 I told you, we're intimidating. Hello, everyone, and welcome to Bloomberg's annual Davos debate, where we bring together leading figures in the world of politics, government, and finance. I'm Francine Lacquenau. Today, our topic has many, many names, the rise of populism, the crisis of the middle class, the politics of rage, whatever you want to call it. It's the movement that's been sweeping across our developed world. Now, this was the big surprise in 2016. And as we enter this year, well, the establishment braces for what's next. So this is what we'll be discussing today. Allow me to introduce my panel. Central to the issue today, of course, is what some have called the new normal. And my first panelist has called the new mediocre. She is the managing director of the IMF, Christine Nagarde. Italy has had 64 governments since the end of the Second World War. And these days, its only constant seems to be a man named Pierre-Carlo Paduan. He's his title, the Minister of Economy and Finance of Italy, but he's much more also an economist. Now, if you watch Bloomberg TV and we sincerely hope you do, you will have heard him talk about secular stagnation. You know Larry Summers from the World Bank, US Treasury, Harvard University, and the National Economic Council. And Bridgewater Associates is the world's largest hedge fund. It's more than $150 billion are scattered across the globe, spanning virtually every sector. It was founded and is chaired by Ray Dalio and still reading from a stunning impeachment. The road ahead for Brazil for the moment is unclear, but Enrique Mireas is the nation's finance minister. His project is to help close a huge wealth gap in Latin America's biggest economy. So thank you all for joining us today, and I'm really looking forward to the conversation. Madame Lagalma, let's kick it off with you. Is the middle class in crisis? Yes and no, the economist would say. First of all, I would like to try to identify the middle class. And I would say that the middle class is both growing and shrinking. The middle class is growing on a global basis. If you look at numbers, the middle class over the last 40 years has gone up. But it has gone up by seven to about 13% today on a global basis. And middle class has generally defined as somebody with an income between $10 and $20 per day. The middle class is also shrinking. If you look at the US numbers, for instance, the middle class in the United States has shrunk from the 60-ish to the 50-ish. And that is as a result of more wealth accumulating at the top and people moving down below as well. As a result, the middle class has been shrinking. If you combine that, and I think we are in this panel focusing more on the advanced economies, where clearly the middle class has shrunk and where there have been signs of lack of trust, lack of hope, disenchantment with many of the principles and vision that people had for their future. With lower growth, more inequality, and much more transparency, I think you have the good ingredients of what is identified now as a crisis of the middle class in the advanced economies. I think we need to distinguish between what is actually structuring some of the low-income countries and the emerging market economies and the advanced economies where there is clearly a crisis. Minister Padong, can we really say that the developed world isn't a crisis and it stems from the middle class? Well, of course, there are many ways you can define a crisis. And there's one possible way, which is an economist, I would say, it's politics. I'm thinking about advanced countries, but also I'm thinking especially about Europe, where hardly you can find a country where according to the polls or according to recent election results, there is dissatisfaction with what has been going on for some time. And I think that Christine made it very clear that it's about objective change in wealth and income distribution, but also, and maybe increasingly so, about expectations. The middle class is disillusioned about the future. It's disappointed about the job perspective for their kids. It's disappointed about the security that they can get out of welfare system that may become unsustainable. And it's expressing this disillusionment in terms of saying no to whatever the policy leaders suggest. And of course, we all know very well that it's much more difficult to build up a solution, to design it and implement it than it is to say no. The fact is that no's are now dominating the political landscape. And this is a sign of a crisis because it calls for rethinking about what leadership means and what it means to have a credible long-term project that can bring back the middle class, not only the middle class, by the way, back into achieving consensus and supporting reforms, which are badly needed. Professor Summers, if we have a middle class which is disillusioned, how do you change that? How do you get them back? I don't think there's any single bullet. There's obviously elements of the middle class looking up and seeing how well an elite has lived and seeing all the various benefits that have gone to people at the top of the income distribution. I think it's a mistake not to recognize that the middle class in my country and I think in others is also very concerned that people do not feel that the government is fighting for it, that the government is fighting for people who live in developing countries, that the government is fighting for people who have recently come into the country from other countries, that the government is fighting for various minority groups who have legitimate concerns about past discrimination, but the sense of the people at the center of a country as being looked out for by the government, they feel that everybody else is being