 Well good morning everybody. How is your enthusiasm, spunk, motivation? I've got great news for you. I'm passionate about this topic. Some of you perhaps go, ethics, well how does that fit into operations? I'm passionate about operations as well and the really cool thing that I've come to appreciate over the years is that they're inextricably linked. And so that will be my objective today is to bridge the theory of ethics to the practice of ethics at a very individual level. It starts with a basic premise. You've talked about it I suspect in lots of different ways but how do you defeat an enemy? What is defeating an enemy? You know to defeat an enemy we need to break his will to resist. But invariably when you're talking about the United States of America, we're not talking about simply defeating the enemy. Our strategic end state goes well beyond that. It says hey we want enduring peace to be an outcome of this conflict and moreover we want that enduring peace to be characterized by reconciliation with that enemy. And from that perspective you've got to change that phrase break the will of the enemy to include break the will of the enemy to resist righteously. That means that the conflict has to be a just war and that our conduct of it must be above reproach. And so the implications are immense in that regard. We in the naval profession when we grasp that we realize that we must conduct the war ethically and as we often say ethics are defined as our code of conduct. And I believe that the extent to which ethics consistently govern and that's important consistently govern our conduct. To the extent that which our ethics consistently govern our conduct that will be strategically decisive. And it's incumbent upon us as an organization as the squadrons and ships and strike groups that comprise our organization the Navy all the way down to the individual embrace this because we can see through events like Abu Ghraib how the actions of just one or a few individuals can change the entire tenor of the righteousness of the conduct of the conflict. And so today what I want to do is springboard from that and say you've heard the basic premise that says hey we need to train the way we fight. And I would submit to you that we need to conduct ourselves the way we intend to fight each and every day ethically so that it becomes habitual. It's not something that we pull out on the day we get the go order. It's something that is ingrained in our DNA. And moreover what I hope to do today is bridge the gap from theory to practice practical actions to enhance not only operational effectiveness but our ethical conduct of conflict. And I propose that we can do that by simply remembering two questions and applying them day for day hour for hour minute for minute to every task that we undertake in the naval profession. And those two questions are simply am I doing the right thing and am I doing things right. And if you view each decision through those two lenses I believe that you'll begin to build a foundation of ethical behavior that is not only habitual but because it consistently governs your actions. It will allow you to contribute to achieving strategic end states that are of great importance to the nation. This is a pitch that I'm delighted to be here to share with you. It's the first time that I've done it wearing a suit. So if I feel a little bit or appear a little bit discombobulated it's only that. This is a sharing of intimate thoughts in many respects that I did as a three and a four star with every single staff that helped me to command organizations both international NATO staffs as well as US staffs. As a strike group commander I gave it to my staff and my subordinate commanders so this is a pitch that I gave to my subordinate commanders as well. And it was designed to say these are my expectations. This is what I believe. And these are keys to success in conducting effective warfare. I viewed it predominantly through the eyes of here's how to be operationally effective and efficient. But as I think you'll see integral to many many of the elements of operational effectiveness is an ethical foundation and I challenge you that over the course of this morning to dig deep on each one of these points and see if you can pull out that as ethical thread. And I'll help along the way and then at the end I'll have reserved some time for questions so don't hesitate to save those rounds and fire freely at the end. Next slide please. So I suspect at the Navy War College that you've examined this issue in some depth. What is the best approach to organizational leadership in our naval profession? And I think you've probably reached the conclusion through teaching and considerations that a commander centric command is most effective in war fighting. And I would recommend to you that you resolve today to make that your model that you will in fact assume the full mantle of leadership when you're assuming positions of command and you will work to build a commander centric command. There are some things to contemplate when you make that decision and then move forward to achieve it. Let's start by looking at what's a staff centric organization look like. The fact of the matter is that authority and responsibility is distributed throughout the staff. The staff exercises perhaps a disproportionate amount of authority and internal to that staff, people's respect to commanding officer, but their allegiance is a little less unified, tends to be fractured across the department within which they're operating. The subordinate commands and lateral commands of those that are off to the left and to the right of you in that org chart realize that to get answers they frequently have to go to a number of different touch points within your organization. And importantly in the context of our conversation this morning, the ethical foundation of the organization tends to be the least common denominator amongst the department heads that people will shop and say, hey, who is going to be my ethical role model? And in this case, in a staff centric organization, they have a choice. Is it going to be their department head or that department head or the chief of staff or the commander? And I would propose to you that that is not the foundation that you want either for effective command and control of the operation, nor for setting the culture in your staff or organization and in particular for setting the ethical foundation for it. On the other hand, when you choose to build a commander centric organization, it is a choice. It doesn't just happen. It must be built. Then you're hanging it out there because it's all on you. Your ethical standards will become the