 Good afternoon and welcome to today's IIEA webinar on the Middle East peace process challenges and opportunities. The event is part of the IIEA global euro project and is supported by the Department of Foreign Affairs. We are delighted to have with us as a guest speaker to our Venezuelan, the UN special coordinator for the Middle East peace process. The special coordinator will speak for 20 minutes and then we will have a question and answer session. Please feel free to join the discussion by using the Q&A button on your screen. Please identify any relevant organization with which you are affiliated. The session, both question and answers and the formal presentation are on the record, and this event is being live streamed. If you wish to follow the discussion on Twitter, you can do so using the handle at IIEA. It is a great pleasure for me to introduce special coordinator to our Venezuelan who is a Norwegian diplomat who has had a long and distinguished career behind him. I first met him when we were both junior diplomats at the UN in Geneva, and he went on to a stellar career, which included a period at the Norwegian Embassy in Dublin. Torres for a long time had a special interest in the Middle East, and he was his country's special envoy to the Middle East peace process, which included responsibility for Norway's chairmanship of the IIEA's and committee. He has also worked in the International Water Academy and has done work on transboundary water agreements for the Euphrates and Jordan River Basins. In addition, tour has been ambassador to Egypt and Libya of Norway, and he has also been representative to the Palestinian Authority. So it was not surprising when in 2021 he was appointed by the Secretary General, the UN special coordinator for the Middle East peace process. He is also the Secretary General's personal representative to the Palestinian integration organization and Palestinian Authority, as well as the envoy of the UN Secretary General to the Quartet. The Quartet, as most of you know, consists of the EU, the UN, Russia and the United States. And with that short introduction, I hand the floor over to Tor. Thank you. Thank you so much and good afternoon to everybody. And thank you, Mary, for the introduction. It's great to see you again. We had great time together and I'm delighted that you are now in this position to moderate this afternoon's event. To all of you, thank you for welcoming me to the Institute of International European Affairs, an institution I know very well from my own days in Dublin. Between 89 and 92. And it was one of the places I went myself as a young diplomat to find out about the broader discussions on European affairs, mainly at the time in Ireland. As you know, I mean, one of my tasks is on a daily on a monthly basis rather to brief the Security Council on the developments on the ground and I work exceptionally close with your ambassador, Geraldine Nason in my in my work with with the Council and it's great to have Ireland in the Council, and then you're doing a serious and significant job. But I would like to step back in the beginning to my time in Dublin because all was about German reunification and integration of Europe. But there was one rare stint of some very important Middle East events that actually took place in Dublin at the time. And it had to do with the developments in in Lebanon and the hostage taking that took place. And I distinctly distinctively remember the work done by the Irish then Foreign Minister Jerry Collins. When he in Dublin with the Iranian ambassador negotiated the release of Terry Anderson, Brian Keenan and Terry Waite in the days of August in 1990. And, and the back of that was to then for Deputy Foreign Minister of Iran, Mahmoud Vaisey at the time who facilitated this whole thing. I remember Foreign Minister Collins as a formidable guy that was quite someone to meet in small for us, because he never had talking points. He had only a little bit of an old path and we when we came with an original foreign minister at the time with a file of 50 pages. I remember Jerry Collins was just kind of sitting watching these strange guys coming from Oslo with all their files. He was a brilliant guy. He was brilliantly also the presidency of Ireland during the important events that took place in the spring of 1990. But let me revert to the Middle East peace process, as we call it, which is, as everything else at the moment impacted on events in and around Ukraine. I mean, we don't see the full picture of that yet, but one of the elements in what's going on is the kind of shift of international attention. We have seen this over time. We have seen it back to the Arab Spring that the Palestinian issue the Israeli Palestinian conflict has somehow been pushed to the sideline. It started, as I said, with the Arab Spring, it started with the unfolding events of what what took place in Syria and in Iraq. We dash and then now we see that the developments on ground in the Middle East has also kind of taken much more of attention and much more of financial resources than what was the case before the Arab Spring. So there is a shift of attention away from the Israeli Palestinian conflict internationally. And now the Ukraine war has kind of almost made a brick wall between the attention towards this conflict and what is going on elsewhere. I think it's somehow difficult both for the Israelis and for the Palestinians to adapt to that reality. Because they've been used to slightly different kind of attention span, but nevertheless, that's where we are. In my work, and in my first conversation with the Secretary General, he gave me a one line or he said, whatever you do to see to that there is no war in Gaza. Well, I mean, I was here only for four months and then it was ticking up at the end of Ramadan on the 10th of May last