 Dr Shirai, mae'r profesor yng Nghymru Ceylau Universityyn Tokio ac yng Nghymru Sgolaeth Llywodraeth Llywodraeth i'r Banki Llywodraeth. Felly, mae'n gweithio'r cyfleoedd y Banki Llywodraeth i'r Banki Llywodraeth ar 2011 a 2016. Felly, mae'n gweithio'r Banki Llywodraeth i'r Banki Llywodraeth i'r Banki Llywodraeth i'r Banki Llywodraeth i 2013, ac mae'n gweithio'r profesor i yn Cymrius Ysgrifesolol Educational! Mae'n glwscirio'r llyfodol 11 o'ch cerfodydd y cyffredinau yn Gweithio'r Cyffredinol Cymru, gyflymio Ysgrifesol Educational!� gref, ac mae gweithio'r Cymru, i'r llyfodol Llywodraeth i'r Banki Llywodraeth i'n gweithio'r llyfodol, ac mae'n gweithio'r cysylltyn, dros mae'n gweithio'r cyffredinol. ..y'r aelod i'r buswys. Yn y cwmhlu yw'r rai i'r hynny'n ymdill. Yn y cwmhlu yma yng Nghyrch Fyrogyntaf, yw'r aelod yma yng Nghyrch Fyrogyntaf. Yn y cwmhlu Fyrogyntaf, mae'n gwybodaeth yn y Cwmhlu... ..y'r aelod i'r cwmhlu a'r aelod i'r cwmhlu... ..y'r aelod i'r cwmhlu a'r aelod i'r cwmhlu. So, when by European and American Central Bankers, when they say about Japan, they also say the deflation, so Japan has a deflation problem, so we should avoid such deflation. If you look at average inflation this is between 2,000 to 2,000 PKRs just before this quantitative quality of the measure was introduced. It was minus 0.3, minus 0.28, so minus 0.3. So it's not very serious deflation spiler. I hope that you will not misunderstand. Y page yn ychwanegwyllwyr. Y page yn ychwanegwyllwyr, y byddwyl yn ymlaen. Byddwyl yn 0%. Y byddwyl yn 0%. Ychwanegwyllwyr wedi'n sy roles. Ond y cyd- y pwysig yw ni dweud yn eu cyfnod. Er, mae'r haf oedd yr aelod yn y ddech chi. Y pwysig yn y ddech chi. Ym overhead cyd- y bobl, yw'r adnod gyngor am yr ysgrif viadd. Ysgrif ydydd hwyl ydwyd, a'r wahan yn y gbldd, Cyd wedi bod ydy'r 1.0, mae'r 1.0 wedi bod ydy'r 3.6 golygu. mae'r amgar yn ym無edd gen乎 pa phuhridol. Ond mae'r 1.0 wedi bod ydy'r 1.0 wedi bod mae'r 1.0 wedi bod fe'n gweithio'r ysgol ei wahanol, nid oes i gyflym'n meddwl, nid oes i gyflymu'n meddwl, nid oes i gyflymu'n meddwl i bach yw, dwi dtwid i'r beth sydd yn ei wahanol. Felly, rwy'n meddwl yma'n ei wahanol. Ond efall, mae'n meddwl i'n meddwl i bach, Something called model in place. So I guess it doesn't see it as a use it. But in Japan we intentionally introduce a model in place style which is some of-not in circulation and mobile apps collect accounts at Central Bank. So you can see both Central Bank's asset, model in place, and they increase together at the same place. Mae'r ddweud oherwydd mae'r cadwysgau a phrygu o'r pwysig yw'n rhanio'r rhaid o'r blaenmar. Yn ymwybodaeth yma, ac rydym yn bwysig o rhaid o rhaid o'r blaenmar, ond nid o'r ddweud o'r ddweud o'r blaenmar, a mae'n cael ei ddweud o'r ddweud o'r bwysig o'r blaenmar, ac rhaid o'r ddweud o'r ddweud o'r blaenmar. Now here if you are interested in data please look at it. I just wanted to show how similar is the Bank of Japan's policy, both by various landscape asset, negative interest rates introduced and also concessional, then we program right through Trump. We have a very similar tools. The problem with difference is that the Bank of Japan purchase ETM, B means the other state in this interest, which is easy to buy stocks. So that makes different things. And also Vojar doesn't buy local government bond, of course we don't buy super bond so there are some differences. But basically, it's very similar between Vojar and ECB approach. I think we are learning from each other. I know it's easy to get a lot of insight from what Vioge's policy and so on does. So now I'd like to show you what Vioge has done since 2013. Now, Mr Crowder became governor at the end of March in 2013. Now I spent two years with previous governor, Shirakawa, and three years with Crowder. Now it's very important to explain to you what's happened before that. So Abe and the LDP, his party, the Liberal Democratic Party, used to be opposition parties. And then in December 2012 they won, so Abe became prime minister. And during this election campaign, he said he will introduce 2% inflation target. He will introduce massive monetary easing and W3RO. So the first RO is this massive monetary easing. Second RO is a massive fiscal stimulus. Third RO is economic growth strategies. So already he was planning to introduce 2% to the Bank of Japan. So having said that, so he became prime minister at the end of December 2012, January, under the joint declaration between Bank of Japan and government, that Vioge introduced 2% under previous governorship. Now at that time there was a program, because even though Vioge said okay, we will introduce 2% inflation target, but the monetary easing conducted under Shirakawa's governorship