally has this perfection in a way befitting him thus likeness in these Cases is quote in name only according to Ibn Tamia ergo. It tells us nothing especially with Jake's Nominalist impures his position which he admitted we will look at this in a second. So keep that in mind True for thee not for me the Jake brand Jake believes that the attributes are really distinct and inseparable Did you hear him say that in his opening statement? That means counting by division, but he also distinctly identifies they really just The attributes is really distinct From each other and from the essence that's counting by identity Which in the same boat places him in the same boat as Trinitarian's when accounting for the distinction of hypostasis Counted by identity and the divine essence counted by division No, I did not say that Jake thinks that the Allah that Allah's attributes are persons or that we think Attributes are persons that is Jake's straw man that he often uses in many discussions and live streams When he attempts to rebut this argument But rather Jake makes the same move when accounting for unity and distinction in God that we do yet He calls us out on it. This is in fact Jake's guilty double standard Furthermore Jake and Ibn Tamia are allowed to engage in affirmation claims about Allah Which we call cataphatic theology that he would call idolatry in Christianity Jake often states the Trinity incarnations pagan We look at examples in a moment This illustrates another double standard where Allah's body parts are considered real but not created Foot, hand, eyes, etc. What is an uncreated foot that is nothing like a human foot? What by the way is a more perfect foot? Does the God foot have toenails? Isn't a foot with toenails more perfect than a toenail deficient foot? In other words, it tells us absolutely nothing and it reduces to absurdity Also, Ibn Tamia argues that God laughing is somehow more perfect than him not laughing I'm interested to see how Jake accounts for this it would then follow that eternally laughing is better than laughing once So God is eternally lowling in other words a clown God. Remember what applies to one attribute According to Ibn Tamia's rules applies to all the others If there's an infinite series of creative worlds and causes then why would we ever need a single being also a position of Ibn Tamia? Contingent means dependent upon something else But it's begging the question to say that it's a single necessary being so Ibn Tamia might cash this outward Jake in two different ways If it's a causal relation Then he's engaged in the quantifier shift fallacy that every event has a cause And so that every event has one cause if every event is contingent such that there's a transference to the whole That's the parts whole fallacy because if every being is contingent therefore the hole is contingent is in non sequitur For example my room is made up of atoms atoms are invisible. Therefore my room is invisible This is a non sequitur and this relates to the two types of argumentation that Ibn Tamia thinks is Rational argumentation for the existence of God Created acts in God's essence Jake is quick to claim idolatry in our position But holds actual idolatrous views by positing actions in the essence of God unless he again Departs from the guy that he says is his Palomax So in Suleyman 241 the event to me and attributes of God We have this pointed out that in other words temporal acts are contrasted with eternal acts Jake makes this argument himself And Jake might can't encounter that created acts are now eternal That is a contradiction and also creates an attribute that contradicts even to me as principle number one of What is applied to one attribute then applies to all meaning that all the attributes are now created and temporal or temporal acts are eternal It also violates him in principle Tamea's principle number two which applies to the attributes In God's that which applies which applies to the attributes applicable to God's essence meaning that God's essence is now temporal Idolatry will remind you as ascribing to creatures of the divine nature or worshiping creatures as God This may also be why Jake thinks God's knowledge is had through discursive Propositions and that's precisely why he thinks the indexicals argument and debate from modern Philosophy applies to his ideas of God. I can simply reply that God's mode of knowledge is not equivalent to creaturely modes of knowledge and since Jake can at will invoke the idea of We don't know the modality. Well, we don't know the modality of God's knowledge But I also might just simply deny that God's knowledge is discursive or indexical More problems for Jake perfectly laughing. Do the attributes of Allah considered in themselves possess a saiyan? This has been asked to Jake in the past and of course Jake has not had an answer to it Is one answer one attribute considered in itself less perfect than all of them Compiled together or all of them plus the essence remember a lot of this theology is going to be built on Perfect and less perfect metaphysical assumptions and we're going to see in a moment that he doesn't even have the ability to get to Predicating metaphysical claims at all. Why is laughing and turning his face quote more perfect than not? And this is it's actually argued by Ibn Tamia in the book The Suleyman book we might ask what is a more perfect laugh? Was it a perfect laugh? Was it merely a snicker? Why must we arbitrarily stop inquiring about this meaning if it's a they will typically say well It's a laugh that fits the majesty of Allah. This again tells us absolutely nothing and in fact It's circular because it's not telling us anything. It's just another supposed attribute that tells us that a law is more perfect So that's a circular claim which even even Ibn Tamia would project circularity If being is part of what it is see what it is to be perfect Then God must be seen to be perfect yet Ibn Tamia says that God cannot be seen even Suleyman notes in the book on Ibn Tamia page 252 This is a flat-out contradiction and again We're gonna see tons and tons of contradictions when it comes to basic ideas about predicating about God What is the eye all priori idea by the way a metaphysical? Perfection here. Where does Jake derive it? How do we know this well? It turns out it gets even worse because Jake Ibn Tamia's epistemology as he noted is an empiricist nominalist epistemology Jake's position cannot get off the ground in terms of predication at all And if this argument holds all of his argumentation about how he will then fail This is because Jake has put his metaphysical cart before his epistemic horse and is engaging in a host of unjustified arbitrary and contradictory claims Empiricism is the view that knowledge arises from sense data or relations of ideas Nominalism is the view that universals have no real existence and for Ibn Tamia and for Jake They're purely mental and solely particular I committed nominalist. However, I must grapple with the following problems There's no empirical perception of quote necessity being caused or any other metaphysical claim This then undercuts all of his theology and theology claims There's no empirical perception of the paraptic axiom the idea that what's in the mind derives from since data This is a position that Ibn Tamia holds. There's no empirical perception of quote reason or quote self-evident truths We note that Ibn Tamia affirms self-evident truths as most Sunni do as well And I assume Jake does as well There's no empirical perception of the universal that is abstracted by the intellect through the phantasm something crib from Aristotle Also present in Ibn Tamia universal is thus not a universal if it's only merely particulars I forgot to put the footnote there, but I can add it There's no empirical perception of quote perfection many all the arguments that hinge Alice perfection on Maximally creature like perfections also then fail. There's no empirical perception of identity over time if you're an empiricist These arguments are arguing and by extension no perception then of meaning over time In other words, I can just take Hume's critiques of identity over time and apply them to Jake's position Which is a not consistent empiricism Turns out actually David Hume's empiricism is way more consistent And that's why we we can use these arguments In fact, Jake might think this isn't fair Since this is a debate about tawaitan trinity, but again, he brought up transcend argumentation So I don't feel unfair now But if all this about predicating by the attributes is based on a faulty epistemology of naive empiricism And a faulty metaphysical nominalism then every sentence Jake makes fails to be justifiable or even coherent as all predication Itself is now impossible much less divine predication And indeed the Oxford handbook of Islam even Notes that even to Mia is a Hume and a lock before human lock Thus as such he will be subjected to the exact same critiques that we make of human lock even to Mia principles of reason are Self-evident on page 196 were told it's even to Mia's view and I assume Jake's as well It's a form of classical foundationalism where the first principles in terms of reasoning are self-evident of course David to me They require no justification If this is the basis of his reasoning in general and by extension of the theological reasoning of Choranic explanations, then we see no basis for this assertion if Jake can be arbitrary. So can I Jake? I can just claim that the transcendal argument requires no justification It just is the case now I don't actually think that I'm going to address your misunderstanding of the category error that you made between logical and Theological argumentation, but that'll come later What is the non self-referential non circular basis for you as a kind of foundationalist for thinking that the principles of reasoning are self-evident? What determines self-evidence if it's based on something else else, then it's no longer self-evident If it's not based on something else, then there's the problem of arbitrariness Furthermore, there's the criteria problem. What is the more fundamental principle by which you classify self-evidence from non self-evident truth? For example, for example, an IT admits so many passages that are disputed in the Koran In terms of their meaning yet, we're told that the plain simple meaning is accessible to all and becomes extremely complex However, when we see Ibn Tamiya lay out four rules for knowing when it's figurative versus the plain meaning Now this you can see was a huge source of dispute between him and Dr. Khalil in their debate where they were trying to figure out between various Koranic texts the pen the tablet this that the hand the foot what's literal what's figurative and Well, Jake says well, we're going to go to the the rules laid out by my scholars How do we know that those rules are the correct rules? In other words, it's just moving the problem back a step Given that Jake rejects the incarnation as a pagan contradiction We can return to the body parts which are clearly anthropomorphic attributes are claimed to have a practical teaching a value that would be useful for seventh century Arabs and Jews or even Christians hearing the text Yet the plain meaning is championed by Ibn Tamiya and the salafi. It's based on analogy or likeness. It is immediately divested of all the meaning Making the statements empty and contradictory hand foot face laughter above the throne descent to the lowest heavens are all Quote affirmed and then stated to be unknown in modality in other words The god foot is a foot that befits Allah, but it's nothing like a human foot even Sulayman notes Of Ibn Tamiya that he plainly contradicts himself here on body parts on page 331 As well as on the notion of creaturely and divine perfections on page 252 It is a hand that's unlike empirically known hands is basically what we're saying here Yet we're expecting every person in this century to just simply know that well clearly It's not talking about a creaturely hand even though we're empiricists And so lastly I would note that the trinity Is a doctrine that is not far-fetched basal in letter 234 says the interdicts come down to us And then monarchical trinitarianism, which I think we'll get into my time is running out is a combination of counting by by unity about division and identity With that I want to say first Thank you to both of our guests for those opening statements folks You can find our guests link below and I encourage even if you don't agree with them This is a great opportunity. You can learn their positions first hand By checking out their links in the description box Also, I want to let you know for tonight. We have a limited q&a as this debate's going to be a pretty long one So I want to let you know for the q&a. We won't get to every single question. We do want to ask One if you do a super chat, we're going to read super chests that are five dollars or more and If you submit a question where it's not a super chat just a standard question We're going to try to get to those but no promises because we do We'll let these guys out by a decent time tonight But with that we're going to jump right into the rebuttals. Thank you very much for those openings gentlemen And jake the floor is all yours for your first 10 minute rebuttal Okay, thank you very much. I just want to say at the outset, you know jay's opening statement was very interesting He spent the entire 15 minutes attempting to attack my position Which i'm going to show in just a second that he did a very poor job Because he's so ignorant of our position. He doesn't understand what we actually believe Nevertheless, he barely went through any detail during the 15 minutes of explaining what orthodox theology is And what that actually teaches so the audience and myself if I don't didn't have these You know about 50 books of orthodox theology I wouldn't know what the hell jay's position actually is because he didn't go into any significant detail to talk about his own position Whereas I did I tried to manage my time to speak about half the time about my own position And half the time about my opponents and creaking and critiquing his position So I wish jay would have spent more time on his own position But of course, as we'll see it's very difficult to do so because he can't defend his own position And I just want to point out that jay makes so many mistakes about what he thinks Ibn Taymiyya's position is what he thinks etady or selafi akhida or creed is And I'm going to try to point that out as we go along and when we get to cross examination section One by one and I just want to explain this to the audience It should really be of no surprise because jay himself and people were wondering Why did he delay this debate? Well, he delayed the debate because he told me that he was incapable of having the debate unless he was able to read One text that was an unreleased text in english Okay, so this is a guy who just started reading about ibn Taymiyya and etady creed two weeks ago And he thinks he's now an expert isn't going to tell the audience all about it. It's it's honestly a complete joke Okay, so now let's get to some of what jay actually had to say here He says that ibn Taymiyya doesn't understand orthodox trinitarianism Well, nobody would at this point because you didn't really explain it But nevertheless what ibn Taymiyya says about orthodox trinitarianism is irrelevant to this debate I didn't cite ibn Taymiyya as an argument against orthodox trinitarianism I gave arguments and which I've made numerous times and you haven't responded to any of them In which you should have been able to preempt in your opening statement because i've been repeating them for five plus years So that's the first thing The second thing is jay makes a big to do about nominalism Now I actually appreciate that jay and that's why I spent a significant portion of my time Speaking about our position of nominalism because I think it's a clear Difference between the two views if nominalism is true Then orthodox trinitarianism is necessarily false And I think even jay dyre would have to agree with this Why because they conceive of the universal that the three person share or the essence as a universal that the three person share Well, if there are no such things as imminent universals then quite literally the trinity cannot exist Now jay makes it seem so obvious as if these things such as Universals these entities and and and so if people don't know what they are right You know, you can see this piece of paper here this white piece of paper The idea that jay dyre wants us to believe that he thinks is so obvious is that there is something Can you picture people there's something in this piece of paper that is actually identical to the white stripes And the whiteness in my color and my skin complexion That's what jay dyre wants us to believe is that there's this thing There's this thing that's a universal whiteness Which exists that is partially at least identical in the paper and also in jay's forehead Well, if he thinks that that's so obvious I'd like him to give an argument for that because based upon akam's razor We should not be postulating entities beyond necessity Jay dyre has given no argument for the existence of the so-called aristotelian imminent universals And this is going to be a big difference between us going up. So I at least appreciate jay Having enough sense to know and understand that Now he makes a big to do about nominalist predication I don't know if jay has done any reading on nominalism I assume that he has with all those books behind him But I'd like him to show me an argument from an actually scholarly source That says that nominalist predication is meaningless that unless there is this weird thing Which is a universal that is partially identical in this white piece of paper and in jay's beautiful forehead over there Unless there is something partially identical in them It makes no sense to say that jay's forehead is white and this paper is white Now does the public and the people watching think that that's a convincing argument? No jay needs to give an argument for his position. He has not given any argument for his position So until he can give an argument for the necessity of these types of universals, we can simply dismiss it Now um, that ties into everything that he was saying about Allah subhanahu wa ta'ala and he's mocking about god having so-called body parts But if he's actually read the ferid suliman source that he desperately needed to delay the debate in order to To read that he would actually see that ferid suliman explicitly says As I quoted in my opening statement that the idea that ibn tamia's conception is of god is overtly anthropomorphic Is completely untenable and he cites numerous sources and gives arguments for that throughout the book So jay can say he disagrees with that and it's fine But on the one hand you can't claim that jay and the ethyl saying that Allah subhanahu wa ta'ala has a hand Is completely meaningless and on the other hand say that it's kashbi or it's likening god to creation and having body parts So you cannot have it both ways jay is the nominalist predication Completely meaningless and devoid of any content or is it meaningful and therefore we're likening god to creation And if you do think we're likening god to creation Then what is your problem with that because you believe in the necessity of likening god to creation And your concept of theosis which I quoted from saint maximus the confessor in my opening statement So even if let's say for the sake of argument. Oh my god. This is terrible anthropomorphic. Jake is likening god to creation Okay, what is your problem with that? You can't you don't have an argument about that You have no argument about that whatsoever. So uh jay needs to deal with those points He mentions about uh indexicals and god's knowledge. Um actually before I get to this There was another important point here Um, let me see there's so much nonsense. He he mentioned He said oh, he said there even jake believes in two ways of counting He believes in a counting by identity and then he also believes in counting by division when it comes to a law And he said you see he mentioned that a law's attributes are inseparable from each other I mean honestly jay Where did you get this from this was the most ridiculous thing i've ever heard that we're counting by division No, in fact by the fact that they're inseparable from one another and inseparable from the essence Means that we are counting them by identity Because if we were