year and it lasted for 10 days and I was a part of the negotiations to stop that war. In Doha with Hamas, with the Americans and the Egyptians online and by a kind of split of a hair, we managed to kind of get that stopped at the time and which is not really what an envoy should do if you want to make long term peace but it is what an envoy has to do in order to see escalation that will make any lasting arrangement almost impossible. It is a challenge, I must admit, to move from the ground of the day to day events into the more principle issues of setting up a process that could lead us in a meaningful way into negotiations between the two sides. But there are some developments that have changed the equations both in constructive and in less constructive way that I want to highlight. First of all, there is a different, there is a different dynamics as a result of the change of guards in Washington, where the Middle East and the Israeli Palestinian focus is more recognizable. It is more like things we have seen before and it's less unpredictable. But it doesn't mean that we are because of that on track into a totally different developments, but I clearly see the footprint of the Americans on the ground, Jerusalem, as a key player in pushing back on some of the events that is taking place on ground, both when it comes to settlement expansion and to eviction and demolitions in and around Jerusalem, and also a clear line from the American side together with the international community to stop the ever expanding role of settlement, settlement of violence and things that are going at the West Bank. But there is also a new Israeli government in place after a whole round of elections and that government is in a way superbly kind of complex in its composition. But nevertheless, there are voices in that government that are different from what we have seen during the previous period with Prime Minister Netanyahu in seats. Well, where does it take us? First of all, I would say that the general picture is in a way negative. There is no stop in settlement planning in settlement expansion. There is a pushback, but there is no stop. There is no major willingness to go into the key issues, key issues of the final status agenda. But there are some openings where we can pave a way forward. There is a development on ground in the Palestinian territory. Some of them are constant. Some of them are very challenging. We still have a serious split between Gaza and West Bank, territorially, but definitely also politically. We see no clear progress in establishing a national common agenda amongst the Palestinian factions. The last attempt that was done in that regard was taking place in early January last year, leading to a decision between Hamas and Fatah to go for elections. It's quite clear that that was not only a political mobilization that took place in the spring last year, but it was also a period of calm. There is a distinct connect between a real process where the parties on the Palestinian side are seeking together and what is happening on the ground. And to me, it is quite clear that if we are going to move from where we are now to a place where we can have a more productive involvement from the whole Palestinian political environment and the different factions, they will somehow need to find together on an agreed national agenda. We don't have that now. If you look at what is driving the conflict, there are three major factors. One is the closure in Gaza and the situation for the population of Gaza to have a standard of normal life. On this one, there is a slight improvement in the development. Another one is what is going on in and around Jerusalem, which takes a rise at flashpoint. And also the developments on ground with with settler violence and attacks and killings and incursions, more or less on a daily basis. And the third flashpoint and the destabilizing factor is the downward spiraling of the political and financial situation of the PA. I would like to deal a little bit with the last element of it because I think it's less known and less attended to the, the situation of the PA economically precarious. They cannot fully pay salaries anymore. They don't have income that matches their spending. They owe money right left and center and the development on ground is not such that we can have short term stability financial stability of the PA for the next couple of years or so best case. In order to address that, there has been messages taken by the Israeli side on opening up the labor market in Israel for laborers from the West Bank. The number of people from the West Bank that is currently working in Israel or in Israeli settlements is more than 150,000 that passes into and out of the West Bank on a daily basis. Similar measures are about to be undertaken by the Israelis regarding Gaza, where we at the moment have 10,000 people working in Israel to be expanded at least up to 20 maybe 30,000. I will not hide the effect of that in the Palestinian economy. And I can tell you if we didn't have that development, the Palestinian situation at the West Bank and in Gaza would have been worse. In Gaza 10,000 workers a day is bringing 2 million shekel into Gaza every afternoon. We haven't seen that for a long time. And if it increases up to 30,000 just to give you an indication, these workers will take back to Gaza the same amount as you and is going to spend in Gaza this year in 2022. The U.N. footprint in Gaza is here is around $800 million. If we have 30,000 workers from Gaza working in Israel, it will mean $750 million a year. So these kind of integration activities is important from an economic point of perspective. The problem with it. The problem with it is that there is integration without regulation. So if we're going to go towards what I will call more of a two-state reality, we