command's ethical standards. And in that respect, your conduct must be above reproach. You live in the fishbowl. There isn't anything that won't be observed on duty or off duty by somebody. And in this day and age, there isn't anything that isn't likely to be filmed. And so when you choose to develop to build a commander centric organization with that comes an extra measure of responsibility that says they are going to reflect you. And everyone will know that it is a reflection of you. So how do you do that? How do you actually go and build a commander centric organization? As I mentioned to you, it doesn't just happen. You've got to invest time into it. And the outcome, the value of it is, it is proven through history, not just modern times, that it is the most effective and efficient organizational concept when it comes to fighting and winning wars. So how do you do it? The first thing is, you can't hide. You have to be present. You can't hang out in your office. As you look across the international scene, you'll find a broad variation from staff centric, rare instances of commander centric, and a habit, a comfort zone that says the commanding officer sits on a pedestal, hides in his office, and on occasion makes the big decisions simply by announcing them. I would propose that in all likelihood, and in most cases in my personal experience, those are staff centric organizations. So you have to be present. You have to interact with your staff and task force commanders. And the key here is to allow them to get to know you, develop a relationship with them. It's not an inappropriate relationship. It's not one that's overly familiar. It respects all the rules and regulations about fraternization. But hang it out there. Let them get to know you, because it's through relationship that we build trust. And the foundation of trust I propose to you is your ethical behavior. They're going to see it. And the things that build that ethical foundation are pretty straightforward. Yes means yes. As you interact regularly with your staff and subordinate commanders. Yes means yes. No means no. And because you're interacting with them frequently, they're going to see it vividly, is there a do say gap? This is what he says, but this is what he does. This is what she says. This is what she does. And so interacting with them allows you to reinforce those basics that build that foundation of trust. And remember, in building this foundation, in building a relationship, and moving forward to do very difficult things in this commander centric command that's going to go wage war, your objective is not to be liked. Your objective is to be respected. And the best foundation for respect is an ethical foundation along the lines that I just described to you. And oh, by the way, the likelihood is you will be liked. But when we begin to have our preeminent objective of that personal relationship and interaction with staff and subordinate commanders to be liked, then you begin to find yourself on a slippery ethical slope on occasion. Second thing, clearly defined and articulated staff and task force roles functions authority and expectations. Don't make your staff and your subordinate commands guess. Clearly define every one of those things. And the basic premises you already know. With responsibility must be commensurate authority. Sometimes we stop there. But go further. Responsibility, authority, resourcing to accomplish your responsibilities and authority over those resources. And accountability. It's not just two things. It's for responsibility, authority, resources and accountability. Make it clear. And when you distribute or delegate those things, don't fall into the trap that says they come automatically with the position. That staff position or that subordinate commanders position. That those that are working on your staff or in your subordinate commands must be ready, must be equipped in terms of their experience, their teaching, what they've been taught. To exercise that authority appropriately. And it is legitimate. As you contemplate roles and functions and the delegation and assignment of those things, to contemplate as one of your decision factors, the ethical foundation of that individual. Without an ethical foundation, do you want the ultimate in terms of authority to kill or not to kill, delegated to employ this element of ROE on a more practical level? Or do you want to withhold that that element of the ROE, which says you can respond to an imminent attack? Do you want to withhold that until that individual is equipped? You have an ethical responsibility to understand the members of your staff and their level of equipping, if you will. And to understand your subordinate commanders and to do that, clearly define and articulate roles, functions and authority in the context of their readiness to do it well. Because of what we began this morning with. That it is the choices of those individuals that can have strategic consequences. Play the part, inspire confidence. Your subordinates expect you to be calm, confident. I was giggling one day because I was a new four star commander and I had my NATO hat on. It was commander, joint force command Naples. It's the NATO equivalent of a combatant commander. And I was going up to Brussels to have a discussion with the North Atlantic Council. Those are all the ambassadors from the nations that that make up NATO. And it was really one of those awkward occasions when I was going to come in, I was going to brief them on what was going on in Kosovo because we were the operational level commander in terms of the peace enforcement mission that NATO has ongoing in Kosovo. But at the same time, it was like, how do you like me so far? Because here's what we're doing. But you need to stop micromanaging. You need to stop going around from the political level, ignoring the operational commander, putting political pressure on the tactical commander. Let's get this straightened up. Because the 5,000 kilometer screwdriver with ambassadors doing tactical level work is probably not the best model for success. It was like, I'm Bruce Klingon. How do you like me so far? What did my political advisor advise me? And this is about playing the part. He said, you might be new. But those ambassadors expect you to walk in the room and fill it up with your personality, to fill it up with your knowledge, to fill it up by being a straight shooter that's tactful but direct. Well, interesting because I tend to be a little bit of an introvert. So it was one of the things going okay. And it worked. The point is sometimes playing the part is going to put you out of your comfort zone. But it's important. Inspire confidence. Think