 I'm David Broughy from the University of Sydney and I'm chairing the final session of today's first day of this conference. The topic for today's session is China's counterterrorism strategy in action, the case of Xinjiang. And the speaker this afternoon is Julia Familaro, another international visitor. For this conference she has many affiliations. She's currently working in DC at a think tank called the Project 2049 Institute. She's been a fellow at Yale University in the international security studies program. She's also finishing a PhD on protest in China and states measures to contain protest in China. That's at Georgetown University. She also finds time to be very active on Twitter. If you don't already, you can follow Julia and be kept up to date on almost everything that's going on to do with Xinjiang. Then I'll just do the introductions now then as discussant we'll be hearing from associate professor James Labeled from La Trobe University who is a historian of China's approach to ethnic difference as well as been doing a lot of interesting work more recently on contemporary issues in Xinjiang including the question of the veil and the discourse around the veil in China's counterterrorism strategy. So I'll hand over to Julia now. Thank you so much to A&U and Professor Clark for inviting me today. It's such a pleasure to be back at the university. China's counterterrorism policy in Xinjiang represents an evolving complex and controversial approach to managing ethno-religious tensions. Chinese Communist Party General Secretary Xi Jinping is using a spectrum of tactics to combat the three evil forces of ethnic separatism, religious extremism and violent terrorism ranging from heavy police actions against violent elements to inducements for minorities to enjoy the purported fruits of CCP rule and assimilate into Chinese society. Xi's vision is to grasp the present period of strategic opportunity to make progress towards achieving the nation's centenary goals. Prior to the 100th anniversary of the founding of the CCP in 2021, he has pledged to transform China into a moderately well-off society by doubling China's 2010 per capita income and GDP. Xi furthermore aspires to realize the Chinese dream of national rejuvenation prior to 2049, which marks the 100th anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic of China. Convincing ethno-religious minorities that they stand to reap significant benefits by embracing these goals would consequently also yield benefits for China's counterterrorism strategy. A local population that wholeheartedly supports the regime is less likely to subvert the nation through violent means. The Party thus seeks to strengthen and deepen its ongoing campaign to assimilate Turkic Muslims into mainstream Chinese society through a combination of hard and soft power. Upon launching a strike-hearted counterterrorism campaign in May 2014, ex-UAR Party Secretary Zhang Xunxian stated that Xinjiang would quote, promote the eradication of extremism, further expose and criticize the reactionary nation of the three evil forces, enhance schools' capability to resist ideological infiltration by religious extremism, and resolutely win the ideological battle against separatism and infiltration. In line with Xi's vision, he pledged to fully implement the CCP's ethnic policies as well as improve people's lives through development. This paper will examine some of the core aspects of the Xi administration's counterterrorism policy in Xinjiang. First, it will discuss how ideological imperatives influence Beijing's approach to combating terrorism. Second, it will discuss how ideological imperatives reflect upon the management of religious affairs in the ex-UAR. Third, the paper will describe other manifestations of hard power, including the use of militarized policing and a deepening system of surveillance and patrols. Finally, the paper will consider the potential impact of recent national and regional legislation on ethno-religious instability in the ex-UAR. So first, let's talk about a renewed focus on ideological struggle in the PRC. China formulated its three evil forces terminology prior to the September 11 attacks, but the consequent global focus on fighting a war on terror provided China with a new platform for its political and security agenda in Xinjiang. More recently, General Secretary Xi Jinping's ideological imperatives have influenced the development of China's long-term strategy for combating the root causes of terrorism. As part of his efforts to support the PRC's centenary goals, including the China Dream, Xi constantly stresses the need to actively guide people of all ethnic groups to enhance their sense of identification with our great country and help them to further identify with the Chinese nation, Chinese culture, and the path of socialism with Chinese characteristics. The unspoken understanding is that Xi's remarks are actually directed at PRC ethnic minorities, particularly Turkic Muslims and Tibetans, who have hitherto resisted full integration into the Chinese nation-state. Tibet Autonomous Region Chairman Loh-Sung Gielson pleads Xi's case more directly by stating that minorities will have nothing but, quote, bright prospects for the future if they bind their destiny to that of the entire Chinese nation. PRC leaders thus contend that the China Dream is achievable only if all citizens actively participate in the process of national renewal and rejuvenation. In order to understand the types of policy choices that CCP leaders have made at the state, regional, and local levels, one must first comprehend the contemporary ideological framework in which leaders operate. In April 2013, the general office of the CCP released an internal communique. As it was the ninth dispatch disseminated that year, observers refer to it as Document Nine. It meant for absorption and implementation at all levels of society from the center down to the grassroots. It is already shaping the official public discourse in the Western PRC. The communique identifies disseminating thought on the cultural front as well as the most important political task facing the current regime. It advocates the study and implementation of 18th-party Congress goals, support for socialism with Chinese characteristics as well as the China Dream, the promotion of ideological purity and unification of thought, and strengthening the role of party propaganda and official guidance within Chinese society. Specifically, Document Nine focuses upon what identifies as key problems that threaten the CCP ideological sphere. These false ideological trends, positions, and activities aim to weaken the party's state by calling for the implementation of western thought and practices such as a constitutional democracy, universal values, neoliberal economic thought, a free open press, and a strong independent civil society. The party also condemns those who seek to undermine the state through revisionist criticisms of party history, the reform and opening policy, or socialism with Chinese characteristics. These measures, argue the document, are necessary due to the grave threat of ideological infiltration. China must confront anti-China forces and their attempt at carrying out westernization, splitting, and color revolutions at all levels of party and government. Leaders must therefore strengthen leadership in the ideological sphere, guide our party members and leaders to distinguish between true and false theories, demonstrate unwavering adherence to the principle of the party's control of the media, and conscientiously strengthen management of the ideological battlefield. The directives appear to represent deep anxieties within the central leadership regarding China's external environment. Such anxiety is reflected in an increasing number of articles in the official