 Good afternoon from Kings College London. My name is Dr. James W. Smith and I'm a postdoctoral researcher in the Department of War Studies. I have the pleasure of organizing in chair in this afternoon special online conference in which Kings College London marks 40 years since the 1982 Falklands War between Great Britain and Argentina. I'm being supported today by other King staff, specifically Dr. David Jordan of the Defense Studies Department based in the UK Joint Services and Command College Shrivenham and Dr. Hilary Breford Lecturing National Security Studies in the Department of War Studies. This is making this a school of security studies wide event which I think demonstrates the level of interest we have here at Kings of the Falklands War. I'm also grateful to support the Corbett 100 project that marks a centenary of the deaf British historian, strategist and philosopher of sea power, Sir Julian Corbett. We're about to hear from veterans of the war serving military personnel, researchers and academics who offer a perspective 40 years across panels covering maritime, land and air operations. This will be followed by a panel dedicated to sample new research perspectives by researchers who are in process of producing new research and scholarship having recently published or going to publish an arranger topics on the wall or related to the Falkland Islands. On an administrative note, the event is being recorded so you can re-watch it at your leisure and if you're on the live online event audience please place any questions for our speakers per panel in the question function of the software. Before we proceed today, I'd like to provide a brief primer for the 40th anniversary and also our speakers. As I was thinking on the events that occurred in the South Atlantic 40 years ago, it occurred to me that 1982 is now closer to 1945 than it is 2022. Much has been gained but also much has been lost about the Falklands wall but it's not been about comment, study or research. The lens or prism of time can offer society, culture and debate greater perspective, knowledge and understanding alongside remembrance and reconciliation. In fact, many of the great historical works of military history utilized time and perspective with primary sources that has led to some of the most authoritative and scholarly works on topics you can find. True historians are after all very keen to not execute knee jerk analysis or responses but instead gather fact rather than fiction and feeling. 40 years of thought is something worthy of exploring even if we find the same arguments undisplay across a range of topics related to the Falklands or far beyond most often thought of shores. This is far more to Britain to discuss than about the Falkland Islands for British people but as Admiral Terry Lewin and Henry Leitch reminded Prime Minister Thatcher in 1982 who we are and what we stand for is the fundamental point. I was particularly keen in organizing this event to be mindful of perspective, somewhat true to the roots of the Department of War studies that Sir Michael Howard created 60 years ago. So Michael, I call historian, stand on the back of works and efforts of others in particular to military history and military education. This can be seen in Kings and the path can be traced back to Sir Julian Corbett and others in particular retired naval captain Sir John Knox Lawton who in the late 19th century came to Kings as a history professor and strived to demonstrate the importance of military history and its close collection to classical philosophical grounds. The study of society, culture, people, relations between nations, politics, the impact of technological change to name a few. And of course, the actions of state and the military personnel should be recorded to the benefit of society, statecraft and of course, military education. After all, experience is all we have when we look to paths ahead. The Falklands War is a pertinent reminder of Britain's strategic experience and global connections in which the national reality is an island nation and an inheritance of connections and culture between communities were laid bare to the shock and angst of a class of decision political and policy makers and even the odd academic who thought otherwise. The easiest example of this was the configuration of the British armed forces and particularly the status of the Royal Navy as an instrument of the state and foreign policy vastly reduced in its role widely misunderstood. It was on the cusp of a niche coastal service consigned to anti-submarine warfare operations, a servant of the US Navy in the North Atlantic. Britain's global connections and standing of its strategic experience were all basically on the scrap pile. This was a failure in understanding the root of understanding is education, education where the study of history is an important pillar to success but also those connections between peoples and the positive things they have inherited and share. After 1945, the hopes of a more peaceful world had by being 1942 or by being dashed. The clash of great and superpowers, the push and pull of alliances new and old. Technological change and of course the inevitable impact of an expansion of humanity around the world and after a bloody half century of the 20th century meant that turmoil and resolving issues and differences were going to be an arduous one and a difficult legacy to address. In 1982, leaders of a nation chose to distract from the economic and social woes impacting their people and also influenced by other actors chose to turn into an act of aggression rather than pursue a path of diplomacy. Sadly, events of 1982 in the path to war and conflict remains all too easy, resonating with events after 1982 even to this day. I think this year in 2022, it's fair to remark with a simple statement that diplomacy, no matter what form it takes is always a better option than picking up arms and violence. After the 1982 Falklands war, the four war continued to cast a shadow of relations between two nations and the Falkland Islanders today. The Falkland Islands remained a place of natural beauty, scientific research and has a thriving community determined to make a better future for themselves. On that note, I'd like to hand over to Mr. Richard Hyslop, the high representative of the Falkland Islands in London. Thank you very much. Firstly, I'd like to thank you, James and the Kings College London School of Security Studies for organizing today's online conference. Now, I have been asked to speak today about the modern Falkland Islands and the progress that has been made in the islands over the last 40 years. However, before doing that, I think it is important to travel back in time to the period leading up to 1982. The economy of the islands was then primarily based around sheep farming and the export of wool and meat. There was not a great future for young people living in the islands at this time. Farming and wool prices were very poor, so the economy was struggling and a lot of islanders were leaving. By 1982, the population of the islands have fallen to around 1,820. Despite these challenges, Falkland Islanders enjoyed a relatively peaceful and happy existence. As we all know, that all changed on the 2nd of April, 1982, when the islands were illegally invaded and occupied by Argentine forces. After 74 days of war, islanders were able to celebrate their liberation from occupation. That liberation came at a high price with 255 members of the UK armed forces and three Falkland Islanders losing their lives. A fifth generation Falkland Islander recently described to me pre and post 1982 as being a bit like BC and AD in its significance. In the years immediately following the war, the findings of the second Shackleton report were implemented. Large farms owned by absentee landlords were broken up into smaller family farms owned by islanders. The UK military presence was strengthened through the creation of the Mount Pleasant complex. The introduction of a fisheries conservation zone and fisheries management regime in 1986 transformed the economy of the islands, securing our self-sufficiency in all areas except the fence. Today, the economy of the islands is based around three key areas, fishing. Around 94% of all the fisheries products caught in Falklands waters are now exported to the EU through the port of Vigo in Spain. In 2017, a typical year, 288,373 tons of fish were imported into Spain through Vigo, of which 16% with a customs value of 139 million euros came from the Falkland Islands. In the same year, 34% of all the calamari imported by Spain came from the Falklands. In the last year where figures were available, the exports of squid and finfish generated 154.1 million pounds for the island's economy. Whilst less significant than in 1982, farming is still the second largest employer in the islands and combined meeting will exports generate around 10.4 million pounds a year. Tourism is an increasingly important contributor to our economy. In 2019, over 70,000 cruise ship and 1,650 land-based tourists visited the islands. Despite the challenges arising from COVID-19, this interest is unlikely to diminish in the coming years. If anything, we expect growth to continue. Together, these three sectors contribute 53% of our total GDP, which stands at 228 million pounds. As the economy of the islands grew, so too did the population. Today, while still small in global terms, at nearly 3,500, the population is roughly double what it was in 1982. And growing at a rate of around 3% a year, with growth also came diversity. There are now 60 different nationalities represented in the islands, with Chileans, Filipinos, Saint-Hillianians, and yes, even Argentinians, all calling the Forthland Islands home. The average age of the population is 38, two years lower than the OECD average. The economy of the islands has faced two major challenges in recent years, COVID-19 and Brexit. The economy has been severely impacted by COVID-19. Fisheries, tourism, and wool, as I have said, are the main sectors of the island's economy. Global markets in all of these sectors have been disrupted, and in the case of tourism and wool, brought to a complete standstill. At the same time, Brexit and the subsequent failure to secure the Forthland's continued tariff-free trading relationship with the EU has resulted in our exports to VEGO being subjected to tariffs of between six and 18% for fish and 42% for meat. This will have an impact on our economy, and already, meat exports to the EU have ceased. As islanders have worked to rebuild the islands following their liberation, they have also had to deal with the legacy of wool. Several thousand land mines were laid in the island by Argentina during the war. These mines have impacted