looked out for. The wealthy who can look out for themselves, others who are poor, and they feel that they are not being heard, and they have expressed they're not being heard in the Brexit vote, in the Italian referendum, and of course in the US presidential election. And they're obviously important economic elements, but it would be a mistake to neglect that there are social elements as well. Ray, do you believe that actually a lot of people feel like they've been left out? And when did politicians start having that disconnect with their voters? Is it a communication problem or were they really not looked after? I think you're talking about a phenomenon of populism. So there is a middle class, and then there is the whole phenomenon of populism, which is part of that. I think if you look at history, the 1930s, I'd say studying the 1930s to understand what the wealth gap was in the 1930s, it rhymes. And populism is not just the belief that there's a wealth gap, although the wealth gap today is the highest since the 30s. But it's also a sense that they don't represent me. It's a matter of nationalism. It's a matter of gaining greater control. It's a matter of increased polarity. The left becomes more left. The right becomes more right. And that particular dynamic, I'd say this is the first year where populism is the most important issue globally. Protectionism is part of that mix. So I would say before it used to be central banks. Central banks don't matter as much. Now we're the number one issue economically as a market participant is how populism manifests itself over the next year or two. But is populism the same thing as anti-globalization? Yes. Populism, by definition, if you particularly, as I say, in the 30s, every government that existed practically was populist. And particularly in the so populism, by definition, is nationalistic and protectionist. And it's also a matter of values. In other words, there's a sense of a threat that my country is losing its values to internationalism. It's the combination of those things that makes populism. Minister Mereyes, you've been part of the efforts, of course, to stabilize Brazil's economy. But in that, and this is because of the trauma of impeachment, but a portion of your agenda requires even more sacrifice from working families. How do you get them on board? Yeah, I think that in economies like the one I come from, which is Brazil, the dynamic is different in the sense that there is no history of growing middle class or large population or large share of the population being part of the middle class, et cetera, as in the developed countries. That's a recent phenomenon. For instance, in a country like Brazil, we had, during the last 15 years, actually, the middle class doubling as a percentage of the population. But that happened throughout the last decade. And as a result of deep recession, which took place during the last years, that dynamic has reversed. And that is the problem. But that's a much short-term problem. And in my vision, it's directly related to a specific situation of the Brazilian economy, which means the fact that the Brazilian economy got into a recession. And evidently, that is affecting everyone, particularly the middle class, but also the lower level income, particularly the lower level income classes as well. In summary, the way out for an economy like Brazil is to start growing again, creating jobs again, and actually to modernize the economy, and opening up, et cetera, in a way to become more efficient, which what I would gather is at the end of the day, we are in a different cycle compared to the developed economies. We are at the moment of establishing the middle class, heavy, groovy, opening up the economy. Yeah, and I imagine a lot of the emerging markets don't want to be left out of a possible globalization effort, but Madame Lagarde, why did we not see this coming? You came here at the World Economic Forum in 2013. You did the plenary opening speech, and you talked about inequality. And actually, at the time, you didn't get much traction. Well, I hope people will listen now. You're quite right, actually, because not only did it not get much traction, and at the time we were producing research focusing particularly on the excessive inequality and the relationship to sustainable growth. And our point was that if there is excessive inequality, then it is counterproductive for the sustainable growth that the G20 members and many people aspire to, which is, that's a little parenthesis, if we want larger share of the pie for all, we just need a larger pie altogether. And for that pie to be sustainable, we were demonstrating, I think rightly so, that excessive inequalities were putting a break on that sustainable growth. Now, why did people not listen? I don't know, but certainly I got strong backlash from economists in particular saying that it was not really of their business to worry about these things, including in my own institutions, which has now been very much converted to the importance of inequality and studying it and providing policies in response to that. But I would say that we now, probably, and I hope, have a very, very opportune time to put in place the policies that we know will help. And I would completely agree with Larry that there is no silver bullet response to that. But there is clearly a sense, in my view, and minister, you just indicated that, that when you have a real crisis, or when you have very strong signals, as we have received from the voters, from people who say, no, it's really time to say, what policies do we have in place? What more can we do? What kind of measures do we take to reduce inequalities? What kind of safety net do we have for people? What education training do we have in place in order to