was not enough. There was an asset purchase program, but it's never very massive. So no market participant believed that Vioge can achieve 2% with existing framework. So then Mr Krouda came, because Mr Krouda, and there are 2 deputy governor, one is Iwata. So Mr Krouda and Iwata are long-term critic of Bank of Japan. They are always writing a lot of books and saying that Vioge has never done sufficient monetary easing. So they also said, before they were nominated, that they can achieve 2% in two years. So with that confidence, I think they were selective. And so when they introduced them under Mr Krouda's governorship, we decided to introduce QQE. And so when Vioge introduced this monetary easing, so the Vioge said we will try to achieve 2% as soon as possible with a time horizon of about two years. And the Vioge will continue this QQE as long as necessary to achieve 2% target in stable money. And they hear what I said earlier. So we used to have a policy rate target, like a federal fund rate, but we switched to the monetary base. It doesn't mean the Bank of Japan believed in quantity theory of money, like a clear relationship between monetary base and inflation and inflation expectations. It wasn't that. But I know some people believe in that. Like Mr Iwata, deputy governor, he's a monetaryist. So he was a strong believer of quantity theory of money. But like me or Mr Krouda or others, we don't really think that there is a very clear relationship between monetary base and inflation. So why we introduce monetary base? Because I think we really wanted to give inflation to people that Vioge this time was very different. Because in the past Vioge did a lot of monetary easing, but it could never achieve the goal and it could never get a little overvalued yen. So a lot of people, not domestically, but from abroad and then foreign central bankers, they all criticize Bank of Japan saying Vioge have never done enough. Maybe Vioge is not really want to generate inflation. Maybe they want to have a depression. So a lot of people criticize. So I think we really need to introduce something very dramatic. So we wanted to show that we really want to increase quantity. So as a symbol of quantity, we thought that it may be easy for people to understand if you set the target on monetary base. Because monetary base is a sum of notes in circulation and commercial banks visa placed as central bank. So it includes notes in circulation. So even in public, probably if we use quantity target, probably they understand okay this time, Vioge will really increase lots and lots of liquidity so that would be inflation. So that was an original idea. So in order to achieve this monetary base target, initially the target was 60 to 72 yen. In terms of US dollars it's like 550 to 650 billion annually. That's quite a lot. So in order to achieve monetary base target, the Vioge need to, Bank of Japan need to buy Japanese government bond. Because in Japan we don't have a very big hope and bonds market or asset back security. I think similar in ECB. After all the most and the major asset that ECB or Bank of Japan can buy is government bond. So basically a Japanese government bond is most important asset. So initially to achieve 60 to 72 yen on your expansion on monetary base, the Vioge decided to purchase 50 trillion on government bond. The remaining will be filled out by purchase of a treasury bill and in the end stocks 1 trillion and a real estate investment trust 30 billion. And then we purchase Japanese government bond all after 40 years, the maximum. Then the problem happened from April 2014 when this consumption tax hike was incremented from 5% to 8%. Demand started to drop. Problem with the decline of demand was greater than Vioge expected. In the meanwhile oil price started to drop from summer of 2014. So we started to see inflation decelerating and inflation expectations also started to decelerate. And as a central banker we felt that we should do something to improve this situation. So that's why in October 2014 the Vioge decided to expand this monetary easing. So monetary base target was increased from 60 to 70 to 80 and the Japanese government bond purchase increased from 50 to 80 and also increased EDF and lead. So it was very massive. So how big is 80 trillion is? Right now Japanese government net issuance of Japanese government bond annually is 50, 50. So Vioge buying 80 so means that we are really taking, Vioge is really taking JGB from investors. So you can see how big this program is. Then last January Vioge decided to introduce, they are not interested. While we introduced it I think you remember there was a global uncertainty. China economy started to fluctuate from summer 2015. The