 I'm Tom Perico and I'm delighted to moderate this panel on some policy questions related to homeland missile defense. We've got three distinguished panelists and I'm with some impressive bios which I will abbreviate considerably. First up we have Keith Payne who is the president of the National Institute for Public Policy. He's also the head of the Graduate Department of Defense and Strategic Studies for the Washington campus of Missouri State University. And during the Bush administration Keith served as the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Forces Policy. Next we'll have Dr. Michael Hanlon, Senior Fellow and Co-Director with the Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence and Director of Research for the Foreign Policy Program at the Brookings Institution. And cleaning up we have Dr. James Miller, President and CEO of Adaptive Strategies. I got that right. And previously with the Obama administration he last served as Undersecretary of Defense for Policy. Each of these men is written extensively on strategic forces policy and on missile defense in particular. So we'll just go ahead and get started beginning with Keith, Mike and then Jim. Okay. Thank you Tom, it's a pleasure to be here especially with three good friends and colleagues from many years. The discussion today that we were asked to look at are some of the fundamental policy questions of U.S. homeland ballistic missile defense. I think it's appropriate to review some fundamental questions now. We're not just because of the new emerging political changes in Washington but more so because I think we're entering a markedly new threat environment. It's what I call the post post Cold War era. I'm sure we'll find a better name for it than that but at least for now I'll call it the post post Cold War era. What can we say with regard to the emerging post Cold War environment? What's new? What's different? The nuclear proliferation and terrorism challenges of the post Cold War era remain with us but there are some unprecedented threat developments as well. The Cold War's ideological basis for hostility is largely over but hostility towards the West now seems to stem from the age-old drivers of history nationalism ethnic religious and linguistic differences and resentments and power politics. Every post Cold War U.S. administration has sought an earnest to improve relations with Russia and now China but in this post post Cold War era Russian hostility is expressed in many ways Moscow's leadership now honors us in its own way by finding much of its identity and legitimacy in its nationalistic opposition to the United States. President Putin has declared Russia's sacred nationalist responsibility for ethnic Russians Russian population in neighboring states and given Russia's military actions against Georgia and Ukraine. Some of our NATO allies are very concerned for their security. In addition Moscow is pursuing its nuclear arms and engaging in nuclear exercises in really an unprecedented fashion since the Cold War and it's expressed nuclear doctrine openly accepts nuclear employment in a range a wide range of contingencies. Alexei Arbatov a well-known Russian defense expert and the former deputy chairman of the Duma's Defense Committee recently reported that the widely accepted beliefs in Moscow now underlying Russian policy include the following one Russia is surrounded by enemies led by the United States to the United States and its allies may invade Russia anytime to seize its natural riches three nuclear weapons are the basis for Russian security and for US calls for nuclear disarmament are a malicious US trick now Alexei is no conservative by Moscow standards and these points sound like paranoid nonsense to us but in Moscow according to Arbatov these are accepted truths in addition China's pursuing robust nuclear and conventional force monetization programs it's pressing Japan very hard in the East China Sea so much so the Japanese Prime Minister Abe has said that the situation in Asia is similar to that in Europe just prior to World War one equating China with Imperial Germany in 1914 in this dynamic emerging post post Cold War threat environment it's no small thing to ask what do we want from ballistic missile defense and from defenses more broadly well the past six decades USB MD policy has at one time or another emphasized each of the following goals defense of forward-based forces defense of allied territory defense of US turret territory against accidental or unauthorized launch the defense of US deterrent forces to help provide their survivability in conformity with the balance of terror framework defense of US territory to disrupt a strategic attack and thereby contribute to deterrence and finally the fence of US and allied societies in a bid to mitigate or overturn the balance of terror as a basis for deterrent stability at one point or another in the past decades each one of those has been emphasized in US policy current express US policy appears to include homeland defense goals against some long-range missile threats such as that from North Korea and prospectively Iran but not from Russia or China it appears attended to defend US society selectively depending on the national origin of the missile launch in particular frequent US expressions that USB MD is not capable against Russia or China nor is it intended to be so give us this feeling a question for the emerging post post Cold War era and pertinent to this meeting here today I think is should we prepare to defend US and allied societies IE homelands directly against