 Martin's agreed this is on the record, we encourage you to do that as well, but this is on the record. Good, any bugging with a question? Yeah, Martin, I wouldn't thank you, but the question is this, having lived through the whole of the crisis and the aftermath, my question is around, over the last moment, would you just tell it off that we're all Europeans, but that we say, you know, to Europe, just inherently, a single currency in a place like Europe, with all these different countries, different globalities, different population rights, is just not sustainable, and that over time, no matter how well we fix up the current disease, it just remembers, but it's just when I was inwardly embossed, like we did in Ireland and like we did in other countries, or whether it's possible for Europe to become a federal system like America, with a true European team, it doesn't test the European, the economic cohesion so strongly. It's a good question, and I think, maybe I'll stand so that I can see everyone. The premise of your question is that the place we're at now can't hold together, and that's what I'd like you to reconsider, or at least not take for granted, because you're suggesting that we have to either get a much more unified sort of eurozone politically, or we need to find some way of going back to separate currencies, maybe not all national currencies, but at least kind of similar countries in the similar, in the similar basket, if you like, and you talked about how there's a risk of combustion, and that's what happened here. Now Iceland combusted, just as spectacularly as Ireland did. The form that crisis took was somewhat different because Ireland was in the euro, Iceland had its own currency. But what I'd like you to consider is a proposition that most of what went wrong, had little to do with the fact of the euro itself, and a lot more to do with choices, political, regulatory, economic policy, that a country could also get on the other side of the euro, and that there's a lot of post-hoc-hoc or property-hoc going on. It's very easy to blame the euro partly because the form of the crisis management is tied into eurozone structure, which it had to be. But it doesn't seem to be reasonable to think that Ireland, with its own currency, back in the early 2000s, would have fared any differently from Iceland, with its own currency, similar policies, similar current account deficits. Why blame the euro for it? I suppose I witness, like everybody else, a massive intro to foreign history. There's a lot of foreign history on Germany, Belgium, Holland, and all these places because here there was the attraction of high-refinition property, low-euro rate interest rates. So, one of the things, can you point the place any to stop that massive flow of funds in the country like Ireland, where you're part of the euro? Well, first let me just mention a couple of other places where the same thing happened. I've already mentioned Iceland, let me say Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Turkey, I'm thinking of some eurozone countries here, Florida, right? These things happen in many types of currency regimes. So, you might write, that's the root of the problem. I want to first point out that this happens with or without a currency union. And second, you ask exactly the right question, what should you do to stop it? Well, I think, for example, you should use regulatory powers more intensively to stop banks from lending records. Lots of things, and you actually have probably more tools now, probably had them back in 2005 for 4562, but now at least central bankers and regulators know about them. You can increase capital requirements, equity requirements, you can do various forms of macro-prudential regulation. You could go quite radical and put limits on borrowers, the legality of somebody borrowing too much compared to their income and so on. You can force more financing to take the form of equity type financing where it's the investor who loses when things go bankrupt. So all of these things you can do, you probably could already the last time around, but certainly it's easy to do now because regulators are more conscious of it. And if you think about what banking union does, it's one aspect of what it does through the bail-in rules is that it kind of starts to make debt look a bit more like equity and the debt will be written down. The whole debate about senior bond holders here, the system has now been established where by that kind of marketable bond of debt should really be treated a bit more like equity, as to just write down the value when things go bankrupt. So there are ways of dealing with this within the Europe. Before going to a past finance minister, do you think the politicians of the 1990s would go ahead of the creation of the Europe if they had been able to see 20 years of the future? By 20 years you mean which year exactly? So they've seen the first 20 years of the Europe. If you said up to about 2008 or 2009, I guess the answer would be no. Give it five more years, give them 25 years, and I think they might have. But just on that, I think that if the politicians who decided on banking union back in 2012 had fully realised what they were signing up to, I don't think they would have done that. So I'm sort of using a parallel to your question to mention an important point about banking union, which is that the effect of the long run will be to separate in a sense the bonds between national politicians and national banks. Because governments won't be allowed in the same way as before to rescue their banks, which means that you will have write-downs or change in ownership, you will have the emergence of a more pan-European owned banking system. And so they will gradually, I think, erode this link you see in pretty much every country between political elites and banking elites or commercial elites at the national level. That's one of the, I think, deepest effects of banking union. And that will take time to play out. But I don't think it's one that politicians were consciously signing up to an