 Question 59 of Summa Theologica, Paris Prima, on the Angels and on the Six Days. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Recording by Simon Wainwright. Summa Theologica, Paris Prima, on the Angels and on the Six Days. By St. Thomas Aquinas. Translated by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province. Question 59. The Will of the Angels, for Articles. Question 59. The Will of the Angels, for Articles. In the next place, we must treat of things concerning. The Will of the Angels. In the first place, we shall treat of the Will itself. Secondly, of its movement, which is love. Under the first heading, there are four points of inquiry. One, whether there is Will in the Angels. Two, whether the Will of the Angel is his nature or his intellect. Three, is there free Will in the Angels. Four, is there an irascible and a concupiscous appetite in them. First article. Whether there is Will in the Angels. Objection 1. It would seem that there is no Will in the Angels. Four, as the philosopher says. D. Anama III, text 42. The Will is in the Reason. But, there is no Reason in the Angels. But, something higher than Reason. Therefore, there is no Will in the Angels. But, something higher than the Will. Objection 2. Further, the Will is comprised under the Appetite, as is evident from the philosopher. D. Anama III, text 42. But, the Appetite argues something imperfect. Because, it is a desire of something not as yet possessed. Therefore, since there is no imperfection in the Angels, especially in the blessed ones, it seems that there is no Will in them. Objection 3. Further, the philosopher says. D. Anama II, text 54. That the Will is a mover, which is moved. For, it is moved by the appetable object understood. Now, the Angels are immovable. Since, they are incorporeal. Therefore, there is no Will in the Angels. On the contrary, Augustine says. D. Trin 10, 11, 12. That the image of the Trinity is found in the soul, according to the memory, understanding, and Will. But, God's image is found not only in the soul of man, but also in the angelic mind, since it also is capable of knowing God. Therefore, there is Will in the Angels. I answer that we must necessarily place a Will in the Angels. In evidence thereof, it must be borne in mind that since all things flow from the Divine Will, all things in their own way are inclined by appetite towards good, but in different ways. Some are inclined to good by their natural inclination without knowledge, as plants and inanimate bodies. Such inclination towards good is called a natural appetite. Others, again, are inclined towards good, but with some knowledge. Not that they know the aspect of goodness, but that they apprehend some particular good, as in the sense which knows the sweet, the white, and so on. The inclination which follows this apprehension is called a sensitive appetite. Other things, again, have an inclination towards good, but with a knowledge whereby they perceive the aspect of goodness. This belongs to the intellect. This is most perfectly inclined towards what is good, not indeed as if it were merely guided by another towards some particular good only, like things devoid of knowledge, nor towards some particular good only as things which have only sensitive knowledge, but as inclined towards good in general. Such an inclination is termed will. Accordingly, since the angels by their intellect know the universal aspect of goodness, it is manifest that there is a will in them. Reply, Objection I, reason surpasses sense in a different way from that in which intellect surpasses reason. Reason surpasses sense according to the diversity of the objects known for sense judges of particular objects, while reason judges of universals. Therefore, there must be one appetite tending towards good in the abstract. Which appetite belongs to reason? And another with a tendency towards particular good. Which appetite belongs to sense? But intellect and reason differ as to their manner of knowing, because the intellect knows by simple intuition, while reason knows by a process of discursion from one thing to another. Nevertheless, by such discursion reason comes to know what intellect learns without it, namely the universal. Consequently, the object presented to the appetitive faculty on the part of reason and on the part of intellect is the same. Therefore, in the angels who are purely intellectual, there is no appetite higher than the will. Reply, Objection II, although the name of the appetitive part is derived from seeking things not yet possessed, yet the appetitive part reaches out not to these things only, but also to many other things. Thus, the name of a stone, lapis, is derived from injuring the foot, laison pedis, though not this alone belongs to a stone. In the same way, the arrestable faculty is so denominated from anger, Ira, though at the same time there are several other passions in it, as hope, daring, and rest. Reply, Objection III, the will is called a mover which is moved. According as to will and to understand are termed movements of a kind, and there is nothing to prevent movement of this kind from existing in the angels since such movement is the act of a perfect agent, as stated in De Anima III, text 28. Second article, whether in the angels the will differs from the intellect, Objection I, it would seem that in the angel the will does not differ from the intellect and from the nature. For an angel is more simple than a natural body, but a natural body is inclined through its form towards its end which is its good. Therefore, much more so is the angel. Now, the angel's form is either the nature in which he subsists or else it is some species within his intellect. Therefore, the angel inclines towards the good through his own nature or through an intelligible species, but such inclination towards the good belongs to the will. Therefore, the will of the angel does not differ from his nature or his intellect. Objection II, further, the object of the intellect is the true, while the object of the will is the good. Now, the good and the true differ, not really, but only logically. Therefore, will and intellect are not really different. Objection III, further, the distinction of common and proper does not differentiate the faculties for the same power of sight perceives color and whiteness, but the good and the true seem to be mutually related as common to particular, for the true is a particular good to wit of the intellect. Therefore, the will whose object is the good does not differ from the intellect whose object is the true. On the contrary, the will in the angels regards good things only, while their intellect regards both good and bad things, for they know both. Therefore, the will of the angels is distinct from their intellect. I answered that in the angels the will is a special faculty or power, which is neither their nature nor their intellect, that it is not their nature is manifest from this, that the nature or essence of a thing is completely comprised within it. Whatever then extends to anything beyond it is not its essence. Hence, we see in natural bodies that the inclination to being does not come from anything super-added to the essence, but from the matter which desires being before possessing it, and from the form which keeps it in such being when once it exists, but the inclination towards something extrinsic comes from something super-added to the essence. As tendency to a place comes from gravity or lightness, while the inclination to make something like itself comes from the active qualities. Now, the will has a natural tendency towards good. Consequently, there alone are essence and will identified where all good is contained within the essence of him who wills, that is to say, in God. Who wills nothing beyond himself except on account of his goodness. This cannot be said of any creature because infinite goodness is quite foreign to the nature of any created thing. Accordingly, neither the will of the angel nor that of any creature can be the same thing as its essence. In like manner, neither can the will be the same thing as the intellect of angel or man because knowledge comes about in so far as the object known is within the knower. Consequently, the intellect extends itself to what is outside it. According as what is its essence is outside it is disposed to be somehow within it. On the other hand, the will goes out to what is beyond it. According as by a kind of inclination it tends in a manner to what is outside it. Now, it belongs to one faculty to have within itself something which is outside it and to another faculty to tend to what is outside it. Consequently, intellect and will must necessarily be different powers in every creature. It is not so with God for he has within himself universal being and the universal good. Therefore, both intellect and will are his nature. Reply, Objection 1, A natural body is moved to its own being by its substantial form while it is inclined to something outside by something additional as has been said. Reply, Objection 2, faculties are not differentiated by any material difference of their objects but according to their formal distinction which is taken from the nature of the object as such. Consequently, the diversity derived from the notion of good and true suffices for the difference of intellect from will. Reply, Objection 3, because the good and the true are really convertible it follows that the good is apprehended as something true while the true is desired by the will as something good. Nevertheless, the diversity of their aspects is sufficient for diversifying the faculties as was said above. Add 2, Third Article whether there is free will in the angels. Objection 1, it would seem that there is no free will in the angels for the act of free will is to choose but there can be no choice with the angels because choice is the desire of something after taking counsel while counsel is a kind of inquiry as stated in Ethic 3.3. The angels' knowledge is not the result of inquiring for this belongs to the discursiveness of reason. Therefore, it appears that there is no free will in the angels. Objection 2, further free will implies indifference to alternatives but in the angels on the part of their intellect there is no such indifference because as we observed already Question 58, Article 5 their intellect is not deceived as to things which are naturally intelligible to them. Therefore, neither on the part of their appetitive faculty can there be free will. Objection 3, further of the angels belong to them according to degrees of more or less because in the higher angels the intellectual nature is more perfect than in the lower but the free will does not admit of degrees therefore there is no free will in them. On the contrary, free will is part of man's dignity but the angels' dignity surpasses that of man. Therefore, since free will is in men with much more reason is it in the angels? I answer that some things that are which act not from any