 Section 54 of Personal Memoirs of U.S. Grant This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Recording by Jim Clevenger. Personal Memoirs of U.S. Grant by Ulysses S. Grant, Chapter 54. Movement by the Left Flake, Battle of North Anna, An incident of the march, moving on Richmond, south of the Pamunkey, position of the National Army. We were now to operate in a different country from any we had before seen in Virginia. The roads were wide and good, and the country well cultivated. No men were seen except those bearing arms, even the black men having been sent away. The country, however, was new to us, and we had neither guides nor maps to tell us where the roads were or where they led to. Engineer and staff officers were put to the dangerous duty of supplying the place of both maps and guides. By reconnoitering, they were enabled to locate the roads in the vicinity of each army core. Our course was south, and we took all roads leading in that direction which would not separate the army too widely. Hancock, who had the lead, had marched easterly to Guiney's Station on the Fredericksburg Railroad, thence southerly to Bowling Green and Milford. He was at Milford by the night of the twenty-first. Here he met a detachment of Pickett's Division coming from Richmond to reinforce Lee. They were speedily driven away and several hundred captured. Warren followed on the morning of the twenty-first and reached Guiney's Station that night without molestation. Burnside and Wright were retained at Spotsylvania to keep up the appearance of an intended assault and to hold Lee, if possible, while Hancock and Warren should get start enough to interpose between him and Richmond. Lee had now a superb opportunity to take the initiative either by attacking Wright and Burnside alone or by following by the telegraph road and striking Hancocks and Warren's cores or even Hancocks alone before reinforcements could come up. But he did not avail himself of either opportunity. He seemed really to be mislead as to my designs but moved by his interior line, the telegraph road, to make sure of keeping between his capital and the Army of the Potomac. He never again had such an opportunity of dealing a heavy blow. The evening of the twenty-first, Burnside, ninth core, moved out followed by Wright, sixth core. Burnside was to take the telegraph road, but finding standards forward over the pole, fortified and guarded he turned east to the road taken by Hancock and Warren without an attempt to dislodge the enemy. The night of the twenty-first I had my headquarters near the sixth core at Guiney's Station and the enemy's cavalry was between us and Hancock. There was a slight attack on Burnside's and Wright's cores as they moved out of their lines but it was easily repulsed. The object probably was only to make sure that we were not leaving a forest to follow upon the rear of the Confederates. By the morning of the twenty-second, Burnside and Wright were at Guiney's Station. Hancock's core had now been marching and fighting continuously for several days, not having had rest even at night much of the time. They were, therefore, permitted to rest during the twenty-second. But Warren was pushed to Harris's store, directly west of Milford, and connected with it by a good road and Burnside was sent to New Bethel Church. Wright's core was still back at Guiney's Station. I issued the following order for the movement of the troops the next day. New Bethel, Virginia, May 22, 1864, Major General Meade, commanding army of the Potomac, direct core commanders to hold their troops in readiness to march at five a.m. tomorrow. At that hour each command will send out cavalry and infantry on all roads to their front leading south and ascertain, if possible, where the enemy is. If beyond the south, Anna, the fifth and sixth cores will march to the forks of the road where one branch leads to Beaver Dam Station, the other to Jericho Bridge, then south by roads reaching the Anna as near to and east of Hawkins Creek as they can be found. The second core will move to Chesterfield Ford. The ninth core will be directed to move at the same time to Jericho Bridge. The map only shows two roads for the four cores to march upon, but no doubt by the use of plantation roads and pressing in guides others can be found to give one for each core. The troops will follow their respective reconnoitering parties. The trains will be moved at the same time to Milford Station. Headquarters will follow the ninth core. U.S. Grant, Lieutenant General. Warren's core was moved from Harris's store to Jericho Ford, right's following. Warren arrived at the Ford early in the afternoon and by five o'clock affected a crossing under the protection of sharpshooters. The men had to wade in water up to their wastes. As soon as enough troops were over to guard the Ford, pontoons were laid in the artillery and the rest of the troops crossed. The line formed was almost perpendicular to the course of the river. Crawford on the left, next to the river, Griffin in the center and Cutler on the right. Lee was found entrenched along the front of their line. The whole of Hill's core was sent against Warren's right before it had got in position. A brigade of Cutler's division was driven back, the enemy following, but assistance coming up, the enemy was in turn driven back into his trenches with heavy loss and killed and wounded with about five hundred prisoners left in our hands. By night, Wright's core was up ready to reinforce Warren. On the twenty-third, Hancock's core was moved to the wooden bridge which spans the north and a river just west of where the Fredericksburg Railroad crosses. It was near night when the troops arrived. They found the bridge guarded with troops entrenched on the north side. Hancock sent two brigades, eagans and pierces, to the right and left. And when properly disposed, they charged simultaneously. The bridge was carried quickly, the enemy retreating over it so hastily that many were shoved into the river and some of them were drowned. Several hundred prisoners were captured. The hour was so late that Hancock did not cross until next morning. Burnside's core was moved by a middle road running between those described above and which strikes the North Anna at Oxford, midway between Telegraph Road and Jericho Ford. The hour of its arrival was too late to cross that night. On the twenty-fourth, Hancock's core crossed to the south side of the river without opposition and formed line facing nearly west. The railroad in rear was taken possession of and destroyed as far as possible. Wright's core crossed at Jericho early the same day and took possession to the right of Warren's core extending south of the Virginia Central Railroad. This road was torn up for a considerable distance to the rear, west. The ties burned and the rails bent and twisted by heeding them over the burning ties. It was found, however, that Burnside's core could not cross at Oxford. Lee had taken a position with his center on the river at this point. With the two wings thrown back, his line making an acute angle where it overlooked the river. Before the exact position of the whole of Lee's line was accurately known, I directed Hancock and Warren each to send a brigade to Oxford by the south side of the river. They found the enemy too strong to justify a serious attack. A third Ford was found between Oxford and Jericho. Burnside was directed to cross a division over this Ford and to send one division to Hancock. Crittenden was crossed by this newly discovered Ford and formed up the river to connect with Crawford's left. Potter joined Hancock by way of the wooden bridge. Crittenden had a severe engagement with some of Hill's core on his crossing the river and lost heavily. When joined to Warren's core, he was no further molested. Burnside still guarded Oxford from the north side. Lee now had his entire army south of the North Anna. Our lines covered his front with the six miles separating the two wings guarded by but a single