missiles from any asthma regardless of their national origin and if so what level of effectiveness will we define as success and what long-range missile capabilities are to be included Chinese for example let's look at how these questions were considered questions of homeland defense were considered during the Cold War and the post Cold War airs and in doing so this morning I mean drawing a bit on some excellent work by my colleague just completed by my colleague Kurt Guthe it's important first to recognize that for every presidential administration from Truman to Obama limiting damage to US territory in the event deterrence fails has been a goal in some context we have sought to achieve the goal of societal protection directly directly protecting against threats including the active defense provided by ballistic missile offense for example the Johnson administration's sentinel BMD program with the late 1960s was intended specifically for homeland defense against Chinese missiles however against large missile threats such as that posed by the Soviet Union US policy has focused much more US fall policy focus much more on intro war deterrence and indirect means of limiting damage to US society of deterrence fails and this US focused the decision in the early 70s to rely on intro war deterrence vice direct defense for homeland protection corresponded with the general reject general rejection of direct defenses including ballistic missile defense and air defense now four decades later the Cold War is over but declared US policy appears to continue to avoid the notion of homeland defense or societal protection against Russian and now Chinese missile threats five basic arguments typically are made we're made and are made in support of that focus that decision we take it just a minute to identify each of these arguments first nuclear deterrence can be relied upon to prevent nuclear attack by large established powers so thick societal defenses are unnecessary as the late professor Kenneth Waltz one of my professors at Cal many years ago asked rhetorically who needs unreliable defense when we can have reliable deterrence with deterrence instead of defense second defensive measures cannot be sufficiently effective to provide a meaningful level of homeland protection against a large missile threat that goal is simply impossible to reach third even if technically feasible the cost of meaningful societal protection against a large threat is unaffordable fourth US homeland defenses would compel an opponent to consider striking first for fear of losing its deterrent that is US homeland defenses will cause first strike deterrence instability and fifth societal defenses would cause arms racing because they would provoke offsetting Russian and Chinese increases in their offensive arms these are the five canonical arguments that have been made for the past five decades with regard to focusing on intra war deterrence as a means of protection as opposed to direct to direct defense may take just a minute to review each of these five arguments in the context of the post post Cold War era first if deterrence really were full proof as is suggested by Professor Waltz's rhetorical question the value of defenses would be limited indeed for homeland protection but there is no assurance of deterrence working given the great diversity of threats decision makers and stakes in the post Cold War era consequently a question to be considered new for this era given the potential for deterrence failure or irrelevance is should homeland defense programs be designed to directly mitigate any missile attack or is relying on indirect intro war deterrence the best protection that we can get in most cases or some cases and if direct defense is a choice is homeland defense against Chinese missiles a goal second general claims that meaningful societal defense is technically infeasible just simply our bogus that feasibility is a matter of the nature of the threat the range of the defenses in play the security context and the level of protection deemed meaningful consequently a pertinent missile defense question homeland defense question for the post Cold War post Cold War era include what level of societal protection and effectiveness may now be possible against what size threats and in combination with what other direct defensive measures third general claims that meaningful societal protection is unaffordable are likely to be false in at least some contexts the cost of different damage limitation measures can vary considerably and affordability depends on many factors that can change and will change over time including the urgency of the demand the extent of the threat the overall budget constraints and competing demands the corresponding questions for the new post post Cold War include what are the BMD affordability implications of the emerging threats conditions and technologies and the competing needs of the post post Cold War era fourth US defensive capabilities cannot be considered predictably destabilizing for example US homeland defenses may reduce pressure on the US to strike first promptly if for example it were to appear that North Korea was preparing a nuclear armed long-range booster for launch and defenses are only one of many factors that can influence leadership's considerations of first use consequently the post post Cold War questions regarding deterrent stability include how might various possible US homeland defense programs now contribute to detract from or be irrelevant to post post War post Cold War considerations of stability across a