at least need to frame that opening and integration of economy with institutional arrangement that would allow for more orderly activities also economically. Moving fast forward, how can we get from where we are to where we ideally should be? How can we get negotiations to start? First of all, my view is to follow. If we go to that too ambitiously, like we have done for many, many years and in vain, we will not get there. We have to see on what type of issues can we get the parties engaged in such a way that we get back to a situation where the PA can be strengthened enough to take care of its own population, but also to be strong enough to go into key areas of negotiations with Israeli Israelis. I'll give you one example only on what I mean with getting on track towards a two-state reality. There are huge areas at the West Bank where there are very little settlements, but a lot of fertile ground for example agricultural economy. If we could kind of rewind back some of the areas that are not under Palestinian control and get them integrated into the Palestinian economy, that's one step forward. If we can get the settlements to hold and get back to a security situation as the one we had in 2014, where actually nobody got killed at the West Bank. Again, we have had a negative trajectory. We need to get back to that and we need to push back and allow for the Palestinians to build in the West Bank, in area B, do economic activity in area C, and have fixed building permits in areas where they are not able to do anything. I'm seriously thinking about the areas around Jerusalem. I only, a couple of hours ago, passed through the no expanding settlement of Gilo. There is a ring around the greater Jerusalem of building activity on the Israeli side. We will have to, in a way, push back on it and the international community will have to stand up to maintain and protect some key institutions that are well placed on land in Jerusalem. That is actually where the Palestinians are living in East Jerusalem, both on the Mount of Olives and in Sheikh Shirah area. There are five hospitals that we need to protect and continue to fund. How can we see to that the situation for the Palestinians are getting better? The Palestinians have, because of the economy, but also because of political decisions taken on the Palestinian side, come into difficult relationship with Europe and the international donor community. It's clear that the actions of the PA against human rights groups at the West Bank and in Ramallah has been a pushback for the international community when it comes to support. The same has the cancellation of the elections in May. I see no serious progress and stability for the PA from there inside the dynamic where they control some pyramids themselves, unless the PA becomes more democratic, more aligned, more focused on the national agenda, and more clear when it comes to outlining a strategy for PA themselves to become a democratic and viable operation. This is what we are working for. This is not only, and I will underline that, it is not only about economy. There is a serious piece of politics that needs to be addressed, not only on the Israeli side with their relentless expansion of settlements, but definitely also on the Palestinian side. It leads us fast-track into a peace process, but it leads us to, and can lead us to a situation whereby we have a degree of stability and interaction, and more interaction where we can find avenues where the parameters of the final can be more easily addressed. I think we have an opportunity to do that. And always in a vacuum of international affairs, one has to move fast because then one may have opportunities that otherwise were not there. We'll see whether that is the case over the next coming months. Thank you, Mary. I leave it at that in the beginning. Thank you very much for that very thought-provoking presentation, Tour. Can I ask you, I mean, you come across as very optimistic that something positive can happen and building on positive things that signs that you see there. What do you realistically see as the future of the quartet at the moment? I mean, that was the, if you like, the international support mechanism for the peace process. I think that it includes people who are now on different sides in an existentially difficult political situation, a war. How do you see the quartet working? That's my first question. And my second question, because it's, it may be, there are no easy questions, and there are no easy answers, but it might be an area where we can make a difference. What do you see as something that the EU can do at the moment? The EU is, I think, has always been a strong financial supporter, but how can it give or support these little seeds of potential that you're seeing there, especially in relation to the Palestinian people? Can I take that right away? I mean, obviously, you can yourself imagine that it is not long ago since I had my last quartet call with all four being online. Well, that is not possible to do just now, for the obvious reason. As long as this may last, I don't know. We have a conflict still evolving and with the political kind of dynamics around that as it is. But you know, I mean, one should always be very cautious to say that this will never reappear or become relevant again in a situation as the one we have now. It is very difficult to establish credible institution that has international legitimacy, and it's very easy to get rid of them very quickly. One will need to kind of take the time it takes to see what it can, how it can reappear and how we can get back to using it, but for the moment, it is obviously very difficult. But I will not write it off at all. It is, it hasn't, this war hasn't changed the formal status of the quartet. The war has changed the dynamics under which the quartet can