division. To get from one wing to the other, the river would have to be crossed twice. Lee could reinforce any part of his line from all points on it in a very short march or could concentrate the whole of it wherever he might choose to assault. We were, for the time, practically, two armies besieging. Lee had been reinforced and was being reinforced largely. About this time the very troops whose coming I had predicted had arrived or were coming in. Pickett, with a full division from Richmond was up. Hoke from North Carolina had come with a brigade and Breckenridge was there. In all, probably not less than 15,000 men. But he did not attempt to drive us from the field. On the 22nd or 23rd I received dispatches from Washington saying that Sherman had taken Kingston, crossed the Etowah River, and was advancing into Georgia. I was seated at the time on the porch of a fine plantation house waiting for Burnside's corps to pass. Mead and his staff, besides my own staff, were with me. The lady of the house, a Mrs. Tyler and an elderly lady were present. Burnside, seeing us, came up on the porch his big spurs and sabre rattling as he walked. He touched his hat politely to the ladies and remarked that he supposed they had never seen so many live Yankees before in their lives. The elderly lady spoke up promptly saying, oh yes, I have many more. Where, said Burnside? In Richmond. Prisoners, of course, was understood. I read my dispatch aloud when it was received. This threw the younger lady into tears. I found the information she had received, and I suppose it was the information generally in circulation through the south, was that Lee was driving us from the state in the most demoralized situation, and that in the southwest our troops were but little better than prisoners of war. Seeing our troops moving south was ocular proof that a part of her information was incorrect, and she asked me if my news from Sherman was true. I assured her that there was no doubt about it. I left the guard to protect the house from intrusion until the troops should have all passed and assured her that if her husband was in hiding she could bring him in and he should be protected also. But I presume he was in the Confederate army. On the twenty-fifth I gave orders through Hallick to Hunter, who had relieved Siegel to move up the valley of Virginia, cross over the Blue Ridge to Charlottesville, and go as far as Lynchburg if possible, living upon the country and cutting the railroads and canal as he went. After doing this he could find his way back to his base or join me. On the same day news was received that Lee was falling back on Richmond. This proved not to be true, but we could do nothing where we were unless Lee would assume the offensive. I determined, therefore, to draw out of our present position and make one more effort to get between him and Richmond. I had no expectation now, however, of succeeding in this, but I did expect to hold him far enough west to enable me to reach the James River high up. Sheridan was now again with the Army of the Potomac. On the twenty-sixth I informed the government at Washington of the position of the two armies, of the reinforcements the enemy had received, of the move I proposed to make, and directed that our base of supplies should be shifted to White House on the Pamunkey. The wagon train and guards moved directly from Port Royal to White House, supplies moved around by water guarded by the Navy, orders had previously been sent through Halleck for Butler to send Smith's Corps to White House. This order was repeated on the twenty-fifth with directions that they should be landed on the north side of the Pamunkey and marched until they joined the Army of the Potomac. It was a delicate move to get the right wing of the Army of the Potomac from its position south of the North Anna in the presence of the enemy. To accomplish it I issued the following order. Quarles Mills, Virginia, May twenty-fifth, 1864. Major General Mead, commanding Army of the Potomac, direct Generals Warren and Wright to withdraw all their teams and artillery, not in position, to the north side of the river tomorrow. Send that belonging to General Wright's Corps as far on the road to Hanover Town as it can go without attracting attention to the fact. Send with it Wright's best division or division under his ableist commander. Have their places filled up in the line so if possible the enemy will not notice their withdrawal. Send the cavalry tomorrow afternoon or as much of it as you may deem necessary to watch and seize if they can, little pages bridge and tailors forward and to remain on one or other side of the river at these points until the infantry and artillery all pass. As soon as it is dark tomorrow night start the division which you withdraw first from Wright's Corps to make a forced march to Hanover Town taking with them no teams to impede their march. At the same time this division starts, commence withdrawing all the fifth and sixth corps from the south side of the river and march them for the same place. The two divisions of the Ninth Corps, not now with Hancock, made me move down the north bank of the river where they will be handy to support Hancock if necessary or will be that much on their road to follow the fifth and sixth corps. Hancock should hold his command in readiness to follow as soon as the way is clear for him. Tomorrow it will leave nothing for him to do but as soon as he can he should get all his teams and spare artillery on the road or roads which he will have to take. As soon as the troops reach Hanover Town they should get possession of all the crossings they can in that neighborhood. I think it would be well to make a heavy cavalry demonstration on the enemy's left tomorrow afternoon also. U.S. Grant, Lieutenant General. Wilson's division of cavalry was brought up from the left and moved by our right south to Little River. Here he maneuvered to give the impression that we were going to attack the left flank of Lee's army. Under cover of night our right wing was withdrawn to the north side of the river, Lee being completely deceived by Wilson's faint on the afternoon of the 26th Sheridan moved sending flags and torbids cavalry to tailors and little pages forwards towards Hanover. As soon as it was dark both divisions moved quietly to Hanover Ferry leaving small guards behind to keep up the impression that crossings were to be attempted in the morning. Sheridan was followed by a division of infantry under General Russell. In the morning of the 27th the crossing was affected with but little loss. The enemy losing 30 or 40 taken prisoners thus a position was secured south of the Pamunkey. Russell stopped at the crossing while the cavalry pushed on to Hanover town. Here barringers, formerly Gordon's, brigade of rebel cavalry was encountered but it was speedily driven away. Orons and Wright's corps were moved by the rear of Burnside's and Hancock's corps. When out of the way these latter corps followed leaving Pickett's confronting the enemy. Wilson's cavalry followed last watching all the fords until everything had recrossed then taking up the pontoons and destroying other bridges became the rear guard. Two roads were traversed by the troops in this move. The one nearest to and north of the North Anna and Pamunkey was taken by Wright followed by Hancock. Warren followed by Burnside moved by a road further north and longer. The trains moved by a road still further north and had to travel a still greater distance. All the troops that had crossed the Pamunkey on the morning of the 27th remained quiet during the rest of the day while the troops north of that stream marched to reach the crossing that had been secured for them. Lee had evidently been deceived by our movement from North Anna for on the morning of the 27th he telegraphed to Richmond, enemy crossed to Northside and cavalry and infantry crossed at Hanover town. The troops that had then crossed left his front the night of the 25th. The country we were now in