Chinese stock price started to collapse. The exchange started to depreciate. So also January last year the Chinese economy had a lot of fragility. All the price started to drop. So emerging economies also started to become very fragile. In the meanwhile Deutsche Bank program, local profitability issue was closed up. So in Europe the banking sector concerns started to rise. So globally there was a risk off environment. Under that situation Vioge felt also there is no program in regards to domestic demand. But because an external environment is deteriorating, if we don't take any action maybe situation gets deteriorated. Maybe corporate sector's mindset will start to deteriorate. So that was the main reason why Vioge decided to introduce never limited interest. By the way I voted against it and later I will explain why. And to be honest I was right. I know I was right. So Vioge in January introduced QQE with negative interest. So then they said they will maintain QQE with negative interest as long as necessary to achieve 2% target in stable manner. And then they said that Vioge will not hesitate to up monetary easing in three dimensions. Quantity, quality, and quality interest. Meaning that if it's necessary Vioge is willing to expand the annual pace of monetary base above 80. So it means JGB purchase above 80. And quality means ETF stocks are built. So Vioge is willing to buy more in this class if necessary. And in deep interest rate. That was a message. Now this negative interest rate is very different from yours, ECB. Because ECB you apply minus 0.4% interest rate on excess reserves and deposit facility. So basically you have a one-day assistance. In the case of Japan we decided to introduce three types. Existing plus 0.1% and 0% and minus 0.1% to avoid the burden on the side of banking sector. Because if we charge everything, if we charge negative interest rate to all balances, then the commercial bank have to pay a lot of money to us. Minus 0.1% means they have to pay to central bank. So Vioge won't be able to avoid such a burden. So it will just complicates the real system. Last July Vioge double the ETF purchases 6 trillion. Actually this will cost us potential central banks risk, which I really want to discuss with you. Because no central bank in the world is purchasing stocks. So what is the implication of the central bank buying such a large amount of stocks? And how big is it? So now annually Vioge purchase ETF of 6 trillion. Whereas Vioge's allowances and capital reserves is only 7. By the end of Mr Krodd's governorship, which will end in early April next year, Mr Krodd's governorship end, by that time the Vioge's holding of stocks will be 20 trillion. If the central banks allowance and capital only amounts to 7 trillion, what does it mean? In case stock prices go down, there will be very significant central bank risk. So this is my one issue I want to discuss with you. I know easily discussed about the possible purchase of stocks, but they decided not. But only Vioge is doing it. So this is one contentious issue. A very interesting happen. The Vioge had a monetary policy meeting on January 29th, Friday, I remember. So Friday when they announced it, market initially reacted positively. A positive reaction means in the central bank's general, it means increasing stock prices and exchange depreciation. So that exactly happened. And following working day, which is Monday, so February 1, continued. So stock prices continues to go up, the end continues to depreciate. But from Saturday February 2, things reversed significantly. It's just like Trump victory last year had a reverse impact in the market. Stock prices and exchange are the same thing happened. So from Saturday all the sudden, it started to appreciate. It continues to appreciate up to June 27th, in Japan on June 24th, Brexit referendum. At that time, the end of the rate went below 100. That was a bit too much. So stock prices also continues to go down. So the market reaction completely changed. So in the middle step, what was the problem, what was the why people reacted negatively on this negative interest rate? Now in fact, so I summarized as follows. First of all, I think Vioge had a communication problem. Because under Shirakawa and also under Kuroda, Vioge always rejected the idea of negative interest rate. So even when the ECB introduced negative interest rate in June 2014, of course, foreigner would say, why not Vioge introduce negative interest rate? But Vioge strongly rejected the idea of negative interest rate. Why? Because I will tell you, in the case of Japan, we could see the negative impact. So also Mr Kuroda kept rejecting the idea of negative interest rate. So when it was introduced all