counting them by division then we would say that a loss of panathala only has one attribute But we say that he has many attributes and yet they are not divided by time and space So how do we say that there are many attributes and yet they're not divided by time and space or Are separable because we're counting them by identity Wow, I don't know how you made such a big blunder there So you need to show how i'm counting by uh division or separability when it comes to attributes or the essence That was a big blunder Okay, so here we go the the the next part here where jay mentioned about the indexicals I want to read a quote from One of his um authors that he appeals to Let me just bring it up here okay, so On indexicals he says well jake has a strange understanding Of god's knowledge. Well, that's let's see if that's the case when it comes to these indexicals or the i Well, i'm going to show you in a source here from jay's own people that that is exactly the case if i can ever find a damn quote Let me see here Got about 15 seconds Okay, i'll get to that quote in my uh next rebuttal But i'll show you that jay's own church writers explicitly use the indexical i and appealing to god's knowledge With that we'll kick it over to jay for his 10 minute rebuttal as well If you haven't yet folks hit that like button not for me But for you so that youtube knows what to serve you more of with that. Thanks very much jay the floor is all yours Yeah, again, um I think jake missed a lot of the the classes that dealt with basics of epistemology and metaphysics because jake misunderstood A lot of points that i made made some pretty rookie mistakes. For example, he appealed to my argumentation about realist notions of universals On the basis of saying that well because we know this because of occum's razor Well, how do we know occum's razor is true in all cases or true in this case? That's just an arbitrary appeal It's just an appeal to some other thing that we don't actually know Really grounds and disproves the reality of universals. He says i didn't give arguments about universals I gave multiple arguments about how there's no empirical verification or observation Of metaphysical objects that jake believes in that is itself the undercutting and the disproof Of his nominalism jake doesn't appear to be aware of classic critiques And reputations and questions for the nominalist empiricist tradition, which he's aligned himself with First further i would add to i didn't delay the debate just because i needed to read one book I asked him if he was willing to delay the debate because it's relevant for the debate that we're having And it's a newly published book about The school of theology that he believes in so that was the real reason for that and he knows that but he Just is looking for anything to grasp at this point. So um, again, let's get back to this point about what uh, what empiricism anomalism says empiricism says that We begin our theology from sense data I made the argument that we can't even know that the parapetetic axiom is true on the basis of sense data There's nothing in sense data that tells you that knowledge comes from sense data And if that's the case, then all of the arguments that david hum makes about identity over time meaning over time Those are all arguments They notice that if you paid attention to my uh slides in my talk, I did give arguments I listed many many arguments and it's true I did focus on jake's position because I knew we would get to the trinity in later discussions in the debate I'm happy to defend any of the arguments that jake has against the trinity but I want to know that uh, tau heat actually makes sense And you know jake said that he made all of these arguments that I didn't address I didn't actually hear an argument. I heard a bunch of assertions as to what his position is about the creed What his position is about unity? I didn't actually hear an argument So I don't think jake understands the difference between asserting something and actually claiming something I actually went into multiple texts multiple scholars I didn't just rely on one and by the way, I want to address that he's wrong about what he says about first of all boyarin I didn't claim that That uh, those jewish theologians taught the trinity. That's uh, false. So jake's incorrect I didn't say that they taught the trinity I said that they talked about the reality of multiple hypostasis that could be beneterianism That could be a form of trinitarianism in certain cobalas. It could be uh, the other schools that were strictly unitarian I just simply pointed out that early judeism was not monolithic And that was enough to demonstrate that you couldn't use the argument that daniel hikikachu used that the old testament was quote unitarian Or that the prophets taught unitarianism and that this is a corruption It was just simply demonstrating that there were uh jews in the first first two centuries that were Uh, not believers in strict unitarianism and but beyond that there were actually jews who were trinitarians And they were called christians and that's why boyarin says that christianity Is and are a conservative form of judeism So all I was doing was demonstrating that daniel's arguments that judeism is somehow inherently unitarian are not true That's all I needed to demonstrate. So he's setting up a strong man about something. I didn't argue Next I'll address the fact that Uh, the logos theology that that he talked about there's not one logos theology that one guy had And everybody got this from filo or someone else and then it got rejected Jake is completely ignorant of athanasia. So you who engages in consistent logos theology argumentation Is the foremost theologian at the council of nicaea. So this idea that logos theology is not used post nicaea or whatever Dumb argument he made is totally not true clement of alexandria all the alexandrian fathers and tradition Often used this logos argumentation Some of the logos apologists of the first and second century Eventually did go into weird deviations But that doesn't mean that all logos theology is false logos theology is in john one And it's in the wisdom texts of the old testament. It didn't come out of play-doh There's a plenty of scholarship that will note As even some of these jewish scholars do that it goes back to the wisdom texts proverbs ecclesiastes and so forth How that's cashed out by different theologians is a different question. So jake doesn't understand what logos theology is And he doesn't understand, uh, the first three centuries of christianity Um, I would add as well that Jake doesn't understand what an internal critique is He thinks that when I make an internal critique That I have to then agree with the thing that I'm I'm critiquing. So if I say that his position Is anthropomorphic I shouldn't have a problem with it because I'm a I believe in it the morphism But dude, I'm not saying that I'm critiquing your position. So jake doesn't literally doesn't grasp what an internal critique is That's also why he doesn't understand what tag is jake as we said is a foundationalist He's a very one-dimensional one-layer thinker. So he doesn't understand meta level questions Even though ironically he's called the muslim meta physician. So he ought to be at least aware of what Metalogical issues are that's what the transcendental argument is. You ought to be aware of meta physical issues I don't think he actually is I think he copies and pastes out of various scholars that fit his need For example, he uses us when he's arguing with anthony rogers. He uses, uh, you know, analytical, uh, You know, william lane craig when he's so he's just picking and choosing when he when it fits the case And he also seems to sort of move his positions in the midst of various debates. He has a history of that. So I'm interested to see where he's going to go when we ask him about the attributes Whether they possess a seity considered in themselves or not. He said that inseparability is not counting By division is counting by identity and then he proceeded to say that because we identify Allah's essence as one He'd totally missed the point that I said I said that he does both That was the argument I made I didn't say that he he only counts by division by using the word inseparability But he doesn't even seem to realize that in the ancient medieval world Whether it's El Ghazali, whether it's aerosol in category six Whether it's the capidotians, whether it's maximus, whether it's the nicing creed the ancient world Consistently and commonly thought about counting by division We use this argument all the time, especially when we refer to maximus in the ambiguous I think it's question one where maximus talks about unity being a single monad and then Division being the separability that gives us two and then another form of separability Which gives us the triad or gives us three. I'm not talking about the trinity. I'm just talking about counting That's how they thought that's how they counted right in moderation and belief This is how augus the El Ghazali counts for example So it was common in the ancient world. Jake doesn't even know this He thinks that it's something that was made up and then he thinks that everybody just Quote counts by identity. He says in one of his debates. This is just how I count the day It's like we count the day like this. How come uh Others don't even count like that not even aware that this is how people count it in his own Islamic schools, maybe not his school per se because this wasn't an issue of debate But Al Ghazali counts this way. I can show you in moderation and belief where he counts this way For example, it's the 10th proposition. Here we go. Oh, he ain't got no Islamic books. He ain't got no reading Oh, really? How about this right here where Al Ghazali in the 10th proposition is counting by the Dijon? so Jake doesn't know what he's talking about when we came to the body parts, however, I didn't say that Even to me, uh, what uh gave no cataphatic Meaning I said he contradicted So Jake said well, there's a place in the Suleyman book where he says that that it's it's perfectly fine to speak this way I didn't say that I didn't I never claimed that I claimed that he contradicts by saying two different things So again, Jake didn't even understand the argument or it went over his head Or he just didn't want to address it and Jake again has a notorious History of in debates not addressing any actual arguments He blows past them and he because he literally thinks that asserting something is an argument And you can see that when he came to the treatment of tag Tag is a meta level argument about arguing and logic itself and Jake says who was the argument of the logic for that Yeah, exactly. It's a preconceptual precondition type of argument Now Jake is in the tradition of the empiricist So I would think he would be pretty familiar with the ideas of analytic and synthetic truths and apriori truths How much one minute left one minute? But he doesn't seem to be aware of those things at all because his treatment of empiricism Is naive empiricism and again when we get into cross examination, we're gonna see that Does he believe in self-evident truths like? His masters and his teachers do and he says that well Even to me a book's not even relevant for this for this debate Yeah, you said it is relevant because you said that he's your palamas So why would he not be relevant relevant for the debate when he's for us? He's a palamas is a pillar of orthodoxy. You know that I have the dm Where you told me that he represents the palamas for your tradition So is so the the pillar of your tradition isn't relevant for this debate No, you just don't want to go to that because you know, I did read it And you want to stick to some other things some other text when you know good and well that he's perfectly a representative of your tradition if he's the palamas of your tradition Time this one. I just realized so on So thank you very much gentlemen for those rebuttals jake. I am sorry. I accidentally When you guys asked for the one minute warnings I screwed up mentally and when I was supposed to give you your one minute warning I accidentally gave it to you where basically I Accidentally gave you one less minute. So what I'm going to do is for these next rebuttals Which are supposed to be five and five minutes I'm going to tack on that minute back on to yours jake just to keep it fair. I'm sorry about that my mistake And so we'll out these second rebuttals Just just to understand what you're saying. So I only spoke I spoke for nine minutes instead of 10 So I'll be getting six minutes instead of five this time. Is that it exactly? Basically moving the because it was my mistake. I cut you off a minute early So taking that to keep it equal so you have equal time in the debate. I'm going to take that missed minute I'll let you I'll let you I'll let you slide, but it's going to come out of your pay, but that's fine You got it. I'll still give you six if you want it. You don't have to if you want to use five. That's fine But with that, thank you very much gentlemen. The floor is all yours jake I've got it set for six minutes. I'll give you the warning at one minute until that's done Okay, here we go six minutes So j You know, it's so funny to me that you say that I didn't uh that I'm just making assertions the whole time Jake is only making assertions. He didn't hear any arguments Well, I'll just repeat my arguments because j maybe he honestly didn't hear them I have no idea because you didn't respond to a single argument that I gave I actually engaged with your 15 minutes of nonsense to the best of my ability You didn't engage with a single one of my arguments You didn't respond to my arguments asserting that you guys are polytheists based on the lpt You didn't respond to my argument about, uh, them not having the same power or knowledge other than Assuming that I said that these must be energies No, my entire critique is that the orthodox say that they're not energies They make an exception between the begetting and the spirating and god's knowledge and these other things When they're not shared and that's the whole problem with your universalist perspective Is that you don't have the necessary and sufficient conditions for what an essence is You make exceptions and maybe you're not familiar with the classical critiques of the Aristotelian position regarding universals, which you basically hold to that we can come up with all sorts of exception cases That you don't have answers to and that's the point you make an exception You say oh, they they still have the same power Even though the father alone has the power to beget the sun and the holy spirit and by the way the catholics actually Disagree on this point and they make that very same argument that the orthodox are guilty Of saying that the father alone has the power to cause another divine person and because of that They don't have equal power. So don't act like I just pulled this argument out of my backside. I didn't Uh, let's go further here Again, he keeps saying I I'm just making assertions. No, I've made arguments I gave my argument on the lpt whether you think it's ridiculous or not I made the argument that they can't be the same god because they don't have the same power and knowledge Now, let's get to this point that you made about um knowledge Okay, I have the quote here ready. All right, which this is from Dmitri Stan Eloi And he says in the experience of god value one page 152 I'd love to see what you think of this jack. He says and I quote the life of the eternal subjectivity Must be a fullness, which in all respects is not a transitory one It must consist in a love for another subjectivity and in a perfect union between itself and that subjectivity Which has the same fullness so as to be simultaneously Unfailing life the life of the eternal subjectivity is an infinite reference to its subjectivity Contemplated within another I within another quote unquote I so as to be true love eternal unfailing love It is referenced to another I who is himself also the bearer of his own infinite subjectivity And responds within that same eternal unfailing love a divine I Loves with an eternal inexhaustible love a thing proper to the divine or with its fullness Which is like that of another I and this occurs in reciprocity This is divine light this this divine love Sorry, this is divine life and it exists together with a mutable fullness It is the same infinite existence of love the love in of an infinite person Directed towards another person worthy of infinite love and vice versa But within the inferior interiority of the same subjectivity in other Circumstances eternally would either be an unbearable boredom if it were the prerogative of a single consciousness Thereby he's saying there are three Consciousnesses within the trinity or three minds Well, if three consciousness or three minds in the trinity isn't polytheism, then I don't know what the hell is What is the standard and he's saying that that is the contemplation of another consciousness or else an absurdity if it were prerogative of a substance of law that was aimless He's basically saying oh my god. God would be bored if he didn't have another god to sit there and talk to Okay, so don't make it seem like oh jake has no idea the orthodox don't have this concept of knowledge Well, what is he talking about here in the subjectivity of the different divine persons? They have a self referential eye which accounts for the mutual love. Otherwise, they would all be bored And he says that if it were the prerogative of a single consciousness Meaning there are three consciousnesses in the trinity j So how do you defend that three consciousnesses in the trinity is not polytheism? One minute left now back to the whole issue of epistemology j thinks that I don't understand I do understand the criticisms And I knew that he was going to bring this critique because he doesn't want to talk about trinity versus tauheed He wants to talk about epistemology Because he knows that he can't respond to my actual arguments So he's spending the entire time trying to criticize my position without a defense of his own position and response to my arguments And he wants to make the debate about epistemology, but I knew he was going to do that That's why I included that in my opening statement But I'd be happy to have an entirely separate debate about epistemology But j wants to make it only about that in this debate because he know he can't defend his actual position But I'd be happy to go through that and if you want to talk about self evidence truce I'd be happy to talk about that But whatever your critiques are of them as you've already admitted You can't give a justification to something that is Meta logical and therefore I can tell you the same exact thing and we're at an intellectual stalemate and times Without we're going to kick it over to j for his five minute rebuttal Want to let you know folks at the very end they'll have their closing statements Or I should say second to the end which will be flipped in other words different from usual It'll actually be instead of jake going first and then j it'll be flipped where it'll instead We'll explain when we get there with that Hold on a second. What I didn't understand what you just said I'll like I'm putting the cart before the horse. I'll explain that once we get there But you had mentioned it earlier in our discussion on how you guys wanted it So I'll I'll bring it up later though, but j thank you very much. The floor is all yours Yeah, so I just wanted to point out here that one of the things that would definitely help Jake in the future if he wants to understand The history of christian metaphysics and the distinctions that he's not able to actually make Is this great book here christian theology in the end of ancient metaphysics? And this is the a new recent book in the scholarship Uh, it it's by yohan zakkuber and it's really good for pointing out that We don't for example think that the essence of god is a universal. This is a fundamental mistake I don't know where he got this. I think he misunderstood The idea of the comparison between the capidotians saying that the essence of god is common And therefore it's like the relationship between a universal in a particular but the essence of god itself is not Actually a universal in the sense of the way that we understand universal say maximus So the confessor famously see that teaches as does john mascus that universals are created God is not created. And so universals cannot be the essence of god. So