operate or not operate. We have to live with that for a while and then see what we come back to on the EU side. There is an unclear situation about some key funding from EU to the Palestinian authorities. Money has been held back from 2021 and is still not released from 2022. It's a significant input to the Palestinian economy and to the payment of salaries to teachers and nurses and doctors. And it's a very established and regulated mechanism. So EU is 240 million euros in the back. And I hope that the internal processes that will take place in in Brussels can lead to a release of that, but I would like to put the focus on something else. I mean, EU is now implementing a very important program of supporting private sector developments in Palestine. That work is now being rolled out and I think it's superbly important because we cannot have a Palestinian economy. Where basically the main employment is 351,000 people in the public sector that needs salary monthly in an economy where the PA cannot pay these salaries. I mean, it is the private sector and the integration with Israel that would revitalize the Palestinian economy and EU is playing a very important role in doing that. So what is EU doing politically? EU is first of all a member of the Quartet and has distinguished its work inside the Quartet for a long, long time. I think that's superbly important. EU has also the capacity not only as Brussels, but as member states to make serious footprint on ground here and that is taking place as we speak. Not only Brussels, but the totality of the contributions of the EU to moving forward and supporting the Palestinian institution building and the Palestinian people humanitarian is immensely important. And I can tell you also that it is very important the political connects EU member state to do have with both parties here on ground as a part of kind of addressing the issues I dealt with in my opening statement. It is not like EU is a money back EU has a distinctively impact on their in their discussions with the two parties on how to move the finance forward. Thank you for that. There's a question here from Brendan Ryan, who's described as a barrister at law, and he asks if what progressive Annie has been made on irrigating the Jordan Valley using water from the Sea of Galilee down to the Dead Sea. Is this project progressing and is there cooperation on this between the Palestinian Authority and Israel. Sorry, before I give you the floor there could I just encourage people to let us have their questions by using the Q&A on their screens. Sorry to turn on that on the. Well, I mean, I'm not into the details on the development cooperation, the particular the water developments in the Jordan Valley, this belongs a little bit to my past, I must admit. But what is what is important here is that you cannot deal with the water issue, unless you deal with the water problem in a transponder strategy. The water systems in Palestine, both at the plane and at the West Bank and the East Bank are integrated system that needs to be developed in cooperation. That is to some degree happening to some degree, but it's going by far slower than it should have been going. There are there are challenges. In particular, I would say between Israel and the Palestinians when it comes to using water resources, the centers are taking out much more water per capita from sources at West Bank. There is also a lot of questions relating to reuse of water, where you combine the reuse from settlement with the reuse from villages and towns in Palestine. My view on that is very clear, you don't resolve any water issues in that region unless you cooperate, because the water sources are like in a way. They're the same as oil and gas resources in the North Sea basins. I mean, they're crossing the lines and you need to find ways of working together in order to get the system to work. But I can tell you, this is not an easy area of cooperation that so much I can say but that's as precise I can be I'm sorry for that. Two questions. One from Alex Conway, a researcher here at the IAEA, and he asks for your thoughts on an argument put forward by Porick O'Malley of the University of Massachusetts on what he calls that is Mr O'Malley calls the two state delusion. That is that a binational solution to the Israel-Palestinian conflict is politically socially and economically unviable. And he asks, does the UN need to change its approach on this issue to end the conflict? I mean, that depends a little bit on your concept of a two state solution. The concept of a two state solution is two entities separated from each other, kind of totally. And I understand why this concept has been developed. It has been developed in the negotiations that have taken place since Oslo too. And in easy formulas, it has been like this, we don't want to have any Israelis living on Palestinian land. There are to be no boots on the ground along the borders with Jordan. You cannot have a two state solution whether two entities are completely separate. The ability of Palestine to have a viable economy and become a viable state that can prosper needs integration. There are no resources to kick Palestine going on its own without any cross border cooperation. And a very important part of the two state reality is to have that integration, not only between Gaza and West Bank, but with the markets in Jordan and with the market in Israel. I mean, if you look at what has happened since we started to negotiate Oslo, I mean the economy of the Israelis have grown kind of 10, 15 times from what they were when Oslo was signed. And it is an immense opportunity also economically for the Palestinians. You cannot have a two state solution whether two states are acutely separated. You need to have two states that have an approach of cooperation and integration in a