about your body language. If you're one of those people that tends to do public grooming, you're just grooming, but your entire staff is going, uh-oh, the boss is nervous. And so think hard about the part that you're expected to play and play it with integrity. In other words, don't be something that you're not, but stretch yourself to play that part so that you can be the most effective leader that you can be. How do you inspire confidence before I leave this point? Righteousness. People are confident in you if you're always working through those two lenses that I mentioned to you. Are we doing the right things? Are we doing things right? Because they will gain confidence that that's not only the way you conduct your interactions at the political level. Your interactions in managing and leading the operational level of war. But there are interactions with them individually. That you're going to treat them righteously as well. And that inspires confidence, particularly when there's no say-do gap. There's no different rule set when you're engaging at the political level, at the operational level with your bosses or colleagues, or with subordinates. And so ethics, again, that grounding that says we're going to conduct ourselves daily the way we intend to fight is so important. Fulfill the role. Commander, leader, mentor. Don't abrogate any of those three roles as a commander. You need to command. You need to lead. And you need to mentor. They're all important. Now certainly, our concept in the United States Navy and the naval profession is that everybody is a leader in their own right in their role within the organization. And you want to inspire that. That's not what I'm saying. But you lead in the context of your role. You mentor in the context of your role. How often have we heard the chief teaches the ensign? That was true in my case. And the chief teaches the subordinates in terms of the young enlisted men and women. Mentor. And of course command. As commander, we've touched on that. And so it's okay to have people exercising the authority that you've delegated them. That's not undermining your role as the commander. That's complementing it because we centralize planning and we didn't decentralize execution. We want people to lead and we want people to mentor. But what happens when you find yourself in a position where you're not equipped? I'll tell you a sea story. Brand new one-star rear-admrow lower half Klingon shows up in the United States central command. We're some significant way through the Afghan OEF conflict where in fact I show up at the time when Operation Anaconda is occurring there's a significant, you know, maneuver force on the ground doing some difficult work. And we took lie detector tests and commenced, you know, seven days a week, 19 hours a day literally planning effort for Iraqi freedom. But I walked in on my first day into that environment which I just had a vague kind of awareness of on that first day and I got a call from General Tommy Franks and he says, you know, come up and see me, deputy director of operations. So I went up there and I said, wow, this is a great organization. I'm here two hours and the boss always wants to say hi, welcome me to the team. This is going to be a great place to work. I walked into the office and he goes, who the heck are you? Well sir, I'm Admiral Bruce Klingon, I'm your new deputy director. Oh, I need a phase four plan. Okay sir, when do you need that by? He didn't look at the calendar. He looked at his watch. He said in about an hour. Oh, so I ran down to my staff which I wasn't even finished getting introduced to. I called the two lead planners and I said, what's a phase four plan? You might not always be prepared to mentor but under those circumstances you're going to want to play a role. Ultimately, I had to contribute significantly to the planning effort in phase four in Afghanistan and Iraqi freedom starting from zero. So don't abrogate that, dig in, learn as fast as you can, surround yourselves, bite with people that can help you bridge that until you're able to fulfill your role. It can be hard work but it's worth it. Fulfill all three roles. In this regard, fulfilling the role, don't just model ethical behavior. Teach it. Part of your mentorship should be engaging in difficult topics and one of them is ethical behavior. It should be on your mentorship list for everybody that you're the mentor for. In other words, it needs refreshing and it really works good when you talk about dilemmas or challenges that you've faced because it brings it home, gets it out of theory and into practice so be bold and courageous and go, man I really struggled with this but don't leave the ethical foundation on the curb, include it in your mentorship. Manage internal and external friction. There is no such thing. We never have friction in our organizations, right? Wrong. In fact, things can seem swimmingly great but you put the pressure of combat operations on any organization and the fractures are going to come out with great clarity. And so in peace discern where the friction is and resolve it. Don't let it fester and in war resolve it urgently because every ounce of energy that we spend dealing with suffering or perpetrating internal friction is energy not focused on dealing with the enemy. I'll give you an example of internal friction. Again, United States central command and we had planned this effort. We had launched into operation Iraqi freedom. We were moving north and there came to a point where there was a Iraqi army maneuver force and we had faced with the decision. Do we destroy it or do we fix it and bypass? Fix in place and bypass. And there was this discussion about what to do. Ethically there wasn't an issue about either one. If we destroyed it, which means it ceases to exist, the highest level of effect that you can have on a maneuver force, we would hope and we had reason to believe demoralize the balance of the armed forces. It had some good things about it in regards to all those forces that we would need when you fix a force in place. You can't just ignore it. You got to watch it. You got to be prepared to do something if it tries to break out either to run away bravely or to engage in your flank. So ethically both were legitimate. They had different effects on the campaign. So that wasn't the friction. The friction was that deputy director of operations Admiral Klingon had an opinion about ground operations. Well, you're an aviatorial. Your opinion is irrelevant by all the individuals that had kind of showed up from a small cadre that had done all the planning to, you know, we're going to execute. Now we need a pretty big team. And so the