interesting point. Give up political control of their banks, basically. I start off about 180 degrees different from the previous question. I don't think that the record of the European Union member states in the period when they had national currencies was any better in terms of co-ordination or cohesion than it has been since. So I'm not sure that having national currencies really makes any difference to what actually happens in terms of the objectives that was cohesion. It is a fact that when the crisis hit, we did not have a bank resolution system in the European Union. And in a number of member states, including particularly ours, we didn't have a banking resolution system. So that's changed. Even in a single currency area, and I think both regulators and borrowers need to examine this, there isn't any objective reason why interest rates should be the same all over the area, because risk factors are different. And my question really is, do you think with the instruments that we have now and that we're probably about to have, would Atroica in the future make any different kinds of proposals to a country whose banks were in difficulty? Now, I know that the cramming down of senior volunteers is now part of the system, except if you're Italy recently. So that isn't really quite accurate. But do you think that Atroica might make better informed decisions and leave us with a situation where we didn't have a carbon and internal outlier but at least they are constantly at the corner of the center? I think, you know, the way you asked the question about whether this claim, across one of my claims, that a lot has to do here with how decision makers use the decision power they have within the existing structures, which is why I argued that actually it's not so much about fixing the institutions as about just making the right choices when you're faced with a problem. You're right about there not being bank resolution schemes in place when the crisis hit. So of course, to do what I think would have been the right policies, you would have needed legislation and so on to be put in place. I'll just note that even Ireland itself showed that you can pass legislation overnight when you have to. By February 2009, the UK had a proper bank resolution law which could have been, I think, quickly adapted or learned from the Irish context because that had been the political choice at the time. So, you know, you kind of, you often make the tools you need and you can make them quite quickly if you decided to do it. And the national governments remain actually quite powerful, more powerful than they're often given credit for. So that's sort of a general observation. Would a future Troika behave differently? Well, I would hope so. I think we have some new tools in the sense that, as you say, they live in that part of the system. Yes, it didn't happen in Italy. But part of that was a choice from the European level regulator to leave this in the hands of Italian regulators. That was a discretionary choice. So I think one thing we want to watch over the coming years is, again, how do the people with the power to make the call on the note actually use it? So this will not be politician for probably technocrats regulators. Will they establish a practice and a precedent that means that you mail in when you should mail in? I hope so. But again, it's hard to pin this down completely in law because there will have to be some discretion. So a lot of the political work to be done, I think, is to create a situation where it's seen as politically possible and objectively right to do that. The other point I want to make is I think everyone's learned a lot from the crisis. So let me bring in, I said I wanted to mention Portugal. After they came out of the troika program, they've done quite a lot of things that apply in the face of the standard troika prescription as of 2012-2013. So they, for example, raised the minimum wage. And I'm not as familiar with the Irish reform programs and the Greek, for example, but clearly that was a big issue in Greece to not do that and even to lower it, I think. So in Portugal they've done, they've sort of taken a social democratic, kind of classic social democratic term, without being too vocal about it. It's worked out quite well. They've brought down the deficit, but they've done so sometimes by raising taxes rather than cutting spending. And I said they've increased the minimum wage. It seems to be working out all right economically. So I think there's, the next time around, there'll be a much, I think a more open-minded view among the people who will make these decisions about what policies are good policies. So this is the big problem we're saying. We need to impose the right policies on countries in trouble. Back in the crisis, the central level wasn't that good at picking good policies. I think we've learned some lessons about what the best policies are. That's right. I would ask you about how you see what we might think of as a political transition in Germany affecting the future. You said probably if there are reforms this year there'd be sort of German-type reforms, but not very strong. But over the years of the crisis, the role of Germany was very strong. First of all, because they were predators, but also I think even in the personality of the Wolfgang Schöder, who was there as a strong personality, he never fell out and was there right through for nine years when everybody else was coming and going and he was able to say no to a number of things that should have been done. And he would be replaced by somebody who is not as secure and not as dominant. And there would be a huge transition in German politics. Will this make Germany weaker in defining where the euro is going? Or will there be no change in that? One thing that Schöder famously said was that you can't have an election just to mean that the policy changes, right? About Greece that was. It seems to me that the new German government is applying the same dictum to Germany itself. Because I think all of Schöder said that it's not Schöder