life in the islands over the years. It was therefore a momentous occasion when, on the 14th of November, 2020, the Forthland Islands were officially declared mine-free for the first time since 1982. At the end of hostilities in 1982, UK armed forces made considerable efforts to locate and clear mines. Unfortunately, several soldiers suffered serious injury, and the UK decided to stop clearance and fence off all suspect areas. In the end, over 120 areas were identified as hazardous. In 1997, when the UK signed the Anti-Personnel Mine Bank Convention, the UK committed itself to removing such mines from territories over which they had jurisdiction of control. To that end, the UK restarted clearance work in 2009. The clearance teams, with their Zimbabwe ND miners, have destroyed over 10,000 mines in the sorted items of unexploded ordinance. This has resulted in the release of over 2,338 hectares of safe ground back to the community. Around 15 of the Zimbabwe ND miners and their families have now settled permanently in the islands. The Forthland Islands are proud to be a member of the UK family and are grateful for the continued support of the UK in a variety of areas. In March 2013, 99.8% of islanders on a turnout of 92% voted in favour of remaining the self-governing UK overseas territory. As the Forthland Islands has developed into an internally self-governing and economically self-sufficient overseas territory of the UK, our relationship with the UK has transformed from one of dependence to one of mutual benefit to both the islands and the UK, whether it is providing a base for the UK's armed forces in the South Atlantic, providing opportunities for UK companies to participate in major capital projects in the islands, playing a significant role in helping the UK tackle climate change or being home to a significant proportion of the UK's biodiversity. The Forthland Islands should be seen as a vitally important asset to the UK in the context of a global Britain and the focal point for UK activity in the region. Today, there are on average 1,000 UK armed forces personnel based in the Forthland Islands at any one time. The islands provide the UK with a stable and reliable base in an area of the world that is of growing significance, as well as providing a deterrent force and protecting islanders' right to self-determination. The Forthlands provide the UK with a unique training environment for UK military personnel. From the Forthlands, the UK is able to deter military aggression against the South Atlantic overseas territories, as well as promoting its wider interests in the region. HMS Forth and a Royal Air Force A400M Atlas aircraft based in the islands are used to monitor fishing activity in the Southwest Atlantic. In 2021, HMS Forth was used to deliver COVID-19 vaccines to the British Antarctic Territory and the remote territory of Tristan Dukuna. With access to Latin America, limited by COVID-19 this season, the British Antarctic Survey have used the Forthlands as their gateway to conduct operations and scientific research in the Antarctic, with logistic support being provided to both the new Royal Research ships at David Attenborough registered in the Forthland Islands and the Royal Navy ice patrol ship, HMS Protector. The Forthland Islands enjoy an increasing role globally through bilateral engagement and active membership of a number of international fora. As a result of this engagement, we are pleased to welcome politicians and government officials from across the globe to the islands. In 2020, we were proud to host the Commonwealth Women's Parliamentary Conference and the Red Ensign Group Conference. Each year, we see an increase in the number of scientists, environmental researchers, international journalists, media organisations and tourists wishing to come to the islands. As an example, in 2021, Lufthansa flew two large groups of German polar researchers to the islands from Hamburg. As a government, we are keen to develop this and to establish the Forthlands as the gateway to Antarctica, not just for polar research institutes from Europe, but globally. Respecting the Forthland Islands globally significant biodiversity and unique environment is at the forefront of all we do in the islands. In recent months, the islands have been declared key biodiversity areas for both seawales and for nine species of breeding seabirds. Our energy strategy echoes this with over 19% of energy in the camp coming from renewables and 35% in Stanley with a plan in place for the islands to be 100% renewable by 2050. Whilst the Forthland Islands enjoys positive relationships with a number of countries in the region, relations with Argentina continue to be difficult. Whilst considerable efforts have been put into improving the relationship in recent years, most notably the 2016 joint communique, the threat to the islands posed by Argentina's sovereignty ambition is still real and poses a significant impediment in a number of critical areas, including economic growth and the protection of biodiversity. Despite these challenges, the Forthland Islands government working with the International Committee of the Red Cross have continued to support work in the islands to identify Argentine war dead, to provide them with named graves and to allow their families to visit the islands. Today, the Forthland Islands are internally self-governing and self-sufficient in all areas apart from defence. Our relationship with the UK is modern and mutually beneficial partnership based on the principle of self-determination. Islanders enjoy a good quality of life with growing resources devoted to health, education and preserving and enhancing the environment. Our population is growing and unemployment is less than 1%. Given the material threat posed by Argentina, the one thing we cannot do and unlikely ever are able to do on our own is to sufficiently defend the islands. We therefore rely on the UK for this and Forthland Islanders continue to be profoundly grateful for the strong support and commitment of the UK government in protecting our sovereignty. This last point is critically important. None of the positive developments that have taken place in the islands over the last 40 years would have been possible without the sacrifices made by so many in 1982. Forthland Islands will be forever grateful to those who restored freedom to the islands in those dark days. I hope you will agree with me that Islanders have not wasted the freedom that was won for them. Thank you. Richard, thank you for your time today. I think any King student is almost well aware of the Forthland Islands because of course the office is only a few doors down from the main buildings. So our students are always passing the front door as it was, so they're always seeing the neighbors. But that's sort of one thing that I wanted to pick up was during the COVID crisis, of course every nation sort of looked very inward. And there was almost that we never heard anything about what was going on in places such as the Forthlands when it came to COVID. Was that something that the islands weathered quite well? I know obviously the supply of vaccines got down in the end and the Royal Navy helped with that. But obviously the impact on that, presumably Islanders being very isolated, that was quite considerable. Yes, I mean, the commercial flights from South America ceased and the pattern of flights with the South Atlantic Air Bridge changed to just one a week after a short period where there weren't any flights. I think the islands in comparison to the UK and many other places have fared very well as a result of COVID. No one became serious, apart from one member of the UK Armed Forces, Agurka, and no one became seriously ill in the islands even that person recovered fully. No one has died of COVID compared to many places. We are very, very fortunate. Whilst it was difficult at times compared to other places, I think it would be unfair to say that we had a tough time compared to many. We got off very lightly, but we were able to play a small part in helping others. For example, with cruise ships that were stranded who couldn't go into South America. We were able to bring them into their harbor and then fly the passengers home and things like that. But no, overall, we fared very well over the last couple of years compared to the majority of places. Thank you, Richard. I'm sure we will talk again. And certainly, I know we like staying up to date with the Falkland Islands within the department. And I'm sure we'll be talking again about the Falkland Islands and Falklands Wall. Thank you for your time. I'm now going to hand the floor over to our very own war studies professor, Professor Sir Lawrence Friedman, whose work needs little introduction, a vast array of scholarship that includes being appointed in 1997, the official historian of the 1982 Falklands campaign. Thanks very much. It's a pleasure to be introducing the conference looking back over what's happened over the last, how it seems from a 40 year perspective. Going back 40 years, we were between the Belgrano and the Sheffield and the sense of a pivotal moment in the campaign. We're also, of course, looking back with a major war underway at this time. And it does colour perspectives because it reminds us quite a bit of what was very specific about Falklands, what was different this war to other conventional countries. Falkland campaigns and certainly the one that's going on at the moment. Although, of course, when the Russian ship, the Moskva, was sunk, there was a lot of looking back to the Falklands to make the comparison with the Belgrano. This was, as if this was almost the biggest event in naval warfare since. What I thought, on that sort of note, is to make the comparison, what was particular about the Falklands, why does it stand out not only as an episode in British political history and the Falklands history and Argentinian history, all of which are very important, but as a rather particular sort of war to cover. The first thing that obviously is striking is just how logistically challenging it was. This was a war that took place 8,000 miles away and a few hundred miles from Argentina and everything was conditioned by the logistic challenges. It was a remarkable feat of logistics even to be able to conduct the war, helped obviously by the fact that we have this island, dissension island that made a lot of difference and also, I think by the initial decisions that were taken when the task force was set sail, that no doubt Michael Clap will remember very well about basically getting in as much as you could into the ships before they left rather than having to catch up later with extra kit that that had to be done as well. It was also supported by the Americans. Initially, they were