way that more resembles Europe than having. The moment we define the two state solution as a Palestinian island between Israel, Egypt and Jordan. It won't happen. That's a delusion, but that is not the two state solution we are working at as a human. But just to take up that point and it's a fascinating point. Are there discussions in Israel or are there discussions amongst Palestinians on that concept of a two state like almost a shared a shared two state solution. Well, it is not put in the context of a redefinition of a two state solution, but it's seen in a more practical context of people living together and having opportunities where where they're living. There are, there are limitations to that way of looking at it and the limitation is the expansion of Israeli settlements is of the green line, because the, it is very difficult to see a viable state where the Palestinians don't have access to their own land. I mean, we need to resolve that issue, the territorial issue and the building east of 67 is a serious constraint to this integration. And what I'm saying when I say we have economic integration without regulation, we need to have regulatory mechanism that is born into be a part of the two state reality that we can move towards. But for the ordinary people, if you meet them in the streets of Ramallah or in East Jerusalem. They don't see this within the context of a two state solution they see it as a reality of life where they try to kind of cope, but I would say the following that if we are at all to revive the process and have a realistic of a two state negotiation, we will have to look at some of the concept concepts differently from what we did at the time the DOP was signed in Oslo or the Oslo two agreement was signed in Washington. We need to look at concept of more integration of economy, while at the same time keeping the institution so the state separate. That's absolutely fascinating. And there are three unrelated questions here but but they're all important questions so I'll give them to you together. The first is seeking your views on the prospects for the international criminal court, taking up and dealing in a meaningful way with the issue of accountability for alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity committed in the occupied countries and Gaza. The second question is one about how you would see the conflict in the context of progressing climate crisis. And I find this a very interesting question it's from a Catherine at Tarasova a UCD student, because the world has faced three major crisis or is facing three major crisis at the present. One is the continuing pandemic. One is climate climate change crisis and the latest report is not very encouraging. And the third is the existential threat caused by a nuclear armed permanent member of the Security Council invading another state. So in a sense we can't ignore how all of these spill over so I just your views there on the, how the climate crisis will affect the Israel Palestinian issue. And a final question in this group of questions is one that does Mr Venezuelan think that the Russian Ukraine war and the considerable western sanctions has meaningfully changed the nature of the JCPOA with Iran. I know that you're not responsible for the JCPOA with Iran, but Iran is a major player in the region, and is the dynamic of that relationship changing also. Let me start with Iran. And as you said, correctly, it is not my file, but just an observation. The first of all, we don't know where that will end in these final days of talks and you know better than anyone that when you are in the final days before you sign then suddenly you have to deal with a black swan coming in from a direction you didn't fully expect. So let's have this deal signed before we really talk about the impact, but it's quite clear that the whole issue of the Iranian influence in the region including on the situation that relates to my file, the connect that has to do with Israeli security in the north with Lebanon, and also the contacts between Iran and some of the Palestinian faction. It's a reality that may be impacted by such an agreement. But but again, I mean, in the Middle East, you wait until you see the ink drying on the paper before you make too much of analysis and draw too many conclusions on the climate situation. Well, the climate crisis is already affecting here and I mean if you look at the region as a whole. There is an endemic problem, for example, connected to water availability and water use just to mention one but are more. You have the heat waves and how it affects crops. And you have flash floods in the sense that affects the landscaping in particularly in exposed areas like like like Jordan with Valley we clearly we clearly see that. The, you know, the climate crisis is something creepy. Because it comes kind of slowly and then suddenly you realize what's going on. I think there is a need. And there is. There is a distinct and serious discussion between Israel and Palestinian partners on how to address the climate issues. And there are direct contacts between relevant experts on both sides to see how they together can can address it and and find some resolutions that they need to find. Actually, there isn't dynamic around this here that is not well known, but but actually it is more dynamic than I had anticipated where I really just hope that these things can can lead, not only in, not only in in better cooperation but actually resolving some of the issues that are precarious for example the accessibility to water on the ICC and accountability issue. As you know, the ICC issue has been a 21 between the two sides. It is a 21 internationally and and and in a way for the Palestinians and here I just referred to their positions. It is in a way an issue of last resort. I have recently, the last