anymore, but many of these policies tend to remain in place, which of course makes you ask what's the point of elections. But if there's a consensus for these sorts of policies in the population, maybe it's warranted. I don't want to judge that, but just in terms of prediction, will anything change? German had outside influence because there was a crisis, right? It was a combination of two things. It was that there was a crisis. Decisions had to be laid one way or the other. And some of them, if they involved transferring money, had to be done unanimously or that's good. With German's consent. And the other thing was a widely shared belief that you couldn't have a Eurozone country restructure its public debt. That was an axiom in 2009, 2010, basically until 2012. Or late 2011 when the private sector involvement in the Greek debt restructure was decided. Now as I read it, if you think about 2011, by the time it was too late for Ireland, in the Greek case, Germany was one of the countries actually pushing for public debt restructuring and no further bailout of Greece before private investors had been restructured. So there is the common view that is to some extent right, that things went worse than they should have done because Germany was too recalcitrant at a lot of moments. There's a lot of truth to that. But I think it's also true that back in April 2010, things would have gone better if Germany had been more recalcitrant and said, no, we're not actually going to do any bailout of Greece until there's a restructure. An earlier restructuring in Greece would have made everything quite a lot better. That's my view. So yes and no. At the very early stages, I think Germany is playing because it wasn't tough enough. It gave in to particular French pressure to people who would go by the end of solidarity, putting money in to try to solve the problem instead of the crisis, stop the capital plunge and so on. And that works until it turns out you need so much money that you don't really have enough. As you all know very well here. We're not in a crisis anymore. So I think Germany's role in normal times could be quite different than in a crisis. And I think when or if there is a financial crisis in the future, when, but hopefully not in a long time, given the new rules that are in place, I would think it would be a little bit harder for Germany to play as obstructive a role as it did at some points in this crisis. Partly there will be because the bail-in system will make things easier for governments because you won't have these public sector biologies backing, whole backing sector. Partly maybe because now in this round, Germany will get in some of its preference about automatic or semi-automatic debt restructuring or maturity extension for public debt. So that actually the question won't come up in as sharp a form, whether the creditors have to bail out the debtors or the lawyers have to bail out the southerners or whatever politically toxic form it tends to be phrased in. So I'm cautiously optimistic, I would say, that things could be better in the future than now. Thank you, Dan. My question is about Italy. In this first period we're talking about, Italy is trying to form a government. Out of the various impossible or improbable combinations for that government, the major participants, at least those who are likely to get a government, are all in favour officially of risk enhancement as the Germans would say rather than the risk reduction. They all want to break the 3%. They all want to go against that part of the deal. And Leica, five-star in particular, which perhaps is now just about when there's likely to be a government, does not do that. How do you see that playing into the benign process that you've described? I hope you'll give your answer afterwards because you know Italy better than me. I note that the five-star movement has peddled back quite a lot on European policy issues, the euro and so on. I mean I have no idea what will happen in terms of forming a government and so on. I find it sad that because of the political situation Italy is in, it can't really play a role in debates that are happening now on this eurozone reform issue. So you really have as much influence as a country that size or that importance should have. On the other hand, if they weren't to have that influence they would also have to formulate a proper policy and that's hard. I think there's... I think when I wrote this recently that there is actually... you can see some room if politicians at all sides wanted it to happen for some kind of understanding between Germany and Italy in the context of eurozone reform. And it would take the form of an Italian government ending its resistance to veiling, embracing veiling even in return for a reform that gave a bit more flexibility on fiscal policy to national governments. So if you like centralising more banking policy for banking decision making and returning, redevolving some fiscal autonomy to the national level. For that to happen there would have to be quite a cultural change I think in the Italian political class. I think it would be good for Italy to embrace veiling and separate out, do some restructuring of the banking system to put the legacy problems to one side and another banking system to lend to more promising businesses. That would be good for growth. It would paradoxically fit in well with the five-star rhetoric of taking down all the elites that have driven it into the ground which has some merit. They haven't done that. I think they should, maybe they will, they've changed, it seems their views on the euro, Luigi D'Amaro seems like a pragmatist or opportunist depending on how you see these things. We want to think the best of people not a dogmatic ideologue. So maybe it's possible but I think you can see the possibility of that. I don't think it's likely but I think it would be good for the eurozone and it would be good for Italy. But none, that's not very probable. So what is probable? I guess we'll continue to stay in some sort of semi-stagnation. But I hope you will