quite important in providing fuel, although the equivocation of the apparent equivocation of the Americans about whether or not to support the UK wholeheartedly diplomatically right from the start, the Americans did give a degree of logistic support and of course, also the availability of all those ships to take up from trade. So beyond anything else, this was a war that was made possible by a remarkable logistics achievement but was still limited by what both sides were able to get to the island. The second thing that is striking, the fact that it was contained is the fact that Richard has mentioned, if you were comparing and contrasting the Falklands and the Russo-Ukraine war, the first thing you would comment upon is the impact on civilians. The three Falkland Islanders were killed was, I mean, an unfortunate result of friendly fire. It wasn't the fault particularly of the Argentinians other than the fact that they caused the war in the first place. Whereas when we're looking at Ukraine we're dominated in our understanding of the war by the impact on civilian life and property, not just because the war is fought in and amongst the people because of deliberate acts of strategy. Now, if you talk to Falkland Islanders about the war they weren't particularly happy at all about the initial treatment and the attitude but overall, there's no comparison between what happened in Stanley and what happened, let's say, in Bush and even making the comparison underlines the point. And that had important consequences because although there was a lot of loss of life and there was a degree of angst and bitterness after the war, it wasn't as hard to restore diplomatic relations between the UK and Argentina as it might have been if a war had been fought with the same sort of viciousness. It was a war unusually contained to the forces that were fighting it. It was a war between combatants, between regular forces. Amarhad, it was a professional sort of war. The UK forces didn't involve conscripts and their performance reflected their training and their doctrine and their equipment. Argentina did have conscripts involved in their own ways fought quite bravely, not always well-led. But it was a war between professional armed forces. It didn't involve militias. And it didn't spill over into attacks on civilians. The third element was the role of allies. Again, a similarity with the Russo-Ukraine war in that the belligerents were fighting on their own. They had support, they had backing in a number of ways. The UK more than Argentina. Argentina's support tended to be more rhetorical rather than material. The British got support from its allies more so as the war went on, but from a country like France almost straight away. What surprised quite a number of people is how more robust the French were than the Americans. Mitterrand was quite Anglo-file. The French provided information about the Mirage. The Mirages allowed the Harriers to train against them. And though they provided Super 8 and Dar, an ex-set, and of course if the Argentinean just waited a bit, they'd have had more Super 8 and Dar, an ex-set. They stopped anymore getting to Argentina during the war, which involved some very delicate diplomacy, for example, with Peru, which was supposed to be getting their own. So you have a very particular role of allies, but they weren't belligerents. They weren't doing the fighting. And though at one point there was a suggestion from the Pentagon, the Pentagon of course was following a completely different foreign policy from that of the State Departments and the White House. And there was talk at one point of providing the UK with the carrier. That was never particularly serious. But there was a lot of practical support nonetheless. Intelligence, another example, where the role of allies was very important, but they weren't belligerent. A further fact to take into account is the role of the United Nations. I remember getting into discussions not long after the war, and one of the things that was, I thought was interesting and unique, was that this was a war in which the UN was playing quite an important role from the start. And that was because it wasn't a cold, although this was a time when the Cold War was quite intense in the early 80s with the Reagan administration and major challenges being posed to the Soviet regime. Both the UK and Argentina were friends and allies of the United States, which is one of the reasons it created such difficulty for the United States. But the consequence of that was that it was an issue that could be handled in the UN. There was always a question as to whether or not, just because the UK was on one side, the Soviet Union would support Argentina. But it would have been a not-country support because it was famed for its anti-communism. And although Buenos Aires tried to play the anti-communist, tried to play the Cold War card as a way of putting pressure on the UK, they never did it with great conviction or great credibility because of the stances they'd taken before, after all the role that they played in Central America. So because of this, the UK had some freedom of manoeuvre in the UN because we had a veto after all. And the war opened with Sir Anthony Parsons having great success in the UN with a resolution which essentially blamed Argentina for the crisis and the aggression. Didn't quite go as far as it would have been ideal, but far enough for us to feel that we have the UN on our side and politically that made a difference. But the UN, when one reads the documents and goes through the diplomacy of the time, the role of the UN is a place where pressure is being put on the UK to agree a ceasefire, perhaps especially exactly 40 years ago when the news of the Belgrano had just come through was intense. And it was a curiosity of the time that on the Security Council were the two countries with whom the UK had sort of European countries, with whom the UK had sort of territorial disputes, Spain and Ireland. And they went towards the most helpful in the UN deliberations. So in the end it was one of those occasions when the UK did have to use its veto to stop a ceasefire resolution going through. So the role of the UN, I think, was always one of the striking features of this campaign, which in some ways set the terms for what happened when the Cold War did come to an end and the next great crisis where the UN did play a role with the Gulf War in 1990. The UN's role, for example, in the Iran-Iraq War or even the Israel-Lebanon War was much less impressive. So the role of diplomacy under UN was important. But also I think this factor that it wasn't quite within the obvious terms of the Cold War. Now on the Soviet side that wasn't new. After all, the communist Soviet Union had skirmishes with the communist People's Republic of China, which had a little war in 1979 with the communist Vietnam, which had been fighting the communist Cambodia and so on. So the idea of internecine conflict amongst the communist bloc was actually not new at all. But less so within the American-led bloc. And that did create a lot of the difficulties that were faced by the US in trying to work out its diplomacy. Again, when one reads the diplomatic coming and goings of the time, the Americans were much more bothered about this possibility that somehow because of what the British were doing, the Argentinians might switch sides in the Cold War, though in practice that was the British view and most other views it was never very likely. I remember actually being told by somebody who worked in the Soviet foreign ministry on the British desk that when the war was over and the Argentinian forces had capitulated they in fact brought out a bottle of champagne and toasted the British success. So it cut across the normal Cold War lines. In terms of what it told us about armed forces, it reinforced views that arguably come back again with the current war. I remember a lecture, and perhaps Julian will remember a lecture he gave at King's the year or so after the war, when I think when he was asked to describe the lessons learned, he said training, training and training. And I'm sure the professionalism kicked in and made an enormous difference when one goes to the Falklands once always struck despite what's said by the raw Argentinian conscripts against the hardened British troops. The ages on the gravestones are often teenagers. But the training was what had kicked in. I had a few conversations I had with Margaret Thatcher about the war and I asked her what the lesson she learned was and she said everything takes longer than it should. And I think that also in a time of instant diplomacy and instant communications, it's always important to have a reminder of the time when although the media aspect of the diplomacy was very important news about what was going on took a long time to come. However, I think the lesson that was learned a lot in the media assessments at the time was the exocet. The role of the anti-ship missile or with the Belgrano, the role of the torpedo. But the vulnerability of large objects to small items was something that was much commented on at the time. And it's a feature of most of these wars that what is always striking to people is the vulnerability of the big ticket items to small to anti-tank weapons or anti-ship weapons or air defense weapons or whatever. Now, of course, the counter to all of this is that you still need your ships. You still need your tanks and you still need your aircraft. You can't achieve much without them. But I think that the result of this war has been to raise all of those issues again. And although those in charge of armored divisions and ships and aircraft will point out how little you can do without them, I think the big lessons are still going to be those that revolve around drones and anti-tank weapons, et cetera. But this was thought to be the big lesson of 40 years ago, yet still we built two more aircraft carriers and carried on building large warships and so on. Because in the end, despite their vulnerability, you wouldn't have been able to mount the Falklands operations at all if you didn't have any aircraft carriers at all. So I think that's a debate that was prompted then and will be carrying on now. I think that's largely my time up. I think the thought that it's just worth ending on because what's striking, I think, if one thinks over the last 40 years is that we've had a lot of wars. The UK was involved in 82. Then it was involved in the Gulf War. It was involved in Bosnia. It was involved in Kosovo. Then all Afghanistan and Iraq and so on. So in a sense, those who've grown up over the last 40 years have grown up with the idea that war is something we do quite often. It was a real surprise in 1982. We've had Northern