 Listening to, first of all, to Mr. Charles Sullivan and then to Professor Stone and most of the actual and Englishness, if you will, at least a few prisoners of dilemma, prisoners of two contradicting paradigms. One paradigm would be the national-statist solution of all our problems. This was the paradigm which gathered the solution after the First World War. The second would be the paradigm solution to overcome the national mistake, which is the solution of the European Union. Both of these paradigms, though, bring us the fact, the success that were linked to them. Well, what happened after the First World War was quite real. What happened after the Second World War was the European Unionists, but the national conflicts have not been solved, even inside the European Union. If I remember, the still open conflicts of Hungarian economic disasters, Hungarian problems, which are linked to this problem in Slovakia, in Romania, the largest of question of the Albanians and the Balkans, and so on. So it seems that even if you overcome the national state, you're not overcoming these problems. And maybe this is the correct of the state as such of super-states, which are states as well. I remember Mises and his proposal, I think it was in 1940, about a federation in Europe after the war, where he was proposed. It's a very beautiful proposal, but very utopian in a certain sense. He proposed a small European minimum state, which guarantees the human rights of everybody in this state, and which would be a barrier against using national states to defend the collective interests of certain groups against Albanian groups. This could have been a proposal, but the utopian evidence was that it's possible to limit the powers of the state, because the state has the tendency to grow, and to the Vietnam would not be domesticated. It can be killed, but not domesticated. I think this is one of the lessons that we had in the history of the 20th century. The libertarian answer to this could be apply the right of secession of all levels, from the highest level down to the lowest level, and then see what comes out of it. But if I see cards and proposes like realizing national states in the Middle East, as you showed us before in the report, I am optimistic about the possibility of my kind to learn something out of history. First of all, you asked about our questions, that each one has a topic so big that you've got a tentative analysis, and I can only pick and choose among the points, really, but so let me begin by saying that I don't think I accept what is, I've agreed in a common orthodox view that the first and second world wars were in the sense of the results of the flashing national ascents. The first world war was a war between multinational impacts and the Second World War, and the Second World War was caused by, first, the agreement with the Second World clash between two transnational ideological states, one that believed that the social class was the object of the truth, the object of everyone's loyalty, the operation of the object of everyone's loyalty. To call this common law, I think these ideas, common law of nationalism, seems to me to be a mistake. Secondly, I tend to think that what form of state we have and we live in is the result of history. History does not have a particular direction here. It's not moving towards an ultimate nation state or an ultimate national state, or that we live in states that happen to be the product of what people did before us, and we have to try to manage the conflicts that arise in those states as best we can or between those states. Because remember, I mean, a conflict, conflicts, very serious ones, it exists within states and produces civil wars, and civil wars, as the Spanish Civil War and the US Civil War have shown, that the US Civil War starts as a civil war and becomes a war between small nations. And that, effectively, can be very brutal. How do we solve these problems? Well, again, just as I don't think there's any, the history is supposed to be given us, and knows which way we're going, I don't think it provides us with solutions. My own feeling is, I think it's somewhat along your lines, is to pick up some words of Adam Smith. And Adam Smith pointed out that in the system of free trade, it's like the law of winged about it, he said, in the system of free importation and free exportation, the different states become like the different provinces of a mighty empire. Now, this is an extremely important insight on which it seems to me that liberals should think more, and I think they did in the 19th century, because what it implies is that once you have a system of free trade, then you have cut any necessary link between the size of an economy and the size of a state. And once you've done that, it is possible to devolve power downwards to very small political units. Small units do not become economically unviable in the system of free trade. It's just a rumor, and people have got, in a sense, not adjusted to this thing. Now, what person have who has not? So it's about Cloud Clouds. As you all know him, I know him quite well, but you know him, I suspect, principally, as the man who helped to revive the Czech economy following 1989. But I think he should be equally well known as the man who managed the development of all this between the Czech Republic and Slovakia. At the time, that was seen by many people, practically the whole international community, as a retrograde step. I think it now looks far-sighted and reasonable because both of those countries have benefited from the divorce. Slovakia, which was expected to do badly and was because it needed subsidies from the Czechs, once it couldn't get enough subsidies, had to adjust its economic behavior accordingly. It essentially got rid of the huge communist era industries that were holding it back and has embarked on quite a successful economic recovery. There is also, in addition to, I think, in addition to this argument, I would add that smallness is attractive in the sense that it makes states easier to govern. The larger the state, the more difficult the complex it is, the more difficult it is to govern. And the less control the citizens have over its enterprise. Whereas, as I think you all know, as a kind of a momentum to a communist erosion, there's a book pointing out that there are 14 richest states in the world, 13 in the small countries. The 14th is the United States of America. And the United States of America holds that position because it has a number of standards in modern space and unusually de-centralized political structure in the form of federalism. That is disappearing, in my view, and it will