 But welcome to the first press conference in our new premises. It's, as you may know, the history of this project started with the creation of the ECB itself in 98. And the ECB decided in 2001 to purchase the site of the Gross Market Halle. With this we committed ourselves to preserve its fundamental appearance, to renovate it and to integrate it in our new premises. Then we launched an international architectural competition. Then we had 71 design concepts by early 2004. And then it was chosen after a revision phase. The design by Vienna-based architects, Kopp E-Mell Blau, was selected and the planning phase commenced. So I'm really impressed by the work that's been done, especially by the renovation of the Gross Market Halle. And with that history integrates itself in the ECB. So welcome to you all here. Now let's ask the introductory statement. Ladies and gentlemen, the Vice President and I are very pleased to welcome you to the first press conference in our new premises. We now report on the outcome of today's meeting of the Governing Council, which was also attended by the Commission Vice President, Mr. Dombrowski. Based on our regular economic and monetary analysis and in line with our forward guidance, we decided to keep the key ECB interest rates unchanged. As regards our non-standard monetary policy measures, we have started purchasing cover bonds and asset-backed securities. These purchase programs will last for at least two years. Next week, we will conduct a second targeted longer-term refinancing operations to be followed by six further operations until June 2016. Taken together, our measures will have a sizable impact on our balance sheet, which is intended to move towards the dimensions it had at the beginning of 2012. In the coming months, our measures will further ease the monetary policy stance more broadly, support our forward guidance on the key ECB interest rates, and reinforce the fact that there are significant and increasing differences in the monetary policy cycle between major advanced economies. However, the latest euro area macroeconomic projections indicate lower inflation, accompanied by weaker real GDP growth and subdued monetary dynamics. In this context, early next year, the Governing Council will reassess the monetary stimulus achieved, the expansion of the balance sheet, and the outlook for price stability. The outlook for price developments. We will also evaluate the broader impact of recent oil price developments on medium-term inflation trends in the euro area. Should it become necessary to further address risks of too prolonged a period of low inflation, the Governing Council remains unanimous in its commitment to using additional unconventional instruments within its mandate. This would imply altering early next year the size, pace, and composition of our measures. In response to the request of the Governing Council, ECB staff and the relevant euro system committees have stepped up the technical preparations for further measures, which could, if needed, be implemented in a timely manner. All of our monetary policy measures are geared towards underpinning the firm anchoring of medium-to-long-term inflation expectations, in line with our aim of achieving inflation rates below but close to 2%, and contribute to a return of inflation rates towards that level. Let me now explain our assessment in greater detail, starting with the economic analysis. A real GDP in the euro area rose by 0.2% quarter on quarter in the third quarter of this year. This was in line with earlier indications of a weakening in the euro area's growth momentum, leading to a downward revision of the outlook for euro area real GDP growth in the most recent forecasts. The latest data and survey evidence up to November confirm this picture of a weaker growth profile in the period ahead. At the same time, the outlook for a modest economic recovery remains in place. On the one hand, domestic demand should be supported by our monetary policy measures, the ongoing improvements in financial conditions, the progress made in fiscal consolidation and structural reforms, and significantly lower energy prices supporting real disposable income. Furthermore, demand for exports should benefit from the global recovery. On the other hand, the recovery is likely to continue to be dampened by high unemployment, sizable, unutilized capacity, and the necessary balance sheet adjustments in the public and private sectors. These elements are reflected in the December 2014 euro system staff macroeconomy projections for the euro area, which foresee annual real GDP increasing by 0.8% in 2014, 1% in 2015, and 1.5% in 2016. Compared with the September 2014 ECB staff macroeconomic projections, the projections for real GDP growth have been revised substantially downwards. Downward revisions were made to the projections for both domestic demand and net exports. The risks surrounding the economic outlook for the euro area are on the downside. In particular, the weak euro area growth momentum, alongside with high geopolitical risks, has the potential to dampen confidence and especially private investment. In addition, insufficient progress in structural reforms in euro-era countries constitutes a key downward risk to the economic outlook. According to Eurostat's flesh estimate, euro area annual HICP inflation was 0.3% in November 2014, after 0.4% in October. Compared with the previous month, this mainly reflects a stronger fall in energy price inflation and a somewhat lower annual increase in services prices. Taking into account the current environment of very low rates of inflation, it will be important to assess the broader impact of recent oil price developments on medium-term inflation trends and to avoid spillovers to inflation expectations and wage formation. Against the background of