wide spectrum of threats fifth and finally opponents may attempt to counter US defensive capabilities but historically those responses have not followed a simple action reaction model that causes an arms race and US BMD restraint has not reliably elicited an opponent's corresponding offensive restraint many factors beyond US defensive programs can shape an opponent's armament decisions consequently BMD questions for the post post Cold War era include what factors may drive key opponents armament decisions in what context and what directions and can we anticipate how US homeland defense may affect these decisions across multiple potential opponents in summary for seven decades US senior officials have recognized the possibility that deterrence may fail and for seven decades they believe that the level of destruction to US society could be and should be limited either directly through defenses or indirectly through interwar deterrence or some combination thereof I've tried to point to some of the key emerging policy questions for the post post Cold War era for example at what cost and against what level of threat might US BMD capabilities provide meaningful societal protection meaningful societal protection should we think differently about this depending on the national origin of the threat and if so our Chinese missiles included and perhaps most importantly how much homeland protection should be deemed meaningful protection what does it take to be meaningful and that's potentially worth the cost at heart this is the most important question for policy judgment during the Cold War some US leaders said they saw no difference between 10 million and 100 million US casualties in the event of war suggesting little or no possible value for mitigating damage vice deterring an attack what might be the contemporary standard for the definition of meaningful defense is the Cold War judgment that 10 million is no different than 100 million US casualties that's the right way to think about this for the post post Cold War era or should we move to some other set of judgments these are basic homeland defense policy questions for this new post post Cold War era given the new conditions that we're now entering I don't think we should simply accept the answers and arguments from the Cold War or even the post Cold War periods we may come again to the same policy conclusions and decisions that intro war deterrence is really the only option feasible against established nuclear powers direct defense is not but it seems at this point a review of those basic questions is well in order thank you good morning everyone good to see you and Jim and I were talking a minute ago about whether we would also stand or sit I realized I couldn't see a quarter of the room and the one thing CSIS left out in this beautiful new building is hologram capacity so I was not going to be able to see your faces so decided to stand for my brief remarks I guess we don't need these I just want to make three points and I'm very glad that Keith raised the China question right up front and I'm going to offer a different perspective on China a thought briefly on Korea North Korea related to the earlier excellent presentation by the Admiral and then a final thought on boost phase defense and just make those three points and look forward to Jim Miller's thoughts as well on China I think Keith is right to ask us to raise fundamental questions but having done so myself I come down on sort of the other side of the question which is to believe that it's just not realistic to believe we are going to improve our net security if we try to build a national missile defense architecture that explicitly tries to deal with damage limitation vis-a-vis China because I think the most likely reaction by far is a Chinese decision to no longer show restraint in the nuclear realm the way that I believe it has for most of its history now I know there are debates about just how much nuclear capacity China has there's some uncertainty we should press China for greater transparency we may want to try to bring China into arms accords at some future date because there are going to be ongoing debates as there should be about the uncertainties and what they actually possess but the evidence that I've seen so far suggest that China is showing restraint at least in this domain of its national security policy and we should be hesitant to jeopardize that Keith spoke a great deal about Russia I won't go into all the Russia angles but I come back to a traditional arms control view there as well which basically is that if we were to engage in an offense defense arms race the most likely outcome is going to be worse for us now with China I think they actually have the resources to build offensive interceptors just as fast or faster than we can build defensive ones Russia may not have quite the same capacity but the balance of technology is still such that defense among relative peer competitors is the harder job so I am not enthusiastic about attempting that visa be either China or Russia that's point one point two however this all looks a little different when you think of the North Korea case because in the North Korea case we have enough asymmetric advantages that in fact we have a decent chance of being able to build at least a reasonably effective national missile defense capability and I support the thrust of what we've heard this morning from the admiral obviously we need to get better at a lot of the technology components that are part of this system and I know Jim Miller worked hard on that as