be bad for the United States as a result. But all of these opens seem to me to point towards de-centralizing power downwards in a sense strengthening ethnic states or the possibility of them, if they wish. But doing so in the context of free trade, free movement, not free movement, the population exactly, but career movement. And I'm doing so in producing, as I say, perhaps even the case of Europe, a large de-centralized Europe that is prosperous because governments don't give away too much. Could I just add something to that? It's a curious feature of the moment. Very curious feature when you think about it. That this is an age of ethnic disaggregation. There was a very good essay in Foreign Affairs three or four years ago. I referenced it in my book. I can't remember the author, but I'm talking about it. But he said that why has Europe been so peaceful since World War II? Well, it's been so peaceful because World War II, and we all know what a mountain of misery is behind these words, but World War II affected a terrific sweeping ethnic disaggregation across Europe. There were no longer any student Germans after World War II. And when you get ethnic disaggregation like that, makes the world a more peaceful place. When I was a student back in the 1960s, I went traveling in Eastern Europe, and I traveled all across Transylvania, the north-eastern part of Romania. I couldn't speak Romanian, but they didn't need to because I could speak German. And there were about 300, I think 300,000 Germans in Transylvania at that time. They were left over there from the Middle Ages. They migrated from Saxony in the Middle Ages, and there were a whole group of German villages, German towns. Every town in Transylvania had three names. It was quite tricky traveling. It had a Romanian name, which was the official name. It had a Hungarian name, because the Hungarians thought they still owned it, and it had a German name, because there were some of these Saxons around. Today, there are very few Saxons left in Transylvania, and some of these old Saxon villages in Transylvania is quite tragic. They've emptied out, and there were lovely old carved wooden churches that had just left going derelict, or gypsies have gone in there and went. So, where have all the Saxons gone? They've gone back to Germany. But now, why have they gone back to Germany? Well, obviously, after freer movement became possible, after the fall of the Soviet hang-up, it was easier for them to go back to Germany. But they've been in Transylvania for 600 years. Why do they suddenly just go back? This is an age of ethnic disaggregation. Cyprus, I don't know if I should mention Cyprus while I'm in Turkey, but Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union program, Yugoslavia program, looks like Belgium is the next one to go to Turkey. This is an age of ethnic disaggregation. And under modern circumstances, your best shot at peace and prosperity may be to have your own ethno-state. Be it ever so small, and I'm sorry, Norman, this contradicts Norman's feelings about Scotland. But I'm no doubt he can speak for himself. I will. Perhaps the United Kingdom will also definitely disaggregate, who knows. But I'm just pointing out, this is one of the trends of the modern world. It's very odd that it is. If you were a thoughtful person in the 18th century, in the Enlightenment, you would see the world moving towards greater unity. That's the natural trend of thinking about the future. And yet, in fact, we're disaggregating. There are no more Saxons in Transylvania. Czechoslovakia is no more, and so on, and so on. Very odd feature of the modern. You know, the nation state, first of all, gets a bad name. In fact, it would have to be said, and Hans-Peter Schwartz for sure would agree that, you know, what I'm afraid did give it a bad name, was Germany. And the Germans started going mad when the Bismarck went and provoked everybody. Sometimes it seems to me, looking at that period, that the only sane Europe and those guys are well done in the second, because the rest, something had come to their head. But you know, apart from Germany, the nation states have actually really been quite successful if you've got one language that your youth have instinctively understand each other, and there's a case for it. So I wouldn't be hostile to the nation state as such. I must say, you know, you have to come back almost to an old-fashioned definition of the thing. In 1848, when all sorts of people started discovering that they're a nation, and what were called the peoples without history, began to emerge. And you know, these are the Scottish highlanders. I mean, I'm sorry to say, to a large extent, the Irish, the Basques, people like that, now everybody at the time, John Stuart Middlefaces, would have said, you know, Scottish highlanders, not in the farce of civilization, it has said the thin thing about Ukrainians. And there is a thing called, there is a Ukrainian dialect, but they don't understand each other from one bit to the next. And the middle Ukrainian dialect, funnily enough, is called Sochuk, which is the Turkish word for a sausage. And you know, the idea of such a thing as the Ukrainian, or for that matter, Slovak. It's, these things are, you know, to be something of a part of that. These are not, it's artificial to create nations of that sort. Now what we're getting now is a whole plethora of artificial nations. It began in 1919. Those nations, you talk about, Tenskivakia, et cetera. They were creations of 1919. And you know, we really thought up at the last moment, because scrambling down around at the last moment to try to find an identity and a flag and so on. I know something about the declaration of the Declaration of Independence of Armenia. They had to design a flag and they had a committee. And each member of the committee, as they were done, one, a lion, two, a bear, three, a double-headed bat. And they finally agreed with all the animals of the committee on the flag, which was known as the Zoom. Things like that are absurd, which is where, which allows me to say, a sculpture, speaking English. Not representing anything particular in this world. And it represents the kill of the sculpture, whiskey. And a thing like that is a bit more or less meaningless. Pointless, soft, proficient, rammed. And if it's, sorry, I'm talking much too much, I know, but I'll shut up in a minute. If the people left with the European Union's Copenhagen criteria, which allow representation of minorities and minority languages, I know exactly what I will be. And I promise to do it. I will be the national poet in Gallic. I will have a readership of 10. I will be drunk from