media and academic journals that argue China must fight against foreign ideological infiltration. Just as a nation might respond to a perceived military threat along its borders by rallying its troops and preparing for battle, the CCP is committing itself to an ideological self-straithing movement. Through the rectification, unification, and fortification of thought, the party hopes to guard against corrosive foreign ideas that potentially threaten its rule. Growing official frustration with perceived U.S. interference in China's internal affairs means that more journal and newspaper articles echo CCP criticisms of U.S. policies. A number of official XUIR publications excoriate not only the United States' executive and legislative branches of government, but also quasi-government organizations such as the National Endowment for Democracy for allegedly attempting to destabilize the Chinese Communist Party, either directly or through proxies such as the Uyghur American Association. For example, take two articles from the Journal of Xinjiang Police Officers Academy. Gu Li'en asserts that the United States, as a leader of Western antagonist powers, will not abandon its strategy to westernize and split up China. Meanwhile, Wang Xiu Li argues that Western nations slander the Chinese government's legal management of the internet, claiming that China infringes upon internet freedom and asserting its management of online news, which limits the free distribution of information as well as freedom of speech. They actively cultivate three evil forces organizations both within and outside Chinese borders, supply support and funding, and make abundant use of the internet to permeate Xinjiang's cultural sphere and create serious violent terrorist movements. For example, Western nations have thus gravely influenced Xinjiang cultural security and social stability. Similarly, Chuncheng contends in the Journal of Kashgar University that Western hostile forces are using human rights, democracy, ethnicity, religion, and other issues to intensify their efforts to split apart China. Xinjiang secondary school students, the author notes, are particulars who are susceptible to the influence of ideological infiltration. Embracing the three evil forces negatively impacts the safety and security of Xinjiang schools by causing the breakdown of ethnic unity and fostering ethnic separatism. Given that Chinese newspaper and journal articles undergo review by party censors, it is unlikely that authors could publish those statements without at least passive government approval, and it is equally likely that the current administration encourages such statements. The XUAR Department of Culture made one of the only comprehensive public stations statements in Xinjiang regarding document number nine. During a study session in 2013, party leaders extolled the great importance of doing meticulous cultural and ideological work. Cadres endeavored to unify their thinking and increase their awareness of the situation at hand as they must possess a sober understanding of the grim situation and challenges confronting the ideological sphere. They must fully recognize the urgency and necessity of doing meticulous ideological work and effectively enhance their political awareness. Cadres must possess a sense of urgency and a sense of responsibility. This strong consistent emphasis on consensus and ideological unity echoes the imperatives articulated in document number nine. The report subsequently identifies five key areas of focus in the ideological realm in Xinjiang. First, the Department of Culture must attach great importance to unifying party thinking and completely implement its policies. Earnestly studying and understanding the spirit of document nine will enable Cadres to resist dangerous ideological infiltration and separatist sentiment. Second, the party should strengthen its guidance by helping the populist discern right from wrong and improving its capability to perform meticulous cultural work. There is an emphasis on infusing traditional culture with a modern spirit, modern ideas, modern technology, and modern means of integration, which is a likely reference to integrating ethnic minorities into mainstream Chinese culture, which are key reoccurring themes in the western PRC. Third, cultural workers of all ethnicities must demonstrate leadership through strict political discipline, education, and guidance on sensitive problems. Cadres must consistently maintain a sober individual mindset so that they are not deceived by illusions or confusion or rumors would be susceptible to erroneous communication channels that promote incorrect thoughts or opinions on public affairs, which complain to the hands of criminals. Fourth, Cadres should ensure that they maintain control over the direction of both traditional and modern culture. Among their responsibilities are promoting patriotism, the rule of law, and maintaining stability in the ideological and cultural realms. And finally, the party emphasizes the need to effectively supervise and control the implementation of cultural policies. Although it should firmly establish a pragmatic work style, at the same time the party must strengthen policy execution without compromising its principles and goals. Xi Jinping is strengthening the role of ideological education throughout China down to the grassroots level of society. Ideological imperatives are inextricably linked with Beijing's long-term counter-terrorism strategy reflecting an official belief that only by successfully integrating ethnic minorities into the nation state can China achieve the twin goals of thwarting ethno-religious terrorism and rejuvenating China? In terms of the management of religious affairs in the XUAR, Chinese leaders are convinced that religious extremism comprises one of the three evil forces threatening China's national security. The effective regulation and management of religious affairs is consequently a critical component of China's counter-terrorism strategy. From the time authorities promulgated the 1994 XUAR regulations on the management of religious affairs until the present, regional religious policies have grown increasingly strict. On the one hand, CCP cadres and government officials have defined the legal parameters of religious faith and practice. On the other hand, they have placed an ideological emphasis on maintaining fidelity to the party state through patriotic reeducation campaigns. Such policies are meant to frame and regulate the religious discourse in society and ultimately subordinate religion to the party. The XUAR regulations are sensibly meant to protect religious freedom, maintain social and religious harmony among groups that practice various religions, or not at all, and manage the administration of religious affairs in the PRC. The state protects normal religious activities and safeguards the lawful rights and interests of religious bodies, cites for religious activities and religious citizens, which are who shall abide the Constitution, laws, regulations and rules, and safeguard unification of the country, unity of all nationalities and stability of society. Chinese citizens cannot engage in religious activities that disrupt public order, interfere with the educational system, or otherwise harm state or public interests. Foreign interests must not interfere with the independent functioning of religion in China, although exchanges based on amnesty and equality are permitted. Religious affairs departments at the county level of government and above must administer religious affairs in accordance with state laws and interests. XUAR party regulations stress the primary importance of maintaining fidelity to the party state. Citizens who profess a religion must support the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party and