recent oil price developments, it is crucial to recall that forecasts and projections are based on technical assumptions, especially for oil prices and exchange rates. On the basis of information available in mid-November, at the time of December 2014, euro system staff macroeconomic projections for the euro area were finalized, annual HICP inflation was foreseen to reach 0.5% in 2014, 0.7% in 2015 and 1.3% in 2016. In comparison with the September 2014 ECB staff macroeconomic projections, they have been revised significantly downwards. These revisions reflect mainly lower oil prices in euro terms and the impact of the downward revised outlook for growth. But they do not yet incorporate the fall in oil prices over the past few weeks following the cut-off date for the projections. Over the coming months, annual HICP inflation rates could experience renewed downward movements given the recent further decline in oil prices. The governing council will continue to closely monitor the risks to the outlook for price developments over the medium term. In this context, we will focus in particular on the possible repercussions of dampened growth dynamics, geopolitical developments, exchange rate and energy price developments and the pass-through of our monetary policy measures. We will be particularly vigilant as regards the broader impact of recent oil price developments on medium term inflation trends in the euro area. Turning to the monetary analysis, data for October 2014 supports the assessment of subdued underlying growth in broad money, M3, with the annual growth rate standing at 2.5% in October, unchanged from September. Annual growth in M3 continues to be supported by its most liquid components with a narrow monetary aggregate, M1, growing at an annual rate of 6.2% in October. The annual rate of change of loans to non-financial corporations was minus 1.6% in October, after minus 1.8% in September, showing a gradual recovery from a trough of minus 3.2% in February. On average over recent months, net redemptions have moderated from the historically high levels recorded a year ago. Lending to non-financial corporations continues to reflect the lagged relationship with the business cycle, credit risk, credit supply factors and the ongoing adjustment of financial and non-financial sector balance sheets. The annual growth rate of loans to households was 0.6% in October, after 0.5% in September. The monetary policy measures in place and the completion of ECB's comprehensive assessment should support a further stabilization of credit flows. To sum up, a cross-check of the outcome of the economic analysis with the signals coming from the monetary analysis confirms the need to closely monitor the risk to the outlook for price developments over the medium term and to be prepared to provide further monetary policy accommodation if needed. Monetary policy is focused on maintaining price stability over the medium term and its accommodation stance contributes to supporting economic activity. However, in order to strengthen investment activity, boost job creation and raise productivity growth, other policy areas need to contribute decisively. Particularly, the determined implementation of product and labor market reforms, as well as actions to improve the business environment for firms need to gain momentum in several countries. It is crucial that structural reforms be implemented credibly and effectively, as this will raise expectations of higher incomes and encourage firms to increase investment today and bring forward the economic recovery. Fiscal policies should support the economic recovery while ensuring debt sustainability in compliance with the stability and growth pact, which remains the anchor for confidence. All countries should use the available scope for more growth-friendly composition of fiscal policies. The investment plan for Europe, which the European Commission announced on November 26, 2014, will also support the recovery. And now we are at your disposal for questions. Brian Blackstone. Brian Blackstone with the Wall Street Journal. You mentioned a couple of times early 2015 as a time when you'd be reassessing your monetary policies. Are you comfortable that you'd have enough information in seven weeks when you meet again towards the end of January, whether or not you'd be able to make this type of decision including whether to buy government bonds? And my second question is you mentioned in the introductory statement an intended increase in the size of the balance sheet that's stronger than you had last month when you said an expectation. And I'm just wondering if this new language is a unanimous decision by the governing council. Thank you. Thank you. On the first question you see you are in a very intelligent way trying to extract from me the date of next decisions and you won't get it. Early it means early. It doesn't mean at the next meeting. It depends very much on how our assessment will go. We'll certainly have a lot of facts to examine, namely and especially the big movement in the price of oil and what the impact of this is going to be, not only on economic activity but also on inflation. Let me say just two words on this which has been the major event since we last met. Oil prices have an obvious direct impact on the price of energy and on that ground the effect is unambiguously positive. Just to give you a very rough estimate our import bill of energy of oil is about 10 billion euros between the second and the fourth quarter of this year. That's about 0.2% of nominal GDP. Now that is not going to be the final impact because Europe also exports oil. But the net is unambiguously positive. Then you have indirect effects on the prices of, for example, transportation, price of different transportation services, airline services. That will also have to be