jake misunderstood an analogy comparing the universal uh relationship between Creatures and the participation that they have in the one in regard to the many versus the relationship Of the one of the many in god It's just an analogy that capidotians make and so jake misunderstood that very fundamental misunderstanding jake equivocated on the term power Uh, so i'm going to quit screen sharing there So what I said was is that for that argument the whole which is actually a unomian argument the the notion of Begetting would have to be an energy and this is the argument that unomius makes against nissa in against unomius The argument is that begetting is not a power So jake's just equivocating on the distinction between hypersetting properties and powers And the fact that roman catholics, uh claim this really has nothing to do with our debate roman catholics claim all kinds of things Jake doesn't believe in roman catholicism So he wants to try to use an argument as if that would have any weight in this debate Really doesn't matter what roman catholics say. He says I didn't reply to the lpt I did reply to the lpt. I pointed out that his argument and his use of it relies on counting in one way Counting by identity. I specifically addressed twice now that both of us count by identity and both of us count by division I gave multiple people in the past who count this way Jake ignored all that jake acts like this is all made up in the in recent live streams of talks He's actually acted like why don't y'all count the way everybody does today? Not even aware of the basic fact that ancient medieval world counted also this way I mentioned in my opening statement first order and second order in position That certain things can be counted by identity and certain things can be counted by division even back in the ancient medieval world This became a medieval distinction first order second order in position if we want to go back to my Opening statement, I said that You could think of things like Let me see where I put this You could let me see you could think of things like First order in position would be things like mundane objects of cats cows dogs And so they would be concrete objects in the world and then you could think about abstract objects like sets or laws of logic Those would be counted by identity Because it doesn't really make sense to think of for example one third of a law of logic or one third of a Set of things right so abstract things in this case created abstract things Would be counted by identity But things that might be parted or are divisible Have to be counted by division and this is actually in even today's literature So Jake's acting like we don't count this way today dog. We don't count this way today. Oh really well I mean, I've got academic scholars here talking about The theory of mathematics and countings like like like the david leapsman paper Where he goes into great detail arguing that no actually we do still count by division And you just have to be more nuanced about it I specifically argued again that jake in his own accounting for the attributes in the essence Also counts by identity and by division and he used the very terminology that relates to county by division And he got upset by that he got a little rattled and they had to say that's not what it means, bro That's not what it means dog Now he mentioned the idea of unitarianism in uh modes, uh jake doesn't understand the difference between person nature and mode It's very important for trinitarian theology to make a distinction distinction between hypostasis nature person nature and mode or tropos mode is the way that a thing exists Islamic theology is kind of all over the place and they use modality in a lot of different ways It's kind of unclear and contradictory between the different Islamic thinkers as to what exactly they think modality means Sometimes it relates to parts whole relationships Sometimes it means relation to other objects and sometimes it means the actual way that the mode in which it exists The way a thing exists or how it exists So in orthodox theology, we're using it in that sense of how a thing exists Pardon i miss a reminder So We're gonna kick it over to we're changing it up in the format. We're now going to the three sets of seven minute cross examinations This is going to be more formal for our cross examinations folks So we are looking for just questions on one side and just question or just answers on the other side with that Jake the floor is yours to interrogate jay right now Okay, just give me one second because i'm starting my time right here Okay, i'm ready jay. So you said that uh, you're wondering where did I get this idea that the divine essence is a universal So let me read you from your good friend dr. Bo Branson and his phd dissertation on page 168 On the section 4.2 point 1 uci and who hypothesis in gregory of nissa on universals Richard cross argues persuasively in my view that st. gregory and st. basil both use the term ucia synonymously with nature and they conceive of this as a Universal and then in the rest of the section he goes on to explain just that that the divine essence is conceived of As a universal by the capidotians. So what do you have to say in response to your buddy saying that? Yeah, the zakubra book actually treats this that the notion of universal Evolves over time between the way the capidotians use it and the way that the post Calcedonian fathers use it up in the john damaskas and st. Maximus So what's relevant for our debate in terms of? Human universals is not whether or not god's essence is common But whether or not there are created universals. So that's what I was talking about my question My question is my question is does bow branson believe in this passage? And what he argues for in his dissertation that the divine essence is a universal. Yes or no You're equivocating on the term universal. Does he say that the divine essence is a universal? You're equivocating on the term universal. Okay, so you want to answer the question? Do you think? I'm gonna move on. I'm gonna move on so universal only has one sense. I'm gonna move on because it's It only has one sense. It's clear to the audience that you can't say that now Let's move on to the lpt. You claim that I am counting by division within god Explain how I'm counting by division within god when you use the term insufferable I use the term inseparable means that i'm Separation means division separation means how am I using that to count? Well, you said that the attributes are inseparable Exactly, but how many attributes are there are there one or many? Well, is god's essence one? How many attributes are there one or many according to my position? You have you believe in many? Okay, they're many and yet they're inseparable. So if they're inseparable from each other and there's many How am I counting by division genius? No in terms of the essence you count by division by saying that it's one Oh, there's one essence right that's Where's he's undivided, correct? Where is there a counting by division? There is none. Okay, exactly It doesn't mean that you're it doesn't mean that you're saying goodbye. You're not gonna let me not gonna let you know It doesn't mean that you think you don't you don't even understand the basics of this conversation Let's move on. Let's let's let's move on. You don't understand the other word now. Let now let's get to Some other issues. What is the difference between tefui del mana and tefui del kefir? I don't know your terms. You don't know. No, so you have no idea what that means No, okay, and yet you think you're able to critique our position when these are basic terms As your religion as your religion made for all exactly so Is it just for Arabs or all the world? No, but even when i'm critiquing the trinity I'm aware of the basic terms of what a hypothesis is what I know is I'm under I understand the basics. Is this is this a debate about grammar? This is a debate about the fact that you're ignorant of our tradition. Thank you very much So you want to make it about grammar next and let's move on to the next question Why is it problematic to believe that the persons are identical to the essence as thomas equinus and many catholics hold? Why is that problematic? Because it basically ends up in reducing person to nature and it would be modalism Okay, so would you consider that position heretical? Yeah, if you mean identity in the sense of reductionist identity Okay, so the trinity if you conceive of when you say the father is god that the father is identical to god Would you agree that that's logically problematic because then it would follow that the father is identical to the son Well identity can be as the the sense of is of identity or predication Yeah, i'm saying and the catholics make it explicit There's there's no difference between the person and the nature in terms of the thomas So right they say the father is identical to the nature or essence and so are the son and the holy spirit Which by the logic of identity would follow that the father son and holy spirit are identical to each other Do you agree with that critique? I think you could make that argument. That's why I said modalism. You know, okay You know what modalism is. Yes, I do know You're just asking me again what I already said No, because I want you to be more explicit, but i'm supposed to ask questions not you. Thank you very much Now how many persons are there in the trinity three? Are they separated by time or space? No So you count the persons by identity and not division right? Correct Okay, does god have one eternal attribute or energy or more than one more than one Are his eternal attributes separated from each other by time or space? No Okay, so you count the attributes by identity and not division right? Correct. Okay. So if we count gods in the trinity by the same method of identity, how many gods would we count? It depends on what god picks out If we're talking about the persons three So there would be three gods if we counted by identity and the same method that we count the attributes or eternal energies and the persons correct Right. Okay. Your friend bow banson says a little g god as you know Okay, so your friend. So there would be three little g gods. Thank you Your friend bow Branson says that today we count by identity So that would mean by the standard way in which we count today. There would be three gods in the trinity, correct? The way that we count today is talking about post frego Okay, so and that's analytical I'm gonna go what he says. I'm gonna quote what he's saying by identity. So today we count. Do you don't want me to answer? Today we count. No, I'm answering. I'm gonna give you more. Yeah, you're answering Yeah, you're answering exactly. Today we ask the questions and then you add we count f's by one logical subjects That are discernible from or at least not identical to one another and r f That is x and y are if if x and y are different in any way and are both f-ish We count them as two f's so that's in his explanation that we count today by identity yet You're quoting these other sources, which is not even my argument My argument is that you're inconsistent in your methodology So do you have only if you think that you only if you think you've gone in one way No, no, no, it's not about one counting Forgive me. I I gotta I've gotta see if uh, you can ask a question jake just to keep it a strict as well I'm gonna ask a question What is the justification or argument for why we must count persons and attributes in god by identity? But count gods by another method other than simply trying to avoid that you're a polytheist By the example that I gave from first order and second order imposition in the way that all of the ancient world counted So there is no justification You're not asking why we count the attributes and the persons by identity But we can't be because different things because what what you can't understand is a different. I'll give you a chance to Exactly, but you're not getting I gotta be I'll give you a chance to answer the question j and then I've got to wrap us up Okay, that's can I can I answer what he asked he just talked the whole time And then let me answer you can answer you can answer the last question. Yes Yeah, so different things are counted in different ways. That's what I argued And I've argued that from my opening statement Your argument hinges on only counting in one way And you're taken out of context the fact that dr. Branson said that most people today post Frega think of counting in one way when this is a dispute about the way that people in the ancient medieval world counted Which is not by strictly by identity We'll jump into the seven minutes of j interrogating jake The floor is all yours j Jake you said that you do you're happy to affirm this sort of empiricist nominalist position and that seems to necessitate the idea that All the knowledge that we have comes from either sense data or relations of ideas I'm just curious if you think that the peripatetic axiom itself is found in sense data That's not my position. When did I ever say that I'm an empiricist? Well, if you're a nominalist you're an empiricist How does that follow? Well, you're supposed to ask the question so you disagree with How what most people in your tradition? No So you're not an empiricist I'm not an empiricist by the standard that you just laid out Well, so you don't think the knowledge comes from sense data I do but I don't think it's limited to sense data. I didn't limit it to that. I said all I said relations of ideas. Yeah, I don't think it's limited to those two Okay, where else do we where else does knowledge come from the fitra? And that is what? Do you know what it is? No, I don't that's why I asked you Okay, well similar kind of similar to your concept of the noose So a direct perception of God? Yes How do you directly perceive God as given to me that says God cannot be seen? What do you mean? He says God cannot be seen. Of course God can be seen Oh, how can God be seen? How can God be seen? I guess Jay you're not familiar with our giggling. Yeah. Well, that's why we're asking We're asking you that I'm asking you giggling and it's how can God be seen. Is he with the eyes? Yes, he is it's showing that your ignorance that you don't even know I'm glad you think I'm ignorant. So that's why you get the chance to enlighten us. I'm trying to If you slow down soldier, I will yes How is God seen by the eyes? If you allow me to talk, I'll tell you by the beatific vision We believe in the afterlife that we do see God with the eyes Correct. But has anybody in this life seen God? No Does God have a physical with the eyes? Not with the eyes. Does God have a physical form? Define what you mean by physical The body parts that are listed. We don't believe God has body parts. No Well, you believe he has a foot, right? Uh, we believe yes. We do believe he has a foot. We believe his hand. What is a foot that's nothing like a created foot What is a foot that's nothing like a created foot? Right. The same thing the same thing that in essence is that's nothing like a created essence Yeah, but our argument is not based on analogy for essence I'm saying that any predicate that we ascribe to God and creation There is a similarity in meaning, but it doesn't follow from that. Yeah, what's that mean? What's that similarity of meaning? Let me finish does not follow from that that there is a similarity in ontology, which I know that completely I understand no, I understand that that's the it been to me a position. So I'm asking what is the problem with it? What is the similarity? What is the similarity in terms of the meaning the color and what is that you're just saying the meaning What is that so we know it based on the text? So if you go to the example if you go to the example Is all of that empirically derived is the meaning empirically derived if you if you allow me to finish If you go to the text that describe the yed or the the foot For example, the hands are described as being responsible for directly creating atom So this is how we understand the meanings of the text so you reference attributes in context So you reference another created object, right What's the created object the text? No, the text is not created the the text that you read is created, right The papers and the ink. Yeah, exactly. That's the papers the papers and the ink, but the words are That's called the text. I know you're talking about the eternal Quran. That's not what I'm talking about No, I'm not talking about I don't even believe in an eternal Quran. What are you talking about? So the the text that you derived that knowledge from is empirical, right? The text that I derived I don't understand. Yeah, you don't understand the question. Exactly. No, I don't It doesn't make any sense. Yeah, you think I believe in it. You don't empirically read the current You don't empirically read the current Yes, we do That was the question I asked you so you read we read you did understand it You just don't want to ask you don't want to answer it. You understood it then. No You you're you have been able to ask me appropriate questions. I asked you that yeah You think I believe in an eternal Quran. Where does it say that in the book you read? I'm asking you about your empiricism what you don't want to talk about and you said that So what is a created foot? What is that? What is a foot that's nothing like a created foot? And I explained it to you. No, you didn't I explained it to you. I said no go to these texts I said it's known. It's a circle known through the text. It's right, which is a circle of empirical Sense data, which is what I'm asking you. What's what's the circle? How do we know how do we know about how do we know another empirical piece of data to another empirical piece of data? You can never get out of this loop. That's why that's a problem for empiricism No, it's not because it's the same thing when it comes to divine revelation According to the orthodox. How do you know about that's a two quote way? No, it's not That's a two quote way. I want to know your position. How do you know about trinity? You know about the trinity in the same manner. You know about the trinity in the same manner I'm moderator. He doesn't answer the questions. He just talks over me. You're complaining to the model. That's a two quote way Hold on one second. You want to reset? Hold on to I asked him about his position. I can answer the questions however Jake I'm asking kill I asked about his position and he said your view of divine revelation. That's a two quote way I'm asking about his position which he won't explain Okay, james, whether or not my response is a fallacy is for the audience to decide No moderators are involved in it. I can I can know that moderator step in Yeah, and I can answer and I can say you're not answering. I can I can answer You won't answer I can give any answer I want. Yeah, exactly. We only have one minute left in this section I can give any answer I want. You can say anything you want, which is what you're doing Exactly. I'm answering your question. You just don't like the answer because you can't critique my position Let's just do one last one last just to be sure. I understand the question. Jay, if you can ask it one more time for me Right, so I asked for his basis for knowing what the Quran teaches Which is empirical sense data and I'm trying to get at the point that he can never get out of the domain The veil of empirical sense data to ever actually know anything about Allah himself because much like the tomas position He's stuck in only seeing and interacting with created effects. So I'm trying to figure out He says well in the future there'll be this direct perception of Allah in the beatific vision And I'm asking about the here in the now How do you ever get out of the box of the challenge of humane skepticism? Yeah, and I'm saying that we have a direct possession Direct experience of God right now through the concept of the fitrah, which I explained But since you don't even know what it is, it's no surprise that you don't understand explain what it is So you're just I did I gave you a corollary within Orthodox theology where I explained that it's similar to the concept of news where there is a direct experience You said in the eschatology direct. No, no, no, no. Yes, you did. No, no, no You're confusing a seeing god with a direct experience of God. Those are not the same thing So is that had in this life? Yes, there's a direct experience of God right now that is not through some inferential process It's not based on