previous judgment but as it were moved to act by others just as the arrow is directed to the target by the archer. Others act from some kind of judgment but not from free will such as irrational animals for the sheep flies from the wolf by a kind of judgment whereby it esteems it to be hurtful to itself. Such a judgment is not a free one but implanted by nature only an agent endowed with an intellect can act with a judgment which is free and so far as it apprehends the common note of goodness from which it can judge this or the other thing to be good consequently, wherever there is intellect it is therefore manifest that just as there is intellect so is their free will in the angels and in a higher degree of perfection than in man. Reply Objection 1. The philosopher is speaking of choice as it is in man as a man's estimate in speculative matters differs from the angels in this that the one needs not to inquire while the other does so need so is it in practical matters hence there is choice in the angels yet not with the inquisitive deliberation of counsel but by the sudden acceptance of truth. Reply Objection 2. As was observed already, article 2 knowledge is affected by the presence of the known within the knower. Now it is a mark of imperfection in anything not to have within it what it should naturally have consequently an angel would not be perfect in his nature if his intellect were not determined to every truth which he can know naturally. But the act of the appetive faculty comes of this, that the affection is directed to something outside yet the perfection of a thing does not come from everything to which it is inclined something which is higher than it therefore it does not argue imperfection in an angel if his will be not determined with regard to things beneath him but it would argue imperfection in him were he to be indeterminate to what is above him. Reply Objection 3. The angel exists in a nobler manner in the higher angels than it does in the lower. As also does the judgment of the intellect yet it is true that liberty and so far as the removal of compulsion is considered is not susceptible of greater and less degree because privations and negations are lessened nor increased directly of themselves but only by their cause or through the addition of some qualification. Article 4. Whether there is an erasable and a concupiscible appetite in the angels Objection 1. It would seem that there is an erasable and concupiscible appetite in the angels. For Dionysus says divine names for that in the demons there is unreasonable fury and wild concupiscence but demons are of the same nature as angels therefore there is an erasable and a concupiscible appetite in the angels. Objection 2. Further love and joy are in the concupiscible while anger, hope and fear are in the erasable appetite but in the sacred scriptures these things are attributed both to the good and to the wicked angels therefore there is an erasable and a concupiscible appetite in the angels. Objection 3. Further some virtues are said to reside in the erasable appetite and some in the concupiscible thus charity and temperance appear to be in the concupiscible while hope and fortitude are in the erasable but these virtues are in the angels therefore there is both a concupiscible and an erasable appetite in the angels. On the contrary the philosopher says Deanima 3, text 42 that the erasable and the concupiscible are in the sensitive part of the angels. Consequently there is no erasable or concupiscible appetite in the angels. I answer that the intellect appetite is not divided into erasable and concupiscible only the sensitive appetite is so divided the reason of this is because since the faculties are distinguished from one another not according to the material but only by the formal distinction of objects. If to any faculty they respond in object according to some common idea there will be no distinction of faculties according to the diversity of the particular things contained under the common idea just as if the proper object of the power of sight be colored as such then there are not several powers of sight distinguished according to the difference of black and white whereas if the proper object of any faculty were white as white then the faculty of seeing white would be distinguished from the faculty of seeing black. It is quite evident from what has been said that the object of the intellect appetite otherwise known as the will is good according to the common aspect of goodness nor can there be any appetite except of what is good hence in the intellect part the appetite is not divided according to the distinction of some particular good things as the sensitive appetite is divided which does not crave for what is good according to its common aspect but for some particular good object accordingly since there exist in the angels only an intellect of appetite their appetite is not distinguished into irascible but remains undivided and it is called the will reply objection one theory and cockupist since are metaphorically said to be in the demons as anger is sometimes attributed to God on account of the resemblance in the effect reply objection two love and joy in so far as they are passions are in the concupisable appetite but in so far as they express a simple act of the will they are in the intellect of part in this sense to love is to wish well to anyone and to be glad is for the will to repose good possessed universally speaking none of these things is said of the angels as by way of passions as Augustine says the civ day nine reply objection three charity as a virtue is not in the concupisable appetite but in the will because the object in the concupisable appetite is the good as the lectable to the senses but the divine goodness which is the object of charity is not of any such kind for the same reason it must be said that hope does not exist in the irascible appetite because the object of the irascible appetite is something arduous which the virtue of hope does not regard since the object of hope is arduous and divine temperance however considered as a human virtue deals with the desires of sensible pleasures which belong to the concupisable faculty similarly fortitude regulates daring and fear which resides in the irascible part consequently temperance in so far as it is a human virtue resides in the concupisable part and fortitude in the irascible but they do not exist in the angels in this manner for in them there are no passions of concupiscence nor of fear and daring to be regulated by temperance but temperance is predicated of them according as in moderation they display their will in conformity with the divine will fortitude is likewise attributed to them in so far as they firmly carry out the divine will all of this is done by their will and not by the irascible or concupisable appetite end of question 59 recording by Simon Wainwright question 60 of Summa Theologica Paz Prima on the Angels and on the Six Days this is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org Summa Theologica Paz Prima on the Angels and on the Six Days by St Thomas Aquinas translated by the fathers of the English Dominican province question 60 of the Love or Dilection of the Angels the next subject for our consideration is that act of the will which is Love or Dilection because every act of the appetitive faculty comes of Love under this heading there are five points of inquiry 1. whether there is natural love in the Angels 2. whether there is in them love of choice 3. whether the Angel loves himself with natural love or with love of choice 4. whether one Angel loves another with natural love as he loves himself 5. whether the Angel loves God more than self with natural love first article Paz Prima question 60 article 1 whether there is natural love or Dilection in an Angel it would seem that there is no natural love or Dilection in the Angels 4. natural love is contradistinguished from intellectual love as stated by Dionysus divine names 4. but an Angel's love is intellectual therefore it is not natural objection 2 further those who love with natural love are more acted upon than active in themselves for nothing has control over its own nature now the Angels are not acted upon in the act of themselves because they possess free will as was shown above question 59 article 3 consequently there is no natural love in them objection 3 further every love is either ordinate or inordinate now ordinate love belongs to charity while inordinate love belongs to wickedness but neither of these things belong to nature because charity is above nature while wickedness is against the nature therefore there is no natural love in the Angels on the contrary love results from knowledge for nothing is loved except it be first known as Augustine says on the Trinity 10, 1 and 2 but there is natural knowledge in the Angels therefore there is also natural love I answer that we must necessarily place natural love in the Angels in evidence of this we must bear in mind that what comes first is always sustained in what comes after it now nature comes before intellect because the nature of every subject is its essence consequently whatever belongs to nature must be preserved likewise in such subjects as have intellect but it is common to every nature to have some inclination and this is its natural appetite or love this inclination is found to exist differently in different natures but in each according to its mode consequently in the intellectual nature there is to be found a natural inclination coming from the will in the sensitive nature according to the sensitive appetite but in a nature devoid of knowledge only according to the tendency of the nature to something therefore since an Angel is an intellectual nature there must be natural love in its will reply to objection one intellectual love is contradistinguished from that natural love which is merely natural insofar as it belongs to a nature which has not likewise the perfection by the sense or intellect reply to objection two all things in the world are moved to act by something else except the first agent who acts in such a manner that he is in no way moved to act by another and in whom nature and will are the same so there is nothing unfitting in an Angel being moved to act insofar as such natural inclination is implanted in him by the author of his nature yet he is not so moved to act that he does not act himself because he has free will reply to objection three as natural knowledge is always true so is natural love well regulated because natural love is something else than the inclination implanted in nature by its author to say that a natural inclination is not well regulated is to derogate from the author of nature yet the rectitude of natural love is different from the rectitude of charity in virtue because the one rectitude perfects the other even so the truth of natural knowledge is of one kind and the truth of infused or acquired knowledge is of another second article article two