was a difficult one to move troops over. The streams were numerous, deep and sluggish, sometimes spreading out into swamps grown up with impenetrable growths of trees and underbrush. The banks were generally low and marshy, making the streams difficult to approach except where there were roads and bridges. Hanover town is about 20 miles from Richmond. There are two roads leading there, the most direct and shortest one crossing the Checa hominy at Meadow Bridge near the Virginia Central Railroad, the second going by new and old cold harbor. A few miles out from Hanover town there is a third road by way of Mechanicsville to Richmond. New cold harbor was important to us because while there we both covered the roads back to White House where our supplies came from and the roads southeast over which we would have to pass to get to the James River below the Richmond defenses. On the morning of the 28th the army made an early start and by noon all had crossed except Burnside's core. This was left on the north side temporarily to guard the large wagon train. A line was at once formed extending south from the river, right's core on the right, Hancock's in the center, and Warren's on the left, ready to meet the enemy if he should come. At the same time Sheridan was directed to reconnoiter towards Mechanicsville to find Lee's position. At Hawes's shop just where the middle road leaves the direct road to Richmond he encountered the Confederate cavalry dismounted and partially entrenched. Greg attacked with his division but was unable to move the enemy. In the evening Custer came up with a brigade. The attack was now renewed, the cavalry dismounting and charging as infantry. This time the assault was successful, both sides losing a considerable number of men, but our troops had to bury the dead and found that more Confederate than Union soldiers had been killed. The position was easily held because our infantry was near. On the 29th a reconnaissance was made in force to find the position of Lee. Right's core pushed to Hanover Courthouse. Hancock's core pushed towards Potomoy Creek, Warren's core to the left on the shady Grove Church Road while Burnside was held in reserve. Our advance was pushed forward three miles on the left with but little fighting. There was now an appearance of a movement past our left flank and Sheridan was sent to mediate. On the 30th Hancock moved to the Tata Potomoy where he found the enemy strongly fortified. Right was moved to the right of Hancock's core and Burnside was brought forward and crossed taking position to the left of Hancock. Warren moved up near Huntley Corners on the shady Grove Church Road. There was some skirmishing along the center and in the evening early attacked Warren with some vigor, driving him back at first and threatening to turn our left flank. As the best means of reinforcing the left Hancock was ordered to attack in his front. He carried and held the rifle pits. While this was going on Warren got his men up, repulsed early and drove him more than a mile. On this day I wrote to Hallick ordering all the pontoons in Washington to be sent to City Point. In the evening news was received of the arrival of Smith with his core at White House. I notified Meade in writing as follows. Near Hauses Shop, Virginia. 640 p.m. May 30th, 1864. Major General Meade commanding Army of the Potomac. General Smith will debark his force at the White House tonight and start up the South Bank of the Pomunkey at an early hour, probably at 3 a.m. in the morning. It is not improbable that the enemy, being aware of Smith's movement, will be feeling to get on our left flank for the purpose of cutting him off or by a dash to crush him and get back before we are aware of it. Sheridan ought to be notified to watch the enemy's movements well out towards Cold Harbor and also on the Mechanicsville Road. Right should be got well massed on Hancock's right so that if it becomes necessary he can take the place of the latter readily while troops are being thrown east of the Potomac, if necessary. I want Sheridan to send a cavalry force of at least half a brigade, if not a whole brigade, at 5 a.m. in the morning to communicate with Smith and to return with him. I will send orders for Smith by the messenger you send to Sheridan with his orders, U.S. Grant. I also notified Smith of his danger and the precautions that would be taken to protect him. The night of the 30th, Lee's position was substantially from Atlee Station on the Virginia Central Railroad south and east to the vicinity of Cold Harbor. Ours was, the left of Warren's Corps was on the Shadygrove Road extending to the Mechanicsville Road and about three miles south of the Toto Potomoy, Burnside to his right, then Hancock and Wright on the extreme right, extending towards Hanover Court House, six miles southeast of it. Sheridan with two divisions of cavalry was watching our left front towards Cold Harbor. Wilson with his division on our right was sent to get on the Virginia Central Railroad and destroy it as far back as possible. He got possession of Hanover Court House the next day after a skirmish with Young's Cavalry Brigade. The enemy attacked Sheridan's Pickets but reinforcements were sent up and the attack was speedily repulsed and the enemy followed some distance towards Cold Harbor. End of Section 54, recording by Jim Clevinger, Lillaroth Arkansas, Jim at JOCCLEV.COM Section 55 of Personal Memoirs of U.S. Grant. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Recording by Jim Clevinger, Personal Memoirs of U.S. Grant by Ulysses S. Grant, Chapter 55 Advance on Cold Harbor An anecdote of the war Battle of Cold Harbor Correspondence with Lee Retrospective On the 31st, Sheridan advanced to near-old Cold Harbor. He found it entrenched and occupied by Cavalry and Infantry. A hard fight ensued, but the place was carried. The enemy well knew the importance of Cold Harbor to us and seemed determined that we should not hold it. He returned with such a large force that Sheridan was about withdrawing without making any effort to hold it against such odds, but about the time he commenced the evacuation he received orders to hold the place at all hazards until reinforcements could be sent to him. He speedily turned the rebel works to face against them and placed his men in position for defense. Night came on before the enemy was ready for assault. Right's corps was ordered early in the evening to march directly to Cold Harbor, passing by the rear of the army. It was expected to arrive by daylight or before, but the night was dark and the distance great so that it was nine o'clock the first of June before it reached its destination. Before the arrival of Right, the enemy had made two assaults on Sheridan, both of which were repulsed with heavy loss to the enemy. Right's corps coming up, there was no further assault on Cold Harbor. Smith, who was coming up from White House, was also directed to march directly to Cold Harbor and was expected early on the morning of the first of June, but by some blunder, the order which reached Smith directed him to New Castle instead of Cold Harbor. Through this blunder, Smith did not reach his destination until three o'clock in the afternoon and then was tired and worn out men from their long and dusty march. He landed twelve thousand five hundred men from Butler's Command, but a division was left at White House temporarily and many men had fallen out of ranks in their long march. Before the removal of Right's corps from our right, after dark on the thirty-first, the two lines, Federal and Confederate, were so close together at that point that either side could detect directly any movement made by the other. Finding at daylight that Right had left his front, Lee evidently divined that he had gone to our left. At all events, soon after Light on the first of June, Anderson, who commanded the corps on Lee's left, was seen moving along Warren's front. Warren was ordered to attack him vigorously in flank while Right was directed to move