of a sudden, everybody got surprised. And I guess it took a while for foreign investors to really understand and grasp the idea. So once they started to really know what it means, I think they started to react negatively. Because one problem is remember, Vioge used to say, we are willing to expand quantity. And if they can do that, why not expanding quantity, monetary base, rather than introducing negative interest rate? So it was not consistent with previous communication. That is one issue. The second issue here is the difference between ECB and Japan. Now, in case of Japan, negative interest rate really works against the asset budget program. I talked about this with ECB. They didn't get it for a while because the situation is totally different. In the Euro area and in Ireland, you have a negative interest rate. But it doesn't work against continuation of asset budget program in Europe. But Japan, yes. Where the difference come from? I can give you an example. For example, Ireland, there is a government bond. Who owned it? I hear that most of the government bonds are owned by foreign investors, foreign commercial bonds. And a domestic commercial bond does not hold that much government bonds. Same in Germany. More than 50% of German bonds are owned by foreigners. So in other words, ECB and Central Bank of Ireland, they can purchase easily the government bond from foreigners. In the case of Japan, it's different. We have a huge Japanese government bond, sizes over 200% of GDP. Huge market. But interesting thing is, 95% of this outstanding Japanese government bond are owned by domestic people. And it's highly concentrated. The investor base is highly concentrated. It's basically owned by commercial banks or institutional investors like pension fund insurance companies. Now, why commercial bank holds so much Japanese government bond? Here comes the difference. For example, Ireland, when we look at Ireland banking sector, loan to deposit ratio of the total banking sector. Here I hear that it is 100 over 100. So that means banks can lend. They can extend credit to the household and corporate sector, but Japan no. For always in Japan, even before QQE was introduced, there is no much demand for credit. So on average, this loan to deposit ratio is about 60%, 60%. So lots of deposit are growing, but very limited demand for credit. So there is a 40% gap. So the Japanese government bond used to fill out this gap between this deposit and the loans. So the Japanese government bond is very important for commercial banks because there are no much alternatives. And mega banks, they can invest abroad, but the small community banks, they don't have a skill to invest abroad. And they don't know how to hedge, so basically they need Japanese government bond. And so Bank of Japan has to buy the Japanese government bond from domestic people. So then you have to really look at domestic people and incentive. So BOJ needed to give incentive to commercial banks so that they are willing to sell the government bonds to Bank of Japan. Suppose I'm a banker, say Tokyo Mitsubishi, and I have so much Japanese government bond now. So if I keep this Japanese government bond until maturity, I can get up to this coupon income until maturity. Or I can sell my Japanese government bonds to Bank of Japan at higher prices so I can get capital gain today. But what I will do with this cash after credit demand is little, but then usually the banks will keep those money at the deposit, current account of Bank of Japan. So traditionally the Bank of Japan used to pay plus 0.1% interest, so I could sell easily my Japanese government bond to Bank of Japan. Then at least I could get 0.1% interest. So positive interest rate was really incentive for the BOJ to continue this smooth functioning of asset purchase program. So therefore it's totally different from your countries. So we knew that. So that's why we always reject this idea naturally. When the negative interest rate was introduced to the margin, it means that to the newly increased current account. Of course people would not sell it, right? Because why should I sell it if I just get minus 0.1%? So naturally it worked against the smooth operation of asset purchase program. I knew that. That's why I oppose it. If you look at Bank of Japan's statement, public statement issued in January 29th, out of nine, four people descended, and three people are regular descended. But I was different because I always worked very closely with Mr. Clodda and Bank of Japan. I'm one of the very important theoretical founders of QQE, and so we had a very close relationship, working relationship. So when people saw my name, I hear that everybody was quite shocked. Of course I didn't