argumentation But we are at the end of the seven minutes for that section We might have to come back to this and the next set But sure I have the clock set for seven minutes For you jake to interpret jay Okay, give me one second interrogate not interpret Well, I got to interpret what he's saying but hold on a second. Let me just get my uh thing here Okay All right. I'm ready whenever you are james ready Okay. All right jay. We're back at it again Let's go to the next issue All right How many men are on this stage right now between jake james and uh jay? None because we're not on a stage Okay on this platform Three there's three men Okay, how come you don't count the same way in which gregory of nissa counts Peter james and john three men in his work On not three gods when he says that there's only one man because I already explained different things are counted different ways And you're counting three men as saying there are three men, but gregory of nissa counts them as one man Well, they're one in terms of nature And gregory says that it's more appropriate to call them one man And that actually our way of calling them three men is incorrect So it's better to change that than to call the persons of the trinity three gods That's his entire argument. So you by by you saying that there's three men here. You're actually disagree No, it's just two different senses of the same word which you constantly equivocate on Okay, richard karts right says on this passage It seems to have been left to gregory of nissa basal's younger brother to notice that thus understood Consumstantiality of the father son and holy spirit appears to license saying that there are three gods Gregory himself rather desperately suggested that strictly speaking. There is only one man So do you agree that there's three men on this platform or one? There's one man There's one human nature and that sense man can pick out nature which is a common thing And there's three men as individuated Okay, gregory says about the logical problem of the trinity He says this question which was asked to him by another bishop Is very difficult to deal with if we should be able to find anything that may give support to the uncertainty of our mind So that it may longer totter and waver in this monstrous dilemma It would be well on the other hand, even if our reasoning found unequal to the problem We must keep forever firm and unmoved the tradition with which we received by succession from the fathers So gregory is saying that the problem is difficult. Do you agree with that? Uh, depending upon how you cash it out if you think that the logical problem that trinity is identical to the arian disputes Then you're engaging in anachronism. This isn't about an arian dispute This is specifically where he sets up the problem in his work on not three gods and responding to a blabius Where he's asking them. Well, we say that your father son and holy spirit are each god But you're making a mistake. We forbid men to say that there are three gods So this is the very problem of titheism. No, we forget we forbid three gods if you mean three natures Okay, so here we go next question According to you according to you the father has the power to cause another divine person And alone causes the son and the holy I already answered this you're equivocating our power. Do the son and holy spirit have the power to cause another divine person You're equivocating on power power is not an energy. Do the son. I didn't ask about energy Do the son and holy your argument is saying that Do the son and holy spirit have the ability to cause another divine person Causing a divine person is not an energy. Do they have the ability to cause another divine person? No No. Okay, they don't. Thank you. If no, then do they have the same power? That's only if power is viewed as an energy. And I just argue that the power that we're talking about here is not really correctly called power. It's called begetting. Okay. But it has to do with an action, doesn't it? Well, it's acting a different sense than energy. And that's what Athanasius argues against the Arians. Yeah. I'm not asking about energy. I'm asking about the argument of all power. Power is what an agent is able to do. Do you agree? No. Powers, no. There's multiple senses to the word power. Okay. So when I say that God is all powerful, I mean that he can do whatever is metaphysical. There's first actuality, second actuality, and there's power. I'm so divining. Are you going to let me finish? I didn't ask you a question yet. You did. No, I didn't. You asked multiple questions. I'm explaining to you what the understanding of power is. I'm giving you my definition. I'm giving you my definition of power. I'm giving you my definition of power. My definition of power is whatever a being can possibly do. Now I'm asking you, does the son have the same ability to do whatever the father can do, yes or no? It's equivocating on the word power. I just gave you the definition of power. That's your definition. Exactly. So you understand that every argument that you make where you reduce words to having a single definition just restates your position. So that's why it's a valid myth. No, it doesn't. It doesn't. No, it doesn't because the capital. So you're not interested in our... I suppose this might be a good opportunity to... It could be that, Jay, if you want to answer it according to your own definition of power and you can share that definition and then if you're willing to humor Jake's question using Jake's definition of power. Right. Right. So Jake wants a single definition of what power is according to what he says it is. And if he's going to critique our position, then it needs to be our understanding of first actuality, second actuality, which we ascribe to God and there's different senses to power. I can have power as a potentiality that I possess that I don't actualize. I could also have power as an actualized energy that I'm engaging in. Or sometimes in the sense of Athanasia is talking about the father begetting, he says you could call this an act, but it's not act in the same way that God has a triad action in terms of the energies. So Jake's argument hinges on reducing the word act to having one sense in God and we simply don't have that view. Okay. That's not my argument, but let's move on to the next question. That is your argument. That's what your argument is. Let's move on to the next question here. Does the... You're moving on because it doesn't work. Does the father... No, because you've already been refuted. Does the father have the ability to become incarnate? You're not told that. So you don't know. You're agnostic on the proposition. Well, there's nothing about that. So there's no reason... I'm asking you. Do you know about it or not? Can the father become incarnate? So you're not even letting me answer. You're just immediately cutting me off. I asked you a question. I just simply said there's not any information about that. And the way that Jesus speaks is that no one has seen the father at any time. So there's no incarnation of the father. Okay. So people have interpreted John of Damascus as arguing that the father cannot be incarnate when he says in his exposition of Orthodox faith book four, the father is the father and not the son. The son is son and not father. The Holy Spirit is spirit and not father or son or father or son. For the individuality is unchangeable. How indeed could the individuality continue to exist at all if it were ever changing and altering? Wherefore the son of God became son of man in order that his individuality might endure. So he's arguing that this must include that the son only can become incarnate in order for the individuality of the ditch distinctions between the persons. So do you agree with that interpretation? I'll give you a chance to respond, Jay, and then we've actually just hit the seven minute. I'm just asking, do you agree with that interpretation? That's all. It's the individuality of the persons as known by us. So has not the incarnation is not what lets us know or what conditions the distinctions in the triad. We'll kick it over to Jay for his seven minutes to interrogate Jake. The floor is yours. Jake, earlier when you were talking about your view of epistemology and whatnot, do you agree with the position of Ibn Tamia as related on page 196 of the Salaman book that the principles of reasoning are self-evident truths? I would have to look at the reference, but define self-evident. Not relying on anything else to be the case. I believe that they are known directly through the fitrah. And that is what? I said I explained it before similar to the noose. Okay. So every individual in an inner sense just knows self-evidently that what the law of logic is true, the laws of logic are true. He knows that certain principles like that half is less than a whole. He knows these things directly not through some type of inference. So are they self-evident? Self-evident only in the sense that he knows them directly through the fitrah. Okay, so they don't rely on... They're not from an inference. So they don't rely on anything else to be true? They rely on God to exist to create us with that fitrah. Hold on, we don't know that that's the case yet. So you do believe they're self-evident? I know, I said they're not self-evident in the sense that you're... No, too human perception. They're not dependent on human perception. They're prior to... I didn't say are they dependent. I said are they self-evident? Too human perception. They're self-evident in the sense that they're known directly through the fitrah as an apparatus. Okay, so how do we adjudicate between the things that are self-evident and the things that aren't? By the fact of our existence. We know that, for example, a half is greater than a whole. So that's a fallacy. I mean, sorry, a whole is greater than a half. Yeah, that's a fallacy. Appealing to existence doesn't justify the truths. I explain to you how it's because we know them directly through the fitrah. So we know them because we know them. So that's a circle. No, it isn't. I explained how we know them. You just said we know them because we exist and experience them. That's a circle. I said that we experience them through the apparatus of the fitrah, which God has created human beings upon. Yeah, but how do we know the difference between those and the non-self-evident truths is what I asked you. You said by existence. Because they're self-evident, as you just said. Oh, so now you do believe in self-evidence. Self-evident in the sense that they're not based upon inference. And how do we know those distinct from the ones that aren't? Because you know when you make an inference and when you don't. And if you don't, then you get a big problem. Oh, so we just know. So reality is reality. So if you don't, do you get this from P-Jump? Do you know the difference between when you're making an inference and how you're not? I'm asking you questions, not you. Exactly. So I'm telling you. We know the difference between when we make an inference and when we don't make an inference. Yeah, but that's not answering the question. I'm asking for the justification for the division between the self-referential and the non-self-referential. What's the justification? The justification is that the self-referential, which you're talking about, the self-evident ones do not rely upon inference where other people do. So they're self-evident because they're self-evident. No, they're self-evident because they don't reply on inference. And you're asking how we know that. How do we know that? Because when I make an argument and I appeal to an inference rule, I know that I'm appealing to an inference rule. So that's a circle, Jake. This is a basic epistemology problem for your empiricism. Do you have a question, sir? Oh, exactly. You have a question. You ready for me to move on? No, I'm asking you if you have a question. So how do we know the difference between the self-referential, self-evident ones, and the non? I already answered your question. No, you didn't. You just restated that the self-evident. No, you said, how do we know that there's self-evident? How do we know the difference? How do we know? It's called the criteria problem. No, how do we know that there's self-evident? It's called the criteria. Are you familiar with the criteria problem? I'm not answering that. I know what the criterion problem is. And what is it? That's not my point. I'm saying to you. That's my question. So that's why you're saying it's not your point. And I'm saying to you that you're asking me, how do I know the difference between what's self-evident and what is known through an inference? No, between what's not self-evident. Right. And the opposite of not being self-evident is something that is known through an inference process. So you're in the criterion problem, Jake. It's a. You're giggling. I've explained it three times. It's very simple to understand. You explained it, but it's not answering the criterion problem. Do you know what it is? If you don't know the difference. Do you know what the criterion problem is? I already answered that question. Do you know what the problem is? Yes. What is it? I do. You just explained the problem to me. Moderator, he won't answer. Do you know who's associated with it? Who's associated with what? The criteria problem. It's a problem in epistemology. Yeah. Who's associated with it? I don't know who the origin is. Right. So it's David Chisholm. So how do you answer the criteria problem? I'm giving you an answer. I've been doing it for the past five minutes. So you'll notice in the debate, Jake just walks, and he doesn't answer the object. No, I asked. And he says that it's self-evident because it's self-evident. No, I never said that. Never said that. Everybody heard him say it's self-evident because it exists. And we don't. That's not what I said. That is what you said. How do we know, and I said, we know it through a divinely created apparatus? That's how we know it. We know it by records. This is your starting point. What do you mean? We're talking about starting points. You're appealing to divine apparatuses. I'm talking about the starting point. No, I'm saying that according to our epistemology, the fitra is how we know these things. And we know that because we're created upon it. Yeah. But the question is about, do you know that you're just saying, well, we're made that way? That's my question. I'm saying we know we're created because we have a direct experience. No, I'm asking about the principles of reason themself, and you said you believe in self-evidence. And then I said, OK, and then I asked you the criterion problem, and you haven't answered the criterion problem. You keep talking around it. I've answered your question several times. Your answer was circular. Explain the circle. Because you said that, well, I know it's self-evident because it's self-evident. And when I'm not doing something that's an inference, that's not answering the criterion problem. No, you asked, how do I know it? What's the justification? I explained. You don't even understand the question. Do you need to state the question again? I explained the justification. What is the justification for the belief that you know the difference between the self-evident ones and the non-self-evident ones? So the criteria problem is saying that you have a more fundamental criteria by which you cash out these two different things and put them into different classes. How do you know that more fundamental chism issue is what I'm asking? Yeah, and I'm repeating the same exact answer. We know it based on the fact that we are created by God with a direct experience of those things. That's a circle that doesn't justify the criteria problem. That doesn't tell us, Jake, that doesn't tell us that we know the fundamental criteria is the case. We were out of time. We've got to kick it over to Jake to interrogate Jay. And this is our final set. So we'll have one seven-minute section of Jake interrogating Jay, and then one last interrogation of Jay on Jake. With that, Jake, the floor is all yours. Sorry about that. I'm just getting my notes up here. No problem, folks. If you haven't yet, check out our guests linked below. There's a value in hearing their positions firsthand from them. This debate is a great introduction to their views, but check out their channels. That includes at the podcast. We've linked both of our guests below. Okay, I'm ready. Ready. Okay, Jay, do you have an argument or justification for the claim that the Trinity and orthodox theology or the orthodox church specifically is a precondition for rationality, intelligibility, and all the other transcendental categories? Do you have an argument and justification for that? Yes. What is it? It's a two-parter. Can I explain it? Yeah, go ahead. So the first part is that it's a reductio at absurdum argument when you deny it. This is called retortion in Aristotelian argumentation. And the second part of the argument is to posit the Christian worldview as the way to ground the transcendental categories that are the preconditions for all possible knowledge. Yeah, you're saying to posit them. Well, what's the justification for the claim that it is the only system that can account for those things? Is there, do you provide arguments or not? Retortion, correct. The first one is retortion. Okay, explain what retortion is. Do you know, you're a jake and muslim metaphysician. I know what it is, but I've actually seen in your, I've actually seen in your videos. Okay, what is it? You're not asking me questions. I'm asking you questions. You've explained in your videos that you critique the Thomists when they bring up the issue of retortion. So can you explain it and explain how when they use it they're not justified in doing so, but you are. Because they're classical foundationalists like you and it's a reductio argument. I'm not a classical foundationalist. Now it's a reductio. You are, you are. I'm not a classical foundationalist. You are. So you're gonna tell me my own epistemology. I mean, the way you argued in the last comment in the last section just now. I'm not a classical foundationalist. The way you just argued. Again, I'm gonna ask you. You believe in self-evident truths. I'm gonna ask you again, Jay. You believe in self-evident truths. So you're lying. I'm asking you questions. Why are you lying? Because you are a classical foundationalist. I'm asking you questions. Yeah, I'm supposed to be asking him questions. Just to be clear. Okay, Jay, again, I'm going to ask you. When you critique the Thomist, you're saying the only reason is because they're a classical foundationalist and you're not. How does that affect the legitimacy of them making the same move that you are? Because like you, they don't understand a meta-level argument. Okay, so why don't you explain it to us other than making a claim? I didn't make a claim. I said that the first part of the argument is reductio or retortion argument showing the absurdity of that worldview. And then the second part of the argument is to show and argue that only the orthodox Christian metaphysic epistemology and ethic can ground the transcendental categories that are the preconditions for any possible knowledge. Okay, so there's two parts to it, Jay. Let's deal with the first part. Does the first part alone give justification for the claim that the orthodox theological positions are the only justification for the preconditions of intelligibility in all the other transcendental categories? No, all retorres and shows is that the other position is absurd. Okay, so it only shows that that position is absurd. So that doesn't justify it. So the second part is, is positing the orthodox position. But that's the very thing that we're asking for. What is the justification for the claim that the orthodox position alone justifies the preconditions of intelligibility? Correct. But what is it? You're just restating the claim. You're not giving an argument. No, you're confusing a first order argument with a meta-level argument. It's a category error. You keep saying I'm confusing and you're making claims, but then you're never giving any content to your claim. I just stated the content. You just don't understand it. No, I do understand what you're saying. You just said, you just said. Then you should understand what a meta-level argument is. You just said it's a meta-level argument. And I see here, from your good friend, Anais, Father Deacon Anais, which I've read as paper and was very interesting, actually. Too bad you didn't understand it. Too bad I