out and get on his front. Warren fired his artillery at the enemy, but lost so much time in making ready that the enemy got by and at three o'clock he reported the enemy was strongly entrenched in his front and besides, his lines were so long that he had no mass of troops to move with. He seemed to have forgotten that lines in rear of an army hold themselves while their defenders are fighting in their front. Right reckoned ordered some distance to his front, but the enemy, finding old, cold harbor already taken, had halted and fortified some distance west. By six o'clock in the afternoon, Right and Smith were ready to make an assault. In front of both, the ground was clear for several hundred yards and then became wooded. Both charged across this open space and into the wood, capturing and holding the first line of rifle pits of the enemy and also capturing seven or eight hundred prisoners. While this was going on, the enemy charged Warren three separate times with vigor, but were repulsed each time with loss. There was no officer more capable nor one more prompt in acting than Warren when the enemy forced him to it. There was also an attack upon Hancock's and Burnside's corps at the same time, but it was feeble and probably only intended to relieve Anderson who was being pressed by Right and Smith. During the night, the enemy made frequent attacks with the view of dispossessing us of the important position we had gained, but without affecting their object. Hancock was moved from his place in line during the night and ordered to the left of Right. I expected to take the offensive on the morning of the second, but the night was so dark, the heat and dust so excessive, and the roads so intricate and hard to keep that the head of column only reached Old Cold Harbor at six o'clock, but was in position at seven thirty a.m. Preparations were made for an attack in the afternoon, but did not take place until the next morning. Warren's corps was moved to the left to connect with Smith. Hancock's corps was got into position to the left of Right, and Burnside was moved to Bethesda Church in reserve. While Warren and Burnside were making these changes, the enemy came out several times and attacked them, capturing several hundred prisoners. The attacks were repulsed, but not followed up as they should have been. I was so annoyed at this that I directed Meade to instruct his corps commanders that they should seize all such opportunities when they occurred and not wait for orders, all of our maneuvers being made for the very purpose of getting the enemy out of his cover. On this day Wilson returned from his raid upon the Virginia Central Railroad having damaged it considerably. But, like ourselves, the rebels had become experts in repairing such damage. Sherman, in his memoirs, relates an anecdote of his campaign to Atlanta that well illustrates this point. The rebel cavalry, lurking in his rear to burn bridges and obstruct his communications, had become so disgusted at hearing trains go whistling by within a few hours after a bridge had been burned that they proposed to try blowing up some of the tunnels. One of them said no use, boys. Old Sherman carries duplicate tunnels with him and will replace them as fast as you can blow them up. Better save your powder. Sheridan was engaged, reconnoitering the banks of the Chickahominy to find crossings and the condition of the roads. He reported favorably. During the night, Lee moved his left up to make his line correspond to ours. His lines extended now, from the Toto Potamoy to New Cold Harbor, mined from Bethesda Church by Old Cold Harbor to the Chickahominy with a division of cavalry guarding our right. An assault was ordered for the third to be made mainly by the corps of Hancock, Wright and Smith, but Warren and Burnside were to support it by threatening Lee's left and to attack with great earnestness if he should either reinforce more threatened points by drawing from that quarter or if a favorable opportunity should present itself. The corps commanders were to select the points in their respective fronts where they would make their assaults. The move was to commence at half past four in the morning. Hancock sent Barlow and Gibbon forward at the appointed hour with Bernie as a reserve. Barlow pushed forward with great vigor under a heavy fire of both artillery and musketry through thickets and swamps. Notwithstanding all the resistance of the enemy and the natural obstructions to overcome, he carried a position occupied by the enemy outside their main line where the road makes a deep cut through a bank affording as good a shelter for troops as if it had been made for that purpose. Three pieces of artillery had been captured here and several hundred prisoners. The guns were immediately turned against the men who had just been using them. No assistance coming to him. He, Barlow, entrenched under fire and continued to hold his place. Gibbon was not so fortunate in his front. He found the ground over which he had to pass cut up with deep ravines and a morass difficult to cross, but his men struggled on until some of them got up to the very parapet covering the enemy. Gibbon gained a ground much nearer the enemy than that which he left, and here he entrenched and held fast. Right's corps moving in two lines captured the outer rifle pits in their front, but accomplished nothing more. Smith's corps also gained the outer rifle pits in its front. The ground over which this corps, 18th, had to move was the most exposed of any over which charges were made. An open plane intervened between the contending forces at this point, which was exposed both to a direct and a crossfire. Smith, however, finding a ravine running towards his front, sufficiently deep to protect men in it, from crossfire and somewhat from a direct fire, put Martindale's division in it and with Brooks supporting him on the left and Devon's on the right, succeeded in gaining the outer, probably picket, rifle pits. Warren and Burnside also advanced and gained ground which brought the whole army on one line. This assault cost us heavily and probably without benefit to compensate. But the enemy was not cheered by the occurrence sufficiently to induce him to take the offensive. In fact, nowhere after the Battle of the Wilderness did Lee show any disposition to leave his defenses far behind him. Fighting was substantially over by half past seven in the morning. At eleven o'clock I started to visit all the corps commanders to see for myself the different positions gained and to get their opinion of the practicability of doing anything more in their respective fronts. Hancock gave the opinion that in his front the enemy was too strong to make any further assault from a success. Wright thought he could gain the lines of the enemy, but it would require the cooperation of Hancock's and Smith's corps. Smith thought allegement possible, but was not sanguine. Burnside thought something could be done in his front, but Warren differed. I concluded, therefore, to make no more assaults and a little after twelve directed in the following letter that all offensive action should cease. Cold Harbor, June 3, 1864, 1230 p.m., Major General Mead, commanding Army of the Potomac. The opinion of corps commanders not being sanguine of success in case an assault is ordered, you may direct a suspension of further advance for the present. Hold our most advanced positions and strengthen them, whilst on the defensive our line may be contracted from the right if practicable. Reconnaissance should be made in front of every corps and advances made to advantageous positions by regular approaches. To aid the expedition under General Hunter, it is necessary that we should detain all the Army now with Lee until the former gets well on his way to Lynchburg. To do this effectually, it will be better to keep the enemy out of the entrenchments of Richmond than to have them go back there. Right and Hancock should be ready to assault in case the enemy should break through