internal friction was one about service roles. Well, when you're endeavoring to sort out, what is the right thing to do? Are we doing the right things? And are we doing things right? You got to be willing to take input from a reasonable cross section of your organization so that you're making fully informed decisions. That is a hedge against unethical behavior, one that's parochial in the service way. Or biased in lots of other ways. And so that was an example of internal friction that needed to be resolved than was. There's external friction as well. You know, in a deployment I did as a battle group commander, we had an air defense warfare commander who was just difficult to work with. It needed to be resolved. You know, in the spectrum of resolution goes from relieve him or mentor him. And the really wonderful thing about that event was the other warfare commanders who suffered most of the brunt of that dysfunctionality along with the staff said we're going to surround this guy and help him to succeed. Because they took the time to say let's try to understand what the root cause of his behavior was. And he was out of his league. He could only focus on this much and it wasn't I don't care about you it's just I can't care about you. I'm not equipped as a leader to be able to deal concurrently with the broad spectrum of things. I'm overwhelmed with my slice, my responsibilities. And so by teamwork and mentorship that helped address those things we were able to resolve external from the perspective of the staff for example and from this perspective of that warfare commander interfaced with lots of other allies and friends and strike groups and things as well. Manage both internal and external friction. Make decisions own the consequences. Thou shalt never say my staff did this or my subordinates did that. You're the commander. Make decisions own the consequences. And in fact it is the selflessness that builds trust. And trust is the foundation for combat effectiveness. We need to operate at the speed of trust. And so be courageous. Make those decisions own the consequences. And by the way when you make bad decisions confess them even if the consequences are not big at all. Why? Because it sets a culture that says ethically we are always trying to make the best decision possible. Always. It's a matter of habit. We are always working on are we doing the right things are we doing things right. And by saying I made this decision the consequences aren't big but I want you to know this wasn't the right decision it creates an environment of transparency. And transparency is the best antidote to unethical behavior. Because it is always good to have a wingman another ship steaming in formation with you. That's going to hold you accountable for making good decisions and if they don't know you're making decisions or if they see well that was the decision you made it must be right you didn't confess it was wrong then you begin to set a standard. So confess those things. Now some of you might go well if I'm always confessing not good decisions it's really going to undermine my reputation it's going to undermine you know the view that the commander staff has of me as a leader. There's a risk here right but I would propose that if you're always making the wrong decisions you have two choices. Find a mentor and start up in your game or raise your hand and go I'm not equipped. That's a real tough one isn't it? But ethically in the naval profession where the consequences have strategic implications isn't that our obligation. Now the wonderful thing about our naval profession is that we do a great job of teaching coaching mentoring training and equipping people and selecting the right people for the position so the likelihood that you're going to need to raise your hand and go I'm not equipped to take me out coach. It's very very low. The likelihood that every one of us benefits from a mentor or confidant the very high. It's a good practice. Both operationally and ethically. And so with that in mind those are just a few of the practical actions that you can take to build a commander-centric organization. To build an organization that whose culture is proven to be the most effective and efficient in warfare. Next slide. Perspective matters. Sharing your beliefs puts your intentions in context. In other words when all the communications are lost and the fight needs to go on because they understand what you believe when they're faced with those circumstances that are unexpected they're going to be able to go well what would the boss do under these circumstances. And because you shared intimately what you believe the likelihood is they're going to proceed in a manner along the lines that you would have done if the normal command and control was available. So sharing your beliefs puts your direction your plan into context. Shared beliefs are a wonderful hedge against ethical failure. So to the extent that in a commander-centric organization you are the model of ethical foundation you've built trust and you have shared beliefs with your subordinates that's a great hedge against ethical failure. So also as I mentioned and began with it's a great hedge against disruptions to the campaign when you when the enemy begins to vote and disrupt. So what things do you believe are relevant to operational effectiveness and efficiency? The first one is war is political but we are not. We're an extension of the political we achieve political ends if you will through our armed conflict but we're not political beings. This came home in a vivid way to me when I was commanding a NATO organization it was Joint Force Command Lisbon. This was back in the 2008-ish time frame and Russia invaded Georgia to take Abkhazia and South Assyria. At that time our command was the operational commander for the NATO Response Force. We were responsible for being able to gear up and go do seven missions. Some war fighting some disaster relief but the fact of the matter when this conflict broke out I immediately called my department heads together in that staff and I said hey we're the NATO Response Force by the way this was week one in command. We're the NATO Response Force I don't think we're going to be asked to go fight Russia but we very well could be asked to do something in terms of humanitarian assistance or disaster relief so we need to pull together a plan. Nine out of ten of my department heads pulled their red card their soccer red card out and said we can't plan. What? We can't plan? I said well you know in about an hour Sackier is going to call me as the commander of the NATO Response Force and say Bruce what can you do now I can figure some stuff out I'll be