want to vote against it. I know they didn't want me to vote against it, but I didn't have a choice because it was inconsistent, logically, conceptually, or from operational wise. There was no justification for me. So as long as we could continue asset purchase program for a while, we should not have introduced that. That was my idea. So banks, what happened? Later I will show you data. Banks, you know in Japan, the credit gross is not so much, 2% to 3% only, and too many banks. More banks than Europe. We have too many over banking sector, lots of competition, so already lending to deposit interest margin was so low, 0.8%. So if we introduced negative interest rate, the lending rate would go down first, so that naturally interest margin will squeeze more. Already this is foreseen. So the direct impact on banks will be very similar. So that's why I voted against. There are many other issues, one more issue. What happened to household? Household, they didn't realize the difference between interest rate, negative interest rate charged on commercial banks, and the retail deposit rate that they get. So when the negative interest rate was introduced, I hear that lots of households got worried. So they made a thousand of points to local banks and asked what would happen to their deposit. Then there's a household survey which shows what do you think about interest rate. So after negative interest rate, many people say interest rate is too low, so actually it really didn't help to increase aggregate demand. Other than that, household got worried. I think similar thing happened in Germany. So to summarize, I think negative interest rate was not really working in Japan, consistency issue, I already told you. And this is the system, it's far more complicated than ECB. So this is another reason why almost nobody understands the audience is complicated system. So it is very complicated. So this is an interesting one, source rate. It's the lowest if we compare Japan and European banks. This margin is lowest among the country economies which introduced negative interest rate. Another issue is that this new country became too fraught. If interest rate is almost fraught after 10 years, how can banks get money through maturity transformations? And also institution investors felt this is too low because at one point 10-year yield went down to minus 0.3% and everybody said that is too low. It is not good for institution investors because return is low, but also discount rate became low. So the pension liability, present value of pension liability also expanded. So corporate safety pension fund also had a problem. So actually a lot of people started to complain. So last September, the BOJ introduced illegal control. Why? I think there was two reasons for that. One because since January that when the negative interest rate was introduced, there was a growing criticism from banking sector and insurance industry about the adverse impact. So I think BOJ realized maybe interest rate went too low. So by introducing the payment of 10-year yield at 0%, they can stop this further decline in a 10-year yield. At the same time, they can prevent overshooting. So I think it was inevitable for Bank of Japan at that point to introduce this payment system in order to avoid further cuts in the yield curve. That is one reason. I think most important reason is because of the growing anxiety in a financial sector and I think BOJ needed to correct the side effect caused by negative interest rate. Another problem is that remember BOJ buy 80 trillion Japanese government bond? That is a bit too much. If BOJ continues to buy it, what will happen to Bank of Japan? Nothing there. So everybody worry about it. I think it's growing stress is generated in a Japanese government bond. So BOJ really wanted to move away from volume approach, like monetary base, to interest focus. So that's why they shifted from monetary base control to income control. Essentially they abandoned the volume target. But here comes the problem. There's a lot of problems now. You know, when Bank of Japan announced this system, all central banks, I believe, understood as follows. Okay, this must be the following case. The BOJ may find it increasingly difficult to purchase 80 trillion Japanese government bond. So they need to move away from volume. That's why they switched to yield card. I think this is the interpretation of ECB and many of the central bankers expert in the world. Here comes the problem. So that is the interpretation of central bankers. That is the interpretation of myself. But here is a unique expression here. At the same time, in September, the Bank of Japan introduced the following expression. It's called inflation overshooting committee. So monetary base will expand until inflation exceeds 2% and stays about 2% in stable money. I thought that they got out of monetary base target, but the monetary base is here. So continue to expand. There is another expression there below that. There is a BOJ project to expand. BOJ expects that the JGP purchase will continue. 