morning to night. And I will take, I will, and I will be living off European taxpayers' money. And that's the sort of monstrosity that comes up with this, with these bogus states. They're only states, you know, in the end of 1919, which survive. The only states of that post-war period are, well, I suppose, you know, I mean, as a Scotsman, I regard the independence of Ireland as a distinct. I wish it hadn't happened. They're closer to the English than I am. And there's no country, which is, as it says, Turkey. And, you know, I think every most current degree and the electoral figures supported, that most current would say, we belong in Turkey. And the idea of setting up a separate Kurdistan and putting those seven languages together artificially, when the biggest of those 15,000 words, the Kurds are wounded people, the Turkish state has handled them badly. But still, they belong here. I agree with what's here. Still, again, just one thing. I think nation states have created a problem of confusing national liberation and individual liberty. When I was growing up in Turkey, we were always celebrating our freedom. And what we were celebrating as freedom was our, you know, formation as an independent public. I mean, independence is helpful. But like, North Korea is independent as well. So, that focus on national liberation doesn't always bring you, like, liberation. It actually sometimes created a authoritarian state which claims to have the right to do it anyway. And, you know, but that creates its own dictatorship. So, I think we should be from the perspective of individual liberty, like our empires versus, you know, nation states, which are going to be independent. It's not an easy question. But I think the nation states and moments of natural liberation have that tendency to collect lives and then, you know, make us happy, thinking that we all became free, whereas maybe we're not that free under the place like, yeah, North Korea. Can I just agree with this? It seems to me that what you're describing, what you're describing is independence at a particular moment. I mean, we become free. You have a, generally speaking, particularly in Africa, you would have a party called the Nationalist Party or the ANC in South Africa, which would be the representative of the fight for independence, which now gets independent. Therefore, it persuades a lot of people inside and outside the country. Generally, by the way, outside, before it persuades them inside, sometimes it never persuades them inside, that it's the representative. It is the sole legitimate representative of the people that either does the whole elections or it wins them off side of the table for a generation. Okay, I can see in those circumstances even make the case that there's a mass confusion between individual liberty on the one hand and national independence on the other. People who, what you might call, domesticated nationalists, domesticated nation states, states which have been at the national independence for a while. I don't think there's any serious confusion between individual liberty in those states and national independence. The battles between left and right over liberty versus equality and so on go on and they move one way or the other. As a matter of fact, I would say national independence is one safeguard for individual liberty in the sense that the nation state is the only reliably long-term democratic kind of state. It's very, very difficult to run a democratic politics in a multinational state and impossible in a cultural, in a multicultural state because you don't have a common debate which is necessary for democracy. Now that effectively means that if the people want to express a point of view, they might make that point of view politically effective. They have to be more or less living in a democratic nation state. That nation state will envious them that they may make the wrong decisions but they can complain against the black government, they can throw black government out. It's very, very hard. No one in Europe can throw out the government represented in the European Parliament. I mean, it's an impossibility and in many states, I would say, which are multi-ethnic, it's quite hard to get rid of governments because parties tend to represent national groups rather than shifting blocks of opinion. So I think the nations, I mean, I don't believe the nation, my view is that of liberals in the 19th century. We don't, I don't go so far as to say there is a natural harmony but there is a reasonably good fit between the battle for individual liberty on the one hand and the cause of national independence on the other. They're not the same thing. For a time, they seem to be different but nonetheless, it's easier to defend individual liberty in a much less nation state than it is in any other form of politics, particularly in multicultural. Right, well, one small little bit. Just regarding the case of Transylvania, the Germans needed it because they were hated by the Romanians and not even because they wanted to go to Germany, they simply left the country because there was so much of a risk. He sold first the Jews, then the Germans. This was the reason. So without George S. Cribs of this period, they would have continued to live there. I don't think that there is an inevitable link between ethnic originality and the modernism. So you're telling me they left him voluntarily? With another conditions of George S. Cribs, everybody would have liked him to leave this country if he had the possibility. The Romanians didn't have the possibility because nobody would have given money for them. Israel paid for the Jews and the Germans were paid for the sexes. So they booked the location and they left this completely mad communist dictatorship. I don't know that this panel needs any questions actually, but I have one for John Derbyshire. About 15 years ago, I interviewed the economist Gordon Tullack, who we know to this audience is one of the leading public choice theorists. He invented the concept of rent-seeking. Tullack was not actually trained as a economist. He was a Scientologist and not just a three-week-old John. And in the course of this interview, in fact, his idea of rent-seeking came from his study of the landowners, the landowners, who were basically extracting rent from the economy for their own benefit. In any case, he said to me in the course of the interview, this was 15 years ago, that he thought there was a future China that was about equal birth three ways. One was that it would continue as it was there developing some type of capitalist society in this crony capitalist to continue to expand. The second was that it