able to tell them you know we can do this this but what I tell him would be much better informed if we worked together collaboratively to harvest the best ideas by the way about are we doing the right things are we doing things right that's where the value of collaboration really comes home and I said I don't think that's the best approach we really need to think about this all of a sudden nine red cards went back in the park oh we're allowed to think okay then let's get to work on doing some prudent operational thinking deep prudent operational thinking so we got through that circumstance but there was an element in culture in NATO at the time which every staff officer in that command was a megaphone for their nation's political position and did or knew very little about military advice and so in that regard we're not political now here's the first question for you I'll pose it and then answer it and you can pull that thread later in the question session but over the next five years in a series of commands in NATO I worked hard to beat down this prohibition about planning using prudent operational thinking as the means so if you're doing deep prudent operational thinking how are you doing on standing on ethical ground are you playing a game going well we're not really planning but where the output is a plan on PowerPoint so the question was one that I wrestled with going I will not undermine the ethical foundation upon which I stand in the command stands but at the same time it's an imperative that we look at these emerging crises so what did we do we began to tout prudent operational thinking as a way to bridge the gap which it was in reality between what was provided to us through the training court continuum to say hey we're absolutely not ready we are not proficient in crisis response planning or planning deliberate planning we don't have the wherewithal in terms of resources within the NATO to provide structured curriculum with you know orange red blues type scenarios and so we need to leverage all these crises that are ongoing and by the way they're relevant you the North Atlantic Council are going to call me up and ask me to provide the constraints the restraints the potential military objectives relevant to giving me a formal planning order so if you're going to allow me to prepare to give you relevant advice about what you should provide back to me I need to be able to do that and so what did we do to stay on the ethical ground we didn't hide it we made it absolutely public exactly what we were doing and why we were doing it and gave them an opportunity to say that's still not good enough we think it's too close to planning and in fact they resonated with it so what's the ethical take away don't hide stuff if you feel really strongly about something then hit it on head on you can hit it in a sophisticated way but don't stretch the truth be absolutely concise and factual about what you're doing and why and then ultimately if they said you still can't do it we would have had to put our pens down but in fact over time we were able as I mentioned to change the entire culture and now we don't plan but everybody is getting much better at deep prudent operational thinking so remember that ethical take away it was ethically and imperative for me to make my staff ready to do what would be expected in a heartbeat from the political level but there was a constraint in place and we worked away our way around that constraint in a very public way giving individuals in the North Atlantic Council a chance to say no and in that way we were able to move forward war is inevitable train the way we fight I won't go through a history of every place I've gone but it seems that every place I've gone there's been a crisis or a conflict I can stand here today on this stage and say without fear of contradiction that as true as that might have been over my tour of active duty 37 years it is more true today and will be throughout the rest of your careers when you look at the trends in the security environment there's going to be a diversity of crises that's going to stretch us in every way imaginable so the basic war and is it war is inevitable train the way we fight is absolutely important now think about it if you look at world war two and you look at aviation and you look at who was doing the killing there were thousands of fighter pilots that got zero kills there were a few fighter pilots that got a couple there was these ones these entusias that were just absolutely lethal they got the majority of the kills 30 35 40 look at our special operating forces today it's the same concept big army but there are some number of men and women that are absolutely lethal in our naval profession we need to find those lethal people we need to put them to work doing what we are all about and we need to make sure that we put them in positions so that the extent to which they can replicate their ability in your organization in your ship in your squadron in your air wing in your strike group that's what training to be ready to do the business is all about and remember the other thing that we already touched on and I'll keep hammering this home we need to conduct ourselves daily the way we intend to fight on an ethical foundation they were lethal within the rules of engagement train the way we fight conduct ourselves daily the way we intend to fight on an ethical foundation no plan well let's not skip war is ugly war is ugly war is ugly used to be on the front but I proposed to you that today there is no front that the front you know our strategic or our national strategy is to fight overseas don't let the fight come to the homeland the fact the matter is 9-11 caused us to reconsider our national strategy and to understand and appreciate its shortcomings in a modern world I was commanding the USS Carl Vincent on 9-11 9-11 marvelous connectivity right airplane hits the first building we're watching that drama from the bridge a hundred miles south of India we're headed to the Gulf we thought we were going to just do it around the world cruise we're going to spend some time in the Gulf enforcing the no-fly zone and we watch this thing unfold when the second airplane hit that second tower the young third-class petty officer female riding on the grease board behind me burst into tears her husband worked in that building time and time again through that conflict you can see the horrors of war globally and central command at night time this is now during oaf there was only two people the deputy director of operations and the deputy intelligence officer on at night and one night we were sitting there and we were doing scud hunting and the intelligence