assessed. Then you have a third effect which might happen if the lower prices get embedded in a lower wages formation process. That is something that we want to look at. We estimate the direct and indirect effects on HICP inflation. It's going to be 0.4 in 2015 and 0.1 in 2016. That's very important to keep in mind because it could alter the profile of inflation rates over the coming months, especially in the next few months. Through the indirect effects that I mentioned before, however, lower oil prices will also impact on-core inflation. We have to also be aware of this second order phenomenon. As I said, it's important that it doesn't get into second round effects. In other words, it doesn't get embedded in inflation expectations. There's a lot to look at. It's a bottom line of what I was saying. There's a lot to look at to reassess and to look at the median term outlook for inflation. The second question is, yes, indeed, intended is different from expected. It's not simply an expectation. It's an intention, but it's not yet a target. It's something in between. There was a vast majority of the members of the Governing Council, but the decision was not unanimous. Tonya Mastrovoni. Thank you, Mr. Draghi. You mentioned the European investment plan. When you talked in Jackson Hole, you mentioned that there was the necessity to boost the economy on the demand side. Do you think that the Junker plan could boost the European economy on the demand side as you imagined it then? As the assumption is, for example, that for every euro which is invested, you have 10 or 15 euros that come back from the private sector. Do you think this is credible? Well, certainly so. I mean, we have great confidence in the success of the Junker plan. And let's keep in mind that right now it's the only initiative we have as far as the aggregate fiscal stance is concerned. It's rightly focused on investment because that's where I would say most action is needed. One of the features of the present outlook is actually the low level of investment, both public and private. And there are several signs that, as far as the private investment is concerned, this is so because there is a sort of lack of confidence. The confidence is by and large returned into financial markets but has to be now spread to the real side of the economy and namely the investment decisions. From sort of kind of anecdotal surveys that are being conducted, often companies declare that the margins for a news capacity are not big, which means that they are not prepared yet to ramp up, to step up their investment plans. So that is the situation for the private investment. As far as public investment is concerned, I don't remember exactly the benchmark. It's one of the lowest levels in the last few years, in several years as a matter of fact. So the Junker plan is one response to this. Alessandro Speciale. Alessandro Speciale, Bloomberg News. Mr. President, my first question would be on the TLTROs that would be the allotment on the second round in December 11. Can you tell us something about your expectations for this second tender and the impact you expected to have on the balance sheet expansion? And my second question is on the work of the Euro system and ECB committees. If you could give us some more details on the measures that they have proposed that you have ready to implement, should it be needed? Thank you very much. Thank you. On the first, obviously it's very, very difficult to estimate precisely what the take up of the TLTRO will be. And also we should take into account that we should have in mind the net take up in the sense that banks will also do other refinancing operations at the same time. The previous take up came out in the lower part of our range of expectations for a variety of reasons, but still had significant impact together with other announcements of policy decisions like the ABS and the cover bond programs purchases. It had significant financing easing effects and one of the effects we often forget is that in spite of the fact that the net take up was not remarkable, it did change significantly the average maturity of the bank's exposure to the ECB because they basically substitute their present exposure, short term maturity of three months with a longer term TLTRO, and now the average exposure is just less than a year. So you see that that has had an effect on the duration of their exposure. So as I said, it's very difficult to foresee exactly where the take up is going to be, even more so the net take up. Certainly one thing we should keep in mind that, by the way, incidentally, there has been a rumor that the conditions of the second TLTRO could change. No, they're going to be exactly the same conditions as the first. In the meantime, the outlook has become weaker and that's what we have in mind. We have to keep in mind. The work of the ECB committees will continue. It was the basis of a very rich, I would say very rich discussion yesterday afternoon especially, but it was also today during the meeting. We discussed broadly all sorts of measures. We certainly discussed the various options of QE and the more work is needed. And certainly, and I will keep you informed as this work will proceed. Mr. Draghi, could you tell us if you take new steps next year, will it be a big step in one? I mean buying sovereign bonds or will it be corporate bonds first and then sovereign bonds? That was one question and the other one. Have you discussed the regular account of governing council meetings and have you taken a decision on it? Thank you. Thank you. On the second question, we will discuss the accounts of our meetings at the next meeting we'll have in December. On the first question, let's reflect for a moment. First of all, we've seen that inflation, now headline inflation is 0.3 in November from 0.4 the month