General Smith's lines, and all should be ready to resist an assault. U.S. Grant, Lieutenant General, the remainder of the day was sent in strengthening the line we now held. By night we were as strong against Lee as he was against us. During the night the enemy quitted our right front, abandoning some of their wounded and without burying their dead. These we were able to care for, but there were many dead and wounded men between the lines of the contending forces which were now close together who could be cared for without a cessation of hostilities, so I wrote the following. Cold Harbor, Virginia, June 5th, 1864 General R. E. Lee Commanding Confederate Army It is reported to me that there are wounded men probably of both armies now lying exposed and suffering between the lines occupied respectively by the two armies. Humanity would dictate that some provisions should be made to provide against such hardships. I would propose, therefore, that hereafter, when no battle is raging, either party be authorized to send to any point between the pickets or skirmish lines unarmed men bearing litters to pick up their dead or wounded without being fired upon by the other party, any other method equally fair to both parties you may propose for meeting the end desired will be accepted by me. U.S. Grant, Lieutenant General, Lee replied that he feared such an arrangement would lead to misunderstanding and propose that in future when either party wished to remove their dead and wounded, a flag of truce be sent. I answered this immediately by saying, Cold Harbor, Virginia, June 6th, 1864 General Robert E. Lee Commanding Army of Northern Virginia Your communication of yesterday's date is received. I will send immediately as you propose to collect the dead and wounded between the lines of the two armies and will also instruct that you be allowed to do the same. I propose that the time for doing this be between the hours of twelve o'clock and three p.m. today. I will direct all parties going out to bear a white flag and not to attempt to go beyond where we have dead or wounded and not beyond or on ground occupied by your troops. U.S. Grant, Lieutenant General, Lee's response was that he could not consent to the burial of the dead and removal of the wounded in the way I propose. But when either party desired such permission, it should be asked for by flag of truce, and he had directed that any parties I may have sent out, as mentioned in my letter, to return to back. I answered. Cold Harbor, Virginia, June 6, 1864 General Robert E. Lee Commanding Army, Northern Virginia The knowledge that wounded men are now suffering from want of attention between the two armies compels me to ask a suspension of hostilities for sufficient time to collect them in, say, two hours. Permit me to say that the hours you may fix upon for this will be agreeable to me, and the same privilege will be extended to such parties as you may wish to send out on the same duty without further application. U.S. Grant, Lieutenant General, Lee acceded to this, but delays in transmitting the correspondence brought it to the seventh of June, 48 hours after it commenced, before parties were got out to collect the men left upon the field. In the meantime, all but two of the wounded had died, and I wrote to Lee, Cold Harbor, Virginia, June 7, 1864, 10.30 am, General Robert E. Lee Commanding Army of Northern Virginia. I regret that your note of 7 p.m. yesterday should have been received at the nearest corps headquarters to where it was delivered after the hour which had been given for the removal of the dead and wounded had expired. 10.45 p.m. was the hour at which it was received at corps headquarters, and between 11 and 12 it reached my headquarters. As a consequence, it was not understood by the troops of this army that there was a cessation of hostilities for the purpose of collecting the dead and wounded, and none were collected. Two officers and six men of the 8th and 25th North Carolina Regiments, who were out in search of the bodies of officers of their respective regiments, were captured and brought into our lines owing to this want of understanding. I regret this, but will state that as soon as I learned the fact, I directed that they should not be held as prisoners, but must be returned to their commands. These officers and men, having been carelessly brought through our lines to the rear, have not determined whether they will be sent back the way they came, or whether they will be sent by some other route. Regretting that all my efforts for alleviating the suffering of wounded men left upon the battlefield have been rendered non-negatory, I remain, etc., U.S. Grant, Lieutenant General. I have always regretted that the last assault at Cold Harbor was ever made. I might say the same thing of the assault of the 22nd of May, 1863, at Vicksburg. At Cold Harbor, no advantage whatever was gained to compensate for the heavy loss we sustained. Indeed, the advantages other than those of relative losses were on the Confederate side. Before that, the Army of Northern Virginia seemed to have acquired a wholesome regard for the courage, endurance, and soldierly qualities, generally, of the Army of the Potomac. They no longer wanted to fight them one Confederate to five Yanks. Indeed, they seemed to have given up any idea of gaining any advantage of their antagonists in the open field. They had come to much prefer breastworks in their front to the Army of the Potomac. This charge seemed to revive their hopes temporarily, but it was of short duration. The effect upon the Army of the Potomac was the reverse. When we reached the James River, however, all effects of the Battle of Cold Harbor seemed to have disappeared. There was more justification for the assault at Vicksburg. We were in a southern climate. At the beginning of the hot season, the Army of the Tennessee had won five successive victories over the garrison of Vicksburg in the three preceding weeks. They had driven a portion of that Army from Port Gibson with considerable loss after having flanked them out of their stronghold at Grand Gulf. They had attacked another portion of the same Army at Raymond, more than fifty miles farther in the interior of the State, and driven them back into Jackson with great loss in killed, wounded, captured and missing, besides loss of large and small arms. They had captured the capital of the State of Mississippi with a large amount of materials of war and manufactures only a few days before. They had beaten the enemy, then pinned up in the town, first at Champions Hill, next at Big Black River Bridge, inflicting upon him a loss of fifteen thousand or more men, including those cut off from returning, besides large losses in arms and ammunition. The Army of the Tennessee had come to believe that they could beat their antagonist under any circumstances. There was no telling how long a regular siege might last. As I have stated, it was the beginning of the hot season in a southern climate. There was no telling what the casualties might be among northern troops working and living in trenches, drinking surface water filtered through rich vegetation under a tropical sun. If Vicksburg could have been carried in May, it would not only have saved the Army the risk it ran of a greater danger and from the bullets of the enemy, but it would have given us a splendid Army, well equipped and officered to operate elsewhere with. These are reasons justifying the assault. The only benefit we gained, and it was a slight one, for so great a sacrifice was that the men worked cheerfully into trenches after that, being satisfied with digging the enemy out. Had the assault not been made, I have no doubt that the majority of those engaged in the siege of Vicksburg would have believed that, had we assaulted, it would have proven successful and would have saved life, health and comfort. End of Section 55, Recording by Jim Clevenger, Little Rock, Arkansas, Jim at joclev.com Section 56 of Personal Memoirs of U.S. Grant