guys were working really hard to try to understand was that a fuel truck in the shadow of that building with those three guys there enjoying a nice moonlit night near the Euphrates or was it a scud missile the decision was made that it was a scud missile we employed a weapon to kill it and here you are a thousand miles away and what we like to tritely say three screaming alphas why do we say that because that's how we cope with the ugliness of war war is ugly embrace it not in a way that's great but embrace that it's ugly and you must be prepared for it and your subordinates must be prepared for it and if your colleagues to the left and right and in the maritime component air component land component they've got to embrace it and be ready and so does your boss work together to prepare for the ugliness of war technically what does that mean we buy fewer and fewer things fewer airplanes fewer ships and we deal we expect to win because we're going to use the overmatch of our technology to make up for a shortage in numbers we can debate the wisdom of that approach but there is one thing that is absolutely true in that context and that is you must be able to technically exploit the entire capability of that weapon system that is your responsibility to operate you can't be Bruce Klingon and his iPhone where I got this powerful machine in the palm of my hand and I pushed the little green button to talk to Jamie you know what I can surf the internet from this thing if your approach to exploiting the technical capability of your weapon system is that then we're in serious trouble war is ugly make sure that you are technically competent to exploit in all sorts of tactical and operational circumstances the full capability of that weapon system that's entrusted to you second physical it's physically grueling now we like to think about the man in the foxhole yeah that's physically grueling but I'll tell you a year of planning seven days a week 19 hours a day ends up being physically grueling war is physically challenging at every echelon and in every warfare area so be ready physically emotionally ready I talked to you already with some C stories at the beginning of this element about the emotional challenges and we have a wonderful knowledge and growing awareness of all the things that I sum up in that one word PTSD for example PTSD is not new it's interesting when I was growing up my father was a marine F4 you driver he flew corsairs off the jeep carriers during the Korean War I confessed to you I just thought he was kind of mean you know he was a he was awkward now as I began to learn a little bit more and he didn't share much about the war stories but he did say for example that when he was flying at one point he had to take 48 hours off from flying because he he began to laugh hysterically and couldn't stop every marine is a ground pounder first he went ashore to be a forward-air controller and a Chinese guy jumped in the foxhole next to him tried to bayonet his best friend who pulled out at a 45 and shot the guy who fell on top of him and on his deathbed when I was there he was in and out of consciousness and at one point clears a bell 40 years later he utters it will be okay the migs will keep them off us the migs the sabers will keep the migs off us because in that war therefore sabers engaged the migs at high altitude while the Marine Corps F4 use did close-air support for the Marines in contact it will be okay the sabers will keep the migs off us he's reliving the trauma of that conflict we have wonderful work ongoing about resilience and about recognizing PTSD and about getting our colleagues and friends and shipmates hooked up with the help that they need to deal with this fact that war is ugly don't ignore it you have an ethical obligation to take care of your shipmates in that regard and spiritual readiness there's a saying that says there is no atheist in a foxhole the fact of the matter is the data shows that those with the spiritual foundation endure the horrors of war they are more resilient than others so in the context of the constraints that are applied to our naval profession you can deal with this the way I used to say to my shipmates my subordinates my commanders was make your team ready across those four attributes and don't shy away from the last one when I tell you and this came from my days in the LSL when I tell you to shoot down range and kill that approaching small boat that might have a bomb in it that is not the time for you to be wondering about what's going to happen to that person when I kill him or if the heat you miss and he gets there and you're killed what's going to happen to you resolve that issue before you ever get into conflict one way or the other it's your choice but don't shy away from it because it's real no plan survives first contact branches sequels think planning is the fundamental advantage that we have in the United States above every ally and every potential and we plan well the ethical conduct of war begins right when you begin planning as you're making choices between courses of action you can think about while we can go through the Interland or we can go through downtown where am I most likely to run into the stressors that could cause me to snap and have an ethical failure and commit an atrocity out there amongst the cows or in the urban conflict where people are throwing Molotov cocktails and all sorts of ugly things starts with coa selection it also starts in the execution you know you need to plan well identify the risks and choose wisely war fighting is not risk-free but what's the point when you move from the theory of the plan to the execution you're going to have all sorts of ethical decisions to make are you going to continue to bump your head against the plan that isn't making the expected progress wasting lives along the way or are you going to be willing to change to branch or move to a sequel in other words plan well but don't be married to it and remember the enemy has a vote and part of planning is always are we which will talk about a little bit later so assess the risks choose wisely and assess progress don't take unnecessary risks and don't pay unnecessary costs that's an element are we doing the right things are we doing things right so jiff mick in this particular case you can say this applies to a JTF commander in a joint context applies to jiff mick today because we're at the navy war college the naval war college we're talking about jiff mick but it's important that the jiff mick work the operational where they're actually commanding and controlling sitting on top of task forces and task groups and the strategic in other words you want to shape