would just revert to a centralized dictatorship. The third, and to my mind, most interesting was that it would just break up. He said that for about a third Chinese history. No Chinese, you know, is not a view of his empire even within the Han community. The language is so indifferent. He said for a third Chinese history, the country been disunited, he was talking about Hancao here, not the national minority areas. Most famous, of course, been the Europe War in the States. Anyway, I'll have to bounce, but he still hardly thinks of it, so I'll have this to you, which of these three chances would you bet on? Well, first let me just say that bringing up the warring states in that context, this is a bit disingenuous. The thumbnail scant of Chinese history is that China was really an aggregation of petty states until 21 BC, and after that it was an empire, or wished to be an empire. There were long periods of disunity, but the imperial, the idea of imperial unity was very strong after the Han dynasty. So the warring states period, which came before the imperial period, was not an intermediate period of disunity, it was the original Chinese disunity, it was the original China of many small independent states, and that was the warring states period, the 5th, 4th, 3rd century BC, was the last phase of that, and then the imperial idea took over. Which one would I bet on? I bet on a breakup, as I rather implied in the talk that I gave, I don't see how a demographically collapsing China can hold on to these vast territories that are not ethnically Chinese, and not only do I think China will break up, I think it should break up for the reason that I just implied, that I think that an ethnically homogeneous China has a better shot at freedom and enduring prosperity than an imperial China, which is what we have. And I say this to my Chinese friends, Chinese people hate to hear this, even my wife hates to hear me say, they say, do you think we can have democracy in China? I say, well, you can if you get rid of your occupied territories, if you get rid of Tibet, and you get rid of East Turkestan, yeah, you've got a good shot at democracy, and they throw up their hands in horror, and they turn purple and get angry, so these territories are historically part of China, and they're not, they're part of the Manchu empire, but the Manchu empire wasn't even ruled by Chinese people, it was ruled by Manchus. But John, John, what was told specifically about the Han Khor out there? Yeah, the Han Khor. Yeah, if you look at, for example, the government's historical act was of China, where you get maps of what was Chinese territory down through the ages. It's a bit difficult to pin down the Han Khor, take for example, Manchuria, is Manchuria part of the Han Khor? Well, I would say that it is, I mean, the idea of an independent Manchuria is pretty absurd, you can meet people who claim Manchu and Han Khor's sleeper. You're not gonna get a state out of them, although the Japanese tried it at the 19th century. Manchuria is now part of the Han Khor. So is South China, so is Guangdong Province, you know, the far south of China, where Hong Kong is located. That's part of the Han Chinese Khor, even though it was only incorporated into China in actually the Han Dynasty, and then not very tightly, Southern Chinese people, actually they don't call themselves Han, even Hong Kong people, I think they have a Hong Kong name here, but he has a period. They don't call themselves Han, what do they call themselves, Peter? Well, well, we also consider ourselves Han. Come on. You're Hong Kong, you're Hong Kong. In Hong Kong they call themselves Tongyang, which means people of the Tang. The Tang Dynasty was much later than the Han Dynasty. Now, theoretically that was part of Chinese territory in the Han Dynasty, the second century BC, the second century AD, but the people there feel that they really became part of China 500 years later in the Tang Dynasty. They call themselves Tongyang. The ordinary Cantonese word for China town, Tongyang guy, which means the street of Tang people. So, you know, you've got a problem defining the Han core. I would say, I'm no offense, I mean, I would say that Hong Kong is part of the Han core. The Guangdong province is part of the Han core. I would say Manchuria is part of the Han core. I think even in the Mongolian now is a lost cause. In the Mongolian has been pretty thoroughly sinified. I don't think that's ever going to go back to the Mongolians. But Tibet and tourist now are no way part of the Han core. They are no more Han than Lithuania was Russian just because the Soviets occupied it. And I think the sooner China breaks up the better. I think it will just for those demographic reasons. I don't think China's going to have the manpower to hold on to those territories. And it hasn't helped a bit that the one child passing from the institute in 1979 where the Chinese people were only supposed to have one child. The one child pass actually excluded the national minority. So if you're a Tibetan or a Uyghur, you could have more than one child. So they have better fertility than the Han core anyway. So I think demographics is going to lead to option three, the great one. I think that's an ellipse one. I hope it will be a peaceful one. I think it should be. I think the Chinese sophisticated enough to manage something like that. But somehow they have to get rid of these cognitists first. Yes, I've listened to all of the participants and also to Hirsch-Botz's comments, which I generally agree. It seems to me that there is not necessarily incompatibility in defending the ancient state. They're criticizing it. It seems to me that before the First World War we do have multinational empires. The Austro-Hungarian Empire and the Turkish Empire which stumbled into a war in some candidates of Austria being very discreetly recklessly getting into a war. But this was a pity because these were reformable empires that could treat minorities humanely. And there's much to be said for both of those empires. And for all of its faults, the German Empire was better than the Polish state that was created on its eastern borders and was treated by minorities very aggressively in the 1930s. But certainly the Austro-Hungarian and Turkish empires are much to be said for them. They were reformable structures of authority. But I think John and I would object to is what is replacing the nation's state in Europe, which is the European Union, which is a horror, which interferes in people's lives, which tries to impose multicultural lifestyles on them, which destroys tradition, today, or Christian morality. I mean, you cannot exaggerate the