respond not necessarily to globalization, but to the technologies that are going to completely disrupt and change the working place for a long time? So if policymakers do not get the signal now, I don't know when they, you know, that they don't listen to my opening speech back in 2013, it's okay. But if they receive the feedback from the voters who say no, then they really have to think it through and see what can be done. And there are things that can be done, fiscal, structural reforms, and the monetary policies that Pierre-Carlo alluded to. But it needs to be granular, it needs to be regional, it needs to be focused on what will people get out of it. And it probably means more redistribution that we have in place at the moment. Larry? I'm half in agreement with Christine and half in disagreement. Let's have half of disagreement. Christine has made a huge contribution to the global dialogue in the way that she has given the IMF face of concern about human issues in a way that it didn't before, of which equality is won. And that's been a huge contribution for which I salute her. I think it is important to distinguish though between redistributionism and populism. Look, the United States has just elected the world's most visible symbol of conspicuous consumption. That is a bizarre manifestation of a concern about inequality. I think you have to think about that in analyzing what it is. And I think the answer lies in some of the things that Ray talked about in his initial remarks and that I tried to touch on having to do with the middle class. When you say inequality, the first thing you think about and it's a very important issue is the poor and what you're gonna do to support the poor. But a lot of the people who voted against Brexit and a lot of the people who voted for Donald Trump think too much is being done to help the poor, not that too little is being done to help the poor. And so I think this sense of what I've called responsible nationalism, a way of bringing greater cohesion to countries and having more of a sense of governments as standing up for the broad center of the population is very much at the heart of it. And I think framing this in terms of inequality captures some of what's going on, but I don't think there is as much of an element of envy and I think there is more of a desire for national unity and strength than the emphasis on inequality suggests. So that would be the nuance of difference that I would highlight. So Ray, do you agree with that? And was it the same fear that led to Brexit and Trump and was it actually just taking control back? I think it's a phenomenon that has happened through history that we've seen repeatedly. And so I think we just look at it. It is most obviously in the 30s. So it is, as Larry's saying, partially it's a matter of the differences in income, but partially it's a fed-upness with like they're not on good control. Partially it's a lack of what Davos represents, which Stapros represents the inclusiveness of speaking, but this is a group of elites essentially. So it's an anti-Davos way of operating. I'm not represented. And I'm saying in the 1930s, if you look, every country in the 30s ended up becoming more extreme. Like Bernie Sanders was Huey Long. So if you look at the repeat and you say what was those elements, they've repeated over time, right? And so I think you have to have an iconic vision of what that is. And I think it's living itself out now globally. It's not just income. And Minister Paduan was referendum a warning sign. And what can Italian politicians do to reconnect with their voters? Well, before I go to the Italian politics, let me remind that there is another problem in Europe. And the problem in Europe is Europe. The fact is that a specific manifestation of populism and disaffection with the current state of situation is Europe. In many, if not all European countries, there is a strong term to say, our problems are generated in Brussels or sometimes in Frankfurt, depends where you live. This is a problem because Europe used to be the solution to many of the problems of the left out of the laggards in European integration project. And now this is being turned around completely. So Europeans have an additional duty when they set up a policy which is hopefully convincingly dealing with the issues with sometimes the right issues raised by populism because they're raising the right issues. They're not giving answers, but they're raising the right issues. So this is one of the aspects. The other aspect is that, let's face it, anyone who is involved in policy making knows that we can design beautiful strategies, solutions, bringing in all the tools in the pot. And then we know that before these things generate visible benefits to the population and therefore we have a hope to raise consensus on those policies, time goes by. And maybe we don't have enough time today because we need to respond to immediate crisis and to immediate pressures. As far as Italy is concerned, let me reassure everybody that we are continuing our reform strategy in spite of what I often read and hear. One nice thing about structural reforms is that they have a public affair aspect where you vote a reform and it gets the headlines, but then the next day the hard work begins because you have to implement the reforms. And of course the media, sorry, are not interested in implementation which is actually what makes the difference and which with a lag a few years maybe will hopefully be recognized in terms of political support. Mr. Mereyes, we're central banks, part of the problem. With all this cheap money out there? I missed your question. The first part? The central banks because of the cheap money. Wow, they do. Evidently, in different ways in different times. For