Ireland. We've had the Malaya and so on. But these have been below the radar for most people. When the thing started, most mines went back to Suez in 1956, which had been the shambles. So we weren't used to the idea, actually, British forces going to war. We were aware of the confrontation, of the nuclear issue of the Cold War, but not of the idea you might actually fight. And in that sense, it was a turning point because after that point, British forces found themselves regularly engaged in armed conflict. And when they did so, in a sense, the Falklands was also a turning point because it was a point in which the professionalism of the armed forces was recognised. We were. And perhaps just to conclude with an anecdote which Michael Clapp and Julian Thompson, I hope will remember, is after my official history was published and Sandy Woodward wasn't very happy about some discussion of the commander range. We had a fascinating meeting, which I wish I'd recorded in my office with Michael and Julian and Sandy Woodward, going over all the ground about what went wrong with the commander range and how they could have been improved and so on. And things got quite animated until at one point Julian turned around to Sandy and said, but Sandy, we won. And I think in the end, that was the most important point. Thanks very much. Thank you, Professor. I know you've got a really busy schedule at the moment. If I can grab you before you have to run off. I'm sure the school administration will be furious at me when I reveal the slogan for our school conference this year is back to the future. I'm sure you've got a lot of questions about the United States, Ukraine, the European Union, Brexit, the United States, COVID-19, China. A lot of questions and people starting to wonder in the British context, is it time that we really overhaul and have a look at British defense policy, foreign policy. We really look at the integrated defense review. Is that all up for grabs now or is it fairly plain sailing as was before? Well, it's never plain sailing. It said that the big issue was going to be in fact, a pivot to so-called pivot to Indo-Pacific, which I think will actually become more important after this war is over. It did focus as the major security area, Russia. And you can argue that, you know, the British role in this war is the most, probably the most influential we've had on a major crisis for a while, simply because we were to the fore in sending weaponry to Ukraine and have taken quite a hard line hawkish position and therefore find ourselves the better of Russian threats and grumps and propaganda and so on, including threatening some tsunami the other day by releasing nuclear weapons using a submarine that they don't actually have yet. So, yeah, I mean, I think when you're in the middle of something like this, it's very as it was in the case of the Falklands, it's very hard to work out the repercussions and, you know, a lot of the unintended consequences of war are those that result from, I mean, in this case from high energy prices, high wheat prices and so on, they're hard to anticipate. The big question is what this does to Russia. I mean, Russia isn't the process of being defeated one way or the other it's a loser in this war and what that means for a lot of the assumptions we've literally been working for the last 10 or so years as Russia has been becoming more hard line and aggressive and so on it is going to be quite significant. I mean, starting to see European diplomats saying, well, you know, if it's the case that Russia is now diminished power, why are we getting all excited about increasing our defence budgets and so on. So, I think the big issues are going to be still going to revolve around post Ukraine, Russia and in particular Putin's own role until we see some resolution of that it's going to be very hard, I think, to manage a further reorientation of British foreign policy. And this is always the concern, isn't it, that we sort of worry about, I guess in war studies of these knee-jerk reactions I know when we saw the sinking of that Russian warship everybody was basically saying once again as we saw in 1982 that, you know, get rid of all navies, get rid of all surface warships where we didn't know all the facts at the time we still don't and actually there might be a lot more at play this than simply, you know, warship to vulnerable. Yeah, I mean, I think if you look back at the Sheffield example, the anniversary of that too I suspect with the Moskva it's if you're paying attention you can deal with these sort of threats if you're not paying attention you can get caught out and this is always going to be the danger of drawing large conclusions when the explanations may lie in the quality of the equipment the training, how they're being used the Russian combined arms doctrine doesn't seem to have actually been applied in Ukraine which is why tanks being picked off in such numbers. So I think one always has to be careful but you can't avoid but noting the the what if you're not paying attention and are in a vulnerable position what can be done with comparatively cheap weapons comparatively cheap weapons Thank you Sir Lawrence I know you're off to do some other talks in the talk Thank you anyway Bye So now we're going to move to the Maritime panel and this is our first official panel which I also have the privilege of chairing this panel will form a mini witness seminar style format which will join with three distinguished former naval officers veterans of the 1982 Falklands war and I have had the privilege of working with all their counsel during my years as a PhD student and I know I continue to learn from them and fire reams of questions to them about the Falklands war so it just demonstrates there's a long way to go before we have anything which at least I would argue is a comprehensive history and account of events. So first I'd like to turn to that Royal Navy retired who amongst his long service in the Royal Navy that saw him working around the world. He was the Commodore of the British Armed Forces group working closely with British Special Forces, the Royal Marines and of course naval and often forgotten civilian Seaborn leadership to take those fundamental steps to retake the Falkland Islands Michael 40 years has now passed 1982 Maritime Naval led operation 8000 miles from the UK a massive logistical operation spanning tri-service civilian seafarers and civilian workers but a profound shock to a nation and political establishment that after 1945 had been convinced there was little beyond the immediate surrounding waters of Britain and Europe. How does the Falklands war fit into British defense history and Royal Navy history? What are your thoughts 40 years on now that you've had time to really reflect on it? Well I wouldn't begin to be able to answer that question because I've been retired for nearly 40 years but I hope that lessons were learned. I'm unconvinced that they were because of my experience after the campaign and and you know for instance I wasn't invited to attend any debrief an official debrief such as they used to do in the Second World War you need to sit down and analyze it right the way through and I've been left really for 40 years questioning in my mind whether the lessons of the Falklands were ever learned. Shortly after I returned home I asked a captain in the Northwood staff I'd had a very good relationship with him during the campaign he was an excellent chap and I asked him when will a debrief be held and he said we don't need a debrief we won and that's all that matters so you can see no doubt he got this from senior officers and you can see how the thinking was that you know just relax it'll all be sorted out and people remember and make use of the campaign but you don't need to worry about it I feel that that was a huge mistake and I was disappointed to hear it because there have been a lot of misunderstandings and even today we hear people writing to some of the better newspapers or talking loudly about an event but they clearly didn't understand why that particular event happened in the way it did and the obvious example is the disaster of Sagalla Haddon's of Tristram which suffered from poor communications and disobedience by in a naval view by army officers untrained in naval cooperation and it wouldn't take orders from a Royal Naval Officer or a Royal Marine it all added to the catastrophe that those were burnt and still suffering there was an awful rush in getting their equipment to Fitzroy and to the Welsh guards who split and to try and get them to just up it didn't give us time to get things like the anti-flash gear or at action stations in sufficient numbers to put on the soldiers we're going into Fitzroy if that had happened there would have been much less danger for the Gallagher soldiers and very many fewer would have been properly burnt the whole thing was rushed and not well organised and I have to admit but it was essential to try and get them together as a regiment and to get vibrigate ready to go up in the front line I'm grateful to Sir Lawrence for many of his comments which I was going to try and cover but I can save that but before the Argentines started to claim the Falkland Islands the Ministry of Defence had been cutting the Navy but disregarding our responsibilities to overseas territories and Commonwealth and I think this was very clear it was concentrating on the Central Front and perhaps it was simply driven by the Treasury but to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office the cuts to the Navy must have had strong implications the loss of HMS Ark Royal a short while before suggested to Admiral Anagia that an invasion by them would not be countered going back a few years when I was a Midshipman I served in the cruiser HMS Salon during the Korean War and I learnt about the Navy's role in supporting our land forces mainly by shelling bridges far north of the front line so that train and vehicle transport of stores were disrupted and prevented from supporting the North Korean and Chinese troops so helping our troops move north later as a Lieutenant Commander during the Indonesian Confrontation I commanded a Minesweeper HMS Puncheston and found myself once again supporting land forces we experienced several potentially lethal engagements at sea but luckily we were never badly damaged or injured by the Indonesians so what I'm trying to say really is that working with the Army was relatively common for a Naval Officer until the days shortly before the Falklands campaign the other aspect is that the Confrontation that Indonesian Confrontation that covered Malaya, Sarawak and Brunei in places did bring home strongly the defendants of our colonies on our armed forces but particularly the Royal