days met with Palestinians who are dealing with the ICC file. And, and the fact of the matter is that the developments on ground Palestine internally is also affected by the same ICC regulations. The situation in Gaza is not only a situation caused by warfare, because that's the more important one, the same as the West Bank, but there is also internal dynamic on the Palestinian side both in Gaza and the West Bank that is affected by possible attention from the ICC and and those who are working on these files on the Palestinian side are very well aware of. I cannot give you. I cannot give you any kind of overview on how I see these developments unfolding over the next, over the next month or weeks. And it is a difficult issue between the two parties that remains the same. There are two questions here I want to put to you and the first one actually leads very much into something that struck me when I was reading your reports to the Security Council. And you will understand what I mean when I say they're very depressing and you list quite rightly all the people who have died violently, either in Israel or in the occupied Palestinian territories in these reports. And it led me to ask myself the question, have people become numb to this reality has has violence just become accepted as part of what people have to live with. And does that inhibit it efforts for peace. And there's a question here long similar lines from Peter McLoone, who's an IIE member. He says, will there ever be a time when Israel and Palestine will share a common readiness to simply promote the interest of all those born and living within the same region, where people will bear no will, ill will or hostility to each other. The recent threat posed by COVID to life regardless of ethnicity or identity is an example of nations being forced to work together to protect each other and from a threat that respects no borders. And the second question is from King Fitzgerald. Mr. Venice land may comment on his perspective of the Israeli military's use of the concept of proximate shields to justify the use of a strike strikes on civilian populated areas in Gaza. And how the UN is responding to ensure that international humanitarian law relating to the protection of civilians from being used as human shields as being manipulated. People are not getting numb to violence. It is bad for all affected, and it affects life of people. They are not numb. They are not numb at the West Bank. They are not numb in the villages. They are not numb in Jerusalem and they are not numb in Gaza. They're scared of it and they're afraid and it has to be dealt with. I agree. It is quite depressive to read out in the Security Council what has happened since last time I addressed the Council. But that is the reality on the ground. But nobody, nobody is getting numb to it. There is no kind of say, oh, kind of this is going on. People are focused on it. They go to funerals and I know who is affected. And it's imperative to be able to kind of deal with this in a different way. As I said, I mean in 2014 it didn't happen. But nobody killed to my knowledge at West Bank. And I have this from my last meeting with the Palestinian Minister for Interior who is actually in a very difficult situation seeing that the security systems we have in place are not working. And those who are in the losing end of that are people. So, no, there is no numbness, but it takes a lot to get it on a different track. I can tell you it takes a lot of work on the both on the Israeli and the Palestinian side and I'm superbly nervous for a situation where we are moving into the kind of combination of Easter Peshaw and Ramadan that we will have at the end of the month given what happened last year with the escalation. I'm just saying that an escalation is as likely now as it came upon us in May last year because too much of happens instead, but it's still with us. And it's clearly that we need to address them when it to be repeated. Is it possible to work on common interests like COVID? There has been on COVID, a very interesting degree of cooperation and it is quite interesting across the board exchange of capacity in the medical areas. The one for me interesting part of it is the huge number of Palestinian professionals, health professionals at all levels that are working in Israeli hospitals. Also in Jerusalem hospitals like Hadassah, there is an exchange and interchange and there has been a clear involvement from the Israeli side over and above what Kovac's mechanism could contribute with to make vaccination available for a growing number of Palestinians. One could say that they've done too little and they've done too late but they've done stuff and they have facilitated these deliveries of COVID vaccines in a very prompt and distinct way. Well, is it possible to kind of develop mentally a common horizon between Israelis and Palestinians and kind of look for a common future? No, it's very difficult. It is probably difficult for as long as we are not able to address the political issues that keep them apart in a different way that we do now. It does mean that there is not a lot of interaction between Israelis and Palestinians at all level, professionals and others. There are more talks between politicians now that we have had for a long, long time, even if there are areas where no contact is taking place. But I mean, I'm not looking at the common vision as the sign of progress. I'm looking at what is really happening and I'm trying to kind of limit the scope of my perspective to that. Actually, what is happening and what we can do to better it on Gaza and protection. I mean, I've had the, my experience is that I have walked into an out of Gaza after five months since 2006. And it's a grim reality. And what can be done to protect and prevent civilians from being exposed in