give your view because you follow this with your own mind. Anything that's going to happen will take quite a long time. And therefore my view will first of all be that the sort of process of decision-making about Europe governance that you've described is going to have a lot of Italian uncertainty going on around it probably for six months and for a long time. Because even if, I mean I agree with you about the Berlin versus fiscal trade-off, I mean that should be in principle attractive to both fighters, and the legally four-fifters, but the legally possibly both but to actually get there will take a long time to know the new government anyway. So it's going to be a scare as the bond markets will come from the forming of that new government and a lot of rhetoric about higher fiscal spending will come from the forming of that new government will nevertheless disturb the process that you've described I guess. In terms of what's going to happen politically actually I'm not sure I have any better for getting there than you are. I think that 5 star as a legal figure is the likelihood outcome because it has a political logic to it and it doesn't entirely have a policy logic. But the keen maker is the defeated party that directs the Democratic party. They are presently just what they did in Germany and say no way we're not having any finalist we're going to be in opposition we can imagine the same process going around initially and then finally come back with the form of a more moderate administration. So that the place to watch in some ways is the PD that I thought was being here there as you say, moderating other places. In the meantime everyone else will have made up their mind on these reasonable reforms perhaps. Brendan Yeah, just partly on you made a number of statements about politics in the Eurozone just one of them then to pick up on you said that if putting a support for the Euro to clients then the Eurozone would break up or I don't know how you said could or would I have my doubts as to how that could happen and how easy a process it would be so could you expand a bit and how could that happen in real life given the destruction of the Euro and what depends on it now Yeah, I didn't mean to say that it would lead to that I think I didn't say anything about what he meant and I'm glad you're pushing me to say why does it matter whether it has political support is a pointed way of rephrasing the question I would say that it matters in herit it would be a good thing to ask the institutions they live under as a sort of general democratic point but in terms of the effect I think I would say that in a crisis in a future crisis there would be our choices to make there would be losses and pain to distribute that's what crises do you go from a point where you think everything looks nice and it turns out things will be as nice as they look like they would and the politics is all about how do you allocate the burden for all of the previous expectations from what is possible and that's not true, that's really a financial crisis within a single country too you could tell the political story of the Euro crisis as one in which it took a very long time for politicians to be willing to make those choices about where the losses fall in a future crisis where things are difficult if you start from a point of view where the Euro is already very low it seems to me that it's more likely that a movement that not just says you know what, forget it, stuff your Euro will leave but also means it unlike you're having one seriously would actually come to power it would be I just think that the probability of a reaction to what would be partly for real, partly perceived as being hard choices imposed from outside that the reaction to that would be to turn your back and leave it's not a very different story from what people thought might play out in Greece for example I just think that back then many of us probably underestimated the support that disliked everything the Euro had and that if that support was thinner, lower when going into an ex-crisis that the probability of a population of a government disabled to leave is high I don't think I haven't convinced you but I don't feel particularly convinced by some of the things I think one of the things particularly being higher between the risk of a small peripheral member state leaves the Euros on Ireland or Greece and there might have been some small risk of that either that's one thing but that doesn't end the Euro or break up the Euro and breaking up the Euro is a different thing altogether and as we saw in Ireland and I don't know the risk that there was that Ireland might allow itself to be pushed down to the Euro maybe some non-trivial risk or the risk that Greece might be but neither of them I've seen Greece the Euro wouldn't be over if some country like of our size or Greece's size would make the Euro so the break up of the Euro zone that's a much bigger thing altogether and I'm not sure at all that it would be an easy process in any way or that it could easily happen but I'm not clear I think so I took your question to be about the possibility that more and more several countries leave the Euro zone but specified in that way as the whole thing disappearing I think I agree with you I don't really see how that would happen the only way I could see it happen is if Germany essentially that public support for the year in Germany becomes so weak why would that be well it would have to be some public opposition to the sort of policies Germany goes along with Germany is a democracy in spite of the things we just said if there are policies that Germany that Germans still want Germany to participate in then Germany will not participate in it at the end of the day if the opposition is great enough and that will not break up the Euro as I've argued if no German money had come on the line at all that might still not have broken up the Euro with the forced public sector restructuring and there's no way to kick Germany out of the Euro so I think I think we agree I mean I think I can't tell a