undersecretary a number of you have been involved we'll hear more about that in the third panel as well but I think in general we have not only the technologies of improved interceptors the hope for an improved redesign kill vehicle and such but we also have other advantages that I could at least briefly mention which relate to the overall integrated way in which you try to deal with the North Korean threat in the context of a crisis or a war and these have to do frankly with theater assets of an offensive variety and even though I'm not sure where the North Korean threat will be in five or 10 years and just how mobile their ICBM force could be and just how easily they could develop solid fuel technology to make it rapidly launchable. I believe that for the foreseeable future we will actually have a fairly good chance of preempting a lot of their long range missiles on the launch pad in the event of war and I think that's a very important point to bear in mind because we're not talking about preventive war this is not another 2003 invasion of Iraq this is not a controversial decision of that sort I'm imagining a situation in which we are already in a crisis conflict or war and then we start to see the North Koreans fueling multiple ICBMs on the launch pad I don't think it's practical that we would let that happen and therefore I think it's going to be a combination of offensive and defensive assets that work to our advantage in that situation which make the admirals job a little more doable even though the thrust of technology is still such that offense I think in theory in the abstract has the relative advantage over defense in the missile defense competition so my second point simply is that I believe the North Korean threat is one that we should continue to try to address through both offensive and defensive means because the combination and the synergy of those gives us a pretty good chance of at least reasonable success and that's probably true as well in regard to a hypothetical Iranian threat but I won't get into that right now final point the logic of what I've been saying about both China and North Korea leads me to want to keep a little bit of focus on a kind of technology that we heard and talked a lot about in the 1980s in the strategic defense initiative context that we thought about a fair amount through the 1990s and 2000s but we're tending to deemphasize right now and that's boost phase defense and specifically what interests me is ground-based or sea-based boost-based defense because in addition to the fact that this allows you to potentially intercept an offensive ICBM before it can deploy decoys it also works extremely well geographically speaking against a country with the location and size of North Korea because we have our Japanese ally and the Sea of Japan waters that are immediately to the east of where North Korea would be launching from it doesn't have strategic depth from which it could launch a lot of things from thousands of miles away from a boost phase interceptor capability this system as you know was being investigated by the missile defense agency in recent years I think for fiscal reasons we've decided not to push this technology in the short term and there may be good technological reasons why in the short term it's also not feasible as you all know I think hitting a big rocket when it's still burning has certain advantages and certain disadvantages the advantages are it's easy to see and if you hit it even obliquely or partially you're probably going to cause a catastrophic failure of the rocket and you're going to get it before decoys can be deployed and before any multiple warheads if North Korea ever got to that point could be deployed the harder job however is you've got to react extremely fast and also the ICBM is accelerating during this period which means that you may have a harder time predicting its future location based on sensors and computers but on balance I think the advantages of trying to do boost phase intercept not from space this is not a space capability I'm talking about talking about ground based or navy based boost phase intercept I still think our technology is worth looking into further as well so I would simply suggest we keep that part of the conversation and with that I'll look forward to Secretary Miller's thoughts and then your questions thank you. Thanks Tom for hosting today it's great to be on a panel with Keith and Mike and you a lot of depth not of knowledge about strategic issues including missile defense. It was great to see Jim Searing here and always great to see Catholics with whom I had the honor to work in the Department of Defense and it is also great to see so many old friends in the audience and I use that term somewhat advisedly as well I wanted to make five points today and the overlap pretty substantially with both Keith and Mike's points and as I think neither Keith nor Mike will be surprised they tend to correspond more closely to Mike's perspective and Keith's although I do think if the fundamental point of Keith's presentation is we need to continue to ask hard questions about what missile defense is about and what we're capable of and how that will play out over time I think that's spot on that core message I think that's spot on so point number one our home and missile defense including GMD should be protected in tough budgetary times it's a number one mission for the Department of Defense to defend the nation nothing is as important to the department as to prevent catastrophic attack on the United States the threat is real we haven't