such armed conflict. I would be very cautious here with what I'm saying, but I just want to kind of highlight one thing instead of going into the weeds of whether there are human shields and all that because that is a different one. I don't want to walk into it, but I just want to say the following for any diplomat, any who is working seriously on this conflict. The grid escalation in Gaza is totally to be prioritized. Listen, Gaza is a very small area. It has been more or less locked for people to travel easily into an out of it. There are 2.2 million people living there. And half of them are less than 17. If you have modern warfare on such a ground, Gaza, you inevitably will have high numbers of casualty, whatever happens, wherever the locations are for any military installation and whatever kind of preventive measures that are taken in such a war situation. You will have serious losses where a huge number of civilians that will be killed will be kids. A huge number of installations that will be hit will be schools and hospitals. It is inevitable that warfare in such a place like Gaza has to be avoided because otherwise you you run into all all sorts of terrible kind of equations and qualifications that that you need. It is impossible to run any clean war anywhere, but particularly so in Gaza. Let me stop with that one and just say that when you walk the streets of Gaza after a war, you learn why you have to avoid it. I'm going to beg your indulgence for a few final questions. The first one is from Emily Binshee. She is a researcher at the IEA and she says, today being International Women's Day, could Mr. Venezland comment on the status of women in the occupied Palestinian territories and whether achieving gender equality could be an important factor in attaining a peaceful solution to this conflict. There are two questions which are along the same lines, one from Brent and Ryan and the other from Derek Fitzgerald, members of the IEA, and they both asked, do you expect improvements in Israeli-Palestinian relations as Israel continues to expand its foreign relations with other Arab countries in the Middle East? There's no way to go before we have the same kind of gender equality in Palestine as we have in Europe. Despite modernity, despite education, despite progress, Palestine is still very much rooted in traditions. It doesn't mean that there are not people that are breaking through all these boundaries of gender inequality, but that's the basic fact. What I think is superbly important is to focus more of the attention in the development work towards women and child health, superbly important education, and integration of female workers in the private sector. I think we can do more as international community to support that development, but it is not like this that it will come fast. Palestine is and will remain a quite traditional society, even if it's on track to be modernized. This is my first observation. The issue of the normalization agreement and how it may impact the Israeli-Palestinian relations. First of all, in the talks that led up to signing of the foreign current agreements, there was one that was particularly important. I would say that the fact that the Emirates signed an agreement with Israel where one of the conditions to sign was to stop any plans for annexation of Jordan Valley is already one major outcome of the normalization agreements. That has been immensely important for being in a position where we still can talk about a two-state reality. So that's number one, number two. There is a dynamic in the aftermath of these agreements where there is a lot of attention on the Israeli relations with these countries and more so than how the Palestinians can leverage it and benefit from it. That is still to come on a large scale and there is still to come initiatives in that direction. But these agreements, I mean, they have the potential to have that function down the road. I mean, it was not why they were signed, but they have the potential to be an important part of a broader set of cooperation between Arabs, Israelis and Palestinians in a different way than we have seen before. This agreement is a reflection of the fact that some of the countries have developed fast and in a way where they've defined their national interests in a different way than what was the case. A, when Oslo agreements were signed and B, that was the case when the Arab peace initiative was agreed upon. The dynamics in the Arab world is kind of different from one country to another. But the normalization agreements reflect a new reality whereby individual Arab countries can have their own bilateral relationship with Israel in a totally different way than what was foreseen only 15 years back. And this development will continue. So, so it is not anymore that the Israeli Palestinian relations are defining the relations between individual Arab member countries and Israel in the same way as before. That's clear. And that is what this agreement is manifesting. Well, thank you very much to her and thank you so much for dealing with all the questions. Thank you for your enthusiasm and also for some very thought provoking ideas there. And I want to end with a quote, I'm going to quote you back to yourself, because I thought it was a very interesting quote from your last presentation at the Security Council. And you said that we must push beyond the paradigm of managing rather than resolving the conflict. And I think as long as we keep that in mind, it isn't just managing it making life better day to day, but actually making it better in the long term that I think we might achieve some progress. But thank you very, very much. And the best of luck to you and to the UN in your endeavors. Thank you so much. Thank you for inviting me. Good to see you again, Mary, and have a good afternoon.