80 trillion JGP purchase will continue until the end of GCU. Then people got confused. We thought you got out of volume, no? But you are saying you will continue 80 trillion until the end of GCU. How can you do that? Because technically, if the Bank of Japan target 10-year yield, the amount of JGP purchases has to be endogenously determined. You can't target volume in yield, right? So if you really shift it to the volume target, then you don't need 80 trillion. Because we don't know how much we need. So this created confusion. So right now, if you talk to the hedge fund, they often talk all the time on TV like Bloomberg and CSMBC. Yesterday I saw one of the guys from hedge fund was talking about Japan. BOJ is different because they introduced 0% interest rate. So whenever there is upward pressure, they always buy more to excess downward pressure. What does it mean? Meaning that there are many cases that BOJ has to buy more than 80 trillion in order to maintain 0% tax. So then what will be the BOJ's intention? BOJ really want to move away from massive purchase. Maybe want to have a tapering because it's getting harder to do it. Or BOJ really want to target 0%. If it is all, then BOJ should be ready to purchase Japanese government bond as much as possible and it should not hesitate to purchase above 80. Is that the real BOJ's intention is to clear? So there is a confusion. So among central bankers they all understand the way I did. But investors interpret totally different way. What was the impact of this QQE? I think I can say at least the part of Japan was able to correct over-variation currency. It used to be very high. It used to be very high and now at least we got out of over-variation. So that was good. And also stock prices used to be too low also that we collected. So that is too good thing, the effectiveness of BOJ's policy. But other things, for example, let's look at credit growth. This is a credit growth. Do you see any pickup? No, right? So then the QQE despised the very large scale was not able to generate higher credit growth. You see, nothing changed. Instead, the deposit was growing more because after a negative interest rate, some money market funds were not able to make money in the interbank market. They closed it so the money shifted to deposit. So ironically, loan to deposit ratio dropped further on. If you look at GDP, over the years, average GDP growth was 1.1%. Which was okay. But 2012, one year before, QQE was introduced was 0.9. So slight improvement. Most importantly, this potential economy growth is 0.2%. I hear that Irish potential economy growth is 3%. I agree. 0.2%. So our economy has a growth. So without increase in potential economy growth, I think it's very difficult to see a sustainable impact on a conventional money very easy. So this is, I quickly went over the issue. Here are the issues. What have we learned from our conventional money policy? First, I think we can say that our conventional money policy was effective in terms of lowering short-term interest rate and long-term interest rate. Both in nominal and real-time. Same in Japan, same in Europe. No doubt. So in that sense, I think central bankers did a very good job. How about impact on asset prices and exchanges? I think we can say those are quite effective, especially in the initial stage. But after that, the impact are mixed depending on the investor sentiment, the investor's view about monetary easing and global economic condition. For example, last September, when the Bank of Japan introduced this EU control, there was no impact on stock prices and yen. But when the Trump had won during the US election, all of a sudden US interest rate started to go up. Then, German interest rate, Irish interest rate all increased, but not as much as US. So of course you had an interest in Malaysia. But Japan, pegging the 10-year yield at 0%, so this interest differential was the widest. That led to the speakers' change in their perception. Before, they bet on the US appreciation, but after Trump's victory, they switched to the US depreciation speculation. If you look at hedge fund positions, before elections, their positions were long in yen, but after that, they switched to short in yen. So it really depends on how investors think. So now all investors say, oh, BOJ's policy is very good, it's very effective. So there's no doubt we can really bet