harm and havoc done by the Soviet Union and right sports in the attempt to regulate the behavior of nations and so forth, which is probably worse in Western Europe than East Eastern Europe. You can sort of escape the control, whether it's Poles or Nigerians and get away with being sexist or whatever, until now. So there really is certain, in terms of Western Europe, I would say there probably is no, to say, heartening or happy alternative to the nation's state right now. But I think one can regret the passing of empires, which, on the whole, did well dealing with the Hercules populations and protecting their religious ethnic rights. And it's questionable whether we'll be able to replace them. I mean, I saw the map that you put on it, and I was wondering, you know, what these railings are going to say to be this land away from them. And you're always stuck with minorities somewhere anyhow. No matter what way you're going to have minorities living among majority populations, but certainly, I think, you know, China's remarks about Europe, right, about the European Union, and being not a proper substitute for nation states. You can respond if you want. Well, I'm going to agree with you, but I agree with you, too, because I have certainly broken up. I'm in the two empires who mentioned, particularly the Austro-Hungarian Empire. And, incidentally, had it not been for the First World War, I don't think Ireland would have left the United Kingdom. I share, and as a son of an English mother and Irish father, I share enormous hostility to Irish nationalism. Constitutional Irish nationalism had reached an effective, reached an agreement with the British government in 1913, 1914 to remain part of the United Kingdom while giving room with the UK Parliament pertaining perhaps to defence and foreign policy, with a significant measure of a common rule going to double it. And by the way, more than satisfied, most Irish, what changed things? Well, the Revolution of 1916, which was a revolution carried out by lunatic fascists. I mean, the Irish of the 1960s revolution was carried out by people who actively wanted a blood sacrifice. And why? Because they felt that even a home rule and Ireland enjoyed a home rule would not become socially separate from Britain. It would become kind of West Britain, which is the slur used against constitutional nationalism. And they wanted a blood sacrifice in order to create a gulf between Ireland and the other nations in the 19th century. Well, and they got it, they got it over time in executing the 16th Revolutionaries. That did create a gulf. But by the way, the gulf that got a majority of the Irish population in favour of complete separation should feign in the 1918 Revolution one 48% of the close to the modern majority. So I agree with you. And my views on the Scottish nationalism side have said I would support independence for Scotland, not only on sadistic grounds. And I think it can easily be avoided if people are sensible, people are not always sensible. So yes, I agree with you. One final point. You are right to say that Eastern and Central Europe have been to some degree able to resist some of the worst moral excesses in the European Union. Yesterday, however, the European Court decreed that the Polish law allowing doctors and nurses to refuse to take part in abortions had to be overturned if this refusal was significantly restricted to the availability of abortion. Now, in effect, people's consciences are going to be coerced. And on this matter, I know that many people here probably support abortion. But the fact is I don't think that any liberal wants to coerce the consciences of medical practitioners to carry out a medical procedure that they feel are the opposite. Even if that results in the medical procedure being less available than it otherwise might be. I'd like to ask John, I was your second question, but it's all fantastic. The Chinese Communist Party might be listening today. They might have a plan and the plan might be to cement themselves out of power for the top-first century to try to replace the dollar with the liwan or renminbi as the World Reserve currency. And maybe maybe the dollar or even silver liwan would be fantastic. Do you think they might try to create a World Reserve currency or do you think they'll keep supporting the dollar? And if they do keep supporting the dollar, when the dollar collapses, could that be the final tool which brings down the Chinese Communist Party? In short, yes. I think it could. I don't think they will try to take over the World Reserve currency. They just don't want that much responsibility. It's a uneasy lives ahead that wears the crown, and they don't want to wear that particular crown. But yes, if the dollar goes down, which is quite like it will, it will certainly have a very serious impact on the Chinese economy. Going back to the theme of my talk this morning, I would never underestimate the power of the Communists and their military to control events. Having had my fingers burned once. In 1989, I was telling them I was saying to everybody else what they were done for, and they were done wonderfully from that. And by the way, that book I mentioned, which is my regular book, The Party, well worth reading in this context, he shows how just how The Party has developed a much more sophisticated form of Leninism on how they control everything. It's like a nervous system all through the country. Communist China is not the Soviet Union. So I see more of a long slow process of decay than the revolutionary people. And I think the Communists might even be able to survive the collapse of the dollar. I think the break up of the present Chinese empire is probably in the next generation of historical change after the collapse of the American economy. A question for Mustafa, even though I totally agree with your perspective on the schedule about whether modernization is possible without westernization, because modernity by definition implies anti-traditionalism and practice implies materialism. And if you look at examples like Dubai, I don't find a nice place where people don't wear European hats which I have to do if European's not wearing hats anymore. But I don't see a strong hold against entire Western sentiment. So I'm going to rephrase your question about development possible without westernization. And I think it's only the case that cultural development is stronger than material development but I mean cultural refinement of skills, manners and tastes. Are there any signs of autonomous cultural development in terms of being an example of non-westernization and modernization? Yes, sir. There is that, actually. We are