didn't understand it. I mean, it was so terribly contradicts himself up and down on the same page. And he explicitly says that the tag argument to ask for justification for positing the orthodox view is wrong-headed because it's prior to epistemology, an argument that's wrong-headed in the first order of reasoning. Okay, so then there is no justification. There is no justification by the criterion- No, by first order reasoning. By the criterion problem you were asking- You're not listening. By the criterion problem you were asking me about, do you have a justification for the claim that the Eastern Orthodox position alone suffices for the grounding transcendentals? Do you have a justification that meets the criterion of justification that you're asking for? There is the absurdity of your worldview in our case in this debate. And the second part is the coherence and the grounding work that the orthodox Christian worldview does for things like universals, laws of logic, objective ethics, identity over time. All those metaphysical principles make sense in a world that's where God is the creator. Okay, Jay, which is exactly what I said. So, Jay, and the problem of orthodoxy in orthodoxy argument, does Alan Siegel, from your reading of his Two Powers in Heaven, does he say that the Two Powers in Heaven view is heretical? Yeah. Okay. Do Siegel and Boyorin consider the Two Powers in Heaven view akin to Logos theology? They relate. I don't know if they'd be akin. Okay, they relate it. So, is Logos theology- Because it goes back to Philo. Is, yeah. Is Logos theology heretical according to orthodox Christianity? Meaning the theology of Philo. Is that heretical? Yeah, Philo's position would be binitarian. Okay. According to Boyorin, John Baer, and the Catholic encyclopedia, was Justin Martyr a proponent of Logos theology or orthodox Trinitarianism? I think that Justin had a form of Logos theology and Trinitarianism. Okay. Is Justin Martyr a saint in the orthodox church? He is, and we address this in the inspiring philosophy stream, all of your arguments. Is it permissible to pray to him? We ask for his intercession. Okay. So when he declares that Jesus is another God and says that the Son is a product of the Father's will, are those heretical positions? There might be a lack of clarity there, but we already addressed this in the inspiring philosophy stream. Is it heretical to believe that the Son is a product of the Father's will? There's probably some lack of clarity there if that's an authentic text, yeah. Is it heretical to believe that the Son is a product of the Father's will? Yeah. If he means it in that sense, we would say it's wrong. Okay. Is it heretical? It could be. Okay. So it's permissible to pray to heretical saints, correct? Well, we don't automatically think that if somebody got something wrong, they're necessarily a heretic. I mean, Augustine made many mistakes here. Many heresies? Well, a heresy is decided to be heresy. He believed in the filiokoi, right? Augustine believed in the filiokoi, right? Correct. When it becomes known as a heresy, yes. Okay. So now it would be heretical to believe in that. That's what councils are for, correct? Okay. Thank you very much. So do ethities believe in divine simplicity, Jay? I don't remember. You don't know if we believe in divine simplicity. Well, you say that not in the sense of absolute divine simplicity. Are we occasionalists? Some. Is Ibn Taymi an occasionalist? Ibn Taymi's position seems to be that created causes actually happen, but God can also reverse them, but he doesn't seem to affirm a strict occasionalism. Okay. So is he an occasionalist or not? You don't know? I just answered that. Does he believe in secondary causality? He says that they're not necessary, but God can change them. Does he believe in secondary causality? It's a basic term. I just answered that. Yes or no? Does he believe in secondary causality? I just answered it, dude. You didn't answer it. I did. Does he believe in secondary causality? You want me to read you his position from the book? I just asked you, does he believe in secondary causality? It's a yes or no question. I'll give you a chance to respond, Jay. We've run out of that seven minutes. Okay, Nia, no problem. Yeah. The best of my understanding of his position is that he thinks that there is real causality in the world. It's not, it doesn't operate apart from God's will and that if God wills to, he can do a miracle or do something differently. So I'm, I mean, I couldn't figure out what exactly his position is because I think it's a bunch of contradictions. So what's up next? Are we doing? This will be seven minutes of you interrogating Jake and then we'll go into the closings before the Q and A. All right. So you seem to have a problem with the idea of reductios and internal critiques and meta logic. I'm not sure why this would be a problem for you given that you're named the Muslim meta physician. I don't have a problem. Do you know what meta logic is? I don't have a problem with the critique. You don't have a problem with the transcendent argument? No. I have a problem with your use of it. If you've seen my, if you've seen my debate on this channel, I don't watch all your debates. No, it puts me to sleep. I can't listen to- I've used a form of listening- I put you on four times to listen and it's still unbearable. So what I'm trying to figure out is- Because it's hard on you. You know what meta logic is? No, tell me. What's meta logic, Jake? I have no idea what it is. Well, that answer, that condescending answer is like you do know. I have no idea what meta logic is. Okay. Yeah, tell me. I have no idea. So it's the questioning of how logic itself works, right? Okay, good. So is it invalid to speak of meta logical argumentation? No. Okay, but your critique, for example of the way that Father Deacon Ananias argued in that paper was that he was contradicting himself because he argued that there's no justification for transcendental arguments in a orthodox sense of not the first order argumentation, first order logic. He's talking about meta level argumentation. Was that a question? So what I'm asking you is that why do you have a problem with it if you understood that it's a meta level argument? Okay, my problem with Father Deacon Ananias, when a problem with what he said in the paper is that he makes the claim, and he seems to make the claim that it's a meta logical problem or meta logical arguments are. And therefore it would make no sense to ask for justification or argumentation because it's prior to argumentation. That's what he's saying. Yeah, but that's still a form of, you can still justify it. It just becomes a paradigm of justification. Yeah, I understand that. But that's not what my criticism is. My criticism is that then later in the paper, he seemingly does try to justify it when he says, and he talks about, which I gave the quote, I don't wanna waste your time, where he says for only an orthodox doctrine of God, we will see that God is the necessary condition, is rational, omniscient, transcendent, and so on and so forth. That was what I was saying. He starts giving all of those reasons, which is the exact same thing that I would do. So what's the problem? Well, you have a different metaphysic as I pointed out in my opening statement and in the critiques about your ideas of self-evident truths. So you have a different metaphysics. I agree with that, but then it comes down to, don't you agree that then it comes down to the difference in our metaphysics, which are the debates, we, that's what we're supposed to be. Yeah, but your starting point was self-evident truths of reason. I know that you claim that you also start with the direct perception or intuitive, whatever sense that you have of a lot of. You think I'm lying about that? No, but I'm saying that it bypasses and ignores the question of the first principles of natural theology or reasoning, which you're committed to. Yeah, but I thought that you as an orthodox believe that the noose in the same manner is a legitimate thing to appeal to. That's a too quick way. It's a too quick way. No, it's not. It is. No, it's not. It's saying that because of the same fact that we are debating metaphysics, yeah, but I have a similar position when it comes to that point. The difference is that in letter 234 of Basil, which was my closing statement, which I had to rush through. If people want to go back, they can screenshot it. I noted the argument that the energies come down to us. And that's why we have a basis for affirmation or what we call cataphatic affirmation. I believe in the same thing. What's the difference? Yeah, but that's why my whole argument this time was that when you try to do the naming, when Ibn Tamia, for example, explains in what sense there is similarity or likeness or resemblance, he says that it is not like the created mode of being. So it actually tells us nothing. So your naming tells us nothing because you don't have an energy doctrine that comes down to us. That was the argument. I do. We do have the same doctrine in terms of... No, you don't. Yes, we do in terms of the energies coming down. When an energy comes down, does it attach to a human being? It has nothing to do with attaching. It has to do with how we predicate. That's the argument here. So that's why I asked you about the foot. And I asked you if a God foot is nothing like a human foot. What does it tell us? What's the meaning that it's given us there? In the same way that when I say that this paper has whiteness, that is nothing like the whiteness in your forehead. Though you're still using paper. A paper is a created thing. I still understand it in the same way. These are creatures. These are creatures. Yeah, they're creatures. And we believe that... So another creature, which is totally unlike Allah, tells us nothing about it. So these names and these predicates aren't telling us anything is... No, no. No, I'm giving you an argument to show you how they... Your argument refers to another creature. No, I'm giving you an argument to show... It refers to another creature. That nominalist... It refers to another creature. That's what's in question. Nominalist predication is not meaningless. It's not meaningless. Nominalist predication is not meaningless. It's circular. That's the point. It's arbitrary. Because you're just using another created object to try to explain what is beyond the created. That's the whole point of the argument. That's what I've been arguing this whole time. And that's why your position contradicts because on the one hand, the uncreated foot is nothing like the human created foot. But you say, oh, but it actually kind of is, but we don't know the meaning of that. So it's... No, we do know the meaning. We do know the meaning. Again, you're misrepresenting. No, Ibn Tamea says both things. You're misrepresenting. Ibn Tamea says both things that we don't... He says that it's like it. We don't know the meaning. He doesn't say that. Yes, he does. He doesn't say we don't know the meaning. Yes, he does. Where? Give the evidence. That we don't know the meaning of what? Because when he... No, the God foot. You know what I mean? Show that he says we don't know the meaning. Where does he say we don't know the meaning? Okay, what he says is that what it means is that it exists in a manner befitting a lot. That tells us nothing. Oh, it does. So when your orthodox church says the exact same thing, what does that mean? We don't say that. We don't say that? God doesn't have an uncreated foot, I mean. He doesn't say in a God... Your orthodox church doesn't talk about a God befitting manner. Not a God befitting foot. Does it talk about a God befitting foot? What is a God befitting foot, Jake? To talk about a God. Jake, I'm asking you. Does it talk about a God befitting foot? I'm asking you, what is a God befitting foot? The same way that it's described in the text. So no answer. No, in the same way that... Which is a circle. In the same way that it's described in the... And how is it described? So Revelation doesn't tell us anything when we read it? No, I'm asking your view. Of course, Revelation means things when we read the words. Which is what? Which is what? So you're telling me nothing. God describes. You're telling me nothing. God describes what his hands and feet actually do. And it's what? So you have no idea. You haven't even read our text? No, I want you to tell me. You said it's creating, Adam, but that's another created thing. I'll give you a chance to answer the question. Adam is not a created thing. I'll give you a chance to answer, Jake. His hands are not created. Neither is his foot. What is an uncreated hand? He said he's gonna give me a chance to respond. What is an uncreated hand? I've got a... Time is up. You time us up, let me respond, and then we can move on. An uncreated hand, in like manner, an uncreated essence has nothing in common. You have not shown that simply using the same word entails that there is similarity. And I've explained what an uncreated hand is. It is that by which a loss of panorama can grasp things that he can create, Adam, with his own two hands. That's a created thing. No, it's not. Those are creatures. Hands are creatures. And so is God's knowledge. God's knowledge is created. God's knowledge is a creature? Yeah, that's what you believe, right? God's knowledge is created, right? I'm talking about your position. We have seven minute closing. I don't even understand basic arguments. Seven minute closing. You're so mad, dude, you said that. No, I'm not mad at a boy. You got to believe what you just said. This one, earlier, I got the order wrong. So it's actually that the closings will be just as you expected, namely, Jake will go first, then Jay will go for his closing, and then we'll go into the Q&A. So we have seven minutes. The clock is set for you, Jake. The floor is all yours for your seven minute closing statement. OK, one second. OK, ready, here we go. All right, Bismillah ar-Rahman ar-Raheem. Alhamdulillahi rabbil alameen. I'm abad. Well, it's been an interesting debate, I can say that. But Jay, as we've seen, he doesn't understand basic ethnic Aqidah. He couldn't answer whether clearly Ibn Taymiah is an occasionalist. I've got a book over here, which I can, I don't mind actually sending it to Jay for free, where he completely refutes occasionalism. We do believe in secondary causation, Jay. So I guess you don't know that. He didn't know the basic difference between. I didn't say that he was an occasionalist. You're not allowed to speak. I didn't say that. You're lying. I do want to, just to, I'll give you a chance in your closing as well to rebut, Jake, but I do want to just for this closing statement, so I want to keep it separate. Yeah, I know it's hard, Jay. You're getting refuted. But I didn't say that. Just chill out. All right, we're ready, James, to restart. Let's see. I'll give you six minutes and 20 seconds left. OK, good, here we go. So Jay can't keep quiet because he knows that he's being made a fool. And he did it to himself. He doesn't know the basic difference between Tafweed el-Nana and Tafweed el-Kafiyah. This is basic. And he says, oh, well, your God is just a God of the Arabs? No. But if you read our literature in the same way that I know the difference between usia, which is essence, and I understand the term homoousian, I don't speak Greek. I don't speak Latin. But I understand these terms because I've read several dozen books on the subject to be acquainted with the terms. But you haven't. And that's why you look like an ignorant buffoon because you don't know the basic difference. And that's why you're mocking right now because it's hard on you. Everybody can see how this debate went for you, Jay. It looked really pathetic. Now, going back to the point, he didn't understand that we believe in secondary causation, that Ibn Taymiah wasn't occasionalist. Yeah, he didn't give a clear option. He said, oh, he's contradictory. He doesn't understand. And also, he doesn't, as I said, understand the basic difference between Teffweed al-Nana and Teffweed al-Kafiyah, which is very basic. There are many things. He didn't even know what the fitrah was. It's very basic to our epistemology. How are you going to critique our epistemology and you don't even know what the fitrah is? It's a complete joke. Now, in terms of my arguments, he didn't respond really to any of them on my first argument, the LPT. The father is God. The son is God and the Holy Spirit's God. And they're not each other. They're distinct from each other. The same way that we count, Jay, let me help you out. One plus one plus one does not equal one, sir. It equals three. So the Muslim meme has been vindicated. Thank you very much, Jay. And his only response is, oh, we count different things in different ways. And I asked you for an objective criteria of why we count attributes or energies and persons by identity and we count gods by division other than an ad hoc on principled assertion. And you had no answer to that whatsoever, sir. You'd had no answer. Yeah, keep shaking your head. And then you claimed, oh, you claimed, Jake actually counts by division. And then when I questioned you about how I count by division in the cross-examination section, you flopped so hard. I don't count by division. We count the attributes by identity. By the fact, even though they're inseparable and not divided, they still count as more than one. That means we're counting them by identity, not by division. So you haven't shown that I've counted by division within God whatsoever. The only thing you have is an unprincipled way of avoiding saying that there are three gods because you just don't want to admit that you're a polytheist, which everybody knows that you are, including the Roman Orthodox, sorry, Roman Catholics. Now, here we go to Jay's point here where he's refuted by the Roman Catholics, right? Here we go. Branson, yeah, again, refuted him on the claim that Branson himself says that Gregory of Nyssa believes that the essence of God, the divine essence is universal. Jayin is one of his videos. He says, we apply that same idea to the Trinity, which is that each of the hypotheses instantiates the divine nature. So they are instantiations of the divine nature. Now, Jay, don't get out of, don't get out of a wrestle out of your seat now. I know they're not merely instantiations, but they do instantiate the divine essence. Nevertheless, Timothy Paul, Catholic philosopher, says about the instantiation view. There are at least two problems with Jay Dyer's Eastern Orthodox instantiation view. This is a critique from the Catholics who believe they're polytheists. That the instantiation view has to face an answer to why the person nature question, both having to do with the conciliar claim that there is only one God. First, consider a problem often raised against social Trinitarianism, a type of instantiation view that builds into the unity of God much more than mere instantiation. The problem goes as follows. The instantiation view gives up monotheism. When we count human people, Jay, just like I asked you how many people are on the screen, what your own church father would have said one, which is ridiculous, we count by individual instances of humanity. When my daughters, Mary, Beatrice, Edith, Agnes, each instantiate the universal humanity and each has a proper characteristic such that we don't confuse them, what we have there are four humans, not a single human, like Gregory of Nises says. So likewise, on the instantiation count, we ought to invert the line from the Athanasius Creed saying, instead that there is not one God, but three gods. Think about it another way. Christians wanted to safeguard the monotheism that they inherited from Judaism, whether they succeeded is a separate question. Now, suppose a Jewish man were accused of polytheism. Here's a defense he could give on this instantiation view of the divine nature. He could say, yes, it is true. I worship the God of Israel, Baal of the Canaanites, Dagon of the Philistines and countless others, but fear not, I only countenance a single universal divinity, which each of my many gods instantiates. As such, I'm still a monotheist. I don't think Moses would be impressed, Jay. This is what Timothy Paul is saying that you're clearly just a polytheist. Now, what does Jay say about the Catholic view? He rightly points out that it reduces to modalism and I agree, that's why the Catholic view is modalism. The Eastern Orthodox view is polytheism. They say that the truth is in between, but they're never able to explain that