Navy for their defence and I found that the gratitude of many locals was very encouraging later in 1972 when in command of HMS Jaguar after two Bahra patrols I was ordered to sail east across the Indonesian and I called in briefly at Tasmania where I was invited to charity lunch I was bombarded by questions as to what effect our joining the EU was likely to have on the trade and also the question of defence how would Australia and other dependencies be affected well I hadn't been briefed at all and they were concerned about China in particular as they've been Chinese have been reported to penetrating Queensland I knew little about the trade but could only say I was sure that the Royal Navy would do all it could to come to their defence and support it if it became necessary and we hadn't been cut much more because the cuts were already beginning when we visited New Zealand the situation was very similar and while steaming further east we called in to a number of islands such as Fiji, Tonga Cook Islands the French island Tahiti and Pitca all but Tahiti questioned our joining the EU and many asked about defence an elderly lady in the Cook Islands asked me if I'd met the Queen I hadn't but she very proudly replied I have they'd obviously met in the Royal Yacht and they if we badly need a replacement for the Royal Family if the Commonwealth is to survive many islands that we went to didn't have airfields or any means of defence against a modern technically technical enemy and so they look for us for support earlier cuts to the Navy's amphibious assault capability had devastated our ability to carry out an opposed assault to help reinforce an island's defence our relationship with the Royal Marines had also suffered through lack of joint training and commitment we were not expected to have to carry out an opposed assault we were only to practice landing troops on a friendly shore all this I felt as a midgetman from Korean days serving in a ship full of World War Two veterans was chaotic and a tragedy in 1981 my boss who is Rear Admiral John Cox and Major General Jeremy Moore got together and reckoned that Brigadier Thompson the commander of three command brigade and I as Commodore Amphibious Warfare should be closer together to get to know each other my office was on Portsmouth with the Admiral until recently his title was Flag Officer Carriers and Amphibious Ships but now Flag Officer Third Fertilla the original title was a far better one which included responsibility for Royal Fleet Auxiliary ships it was fine to relays with my opposite number when the Royal Marines were based in Portsmouth but they had been moved to Stonehouse Barracks and Plymouth so in November 1981 changing the tough subject slightly John Lott Secretary of State for Defence visited HMS Fearless during a simple exercise off Browndown Beach in Dorset which was with the Army she in a landing ship an LSL was manned by a merchant naval seamen of the Royal Fleet Auxiliary but capable of being armed with two air defence 40mm Bofas they were landing tanks and vehicles Nott was amazed and said he didn't know that Fearless and her sister ship Intrepid were so capable and thankfully delayed scrapping them just in time my fourth first thought was why on earth did the naval staff not try and educate the Secretary of State and other civil servants on the Navy's capabilities and needs perhaps they do now but one wonders in January 1982 Brigadier Julian Thompson the commander of three Bacardi welcomed my staff and me and my personal married quarter in Stonehouse Barracks but at last close to his office and staff we were however still limited in training purely for peacetime operations but thank heavens for that sensible move it was just in time and certainly helped us and our staffs to get to know each other and work more easily an unsevious assault and responsibility by the landing force commander and the naval amphibious force commander but as it entails a naval approach and landing by naval helicopters and landing craft responsibility for executing greed plan rests on the naval commander Operation Corporate as it was called involved the most distant naval operation in known history on the passage it became very clear that the Soviet Union was taking a close interest they were flying air reconnaissance and a possible submarine was found when we were leaving Ascension Island for the route south but I wondered how much if anything if at all they supported Argentina the Argentines also showed a close interest quite clearly in sending ships to see what we were up to on our way down to Ascension we attempted various ruses to mislead their intelligence but inevitably it comes clear where the group of ships are in general heading to achieve any degree of surprise we were forced to approach St Carlos water by night and hopefully be able to land most of the landing force before the Argentine air crew could be briefed and attack us this was achieved but it very soon became clear that several naval officers and ratings were not yet adjusted to fighting some of them winged quite hard and asked to be returned home others, thank heavens were quite excited and got on with it and they had taken the Queen Shilling and they felt that it was their duty to do so but earlier on the first day where we were there the starboard Beaufort's crew in Fearless failing to fire as ordered at an Argentine light aircraft flying overhead it was lucky to escape and report a number of ships it had seen but a petty officer standing by the gun told the guns crew to obey the order to fire which they did it was that sort of state of training and understanding of the situation we were in which was obvious initially but then people started to learn and accept it that afternoon an untrained Argentine air force came out in force they were reported to have made about 60 attacks the neck of knowledge on how to attack a ship became clear to me as a Buccaneer observer who had done lots of it most bombs would drop too late for their fuses to unwind but that of course didn't stop the bomb crashing through a ship and often creating considerable damage all in all the campaign was a great success but the lives lost tell a tale two thirds were lost at sea as ships weaponry was mostly designed for deep water in the northeast Atlantic and not for inshore waters with land close by cluttering ships radars and making detection of aircraft and aiming at them impossible anything had to be manual while the sea harriers and ground attack harriers were a great success the lack of airborne early warning which had gone with the Ark Royal their radars meant that early detection of ships and aircraft was extremely difficult so the warning we had was really when we saw the aircraft crossing the hills about to attack us fortunately when I first saw the list of ships I was to have to carry out the operation I was concerned that there were no minesweepers however the staff officer in Northwood I spoke with managed to get three teams of mine clearance divers sent to Ascension to join us one was sent on to the carrier group where a tug repair logistics facility called a Trullar was being created particularly out of range of shore based aircraft the other two came to my task group and these two teams managed to remove some 11 unexploded bombs and so save 11 ships it was an extremely dangerous task but they were very successful and immensely brave the awards I managed to get them unfortunately in my view did not reflect their bravery or contribution to the campaign General Moore had also tried to get a VC for at least one of his Marines but he told me he'd spoken with a senior officer naval officer in the Ministry of Defense who had said to him there'll be no VCs for those in the naval service as it was too short a campaign and all your recommendations are for men that are still alive live VCs are a pain not surprisingly General Moore was furious and I was appalled embarrassed because the man was a naval officer over the years later I heard of other acts of bravery that had not been reported when I tried to upgrade and when I tried to upgrade some awards several years after the campaign I was told that there would be no further awards after five years from the incident there's a marked difference between the land and sea forces in the Marines and soldiers tend to be part of a family or regiment commando and keep in touch for several years while a sailor belongs to one ship for about 15 to 18 months who may never meet those shipmates again few brave men talk or boast about their experience while others suffer mentally through lack of support and some get PTSD so I very much hope the five-year rule will be cancelled and we can go back to a more a kinder system so that perhaps describes the civil service in the mods understanding of what bravery involves the greatest mistake I believe was that after the surrender we didn't sit down and discuss the operation in detail most of my they expect the mistakes that affected my task group and the lack of understanding of naval problems by the soldiers and their acceptance of naval orders this was a very different army to that in South Korea who many of whom had been working and knowing that the navy supported them it also strengthens the argument for a senior in theater commander that he might have been able to stop many misunderstandings and acts of disobedience Julian and I were in many ways to junior and far too busy to spare the time to do that sort of work it also explains while the Royal Marines were created over 300 years ago and while I believe we need a second Royal Marines brigade while China and Russia are supporting many countries such as Argentina and their claims for territory we need to be able to cover operations in the Pacific and Indian oceans as well as the Atlantic which of our overseas territories will be next thank you thank you Michael I will now turn to our second panelist Major General Julian Thompson Royal Marines retired and commanded during the Falklandsfall and distinguished military historian Julian the Royal Marine commandos an integral part of British defence the Royal Navy but also British national identity and culture over the centuries by 1981 their future seemingly in doubt as amphibious operations were deep prioritised as Michael mentioned but here we are 40 years later where the Royal Marines carried a significant burden on British defence after 1982 the Gulf Special Forces Afghanistan and many other tasks yet the Falklandsfall was almost that typical operation that would be dissimilar to a Royal Marine such was found in the Age of Sail under Lord Nelson or the First World War which the Falklands islands were certainly involved with and of course the Second World War what did this mean for the Royal Marines