before. It was due to lower energy prices, certainly, but was also due to lower price of services. So you see one component is the services component is part of the core inflation. The major revisions were due to three countries, Germany, France and Italy led the downward revisions. And by and large, these developments were in line with our previous communication that said that inflation would be low. I would say low in years 2015 and 16. As I said before, it could fall further because of oil prices. Now, let me make absolutely clear that we won't tolerate prolonged deviations from price stability. And the main reason is that if these deviations feed into inflation expectations, it causes a drop on medium to long term inflation expectations, which by the way still are within a range consistent with medium term price stability. But if these were to feed into inflation expectations, these lower outcomes of inflation were to feed into lower inflation expectations, we would have at a zero lower bound nominal interest rate. This would be tantamount to an increase in the real interest rate. That is something to keep in mind. So it would be tantamount to an unwanted tightening of monetary policy. That's why we are preparing ourselves in the way that's been described in the introductory statement. Let me just reread the point about this. It says in this context early next year the governing council will reassess the monetary stimulus achieved because we don't want an unwanted tightening of our monetary policy stance due to a decrease in medium term inflation expectations. So we'll reassess the monetary policy stimulus achieved, the expansion of the balance sheet and the outlook for price developments. We will evaluate the broader impact of recent oil price developments on medium term inflation trends in the euro area. Should it become necessary to further address risks of too prolonged a period of low inflation, the governing council remains unanimous in its commitment to using additional unconventional instruments within its mandate. And that's exactly where the work that's been done by the ECB staff and by the relevant committees comes very, very useful because it's opened up a very rich ample discussion on different unconventional instruments. This would imply alter in early next year the size, the pace and the composition of our measures. I think it's worth repeating it because these are meaningful words. Johanna Tric. Johanna Tric, MNI. Thank you very much. Mr. Draghi, at the European Banking Congress you said that you will bring back inflation without delay. Today you presented significantly downwardly revised inflation forecasts and underlined now repeatedly that there's a risk of further revision. Now I know that you have announced other measures and that they still have to take their full effect, but you've announced those at a time when the outlook was still stronger than today. So I'm wondering what is causing the delay? Why? No decision today. My second question is Vice President Constancio said last week twice that should you decide to go down the route and buy government bonds that this would be a pure monetary policy tool and what happened according to the capital key. And in this context I wonder why the ECB would choose a different route from other central banks that had decided to focus on the safest available assets only in their QE programs. Thank you very much. Thank you. Your first question is very, very reasonable, I would say. And there are two answers to this first question. One, in the sense I've already given it, namely that the changes that have taken place of recent in the price of oil are so meaningful. I just think that between, I'm not mistaken, June of this year and today price of oil decreased by 30% in euro terms. So that they need careful assessment. They need careful assessment in the sense that in the ways that I've described before, we have to assess the direct effect, indirect effect and whether there are going to be second round effects. All these effects are positive, other are not positive. That's one reason, I think, to just think more. The second reason, however, is that between June and September we have announced many meaningful decisions that, as we said several times, are having a sizable impact on our balance sheet but more meaningfully have already produced a substantial easing of financial conditions, both on the credit side and they haven't yet fully developed their action. So we need to see more about what's the impact of this. At the same time we have to be aware that those measures had been calibrated with the growth and inflation outlook which was more favorable than we have it today. So it's both time to look at what the effect these measures are having and will have and also time to be prepared to further action if needed. That's the basic strategic stance that is expressed by today's meeting. On the second point, the form of QE that the Vice President has presented or illustrated is one of the several that we've discussed today. Do you want to comment, please? Yes, I didn't describe any decision that had been taken, of course. I just expressed my view as it is normal in our individual speeches. Also, another dimension of your question was that other countries adopted the policy of buying the safest asset. Well, they just had one because they bought their own sovereign and then there was not the same type of problem that you were alluding to in a context of a monetary union that has many states and different types of debts. Also, you must also recall that we have a very clear policy in what regards what are eligible sovereign bonds for our collateral and that provides a criteria about the safety to our balance sheet. But as the President just said, these are all questions open and still to discussion. We have not