the strategic environment within which you're going to conduct the operational war and you want to allow your subordinate task force commanders to shape you as the jiff mick so they would shape the operational and operate in the tactical why is this important are we doing the right things are we doing things right you want input on that are we fundamental element of planning and of execution you ask for the are we that you think you need to accomplish your mission some of it might be withheld until the circumstances merit its application and then you apply it I remember a day way way back when when we were involved in disciplining Libya I was an f-14 pilot at the time we would send a section of f-14s out and out would come Libyan make twenty ones and we would get all tangled up in a big dog fight and the are we was you can't assess hostile intent even though we could hear that they had authority to fire at us if they fired at us and hit your wingman only your wingman could return fire dot dot dot assuming he was still alive and the airplane was still flying but you could not how's that for are we other are we that we grapple with is how many innocence are you allowed to kill in neutralizing a legitimate military target these are very difficult decisions but fundamental to shaping the environment and managing the risk in which you are going to operate so don't wait like little birds in the nest waiting for a manna from heaven or the worm to be put in your mouth engage in these difficult conversations in the context of the objectives of the tactical or the operational of the strategic and be a voice for ethical decision-making as you develop the courses of action and ask for and implement are we don't fight the scenario leadership and courage matter so how you feel in these days in the course of reductions in capability capacity readiness well they're a fact of life the underdog does win and we're not the underdog may not enjoy quite the overmatch that we might have before I don't know but you do in your areas of responsibility exactly what resources you've been allocated how they stack up against the threat but the underdog does win because of leadership and courage and I have yet to see a scenario when will be the underdog it could be tougher than we might like and so lead lead courageously the ethical perception that your staff your people have of you is going to multiply the effectiveness of your leadership and courage if you are viewed to be ethically soft you'll have a hard time inspiring people in the face of adversity and challenge even so you say the right words and you act courageously without that foundation the ethical foundation and the trust that flows from it you'll have a much harder time inspiring your men and women to do the really tough things that we have to do under the best circumstances let alone the circumstances where we might find ourselves stretched thin across the world that's characterized by crisis after crisis of great diversity however if your ethnic ethical foundation is strong you can inspire your men and women to do amazing things it's real next slide keys to operational success common objectives synchronization and decision matrix are three tools without common objectives you can't be sure that your other component commanders your subordinate task forces are aligning their efforts to accomplish the same thing so take the time to specify those objectives and then make sure it penetrates down to the deck plates so everybody understands here's what we're about and here's how we're going to go do it the synchronization matrix says as I go to accomplish that objective here's the sequence of events who's doing what leading up to accomplishing these objectives and the decision matrix is a tool that says I want to decide between coa a or coa b here's the attributes I should consider to compare the two and decide or a decision matrix on coas should we do out in the hinterland or through the urban center are we doing the right things are we doing things right the synchronization matrix is a wonderful tool as a hedge against ethical failure in other words why is the 82nd airborne always going first is it because they're equipped to do it and the risk to mission risk to force is managed best or is it that they're glory hounds or is it that someone in the chain of command says better they get whacked than my favorite son or daughter over here use synchronization matrix to not only get the campaign or the operation you know sequenced well but also as a perspective to say how are we doing in terms of sharing the burden of war is ugly how are we doing in terms of managing the risk same with the decision matrix and I touched on it it's okay to contemplate the likelihood of ethical failure in coa 1 versus coa 2 hinterland versus urban is a way of thinking about that risk to mission risk to force desired effects drive tasking this is critical we want to accomplish our objectives in the most effective and efficient way possible get the plan right and then if there is some kind of imperative be it a political imperative or a service imperative put that on top of it fully knowledgeable that you may be undermining the efficiency or effectiveness but you're doing it for a cause a reason that you can articulate for example might be a whole lot easier to go do this operation without involving allies but it's important to have that Arab face or NATO face as the case may be you hear that language on occasion to sit there and say that there's global solidarity or there's alliance solidarity and has intrinsic value as opposed to doing it most efficiently and effectively if we shoulder the burden ourselves but get the plan right and then make those adjustments the second thing is true as well not just an Arab face for example but services you know what sometimes it's just okay for the Navy to sit tied up to the peer we are not the best capability to be used in terms of risk to mission risk to force and achieving the desired effects on the other hand there may come a time what says hey if we don't get the Marine Corps into this fight you know then next budget cycle they're not going to compete very well and we know that maybe they're not so required in this fight but they're going to be required amidst all these crises that characterizes security environment later and so we're going to find a spot for them but we do it that objective so don't force the United States Navy or anybody into it start with the most effective and efficient and then make adjustments understanding exactly what risk you're going to incur as a result this comes internal to our service as well so you want to go do something and you have a