whether there is love of choice in the Angels objection one it would seem that there is no love of choice in the Angels for love of choice appears to be rational love since choice follows counsel which lies in inquiry as stated in ethics three three now rational love is contrasted with intellectual which is proper to Angels as is said divine names for therefore there is no love of choice in the Angels objection two further the Angels have only natural knowledge besides such as is infused since they do not proceed from principles to acquire the knowledge of conclusions hence they are disposed to everything they can know as our intellect is disposed towards first principles which can know naturally now love follows knowledge as has already been stated article one question 16 article one consequently because they're infused love there is only natural love in the Angels therefore there is no love of choice in them on the contrary we neither merit nor demerit by our natural acts but by the love the Angels merit or demerit therefore there is love of choice in them I answer that there exists in the Angels a natural love and a love of choice their natural love is the principle of their love of choice because what belongs to that which proceeds has always the nature of a principle therefore since nature is first in everything what belongs to nature must be a principle in everything this is clearly evident in man with respect to both his intellect and his will for the intellect knows principles naturally and from such knowledge in man comes the knowledge of conclusions which are known by him not naturally but by discovery or by teaching in like manner the end acts in the will in the same way as the principle does in the intellect as these laid down in physics to text 89 consequently the will tends naturally to its last end for every man naturally wills happiness and all other desires are caused by this natural desire since whatever man wills he wills on account of the end therefore the love of that good which a man naturally wills as an end is his natural love but the love which comes of this which is of something loved for the end's sake is the love of choice there is however a difference on the part of the intellect and on the part of the will because as was stated already question 59 article 2 the mind's knowledge is brought about by the inward presence of the known within the knower it comes of the imperfection of man's intellectual nature that his mind does not simultaneously possess all things capable of being understood but only a few things from which he is moved in a measure to grasp other things the act of the apetitive faculty on the contrary follows the inclination of man towards things some of which are good in themselves and consequently are apetable in themselves others being good only in relation to something else and being apetable on account of something else consequently it does not argue imperfection in the person desiring for him to seek one thing naturally as his end and something else from choice as ordained to such end therefore since the intellectual nature of the angels is perfect only natural and not deductive knowledge is to be found in them but there is to be found in them both natural love and love of choice in saying all this we are passing over all that regards things which are above nature since nature is not the sufficient principle thereof but we shall speak of them later on question 62 reply to objection 1 not all love of choice is rational love according as rational is distinguished from intellectual love for rational love is so called which follows deductive knowledge but as was said above question 59 article 3 and 1 when treating of free will every choice does not follow a discursive act of the reason but only human choice consequently the conclusion does not follow the reply to the second objection follows from what has been said third article pass prima question 60 article 3 whether the angel loves himself with both natural love and love of choice objection 1 it would seem that the angel does not love himself both with natural love and a love of choice for as we said in article 2 natural love regards the end itself while love of choice regards the means to the end but the same thing with regard to the same cannot be both the end and a means to the end therefore natural love and the love of choice cannot have the same object objection 2 further as Dionysus observes divine names fall love is a uniting and a binding power but uniting and binding imply various things brought together therefore the angel cannot love himself objection 3 further love is a kind of movement but every movement tends towards something else therefore it seems that an angel cannot love himself and either natural or elective love on the contrary the philosopher says ethics 9 8 love for others comes of love for himself since the object of love is good and good is to be found both in substance and in accident as in clear from ethics 1 6 a thing may be loved in two ways first of all as a subsisting good and secondly as an accidental or inherent good that is loved as a subsisting good which is so loved that we wish well to it but that which we wish unto another loved as an accidental or inherent good thus knowledge is loved not that any good may come of it but that it may be possessed this kind of love has been called by the name concupiscence while the first is called friendship now it manifests that in things devoid of knowledge everything naturally seeks to procure what is good for itself as fire seeks to mount upwards consequently both angel and man naturally seek their own good and perfection this is to love self hence angel and man naturally love self in so far as by natural appetite each desires what is good for self on the other hand each loves self with the love of choice in so far as from choice he wishes for something which will benefit himself reply to objection 1 it is not under the same but under quite different aspects that an angel or a man loves self with natural with elective love as was observed above reply to objection 2 as to be one is better than to be united so there is more oneness in love which is directed to self than in love which unites one to others Dionysus uses the terms uniting and binding in order to show the derivation of love from self to things outside self as uniting is derived from unity reply to objection 3 as love is an action which remains within the agent so also is it a movement which abides within the lover but does not of necessity tend towards something else yet it can be reflected back upon the lover so that he loves himself just as knowledge is reflected back upon the knower in such a way that he knows himself 4th article pas prima question 60 article 4 whether an angel loves another with natural love as he loves himself objection 1 it would seem that an angel does not love another with natural love as he loves himself for love follows knowledge but an angel does not know another as he knows himself because he knows himself by his essence while he knows another by its similitude as was said above question 56 articles 1 and 2 therefore it seems that one angel does not love another with natural love as he loves himself objection 2 further the cause is more powerful than the effect and the principle than what is derived from it but love for another comes of love for self as the philosopher says ethic 9 8 therefore one angel does not love another as himself but loves himself more objection 3 further natural love is of something as an end and is more but no angel is the end of another and again such love can be severed from him as is the case with the demons who have no love for the good angels therefore an angel does not love another with natural love as he loves himself on the contrary that seems to be a natural property which is found in all even in such as devoid of reason but every beast loves its like as is said syrup 13 therefore an angel naturally loves another as he loves himself I answer that as was observed in article 3 both angel and man naturally love self now what is one with a thing is that thing itself consequently everything loves what is one with itself so if this be one with it by natural union it loves it with natural love but if it be one with it by non-natural union then it loves it with non-natural love so the man loves his fellow townsman with a social love while he loves a blood relation with natural affection insofar as he is one with him in the principle of natural generation now it is evident that what is generally or specifically one with another is the one according to nature and so everything loves another which is one with it in species with a natural affection insofar as it loves its own species this is manifest even in things devoid of knowledge for fire has a natural inclination to communicate its form to another thing wherein consists this other things good it is naturally inclined to seek its own good namely to be born upwards so then it must be said that one angel loves another with natural affection insofar as he is one with him in nature but so far as an angel has something else in common with another angel or differs from him in other respects he does not love him with natural love reply to objection one the expression as himself can in one way qualify the knowledge and the love on the part of the one known and loved and thus one angel knows another as himself because he knows the other to be even as he knows himself to be in another way the expression can qualify the knowledge and the love on the part of the knower and lover and thus one angel does not know another as himself because he knows himself by his essence and the other not by the other's essence in like manner he does not love another as he loves himself because he loves himself by his own will but he does not love another by the other's will reply to objection two the expression as does not denote equality but likeness for since natural affection rests upon natural unity the angel naturally loves less what is less one with him consequently he loves more what is numerically one with himself than what is one only generically or specifically but it is natural for him to have a like love for another as for himself in this respect that as he loves self in wishing well to self so he loves another in wishing well to him reply to objection three natural love is said to be the end not as of that end to which good is willed but rather as of the good which one wills for oneself and in consequence for another as united to oneself nor can such natural love be stripped from the wicked angels without their still retaining a natural affection towards the good angels insofar as they share the same nature with them but they hate them insofar as they are unlike them according to righteousness and unrighteousness fifth article past prima question 60 article 5 whether an angel by natural love loves God more than he loves himself objection one it would seem