instance, after the crisis of 2007, 2008, evidently they amounted much more because we had a credit crisis. As a result of that, they have evidently at that moment a central role in the recovery of the economy. Evidently that is over now. And evidently their role now is much less important than it was during that period after the crisis. And evidently today we don't also have the kind of problem we had before the crisis when we had some risk of inflation, et cetera, because the economy was moving well. Now it's a completely different question. We don't have a liquidity crisis. We don't have a credit crisis anymore. And inflation is low. Then evidently that's a moment for the central banks to be quieter in this scenario. But evidently time will come. I would like also to add something about the question of populism versus inequality or et cetera. Or what's the reason for that? I think that we have local phenomena and some global phenomena. The local ones is yes, indeed, you created a welfare state. It took care of the lower level income, et cetera, and actually created a society which was happy and as it was pointed out, it was a solution. But the problem now is a very specific one. There are immigrants coming. And now, in a similar way as Larry pointed out to the US, the center, as we call it, say, well, maybe government is taking too much care of these newcomers in a different way in the US. And that's a specific phenomena which it's not the same, but it comes together with globalization where there are winners and there are losers in the globalization process. And those two things come together. Ray, if the Donald Trump policies get implemented and executed, what does that mean for the middle class in America? Will they be better off than they are now? That's a very complicated question. I think, and I get on the theme of what is the phenomenon? You will see more protectionism. You will see perhaps the reversal of the trend that began in the 1990s, which was with trade agreements and globalization, which, by the way, created a narrowing of the wealth gap, the narrowing of the wealth gap between rich countries and poor countries. In other words, if you look at it, the poor countries rose relative to the rich countries right now. We've, by 15% of GDP, well, income now used to be 25%. Now it's 40% for the wealth countries. So this has brought countries up, and so there's been a narrowing of the wealth gap internationally. While within countries, there's been a separating of the wealth gap. A lot of that was fostered by globalization in the 90s when we had all the trade agreements and so on. So we may be at the end of that. We may be at a point where globalization is ending, and that provincialization and nationalization is taking hold. I think that there's a significant risk of that. Larry. Ray said it was a complicated question, what the impact of the proposed policies would be on the people they're supposed to help. I actually don't think it is so complicated. The lesson of history is overwhelming. That classic populism is invariably counterproductive for those in whose name it is offered as a policy regime. It will ultimately not hurt Ray who will find ways to position himself in markets no matter what happens. The people who will be the victims of populist policies are the lower income and middle class people in whose name the policy is offered. Let me give just one example. Yes, our president-elect has made four or five phone calls to four or five companies largely suspending the rule of law and extorting them into relocating dozens or perhaps even a few hundred jobs into plants in the United States. At the same time, the consequence of his rhetoric and announced policies has been a 15% decline in the value of the Mexican peso relative to the dollar. That decline in the peso is a dagger at Ohio. It is a major change in the relative attractiveness of locating production activity in Mexico versus locating it in the American heartland. And the consequence of that is measured not in the dozens or hundreds, but in the thousands or 10,000s or even hundreds of thousands of jobs. The same can be said about a variety of other aspects of populist policies, whether it is tax cuts that are in the name of populism somehow ending up going in vast disproportion to those in the top 1% or top tenth of a percent of the population, or whether when you take a classic broad national objective like strengthening public investment, like responding to the fact that Americans pay the equivalent of a 75 cent gasoline tax each year because of extra potholes in our roads. And you respond to that not by fixing the roads directly, but by offering an 82% tax credit, the highest in history, to private contractors who build pipelines that they were going to build anyway. And so it is the experience of Juan Perón in Argentina. It is the experience of populist leaders all around the world that while the argument is made in the political season in favor of the middle class, they are ultimately the ones who pay the highest price for the policies that are pursued. So it's not complicated at all. Larry and I have liked each other for a long time and Larry is prone to see things in that way. It is more complicated I think than Larry makes it because for example, if you create a pro-business environment, in other words, an environment in which it is hospitable to make money, make things happen, you're creating an environment in which you're actually attracting capital in a lot of places. If you think of how capital moves, just the slightest inclination of something going bad in a place, being anti-wealth or being in favor of wealth will cause money to move between countries very strongly and you create an environment in which making money and making