now, first of all, I believe that there is something called non-westernization but modernization. Modernization is not westernization. And the distinction is one thing, making the distinction between enforced modernization and like self-evolving modernization in terms of different things. I mean, in Turkey, in a place like Turkey there was a state that enforced things and that was not even modernization that was westernization. Well, in Turkey we have this phenomenon that we call Islamic Ujwazi. In Turkey, traditionally entrepreneurial urban-educated class has been the secular Ujwazi. These people were the people who went on the French island and played the piano and we went to Montserrat so they were kind of westernizing. And traditionally the pious Anatolian masses have been the people who are non-cultural politicians who don't know which country they are from. But that has been changing and we are seeing a, first of all, a new urban middle class which is Islamic in this way of life and also in big cities like Istanbul and also in Anatolia. And this is a very entrepreneurial class that's interesting. And a European thing that actually made research about this culture in Turkey they focus on Qaisi in big cities in Anatolia in terms of production and trade. Their report was titled the Calvinists of Islam and it was, of course, very interesting because in Turkey there's just entrepreneurial business oriented capitalist and Islamic class that is in Turkey and the sign of that is for example a lady who wears a scarf but unlike her mom who would just stay at home and look for babies she wants to study economics in university and she doesn't drink the French wine but she drinks Starbucks coffee so that kind of can be a lifestyle and that would be, I think, a sign of and by the way we have a rival to Starbucks in Turkey so that's a kind of modern so there's something like that that I was going with and Turkey, I think, owes that well democracy and a whole history of multiple positions and so on but also to market economy a lot in places like Saudi Arabia you don't have that because you have the curse of oil and oil is not capitalism or it doesn't create a entrepreneurial class it doesn't create a middle class it just doesn't transform your societies whereas in places like Turkey where you don't have natural resources you have to produce stuff so you have to get the technology you have to know how to get to know how to you have to be rational to calculate your rules in the market and that rationalizes your way to look to the world and ultimately it rationalizes where you look at your ability so I think there's that thing coming up and that's more promising but the leaks which looks down on why it's so promising with this work or we should be French I mean that's good, that's the best style that we should be free but that's not going to sound to the world more but the more genuine we'll be more we'll have one chance of meeting Can I just ask a question one of the great events in the 20th century Chinese history was a thing called the May 4th movement 1919 like Turkey like Ottoman Turkey China in the 19th century had been waking up to its own backwards and to the realization that they needed to modernize and they were looking to the West and taking all the ideas they could get from the West and then the West broke their hunts with the Treaty of Versailles which gave big pieces of China to the victors in the first of the war and and that broke the hearts of the Chinese intelligentsia of this great new May 4th movement a great student demonstration to the King May 4th 1919 and there was a turn away from the West now in the second Treaty of 1920 likewise the Europeans broke the hearts of the Turks with their second Treaty and yet as the Chinese turned away from the West the Turks turned towards the West this is all I want to first of all explain why they were reacting differently well it's a great question before we turn to the West I mean the thing is communism like was aimed at modernization but when it came out of the middle of the strong anti-imperialist strain which has always lived and actually it has become quite dominant and flaky but your point is a great point actually it did not make the Turks turn from West it made them turn from liberalism because in the 19th century when you look at the Ottoman Empire they are fascinated by liberalism they are fascinated by the free trade and more responsible like a monarchy a part of the idea of the constitution and in both the Turkish influential world and the Arab world there is a fascination with liberalism in the late 19th century and all of these are not in great Arab history as the book titled the liberal age and Arab thought that as the pre-world were won by the Arab they look at how England is so successful they say it takes free trade and so on there are many reforms in Turkey to install the liberalism in the constitution and in both the system and so on but after the fall and after colonialization after things like the Serbian Treaty or after the colonialization of Syria and Iraq which we are hoping to be dependent on then there is a reaction there is a strong reaction to the west and although they get western ideas it's not liberalism then it's socialism it's a statism it's a Marxism which is a western idea but seen as an idea to fight the west like Maoism that's why the liberalism is now seen as what's actually so different it wasn't so different so liberalism condemned to liberalism they said liberalism is the tool of the imperialists to plunder our national resources so if you want to have a great conservative economy conservative, well-protected economy in order to install they said all the Ottoman Empire fell because it made important all the entrepreneurs and so on able to create our own liberalism so the clash between the west and this part of the world had a big harm to the flourishing of the liberalites hello could you all make some predictions predict the next nation state boundary change it could be disintegration of the states succession from war like Libya could break in half it could be almost anything but please exclude trick answers like Kosovo Southern Sudan where they might be tinkering with the boundaries exclude anything internal to Palestine and exclude changes in the boundary of the euro so so is it going to happen within 10 years or after 10 years so the next nation state could be boundary change in the world that will happen could be any context in Egypt clear words you should tell the next nation state just tell the next nation state where the boundary you don't have to say exactly where the boundary will happen it could