dwelled on that today but North Korean K and 08 and nuclear capability is real and Iran is working on space capabilities that could provide the basis for an ICBM we want to be ahead not behind this threat that's the rationale for having a system in place and actually going from 30 to 44 ground base interceptors we want to be ahead and we want to be prepared should it grow in the future as we think about the broader context our allies and partners globally can contribute to a lot of capabilities they can contribute to theater missile defense they can contribute to strike capabilities they can contribute to inter theater lift and many other missions no one else is going to defend the United States of America and so that that needs to be on our military and I certainly don't accept a salami slice approach to defense cuts in general we need to prioritize and our missile defense of the United States is one thing that needs to be prioritized that said that doesn't mean that funding for ground based mid course defense or national missile defense more broadly should be unfettered or unwashed it doesn't mean it should get a free ride we have to continue to spend that money wisely and I think where the department has been in recent years is to is to prioritize national missile defense prioritize the capabilities that Jim Searing talked about get the get 44 highly capable ground based interceptors deployed and that's going to take a few years as you work through the kill vehicle systems and then also make those investments in sensors including radar and discrimination so it doesn't mean a free ride but it should be our that should be very high priority we can't go to the American people and say sorry we ran out of money and we didn't have the resources to defend the nation that that dog won't hunt point number two national missile defense is affordable and sensible vis-a-vis North Korea and Iran some have argued that we should rely deterrence not just vis-a-vis Russian China but also vis-a-vis North Korea and Iran that missile defense is too expensive of course we should continue to work hard to prevent Iran from going nuclear through negotiations if possible and we should continue to work to rollback North Korea's nuclear program and it's also important to note that conventional and nuclear deterrence are both operative with respect to North Korea and Iran so it's not an either or it's an additive but we shouldn't accept vulnerability to nuclear tip ICBMs from these countries if we don't have to and we don't have to in addition to protecting the United States our national missile defense vis-a-vis North Korea and Iran buttresses are extended extended deterrence as well reinforces our reassurance of allies and partners and reduces any risk that either of these countries could in the future think it could deter us from intervention or deter us from defending our allies and partners some in our audience in fact many may remember the NHTSA criteria from from just about 30 years ago that were articulated by Ambassador Paul that's in the Reagan administration and I think here it's you this is I guess this is back to Cold War Keith but it may be applicable to post post Cold War as well NHTSA said that missile defense had to meet three criteria in order to be sensible first militarily effective second adequately survivable and third cost effective at the margin and implicit in all that is that that would be sustainable for a reasonable period of time in other words if you achieved it for five minutes and then reverted into an arms race that would not be a good outcome to me those criteria still make sense and if you look at them with respect to North Korea and Iran they're applicable the easy merging threats are small enough and tech now technologically limited enough that we can still be military effective militarily effective and though our system couldn't survive a Russian or Chinese attack it can be survivable now for North Korea and Iran and finally even though North Korea and Iran may build missiles more cheaply than we can build interceptors with the US economy 50 times the size of Iran and the difference growing and the US economy a thousand times the size of North Korea and a difference growing we also can be cost effective at the margin they can something that's affordable for the United States none of these criteria fit for Russia and China as we look forward into the future today or or in the future Russia and China both have the capacity to deploy to deploy advanced countermeasures that would make our system military and effective if we come up on new technologies that change that equation then we should certainly have a fresh look I haven't seen them both countries have the capacity to attack vulnerable nodes of our system of our missile defense architecture with both conventional and nuclear weapons so from my perspective and I think an analytical perspective from now and into the future it's not adequately survivable visa be these two actors and finally each of them China and Russia could use the resources of very large economies to deploy many more ballistic missiles more nuclear weapons and other delivery vehicles needed to overwhelm our defenses so that's point number two affordable and sensible for North Korean Iran not so for Russia or China point three and it follows directly on this we need to sustain what I would describe as the right amount of national missile defense and we're well postured to do so and the right amount in today's world and the world that is most likely for the future is sufficient to