business is a good thing. And it changes the nature of capital flows. The United States is in many ways unique. If it's a favorable environment for making money, if it has rule of law, if it has property protections, I know entities that consider, should I be better off in China? Should I be better off in the United States? So money moves in that way. There's such a thing as animal spirits. Animal spirits is when you deregulate some things, it has pros and cons. Deregulation has cons. I'm not arguing that. But it also has pros in terms of getting things going. A sense that you can take cash where there's a lot of cash around and there's a lot of cheap money. And then all of a sudden a sense that you can make things happen can actually invigorate the economy. If you take that element of the wealth gap and let's say imports, one of the elements of the imports has been trade and because elements of trade, the percentage of the population, the big differences in wealth, the spending is in the lower income groups, not in the higher income groups because when you give more money to rich people, they're not inclined to spend it as much. If you put more money into the hands of people who have less, their propensity to spend it is greater and it'll have a greater pass-through for economic activity. So I'm saying that it's a complicated question. In other words, there are pros to this as well as cons to this. I don't think it's as simple as Larry's making it. Christine Lagar. Yeah. To your question, I don't want to comment on the possible outcome of the policies by President-elect because we don't really know what the policies are going to be and we have very little by way of detailed information as to what the plan will be if there is such a thing as a plan. But I want to respond to Ray. You said that maybe this is the end of globalization. I think that if policymakers are concerned about flow of migrants, about flow of refugees, if they're concerned about massive inequalities between the 3.6 billion people relative to the eight, and everybody knows what I'm talking about here, it's 50% of humanity relative to the eight wealthiest people in the world, which might be a very bad way to compare, but still there are 3.6 billion people around the world who are aspiring to better income, food on the table twice a day and sometimes once a day. To turn our back to globalization, to turn our back to helping development is exactly the wrong approach. That globalization should take a new term, that the asymmetry in certain cases be explored and rectified if it is excessive. But to actually say that globalization is bad because it destroys jobs, I think that's a very short cut to something that needs far more analytical work, far more understanding of how much is actually attributable to technology breakthrough, and we will see more of it. And then I conclude with a point that Pierre Carlo made about policies, which concerned me a lot. You said, Pierre Carlo, that maybe we don't have time for policies. That's a concern because if there is no time for policies because there is urgency, because there is instant news, because there is Twitter all over the place, then what are policymakers going to do? They are there to identify the policies that will serve improving the world, improving the fate of the people as well. So I hope that we will find time for policies and those policies will apply to the better being of people. Minister Paduan, and then I'll go back to Larry. Two things. First of all, policymakers need time to see the results of their policies develop and be hopefully transformed into consensus for those policies. They can do it. They have to do it. They are facing additional constraints. One point. Second point on globalization. I don't think we are exiting globalization. I think we are entering a new stage of international global relations where national policies, especially in important countries, will shape how globalization eventually develops because even if there are policies that say, I'm closing down the markets because I'm turning protectionist on the one hand, on the other hand I'm deregulating, so I'm going the opposite direction. This basically means that there are new ways to interpret how nation states used to be that name once, shape globalization. So we have to be prepared on how to deal with that and since I'm concerned about Europe, I'm concerned that Europe does not have a strategy about how to deal with the new phase of globalization. It's reacting. It's inward looking. It's not facing big challenges in globalization such as the migration flows in a coherent way. Professor Mereyes, when you look at globalization, are the emerging markets, if there's a new globalization, will it automatically hurt emerging markets more than developed countries? If we go back to Christine's point, I think that if you take a look on the world, evidently that globalization is allowing for a massive number of people to get out of poverty, to go to get into the middle class, et cetera, and then as a whole, it's working, definitely. And if you take the whole globe evidently, that the net effect is extremely positive. Evidently, what we are talking about here is some specific group of people, particularly in the developed countries, in which on one hand they are feeling to be left out or not to be looked upon, et cetera, et cetera, because they think they are losing. In spite of the fact that the economy as a whole is working better, there are cheaper goods to be consumed by everyone, particularly the lower-level income, et cetera, et cetera, but definitely I think we are talking about some specific policies to basically to address that question of the developed economies, particularly of those who are in a way or another