and the understanding of their role in the history now but indeed debate about their future well the Falklandsfall was a turning point for the Royal Marines actually I'll tell you a little story Robin Pringle who was the commandant general before he was badly injured in late 1981 went to Michael Clap he didn't tell me that himself but he told me that later and said the Royal Marines are in danger of being disbanded should I just say right will burn the colours mix the ashes with wine and march off symbolically rather like Napoleon's own guard or do we trickle away and salami slice and Michael Clap's advice to Robin Pringle would go now at once with maximum publicity and see what they do about it and luckily there was no put to the test thanks in part to the IRA blowing off one of Robin Pringle's legs when it was redeemed a bad thing to do to attack the Royal Marines while they commandant general was languishing in hospital Robin Pringle told me that story himself many years later and I know that it's perfectly true that was the state to which the not defence review had reduced the chances of the Royal Marines another anecdote firstly Lord and his way back from an interview with Mr. Knot in Cornwall called mighty courtesan Plymouth and said to me we will never, the Brits will never do an amphibious operation again this was in about November or October 1981 and he wasn't exaggerating he wasn't being silly if because the not defence review had threatened to reduce the Royal Navy to a coastal navy this had several effects it reduced the level of our deterrence and obviously been noted by our enemies in Argentina and it meant that the navy were not going to do anything other than be a coastal navy and it was a disastrous decision made by Mr. Knot and so that was the legacy which Michael and I inherited and had to make do with when we went south unfortunately the not defence review was only two years before the Falkland and so a lot of the damage had not been done there hadn't been time for it to be done like getting rid of the carriers and the LPDs and reducing the navy to a coastal navy and a lot of the expertise certainly in the Royal Marines had not been allowed to wither away I mean all my staff were still very au-fait it was operation even quite junior ones because we had not been away from our proper trade for too long and I think one of the things that comes out of this war that people don't realise or the general public don't realise is that it was only won by the maritime power of Great Britain and by maritime power of course I mean not only the Royal Navy but I mean also the merchant navy and indeed the Fleet Aeron as well and without that maritime power we would not have won and this reflects itself a lot in the sort of stuff that you see in the newspapers about the Falklands where they are just concentrating mainly on the land battles forgetting the importance of the sea because this campaign I was the analogy is very much the American-Pacific experience in World War II where you are fighting on small islands surrounded by sea and you owe your survival to the Royal Navy or in the case of Americans the United States Navy it's not like a landing in Normandy where after a while everything refers to being a land war and the Navy takes a pace backwards and just becomes a sort of convo organisation shuffling goods and stuff forward and island war has a different flavour to it and people don't realise that I don't think and partly I think Michael again put his finger on it was though there's now been lessons learnt of the Falkland Islands published a little slim pamphlet there's nothing that I know of and I may be wrong to equate with the Admiralty battle summaries that were written during the Second World War covering all the major operations and if you want to look up Sicily go to see the Admiralty battle summary of what happened in Sicily in considerable depth and in considerable detail and this was partly what Michael said this oh it'll never happen again syndrome which I was told and I might say by the first later First Sea Lord some years later saying the Falkland Liberation will never do it again now this attitude I think was very damaging and was also damaging was the Navy's reluctance to publicise its role in the war I feel this is the lack of proper PR policy in the naval service and it may well be happening today I don't know it was a fact in those days and so and part of the attitude was summed up by the business of the VCs which I'm not going to grind on but Michael just covered it very well indeed I think the other point I'd like to make is the Army and the Royal Marines had a lot of experience in fighting small wars in Northern Ireland and whatever this meant that the level of leadership among the junior NCA's and the corp rules and the young officers was high because they had experience and this certainly paid off in the Falklands where night attacks often became just individual battles and individual assaults run by corp rules and indeed Marines and soldiers themselves this was the experience we had which helped us enormously I didn't think I got anything else to say except that in a way we're seeing this again in what was happening in the Ukraine I think or with danger of seeing it again I think that our policy of fitting the thread to the amount of money you can spend is coming home to roost and I hope it is put right fairly soon and quickly because it should be and this is where we get it back to front because I call it situating depreciation in other words how much money you've got to spend okay we're going to do that with that it's quite wrong you've got to actually look at the threat and decide what you've got to do in order to meet it and that is all I've got to say because Michael covered most of the ground very well and I didn't want to take up people's time repeating what he said thank you thank you Julian I'm not sure if you're tired I don't commentate on British defence global events, British foreign policy in recent years and part of the centre of geopolitics at the University of Cambridge Chris the Falklands War stands out almost as a anomaly in post 1945 British politics, defence policy and indeed foreign policy looking back now what are your reflections after 40 years on this and it sort of continues to resonate doesn't it for Britain and Argentina but other nations long after 1982 even the publicly accessible lessons learned I'm actually always cautious and wary of the term lessons learned was produced with a land view 20 years later after events the 1990s a different period for Britain the legacy the Falklands War may be disappearing already by then and of course a world that moved on to the Middle East now the Indo-Pacific this almost and then with recent Russia-Ukraine crisis almost back to where we started in 1945 the West against Russia and of course the Pacific workshop of the world how does the Falklands sort of fit into things today a very simple answer is the integrated review is the natural combination of what has happened to the Royal Navy since 1982 if it weren't for the Falklands the integrated review would not be a maritime based strategy today it would not be reflecting the virtues of global Britain you wouldn't see two carriers you wouldn't see a modern amphibious force and you wouldn't see a modern force of nuclear submarines the integrated review is the direct anti-knot from 1980 it's a complete reversal and every time there's been a defence review and I've been involved in quite a few since then the touchstone has always been can we do the Falklands again and the evolution of the Royal Navy since 1982 has been totally predicated on the fact that we'd have to do a Falklands again it's maintained our global footprint and presence it's maintained our global ambition and I would say without the Falklands review today that has got over the hiatus of Afghanistan and Iraq is now looking at high impact low footprint operations around the world and I doubt if you'd ever again have had a naval CDS so if you ask me what the relevance of the Falklands is today is you look at the integrated review and that is the direct legitimate son of the Falklands war in our ability to project power not just 8,000 miles away where the global Britain needs it now for my bit what I'd like to do is just highlight a few things that are for me come out of the Falklands not only as a result of my own direct personal experience but also in reflecting and researching it and I think there are some general principles that apply here I think the key thing in 1982 is that we really needed to have trained for war generally not a specific context as Mike has already pointed out we were configured against a North Atlantic scenario that was designed to contain the Soviet Union and its allies we had to adapt go down to the South Atlantic against essentially a foe that had first and second generation Western weapons we also had to go into an inshore environment when in fact we expected to not a specific context and yet again you've got to train in peacetime as you intend to fight the further you get away from that the less that your policy makers will actually take you seriously and the public won't even pay for it and one of the things I found interesting when I was in defence policy is the wide gap between the assumptions on which policies and strategies are based and the realities of situations on the ground and I think that's because national policies tend to reflect consensual rather than objective assessments about the future the imperatives are steady state administration by the Ministry of Defence and a sort of strange narcissism that leads to policies and strategies based on what the purveyor prefers rather than what the context demands and these features are often compounded by ignorance or misuse of history a neglect of hard-won lessons or even a non-identification of them and the use of simplistic analogies that mask flaws in policy and strategy and worse still the resulting strategy is really a template for the pressing demands and practicalities of warfare should policy and deterrence fail and armed forces are actually required to fight and it leads to situations where there's a clear ends of policies and national strategies really balance the ways and means by which they can practice so what I'm saying simply is if you insert something into your national strategy you should actually mean it and you should resource it and this is one of the big failings of the not review it was entirely theoretical it operated in the abstract and frankly didn't fit the situation anywhere on the ground even in the North Atlantic or in Europe now the issue about training in peacetime as you expect to fight is both the individual and the collective