problem. Jay says I equivocated on power, but he doesn't believe that the father, son, and holy spirit have the same abilities. He couldn't give an even answer if the father has the ability or power to become incarnate because he knew that would result in them not having the same powers in which they wouldn't be the same God. Thomas Aquinas criticizes that view in the summa in part three. And last but not least, Jay was not able to actually deal with the etheriaquida and it's because he hasn't even read our texts before the debate he needed to delay it. So people were wondering what the delay was. It was because of him, he wasn't able to read an English translation of an unreleased book and that's why he doesn't understand our position. Thank you very much. That will kick it over to Jay for his 10 minute closing as well. I wanna say folks, if you haven't yet, check out the poll in the live chat. You can vote on where you stand on this question tonight. Already has 2,754 votes. So log in right now in the live chat. You can put your vote in the poll. With that, Jay, the floor is all yours. I hope Jake's okay because the whole debate, he's basically been spurging and squirming like something's wrong over there. I've just got Parkinson's or what's going on but I hope he's okay. I didn't mean to hurt him so bad or hurt his feelings. I love you, Jake, man. Yeah, I think that first of all, as I pointed out, when he asked me about Ibn Tamia, I was clearly trying to remember exactly what his position was from the Sulayman book and I specifically said that he allows for creative causation. Jake then tried to make me sound like I was saying that he was an occasionalist. I never said that. So that was a complete dishonest lie. I said that he believes that there's real causation in the world but he also thinks that God can intervene and do miracles. So that was a straight up lie. Just looking for anything grasping at straws because he performed so badly. It's probably why he had to mute or take off his camera. I don't know if he's running the bathroom to take a comfort break or what's going on but yeah, I think if we review this debate, we'll notice that the central issues that were in question, two ways of accounting for unity and multiplicity as I pointed out in my opening statement, not a question of who's the true monotheist versus the polytheist, the way that Jake wanted to characterize the debate because if you go watch, for example, Jake's debate with Dr. Bob Branson or his debate with Dr. Khalil, you'll notice that Jake consistently had no real way to answer for the actual questions of how we account for multiplicity and unity in his conception of the attributes in the essence. I specifically gave numerous arguments in the opening statement that Jake never got anywhere near touching. He says, I didn't make any arguments. I did, I made countless arguments throughout that opening statement. I specifically pointed out that not that Jake only counts in one way. I said that when he uses the terminology of inseparability that he's using the idea of counting by division. And it's simply saying that if you say, for example, that the attributes are undivided or that the essence is one and undivided, that's also counting by division. That's how the ancient and medieval world typically thought, unless they were dealing with objects of first order imposition or objects of second order imposition. Again, I addressed those disputes when I covered that topic. So most of the stuff that Jake has pointed to, I did address, he just then came on and said, he never addressed nothing I said. No, I did address everything that he said. Just most of what I addressed you just weren't familiar with or you didn't know what these topics were. Now, again, in the topic of the universal, for us as universals get discussed amongst the Capedotians and then post-Calcedon, it becomes more and more specified and more and more clarified. So if you just ask me something like it's God's essence of universal, it really depends on what timeframe we're talking about. But post-Calcedon and so forth, we don't usually see the idea of a universal itself in the Platonic sense being attributed to the divine essence. It's simply said to be something common so we can say that, yeah, the divine essence is common but universals take on a specific category of a created thing, especially in St. Maximus. Maximus, for example, argues that universals can perish and this is in the Tolestin dissertation. Well, obviously universals aren't the divine essence because the divine essence can't perish. And if universals can perish, then universals are created things. Now, universals are patterned on things in the divine mind. We would call those the divine ideas but that's a different topic. Let's suffice to say it's again, another kind of equivocation with how the Capedotians use the term common or universal versus the way that it's used by the Talmud Saint John Damascus in a more precise way about created realities. So the universals dispute however is very important for this debate because as we saw, Jake's denial of universals results in a lot of problems for accounting for things like meaning and identity over time. That's why I kept stressing how would Jake understand various texts of the Koran. And you'll notice when we got into the nitty gritty of the epistemology, Jake completely collapsed. Jake went in circles, he was lost, he didn't know what was going on, where he was even at. He thought that you could say that, well, some things are self-evident. What you noticed when I first asked him, you didn't wanna say it was self-evident about a minute or two later. Yeah, these are self-evident truths. But then when I asked him about the criteria problem which is how do we know the self-evident versus the non-self-evident? He began to appeal to a self-referential thing because we know because of the way that we go about doing it. Yeah, but that doesn't justify the claim. And he knows that it doesn't. And that's why he went deeper into deflecting over into transcendental argumentation and justification. And he didn't know what a metallurgical argument was even though he admits that FDA was making a metallurgical argumentation in the paper. The paper's just arguing that the transcendental argument isn't justified in the exact same way that first-order types of beliefs are justified. So, and this is just to say that different things are argued for in different ways. If you watch my Matt Dilla-Hunty debate, this becomes a very central point of dispute between us where Matt thinks that everything's argued for in one way. Likewise, that very low tier quality of debate that Jake shares with Matt Dilla-Monkey, they both just seem to think that words mean one thing. All arguments are argued in the same way. A justification happens in one way. Different types of things are proven and argued for in different ways. Different types of things are counted in different ways. So I made this very clear. Again, Jake didn't get any of that. And everything had to be smooshed down and reduced into one simple one-dimensional ways of understanding everything throughout this debate. So I think that if people paid attention, especially when we got to the notion of hand, foot, the bodily properties that are ascribed to Allah in his school and his tradition, Jake couldn't tell us what an uncreated foot is that doesn't bear similarity to foot, except that it's similar in the case of functionality of creating. Okay, but the creating that you talked about or the piece of paper that you referred to or this or that, those are other created things. And so the created things that you keep appealing to never match up or touch upon the uncreated thing, which the Quran says is unlike, right? Allah is absolutely unlike creatures. What's that? 50 seconds. So the argument is not that Jake believes or Ibn Tamia believes that there's no way to have positive predication. The argument is that they contradict and Suleyman points out numerous places where actually he contradicts. So Jake says, oh, he didn't read it. I was just waiting for a good book on this topic to have a good debate. So Jake's trying to make it like I was avoiding something or whatever. No, no, no, I just wanted to have a good debate. And I went to the trouble of reading this 400 page book for you to have a good discussion and a good debate. And again, Suleyman, page 331 notes that he absolutely contradicts himself on this point. He also contradicts on this notion of what the divine perfections are, right? And so when we're told that we are supposed to know what a hand is, every Jew or Christian in the seventh or eighth century would know what a hand is by empirically based hands. And time. With that, we're gonna go into the Q and A. Wanna say folks, we're gonna try to move through this as fast as humanly possible. Couple of quick things. One is the goal is what we have written down here is 30 minutes, as well as we will not read super chats that are just attacks on people. We do want actual sincere questions. Also, as we had mentioned earlier in the debate and as you can probably see at the bottom right of your screen we're only gonna read super chats that are $5 or more. We're gonna try to get to standard questions, namely when you just tag me in the chat with a question, but I just can't make any promises because we do, we agree to a 30 minute Q and A. So I wanna go through this as fast as humanly possible. Thanks for your patience and here we go. First up, thanks very much, John Michael B says, Jake says that we are polytheists. Does he know he follows a pagan god named La? Give me a chance to respond to that, Jake. I have a feeling you disagree. Yeah, I don't know where he's getting this pagan god concept of La. In fact, even Orthodox Christians, I think Jay, maybe this is something that we could agree on, Orthodox Christians that are actually Arabs call God a La. So if you think that that's the case then Jay is just as much of a pagan and Orthodox are for using the term a La. So it's completely ridiculous. Question for Jake. They say, how does Allah, who is above the seven heavens, descend to the lowest heaven? Does he have temporal space? I don't know what temporal space means because that time and space are two different things, at least in my understanding, unless you take a modern physical understanding where time and space are the same thing. So I don't even really understand the question, but when you ask how, that shows that the questioner doesn't understand because we don't say that we know the how or the kafia. We don't know the kafia of the attribute. So, and it's not only for descent or nizul, it's the same for yed or puwa or any of the attributes. We don't talk about the howness of the attribute. Not to disclaimer, folks. We have so many questions. Please don't submit any more questions. We're gonna try to move fast. Joshua the king says, believe whatever you want. Allah has eternal attributes that require a recipient. Therefore, he's dependent upon other than himself to express himself. Who's that for? Yeah, that's just a statement, but I mean, okay, we don't believe that. We don't believe that Allah subhanahu wa ta'ala. How is he, if he's dependent upon his attributes, let's say for the sake of argument, if he's dependent upon his attributes, how is he dependent upon somebody else? They're his attributes. So, I mean, that just makes no sense. It's the same. It would be a similar concept in orthodoxy to say, oh, God has attributes, so he's dependent upon somebody else. Well, the attributes are his. It's just such a low level critique. This one from Golsi Tabard says, Allah and Yahweh are both the, that's they're just crawling. This one coming in from, do appreciate your question. This one is from, I'm sorry, my screen's reloading, I mean. Yeshua the king says, Why does the Quran say it's clear, detailed and explains everything, yet Muslims differ on Allah and the Quran doesn't detail the Kaifiyah slash Haunus? Let me know if I pronounce it wrong. Yeah, yeah, no, no, it's okay. So he's saying, why does the Quran say it's a detailed explanation of all things? That's in chapter 12, verse 111, when it says, Tefsile kulli shay. But if you see this phrase used, it's obviously used in a hyperbolic manner because it's used in the same sense when it talks about what was revealed to Moses. He was also revealed a detailed explanation of all things. And yet we believe the Quran came afterwards and revealed things that were not given to Moses. So it's just a misunderstanding of the phrase. This one coming in from Dr. Chilin says, Hey Jake, two-part question. Is LGBT allowed in Islam? Because in Sanaan Nabi Dawood, 5224, Muhammad was kissing, let's see, they say allegedly Muhammad was kissing another man on the chest. They say, should we stone him? I would have to look at the hadith. I don't know what he's referring to, but LGBTQ, I mean, I don't wanna get this stream banned or anything, but no, we believe it's a sin and similar to orthodox. So we're actually in agreement on that perspective that LGBTQ is a sin. This one from FAMO says, Jay, your entire open was a failed attempt at trying to challenge Tahid, yet once, not once did you attempt to prove the blatant paradox known as the trinity? Well, again, in my last statement, I addressed the chief argument that Jake relies on the LPT and I just simply pointed out that there's two different ways that counting happens for different things. Different things are counted in different ways and that's why, if you want a fuller presentation of explaining and arguing the Trinitarian doctrine itself, I gave a lot of those passages in the beginning part of the Daniel debate, but I was just trying to squeeze as much in as possible, but I would also add that I would say that if Jake, as he pointed out, wants to just count by identity, if he thinks God is necessary and he counts by identity and if we follow the rules of Tamia that each of the, what's true of one of the attributes is also true of the essence and so forth, then he's got multiple necessary beings, if he's got multiple attributes. You got it, this one coming in from, do appreciate it. Even Lord says, Jay, are Mormons basically Muslims and Jake as a Muslim, well, first we'll give you a chance to respond, Jay, are Mormons basically Muslims? And there's some interesting parallels between the supposed profit status of Muhammad and the supposed profit status of Joseph Smith in terms of polygamy or direct new revelations that sort of contradict previous revelations, see my argument with Daniel Hakekachu, but also I would argue that Islam is mainly focused on trying to explain through thousands of pages of debates what Allah's unity and singleness actually is, whereas Mormons are actually Tritheists and believe in three distinct discrete gods. You got it. I believe in a lot more than three gods. They say for Jay, as a Muslim, what are your thoughts of Mormons compared to other Christians and Protestant groups? Yeah, Mormons, I agree with Jay's part of Mormonism. I don't think it's anything similar to Islam, but Mormons are actually some of the biggest polytheists in the world because they believe Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. At least I say they're a bit more honest than Jay because they admit they're three gods, but then they go much further than that by saying that man can become God one day and not in the sense that Jay talks about with theosis. They go much further than that because they believe Father, Son, and Holy Spirit used to not be gods and they elevated to that station of God. So they're actually one of the biggest polytheists in the world as a religion. You got it. This one from Bo Branson says, Jake quotes me saying Trinitarianism, quote, unquote, seems like saying one plus one plus one equals one, not that it is. He admits that I next put Gregory of Nisa's response in standard predicate logic, giving a formal consistency proof. Yeah, so to be clear, I wouldn't be so stupid to claim that Bo Branson actually explicitly says that the Trinity is like one plus one plus one equals one. That's not the point. The point is that the original problem, I was using the quote to explain how he understands what the LPT is. And we can agree, I think Jay and I, if we agree about anything, the difference in terms of why I say the Trinity results in three gods is about counting. So that's the only point of the quote. It's not to say that Branson believes that the LPT is successful or he believes in three gods. That would be ridiculous. It's just to show that he's explaining what the problem is supposed to be. And then of course, in his dissertation, he attempts to respond to the problem. This one coming in from even Lord says, Jay, we got that one. XXWLZXX says, question for Jake, do you believe the eyes are, Bo Branson says, if there should turn out to be any problem with the doctrine of the Trinity at all, it will not be one of mere logical inconsistency in saying that quote, these three are one, unquote. I mean, that's just a claim, but I've given an argument for the LPT. And the same argument that I gave to Branson is the same one I gave to Jay and Branson, even in his new book, because I've spoke to other contributors to the new book, which has not been published yet, he never responds to my critique of the unprincipled ad hoc manner in which they count persons and attributes or energies by identity, but they count gods by division. He has no explanation for that. Well, of course, that was explained multiple times tonight. It's explained by Dr. Branson in many places. And I addressed it by first and second order position argumentation as well as showing that multiple theologians, even Al-Ghazali count by division. I don't mind Jay responding, but if he's gonna respond, then I'd like to respond to other questions. I can give you the last word, Jay. Well, I mean, Jay said like... No, no, no, I'm not saying to respond now to what he said. I'm just saying Jay has answered other questions that I would have wanted to respond to, but I was quiet, so... So, well, let me ask you a question about that in terms of the moderator, like, so does the other person get to respond to it? Like if a question goes to Jake, does it just to Jake or how's this gonna work? I don't know, that's why I'm trying to... I'm asking the moderator, what do you want to... Normally, this is something that I'm happy to have you guys' creative input on. Tonight, I would, I think it's best, just because we want to get through as many questions as possible in about 30 minutes for the Q and A. This one from Mahir84 says the Messiah in parentheses, whose name wasn't Jesus, didn't know the hour. When did the Holy Spirit relinquish power to not have the same knowledge as the Father? Emphasis on Father, I think that's for you, Jay. Is that to me? Yeah, if you read the basal letter, 235 and 6, I think, 234, 5 and 6, 34 is the energies and the 5 and 6 addresses this topic where it's just the use of rhetorical, exaggerative language, which Jesus does quite a bit. For example, he says, there's none good but God. But then we have other places where he says, of course, this person is the good man. The Bible calls Jesus good, the Holy Spirit good. So it's a rhetorical device to say that, not even I know, right? Or not even the Son knows. It doesn't literally mean that he doesn't know because we're also told that Jesus knows all things. This one from Sauer says, is the Trinity a necessary truth or contingent truth if the former, what is the contradiction of rejecting it? If the contradiction isn't shown from denial, it's a contingent truth, therefore, Trinity false. I'm assuming that's to me, right? Yep. Yeah, I think that if this is like the atheist TikTok people that asked this question, this is again, kind of making the mistake of thinking that the argument, the transcendental argument is a first order argument. It's a meta level argument. So that's not really relevant to how we argue tag. This one from FCLA News says, I know I'm gonna say this wrong. So help me. Alouak Bar. Yeah. Am I saying this right? Yeah. This one from LH says, Jake the meta is central Dawa says, Jay Dyer saying, quote, Jake doesn't understand unquote is not an argument against Jake. Make an actual argument. Give you a chance to Jay to respond to that. Well, I mean, I might have used that phrase a couple of points in the debate, but I didn't rely only on saying Jake doesn't understand. I think I used that phrase two or three times, but I gave many arguments. You got it. See this one from LH says, so there's one