losing. Particularly here is a question probably of training, of education in terms of allowing those people to get higher-paid jobs or jobs which create more value, added products which is again a net result of the globalization. The question is how to make that group to take advantage of that. But if we look at the world as a whole, there is no doubt that hundreds of millions of people are getting out of poverty, which would not be the case if the markets were closed. Ray, how do you see globalization playing out in the next five years? And then Larry? I think just the essence, Christine, of the difference maybe between us, is what we hope for versus what is most likely. So when you talk about we policy makers doing those things, I don't know, first of all, who the we is. That we will change is changing in a way that those policy makers themselves have different agendas. And so I think that as we look forward, we have to say, will in five years we be more collective in our approaches? Would we be more international and embracing that? Or will we, or the policy makers, be more nationalistic? I think that the trends are clear in terms of the pressures. The question of who will the battle be? So who will that we be? Because they will determine whether we're going to have protectionism or whether we're going to have things that we want, which is globalization. So I think that that becomes the question. I think there's the question of can the middle be cohesive enough so that the extremes are not in control? Because populism takes two forms. It's extreme left or it's extreme right. And so that kind of polarity. I think that the challenge is can a Mario Draghi and a Shoibla come together in a certain way of moderates, let's say. Can the middle be cohesive enough and strong enough and do those things? I think the question is what is do those things? When you look at what is causing this, the forces behind this are things that we would like. In other words, technology is causing this. Globalization is causing this. These are forces that we don't want to do away with. So if we're saying the root cause, what are you going to do? Are you going to lessen technology which is creating a polarity and income? Are you going to lessen globalization which has these effects? So you have to get at the root cause. What are those root causes? And then you have to deal with it. And then the question is who is you and how will you deal with it? I think that's, I'm just trying to be realistic. Larry. And then Madame Lagal. Three things. One, we're having yesterday's debate in a way because globalization has changed profoundly. It used to be that countries imported and exported products. Today they are one part of global supply chains. And that changes profoundly the dynamics and makes interference with globalization more difficult. Two, what should global integration policies be like? I would like to live in a world where the global policy community had devoted 10% as much energy to preventing tax arbitrage through escape of capital to tax havens and regulatory arbitrage through taking advantage of low regulation jurisdictions as it had to protecting the intellectual property rights of multinational corporations. And in such a world, it would be easier to persuade middle class people that they should be interested in the project of global integration. And we have not lived in such a world. And that is a failure of the political process in every country. Third, Ray and I do not really disagree very much. I do not yield to him in my enthusiasm for the idea that business confidence is central to national economic success. And that is indeed why I resisted the notion that our principal problem was a lack of redistributionism. I do think that one needs to be very cautious about temporary increases in animal spirits brought about by a reversion to extremely ad hoc policymaking. And I would inquire of my friend Ray what he thought of the decision to make a few remarks about pharmaceutical companies in a way that within 45 minutes took $25 billion off their equity value and whether he saw that as the kind of positive contribution to increasing business confidence that he was highlighting. All of our new administration. I think we're talking about different things. First of all, I think we're talking about what we want. In other words, Larry's describing policies that he would want. And I'm talking about things that are likely to happen. And if you ask me that question, I think that that's really problematic. I think that the spontaneous decisions, do you want to have a border tax? Do you not want to have a border tax? And all of that is not good. And that improvisation or that spontaneity or the issues being the complexities, these are challenges. We agree on those things. I was just responding to the question of is this all negative or is it all positive? And then when we get back to the future. Just to check. I think you and I agree that the populist elements are almost all negative. And I think your real point was that some of the elements in what we're seeing aren't populist and that you like those. In terms of populist policy, I didn't hear you say anything that was supportive of traditional populist policy. No, populism scares me. I want to be loud and clear. Populism scares me. It is the extremes. And it goes to more extreme. And I'm just saying what is likely? Where are we headed? And what does that look like? Define it. Define its left version. Define its right version. We know what they're like. This has been enacted before and it will likely continue in a slow way in the next year in Europe, in the next year in Europe. There is the risks of that greater. And it's a matter of impatience. So is it likely is my question. I think it's