that an angel does not love God by natural love more than he loves himself for as was stated in article 4 natural love rests upon natural union now the divine nature is far above the angelic nature therefore according to natural love the angel loves God less than self or even than another angel objection two further that on account of which a thing is such it is yet more so but every one loves another with natural love for his own sake because one thing loves another as good for itself therefore the angel does not love God more than self with natural love objection three further nature is self-centered in its operation for we behold every agent acting naturally for its own preservation but nature's operation would not be self-centered were it to tend towards anything else more than to nature itself therefore the angel does not love God more than himself from natural love objection four further it is proper to charity to love God more than self but to love from charity is not natural to the angels for it is poured out upon their hearts by the Holy Spirit who is given to them as Augustine says the city of God twelve nine therefore the angels do not love God more than themselves by natural love objection five further natural love lasts while nature endures by the love of God more than self does not remain in the angel or man for Augustine says the city of God fourteen two loves have made two cities namely love of self unto the contempt of God has made the earthly clay while love of God unto the contempt of self has made the heavenly city therefore it is not natural to love God more than self on the contrary all the moral precepts of law come to the law of nature but the precept of loving God more than self is the moral precept of the law therefore it is of the law of nature consequently from natural love the angel loves God more than himself I answer that there have been some who maintained that an angel loves God more than himself with natural love both as to the love of through his seeking the divine good for himself rather than his own good and in a fashion as it is to the love of friendship he desires a greater good to God than to himself because he naturally wishes God to be God while as for himself he wills to have his own nature but absolutely speaking out of the natural love he loves himself more than he does God because he naturally loves himself before God and with greater intensity the falsity of such an opinion stands in evidence if one but consider with the natural movement tends in the natural order of things the natural tendency of things devoid of reason shows the nature of the natural inclination residing in the will of an intellectual nature now in natural things everything which as such naturally belongs to another is principally and more strongly inclined to that other to which it belongs than towards itself such a natural tendency is evidence from things which are moved according to nature because according as a thing is moved naturally it has an inbound attitude to be thus moved as stated in physics to text 78 for we observe that the part naturally exposes itself in order to safeguard the whole as for instance the hand is without the liberalation exposed to the blow for the whole body's safety and since reason copies nature we find the same inclination among the social virtues for it behooves the virtuous citizen to expose himself to the danger of the public wheel of the state and if man were a natural part of the city then such inclination would be natural to him consequently since god is the universal good and under this good both man and angel and all creatures are compromised because every angel in regard to its entire being naturally belongs to god it follows that from natural love angel and man alike love god before themselves and with a greater love otherwise if either of them loved self more than god it would follow that natural love would be perverse and that it would not be perfected but destroyed by charity reply to objection one such reasoning holds good of things adequately divided where of one is not the cause of the existence and goodness of the other for in such nature's love loves itself naturally more than it does the other in as much as it is more one with itself than it is with the other but where one is the whole cause of the existence and goodness of the other that one is naturally more love than the self because as we said above each part naturally loves the whole more than itself and each individual naturally loves the good of the species more than its own individual good now god is not only the good of one species but is absolutely the universal good hence everything in its own way naturally loves god more than itself reply to objection two when it is said that god is loved by an angel in so far as he is good to the angel if the expression in so far denotes an end then it is false for he does not naturally love god for his own good but for god's sake if it denotes the nature of love on the lovers part then it is true for it would not be the nature of anyone to love god except from this that everything is dependent on that good which is god reply to objection three nature's operation is self centered not merely as to the certain particular details but much more as to what is common for everything is inclined to preserve not merely its individuality but likewise its species and much more as everything a natural inclination towards what is the absolutely universal good reply to objection four god in so far as he is the universal good from whom every natural good depends is loved by everything with natural love so far as he is the good which of its very nature beatifies all with supernatural beatification he is love with the love of charity reply to objection five since god's substance and universal goodness are one and the same all who behold god's essence are by the same movement of love moved towards the divine essence as it is distinct from other things and according as it is the universal good and because he is naturally loved by all so far as he is the universal good it is impossible that whoever sees him in his essence should not love him but such as do not behold his essence know him by some particular effects which are sometimes opposed to their will so in this way they are said to hate god yet nevertheless so far as he is the universal good of all everything naturally loves god more than itself end of question sixty question sixty one of summa theologica parz prima on the angels and on the six days this is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org this recording by Anna Roberts summa theologica parz prima on the angels and on the six days by st. Thomas Aquinas translated by the fathers of the English Dominican province question sixty one of the production of the angels in the order of natural being in four articles after dealing with the nature of the angels their knowledge and will it now remains for us to treat of their creation or speaking in a general way of their origin such consideration is three fold in the first place we must see how they were brought into natural existence secondly how they were made perfect in grace or glory and thirdly how some of them became wicked under the first heading there are four points of inquiry one whether the angel has a cause of his existence two whether he has existed from eternity three whether he was created before corporeal creatures four whether the angels were created in the imperial heaven first article one question one article one whether the angels have a cause of their existence objection one it would seem that the angels have no cause of their existence for the first chapter of Genesis treats of things created by God but there is no mention of angels therefore the angels were not created by God objection two further the philosopher says metaphysics eight text sixteen that if any substance be a form without matter straight away it has being in unity of itself the cause of its being in unity but the angels are immaterial forms as was shown above question fifty article two therefore they have no cause of their being objection three further whatever is produced by any agent from the very fact of its being produced receives form from it but since the angels are forms they do not derive their form from any agent therefore the angels have no active cause on the contrary it is said Psalm 148 praise ye him all his angels and further on verse five for he spoke and they were made I answer that it must be affirmed that angels in everything existing except God were made by God God alone is his own existence while in everything else the essence differs from the existence as was shown above question three article four from this it is clear that God alone exists of his own essence while all other beings have their existence by participation now whatever exists by participation is caused by what exists essentially as everything ignited is caused by fire consequently the angels of necessity were made by God reply objection one Augustine says the city of God eleven fifty that the angels were not passed over in that account of the first creation of things but are designated by the name heavens or light and they were either passed over or else designated by the names of corporeal things because Moses was addressing an uncultured people as yet incapable of understanding an incorporeal nature and if it had been divulged that there were creatures existing beyond corporeal nature it would have proved to them an occasion of idolatry to which they were inclined and from which Moses especially meant to safeguard them reply objection two substances that are subsisting forms have no formal cause of their existence in unity nor such active cause as produces its effects by changing the matter from a state of potentiality to actuality but they have a cause productive of their entire substance from this the solution of the third difficulty is manifest second article one question sixty one article two whether the angel was produced by God from eternity objection one it would seem that the angel was produced by God from eternity for God is the cause of the angel by his being for he does not act through something besides his essence but his being is eternal therefore he produced the angels from eternity objection two further everything which exists at one period and not at another is subject to time but the angel is above time as is laid down in the book Dekasus therefore the angel is not at one time existing and at another non-existing but exists always objection three further Augustine on the trinity thirteen proves the soul's incorruptibility by the fact that the mind is capable of truth but as truth is incorruptible so is it eternal therefore the intellectual nature of the soul and of the angel is not only incorruptible but likewise eternal on the contrary it is said Proverbs eight twenty two in the person of begotten wisdom the Lord possessed me in the beginning of his ways before he made anything