choice and I going to employ the air wing or T-Lam aviation tribe or the surface tribe and what are the budget implications don't start there what is how it was it take to get an air wing into the middle of some place to bomb a target you got a roll back to air defenses you're putting men and women at risk you were killing a whole lot of enemy that you might not have to because you had to neutralize all that air defense etc etc whereas the T-Lam push the button let it fly neutralize the target so think about the implications of those choices CZ initiative how many of you been involved in cop 2x okay you're all worried here comes you know this is the big graduation exercise the orange forces are raid over there and you're worried how's this thing going to start supposed to culminate in kinetics but and then all of a sudden some orange guy shoots and everybody's like worrying going well what if that was a rogue commander what if you made a mistake what if that semen on the button just sneezed and pushed the button stop cover the enemy every one of them when the criteria is met which you have sorted out in terms of your plan you know the ROE and on that first hostile act make it a very bad day to be orange neutralize every single ship within the law of arm conflict and what you intended to do achieve the effects that you need to without hesitation it's these stutter steps into conflict where bad things happen we suffer more casualties than we need to orange gets a sense that well we may not win but we can really bloody their nose so we're going to protract this thing but if you neutralized every one of them at that first shot then all the rest of orange goes wow maybe we better not do it sees the initiative simultaneously simultaneously matters in terms of operational success networks this is how we roll started with the soft we're trying to find high-value targets in Afghanistan and Iraq so they collect intelligence through all sorts of means and they build out this network that says you know those those you know insurgents here's their network here's the finance or here's the bomb maker here's this and that one cycle of darkness we go in there and we roll up that entire network would put helicopters on the target we snatch and grab them we battlefield interrogate them we find out that they rat out Dave over there in this other hut so we go over there we get dave to by the end of the night we've kind of hit a dry hole we've rolled up everybody in the network that we can and we go back and we start to remap the remnants of the network the same applies to us the sea is nothing but the maneuver space for networks that reside a shore networks are the way we roll in warfare I want to take out that command center that's in the middle of the mountain I'm not going to do that I'm going to take out the power grid but understand the power network and neutralize it networks are the way we roll but at the foundation of it are lots of ethical decisions do I take that soft team in helicopters and put them in there at great risk where they got to isolate that building they got to do a door-to-door knock down find the guy booby traps people that are willing to die for their cause or do I kinetically neutralize them by dropping a bomb do I drop a 250 pound bomb which runs the risk that if they're not in the corner of the house that I think they're in they're going to escape or a 500 pound bomb which runs the risk that I'm going to kill the neighbors that are innocents ethical dilemmas to be sorted out and decided on as you do something as simple as we're going to apply this work networks are how we break the enemy's will to resist by neutralizing information assuredness our greatest vulnerability think about it the oh I F plan was released in the press before we executed think about it thumb drives introduced into networks in Afghanistan think about it Snowden how are you going to deal with that what does an insider threat look like can we go like this and say we're not going to pay attention to it because you know your guilt you're innocent till proven guilty or are their leading edge indicators that someone might have a propensity to behave badly tough issues that we're dealing with as we look at information assuredness but again are we doing things right are we doing the right things gauge progress holistically we'd like to do metrics but guess what commanders have the right to use their intuition their instinct their knowledge and here's one for you oftentimes we have the privilege of intelligence that's credible and not available to our allies that takes one decision and says that's not the right thing to do we need to go over here how are you going to navigate that ethically you can't release that this is where I think the foundation of trust that you have established in your command by daily conduct that says I operate on an ethical foundation yes means yes no means no when you achieve that trust you can say I know it stacks up and looks like we should do a but we're going to do be and sometimes you can't even say because I have intelligence that you don't have because it would reveal potentially sources and means gauge is an important word metrics are good do the best you can but we are gauging progress and again you have an obligation not to bang your head against a plan that's not succeeding be willing to change and adapt and lastly public perception preeminent in a virtual world I am utterly convinced that we could stage a conflict in the ether net with all sorts of reporting and even video and this and that that never occurred and people would begin to behave as if the conflict was real and the outcomes depicted were real that's how powerful the virtual world is public perception of reality plays and that's why I began the day when I said that our conduct must be above reproach every day because perception is reality and the reality that the naval profession is an ethical profession amidst all the challenges and dilemmas and difficult decisions that I highlighted to you today when you move from theory to practice from ethics as an app that you look up the ethical rule to apply to the circumstance not that is not what we do to the habitual are we doing the right things are we doing things right you can build a public perception and maintain a public perception and you have the obligation to do so that says we the naval profession are an ethical profession we do difficult things in an ugly environment called war but the ugliness is not caused by us an ethical failure it is caused by the nature of the endeavor with that I'm eager to answer your questions which I think we have about 15 minutes thank you for your attention