on the yen depreciation. A lot of hedge funds say, yen dilabed can go to 130, some people say 140. To me, that's crazy. I think households get curious about that. We need that depreciation. So that is how hedge funds do in circulation. So it depends on the hedge fund. If the hedge fund thinks it's effective, they will bet on that direction. But if you know, they change it. So I think nowadays, the impact of unconventional monetary policy really depends on how those investors feel. So it's not really clear. I don't think we can generalize that. What about the impact on credit growth in everyday demand? The effectiveness, I think we can see some effectiveness, especially in the initial stage. But after that, I think once unconventional monetary policy stays too long, people forget. People even do not question the sustainability. They just take it for granted. So low interest rate becomes normal. Then people do not really pay attention. Then effectiveness starts to gradually weaken. That's what's happening in Japan. I think what's happening in Europe in general. So in terms of the impact on everyday demand, I think, and it's not that effective if we do it too long. Instead, the problem is that if we continue unconventional monetary even for too long, we don't see a positive impact. But instead, instability problem in March, financial instability problem, like a distortion, profitability, banking sector and so on. So there's a greater financial instability risk rather than benefit. So that is, I think, the problem we are seeing now. Now, what about the impact of negative interest rate? I looked at Sweden and many other countries in detail. My conclusion is that the adverse impact of negative interest rate depends on one, cash prevalence of society whether the country use cash a lot. And two, low gross. If the low gross is high, the banking sector can offset decline in profitability caused by negative interest rate. Also a degree of competition in a banking sector. If you don't have a lot of banks, then maybe you can charge higher lending rate. And also the existence of alternative resources. This is an example. Not in circulation as a percent of nominal GDP. That is Japan. You see, means Japan is a very cash-oriented society. So after negative interest rate, there's nothing circulation starting to go up even more. So there was a shift from deposit to cash. But nothing happened in Sweden. Sweden and this ratio is broken because that economy is highly technology-oriented that commercial banks do not have any cash at bank. People do not use cash. And that's such a kind of society. Just because negative interest rate is introduced, people are not willing to go back to cash-based economy. So there's no Syria negative impact, but the Japanese people. So depending on the country's prevalence of cash, also depending on the credit gross, if the credit gross is not high, then bank cannot get profit. Unresolved issue. Based on my understanding about Japan and Europe, and also the United States, I think we have the question whether decline in short-term and long-term interest rate always could sink. Traditional textbooks often say if the economy is not strong, we can lower interest rate to stimulate. But there are many cases that the decline in interest rate goes too far. That will no longer generate any strong political impact. I think that is the one that's going down. But the question is what threshold leads to such a situation? I don't know clearly, but I think academics really can talk about that. This conflict I already talked about. Another issue I really want to talk with is perhaps should listen. Central Bank are taking too much of this as a result of unconventional monetary policy. When they start to normalise by raising interest rate, I think that some of Central Bank in Europe area, possibly Ireland and Germany particularly, also definitely Japan, may face deficit for a while, and maybe they use up all the reserves and then they will have a negative equity. Can we, under that situation, if you know that someday the Central Bank have such kind of problem, the question is should Central Bank still continue to do unconventional monetary policy to achieve 2% target? I think this is one issue I have not solved yet. So final issue is what would be the best combination between fiscal policy and monetary policy? If you look at Japan, the debt is 250%. There is no sign of very strict fiscal discipline. And if we just now say, this is now the government time, expand fiscal policy, I mean, can we really improve the government fiscal discipline? Maybe we might undermine the fiscal discipline even more. So this is quite an important issue. So I stop here. I have a discussion with you.