This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org Recording by Jim Clevenger Personal Memoirs of U.S. Grant By Ulysses S. Grant Chapter 56 Left flank movement across the Czechohominy and James General Lee Visit to Butler The Movement on Petersburg The Investment of Petersburg Lee's position was now so near Richmond and the intervening swamps of the Czechohominy so great an obstacle to the movement of troops in the face of an enemy that I determined to make my next left flank move carry the army of the Potomac south of the James River. Preparations for this were promptly commenced. The move was a hazardous one to make. The Czechohominy River, with its marshy and heavily tempered approaches, had to be crossed. All the bridges over it, east of Lee, were destroyed. The enemy had a shorter line and better roads to travel on to confront me in crossing. More than fifty miles intervened between me and Butler by the roads I should have to travel with both the James and the Czechohominy unbridged to cross. And last, the army of the Potomac had to be got out of a position but a few hundred yards from the enemy at the whitest place. Lee, if he did not choose to follow me, might, with his shorter distance to travel and his bridges over the Czechohominy and the James, move rapidly on Butler and crush him before the army with me could come to his relief. Then, too, he might spare troops enough to send a guest hunter who was approaching Lynchburg, living upon the country he passed through and without ammunition further than what he carried with him. But the move had to be made, and I relied upon Lee's not seeing my danger as I saw it. Besides, we had armies on both sides of the James River and not far from the Confederate capital. I knew that its safety would be a matter of the first consideration with the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of the so-called Confederate government, if it was not with the military commanders. But I took all the precautions I knew of to guard against all dangers. Sheridan was sent with two divisions to communicate with Hunter and to break up the Virginia Central Railroad and the James River Canal on the 7th of June, taking instructions to Hunter to come back with him. Hunter was also informed by way of Washington and the Valley that Sheridan was on the way to meet him. The canal and central road and the regions penetrated by them were of vast importance to the enemy, furnishing and carrying a large percent of all the supplies for the Army of Northern Virginia and the people of Richmond. Before Sheridan got off on the 7th, news was received from Hunter, reporting his advance to Stanton and successful engagement with the enemy near that place on the 5th, in which the Confederate commander W. S. Jones was killed. On the 4th of June, the enemy having withdrawn his left course, Burnside on our right was moved up between Warren and Smith. On the 5th, Birney returned to Hancock, which extended his left now to the Chickahominy and Warren was withdrawn to Cold Harbor. Right was directed to send two divisions to the left to extend down the banks of that stream to Bottoms Bridge. The cavalry extended still further east to Jones's Bridge. On the 7th, Abercrombie, who was in command at White House and who had been in command at our base of supplies in all the changes made from the start, was ordered to take up the iron from the York River Railroad and put it on boats and to be in readiness to move by water to City Point. On the 8th, Meade was directed to fortify a line down the bank overlooking the Chickahominy under cover of which the army could move. On the 9th, Abercrombie was directed to send all organized troops arriving at White House without debarking from their transports to report to Butler. Halleck was, at this time, instructed to send all reinforcements to City Point. On the 11th, I wrote, Cold Harbor, Virginia, June 11, 1864, Major General B. F. Butler, commanding Department of Virginia and North Carolina. The movement to transfer this army to the south side of the James River will commence after dark tomorrow night. Colonel Comstock, of my staff, was sent specially to ascertain what was necessary to make your position secure in the interval during which the enemy might use most of his force against you, and also to ascertain what point on the river we should reach to affect a crossing if it should not be practicable to reach this side of the river at Bermuda Hundred. Colonel Comstock has not yet returned so that I cannot make instructions as definite as I would wish, but the time between this and Sunday night being so short in which to get word to you, I must do the best I can. Colonel Dent goes to the Chickahominy to take to you the 18th Corps. The Corps will leave its position in the trenches as early in the evening tomorrow as possible and make a forced march to Coal's Landing or Ferry where it should reach by 10 a.m. the following morning. This Corps numbers now 15,300 men. They take with them neither wagons nor artillery, these latter marching with the ballots of the army to the James River. The remainder of the army will cross the Chickahominy at Longbridge and at Joneses and strike the river at the most practicable crossing below City Point. I directed several days ago that all reinforcements for the army should be sent to you. I have not advised of the number that may have gone, but suppose you have received from six to ten thousand. General Smith will also reach you as soon as the enemy could going by the way of Richmond. The balance of the force will not be more than one day behind unless detained by the whole of Lee's army in which case you will be strong enough. I wish you would direct the proper staff officers, your chief engineer and your chief quartermaster to commence at once the collection of all the means in their reach for crossing the army on its arrival. If there is a point below City Point where a pontoon bridge can be thrown, have it laid. Expecting the arrival of the 18th Corps by Monday night, if you deem it practicable from the force you have to seize and hold Petersburg, you may prepare to start on the arrival of troops to hold your present lines. I do not want Petersburg visited, however, unless it is held nor an attempt to take it unless you feel a reasonable degree of confidence of success. If you should go there, I think troops should take nothing with them except what they can carry depending upon supplies being sent after the place is secured. If Colonel Dent should not succeed in securing the requisite amount of transportation for the 18th Corps before reaching you, please have the balance supplied. U.S. Grant, Lieutenant General. P.S., on reflection I will send the 18th Corps by way of White House. The distance, which they will have to march, will be enough shorter to enable them to reach you about the same time, and the uncertainty of navigation on the deck of harmony will be avoided. U.S. Grant, Cold Harbor, Virginia, June 11, 1864. Major General G.G. Mead, commanding Army of the Potomac. Colonel Comstock, who visited the James River for the purpose of ascertaining the best point below Bermuda-100 to which to march the Army has not yet returned. It is now getting so late, however, that all preparations may be made for the move tomorrow night without waiting longer. The movement will be made as Heretofore agreed upon. That is, the 18th Corps make a rapid march with the infantry alone, their wagons and artillery accompanying the balance of the Army to coals landing or ferry, and there embark for City Point, losing no time for rest until they reach the latter point. The 5th Corps will seize Longbridge and move out on the Longbridge Road to its junction with Quaker Road, or until stopped by the enemy. The other three Corps will follow in such order as you may direct, one of them crossing at Longbridge and two at Joneses Bridge. After the crossing is affected, the most practicable roads will be taken to reach about Fort Pauhutton. Of course, this