more likely than not. We're literally flew by. So I'm going to ask for a quick comment from Madame Lagarde from Minister Paduan. And then just think about this and this will be your closing remarks. Think of a three-point plan. If populist policies don't work, a three-point plan to make the middle class feel a little bit better. I was trying to reconcile Ray and Larry, but they have reconciled by themselves. Thank you. But I was also thinking that whatever outcome from the additional 10% spent on fighting tax evasion, fighting corruption, having a common solid platform of regulation, particularly concerning the financial world, all of that could actually be used to address the point made by Ray, which is we're not going to fight technology. We're not going to disrupt completely the global supply chain. Hopefully the private sector will be able to sustain the intimations that be done. And as a result, whatever comes out of what Larry has identified, could actually be spent on addressing the middle class anxiety which is out there, which is how am I going to adjust to this new technological world? What future is there for my children? What safety net is there if everything falls apart and I don't have anything to hang on to? And I think that that's where policies actually can insert themselves and can do so with courageous leaders who, like Pierre Paolo, say it will take time, it's going to be difficult, implementation will not be glamorous, will not interest Bloomberg and others, but we need to go through it in order to get to a better place. So that's what I really wanted to say. And I don't think that we should be resigned to taking the situation as it is without doing something. But is there a problem with Timeline? Can we reconnect with the population in time for dealing with all the European elections? I think the truth and the courage of identifying the landscape as it will be is critical to that. If you look at the Global Shapers Survey that has just been conducted by Davos, by the way, it's interesting to see that the key concern is about corruption, is about transparency, is about accountability. So those can be addressed through the policies that Larry has identified and that Pierre Paolo has alluded to. Minister Paduan, you have a three-point plan? Well, I don't know where it's a plan. It's a three-point statement. The first statement is we have to take populist seriously, meaning that not all populists, all those who vote for populist ideas, are the bad guys. In most cases, they are the good guys. They are fellow citizens and they have real concerns about, as Christine was mentioning, the future of their children, job opportunities, concerns about security. And these are real concerns. So policymakers have to take that very, very seriously. Second point, there is no silver bullet. There is no shortcut. The solutions are complicated and they take time to develop. However, third point, we as policymakers don't need to provide a vision which has been lacking. You need a vision to generate animal spirits that translates into action in the private sector. And especially in Europe, we are lacking that vision. In some other places, there is a vision. You may agree or disagree with that vision, but that is the challenge that Brexit is posing and that Trump is posing. They have a vision. We don't have a vision in Europe, not a vision which is comparable in terms of powerful message. Sorry to be so pessimistic, but that's the case. I need a minute each. Minister Mideas. Okay. I think that we have a very interesting point here and we should be very clear about the difference between, number one, the problems and some reactions which are coming as a result of globalization and the policies which are needed to address those questions versus the populist reaction to the same problem. If we go back, for instance, to the 30s and the problems in Europe, et cetera, we can clearly see that difference. There were the real problems, the post-first war treaties and the economic consequences for some areas of Europe and the popular reaction to that. This is one thing. The other thing is how leaders took advantage of that problem and that dissatisfaction to create very negative populist measures and evidently go much beyond that. I think that's the difference that we should draw in terms of what the populist reaction and how populist leaders take advantage of that and what the real problem is. Right. I think it will be very important. Over the next 90 days, we'll start to learn more about whether we're invigorating the economy in certain ways prudently. I think Donald Trump is aggressive. Is he aggressive and thoughtful? Or is he aggressive and reckless? And we're going to find that out with time and I think that that'll have a very important implication. The people that he hired in his administration are quite often thoughtful people and so I think we should step back and see how it all plays out. Larry? I'll answer your three-point plan question in an American context. Our broad objective should be to make America greater than ever before. That's very different from making it great again. There are three major steps. One, public investment on an adequate scale starting from infrastructure at a time when ours is in a shambles but also embracing technology and embracing education. Two, a global strategy focused on making global integration work for ordinary people starting with the issues of capital mobility and its control that I referred to. And third, enabling the dreams of every young American which goes to issues of education, goes to issues of supporting the transition from school to work for those who don't go to college, goes to the ability to purchase a home, and much else. Thank you so much for a great panel.