exclude Libya what could be exclude Libya no I don't exclude Libya just Kosovo, Sudan internal to Palestine self-currency boundary I don't count so clearly, Texas the name is already in the game the obvious thing that you are going to be the unit will probably accept someone new quite soon I mean Serbia it's just the groundwork for entering I don't think you mean that I forgot to explain no I mean it was Norman or John who had already given the case of Belgium which was a great government too and who knows whether Libya would go again to join with France which would have done I think 50 years ago or 80 years ago and I think that is quite likely long term it doesn't look likely at the moment because of the recent election long term I think Quebec might possibly succeed the Quebec nationalism rises and falls and suffered recently from the first one were the re-creation of a successful conservative party which has managed to win the majority but at the same time that it didn't do particularly well compared to the PT so I think that when things get bad or when the immigrants to Quebec are probably assimilated they may assimilate to a French nationalism and that's another possibility and I think that a lot of places you might have ever heard of which nonetheless there is a significant secessionist movement but of course we have had some secessionist movements in the United States but I tend to think that that won't happen unless the United States continues to be even less and to move away from federalism towards a more more elitist state well I hope first of all they're really Palestine but if you're not asking that well leaving the United States if that belt is being fired and they could be Kurdistan independent Kurdistan in Iraq to begin with and God knows who that will influence yes I'm the one who brought up Belgium and that looks like the next one possibly I agree with you about and even Longbottom looking a couple of generations at it as I answered Peter's question from demographic considerations the continued unity of what is now the people's Republic of China has to be questioned more I don't know anything about Libya Sudan has just split hasn't it a few weeks ago north and south Sudan yeah maybe we get to go get to by force oh okay all right I'm just curious going in the other direction one thing that puzzles me somewhat is why Turkey does not annex Turkish Cyprus why don't they nobody likes this fictional independent northern Cyprus why don't Turkey just annex it I mean everyone will be ticked off for a while and they'll forget about it why don't they just do that we are already paying a lot to pay them something you know what I mean, it's the whole thing you think maybe that was really even for us we're happy with that then but think how much pleasure we all get from seeing how ticked off the Greeks were we'll think about it most of all that's given me a view I don't know why the Turks will be elastic about north Cyprus but it could easily get something independent it's not a bad place it's quite prosperous in its way more it's extraordinary unrecognisable rules very quick the 14 biggest trading nation in the world I don't know what it ranked like now and north Cyprus if you just you don't have the international community you can bother with an airline when they make a mess of that they're relatives to all the jobs running it you don't have a second view like nations you don't have this self important to the class and you become quite prosperous in the way that the class is equal for instance you can't live on the edge of the Islamic world you can make a lot of money out of it and I think too far on it they I'd like to read down tomorrow I do see the Turks they're not too creative in their attitude to the Europeans what is dreadful for a Turkic moment is applying for a visa to any European country you get 80 pages to fill out and they can help the Americans do it very well they gave 10 year visas to educated Turks no questions asked the Europeans make a mess of it now there's one answer to the beastly bureaucracy of the European United Nations and it's this preferably in that weather when the satellites are not watching they take a very ancient rusting boat and you fill it up with endless Kurdish families instructed to throw their passports into the sea and you crush on it at longer current and you get all the Kurds coming saying freedom, freedom, freedom you find that North Cyprus will be recognized in the Syrian United Nations tomorrow and the Turks have their visa arrangement with Europe going to the Syrian United Nations after that so I would like to present all the panelists of all these remarks on the period of states and nationalism and I would say that together with the people of Stoltenberg those who actually experienced our life's successful succession from the States to the European Union and when recording actually these memories what do we think at that time what did we expect it was of course generally here but behind now I'm thinking whether we would behave the same way if it was not Soviet Union but capitalist union for example without all these slides of history with the freedom of movement and freedom to do anything we want and it's very difficult to figure out how would we think we can behave but my question is from historical perspective to those who are normal here who were raised in nationalism in the 19th century what did you say what was the cause for it in nationalism at that time and my Russia is that maybe it's later they get into the expansion of various of social lives like education for example and of course if you speak in your family in your own language suddenly your children are taught in some different languages in different way and some different traditions and so on so maybe that is the actual reason why the actual national speeding starts to rise quite naturally against the state against this big empire because we are just all the states as a thing national just popular in the 19th century why I would just say that in pre-industrial you need a leap of imagination to understand how in pre-industrial how other way people were of the state Walker Comer's book I think it's called Nationalism he has lots of examples of people even immigrants to the United States in the 19th century being asked what country you come from people from province didn't know they were French and there's a story it might be apocryphal but it seems to me that this could be true that in British India there was a survey done in some country districts of British India as to whether the British should stay or go and they found that most people didn't even know the British were there