defeat any North Korean and Iranian capability but not enough to impact strategic stability including arms race stability vis-a-vis Russia and China today would need ground-based interceptors to work against a limited number of first generation ICBMs like the KNOA over time North Korea may improve that capacity and we need to be prepared as Admiral Searing talked about to defeat that capacity that's still a fair bit below where Russia and China are capable of being if we attempt to develop a system to defeat Russia and China according to any technology that I've seen not just what's available today but what's what looks feasible within within at least a couple of decades we would expect their counter measures including growing their offensive program including technical countermeasures of Russia and China to be able to defeat that two final points sub points I guess got contrary to the fears of many in Russia and China our missile defense system is not oriented toward defeating their nuclear deterrent if they're don't if they don't like our missile defense system and I've gotten substantial indications when I was undersecretary that they don't the best approach for them in addition to working together to exchange information about threats and so forth is to work to stop Iran from going nuclear and to work to rollback North Korea's nuclear program as well we don't have the resources to waste more on national missile defense than we need and we certainly don't need to get ourselves in an expensive arms race that would reduce our security vis-a-vis Russia or China sub point two on this however once we have a deployed system this is true for national missile defense it's true for theater missile defense as well our policy of saying that we don't want to affect strategic stability vis-a-vis Russia China does not mean that we would not use that system to attempt to engage an ICBM or other missile if we're shot at ourselves or at our allies of course you would what what our current policy means is that we're not trying to build a system of the scale or technical capacity to be able to comprehensively defeat Russia or China's Chinese attack or indeed realistically would have very minimal impact on that if a missile is launched at the United States of course the United States will use whatever capabilities it has to try to defend against it we wouldn't expect to be very successful vis-a-vis Russia or Chinese attack point number four and I think this is self-evident from Admiral Syrian's presentation this morning we have substantial time to make a decision on an east coast ground-based interceptor field so-called east coast missile field as Admiral Syrian noted we've got 24 months to go on environmental impact assessment not to get to an environmental impact statement in principle that could be could be compressed it would take the cooperation of Congress the administration but in the event of a national emergency I would hope and actually expect that that could be done but the reality is if we've prioritized in the near term on getting from 30 to 44 interceptors and more importantly from ensuring that the interceptors that we have deployed are highly capable those interceptors will be able to provide coverage against both North Korea and Iran that number growing from 30 to 44 by 2017 is sufficient to deal with any threat that is is likely or foreseeable from those two in that time frame so any additional capacity and any any deployment of an east coast missile field can safely be to the right of that from from certainly from my perspective and I think that I think that makes sense focus today on making the current system work and getting from 30 to 44 now let me rephrase that focus today on improving the current system the group most recent test suggested that it can work and enhancing the reliability of interceptors and make it as highly effective as possible and having it be able to deal with the countermeasures that we may see from a North Korea or Iran and finally I want to acknowledge that national missile defense is critical but it's not a panacea I mentioned the importance of conventional nuclear deterrence earlier and the reality is national missile defense will not defend off against all threats even against the North Korea or Iran they could use cruise missiles on a trawler they could try to smuggle in a nuclear weapon but there are advantages to an ICBM for North Korea or Iran which may be why North Korea has pursued that capability and why Iran appears to be developing that option including through its space launch capabilities in the smorg and the sephir space launch vehicles it allows them to launch from their territory gives them a visible sign of capability and hiding the nuclear cruise missile or nuclear weapon on a ship would pose some some substantial risk that US intelligence and allied and partner intelligence might discover it and interdict it we need to defend against all these threats national missile defense is a critical we need to continue to work on other aspects as well and to get to a question that may arise I don't see any prospect in the in the near to mid-term that it's going to be cost effective to deploy a nationwide cruise missile defense but if we have some technological breakthroughs that substantially drag down costs I could imagine that that would be a initial that will rise again and in my view that that mission of defending against a limited number of cruise missiles if we have directed energy systems or other systems that come forward in the future that allow allow us to see them and