a la with multiple body parts, i.e. the hands are distinct from the shin, complete partiality of a la they put in all caps. No, we don't believe that Allah's yid is a body part. We don't believe that he has any body parts. And Jay should know this. I'm not saying he's claiming that, but from reading the text, we don't believe that their body parts. So by people keep asserting this same falsehood, which Fareed Suleiman refutes directly in the book, just shows their own ignorance, but they can do it as long as they like. This one coming in from Dalil says, Jake, why do you worship 99 gods? I'll give you a chance to respond to that. I don't worship 99 gods because I don't say that the Sufats or the Sifa, which is an attribute is a God. Just as Jay Dyer does not say that the energy of God's will or power or knowledge are gods. We don't call them gods, they're attributes of God. Femo says, Jay, if the sun wanted a tree to be yellow, the Holy Spirit wanted it to be orange. And at the same time, the father wanted it to be blue. What color would the tree be? Yeah, we don't believe in that will and intentionality and action are themselves personal properties. So the Trinity shares a common will, a common nature and common operations. And so there wouldn't be conflicting contrary wills within God. That's the traits or properties of nature. And then when we talk about the mode in which that nature exists, it exists in the mode of three persons that have it. So it's both particularized and it's common at the same time. So I'm coming in from L2A says, did a natural theist really just try to hijack the anthropology of the news without an energy essence distinction? I think that's to me. And I would say that, I mean, I understand, I guess the apologetic use of trying to utilize the notion of the news, but I don't think that translates into the Tauhi theology that he has in any coherent way. You got it. Thank you very much for this question. Ecclesiastes says, Jake, why would you debate? Let's see. This one from punk givers says, for Jake, if the sun cannot cause another person, can Allah's foot cause another Allah's hand? I mean, it's just a ridiculous question. It's not what I'm responding to. Ecclesiastes says, great job, Jay Dyer. They say, Jay, or they say, Jake, would you debate David Wood? Depends on the topic. This one from Doman says, is the sun a S-E? If yes, how is that possible since he's begotten? And if no, how is he God? Because it's greater to be a S-E and God is maximally great. I think he means a S-E, but I'm sure Jay got that. A S-E-D is for us a property that picks up the father. And so as you, if you can go watch the debate between Jake and Dr. Bo Branson, that whole debate settles this question because we could say, for example, that all fathers are human beings, but anything that's not a father is not a human, right? This ends up in certain fallacies like denying the antecedent. And if you watch that debate, Jake's guilty of denying the antecedent. You got it. This one from the Chelskian says, Jake, does your back hurt? Okay, that's weird. Abraham, I'm sorry, guys. I don't get to bet all these. It actually doesn't. I'm sitting quite comfortably, but yeah. You say, what is the point in Allah using the created term hand or foot, et cetera, yet is nothing like a created hand, foot, et cetera? Yeah, it's something very basic that I've explained numerous times and it seemed that Jay himself didn't get it. When you say that these are created things, all of the predicates that we use in the English language or in Arabic, when we say essence, or we say power, or we say hand, there is no difference in terms of predicating those things of God and predicating those things of creation. Our position is that there's a similarity in meaning and that there's no similarity in ontology. This one coming in from N.H. Nurse says, did Muhammad destroy Allah's idol with Kabbals? I don't know what that's talking about. In either. My Zabibah's trajectory says, if I text you the way, let's see, that's weird. MJ says, can Jay give an example of anything else that is counted differently as in the case of Trinity? We have three persons, one nature, but yet one God. I don't understand the question, is there something that we, are there things that we count in different ways or can I give examples the way that we count God in different ways? Because what I argued was that if you look at medieval philosophy, there's first order imposition, second order imposition. First order imposition is counting things that are mundane like cows and dogs. And then second order imposition is counting abstract things like laws of logic or sets. And so, for example, concrete things we would count by division and abstract things we would count by identity. So even in the middle ages, people count them in different ways. So it's odd to me that the whole argument tonight was premised on, we only count in one way and that's counting by identity, which is why I said that if Jay counts by identity, then he has many necessary beings in his account of the attributes. Got it, this one from, the Chelskyan says, when Allah comes down the third part of the night to answer prayers, that means that either Allah is like a yo-yo because earth is a globe or that Muhammad thought that the earth was flat. I think this is for you, Jake. No, that's incorrect because again, they're going into the kafia or the howness of the descent, which we don't. And we don't actually make the claim that it is a movement necessarily from one spatial location to the other in a similar manner that Jay Dyer believes that the attributes or energies descend upon creation and he doesn't imagine that they're like ripping off a piece of and somehow coming into creation and landing on a human being. So this is just a misunderstanding of our position. You got it, this one coming in from, do appreciate it. Ahmed says, Jake, Aalu Akbar, great job. MJ says, can Jay give an example of anything else that is counted differently as in the case of Trinity? We have three persons, one nature, but yet one God. I think that's like the same question in it. Yeah, that's the same question. Sorry about that. Matt Belcher says, Michael Lofton dressed as a Muslim. I don't understand. This one from, who's your friend, Michael? Okay, GPT.12 says, let's see. I don't think Michael Lofton has any friends on this stream. This one coming in from, do appreciate it. FAMO says, Jay, answer without, they say, how can an unlimited infinite being, i.e. God be finite, i.e. Jesus and infinite, i.e. God at the same time? Yeah, well, this is what we talked about earlier with mode. And so the mode that Jesus entered into is a new mode of being, which the book of Philippians describes as a willful non-exercising of every one of his attributes. I think that Jake himself has argued in the past that God doesn't have to exercise every power and every attribute of creating at all times. And so in the same way, we just simply say that the second person of the God had stepped into the mode of human nature while still having the divine nature. So he didn't lose his deity. He didn't undergo any change. He didn't become the opposite of himself. We believe a bow fan rather than an either or. You've got it. This one coming in from, just wanna remind you folks, we are looking for sincere questions, not statements that- I don't know why these guys would pay a lot of money just to not get a question up there. It's just silly. I don't know either. They're asking, they're saying all sorts of things, but this one from John, this one, we got this one, Manib Zia says, Jay, how do you worship Jesus without worshiping his human nature? Don't you have to worship the created human nature when you worship the person of Jesus, which even Christians would consider idolatry? Well, this is addressed in St. Cyril and the Council of Ephesus because it's an argument that Nestorius makes. And interestingly, the Islamic or Oxford Handbook of Islam notes that there is, in fact, an historian influence on Islam. So I don't fault him for making that mistake or thinking that way, but the answer is just simply that. Cyril says that we don't worship the creature per creature. We direct all of our worship to the divine hypostasis and we give him a holistic worship as the whole being because it's the body of the word. We don't worship the body of Christ or the human nature of Christ in any divided or separate way, but we worship the God man who is also incarnate. You got it. This one, I'll read the appropriate part. They say, guys, it's read. Go join gg slash Sunni. By the way, I'm six foot seven. Okay. I have no idea what that means. I don't know either. This says discord.gg slash Sunni says join the debate review. So if, yeah, we're happy to share about debate reviews. Folks, if you wanna go check that out, go have a conversation there. Sussep says, they say, John Michael B says, Jake says we are polytheist because we know we follow Hagan. We got that one. Manib Zia says, Jay, got that. Abdishakir Nur says, Jay, how have you actually read a thawry position? Cause when Jake asked you simple questions, yes or no, you have hard time answering yes or no. Well, for example, when he asked about whether Emitemia believes in occasionalism or secondary causes, I was trying to remember the specific page in the 400 page book, which I did read, which says he doesn't believe in occasionalism. So I was trying to accurately give the position. And so the answer is no, he doesn't believe in occasionalism. That's why I said specifically that he does allow for created causes. You got it. This one from Giant Meteor says, Jake, if Allen's foot, I think I mean Ola's foot and hands and other attributes, quote unquote, are not divisions of Ola, but each one is an identity is, I think no, it wasn't a mistake. They're saying Allen on purpose, I think. They say if Allen's foot and hands and other attributes are not divisions of Allen, but each one is an identity, is each one the whole of Allen. Yeah. So obviously he's talking about a law. I don't know what this Allen business, but we believe that the attributes, all of the attributes, and I repeat it again, we don't believe their body parts. So you can keep saying that we believe their body parts, but we don't believe that. This is explicit in all of our texts. So it's just misrepresentation, but we believe they're inseparable from the essence, right? Just as God's power and knowledge, they're all inseparable from the essence. It's not like God's knowledge starts floating around and comes and drifts down to earth, and we don't believe that. So just a misunderstanding of the position. I'm Yelp says, Jake, I love you. Remember Jesus, King and Joe, you're weird. And Derek, let's play Fortnite. Susup says, Justin in his dialogue makes it clear that the father can't incarnate. This is clear subordinationism, showing he believed the father had a level of greatness in his personhood where he can't incarnate. Do you pray to a heretic? Is that a question to me, I guess? I think so. I don't pray to Justin. I know you don't pray to Justin. What was it? It was phrased odd. Yeah, so like I said, I mean, the father, the reason I said that we don't know is that I'm not aware of any statement where we're told by divine revelation that the father could not incarnate. There are a theophanic manifestations where we have the father speaking to the son, but that's an energetic manifestation. But like I said, Jesus says that, no one sees the father at any time. So just like the divine essence is not perceived or seen, we don't think that the father is directly seen or perceived, except as Jesus says, in the son. So I don't see why that's a problem really for our theology. I mean, it's not, if Justin Margaret makes a mistake like that, I would class it as the same type of mistake that Augustine makes. Can I just ask Jay a quick question about that? Are there disputes in orthodoxy amongst the scholars about whether or not the father can become incarnate? No. Just a genuine question. I'm just asking. No, I just was thinking about first divine revelation. I'm aware of what you're talking about in terms of what John Damascus talks about. But I was just trying to think about what they might be referring to, which is like we have stories or we have a case like where when Jesus baptized, right? The father says, this is my beloved son. So somebody might think that that's the father entering into creation. But in our theology, we don't think the father enters into creation in that way other than it's an energetic manifestation that tells us about the father, but it's not the person of the father. Okay. This one from Jack Hogg says, Allah is completely unlike created things, but yes, created things can predicate of Allah. Yeah, as I've explained numerous times, this hinges on our, and Jay is right to point out. I'm happy that we, that was actually part of the conversation, nominalism, but they keep focusing on God but what these people don't understand, if they actually study nominalism, I believe that there is no shared reality between my hand and Jay's hand. I don't believe that there is this thing called handness, which is partially or fully identical in my hand and Jay's hand or my knowledge and Jay's knowledge. Everything that exists is a particular. So there's nothing unique about this when it comes to Allah or human beings. So people understand that this is a debatable point, but it seems like they're not even aware of what nominalism even is. So from beyond doubt theology says, Jay, you have a problem with God having a foot, but if you can say God died in parentheses, console of Ephesus, can't you say that God or Jesus in particular had feet? Yeah, so the internal critique was the first part about how when Jake gives an account or when Ibn Tamia gives an account of the semantic content that's supposed to be similar in terms of quote meaning, that actually ends up telling us nothing about what that actually is. That was the force of my argument in terms of an internal critique of his position. But it is true that in our theology, you could say that by appropriation or by what Cyril calls the communication, communicatio video modern or the communication of properties that God the Son died, it doesn't mean that he died in his divine nature or the underwent change or that the divinity became possible. It just simply means that the subject of the divine person of the Son experienced the severing of his human soul from his human body. You got it. This one coming in from Jack Hogg says, got that one. Imagination says, Jake, you cannot have your own definitions and tell Jay to respond by using them. It's utterly ridiculous. Allah means fake by my definition. Could you please prove Allah is real? I mean, that's a strange question there or statement. But obviously my theory of language and theory of meaning is entirely different. I believe that the meaning of a word or a sentence or a phrase is based on the intention of the speaker. So when I ask about what power is or what this is, and then I explain my intention of what the meaning is, you can answer according to that and you can say, oh, but I don't use the word that way and give another answer. So there's no problem with that whatsoever. Well, except that you tried to say that I have to accept that meaning. I mean, got it. This one coming in from, appreciate it. Al-Masih says to Jake, Ibn Taymiah brings Sahih in his book that Muhammad sits with Allah where Arsh, Hersey trembles. Since you pray to Allah, how are you not polytheist? Since I pray to Allah, how am I not a polytheist? I mean, how is that even connected to the first part of what he said? I have no idea. And since Jay is making comments on the back end of my statements, then I would make a comment on the back end of his questions. And just as the questioner was asking before about predications and the communication of idioms or attributes, likewise Jay can appropriately say that God has a penis. There's no problem with that whatsoever. This one from, I'm Yolp says, I was low-key having doubts. Then I remembered Jesus is God. Now I'm gonna give doubts. Hi, Derek, I love you and you as well, Joe. Matt Schneider says, Jake, if you were on the North Pole and Jay was on the South Pole, could you both point toward Allah? Yes. We don't believe space is an actual thing. It's relative. But he believes that you can point up to Allah and we believe that God is on the present. He's not in a spatial location. Up is a spatial location. This one from- Depends what you mean by spatial location, but we can go back- Like up? No. Like space- You do believe, you do believe. Up is not a spatial location. Space in an Aristotelian sense of encompassing. In your sense, you believe that you can point up to Allah. You said it to Khalil. I already just said that right here. Right, that's spatially direct. You don't think up is a spatial direction. We believe in a jihad or a direction, but when you use- Is that not spatial? When you use spatial, it depends on what you mean by space. Yeah, so a new definition of space that's totally- We have an Aristotelian definition of space. Oh, interesting. So it's okay to use the medieval things here, but what about counting has to be post-freight? I never said that. What are you talking about? My critique was that you're inconsistent in your counting method, but you don't have a- No, you're inconsistent because you count the attributes by identity. I already showed you that you look like a fool because I don't count by identity. So now you have to go to Ad-Hominem when I pin you down again. When you did what? When I pin you down, you have to go to Ad-Hominem. You didn't pin me down. You just called me a fool. You count by identity. I hate to do this. I do count by identity. I do count by identity. Awesome, awesome. You have multiple necessary beings. No, we don't. We must move. There you say. Question for Jake. Please ask this, James. Does Islam teach that Jesus is the nephew of Aaron and Moses? Sorry, say that again? They say, does Islam teach that Jesus is the nephew of Aaron and Moses? No. This one from James says, can Jake, he put in quotes, tell us why Allah being called, quote, the one the absolute is not blatant mimicry of Hutton, Plotinus, Quran 112, one through two. Thank you. We don't believe that Allah subhanahu wa ta'ala is the one or absolute in the way that Plotinus said. Plotinus believed in a complete, in divine simplicity, in a radical sense. We don't believe in that whatsoever. So it's a complete misunderstanding of our actual position. This one coming in from Sosa says, Jake, does Allah act in time or is he timeless? How does the doctrine affect immutability? The fal-Saffa adhered to true Tahid. If you mean by the philosophers Ibn Sina, we believe that he was a kafir. So I'm sorry to tell you for the questioner, we don't believe he was a Muslim in that sense, unless you take the theory that he repented later in life. But nevertheless, I forgot what the first part of that question was, besides the philosophers. So does Allah act in time or is he timeless? Oh yeah, I'm surprised that Jay didn't actually, I wish we would have had a chance to go through this more. If you mean by, does Allah subhanahu wa ta'ala act in time, then yes, we believe that he acts in succession. That he has, and this was actually, and I mentioned this, Jay and I don't agree on many things, but in my debate review of his debate with Asra Rashid, I think this is a serious problem that he highlighted very effectively in pointing out that the Ashadis don't believe that the attributes of action are actually divine attributes. They say that Allah's actions simply refer to his created effects. We think this is complete nonsense. No, we believe that his actions are actual attributes or in the language of Eastern Orthodoxy are energies and they can have a beginning in time and yet are uncreated. And I gave support from that from Imam al-Bukhari in my opening presentation. This one from Alexander says, why does Allah have two right hands? Why does he have two right hands? I mean, it's just a silly question. If you actually read the text and understand why the term right is used, right is used in terms of blessing. So we believe that the blessings pour forth from Allah subhanahu wa ta'ala's hands. That's the meaning of the term, which I have videos on my channel explaining that. This is a standard tefsir or explanation of those ahadith. I'm Yolp says I'm currently twerking. Matt Belcher says, Jake, if Allah is the only eternal, then why is the Quran also said to be eternal? Again, this