from the beginning but as was shown above article one the angels were made by God therefore at one time the angels were not I answer that God alone father son and holy ghost is from eternity Catholic faith holds this without doubt and everything to the contrary must be rejected as heretical for God so produced creatures that he made them from nothing that is after they had not been reply objection one God's being is his will so the fact that God produced the angels and other creatures by his own does not exclude that he made them also by his will but as was shown above question nineteen article three question forty six article one God's will does not act by necessity in producing creatures therefore he produced such as he willed and when he willed reply objection two an angel is above that time which is the measure of the movement of the heavens because he is above every movement of a corporeal nature nevertheless he is not above time which is the measure of the succession of his existence after his non-existence and which is also the measure of the succession which is in his operations hence Augustine says the little meeting of Genesis eight twenty twenty one that God moves the spiritual creature according to time reply objection three angels and intelligent souls are corruptible by the very fact of their having a nature whereby they are capable of truth but they did not possess this nature from eternity it was bestowed upon them when God himself willed it consequently it does not follow that the angels existed from eternity third article one question sixty one article three whether the angels were created before the corporeal world objection one it would seem that the angels were created before the corporeal world for Jerome says in commentary on the epistle to Titus one two six thousand years of our time have not yet elapsed yet how shall we measure the time how shall we count the ages in which the angels thrones dominations and the other order served God demacini also says on the orthodox faith two some say that the angels were begotten before all creation as Gregory the theologian declares he first of all devised the angelic and heavenly powers and the devising was the making thereof objection two further the angelic nature stands midway between the divine and the corporeal natures but the divine nature is from eternity while corporeal nature is from time therefore the angelic nature was produced ere time was made and after eternity objection three further the angelic nature was more remote from the corporeal nature than one corporeal nature is from another but one corporeal nature was made before another hence the six days of the production of things are set forth in the opening of genesis much more therefore was the angelic nature made before every corporeal nature on the contrary it is said genesis one one in the beginning God created heaven and earth now this would not be true if anything had been created previously consequently the angels were not created before corporeal nature I answer that there is a two fold opinion on this point to be found in the writings of the fathers the more probable one holds that the angels were created at the same time as corporeal creatures for the angels are part of the universe they do not constitute a universe of themselves but both they and corporeal natures unite in constituting one universe this stands in evidence from the relationship of creature to creature because the mutual relationship of creatures makes up the good of the universe but no part is perfect if separate from the whole consequently it is improbable that God whose works are perfect as it is said deuteronomy 32 4 should have created the angelic creature before other creatures at the same time the contrary is not to be deemed erroneous especially on account of the opinion of Gregory Nazianzen whose authority in Christian doctrine is of such weight that no one has ever raised objection to his teaching as is also the case with the doctrine of Athanasius as Jerome says reply objection one Jerome is speaking according to the teaching of the Greek fathers all of whom hold the creation of the angels to have taken place previously to that of the corporeal world reply objection two God is not a part of but far above the whole universe possessing within himself the entire perfection of the universe in a more eminent way but an angel is a part of the universe hence the comparison does not hold reply objection three all corporeal creatures are one in matter while the angels do not agree with them in matter consequently the creation of the matter corporeal creature involves in a manner the creation of all things but the creation of the angels does not involve creation of the universe if the contrary view be held then in the text of Genesis one in the beginning God created heaven and earth the words in the beginning must be interpreted in the sun or in the beginning of time but not in the beginning before which there was nothing unless we say before which the beginning of the nature of corporeal creatures fourth article one question 61 article 4 whether the angels were created in the imperian heaven objection one it would seem that the angels were not created in the imperian heaven for the angels are in corporeal substances now a substance which is in corporeal is not dependent upon a body for its existence and as a consequence there is it for its creation therefore the angels were not created in any corporeal place objection two further Augustine remarks the literal meaning of Genesis three ten that the angels were created in the upper atmosphere therefore not in the imperian heaven objection three further the imperian heaven is said to be the highest heaven if therefore the angels were created in the heaven it would not be seemed them to mount up to a still higher heaven and this is contrary to what is said in Isaiah speaking in the person of the sinning angel I will ascend into heaven Isaiah 1413 on the contrary Strabus commenting on the text in the beginning God created heaven and earth says by heaven he does not mean the visible firmament but the imperian that is the fiery or intellectual which is not so styled from its heat but from its splendor and which was filled with angels directly it was made I answer that as observed article three the universe is made up of corporeal and spiritual creatures consequently spiritual creatures were so created as to bear some relationship to the corporeal creature and to rule over every corporeal creature hence it was fitting for the angels to be created in the highest corporeal place as presiding over all corporeal nature whether it be styled the imperian heaven or whatever else it be called so Isidore says that the highest heaven is the heaven of the angels explaining the passage of Deuteronomy 1014 behold heaven is the lord's thy god and the heaven of heaven reply objection one the angels were created in a corporeal place not as if depending upon a body either as to their existence or as to their being made because God could have created them before all corporeal creation as many holy doctors hold they were made in a corporeal place in order to show their relationship to corporeal nature and that they are by their power in touch with bodies reply objection two by the uppermost atmosphere Augustine possibly means the highest part of heaven to which the atmosphere has a kind of affinity owing to its subtlety and transparency or else he is not speaking of all the angels but only of such as sinned who in the opinion of some belonged to the inferior orders but there is nothing to hinder us from saying that the higher angels as having an exalted and universal power over all corporeal things were created in the highest place of the corporeal creature while the other angels as having more restricted powers were created among the inferior bodies reply objection three Isaiah is not speaking there of any corporeal heaven but of the heaven of the blessed trinity unto which the sinning angel wished to ascend when he desired to be equal in some manner to God as will appear later on question 63 article 3 end of question 61 question 62 of summa theologica pars prima on the angels and on the six days this is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org this recording by Anna Roberts summa theologica pars prima on the angels and on the six days by St. Thomas Aquinas translated by the fathers of the English Dominican province question 62 of the perfection of the angels and glory in nine articles in due sequence we have to inquire how the angels were made in the order of grace and glory under which heading there are nine points of inquiry 1. were the angels created in beatitude 2. did they need grace in order to turn to God 3. were they created in grace 4. did they merit their beatitude 5. did they at once enter into beatitude after merit 6. did they receive grace and glory according to their natural capacities 7. after entering glory did their natural love and knowledge remain 8. could they have sinned afterwards 9. after entering into glory could they advance farther first article question 62 article 1 whether the angels were created in beatitude objection 1 it would seem that the angels were created in beatitude for it is stated on the articles of the church 29 that the angels who continue in the beatitude wherein they were created do not of their nature possess the excellence they have therefore the angels were created in beatitude objection 2 further the angelic nature is nobler than the corporeal creature but the corporeal creature straight way from its creation was made perfect and complete nor did its lack of form take precedence in time but only in nature as augustine says the literal meaning of genesis 1 15 therefore neither did god create the angelic nature imperfect and incomplete but its formation and perfection are derived from its beatitude whereby it enjoys god therefore it was created in beatitude objection 3 further according to augustine the literal meaning of genesis 4 34 5 5 the things which we read of as being made in the works of the six days were made together at one time and so all the six days must have existed instantly from the beginning of creation but according to his exposition in those six days the morning was the angelic knowledge according to which they knew the word and things in the word therefore straight way from their creation they knew the word and things in the word but the bliss of the angels comes of seeing the word consequently the angels were in beatitude straight way from the very beginning of their creation on the contrary to be established or confirmed in good is the nature of the beatitude but the angels were not confirmed in good as soon as they were created the fall of some of them shows this therefore the angels were not in beatitude from their creation I answer that by the name of beatitude is understood the ultimate perfection of rational or of intellectual nature and hence it is that it is