the socialist system, love their country and abide by its laws, safeguard the unification of the motherland and national solidarity, and oppose national separatism in illegal religious activities. Religious affairs officials must approve all religious seminaries, schools and scripture classes, as well as the clergy that teach therein. Furthermore, all clergy must love the country, abide by Chinese laws and regulations, and submit to routine supervision by religious affairs bureaus, religious organizations, and democratic management committees, i.e. supervisory bodies drawn from clergy and worshipers, at their places of worship or sites of religious activities. Under Chinese law, authorities thus have the power to determine which religious organizations and activities are deemed normal and which are deemed abnormal or unlawful. They may similarly judge whether members of the clergy are sufficiently patriotic. Therefore, CCP members, civil servants, and students must officially adhere to atheism and refrain from participating in religious activities, which in practice include visiting mosques and fasting during Ramadan. The party may expel members who have joined religious organizations. Any religious activities which the state deems to undermine ethnic unity, national unity, or social stability are likewise forbidden. Citizens who believe that their right to religious freedom has been violated may not take legal action against the state. The atheist state thus attempts to create new norms or re-establish previous norms to cement its authority over religious dogma in practice. We'll talk a little more about development of religious work under the Xi administration. An understanding of CCP ideology and security imperatives is essential to ascertaining the future direction of ex-UAR religious and consequently counter-terrorism policies. In addition to considering Document 9, one can also examine Xi's statements at the Second Xinjiang Work Forum in May 2014. All Chinese Politburo members attended the event Beijing, which was the second work forum on Xinjiang in four years. The People's Daily published a one-page article entitled, Do religious work meticulously well? Three theories on the study and implementation of General Secretary Xi Jinping's important speech at the Xinjiang Work Forum. According to Xi, the CCP must engage in meticulous religious work, actively guiding the adaptation of religion to social society, and ensuring that religious figures and believers play a more positive role in promoting economic development. He articulated that the nation should adopt particular principles, methods, and paths to promote ethnic unity and religious harmony. The article proceeded to discuss the dangers of extremist religious ideology, which is behind a series of serious incidents from Kashgar to Turpan and from Kunming to Urumji. Perhaps echoing Mao's depiction of religion as the opiate of the masses, the People's Daily referred to extremist ideology as a powerful hallucinogen that turns an average individual into a killer who seeks to commit violent terrorist crimes. The editorial argues that distorted religious doctrines are used to foment ethnic separatism and terrorism. Party cadres and government officials must therefore support the basic principles of upholding that which is legal, suppressing that which is unlawful, containing extremism and resisting its penetration and striking against crime. We must also safeguard religious harmony, ethnic unity, and social stability. Herein lies the well-being of the 22 million people of Xinjiang. Here party leaders once again draw attention to the importance of suppressing the three evil forces. They believe that the CCP has the right and responsibility to determine which religious activities are considered legal. By delineating right from wrong and guiding the development of religious policy in Xinjiang, it can resist destabilizing ideological penetration. Media reports on high-level visits to the Western PRC often include accounts of leaders interacting with ethnic minority locals. Such encounters reflect the historical trope of cadres listening to and learning from the masses, as well as providing model minorities for public consumption and emulation. During inspection work in Xinjiang, Xi praised an old mom in Kashgar. The elderly man had told Xi that when expounding upon the Quran, he pays attention to preaching about the party's good policies in order to make the masses understand them better. The article states that the existence of religion in human society is an objective fact, so we must do religious work well. Legal protection for religious believers is prerequisite for normal religious needs. We must comprehensively implement the party's religious policies, respect the practices of religious adherence, broaden legal channels for religious people to accurately grasp religious knowledge, guide them to establish the right faith, reject extremism, keep their minds on developing the economy, and improve their lives. In practice, this means that the party, rather than religious leaders themselves, will determine which forms of religious knowledge and religious activities are permissible. CCP leaders recognize that they must co-opt religious elites to effectively implement their agenda. In doing religious work well, we must focus on cultivating a team of patriotic clergy. We must take effective measures to improve the quality of religious figures and mobilize them to carry out the fine tradition of loving the country as well as the people. We must place more focus on refuting fallacies as well as preaching the ideology of patriotism, peace, and ethnic unity. The party believes that in order to win over ethnic religious minorities, it must first target religious leaders. Chinese authorities can subsequently use these clerics as tools to support the state counter-terrorism campaign against religious extremism. To the party, religion cannot supplant the CCP as the most powerful force in people's lives. It must remain subservient to as well as serve the party. Muslims are thus instructed that they cannot place obedience to God over obedience to the CCP. The party must therefore ensure that leaders of religious organizations are firmly in the hands of people who love the country as well as religion. In this way, we can exhort them to play a positive role in promoting economic and social development as well as unite religious adherents to jointly promote better and faster development in Xinjiang. The party is thus placing new emphasis on cultivating relationships with these elites who can in turn responsibly influence the direction of religious ideology and harness the energy of the people for further economic development. Now, moving on to the 2015 regulations, the XUIR religious regulations came into effect on January 1st of last year. At the time, the People's Congressional Deputy Director and Legislative Affairs Committee director, Ma Mingcheng, argued that the religious problem in Xinjiang is increasingly widespread and complex. The old regulation, which was passed 20 years ago, just cannot handle new situations such as the spreading of terrorist or extremist religious materials via the Internet of Social Media and using religion to interfere in people's lives. Many of the 66 articles comprising the law subsequently clarify the nature of illegal and extreme religious activities. Keeping in line with China's post-911 focus on combating the three evil forces, the new regulations sought to address the threat of violent terrorism in addition to ethnic separatism and religious extremism. The regulations also emphasize the importance of preventing individuals and organization from coercing others to radicalize, which reflects an official belief that extremism is on the rise throughout Xinjiang society. It