is supposing the enemy makes no opposition to our advance. The 5th Corps, after securing the passage of the balance of the Army, will join or follow in rear of the Corps which crosses the same bridge with themselves. The wagon train should be kept well east of the troops, and if a crossing can be found or made lower down than Joneses, they should take it. U.S. Grant, Lieutenant General. B.S. In view of the Long March to reach Coles Landing, and the uncertainty of being able to embark a large number of men there, the direction of the 18th Corps may be changed to White House. They should be directed to load up transports and start them as fast as loaded without waiting for the whole Corps or even whole divisions to go together. U.S. Grant. About this time word was received through the Richmond Papers of the 11th that Crook and Abarill had united and were moving east. This, with the news of Hunter's successful engagement near Staunton, was no doubt known to leave before it was to me. Then Sheridan, leaving with two divisions of cavalry, looked indeed threatening both to leave communications and supplies. Much of his cavalry was sent after Sheridan, and early, with Ewell's entire Corps, was sent to the valley. Supplies were growing scarce in Richmond, and the sources from which to draw them were in our hands. People from outside began to pour into Richmond to help eat up the little on hand. Consternation reigned there. On the 12th Smith was ordered to move at night to White House, not to stop until he reached there and to take boats at once for City Point, leaving his trains and artillery to move by land. Soon after dark some of the cavalry at Long Bridge affected a crossing by wading and floundering through the water and mud, leaving their horses behind, and drove away the cavalry pickets. A pontoon bridge was speedily thrown across, over which the remainder of the army soon passed and pushed out for a mile or two to watch and detain any advance that might be made from the other side. Warren followed the cavalry, and by the morning of the 13th had his whole corps over. Hancock followed Warren. Burnside took the road to Jones's Bridge, followed by Wright. Ferrero's division, with the wagon train, moved further east by window shades and coal's ferry, our rear being covered by cavalry. It was known that the enemy had some gunboats at Richmond. These might run down at night and inflict great damage upon us before they could be sunk or captured by our Navy. General Butler had, in advance, loaded some vessels with stone ready to be sunk so as to obstruct the channel in an emergency. On the 13th I sent orders to have these sunk as high up the river as we could guard them and prevent their removal by the enemy. As soon as Warren's corps was over the Chickahominy, it marched out and joined the cavalry in holding the roads from Richmond while the army passed. No attempt was made by the enemy to impede our march, however, but Warren and Wilson reported the enemy strongly fortified in their front. By the evening of the 13th Hancock's corps was at Charles City Courthouse on the James River. Burnside's and Wright's corps were on the Chickahominy and crossed during the night, Warren's corps and the cavalry still covering the army. The material for a pontoon bridge was already at hand and the work of laying it was commenced immediately under the superintendent's of Brigadier General Benham commanding the engineer brigade. On the evening of the 14th the crossing commenced Hancock in advance using both the bridge and boats. When the Wilderness Campaign commenced, the Army of the Potomac, including Burnside's, which was a separate command until the 24th of May when it was incorporated with the main army, numbered about 116,000 men. During the progress of the campaign about 40,000 reinforcements were received. At the crossing of the James River June 14th, 15th, the army numbered about 115,000. Besides the ordinary losses incident to a campaign of six weeks, nearly constant fighting or skirmishing, about one half of the artillery was sent back to Washington and many men were discharged by reason of the expiration of their term of service. In estimating our strength, every enlisted man and every commissioned officer present is included, no matter how employed in bands, sick and field hospitals, hospital attendants, company cooks and all, operating in an enemies country and being supplied always from a distant base, large detachment had at all times to be sent from the front, not only to guard the base of supplies and the roads to it, but all the roads leading to our flanks and rear. We were also operating in a country unknown to us and without competent guides or maps showing the roads accurately. The manner of estimating numbers in the two armies differs materially. In the Confederate Army, often, only bayonets are taken into account, never I believe, do they estimate more than are handling the guns of the artillery and armed with muskets or carbines. Generally, the latter are far enough away to be excluded from the account in any one field. Officers and details of enlisted men are not included. In the northern armies the estimate is most liberal, taking in all connected with the army and drawing pay. Estimated in the same manner as ours, Lee had not less than eighty thousand men at the start. His reinforcements were about equal to ours during the campaign, deducting the discharged men and those sent back. He was on the defensive and in the country in which every stream, every road, every obstacle to the movement of troops and every natural defense was familiar to him and his army. The citizens were all friendly to him and his cause and could and did furnish him with accurate reports of our every move. Rear guards were not necessary for him and having always a railroad at his back large wagon trains were not required. All circumstances considered we did not have any advantage in numbers. Generally, who had led the army of northern Virginia in all these contests was a very highly estimated man in the Confederate army and states and filled also a very high place in the estimation of the people and press of the northern states. His praise was sounded throughout the entire north after every action he was engaged in. The number of his forces was always lowered and that of the national forces exaggerated. He was a large austere man and I judged difficult of approach to his subordinates. To be extolled by the entire press of the south after every engagement and by a portion of the press north with equal vehemence was calculated to give him the entire confidence of his troops and to make him feared by his antagonists. It was not an uncommon thing for my staff officers to hear from eastern officers well Grant has never met Bobby Lee yet. There were good and true officers who believe now that the army of northern Virginia was superior to the army of the Potomac man to man. I do not believe so except as the advantages spoken of above made them so. Before the end I believe the difference was the other way. The army of northern Virginia became despondent and saw the end. It did not please them. The national army saw the same thing and were encouraged by it. The advance of the army of the Potomac reached the James on the 14th of June. Preparations were at once commenced for laying the pontoon bridges and crossing the river. As already stated I had previously ordered General Butler to have two vessels loaded with stone and carried up the river to a point above that occupied by our gunboats where the channel was narrow and sunk there so as to obstruct the passage and prevent Confederate gunboats from coming down the river. Butler had had these boats filled and put in position but had not had them sunk before my arrival. I ordered this done and also directed that he should turn over all material and boats not then in use in the river to be used in ferrying the troops across. I then, on the 14th, took a steamer and ran up to Bermuda Hundred to see General Butler