training everybody stresses the individual training but the collective training is the most important and I think in the case of the Royal Navy in 1982 the training ground is the battleground and although we hadn't operated in the South Atlantic the conditions down there were pretty extreme people seem to forget that one day in three was either a 4.6 or greater now we've been used to operating in the Atlantic the Royal Marines in Norway so essentially we've been training in that battleground but the principle holds true people forget we actually conducted a really effective anti-submarine campaign there was not one ship sunk by an Argentinian submarine in the Falklands people say look you put a lot of effort into it but people forget the idea is not to destroy submarines to stop submarines interfering with what you're trying to achieve and that was stunningly successful people are whinging about the 31 torpedoes that were expended 49 depth charges the 21 anti-submarine mortar rounds let me tell you that costs less than 21 million pounds the price of a frigate is 100 million pounds okay cheap at the price I'd say we've destroyed one Argentine submarine the other one was ineffective and we successfully detected a submarine on 11th of May as well exorcets and chaff I think we rather got right around the axle on exorcets I think one thing that's worthy of research is no ship that managed to fire chaff in the Falklands was hit by an exorcet and I don't think enough operational research was done at the time into the effects of chaff on the missile head and if you go through the engagements now you can see that actually this thing was introduced unfortunately in the case of Atlantic conveyor that was the biggest chaff clouds around at the time and it got hit but in the other cases if you deployed your chaff you weren't going to be hit by an exorcet so we rather overemphasize that the other thing I think people forget when analyzing the campaign is the Argentinians didn't fly at night that gave us some good respite to tell you the truth we're not likely to get that in future sustainability but that's been mentioned I think what's really important to something that doesn't happen today is that we sailed from Gibraltar in my case from the UK with war stocks our ships were fully stored for war against the Warsaw Pact if necessary we had a good logistics train as you heard and your campaign should always be shaped by your logistics rather than your operational ambitions we had a good inventory back in our storerooms and at sea and also we had industrial reach both in the UK and beyond the United States and our allies none of this I think is in place today I think the other thing we need to recognize about the Falklands was the very heavy weapon usage that is required to actually achieve an objective if you look at the service to air missiles only one in four actually achieved a kill that's a shocking cost ratio if you think about it I'm afraid to say that quite a lot of our weapons didn't actually work not really up to the scale of the torpedoes in the German, American and British Navy at the start of World War II which effectively was the result of actually not trialing them in peacetime you didn't realize how they didn't work you didn't realize how many failures there would be Japanese of course practiced all the time with their long lance and they produced fantastic results as a consequence one of the failings we have today is we hardly ever do missile fireworks we don't know whether they're going to work or not and I would dare say that most of our weapons would not even leave the rails given the assurance that we've got however having said that I think one of the real pluses of the campaign is having thinking as Julian said NCOs and officers who can improvise and adapt I think one of the things that we were required to do almost all the time was actually say here's the mission how are you going to deal with it so flying at night without night vision goggles below the level of mountains in the dark is doable if you really work hard at it and obviously you cross your fingers while you're doing it but what disappointed me down south I think was the poor corporate memory it seemed that everything that we were going to do was the result of within living memory and I remember being in San Carlos on day one and I'm sure Michael remember it as well thinking I wonder if these ships could make smoke I wonder if we've got barrage balloons back in the UK well the answer was we did in Abingdon Abingdon airfield there were 400 barrage balloons that we could have used and what disappoints me as a historian and as a military practitioner is the fact that we didn't go back to World War II and say well if we're going to do an island hopping land assault what did we use then and what can we use today we didn't do that we didn't draw forward all those lessons of our forebears we relied on our own experience and the most recent generation that is a besetting fault I think of all armed forces they want to perfect the last day of the previous war rather than get ready for the first day for the next using everything at your disposal my final point is and Laurie mentioned it we really played our part in the very sterile information environment in the South Atlantic there were no snooping civilian satellites there was no social media there were no press helicopters and boats we would expect to be swarmed over in any modern conflict and I'm afraid to say the operational tempo would struggle to keep up with the information tempo that's me Chris thanks very much I'm going to slightly abuse our chair and ask each of our panelists a question but if you do have a question please put it in the question and answer function and I shall try and sift them and ask them before we move on to the next panel Chris if I can start with you as we refresh off the back of your speech there you mentioned the lessons learned and I also mentioned you're always being wary of that term lessons learned and I suppose that's the skeptic in me but when it comes to the politics of defence and how we look to the future of what is national defence we've seen this constant debate in public and parliament of this sort of yawering all the time of what is the national priority here what is the threat to the nation we've now seen with the Russia-Ukraine crisis instantly that there is an argument of everything else in the world was irrelevant focus on Russia yet we know in the background I know you're well acquainted with there are big questions in the Indo-Pacific for the future there are that unknown something in the future if Russia is going to be resurgent I have my doubts personally how does say a member of parliament look at and connect experience strategic experience think what we've done before and think I'm going to vote for increasing defence spending or I'm going to support that when actually this is a nowadays is a very fluidic fast-paced debate what should be British defence policy and foreign policy well how do you got right firstly what does the average MP think about the number of votes he's going to gain or lose by every decision he makes I'm afraid I struggle to get a sensible conversation with most MPs about defence it's beyond their electoral horizon they're not interested in strategy because it doesn't really affect their constituents in their view so the first thing is the woke people say we have to educate them this is a they're very keen on saying it's their first priority is government is the defence and security of the British people well you wouldn't think so it's as simple as that we need better people I mean on the naval side just think how many naval officers are MPs in parliament right now just one Andrew who's a doctor medical doctor how many army officers are there quite a lot so this tends to sort of influence quite a lot of the debate the short answer your question James is lessons are just lessons they're only learned when they're incorporated into doctrine or policy doctrine is the safe seashore from which we allow people to dive into the sea of initiative and it gives them something to paddle back to when they get out of their debt simple as that and that's all it is but what we have to do is keep under constant review the strategic context and I'm one of those people it doesn't believe in grand strategy I'm afraid grand strategy died at the end of the Cold War what we need to teach our politicians now is how to do state crafts how to manage the complexities of the situation that you outlined allocate priorities and essentially balance the ends the political ends that are required by the government and the public with the means that they're prepared to make available and then discussing with the military the ways in which those ends and means can be achieved and those means can be employed that's all it is but trying to get that debate that's clear and balanced and informed by the right people is beyond the width of most democracies I'm afraid you actually have to have an intelligent conversation with intelligent customers amongst the political class those intelligent customers do not exist right now and as I keep saying to them war is too important to be left to politicians you tell us what the political objectives are and we'll deliver through the means you give us the ways in which that will be achieved and as I recall that's exactly what Mrs Thatcher said to Admiral Fieldhouse and Admiral Lewin these are my political objectives here are the means get on and deliver them with the ways you know best that's the best way to conduct war Thank you Chris I've got an interesting question coming I'd like to sort of throw out to all three of you which is a key concept in the Ministry of Defence today is that of multi-domain integration what lessons can the Maritime Commanders in 1982 offer today's force what are the likely blind spots It's meant by multi-domain integration it sounds like typical MLD speak which I'm subjected to in the staff college Julian it means joint with a bit of cyber and space thrown in because they're not you and me right anyway sorry I couldn't resist it can you ask the question again please look basically multi-domain integration means that you have to coordinate the effects that you require with the ways and means that are available to achieve them sorry realise them you've got to use the right terminology realise them and everything is relevant whether it's in the cognitive space the physical space or the electronic space so it's bringing everything together that you can know and applying it to a realise effect thank you Chris I knew you'd put me right but you're right I mean you know basically it's integrating all the information the intelligence you require you know to