it's very isolated very immoral looking rural life that encompassed most people before the industrial revolution didn't really nationalism the idea of the nation state wasn't really very relevant to most people it increased education increased education and in Europe there was a dramatic movement this was a fact intellectuals but please remember people in the past before industrial revolution they thought quite differently about these things they thought differently about ethnicity and nation I would really agree with your imagination that person has spoke in management communities and he explains how the invention of maps really created the idea of a nation because you think they're part of your nation and you think there's a country like that basically because you're seeing maps if you have never seen a map of Turkey you don't know what Turkey is you know that you're a neighbor you know you're a village so before the industrial ages when people were traveling when there was no newspaper when there was no school you just know you're a village so in Turkey the Turkish homeland in the 19th century when you ask what's your homeland they would say that religion is somewhere because that's his homeland so in the Turkish state the elites tried to create a bigger homeland because they had to rally troops and they had to give them some sort of defensive legal plan because the armies which had that idea was fighting for Bulgaria whereas you had to counter that to the idea of a bigger homeland that's your ability to do so you have to employ people so once anybody gets it it's like your neighbor has a better technology you need the same kind it's like once a nation state emerges and organizes society in that way and then you have a technology like printing these papers to create the consciousness in your society so to create a nation state was in one sense the only thing you should do to survive otherwise people were butters and if you don't have that consciousness you wipe it out this is quite a complicated question actually I think it begins in the nation state that nationalism begins with language which isn't to say that language isn't as sufficient to create a national sense of nationalism but without it it's very difficult to sustain that combination now you saw that as one of the two previous speakers with the fact that until you have a lot of communications a sense of fellowship is confined in a very narrow range of villages even from perhaps later provinces but once you have the beginnings of a lot of communications initially the newspapers and then the radio and an argument then the people who are within the ambience of this particular language tend to find themselves feeling the sense of common fellowship in this is dramatically illustrated in the case of secular nations for example like America and Australia where people arrive with all sorts of different cultures speaking different languages very quickly and to some degree by state action forcefully to some degree by social pressure they are persuading to adopt the language the country to which they come to feel loyalty towards the institutions of the country and to embrace the history of the country as their own history from somewhere else I always think the best example of this is the major general who points out that he bought an estate the estate contained the graveyard contained ancestors therefore these were his ancestors and the fact is that that's what an immigrant from the United States or Australia or the other secular nations does in a more self conscious way and in a shorter period in Europe over a long period of less self conscious people embrace common institutions and common history and learn more about some common lessons and they do have this made possible for a wider and wider stack of people by the growth of modern communication such as state radios and so on I'm sorry, first these radios and then radios and so on now the work of people like and also the the the tends to argue that the process of building a nation or in the sense of national identity is artificial and you know you can cite things like what's a scott being used by the witness establishment to bring the scott's within the abyss of the union and so on and so forth and of course the popular constitution is an important figure I think for a number of reasons for that but I believe that no mountain negrificism of that work is correct the process of building is deceptively artificial but it draws upon natural materials and as Burke said art is man's nature and statesmanship consists in trying to deal with problems in intelligent ways and one of the intelligent ways of dealing with the problems of Britain after the glorious revolution was to try to draw the scott's and the welsh in the Irish into a sense of common supernationhood called the union and that has been extremely successful and I was sorry to see it go but it didn't work to go, it wouldn't be because in a natural, in some sense in a natural way those bonds of fellowship would have been frail and the scott would have now simply felt different I want to make one final point here I think the American rise of James C. Bannett has written a lot on the Anglosphere that made an important distinction he distinguishes between the continental concept of the nation state fundamentally the German one spread after the French Revolution by Victorian artists which he thinks is an important thing but nonetheless it's not the same as what he calls the state nation and the state nation does not begin with the evidence but by a process of drawing people in by using the same common language by doing some of the things you were describing in the process these people come to feel that they are part of a common policy they come to feel the sense of fellowship and common destiny and they develop the loyalties to the dynasty which they serve or to the concept of the nation in which they are now apart and I think these things are in the modern world the way in which we have tended to express a collective identity most fruitfully and least damagingly because as Orwell pointed out when the nation of decay is intends to be replaced by much more vicious and unpleasant forms of a common political identity such as Nazism and Communism than the then the nation's most intended to be replaced I think we will end our discussion. I want to thank the panelists and there will be a brief presentation given by for those people want to see a movie that will be offered tonight so whoever wants to stay and watch this is free to stay and get informed about what sort of movies will be shown tonight and as for the rest again thank you very much