for the purpose of directing a movement against Petersburg while our troops of the army of the Potomac were crossing. I had sent General W. F. Smith back from Cold Harbor by the way of White House, dense on steamers to City Point for the purpose of giving General Butler more troops with which to accomplish this result. General Butler was ordered to send Smith with his troops reinforced as far as that could be conveniently done from other parts of the army of the James. He gave Smith about 6,000 reinforcements including some 2,500 cavalry under Cots and about 3,500 colored infantry under Hinks. The distance which Smith had to move to reach the enemy's lines was about 6 miles and the Confederate advance line of works was but 2 miles outside of Petersburg. Smith was to move undercover of night up close to the enemy's works and assault as soon as he could after daylight. I believed then and still believe that Petersburg could have been easily captured at that time. It only had about 2,500 men in the defenses besides some irregular troops consisting of citizens and employees in the city who took up arms in case of emergency. Smith started as proposed but his advance encountered a rebel force entrenched between City Point and their lines outside of Petersburg. This position he carried was some loss to the enemy but there was so much delay that it was daylight before his troops really got off from there. While there I informed General Butler that Hancock's corps would cross the river and move to Petersburg to support Smith in case the latter was successful and that I could reinforce there more rapidly than Lee could reinforce from his position. I returned down the river to where the troops of the army of the Potomac now were. Communicated to General Meade in writing the directions I had given to General Butler and directed him, Meade, to cross Hancock's corps over, under cover of night and push them forward in the morning to Petersburg, halting them, however, at a designated point until they could hear from Smith. I also informed General Meade that I had ordered rations from Bermuda Hundred for Hancock's corps and desired him to issue them speedily and to lose no more time that was absolutely necessary. The rations did not reach him, however, and Hancock, while he got all his corps over during the night, remained until half past ten in the hope of receiving them. He then moved without them and on the road received a note from General W. F. Smith asking him to come on. This seems to be the first information that General Hancock had received of the fact that he was to go to Petersburg or that anything particular was expected of him, otherwise he would have been there by four o'clock in the afternoon. Smith arrived in front of the enemy's lines early in the four noon of the fifteenth and spent the day until after seven o'clock in the evening in reconordering what appeared to be empty works. The enemy's line consisted of redans occupying commanding positions with rifle pits connecting them to the east side of Petersburg from the Appomattox back. There were thirteen of these redans extending a distance of several miles, probably three. If they had been properly manned, they could have held out against any force that could have attacked them, at least until reinforcements could have got up from the north of Richmond. Smith assaulted with the colored troops and with success. By nine o'clock at night he was in possession of five of these redans and, of course, of the connecting lines of rifle pits. All of them contained artillery which fell into our hands. Hancock came up and proposed to take any part assigned to him and Smith asked him to relieve his men who were in the trenches. Next morning, the sixteenth, Hancock himself was in command and captured another redan. Meade came up in the afternoon and succeeded Hancock, who had to be relieved temporarily from the command of his corps on account of the breaking out fraiche of the wound he had received at Kettysburg. During the day Meade assaulted and carried one more redan to his right and two to his left. In all this we lost very heavily. The works were not strongly manned, but they all had guns in them which fell into our hands together with the men who were handling them in the effort to repel these assaults. Up to this time Beauregard, who had commanded south of Richmond, had received no reinforcements except Hoke's division from Drury's Bluff which had arrived on the morning of the sixteenth, though he had urged the authorities very strongly to send them, believing as he did, that Petersburg would be a valuable prize which we might seek. During the seventeenth the fighting was very severe and the loss is heavy, and at night our troops occupied about the same position they had occupied in the morning except that they held a redan which had been captured by Potter during the day. During the night however Beauregard fell back to the line which had been already selected and commenced fortifying it. Our troops advanced on the eighteenth to the line which he had abandoned and found that the Confederate loss had been very severe. Many of the enemies did still remaining in the ditches and in front of them. Colonel J. L. Chamberlain of the twentieth main was wounded on the eighteenth. He was gallantly leading his brigade at the time as he had been in the habit of doing in all the engagements in which he had previously been engaged. He had several times been recommended for a brigadier generalacy for gallant and meritorious conduct. On this occasion however I promoted him on the spot and forwarded a copy of my order to the War Department asking that my act might be confirmed and Chamberlain's name sent to the Senate for confirmation without any delay. This was done and at last a gallant and meritorious officer received partial justice at the hands of his government which he had served so faithfully and so well. If General Hancock's orders of the fifteenth had been communicated to him that officer with his usual promptness would undoubtedly have been upon the ground around Petersburg as early as four o'clock in the afternoon of the fifteenth. The days were long and it would have given him considerable time before night. I do not think there is any doubt that Petersburg itself could have been carried without much loss or at least if protected by energy taxed works that a line could have been established very much in rear of the one then occupied by the enemy. This would have given us control of both the Weldon and south side railroads. This would also have saved an immense amount of hard fighting which had to be done from the fifteenth to the eighteenth and would have given us greatly the advantage in the long siege which ensued. I now ordered the troops to be put under cover and allowed some of the rest which they had so long needed. They remained quiet except that there was more or less firing every day until the twenty-second when General Meade ordered an advance towards the Weldon Railroad. We were very anxious to get to that road and even round to the south side Railroad if possible. Meade moved Hancock's core now commanded by Verney to the left with a view to at least force the enemy to stay within the limits of his own line. General Wright with the sixth core was ordered by a road for the south to march directly for the Weldon Road. The enemy passed in between these two cores and attacked vigorously and with very serious results to the national troops who were then withdrawn from their advanced position. The army of the Potomac was given the investment of Petersburg while the army of the James held Bermuda Hundred and all the ground we possessed north of the James River. The ninth core, Burnside's, was placed upon the right at Petersburg. The fifth, Warren's, next. The second, Birney's, next. Then the sixth, Wright's, broken off to the left and south. Thus began the siege of Petersburg. End of section fifty-six. Recording by Jim Clevinger, Little Rock, Arkansas. Jim at jocclev.com