naturally desired since everything naturally desires its ultimate perfection now there is a two fold ultimate perfection of rational or of intellectual nature the first is one which it can procure of its own natural power and this is in a measure called beatitude or happiness hence Aristotle ethics 10 says that man's ultimate happiness consists in his most perfect contemplation whereby in this life he can behold the best intelligible object and that is God above this happiness there is still another which we look forward to in the future whereby we shall see God as he is this is beyond the very nature of every created intellect as was shown above question 12 article 4 so then it remains to be said that as regards this first beatitude which the angel could procure by his natural power he was created already blessed because the angel does not acquire such beatitude by any progressive action as man does but as was observed above question 58 articles 3 and 4 is straight way in possession thereof owing to his natural dignity but the angels did not have from the beginning of their creation that ultimate beatitude which is beyond the power of nature because such beatitude is no part of their nature but its end and consequently they ought not to have it immediately from the beginning reply objection 1 beatitude is there taken for that natural perfection which the angel had in the state of innocence reply objection 2 the corporeal creature instantly in the beginning of its creation could not have the perfection to which it is brought by its operation consequently according to Augustine the literal meaning of Genesis 5 4 23 83 the growing of plants from the earth did not take place at once among the first works in which only the germinating power of the plants was bestowed upon the earth in the same way the angelic creature in the beginning of its existence had the perfection of its nature but it did not have the perfection to which it had to come by its operation reply objection 3 the angel has a twofold knowledge of the word the one which is natural and the other according to glory he has a natural knowledge whereby he knows the word through a similitude thereof he is shining in his nature and he has a knowledge of glory whereby he knows the word through his essence by both kinds of knowledge the angel knows things in the word imperfectly by his natural knowledge and perfectly by knowledge of glory therefore the first knowledge of things in the word was present to the angel from the outset of his creation while the second was not but only when the angels became blessed by turning to the good and this is properly termed their morning knowledge second article 1 question 62 article 2 whether an angel needs grace in order to turn to God objection 1 it would seem that the angel had no need of grace in order to turn to God for we have no need of grace for what we can accomplish naturally but the angel naturally turns to God because he loves God naturally as is clear from what has been said question 60 article 5 therefore an angel did not need grace in order to turn to God objection 2 further seemingly we need help only for difficult tasks now it was not a difficult task for the angel to turn to God because there was no obstacle in him to such turning therefore the angel had no need of grace in order to turn to God objection 3 further to turn oneself to God is to dispose oneself for grace hence it is said Zechariah 1.3 to me and I will turn to you but we do not stand in need of grace in order to prepare ourselves for grace for thus we should go on to infinity therefore the angel did not need grace to turn to God on the contrary it was by turning to God that the angel reached to be attitude if then he had needed no grace in order to turn to God it would follow that he did not require grace in order to possess everlasting life but this is contrary to the saying of the apostle the grace of God is life everlasting I answer that the angel stood in need of grace in order to turn to God as the object of be attitude 4 as was observed above question 60 article 2 the natural movement of the will is the principle of all things that we will but the will's natural inclination is directed towards what is in keeping with its nature therefore anything which is above nature the will cannot be inclined towards it unless helped by some other supernatural principle thus it is clear that fire has a natural tendency to give forth heat and to generate fire whereas to generate flesh is beyond the natural power of fire consequently fire has no tendency there too except insofar as it is moved instrumentally by the nutritive soul now it was shown above in chapters 4 and 5 when we were treating of God's knowledge that to see God in his essence wherein the ultimate be attitude of the rational creature consists is beyond the nature of every created intellect consequently no rational creature can have the movement of the will directed towards such be attitude except it be moved there too by a supernatural agent this is what we call the help of grace therefore it must be said that an angel could not of his own will be turned to such be attitude except by the help of grace reply objection 1 the angel loves God naturally so far as God is the author of his natural being but here we are speaking of turning to God so far as God bestows be attitude by the vision of his essence reply objection 2 a thing is difficult which is beyond a power and this happens in two ways first of all because it is beyond the capacity of the power thus if it can be attained by some help it is said to be difficult but if it can in no way be attained then it is impossible thus it is impossible for a man to fly in another way a thing may be beyond the power not according to the natural order of such power but owing to some intervening hindrance as to mount upwards is not contrary to the natural order of the motive power of the soul because the soul considered in itself can be moved in any direction but is hindered from so doing by the weight of the body consequently it is difficult for a man to mount upwards to be turned to his ultimate be attitude is difficult for man both because it is beyond his nature and because he has a hindrance from the corruption of the body and infection of sin but it is difficult for an angel only because it is supernatural reply objection 3 can be termed a conversion to God and so there is a three fold turning to God the first is by the perfect love of God this belongs to the creature enjoying the possession of God and for such conversion consummate grace is required the next turning to God is that which merits be attitude and for this there is a required habitual grace which is the principle of merit the third conversion is that where by a man disposes himself so that he may have grace no habitual grace is required but the operation of God who draws the soul towards himself according to Lamentations 521 convert us oh Lord to thee and we shall be converted hence it is clear that there is no need to go on to infinity third article one question 62 article 3 whether the angels were created in grace objection one it would seem that the angels were not created in grace as Christine says the literal meaning of Genesis 2 8 that the angelic nature was first made without form and was called heaven but afterwards it received its form and was then called light but such formation comes from grace therefore they were not created in grace objection 2 further grace turns the rational creature toward God if therefore the angel had been created in grace no angel would ever have turned away from God objection 3 further grace comes midway between nature and glory but the angels were not beatified in their creation therefore it seems that they were not created in grace but that they were first created in nature only and then received grace and that last of all they were beatified on the contrary Augustine says the city of God 12 9 who wrought the good will of the angels who save him who created them with his will that is the love wherewith they cling to him at the same time building up their nature and bestowing grace on them I answer that although there are conflicting opinions on this point some holding that the angels were created only in a natural state while others maintained that they were created in grace yet it seems more probable and more in keeping with the sayings of holy men that they were created in sanctifying grace for we see that all things which in the process of time being created by the work by improvidence were produced by the operation of God were created in the first fashioning of things according to seed like forms as Augustine says the literal meaning of Genesis 8 3 such as trees animals and the rest now it is evident that sanctifying grace bears the same relation to be attitude as the seed like form in nature does to the natural effect hence first John 3 9 grace is called the seed of God as then in Augustine's opinion it is contended that the seed like forms of all natural effects were implanted in the creature when corporeally created so straight way from the beginning the angels were created in grace reply objection 1 such absence of form in the angels can be understood either by comparison with their formation and glory and so the absence of formation preceded formation by priority of time or else it can be understood of the formation according to grace and so it did not proceed in the order of time but in the order of nature as Augustine holds with regard to the formation of corporeal things the literal meaning of Genesis 1 15 reply objection 2 every form inclines the subject after the mode of the subjects heart now it is the mode of an intellectual nature to be inclined freely towards the object it desires consequently the movement of grace does not impose necessity but he who has grace can fail to make use of it and can sin reply objection 3 although in the order of nature grace comes midway between nature and glory nevertheless in the order of time in created nature glory is not simultaneous with nature because glory is the end of the operation of nature helped by grace but grace stands not as the end of operation because it is not of works but as the principle of right operation therefore it was fitting for grace to be given straight way with nature fourth article 1 question 62 article 4 whether an angel merits his beatitude objection 1 it would seem that the angel did not merit his beatitude for merit arises from the difficulty of the meritorious act but the angel experienced no difficulty in acting rightly therefore righteous action was not meritorious for him objection 2 further we do not merit by merely natural operations but it was quite natural for the angel to turn to God therefore he did not thereby merit beatitude objection 3 further if a beatified angel merited his beatitude he did so either before he had it or else afterwards but it was not before because in the opinion of many he had no grace before