engage them in limited numbers that's a much it's a very difficult challenge but it's a much lesser challenge than trying to deal with a large-scale nuclear attack against a sophisticated adversary that could that could both suppress our system and use substantial counter measures as a China or Russia could at the same time as we work on these new technologies in conclusion we need to ensure that our system that's deployed today continues to be able to deal with the threat posed by North Korea and by Iran and that we continue to stay ahead of those threats with that I look forward to our conversation in your questions well thank you gentlemen I asked them to kind of probe us on the fundamental questions and I think each of them did that in different ways I think in fact each of them touched upon that language from the 60s and 70s about thick versus thin which was very nice today of course we use two different adjectives interchangeably sometimes we say we emphasize the limited character and sometimes we emphasize the robust those are two adjectives we use a lot this morning Catholics asked Admiral Searing are you confident that even with budget cutbacks and all that the system will continue to outpace the threat and that outpaces it is a another verb that's consistently used in our policy statements and so the question I have is you know if we're going to continue to outpace at least those limited threats at least from North Korea and Iran do you worry that the system could become too thick that it could affect deterrence I think probably there's different answers to that to that question about whether become too thick but just just specifically that relation to deterrence if this is going to continue to evolve and Jim you mentioned specifically that we could use GMD against a stray Russian missile not inconsistent with the 1999 Missile Defense Act what's the future of deterrence in relation to missile defense on this sure I'll take it I'll take a first answer then then I know Mike and Keith will both have ideas as well I having left the department earlier this year I'll say based on the last information that I that I had in my position I'm confident that we have the capacity to stay ahead of the of the North Korea and Iranian threat as long as Russia and China do not transfer technology to them and I think it's clear that it's not in either country's interest to do so we've had the conversation and made it clear that that we would the United States would see that as a grave step and if on the financial or fiscal part of the question as you've heard from my comments it would be irresponsible on the part of this of this country whether whether that initiative came from the administration of Congress to allow fiscal pressures to have us not be able to defend the nation against against these threats and I don't I don't I don't see any indication that either the administration or Congress would allow that to happen I'll just add the brief point that if your concern is partly about Russia and how Russia would see our capability I just think we have to underscore that forty four interceptors is just not a serious capability against Russia under any nuclear scenario and I think the Russians frankly know it even though they sometimes complain implying otherwise and so of all the things that I think we have going on that are tense and difficult in the US Russia relationship I don't feel that we should go out of our way to somehow mitigate any hypothetical worries because I don't really think that they're that serious they're not they don't hold up technically and I think they're more in the realm of talking points so I think the fundamental point is forty four ground-based interceptors is not a serious capability vis-a-vis the Russian arsenal. Yeah Tom I think the your question actually suggests an important point and that is when does the advance of missile defense begin to impinge upon deterrence stability I think that's where you were going as if that there's as if there is a generalized answer to that question and this comes out of our Cold War experience where when we were dealing with the Soviet Union we reached a lot of generalized answers and they become bumper stickers what I'm trying what I was trying to suggest earlier and Jim got it right I was asking a bunch of questions that I think are suitable for the post post Cold War period and that is in this environment I don't think any generalized answer about the implications for deterrence is going to suit very well because the threats are too diverse the spectrum of contexts is too diverse the stakes at risk are too diverse to give you sort of a glib answer oh well when the United States hits 200 interceptors and all of a sudden we've undermined the turns maybe maybe not nobody up here knows because deterrence is on the occasion with the opponent specific opponent over specific issues I give you I'll give you an example I had a meeting with some senior allied folks and again I guess I should pre-stage this by and also depends on by what deterrence are you talking about deterrence of whom for what purpose meeting with some senior allied folks and they brought in the 2010 NPR which by the way I thought was a very good document and so these allied folks want to talk about the 2010 NPR and it was all their copy was all dog ear flags and such so they'd read it well I said is there any line in here that takes you in particular yes there's a line in here that really has hit a red flag in our capital I said what line is that the point was that you're going to pursue stability