is something I corrected Jay on. I'm surprised when he thought that I believe that the put an is eternal. I didn't say you believe that. I just said I wasn't talking about that. You did. No, I said I wasn't talking about that. You can go back to the tape and look at it yourself. I said, I don't know what your position is there. I didn't say you believe that. You don't know what my position is what's explained in the text. We don't say that the Quran is eternal in terms of a speech act. We believe that it was spoken in time to the angel Jibril alayhi s-salam and then to the prophet Muhammad alayhi s-salatu wa s-salam. So we don't believe that it is eternal in that sense, only eternal in the sense of within God's knowledge that he knew what he would speak but the act of speech itself happens at a particular moment in time. You got it. This one coming in from, do appreciate it. So Jernan says, Jake, if Allah's hand is something that grabs, what is Allah's shin? This is just ridiculous questions. And anyway, 30 minutes. He thinks they're ridiculous because he don't want to deal with these. No, I've answered. How many times have I answered questions about Allah's hand, Allah's foot? Every single time about these. It doesn't tell us anything. It does. It does. I've explained the meaning several times over and over. Everybody focuses on this because your explanations are terrible. That's why they focus on it, Jake. No, it's because you guys don't understand the basics of what I'm talking about when I say that it's a nominalist predication. I want to give Jake a chance to answer. You can have a shared meaning, which I gave the meaning and I said the meaning is known through the text and I gave examples of that. And I buried you on that. Yeah, I nailed you on that because of your nominalism. You didn't nail me, but, Jake. You don't even know the basic critiques of nominalism. I do know the basic critiques. No, you don't because you said the particular. You don't know the basic critiques of your own. So you don't have logical laws at all? You don't have logical laws at all? I hate to do this, but just to go back on track. Yeah, Jake can't control himself. He has to interrupt it every moment. So Jernon said, Jake, if Allah's hand is something it grabs, what is Allah's shin? Yeah, I just already responded to this question. You got it. Moose responded to it five times already. Moose says, J, do you support all GBTQ plus and you should believe in progressive Christianity? What? I think this person's a troll, but I'll give you a chance. It's just the way they spelled progressive, but I could be wrong. J, do you support? Well, that was a statement that I should. Or what was it a question? Do I know? I think we think that's a sin. This one from Habakkuk Abu Muhammad says, okay, there's nothing about spanking. Giant meteor says, Jake, you didn't answer my question. I didn't say that Allah's hands and foot are body parts. I ask if they are counted by division, but our identities are each one of them the whole of Allah. They're not counted by division. I already explained that they're inseparable and yet we count them. They're inseparable and yet we count them as more than one. That means we are counting them by identity, which I explained in my response. So multiple necessary beings. Right, so multiple necessary beings. No, they're not multiple necessary beings. I wanna go. But J, are they necessary? You continually can't control yourself. You have to answer on the back end. No, I'm having fun. So then if I do that on every time you answer the question, it's okay, right? I don't care. Okay, well then stick to the rules. We already established the rules and you keep going off the rules. So which one is it? I do wanna, I sympathize with you, I sympathize with you, Jay, because I know that there are way more questions for Jake. And it's, I know you're gonna jump into the debate. I would like, yeah, but so many things Jay says, don't you think I would love to respond? Oh, I know. Don't worry. I'm being polite. I'm getting there. I was saying, I sympathize, Jay, I understand that. I'm just saying we have to have consistent rules. Either Jay's gonna abide by them or you allow me to speak. Jake, I'm agreeing. I'm trying to basically give like a rebuke to Jay right now. I'm just saying, Jay, I know that it's kind of boring when there are like a million questions for Jake, but to be fair, I do wanna keep it so that we're not having any sort of teaming up on Jake. This one from Pataclysm says to Jake, does Salafism hold normative authority to dogmatize and enathomize theology, i.e. Ashari occasionalism. Allah creates absolutely everything, making Allah the worst being. Would prayer under an Ashari Imam be valid? Okay, so you're mixing two things. You're asking about prayer behind an Ashari Imam, which is the question of Fiqh, not merely Aqidah. And when you talk about the Ashari position on occasionalism, we believe that they're completely wrong and that it's a deviant position because it goes against the clear text of the Quran and Sunnah. And it also goes against reason, which again, and I don't think Jay and I are very much friends here, but I have to point out that he hammered Esra Rashid on the same point in the debate when he made the point, which is a similar point that I would make, and which I don't know why they can't understand, that they make an argument based on causation or causal chains to prove that God exists. And then when you get there, they say, oh, by the way, all of those causal chains are not real. So it's just a complete falsehood. Eastern from Christ of Foro says, why did Muhammad get marry the mother of Jesus and marry the sister of Moses and Aaron confused? Say, repeat the question. Why did Muhammad get marry the mother of Jesus and marry the sister of Moses and Aaron confused? I'm not aware of him getting them confused. I mean, you'd have to go into more detail about that. This one from Habib Abu Muhammad says, $100 of Jay can name more than five books on Jake's position. Jake? They technically said, Jack's position, which I don't understand. Yeah. That's all right. My Italian family still calls me Jack. They can't pronounce Jake for some reason. So there's what it is. But anyway, what's the question? What are we doing? They said $100 of Jay can name more than five books on Jack's position. Oh, so that's for Jay. That's for me. So I have, let's see, one, two, three, four. So I have four books here with me. So that would be the critique of the Palmyrian creed, which is not his position, but on his position. I have the Ibn Tamia book. One is of God. I have the Suleyman book, what we're talking about today with the quotes. So, and then I've got all of the Hanbali chapters in the Oxford Handbook. So I'm sure that doesn't meet the five criterion, but I don't think I need five actually. Do we count the Quran too? So if I count the Quran, that's five. Does that count? Lenlin said, is Jake open to having a debate with Sam Shamoon? No, guy is out of his mind. You got it. Let's see this one from... Is this been 30, I thought it was 30 minutes of Q&A. Yeah, we're going on longer than that, but I'm just, I'm being patient for James because I know that some of these are probably super chats, but we're eventually gonna have to wrap it up. I mean. That's fine. Three hour mark, so we're gonna wrap it up. I wanna say folks, thank you for tuning in. Check out both Jake's and Jay's links in the description box. That includes, if you're listening to the podcast later, all of the debates end up on the podcast. Within about 24 hours of the debate being live. So if you're listening via Spotify, Apple podcasts, you name it, both Jay and Jake are linked in the description box there. Check out their links now. There's a value in getting to hear person's point of view straight from them, such as going to their own videos at their own channel. So I highly encourage you folks, check out their channels. With that one to say, thank you so much. It's been a true pleasure to have you both, Jay and Jake. Thank you guys. It was a lot of fun. Thank you. My pleasure. Folks, stick around. I'll be back in just a moment with a post credit scene letting you know about upcoming debates. So thanks for being with us and I'll be back in just a moment. Thanks so much for coming by folks. Thrilled to have you here and excited. I've got to tell you right now what I'm excited about. I'm gonna show you a few things here because you might be thinking like, huh, what are you so excited about, James? Like, tell me, I have to know. Well, a couple of things. First is, here I am, bottom left. Want to say thanks so much for being with us. If you have not already voted in that poll, it is still there waiting for you in the live chat. You can do that right now. Want to encourage you as there's been about 3,500, if I remember right, last time I checked, that many votes. Yeah, about that, 3,482, which is huge. Do want to encourage you to check that out. We are trying out some new things here at Modern Day Debate. As you see at the bottom right of your screen, let me just, I'm gonna try to, top left, top right, there we go, seeing that up a little bit. As you see at the bottom right of your screen is that some nights when we have a ton of questions and when we have limited time for the Q and A, we're gonna do something where we're gonna try to get to the standard questions still, namely those that you just tag me and chat with and then ask the question. We're gonna still try to get to those, but with limited time, we can't guarantee it. And then those nights, we're gonna have $5 minimum super chats. So it's just a way of trying to keep the, if we especially, if you have $2 super chats for insulting people, but we also don't want super chats that are frankly any amount that's insult people. But we notice that, not surprisingly, a $2 super chat, you only need so many characters to type in, so-and-so is a jerk. So that's one thing is we want, you could say more authentic questions, but wanna say, we appreciate you being here with us. I've got a lot of other things to mention in particular. We actually have this Tuesday, the MC Tune debate last Tuesday on Flatterer actually got nicked for the night. So I do wanna let you know that is being rescheduled for this Tuesday. So that's one big one. And then the following Tuesday, Globy McGlobie Face will be taking on a Flatterer, a new one in fact. So you don't wanna miss out on those debates. If you haven't yet hit that subscribe button as we have many more debates, but also you might be thinking like, James, tell me what else is going on? If you didn't notice on the screen before we started, is that right now modern day debate is also trying something else out in particular folks. As you can see at the bottom right of your screen, visible wireless is a sponsor for this debate. If you are paying more than you should for your mobile service, this is the time to switch over to visible. And you're like, well, James, well, how much is too much? With visible, you can get it for just $20 a month for unlimited talk, unlimited text and unlimited data for just $20 a month if you use the link in the description box below. Folks, what are you waiting for? Save your hard-earned money. Don't let it go for $35 a month for the same thing over at Mint Mobile. Save that $15 a month. Use it to go to Chipotle. Use it to get yourself some coffee, whatever it is that you like to do instead of spending it on your mobile service. So that visible link, if you use our link below, I can tell you it is awesome. I use visible myself. I will never promote something unless I actually use it and I'm a fan of it. So I've got to tell you, I use it and it's amazing. I'm going to throw that link in the old live chat and I'm going to pin it and I'm going to wrap up that poll with 3,500 votes. That is huge. But I want to say, we are excited about visible being a sponsor for a modern day debate. And I just realized, I don't think I have that link. Yeah, I don't even have that in the description box. I'm going to grab that right now. And I want to say thank you guys for all of your support. Thanks for your patience as a slacking on that one. But I'm going to grab that link now. And I want to say, folks, the cool thing about visible wireless is you also have unlimited hotspot data. Now, the reason that's cool is because you could just cancel your internet at home. Because here's the thing, why? Why have internet at home when you could just say, hey, why don't I just use my hotspot on my phone? And then I can completely take out my internet bill. Let's say it's 60 bucks a month. And let's say you're paying 35 for mobile. So you could save 15 from your mobile bill. Plus you could save 60 from no longer having Wi-Fi. That's $75 a month, which over the course of a year, that would be $900 of savings over the course of a year. So I've got to tell you, folks, check out that visible link right now. You won't regret it. You have the potential to save $900 over the course of a year. So I just put that link for the modern day debate visible affiliate link. So for the first year, you get $20 a month. That's it. It's just 20 bucks a month for unlimited talk, unlimited text, unlimited high speed data, including unlimited. Thanks, Shane, for sharing that in the whole live chat, including unlimited hotspot data. For me, I got to tell you, I know everybody talks about, hey, things are getting really expensive. There are some things. It is true. There are some things that are more expensive. But mobile service is actually cheaper. For me, I remember when I first got on a plan with data, independently. So when I got off my parents' cell service Wi-Fi, or not Wi-Fi, mobile service, it was 25 bucks a month. And I got unlimited talk, unlimited text, and two gigs per month of high speed data. That's it. Just two. So in other words, you blow through that. You could blow through that in a few days. And then the rest of the month, you'd have just super slow Wi-Fi, or I should say super slow data for using your phone. But now, for 20 bucks a month, so cheaper. Like you can get it compared to like six years ago. That actually, that wasn't six years ago. That was more like 10 years ago. For 10, compared to 10 years ago, you can get a better deal. And it's actually cheaper than what I was paying 10 years ago. So you can stick that in the face of inflation and tell them to stick that in their pipe and smoke it. Got to tell you, it's huge savings. I, anathema says I switched to visible a few weeks ago and I am loving the savings. That's awesome. And I love it too. Actually, I use visible. I don't get the same deal you do. Now I am past that one year mark. I pay $25 a month. But even then, for me, I'm like $25. Still better than when I was using Mint. It's better than when I was using Boost. It's better than when I was using, I think there's another one I tried, like Tether or something. I can't remember. Tello? I think it was Tello. But I highly encourage you to check out Visible's link if you were looking for saving a few bucks each month on your mobile service. And potentially, like I said, you could use your phone as just a hotspot all the time. Like whenever you get home, just turn on the hotspot, connect your computer to it or whatever device you might be using. And you don't even have a wifi bill anymore. Amazing. So pretty cool. Got to tell you, I'm excited about that. I think it's a great deal. I want to encourage you to check that out. Thank you guys for your support. We're at 752 likes. Seriously, it means more than you know. I'm going to get some rest. It's been three hours. A little over. So thank you guys for coming by. I want to say hi to you though because I really do enjoy this. And I do just appreciate you being here. So dead, alive maniac. I see you there in the live chat. Thanks for being with us. Chica, is it Chikami? Let me know if it's pronounced that way. Glad to have you here. Sonya, thanks for coming by. I see you there in the old live chat. Sinclon, thanks for coming by. I see you there. BootyKiller123, thanks for dropping in. That's interesting. I am he. Thanks for coming in. Anathema, good to see you as usual. As well as NYCTom08, thanks for coming by. Norek, happy to have you here. It says, wow, how could they possibly do this? That's right. Visible is giving the deal of a lifetime. And you know what else is cheap? Netflix is cheap. But PHX576, thanks for coming by. And let's see. They say, modern day debate. My super chat was genuine, but you skipped it. I did mention earlier, if it wasn't a $5 super chat or higher, it was both on screen, and I did mention it verbally throughout the debate. So I've got to tell you, you've got to pay a little bit closer attention, man. Houston Euler, thanks for coming by. Happy to have you. Moss, hallo, hallo, lo. Thanks for coming by. Struggling, Protestant, glad you're here. Sweet Bubbles, happy to have you here. Karzan, happy you're here. Gambit, glad to have you with us. Alonzo, here is happy you're with us. Windfire, thanks for coming by. Manuel, hallio, lo, ghost. Thanks for coming by. Keraboo, thanks for dropping in. Awesome, awesome clips. And Mr. Anderson, glad you're here. Abil, thanks for coming by. Solid ground, glad to have you here. A Catholic Dada, am I saying it right? Glad that you were with us. Jay, Samurai, 79. And thanks for dropping in. Karzan, happy to have you here. Baruch, Adam, thanks for coming by. Chikami, says is visible any good? Yes, visible is good. It's actually, they use the satellites for Verizon. So you have good coverage. That's one thing I love too, is that it's rare that I ever go to a spot where it's not good. So, Krishan, thanks for coming by. See you there in the old live chat. Simclaw, thanks for coming by. Kroll, says your channel is growing. Nice to see you. Thank you so much for your support. That means more than you know. Also, I have to tell you, I am so excited, you guys. Thank you guys for making a modern day debate grow as you have. We owe it all to the debaters and to you. Thank you for sharing our debates, things like that. And thank you so much for just all of your support. Let's see. Anathema says, good to have you back for this huge debate, brother. I replied your email was in hospital for a week. Wow, I hope you're doing okay. And man, glad to have you here, Shane. I'm glad you're okay. If you're here, we're glad you're here. So, I'll get back to your email and I appreciate you. Appreciate you, man. Burika, thanks for coming by. See you there in the old live chat. And yeah, I want to say you guys do appreciate you. Thanks so much. Dead Alive, maniacs, love it a base. Please step in more. Jake, Wisconsin, okay. Let's see. Moel, thanks for coming by. So, Farid, thanks for coming by. See you there. John V, glad to have you with us. Golden Victory Lighthouse, thanks for coming by. Debate already wrapped up, just so you know. Thanks so much. Davidson Trailer, happy to have you here. Houston Euler, good to have you. And I want to say, though, thank you guys for all of your support. HawaiianCC says, feet pics. I'm working on it. Check your email. Thanks for coming by. I want to say I love you guys. Thanks for all of your support. Join us while we are small. This is Modern Day Debates Early Stages. Believe me. Join us while we are young. Our story is just beginning. Modern Day Debates is going to do huge things in the coming years. And someday, we're going to look back and say, wow, you remember when we were so small? We had 177,000 subs. That's how big we're going to be in the future. We're going to host bigger and battered debates, more epic debates, things that are going to knock your socks off. Believe me. They're going to be tremendous. People will be saying, wow, I can't believe Modern Day Debates. How'd they pull that on? That was amazing. We're excited. We are continually improving ourselves, continually developing things, improving, tinkering, learning, and figuring out how we can improve more and more. I want to say thank you guys so much for all of your support. We're excited about the future as we strive to provide a neutral platform so that everybody can make their case on a level playing field. We believe that's important, and we know you believe that's important. We believe in letting 1,000 flowers bloom, letting the chips fall where they may, giving people a chance to make their case on a level playing field. So I want to say thanks for all your support. I love you guys. Keep sifting out the reasonable from the unreasonable, and we will see you at the next debate.