appears that the Chinese Communist Party is using its new emphasis on strengthening established legal provisions and procedures to replace some government directives with written regulations. Authorities seem to have incorporated some local regulations implemented in various parts of the XUIR into this new region-wide version. One can characterize such efforts as an attempt to further normalize and standardize the management of ethnic and religious affairs. As legal scholar Carl Minster articulated, however, the party state did not embrace Western concepts of constitutional democracy or rule of law during the October 2014 Fourth Plenum. The CCP continues to promote technocratic legal reforms in China subject to the one-party political control, but it also takes clear steps to redefine the concept of rule according to law by neutering elements that deems dangerous such as bottom-up participation and autonomous legal forces in favor of a top-down version, one increasingly clad in classical Chinese garb. Although the continuing crackdown on freedom of religion is disturbing itself, the regulations are ultimately symptomatic of a far larger problem. In an attempt to restrict civil society and stifled dissent, authorities are using the specter of the three evils to conflate many traditional, normal religious activities with abnormal and illegal ones. The fact that all but the most serious of transgressions are met with administrative penalties rather than criminal ones also suggests that the government is overstating its case regarding the extent to which minor violations threaten national security. Just briefly with regard to some of the internet regulations, these provide authorities with broader powers to stifle online dissent. Chinese analysts commonly argue that hostile, anti-China Western forces seek to control the internet to promote Western values and subvert socials ideology. The rhetoric regarding internet freedom is simply meant to deflect attention from the Western goal of undermining political stability, ethnic unity, and economic development in more minority regions of China. Beijing has espoused an alternative vision for a patriotic nation of bloggers that promote the China dream and eschew corrupt foreign influences. Government concerns over the dangers of foreign infiltration in Xinjiang extend to the ability of radical elements to assess or access and disseminate religious extremist materials and promote separatist ideology online. Mirroring its response to the Hong Kong protests in 2008 unrest in ethnographic Tibet, the region blamed the 2009 Arimchi riots not in its own counterproductive domestic policies or mishandling of Han Wiga relations in Guangzhou factories but on outside agitators. Authorities in Xinjiang subsequently enacted the XUAR informationization promotion regulation in December 2009 as well as updated regulations on December 24, 2014 which aimed to strengthen the management of internet information security. An overarching goal of the regulations is to crack down on and prevent the use of the internet to manufacture, copy, disseminate, propagate, or store information relating to violent terrorists and or other criminal activities as well as safeguard national security and social stability. Chinese authorities believe that tightening internet controls will stem the flow of extremist materials into Xinjiang and help promote future terrorist attacks. Many foreign commentators argue that the CCP is fearful of online Uyghur communities that seek to highlight their own unique cultural, linguistic, and religious identity. Authorities believe that such netizens may secretly harbor separative sentiments. Beijing has consequently moved beyond monitoring online activity to a campaign of censoring and shutting down websites that it believes threaten national stability. Prominent Uyghur economist Ilum Toti was accused of inciting separatism and sentenced to life in prison for creating an online form dedicated to exchange between the Chinese and Uyghur communities. Authorities arrested and sentenced seven of his students as well. Quickly I'd like to also touch upon the National Security Commission. Upon its formation, many observers speculated that the NSC would play a prominent new role in the formation and execution of the central leadership's overarching national security strategy policies and legal infrastructure in Xinjiang. It was originally announced in 2013 and the commission intended to place a highly empowered group of security experts at Xi's disposal to work the levers of the country's security apparatus. And it's meant to lead and coordinate efforts among various domestic intelligence and foreign affairs organs to more effectively respond to critical security and counterterrorism challenges. The maintenance of internal cohesion stability is at the indisposable core of Chinese national security argues political scientist David Lampton to thwart internal or external acts of subversion in the name of stability maintenance and perpetuation of regime longevity. The state requires a broadly conceived central foreign and security policy coordination mechanism of increasing sophistication, a mechanism that can provide top leaders with options, help establish priorities, evaluate costs and gains and enforce implementation on a fractious bureaucracy in society. However, I've noticed that officials have become increasingly lost to discuss the commission. Extremely little has appeared on it in the media since 2014 and it's thus difficult to know the full current scope of its power and influence. Following a deadly market bombing in a roomchee that left 43 dead and 94 injured, China launched a national counterterrorism campaign on May 25, 2014. Vice public security minister Yang Huning stated that while Xinjiang is the main battlefield in the fight against terrorism, security personnel should view the entire country as one chessboard. Authorities consequently began establishing counterterrorism working groups, the national provincial slash local or regional local and district levels. And we know that China already cooperates internationally through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and other bodies. The first international or excuse me national counterterrorism leading group was established in August 2013, replacing an earlier coordination group. Minister of Public Security, Guo Shenggun serves as the chair of the powerful new body. At the regional level, the newly promulgated 2016 XUAR counterterrorism regulations provide greater clarity into the counterterrorism coordination process. Article 8 confirms the establishment of a leading group to direct regional counterterrorism efforts as well as vertically linked groups at the prefectural slash city and as required county level. The paramilitary Xinjiang Production Coordination Corps has also similarly established a counterterrorism leading group, which is subordinate to the regional body but also coordinates with the public security ministry. Each leading group will establish a working group that handles day to day counterterrorism work. Leading groups at each level report on their counterterrorism work to the body directly above unless an emergency requires a leading group to bypass the chain of command. By creating these vertically and horizontally linked groups, leaders hope to prevent or manage emergencies by enhancing coordination, implementing central directives more effectively, gathering and disseminating timely intelligence to thwart potential attacks, conducting drills and training exercises, and responding decisively to attacks through the rapid mobilization and deployment of counterterrorism teams. I'm just going to talk a little bit about some of these aspects of hard power. XUAR authorities have caused a great deal of international controversy