taken any decision and I didn't allude to any decision that had been taken. Thank you. Pierre Jones, FT. For the first question, Mr. President, there's been a lot of talk among analysts about whether or not if you were to do QE, you could do it in the way that the BOJ did in the sense that the decision was five to four in favour or would you need more of a consensus? Would you need what some analysts have referred to as a supermajority? So it would be good to hear your thoughts on that. For the second question, we saw quite a lot last week from the Commission on Member States' plans for structural reform and fiscal adjustment notably for France. Do you think what was announced last week in terms of structural reform is sufficient or, as you suggested in recent speeches, would you like to see more centralisation as some sort of permanent framework in place for dealing with this? Well, I would like to answer the first and second question. I think the final decision about structural reform and fiscal consolidation of France and Italy is in the hands of the Commission. The view that I have expressed several times as far as structural reforms are concerned is that there is a lot to gain in extending the sort of, I would say, the framework that we at the present have in the budgetary policies to areas like structural reforms, to have a common decision making. We are so intertwined already that structural reforms are bound to have spillovers on other countries exactly in the same way, in the same sense as budgetary reforms. That is the basis for having a common interest in having a decision, a common decision making process. And in this sense, I've argued several times that it's not a matter of losing national sovereignty, which is the fear that many people have. It's more a sharing national sovereignty at a supranational level. And it's more and more true that the area of structural reforms is now the predominant importance in producing future growth. And conversely, the lack of it will continue to cause weak growth, the weak growth that we are seeing today. On QE, you asked whether we need to have unanimity to proceed on QE, or can we have majority? I think no, we don't need unanimity. It's an important monetary policy measure. It can be designed, I believe, it can be designed to have consensus. I'm still confident. But we have to remember that we have a mandate. And as I said before, we don't tolerate prolonged deviations from our mandate that would cause, ultimately, a titanine, an unwanted titanine of our monetary policy. John Zion? Stanley Fisher has said that quantitative easing would help Europe in the same way that it helped the United States. Many people, however, have increased doubts that it would filter through to the real economy in the same way as many of the other steps you have taken, perhaps taken a longer time or struggled to get lending, for example, going again. And separate to that, is it conceivable that a decision to go ahead with a quantitative easing without the wholehearted support of Germany would be credible? Sabine Lautenschläger said last week, now is not the time. Is there time to convince Germany between now and March? Well, QE has been shown to be effective in the United States and the UK. In Japan, it's harder to assess because other things have taken place concerning the process of structural reforms and the fiscal policy decisions that have taken place. So the assessment on the effectiveness of QE there is more complicated. But it's quite clear that QE, and without being too specific about what sort of assets would be included in this definition, QE has several effects. One is the signaling, certainly, that shows the commitment of the central bank to keep interest rates low for a protracted period of time and the forward guidance in place for a protracted period of time. The portfolio rebalancing effect, namely, if you buy euro denominated assets, people will get cash, will buy perhaps no neuro denominated assets, and you have a portfolio rebalancing effect through that channel. So you have, and you have other effects that show, there is quite, there is a, I would say, well documented relationship between the size of the balance sheet of a central bank and inflation expectations. So there is enough evidence to say that it could be effective. We have to keep in mind, however, that the initial conditions matter a lot. And in this sense, the initial conditions of the U.S. and U.K., when they decided QE were different from the initial conditions of the euro area. So that's why we are thinking deeply about that. That's why, in a sense, it's another answer to the previous question, why we are not acting today. We want to see all these differences and how they play in one way or another. The second part of your question is mainly, it's actually not mainly, 100% political. I and the governing council will have primarily mined its mandate. And the mandate is price stability with an inflation rate which is close but below 2%. And so the last thing that the ECB would do is not to comply with its mandate. Let's go, Aspar. Thank you very much. My first question would be, which kind of QE variations did you discuss? Did you discuss buying gold? Did you discuss buying U.S. treasuries? Because you were referring twice to these various QE versions. And then also what I was missing is when it comes to inflation estimates, there is no number for the end of 2016. Previously, you were giving us one which was showing us that actually inflation expectations are very close to your target. Thank you very much. Thank you. On what sort of assets they should be including QE, my sense is that my recollection is that we discussed all assets but gold. That's the... On the second point, you're right, I don't have it here. But what I can say is that it is 1.4. So it's