with China we understand what that means that means you're going to pursue mutual vulnerability with China that means when push comes to shove and we're at risk you're likely to stand down and I don't know whether that's true or not I mean I know that the concern was true I don't know whether that prediction is true or not but what that says is that we have at least some allies who are concerned about the thickness of the fences the very the variability of the fences and the threats and how that affects their particular situation and so sort of rebel against your question is if there's a generalized answer about deterrence there aren't any such answers we got to get off that truck and realize that turns is a very unique set of circumstances for very unique countries and we need to think about them differently all right well let's open up the questions on the floor right here in the front if you could just state your name and affiliation Bruce McDonald United States Institute of Peace and adjunct at Johns Hopkins I wanted to five years five and a half years ago the Congressional Lee directed strategic posture review commission issued a report and one of the chapters was on missile defense and it spoke to reflected really a lot of the comments that Jim Miller who was a valuable advisor to that and also to Mike spoke of concerns about it spoke very strongly for a defense against North Korea and potentially Iran but cautioned about deploying seeking to deploy defenses sufficient to address China and Russia and I wanted to ask interested in comments of all three particularly though yours Keith about what you think has changed in the last five and a half years that you would now take issue with that recommendation you have Perry Schlesinger Johnny Foster you know many others what has changed in the last five and a half years on that well as a commissioner on that commission I signed it as well Bruce as you know so it's a pertinent question I think there have been a number of changes in the last five years that have have at least reset some of our thinking from the say from the years 2000 to 2003 and four I personally have different views than I had then because of the activities we've seen taken by Russia in Europe changing borders militarily in Georgia and Ukraine with the threat of doing more is just a profound difference and our central European allies in the Baltic states understand that profound difference and I see this is a is a major issue also also the Russian nuclear modernization program that has come and come on in the last five years is a very robust program I see these as as changes along the way it's not as if a light switch has changed but we're seeing changes move along and again just personally I see China's pressure in the East China Sea and the South China Sea particularly against our close ally Japan as in some ways a a landmark set of events because we have extended terms guarantees to our Japanese allies and they are rightly thinking you know how credible is that guarantee how how long is that guarantee going to last how do we support that guarantee you know this is what comes up close and personal when it's in your neighborhood and we see some of our close allies having these problems in their neighborhoods so if you ask me what are some of the changes those are at least a couple of the changes. And well yeah sure let me first add in consistent with what Michael Hamlin said 44 ground based interceptors or even if you add 20 or something on top of that for an East Coast missile field is trivial compared to the nuclear capability of the Russian Federation and is not is not going to affect stability. So I don't I don't think that we're close to affecting stability in that in that regard and I've met with senior Russian leaders over the years I know that they have a different perspective but I but I think that the math the math is clear in that regard with respect to China. I don't see any prospect that we will be able to succeed in developing a system that can defeat where they would want to go they have to date have had relatively limited aspirations with respect to with respect to numbers of nuclear weapons that they wish to that they wish to deploy and wish to deliver. I think that you would have to expect that that number would would go up over time in order to in order to match and exceed what the U.S. did with respect to missile defense. And I think that's a that's a debate that's happened several times in the past and we've kind of the country's come to different answers. And I'm certainly open to us having that discussion. I don't see the technology on the horizon that would allow us to succeed in that in that endeavor in a competition. And with respect to extended deterrence let me say that I was she spent a substantial amount of time including with our allies in Europe as well as in East Asia. And the combination of I think of our expanded extended deterrence consultations the fact that we have substantial military capabilities and personnel on the ground and have the capacity to forward to or forward deploy additional capabilities and to reinforce in the event of a crisis or conflict is understood by our by our allies and that the that the missile defense the national missile defense is not a fun vis-a-vis China is not the fundamental issue in their regard. We've got one minute left any less comments. OK. All right. Well we're going to end on time. We'll be back in five more minutes with another panel on digging into the weeds of some programs specifically. So thank you all again. Please.