through their use of hard power tactics to combat the three evil forces. Manifestations of hard power include ongoing strike hard terrorism campaigns, anti-terror campaigns, regular vehicle and foot patrols, and a deepening system surveillance and police checkpoints to monitor the movements of the populace. Authorities in Xinjiang and across China have deployed large numbers of armed police units to combat terrorist threats, including people's armed police and SWAT teams. The PAP deputy commander has previously stated that while he feels that China's security situation is overall stable, the struggle against terrorism remains severely complicated. He notes that terrorist networks are simultaneously globalizing and localizing attacks are more sophisticated and they're growing number of lone wolves who seek to commit atrocities. The deputy commander also noted that terrorists are abandoning cold weapons such as knives and axes in favor of hot weapons such as guns and explosives. Reflecting official concerns that China must contend with increasingly organized coordinated and deadly terrorist attacks. As of 2015, we've seen PAP forces deployed in hundreds of cities across China guarding airports, train stations, entry and exit points, and in other high priority venues. I'm going to skip through some facts and figures. You can always ask about them later if you're really interested in economic data. But I do also want to mention something about the surveillance state. Clearly, social stability and instability remains a major concern for Beijing, which particularly seeks to curb the outbreak of ethno-religious unrest and extremist attacks. China is consequently increasing surveillance of the citizens both online and offline as we started to mention before. The Hu Jintao administration began constructing Skynet back in 2005. This is China's nationwide surveillance system. Officials argue that it's meant to maintain the safety and security of the public by deterring and combating immoral as well as illegal behavior. You can see increasing number of cameras all over public transportation, roads, shopping centers, public hospitals, utilities, residential community schools, and so on and so forth. And dissidents, of course, also find themselves under constant watch. And this process has accelerated, particularly since the unrest in ethnographic Tibet and Xinjiang. By 2010, XUAR authorities had installed high-definition video cameras on buses and on bus stops, roads and alleys, markets and shopping centers and in schools. And they've also placed mocks under video surveillance. And officials boasted that the region's eagle-eye cameras are capable of seamless surveillance in all sensitive parts of the room. Xi, undoubtedly a reference to the Uyghur quarter, unbreakable fireproof and riot-proof shells encase the cameras, which can produce sharp, clear images even at night. And police monitor these feeds constantly searching for actionable intelligence. China is also using its surveillance network to develop an advanced crime detection system by compiling surveillance data, including facial recognition software and information regarding individuals' online activities, financial records, and work history. Security officials can predict when and where incidents are likely to incur. Authorities plan to launch the system as a pilot program in the Western PRC where they hope to buttress current counterterrorism campaigns. Authorities have pledged to cover all public spaces nationwide with cameras by 2020. At the same time, authorities continue to buttress electronic surveillance measures in the XUAR. Following the Paris attacks, telecom providers have shut down mobile services for individuals who have avoided use of the real-name registration system, use virtual private networks, VPNs to surmount China's Great Firewall, or download foreign messaging software. Effected individuals in a room she had received text messages stating that, due to police notice, you will shut down your cell phone number within the next two hours in accordance with law. If you have any questions, please consult the cyber police affiliated with the police station in your vicinity as soon as possible. According to Amnesty International, Xinjiang is the frontier for internet surveillance in China due to the critical importance of ongoing counterterrorism operations. You may recall that the authorities famously shut off the internet for 10 months following the 2009 riots, and when the region came back online in May 2010, nearly 80% of Uyghur-run websites had disappeared from the internet. The PRC is also buttressing its surveillance programs through the use of advanced monitoring systems including radars and UAVs along the western and southwestern borders. Border defense units in locales such as Xinjiang are purportedly employing such tools to curb illegal border crossing and drug trafficking. In comparison with the closed-circuit video surveillance previously in use in Xinjiang, the new systems include electro-optic devices and use advanced communications gear and image analysis equipment. These can operate continuously regardless of weather conditions and send real-time information to border control officers. Since the early days of the 2014 Strycard anti-terror campaign, China has deployed UAVs in Xinjiang to hunt down suspected terrorists. During an SCO anti-terror drill in 2014, Chinese drones fired several live missiles. PLA Air Force spokesman Shen Jingke remarked that PLA drones, which are tasked with surveillance reconnaissance and ground attacks, will play a vital role in fighting against terrorism. Western observers have consequently asked whether authorities will begin to deploy armed drones against terrorist suspects in Xinjiang, raising fears of an increase in the extrajudicial use of lethal force. With regard to patrols, these are a common sight in Xinjiang, particularly in Turkic Muslim communities. Some patrols reflect sensitive anniversaries or events and others in response to specific incidents or reflect a heightened overall security posture. Authorities in Xinjiang and beyond regularly deploy significant numbers of pap and swat to patrol local train stations, public squares, tourist spots, downtown areas, and other public places. Such forces have also set up temporary as well as hardened security checkpoints throughout Xinjiang. Public security officials from Beijing to RMG also increasingly rely on volunteers to not only assist patrol teams, but also inform them of any serious or suspicious activities in their communities. Authorities now offer up to $5 million and about three-quarters of a million US dollars for information regarding suspicious activities with potential links to religious extremism or terrorism. Finally, I just want to assess the contemporary counter-terrorism policy in the XUAR. The XUAR People's Congress Standing Committee approved a regional counter-terrorism law on July 29, 2016. The legal interpretation defines what constitutes an act of terror and who constitutes terrorist actors, describe measures meant to combat terrorism, detail security and prevention mechanisms, and provides insight into punishments for transgressors. The regulations, which comprise 61 articles and 10 chapters, came into force on August 1. Regional authorities formulated the measures by combining national counter-terrorism law as well as other relevant laws and regulations with local policies and practices. Naim Yassen, director of the Standing Committee, stated that the regulation can help Xinjiang tackle both the symptoms and root causes of terrorism, namely religious extremism to prevent attacks in the region. Legal scholars have viewed China's recent counter-terrorism, national security and foreign NGO legislation with great skepticism. Rather than strengthen the law