lower than previously predicted. Claudio Perez. Hi, this is Claudio Perez-Proparis about the investment plan. Will the ECB have a role in financing the Juncos plan? You have said that it's a step in the right direction. You suggested in the European Parliament that you are not going into finance, but why if not? And a second question if I may. If in any moment the ECB is going to embark to a QE program, what channel you consider would be the most important in order to the transmission of the policy? On the first question, I was asked the same question you were right in the European Parliament. And as I said before, our mandate is to have a monetary policy which assures price stability, namely an inflation rate close but below 2%. So we will discuss what the ECB can do. But prima facie is not the role of the ECB to finance investment plans. Having said that, I also said in the European Parliament that the ECB through its comprehensive assessment and through its new role as a supervisor has ensured and will ensure healthier banks that could actually be of great help for the implementation of the investment plan. On the second point, what is the channel? We said that there are three elements in any QE program. One is the size, another one is the pace, and another one is the composition. All these three decisions do have an effect. Could have a credit ease in effect or could have a signal in effect or could have a portfolio rebalance in effect. In other words, you buy certain type of assets, the sellers now have cash and would invest into other assets. So the transmission channels could be several, depending also on the sort of QE we design and keep in mind that we have already decided important measures that are like the ABS program and the Covert Bonds program that are and will be especially producing effects over an extended period of time. Marc Schiritz? Yes, Marc Schiritz on this move from expectations to intention. Was there anonymity on the executive board on this being now an intention? And the second question, so you said that you're discussing all options of QE and so this would also include buying foreign assets? And probably you could elaborate on the transmission channel in this case. Well, on the second question, we've discussed several options and at some point someone advanced this possibility, not on this occasion or another occasion. I think it's kind of difficult because it would be a tantamount to foreign exchange intervention. We really don't want to do that because I said several times that the exchange rate is not a policy target but it's important for growth and price stability and the exchange rate is the product of monetary policies that are on a divergent path in different jurisdictions in different countries because of the different economic conditions both as far as activity is concerned and as far as inflation is concerned. On the other point, no, there wasn't unanimity on the executive board. Nobusunaga. Thank you very much. Nobusunaga from JGPRESS, Japanese news agency. Regarding fiscal discipline of Eurozone countries, ECB required the conditionalities when the Eurozone countries want to have OMT program. Do you think this kind of system is necessary for quantitative easing? And if not, how do you secure the fiscal discipline of Eurozone countries? Thank you. Thank you. No, it's quite important to distinguish neatly that the difference between OMT and QE. OMT was addressing the tail risks for the Euro coming from re-denomination risks. And it was necessary to address this confidence crisis in a way that the action of the ECB were to be deemed credible by the markets, which was the case. And so the design of the program, however, would have to take into account that the confidence crisis in the Euro was concentrated in certain countries. The policies that we are discussing today address the risk of low inflation for too long a time, such that it would feed into lower, medium-term inflation expectations. Normally, in ordinary times, which is monetary policy, it's not addressing the tail risks of a certain situation. So this is pure monetary policy. So much so that in normal times, we would address this risk by lowering nominal interest rates. But in extraordinary times, when we already reached the lower bound for our interest rates, we signal the monetary policy stance through changes in the size of the balance sheet of the central bank. So it's a monetary policy decision that will address, as I did say before, an unwanted tightening of monetary policy. Francesco Serra. Thanks. Francesca Serra from the Catalan Public TV. In Greece, Syriza, and now in Spain, Podemos, two groups that we could call from the radical left are asking for a shift, a change in the way that this institution and the Eurozone have been dealing with the crisis. They are asking for heresies in sovereign bonds, and they have serious chances to win the elections next year. I would like to know if this could undermine or it could affect the way of people conducting recitation next year, and that could be a risk for the Eurozone. Thank you. Thank you. I must confess I'm not entirely clear on what sort of changes they are asking from our side. We've discussed the Ampli Monetary Policy Measures, and today we've discussed the possibility of doing QE, where the central bank would buy government bonds as one option, but also other types of bonds and other types of assets. We, in a sense, had started getting more control on our balance sheet already with the ABS program and the covered bonds program purchases. And so it's a discussion that, in a sense, continues along the decisions that we've taken in June and September. But all these decisions have nothing to do with monetary financing. If that's what's being required from the ECB, that would go against the treaty, article