whereby to merit it nor did he merit it afterwards because thus he would be meriting it now which is clearly false because in that case a lower angel could by meriting rise up to the rank of a higher and the distinct degrees of grace would not be permanent which is not admissible consequently the angel did not merit his beatitude on the contrary it is stated revelation 21 17 that the measure of the angel in that heavenly Jerusalem is the measure of a man therefore the same is the case with the angel I answer that perfect beatitude is natural only to God because existence and beatitude are one in the same thing in him beatitude however is not of the nature of the creature but is its end now everything attains its last end by its operation such operation leading to the end is either productive of the end when such end is not beyond the power of the agent working feeling art is productive of health or else it is deserving of the end when such end is beyond the capacity of the agent striving to attain it where for it is looked for from another's bestowing now it is evident from what has gone before articles one and two question 12 articles four and five ultimate beatitude exceeds both the angelic and the human nature it remains then that both man and angel merited their beatitude and if the angel was created in grace without which there is no merit there would be no difficulty in saying that he merited beatitude as also if one were to say that he had grace in any way before he had glory but if he had no grace before entering upon beatitude it would then have to be said that he had beatitude without merit even as we have grace this however is quite foreign to the idea of beatitude which conveys the notion of an end and is the reward of virtue even as the philosopher says ethics one nine or else it will have to be said as some others have maintained that the angels merit beatitude by their present ministrations while in beatitude this is quite contrary again to the notion of merit since merit conveys the idea of a means to an end while what is already in its end cannot properly speaking and so no one merits to produce what he already enjoys or else he will have it to be said that one in the same act of turning to God so far as it comes of free will is meritorious and so far as it attains the end is the fruition of beatitude even this view will not stand because free will is not the sufficient cause of merit and consequently an act cannot be meritorious as coming from free will except in so far as it is informed by grace but it cannot at the same time be informed by imperfect grace which is the principle of meriting and by perfect grace which is the principle of enjoying hence it does not appear to be possible for anyone to enjoy beatitude and at the same time to merit it consequently it is better to say that the angel had grace ere he was admitted to beatitude and that by such grace he merited beatitude the angel's difficulty of working righteously does not come from any contrarity or hindrance of natural powers but from the fact that the good work is beyond his natural capacity reply objection 2 an angel did not merit beatitude by natural movement towards God but by the movement of charity which comes of grace the answer to the third objection is evident from what we have said fifth article 1 question 62 article 5 whether the angel obtained beatitude immediately after one act of merit objection 1 it would seem that the angel did not possess beatitude instantly after one act of merit for it is more difficult for a man to do well than for an angel but man is not rewarded at once after one act of merit therefore neither was the angel objection 2 further an angel could act at once and in an instant from the very outset of his creation for even natural bodies begin to be moved in the very instant of their creation and if the movement of a body could be instantaneous like operations of mind and will it would have movement in the first instant of its generation consequently if the angel merited beatitude by one act of his will he merited it in the first instant of his creation and so if their beatitude was not retarded then the angels were in beatitude in the first instant objection 3 there must be many intervals between things which are far apart but the beatific state of the angels is very far remote from their natural condition while merit comes midway between therefore the angel would have to pass through many stages of merit in order to reach beatitude on the contrary man's soul and an angel are ordained alike for beatitude consequently equality with angels is promised to the saints now the soul separated from the body if it has merit deserving beatitude enters at once into beatitude unless there be some obstacle therefore so does an angel now an angel instantly in his first act of charity had the merit of beatitude therefore since there was no obstacle within him he passed at once into beatitude by only one meritorious act I answer that the angel was beatified instantly after the first act of charity whereby he merited beatitude the reason whereof is because grace perfects nature according to the manner of the nature as every perfection is received in the subject capable of perfection according to its mode now it is proper to the angelic nature to receive its natural perfection not by passing from one stage to another but to have it at once naturally as was shown above article 1, question 58 articles 3 and 4 but as the angel nature inclined to natural perfection so is he by merit inclined to glory hence instantly after merit the angel secured beatitude now the merit of beatitude in angel and man alike can be from merely one act because man merits beatitude by every act informed by charity hence it remains that an angel was beatified straightway after one act of charity reply, objection one man was not intended to secure his ultimate perfection at once like the angel hence a longer way was assigned to the man than to the angel for securing beatitude reply, objection two the angel is above the time of corporeal things hence the various instance regarding the angels are not to be taken except as reckoning the succession of their acts now their act which merited beatitude could not be in them simultaneously with the act of beatitude which is fruition since the one belongs to imperfect grace and the other to consummate grace consequently it remains for different instance to be conceived in one of which the angel merited beatitude and in another was beatified reply, objection three it is of the nature of an angel instantly to attain the perfection unto which he is ordained consequently only one meritorious act is required which act can so far be called an interval as through it the angel is brought to beatitude sixth article one article six whether the angels receive grace and glory according to the degree of their natural gifts objection one it would seem that the angels did not receive grace and glory according to the degree of their natural gifts for grace is bestowed of God's absolute will therefore the degree of grace depends on God's will and not on the degree of their natural gifts objection two further a moral act seems to be more closely allied with grace than nature because a moral act is preparatory to grace but grace does not come of works as is said Romans 11 6 therefore much less does the degree of grace depend upon the degree of their natural gifts objection three further man and angel are like ordained for beatitude or grace but man does not receive more grace according to the degree of his natural gifts therefore neither does the angel on the contrary is the saying of the master of the sentences sentences two d three that those angels who are created with more subtle natures and of keener intelligence in wisdom were likewise endowed with greater gifts of grace I answer that it is reasonable to suppose that gifts of graces and perfection of beatitude were bestowed on the angels according to the degree of their natural gifts the reason for this can be drawn from two sources first of all on the part of God who in the order of his wisdom established various degrees in the angelic nature now as the angelic nature was made by God for attaining grace and beatitude so likewise the grades of the angelic nature seem to be ordained for the various degrees of grace and glory just as when for example the builder chisels the stones for building a house from the fact that he prepares some more artistically and more fittingly than others to bring them apart for the more ornate part of the house so it seems that God destined those angels for greater gifts of grace and fuller beatitude whom he made of a higher nature secondly the same is evident on the part of the angel the angel is not a compound of different natures so that the inclination of the one thwarts or retards the tendency of the other as happens in man in whom the movement of his intellect of part is either retarded or thwarted by the inclination or the sensitive part but when there is nothing to retard or thwart it nature is moved with its whole energy so it is reasonable to suppose that the angels who had a higher nature were turned to God more mightily and efficaciously the same thing happens in men since greater grace and glory are bestowed according to the greater earnestness of their turning to God hence it appears that the angels who had the greater natural powers had the more grace and glory as grace comes of God's will alone so likewise does the nature of the angel and as God's will ordained nature for grace so did it ordain the various degrees of nature to the various degrees of grace reply objection 2 the acts of the rational creature are from the creature itself whereas nature is immediately from God accordingly it seems rather that grace is bestowed according to the degree of nature than according to works reply objection 3 diversity of natural gifts is in one way in the angels who are themselves different specifically and in quite another way in men who differ only numerically for specific difference is on account of the end while numerical difference is because of the matter furthermore there is something in man which can thwart or impede the movement of his intellect of nature but not in the angels consequently the argument is not the same for both 7th article 1 question 62 article 7 whether natural knowledge and love remain in the beatified angels objection 1 it would seem that natural knowledge and love do not remain in the beatified angels for it is said first Corinthians 13 10 when that which is perfect is come then that which is in part shall be done away but natural love and knowledge are imperfect in comparison with beatified knowledge and love therefore in beatitude natural knowledge and love cease objection 2 further where one suffices another is superfluous but the knowledge and love of glory suffice for the beatified angels therefore it would be superfluous for their natural knowledge and love to remain