story by which Germany could leave the Euro either because it could always just stop doing the things in the Euro that ex-hypothesise the German public wouldn't want it to do I'm not immediate Just on that point I understand it's true that during the Euro crisis there was a great interest and it didn't break and Greece remained a member and I just wanted to point out what is the single most important reason why the Euro stayed together at that time and is that still a factor that will keep it together through future crisis Countries who are even joined throughout the crisis so it was even stronger in that sense than how you describe it I would like to say that the reason was because people understand that leaving the Euro will not do anything good for them even economic problems are not the fault of the Euro itself I don't think that's the reason I think the reason is political and it depends a bit on which country you're in in the countries I won't speak for Ireland because you have to but in a case like Greece I would I would interpret it as a sufficient number of Greeks seeing having joined the Euro as a symbol of that level of having arrived if you like if you think about the whole process of European integration from the end of dictatorship joining the EU and ultimately also joining the Euro as sort of political graduation if you like into the ranks of core European countries then of course came the humiliation of mismanagement in the crisis but I think that importance of the Euro being part of a core European system that more or less were continued to be important enough for enough people they wanted to put different policies inside the Euro that's legitimate enough and what was also played in Italy for the Italian establishment certainly joining the Euro was a sort of foundational fundamental act of being European but I think the Italian political establishment still is convinced of that but the business establishment which may or may not go into the Euro on day one and certainly lost its faith in the Euro and it seems to me that Italy is a kind of prisoner in the Eurozone for a whole lot of internal Italian reasons I would suspect that if the Italian backing system was properly sorted out and started lending more liberally, business would feel different about it and I don't know really what business thinks and I suspect it's different between big companies like the exporters, manufacturers and smaller countries but in terms of popular perception Italy is interesting and worrying in the sense that of all Euro countries it has a lower support for the Euro noticeably so and I think among the crisis hit countries one reason might be that unlike the other countries it didn't have this very recent memory of coming out of dictatorship countries that was much further in the past so that wasn't a reason it had already been an important country and more successful more functioning country than those others before them the other of course is that the crisis there in a sense had lasted much longer and there's been a lack of growth zero productivity growth certainly compared to its peers for about 25 years because of the 93, 94 seems to be when Italy stopped keeping up with rich country peers so there's just been a very long period of malays it's natural I think incorrect but natural to link it to the Euro okay we're coming to the end so we've got to take three maybe four together one there, two there and one here yes it could be argued that the page was more quickly and more efficiently to the crisis the crisis was bigger for the United States and Europe but I think it did respond quickly and efficiently relative to the ECB and you asked the question about the page I think the number of most important reasons is the objectives which the head has which the government of the former of the Federal Development Act are far broader than what the ECB has and secondly Bernanke I think had read Friedman and Schwartz's monetary history of the United States and only so what happens when the American type of crisis hit the United States in the 1930s and so in the United States they introduced the quantitative easing very quickly at some time because it was obsessed still when the crisis broke with this idea that they were there to control inflation inflation was there, financial instability was there and they just didn't have the knowledge and the background and indeed the range of objectives to come quickly to the issue and so quantitative easing introduced at a relatively later stage by the ECB that seems to suggest to me that we're talking about reform of the Eurozone we need to get back to that to master it and have a look at that and say hey we do need far greater flexibility than we have in the Master of Truth it could be that they've worked on doing but that's not specific to the objectives that are there in the Master of Truth I'm going to take them all together that's part of what I'm going to do I wonder if we could take it to a higher and broader level and that is both in public and in private the international financial system is grossly over leverage and the quantitative easing of the last few years in the American budget that Mario Draghi is saying and you want his cakes has in fact made this problem even worse and it makes the Italian government I think with even more serious and more difficulty with them against that background now I know that one of your colleagues in the international times said that the setting of macroeconomics was that they thought they could predict the future nevertheless and I think it's necessary to consider what the future would involve first and thus not the whole euro problem less simply to deal with against that kind of background you mentioned you were going to say something about Portugal I was interested in what the teaser might be and very finally following the geography do you think the more positive scenario was quite encouraged in Sweden so if you see the financial system and I address Portugal and the other questions what I had in mind was how after they came out of