of rule of law in China, they serve primarily to buttress Chinese Communist Party rule and suppress dissenting voices at home and abroad. NYU legal scholar Jerome Cohen has argued that the laws collectively reflect the party's determination to create a garrison state through the creation of an ideological platform to guide domestic and foreign policies. Other scholars have expressed similar attitudes toward the regulations. The thrust of the new NGO law is very clear, said UC Berkeley law professor Stanley Lubman, is consistent with a vigorous new Maoist campaign launched by Xi against foreign ideologies and other influences on Chinese social and political development. It is intended to strengthen control by the CCP over Chinese society. A prominent human rights defender in Harvard Law School fellow Tang Biao asserted that the national security law would legitimize the abuse of power by state and public security bureaus. To the CCP, enhancing the rule of law means using legislation as a tool of control. The counter-terrorism legislation likewise contains vague language that authorities could use to suppress dissent in the name of national security. Given nationwide civil society crackdowns and their Trollic state rhetoric warning against the specter of religious extremism or color revolutions on Chinese soil, authorities could plausibly use these regulations as justification to detain or arrest Uyghurs who pass along information to the foreign media, download Arabic pop music onto their phones or attempt to flee across the border to escape religious oppression. Western scholars and officials tend to argue that counterproductive state policies have exacerbated ethno-religious tensions in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. However, it is not necessarily restrictive central state policies alone that explain tensions. Regional and local policies as well as the haphazard implementation of central policies also appear directly or indirectly responsible for the growth of unrest. Polit bureau members articulate specific goals and frame the debate over religious policy. High-level directives such as Document 9, the place in emphasis on defeating the three evil forces, provide the ideological framework within which authorities should act. PRC legislation such as the counterterrorism, national security, and foreign NGO regulations provide the security apparatus with the legal backing to strike hard against real or perceived threats to state power. Similarly, Xi's statements on religious policy at the Xinjiang Work Forum provide state, regional, and local officials with a set of guidelines regarding how the religious masses can adapt Islam to the requirements of a modern social society. Such guidelines stress patriotism, ethnic unity, and religious harmony. They seek to create a framework under which patriotic religious figures can safely instruct the masses on which legitimate religious practices can meet their normal needs. The state subsequently labels illegal religious activities as forms of religious extremism which undermine social stability and endanger state security. The types of ideological and patriotic campaigns that leaders consequently champion provide increasingly shrinking discursive space for ethno-religious minorities to challenge established or developing state norms. However, while leaders in Beijing emphasize that the nation should adopt particular principles, methods, and paths to achieve these goals, the degree to which Beijing is directly or indirectly responsible for specific religious and counterterrorism regulations implemented on the ground in the XUR remains somewhat unclear. While the Politburo mix HORT, the XUR-Proparty Committee, to battle against the three evil forces or create the conditions necessary to foster ethnic unity and religious harmony, until May 2014 there were no ostensible laws that regulated, for example, the ability of a middle-aged man to grow a beard or fast during Ramadan. It was nevertheless possible that Beijing provided specific clandestine directives or religious regulations to provincial officials for local implementation. Even, as mentioned before, the Project Beauty program is framed more as economic development and fostering social and cultural reforms than some kind of region-wide crackdown on Islamic practices. China's regional ethnic autonomy law provides a need for flexibility in creating and implementing laws in ethnic minority regions of China. In times of uncertainty and unrest, however, officials at all levels of government have actually used this law to implement policies that are stricter than other regions of the PRC. This is arguably the case at present as Chinese Muslims such as the Hui are not experiencing the same degree of official scrutiny as Turkic Muslims, but recently Professor Leibow pointed out that you have an increasingly nationalistic and xenophobic body politic in China that is continuing to lash out against Islam. So there's also the possibility that authorities might choose to gradually isolate and severely restrict Hui culture mobility, which would then have a lot of consequences for One Belt, One Road. Providing guidelines and directives to provincial authorities yet granting some flexibility to local leaders may explain why observers are witnessing a diverse set of regulations and restrictions and regulations implemented in different prefectures, counties, townships and villages. If central or provincial authorities were issuing uniform instructions to all localities in the XUAR, then you probably wouldn't see so many discrepancies from one area to the next. Chinese authorities are undertaking a long-term campaign to gradually erase the unique cultural differences that separate Turkic Muslims from the Chinese majority with the goal of incorporating them fully into the Chinese nation-state. The CCP is thus concerned by the marked increase in ethno-religious tensions since 2009. Beijing has begun to shift its rhetoric and approach the Xinjiang problem even if its ultimate mission remains unchanged. During the first work forum in 2010, the party focused on creating leapfrog-style development to simulate the local economy. Yet in the second forum, they focused far more on the challenges that ethno-religious tensions posed society with the ultimate goal of safeguarding social stability and achieving it during peace. As a multi-ethnic social estate that purportedly upholds principles of unity and equality among all ethnic groups, Beijing is lost to admit that its policies are at the root of unrest. Instead, it continues to blame hostile anti-China forces. The American-led war on terror provided China with a more readily understandable and digestible global lexicon, but in reality, one might view terms such as extremist and terrorist as placeholders for classic Chinese Communist Party terms such as counter-revolutionary. In both cases, the CCP employs these terms to describe individuals or groups that hold ideas or commit acts that are openly contradicting state ideologies and policies. This is not to say that terrorism does not pose a threat to China, it does. However, the problem is that China lacks effective mechanisms for ethnic and religious minorities to express legitimate grievances with the state. The state security apparatus threatened prominent ethnic minority intellectuals such as Elim Toti, Tibetan writer Tsering Wosaar, with criminal punishment when they publicly argued that CCP ethnic, religious, and linguistic policies exacerbate social divisions' intentions. Under the three evils framework, the discourse of space for intellectual and civic dialogue is rapidly shrinking. Okay, well maybe that's it then. So anyway, thank you very much, I guess we'll move on. First off, thank Michael for inviting me and convening this wonderful workshop. I