gain strategic operational tactics it's what we've been trying to do for centuries it's common sense I don't give a grand name it's absolute common sense you don't go to be the previous CDS if you don't make up these terms no true absolutely and to pick up something that Chris you did say which I entirely endorse I've heard MP say there are no votes in defence it's absolutely ground into them that there are no votes in defence and I say to them there will be some when you've cocked it up so badly we'll have a war but my little bit too late James can I say something about the Ukraine war I think you're absolutely right that you know we've got to be really really careful here that we don't go off and say actually you know this proves that the integrator review isn't coherent I believe that Laurie Friedman there I think it's very coherent you know Britain is not here to defend Ukraine against tanks we've got the best tank trap in Europe called the English Channel okay and we need to leave leave the panzer stuff to those who need it most and do it best it's as simple as that that's not our role it never really has been our role historically except when we've had to step into the breach for other people but I will say to you that I think the war in Ukraine is probably the last 20th century war rather than the shape of the future 21st century and I think we've got to get our heads around that I think the other thing is is taking our eye off I think the main ball which is China correct yeah little example the Falkland Islands sit like a bottle stopper on the Drake Passage which was one of the two accesses from the Pacific to the Atlantic going a long way around until the Antarctic ice melts which it will and indeed one of the reasons the Chinese are backing the Argentine claim the Falkland Islands because they know they can then sidle up from afters and say now is payback time for us supporting you can we use your port and your airfield in the Falkland Islands and they will get them into so much hot that eventually they'll have to do it anyway so they've got their eye on the main chance and they are not taking their eye off the ball and we've got to have a wee downtime as well yeah Argentina's got more gas of course onshore and offshore than three catars as well so the Chinese will be after that and on that note we all know that resources are the fights over resources is the after war so I'm going to ask a question of Michael Clap that's come in and it reads you mentioned several issues plaguing the operation and your command namely joint operation and the ability of your forces to understand the joint environment major operations and their total environment radar and maneuver issues and limited after action reviews the article bluff co disaster also describes command structure and communication issues with all this in mind do they think there was a key to solving these issues before they became evident Michael that's much of that's beyond me I'm afraid because it was a long time ago now I put it down to a lack of joint training the people I first bet in out in Korea and stuff were nearly always the ships company almost to a man had served in World War two so they were totally relaxed about the whole thing most of the army who seemed extremely keen to come out to a ship and take their leave period with us which was quite fun you had a different type of person that chapter and they were questioning the whole time looking back at that the services were very integrated in each other's role they tried to learn out we were trying to learn what the army wanted out of us bombarding targets ashore and things like that I imagine the carriers were doing exactly the same then mental roundabouts and in some ways the army were doing it in reverse how can you help us because we are the ones that own the property and the land but sometimes that's rather difficult to do if you can do something rather difficult different it's wonderful I'm afraid with this sort of concentration on the central front attitude all that it seemed to me had died now whether you can keep it up in a time of peace and make sure the services are in cahoots with each other and understand each other I also don't know but I think one should try and I went on to become the naval commander of the Maritime Operational Training Centre and it was staggering actually to listen to quite a lot of the Royal Air Force people and then total misunderstanding of what maritime operations was about I'm not knocking them as air crew Battle of Britain that type of campaign they were brought up to think about but one occasion they were asking me why don't you put TACAN beacons out to sea in a position that you can put on your map and they didn't accept that or didn't understand that a Russian submarine could come along and probably remove it and put it about 20 miles in a different direction and it would still be working and their navigation would be 20 miles out and put them in a trap I was just interested in how limited their view of air warfare was and naval air warfare was probably they were very good air crew in other respects so I think there's a huge amount for the services to learn about the other problems whether we do it I don't know I never did a joint staff course frankly I never did a staff course and what they do teach I wish I knew because I think there's so much more basically childish almost down to a simple questions that people need to understand certainly in the Falklands this became very apparent when going back to the disaster in of the of the it was set up at the request of divisional staff at very very short notice and the idea was that Sir Tristram would get in in the darkness and she could just about do most of the passage in the dark and she would meet landing craft there and possibly helicopters and offload the troops in particular first and then the ammunition in the stores that were being delivered and best of these bits that were being delivered were probably quite vital to fight Brigade the only ones I can think of which one could possibly have left behind were the rapier at a fence system which was sent to cover their headquarters but their headquarters is always on the move so that's not the easiest thing to keep cover but if it had been planned longer we might have had the clothing to protect the Welsh guards and all the other people involved but the time didn't allow this and my first efforts didn't show where any spares could be probably in the camera and the QE2 who had well out of the area by then and these were these may not have been passed down to fight Brigade as reasons for why we were trying to do it in this way they hadn't got their communications with them which staggered me afterwards to hear it but the communications were all on HF except to seven ships so you've got the two carriers the two amphibious ships HMS Antrim for South Georgia and the two main troop ships the Canberra and the QE2 those seven had secure voice satellite system was only available because the Americans managed to put up another satellite to understand so it wasn't one going around the south pearl once a day it was two but even so that meant you did have a system which is like the modern communication system every other ship in the whole force and mostly the troops too only had HF recently I was told little incidents without knocking the SAS in particular but they were a team was embarked in Hermes and Hermes had gone for radio silence or despite having the DSS so it was limiting them to having to use the LSS so and they realized that some quite close somebody was using HF and the officer who told me said he'd noticed a rather furtive member of the SAS with a little box walking around to the wing of the bridge and sort of talking to it and for several days until they really worked out what he was up to he was transmitting on HF so they could have launched a huge air attack if she had been in range it was these sort of misunderstandings which were fairly common I'm afraid in the area how you train people to accept the rules that others make for you in order to protect them and look after them and protect them to the right place at the right time I think is very difficult but it's certainly one worth a try The point is the joint training had gone out of the window just before this when I joined as a young officer we were very joint orientated because all our predecessors had it banged into them be joined because they had experience in the Second World War where the presence of jointry was plain sailing everyone knew about it and a very good example when I was a DS Army Staff Corps it was the first year I was there which is quite a lot of joint training with the Navy and the Air Force my second year they had started to slim it down and do away with it and you've got to remember also there's a lot of places like the Joint Staff Corps where the joint where they taught the basics of jointry had been disbanded and got rid of jointry was out it was just not part of the scene for the Central Front and so what Michael is talking about where it's natural to turn around to your dark blue or light blue Chap and Sable let's work together and what can you do for me had gone out of the window and everyone distrusted each other and become on little tram lines this was the problem I think go along with that I think that's a a good point to finish on with the Maritime panel I think I would just add from my own research that it's particularly interesting that after the Second World War there was of course this huge push for as Michael and Julian mentioned joint operations and an understanding but there was also going on that there wasn't enough of it and it was foundational to the creation of things like the Department of Defense and the Ministry of Defense to try and force through more joint operations but with that came a situation where national strategy went out the window because jointness of course was brooted a strategy and this is something that continues to be an element of huge amount of confusion to this day this separation between operations and national strategy and it was certainly something that so Julian Corbett was trying to underline when he discussed national policy and national strategy where all the armed forces must be working towards a strategy based on our strategic experience which of course the Royal Navy has played a significant and important part in on that part Chris Julian Michael thank you as always a pleasure to talk I'm fairly convinced there will be a lot more to say about the naval and maritime part of the Falklands War in the future and I certainly know some students researching that side of it here at King's so I'm sure we look forward to talking about that in the future thank you very much