the monitoring system the Troika monitoring that they have adopted quite a few policies that go very much against the grain of the sort of Troika view of what correct policy is so they raise the minimum wage they've reduced the deficit in monitoring raising taxes rather than coming spending a more classical social democratic policy if you like and it's had certainly not bad economic effects but there's no evidence that this was a bad policy when you actually look at the results on the ground so what I meant was that it's provided a kind of example count for example if you like that I think will become more important in the intellectual development of how policy makers think why do we need to force a country to reduce the minimum wage when Portugal show that you can raise it and have good results so that was the that's what I had in mind so we took you all questions today to interrupt you let me talk about these questions first there's very much in an observation that the Federal Reserve and the Bank of England started buying securities in large amounts quantity easing in March 2009 the ECB must at the time have considered it was seen as one possible option a Central Bank can pursue and decided not to it had sort of microversion of but they decided very much not to do the same as the Anglo American Central Banks until six years later when they started pretty much exactly six years later I think to tie in with your question I think QE made things better because QE I think doesn't increase leverage but shifts leverage to a place where it can sit in an effective way that makes the leverage that exists in the private sector more easy to deal with or at least sustain while also investing in growth friendly kind of activities that leverage is a really important point because partly I think it supports the claim I made earlier that this is nothing specific not much specific to the euro in this crisis it was a banking and financial crisis resulting from excessive leverage it was the same in the US, it was the same in Iceland it was the same in the UK it was the same in a lot of eurozone countries the form, the fallout takes a different if you're in a common currency but it was the same more or less the same origins and of course the countries where that leverage has led to a huge external deficit current account deficit I think the most it was always us so leverage is bad what do you do with it when the crisis has hit and it can't be sustained you basically have a choice between by cutting lending and cutting activity all by so reducing the flow of lending if you like all by cutting the stock of existing debt and restructure in the banking system in the private sector in extremists in the public sector I think for the first few years the eurozone chose the first and that went badly because that squeezes the economic activity for which you can sell this debt whereas the better decision would have been to cut the stock do debt restructuring and allow new flows to continue why didn't they do QE earlier I think it's less to do with the mandate itself which if you read the full manual there's a lot the ECB can do and it's indeed required to do it has to corroborate its inflation but so long as inflation is under control legal treaty text says it has to support the union's economic policy which you go to article 203 of the treaty includes a balanced social market economy inclusive employment all these good things that the eurozone didn't really pursue for a couple of years so there was plenty of legal justification I think for the ECB to say we need to be more expansive and we should be QB too so my best interpretation of why they didn't is largely intellectual I'm kind of with Keynes here that academic ideas actually have a lot of power in policymaking I think that it was not seen as appropriate for the ECB to engage in large scale asset purchases partly this is a tradition I think the the Fed and the Bank of England had more experience with throughout their longer lives whereas monetary policy in the ECB was based on collateralized lending not so much direct market intervention so there was perhaps a bit of a kind of intellectual hurdle there and there was a worry about is this monetary financing but I think it was largely an intellectual the intellectual frame had to be moved there was a frame that made it hard to contemplate these things partly that was the interpretation of the mandate that kind of moved over time so you can read speeches by colleagues over the years 2013-2014 laying the groundwork for engaging in proper queue and it worked what does all this mean for the future of the euro including with other countries will other countries join I know that Sweden will join the euro but I'm pretty sure it will join the Bank of the Union I think Denmark will also join the Bank of the Union certainly the political classes in both countries are quite positive about it so there's sort of political maneuvering process to go through the Denmark is for most a member of the euro already and we've paid to the door since 1982 if I'm right so maybe it doesn't make that much difference I think perhaps the more interesting question is will these European countries join the Bulgaria ones too I think probably in time yes not other than the current governments in places like Hungary and Poland but I think in time economic logic will and political logic more importantly will either to do that so with all that because I've argued that there isn't as much wrong with the euro as such as the standard narrative hasn't I think that the future for the euro is bright because I think there are fewer threats to it than people think so long as policy makers make the right choices whether they do or not doesn't depend so much on the structure of the euro as what they've learned what future politicians will do in a crisis but I do think that when anything is seriously undervalued underrated it will usually outperform expectations so that's my question for the euro as well Good, well I'm out Thank you very much We might end it there, thank you