mean, I judge the merits of a conference by to what extent there are contrasting viewpoints, and certainly we've seen a lot of contrasting viewpoints today, and that's great for stimulating further research and thought. I mean, one of the challenges with trying to work out what's going on in Xinjiang, or to what extent China has a terror problem, of course, is access to information. And what is wonderful about Julia's approach is her use of Chinese language sources. You know, there's a wonderful amount of detail in her paper. She spends a tremendous amount of time surfing the Chinese language internet and coming up with real gems that give us some insight into what's going on in Xinjiang. You know, CT has kind of become a cottage industry post 9-11. And there are all these global terror experts that many of them know very little about China. Don't speak Chinese. Some have never been to China. And China's done a really good job of kind of calling them out in demonstrating how a lot of the discourse on terrorism is quite removed from the actual situation. And so I think that there's a lot to be learned from what Bill Callahan calls ease-dropping on Chinese public discourse. And it's wonderful that we've got Professor Wei and Dr. Liu here today to provide us with a Chinese perspective on these issues. I think it's really important to do. Julia, in her paper, and I hope I urge you all to read it because there's so much detail in there that's really something that needs to be read rather than listened to. She really, I think, convincingly argues that the perception of the terror threat has led to the securitization of Xinjiang society. Literally a kind of a garrison of Xinjiang that calls to mind what Michael Clark called the national security state situation that China perhaps is entering along lines of what the United States was during the Cold War. I urge you, if you haven't already read, Julia wrote a wonderful article for the National Interest where she demonstrated how this kind of militarized policing is spreading well beyond Xinjiang and it's resulting in the kind of legitimization of extrajudicial force throughout Chinese society. This whole focus or obsession with Wei Wan or stability maintenance actually tends to encourage unruly behavior. I think there's much literature out there demonstrating this and leads to a sort of cycle of violence that can be quite counterproductive. In her paper, Julia argues that terrorism and the policing of terrorism is being used as a lever to police political loyalty amongst the Uyghur minority and the conformity to Han-defined cultural religious norms. So in Xinjiang, if one questions Chinese government policy, one can be labeled a terrorist or if one wears the hijab, one can be called a religious extremist. As she argues, these approaches are counterproductive and I share that view. They actually strengthen the kind of confrontational difference between the Han majority and the Uyghur minority. They also hollow out, as she argued, the discursive and physical spaces where the Uyghurs can express their legitimate concerns. What I found particularly interesting is the way Julia framed this around Xi Jinping's larger policing of ideas as demonstrated by document number nine that was issued in 2003. Warning against the infiltration of Western ideas and values. And while the kind of policing of ideological conformity has become universal in Xi Jinping's China, I would argue that the benchmark for loyalty isn't applied equally across China. Clearly, in Xinjiang and also in Tibet, the benchmark for loyalty is set much higher for the Uyghurs and Tibetans. One classic illustration of this, and Julia pointed out, is the sentencing of Professor Ilham Toti, an economics professor at Minzhu University, to life imprisonment for the charge of separatism. Compare that with the sentence that Liu Xiaobo, the Han political dissident, received only 11 years for inciting the subversion of state power. So there's a different benchmark there that I think is important to take into consideration. As I stated before, the terrorism tag in China has a distinct ethnic face. It applies chiefly and formally to the Uyghurs and to some extent to other unruly minorities such as the Tibetans and to some extent the Mongols. What is interesting about this new terrorism trope is that it complicates the CCP's preferred narrative of the ethnic minorities as a kind of singing and dancing exotic other and taps into a much darker and older narrative of the non-Hanist uncooked and violent barbarians. Now, Julia's paper throws up so many questions, and I guess this conference has as well just a few that I might touch on very briefly. I mentioned this before. How do we get from the problem in Xinjiang being labeled as one of separatism or splitism to terrorism? Sean did an excellent job in kind of an archaeology of this term, Uyghur terrorism, and the important role 911 plays into it. But the renewed focus on it really is timed with the emergence of Xi Jinping and particularly his focus upon rule by law and that attempt to try to legislate terrorism, which has only really occurred over the last five years. So what is going on here? Is it an attempt to kind of rationalize and standardize the policing of terrorism as Julia argues, and I think she's right, or is it also an attempt to kind of centralize political control? I noted Professor Wei talked about some of the problems in the Chinese bureaucracy of dealing with CT issues, the monopoly that a lot of local political officials have on the use of force. The other question it raises is to what extent how bad is China's problem with terrorism? If we look at it in a comparative fashion, is China's problem on an equal front would say the problem that France faces with terrorism? That of the United States or even here in Australia? These are open-ended questions, I don't have an answer to it. I think most would agree now that China does have a terrorist problem. I think even if we take Sean's definition of terrorism, I think we'd have to label at least the Kunming attacks as a terror act. I mean, I think there was a lot of people in kind of Uyghur studies, Xinjiang studies were very reticent to admit for a long time that China did have a terror problem. I think now most of us could agree that there is a terror problem, but then the question is how bad is it? I think actually the CCP government overstates the extent of the problem. I think the problem is isolated. I think it's small. The group of radicalized individuals are quite small in number, and most of them are quite marginalized and segregated in parts of southern Xinjiang. Furthermore, I would argue that the Chinese state has plenty of carrots and sticks to manage this problem. It's a very strong state and that strength allows it to kind of eke out a fragile equilibrium. In terms of carrots, it's a co-opted number of ethnic minorities into the ruling party, and its sticks are well described in Julia's paper, many and very pointy. For me, the bottom line is, of course, China does have a problem with religious extremism and terrorism. I think that problem will continue. It may even increase, but I think these things come in cycles. I don't share the kind of pessimism of some who argue that China is on the brink of collapse, that it's a kind of tinderbox of ethnic contradictions waiting to explode. I think we can often underestimate the power of the Chinese Communist Party and its security apparatuses to at least keep a lead on this problem. But those are just my thoughts based on Julia's wonderful paper that I'll urge you to read, and I'm sure you have many questions for Julia. If Julia doesn't mind, because we're running a little bit short on time, we might take a few questions and then come back to the speaker, just to move things along a