objection 3 further the same faculty has not two simultaneous acts as the same line cannot at the same end be terminated in two points but the beatified angels are always exercising their beatified knowledge and love 4 as it is said ethics 1 8 happiness consists not in habit but in act therefore there can never be natural knowledge and love in the angels on the contrary so long as the nature endures its operation remains but beatitude does not destroy nature since it is its perfection therefore it does not take away natural knowledge and love I answer that natural knowledge and love remain in the angels for as principles of operations are mutually related so are the operations themselves now it is manifest that nature is to beatitude as first to second because beatitude is super added to nature but the first must ever be preserved in the second consequently nature must be preserved in beatitude and in like manner the act of nature must be preserved in the act of beatitude reply objection 1 the advent of a perfection removes the opposite imperfection now the imperfection of nature is not opposed to the perfection of beatitude but underlies it as the imperfection of the power underlies the perfection of the form and the power is not taken away by the form but the probation which is opposed to the form in the same way the imperfection of natural knowledge is not opposed to the perfection of the knowledge and glory for nothing hinders us from knowing a thing through various mediums as a thing may be known at the one time through a probable medium and through a demonstrative one in like manner an angel can know God by his essence and this apportains to his knowledge of glory and at the same time he can know God by his own essence which belongs to his natural knowledge reply objection 2 all things which make up beatitude are sufficient of themselves but in order for them to exist they presuppose the natural gifts because no beatitude is self subsisting except the uncreated beatitude reply objection 3 there cannot be two operations of the one faculty at the one time except the one be ordained to the other but natural knowledge and love are ordained to the knowledge and love of glory accordingly there is nothing to hinder natural knowledge and love from existing in the angel conjointly with those of glory 8th article 1 question 62 article 8 whether a beatified angel can sin objection 1 it would seem that a beatified angel can sin 4 as was said above article 7 beatitude does not do away with nature but it is of the very notion of created nature that it can fail therefore a beatified angel can sin objection 2 further the rational powers are referred to opposites as the philosopher observes metaphysics 4 text 3 but the will of the angel in beatitude does not cease to be rational therefore it is inclined towards good and evil objection 3 further it belongs to the liberty of free will for man to be able to choose good or evil but the freedom of will is not lessened in the beatified angels therefore they can sin on the contrary augustine says the literal meaning of genesis 11 that there is in the holy angels that nature which cannot sin therefore the holy angels cannot sin I answer that the beatified angels cannot sin the reason for this is because their beatitude consists in seeing God through his essence now God's essence is the very essence of goodness consequently the angel beholding God is disposed towards God in the same way as anyone else not seeing God is to the common form of goodness now it is possible for any man either to will or to do anything except aiming at what is good or for him to wish to turn away from good precisely as such therefore the beatified angel can neither will nor act except as aiming towards God now whoever wills or act in this manner cannot sin consequently the beatified angel cannot sin reply objection 1 created good considered in itself can fail but from its perfect union with the uncreated good such as is the union of beatitude it is rendered unable to sin for the reason already alleged reply objection 2 the rational powers are referred to opposites in the things to which they are not inclined naturally but as to the things where until they have a natural tendency they are not referred to opposites for the intellect cannot but assent to naturally known principles in the same way the will cannot help clean to good similarly as good because the will is naturally ordained to good as to its proper object consequently the will of the angels is referred to opposites as to doing many things or not doing them but they have no tendency to opposites with regard to God himself whom they see to be the very nature of goodness but in all things their aim is towards God which ever alternative they choose that is not sinful reply objection 3 free will in its choice of means to an end is disposed just as the intellect is to conclusions now it is evident that it belongs to the power of the intellect to be able to proceed to different conclusions according to given principles but for it to proceed to some conclusion by passing out of the order of the principles comes of its own defect hence it belongs to the perfection of its liberty for the free will to be able to choose between opposite things keeping the order of the end in view but it comes of the defect of liberty for it to choose anything by turning away from the order of the end and this is to sin hence there is greater liberty of will in the angels who cannot sin than there is in ourselves who can sin 9th article 1 question 62 article 3 whether the beatified angels advance in beatitude objection 1 it would seem that the beatified angels can advance in beatitude for charity is the principle of merit but there is perfect charity in the angels therefore the beatified angels can merit now as merit increases the reward of beatitude increases therefore the beatified angels can progress in beatitude objection 2 further Augustine says on Christian teaching 1 that God makes use of us for our own gain and for his own goodness the same thing happens to the angels whom he uses for spiritual ministrations since they are all vulgate are they not all ministering spirits sent to minister for them who shall receive the inheritance of salvation Hebrews 1 14 this would not be for their profit were they not to merit thereby nor to advance to beatitude it remains then that the beatified angels can merit and can advance in beatitude objection 3 further it argues imperfection for anyone not occupying the foremost place not to be able to advance but the angels are not in the highest degree of beatitude therefore if unable to ascend higher it would appear that there is imperfection and defect in them which is not admissible on the contrary merit and progress belong to this present condition of life but angels are not wayfarers traveling towards beatitude they are already in possession of beatitude consequently the beatified angels can neither merit nor advance in beatitude I answer that in every movement the movers intention is centered upon one determined end to which he intends to lead the movable subject because intention looks to the end to which infinite progress is repugnant now it is evident since the rational creature cannot of its own power attain to beatitude which consists in the vision of God as is clear from what was gone before question 12 article 4 that it needs to be moved by God towards its beatitude therefore there must be some one determined thing to which every rational creature is directed as to its last end now this one determinant object cannot in the vision of God consist precisely in that which is seen for the supreme truth is seen by all the blessed in various degrees but it is on the part of the mode of vision the last terms are fixed beforehand by the intention of him who directs towards the end for it is impossible that as the rational creature is led on to the vision of the supreme essence it should be led on in the same way to the supreme mode of vision which is comprehension for this belongs to God only as is evident from what was said above question 12 article 7 question 14 article 3 but since infinite efficacy is required for comprehending God while the creature's efficacy in beholding is only finite and since every finite being is in infinite degrees removed from the infinite it comes to pass that the rational creature understands God more or less clearly according to infinite degrees and as beatitude consists in vision so the degree of vision lies in a determinant mode of the vision therefore every rational creature is so led by God to the end of its beatitude that from God's predestination it is brought even to a determinic degree of beatitude consequently when that degree is once secured it cannot pass to a higher degree reply objection 1 merit belongs to a subject which is moving towards its end now the rational creature is moved towards its end not merely passively but also by working actively if the end is within the power of the rational creature then its action is said to procure the end which bears knowledge by reflection but if the end be beyond its power it is looked for from another and then the action will be meritorious of such end but what is already in the ultimate term is not said to be moved but to have been moved consequently to merit belongs to the imperfect charity of this life whereas perfect charity does not merit but rather enjoys the reward even as in acquired habits the operation preceding the habit is productive of the habit but the operation from an acquired habit is both perfect and enjoyable in the same way the act of perfect charity has no quality of merit but belongs rather to the perfection of the reward reply objection 2 a thing can be termed useful in two ways first of all as being on the way to an end and so the merit of beatitude is useful secondly as the part is useful for the whole as the wall for a house in this way the angelic ministerings are useful for the beatified angels in as much as they are a part of their beatitude for to pour out acquired perfection upon others is of the nature of what is perfect considered as perfect reply objection 3 although a beatified angel is not absolutely in the highest degree of beatitude yet in his own regard he is in the highest degree according to divine predestination nevertheless the joy of the angels can be increased with regard to the salvation of such as are saved by their ministrations according to luke 1510 there is joy before the angels of god upon one sinner doing penance such joy belongs to their accidental reward which can be increased unto judgment day hence some writers say that they can merit as to their accidental reward but it is better to say that the blessed can in no wise merit to the blessed can in no wise merit without being at the same time a way fair and a comprehensive like Christ who alone was such for the blessed acquire such joy from the virtue of their beatitude rather than merit it end of question 62