one, two, three. And I wouldn't be absolutely clear on that, that the ECB cannot go against the treaty. Marc Schraus. Marc Schraus, burdens item, thank you. You have said that a decision on sovereign QE does not need to be unanimous. Does that also mean that you would feel comfortable with taking such a decision against quite a number of governing council members? Let's say six, seven or eight. And the second one, you said at your latest hearing at the parliament that the ECB has not been created to ensure that governments do the right things and that you have a mandate, meaning price stability. And the price president argued the same recently. Does that mean that moral hazard issues, that you say that moral hazard issues should not play a role when it comes to sovereign QE? Thank you. Thank you. I think it's pointless to speculate what sort of majority will actually happen to be in place at the time when we will decide, if we decide, if we were to decide these measures. And if you look at past experience, we've taken major monetary policy decisions in a situation where there was no unanimity. So this is what we have to keep in mind. We have to comply with our mandate. We are not politicians here. We have a very clear mandate on that. Moral hazard is a considerable consideration. But as far as we are concerned, only to the extent that it can affect or it can be hampering our main objective, which is price stability. That's very important to keep in mind these distinctions. We are not here to teach governments what they ought to do or blackmail governments that if they don't do something, we'll do something else. We are focused on price stability. So any consideration has to be analyzed and looked from this angle. Jean-Philippe Blacko. Jean-Philippe Blacko from Liseco. Mr. President, two questions. One understanding question, because the new economic projections reflect a downward revision. New economic projections of the ECB reflect a downward revision of net exports. Also, we have an euro now that have reached the lowest level since August of 2012, reflecting, for example, the exchange rate with a dollar. So how can you explain me that a weaker euro, that could be a booster for exports, could lead to a downward of net exports expectations for the period to come? And second question, maybe hypothesis. But after the Greek debt restructuring, you said that the ECB would be a creditor like any others, would be Paris-Pasou with other creditors. Can you confirm that it would be the case if the ECB was to buy government bonds of all eurozone countries next year? On the second question, let me say let's first design the QE and then we'll be able to answer all these questions. On the first question, but let me also add that we don't want to cause unintended monetary policy tightening in choosing forms of seniority which would be counterproductive. You all see this point, I believe. The first question is yes, the exchange rate has weakened considerably. This should have a positive impact on experts. At the same time, we've seen that growth, world growth demand is softer. And so that's why our projections for experts have gone down. And I do think that the most recent movements in the exchange rate have taken place after the cutoff date of the projections. So it will certainly have the previous weakening of the exchange rate. They'll certainly have that, but not the most recent weakening. Last question goes to Alessandro Merli. Problems here. Alessandro Merli with only 24 ore. Doubts have been raised about the legality of a QE program that would include sovereign bonds. From what you said earlier, I think you're confident or adamant that this will not be the case. But you think this will stand up in court as there's certainly got to be a challenge to that. My other question is about the ABS program which has just started with very low volumes. Are you just testing the waters and you plan to increase these volumes? Or are you waiting for regulatory changes to which you've alluded in many occasions before? On the second question, we're not waiting for regulatory changes. When they will come, they will certainly be very helpful in producing a larger market for ABS because we should be aware that we shouldn't be taking a static assessment of the ABS market. The market will expand because of the regulatory changes, but also because of our action. How do we judge the effects of these programs? However, it's not only volumes. It's also the effects they've been having on significant effects. They've been having on tightening the spreads in the relevant markets. We judge the success of a program, and especially this program, depending on the contribution that is given to overcoming the impairment of some credit markets. On that ground, we are quite positive. The volumes have been low and that is partly due to the fact that we just started and partly to the fact that we are a year-end and partly to the fact that we count on a further expansion of the markets themselves. But also to the fact that we are very careful about not crowding out private investors from this market. There is also, in a sense, a self-imposed limitation. So the potential universe of this market, as we said at the time, is 400 billion. We will certainly end up buying less than that, way less than that. And because at the same time, the market will expand if this is well done. On the first point, let me respond with a question. Do you think we would discuss things that we know are illegal? Would it be the best use of our time? So that's, I think, the answer to this. Evidently, we are convinced that a QE program which could include sovereign bonds falls within our mandate. Or better, is an eligible instrument that we could use in the pursuit of our mandate. Not to pursue our mandate would be illegal. Thank you very much.