little bit. Thank you for your presentation. I just wanted to ask, but the increasing number of Chinese people that are moving beyond China's borders for a number of reasons, whether they be study, working, etc., do you think that will, into the future, at all effect China's narrative back home in terms of sort of rejecting foreign ideological influences that will undermine sort of ideological infiltration and those sort of issues? Let's go back to the more recent Chinese past. So sort of thinking of the early 1950s or to the late 1950s, the focus on the education of so-called patriotic religious personages, for instance, is sort of one of the key phrases from that era. Do you think there's sort of a key, in the sense of what's shown, that sort of genealogy of terminology and discourse in combating separatism or terrorism? Well, to answer your question, I think sometimes the western media, western scholars, tend to overstate the possibility of this occurring. Certainly, we see a lot of Chinese students in the west now, but they're not necessarily studying political science or international relations. They're not necessarily even engaging in these discussions. A lot of them are studying science or business or less controversial issues that they can take with them back to China. There are plenty of well-documented cases of students in the west speaking out on behalf of China, even when they have studied some of these sensitive political issues in the west. So I don't think it's necessarily cut and dry. Certainly, I know some students who are very influenced by their experiences in the west and have gone back to China and now see things differently. And others who, I think, might have felt isolated or had a negative experience in the United States or they were studying with back to China and argued more forcefully in favor of the state. So I don't want to generalize and make assumptions in that regard. Certainly, as a historian, I do see, you know, she is having kind of an exponent grasp of history of ideology. I mean, you know, he did do his graduate work in Marxism. And so, you know, I think that some of these efforts that hearken back to previous eras are very conscious, very conscious effort on Xi's part. I don't think they're coincidental at all. I think that places him in opposition to Liar's life who were, I would say, less ideological. Even if, of course, they're still paying obedience to certain Marxist ideals or norms. I think Xi is kind of unique in the modern era in that regard. And so I do believe that he's quite sincere with regard to his efforts to bring back certain ideas or practices or policies, even if he's adapted them to a modern era and to new norms that have arisen in the post-modern era. Yeah, I was curious. There was a recent policy change, and I can't remember exactly when it was, when they started giving out passports again in the XUAR. And it was interesting that when I was in Turkey interviewing refugees, there was one group that just had legally left using these passports. And then I heard more recently that they cut back on that policy. And so I'm wondering how, your perception of how that fits into kind of the timeline that you discussed in the increased securitization, what maybe was driving that policy and has it been completely scaled back? Julie, I know in your dissertation research you're looking at Tibet as well as Xinjiang. I wonder, is there anything different about Xinjiang? I mean, are the situations there the same or is there something unique about Xinjiang as opposed to vis-à-vis Tibet? First of all, I think some of the differences appear local. I imagine you've heard about, for example, the crackdown in Georgia, where they were strengthening intrinsic controls. No one was getting a passport. And I think those who had passports were supposed to turn them in. So certainly I think we've heard different policies occurring in different areas. And I think that was why I mentioned that we're not necessarily seeing enforcement or even policies implemented in one town or policies that are implemented in one town implemented in the next town. I think there is, especially under the real Yotang's law, some flexibility there. I know that similar things have happened in Tibet. I think they've gone through periods where they would issue slightly more, hold back. I mean, I probably have to go back and look at the dates of some of these instances to really kind of match it up with the larger timeline. But a lot of it does seem related to certain incidents in a given area. Sometimes you have a real region-wide policy, but definitely I think we've seen a lot of localities, prefectures that have scaled back requests or denied requests because of some sort of regional tensions. But I think at the same time with years of the government to push forward one government road, they certainly don't want to be seen as draconian. I think it really behooves them to allow some Uyghurs to go abroad to do the hajj, even if it's within the context of an improved group. I met one gentleman who was allowed to go in the hajj, in part because he was old, he was retired. He certainly wasn't a threat in any way. But then when he did return, he was met by authorities in the airport who then clicked his passport so he couldn't use it again. So it's interesting how, as you mentioned, seeing our policies are constantly warping. But yeah, I think you'll probably have to go back and really look at when certain instances occur in order to be a little more specific. With regard to Tibet, certainly there are some interesting similarities. One of the things that I think is even more clear in Tibet than in Shenzhen is the extent to which you see factional debate power struggles among various groups. In Tibet, I think individuals from the United Front really argue for particularly strict policies. These are some of the individuals, like the Jews who have said the Dalai Lama sympathetic to ISIS or whatever the exact wording was. But these attitudes aren't held across the board. Some officials are much more conciliatory. Some are more draconian. But I think with regard to Tibet, I see a wider diversity of opinions expressed officially. Even if sometimes they'll use a suit of them or something for an op-ed. But certainly at the same time too, you're more likely to see something described as terrorism in Xinjiang and separatism in Tibet. The number of times that officials have labeled events as terrorist in nature in Tibet is relatively low. But you've definitely seen that have been flow in recent years with localities experimenting and implementing more flexible policies. Can you show a photo of the Dalai Lama at this monastery? Yes. What rights do locals have in this town? Are we going to turn a blind eye if they're monks under the age of 18 at this monastery? Are we going to enforce that harshly? Definitely because of the fact that you have the Tibetan population split into a number of different provinces and autonomous regions. I think you can see some of the difference in attitudes much more clearly. But yeah, I think that's something that is endlessly fascinating. Just really looking at the flexibility that autonomous region and provincial leaders throughout Xinjiang and Western Africa to have in attempting to mitigate the effects of protests or unrest. And certainly I think the tools they have are somewhat different. But in both situations, you certainly see increasing surveillance, increasing police presence and increasing restrictions imposed on education, on religion. So even though I think there are very important and significant differences, the similarities are also striking and really important study. Okay, if there are no more questions, I think we might have to wrap things up there. Thanks again to Julia and James for a very rich discussion.