 Also, let me turn to Gabrielle Felbermaier. What would you suggest, sir? Thank you, Claude, and thanks for having me. It's the global order collapsing. That's the question of this panel. And I would say it is certainly under tremendous stress, but I don't think it is collapsing. I'd like to make five points to shore up that view. First of all, if you look back in history, Claude, you started with this, I think we have seen crisis before. Of course, every crisis we are in right now seems like the biggest we've ever had, but there's been shocks to the global system. The withdrawal, the unilateral withdrawal of the United States in the early 70s from the gold standard then was a big issue and it traumatized many countries, including in Europe. The Bretton Wood system never was a global system, truly speaking. It was a system for the first world, as we said. The second world, the communist world was not in. The third world mostly was colonized when the Bretton Wood system was engineered. So I think looking back into history tells us that we have had shocks before. Rather than going for collabs, we've seen transformations and relatively strong transformations like the change in the early 70s out of the gold standard. The second point I would like to make is we should not only look at the institutions and at the legal compact. That's of course very important, but if we look at outcomes, the picture looks better. Certainly the institutions are in trouble. So the WTO is not having a functional appellate body right now, which is bad, of course. The IMF has lost ground. Bilateralism has gained ground over multilateralism and so on. All that is true, but if you look at outcomes, what we see is indeed a surprising degree of resilience. The picture and the data that we have is somehow out of sync with much of the discussions we see. For example, trade. So the global financial crisis 2007 to 2009 brought a big recession in trade and so did the COVID-19 crisis. But then the systems reconverged. So today the latest data tell us that the price adjusted trade is 10% higher at the global level than it was immediately before the onset of the COVID-19 crisis. So we see that amount of resilience. I think that should give us hope. It means that's the third point that the global order is not just about rules and institutions. It is about the whole network of economic ties, about the resilience of a market-based global community. And that resilience, I think, is greater and stronger than what many observers believe. There's cooperation going on. I mean, we talk a lot about the breakdown of cooperation, and I'm not denying that. But we see cooperation, for example, in the era of international taxation, the imposition of a minimum tax was an unexpected victory. We see cooperation in the area of competition policy. So that's potentially a very difficult field, but here things work not too badly. And it's interesting that we see cooperation precisely in those areas where we don't have much of an institutional compact. There is no world competition authority yet. We see countries cooperating in this field. And so I think what is really important is that we do have areas where we have a convergence of views, where the epistemics are aligned. Everyone tries, most countries are convinced that excessive market power of very few players is dangerous. Most of them believe that we need financial stability. I think there's no doubt about that. And where we have these epistemic conversions, I think international cooperation is much easier. My fourth point is about things that have changed. I think establishing consensus about that is important to go forward. The first thing that has changed is that global commons met more than ever. So despite of talking about de-globalization, we see that what happens around the world is becoming more and more important for our own faiths. And that will not change. Climate change is, of course, the big issue number one. But it goes beyond that. We have seen the pandemic. We have concerns about the quality and the health of our oceans, of biodiversity. We have issues about global terrorism. All these are global commons that make the world more global and require more cooperation rather than less. The second thing that is, I think, important and will stay is that we witness divergence of preferences everywhere, not just between the big blocks. We see that also within Europe, the countries of Europe diverging in views of how the future should look like. We see that also within our own societies, the polarization in the United States, polarization also in European societies is much at the origin of the troubles that we are seeing right now. And the third thing that will stay with us is a return of geopolitics and geo-economics. I think that the period from 1989 to 2008 was extraordinary. This very short period actually of not even two decades, which is not the historical normal. And so we're going back into a situation where countries are at the same time partners, competitors, but also rivals, and have to embrace at the same time a positive some environment that's the world of trade and finance, a zero-sum environment that's the world of power struggle where only one can win and a negative some environment where our actions could reduce the global prosperity. And the fifth point I would like to touch on is what can be done and what could be lines of agreement. I think we should indeed focus more on outcomes rather than on the institutional and legal structure. Not saying that the latter are important, but outcomes are what matter finally for people, the environment for global health and so on. We should focus more on what works. So a call for pragmatism and what works today might be very different to what worked five years ago or 15 or 50 years ago. I think we should have a more broader perspective on the institutions that matter. These are not just IMF, World Bank, the World Trade Organization, World Health Organization, etc. This includes the big multinational enterprises that we need to mobilize for the common good. This includes the public and the civil society, NGOs, and many more. I think we should also look at the future. Now we're talking about China and the United States. What about India? India is overtaking as we speak China in terms of its population, and if it catches up in terms of GDP per capita, it will outgrow China at some point. What about Africa? Africa will be the place with the biggest population, not far away from us. We should be talking about the future and shape institutions that work in the future and not just look at the present. The last point I would like to make here is that I think there's a minimum consensus where I don't see much divergence. That is, we need transparency, we need transparency about policies, we need a dialogue, and we need accountability in the sense that there is monitoring of what's going on by independent institutions that everyone trusts. That is a very short list of minimum requirements, but I think if we can establish that and take that out of dispute, then we would be quite some way further. Thanks. Thank you. Thank you very much indeed, Gabrielle. I take it that all taken into account with all the challenges of all kinds that we have to cope with, you remain confident. You remain confident of what has been done in the past and what should be done and could be done in the future. Thank you very much indeed.