 Welcome to the U.S. Naval War College, the Navy's home of thought. NWC Talks features our world-class experts examining national security matters. We hope you enjoy the conversation. The response to criticism regarding the inadequacy of protection for U.S. troops against the IED threat in Iraq. Then Secretary-Defense Donald Rumsfeld replied that, you go to war with the army you have, not the army you might want, or wish to have at a later time. Now, that's a remarkable statement. And while much has been written on the importance of strategy, less understood is how strategy affects force planning to produce the army, or indeed the joint force that you want. I'm Jim Cook, a professor of national security affairs, and welcome to NWC Talks. So why is this important? Well, we've taught the logic of force planning here at the Naval War College for many years. And I find it helpful to think of the logic as a methodology for the force planner to answer two basic yet important questions. What capabilities do we need? And how much is enough that addresses the issue of capacity? The strategy helps us answer these questions, but the first step in our methodology is to conduct a thorough assessment of the future security environment. Strategists and military planners conduct assessments to identify challenges, and attend at risk to U.S. national security in the near, mid, and far term. Such challenges include remaining the most powerful actor in an increasingly multipolar world, and the rise of strategic competitors in revisionist states such as China and Russia, and their disruptive impact on the current international order. So-called rogue states, including North Korea and Iran, that seek to develop weapons of mass destruction and carry out malign activities that disrupt regional stability. And non-state actors, such as terror groups like ISIS and al-Qaeda, and transnational criminal organizations including the drug cartels. Advanced technologies and hypersonic weapons and artificial intelligence only add to the complexity and ambiguity while attacks in cyberspace increasingly blur the line between peace and war. Meanwhile, human security challenges include poverty, the lack of employment and education, while increasing urbanization and the lack of corresponding infrastructure to absorb and accommodate the movement of people into cities leads to frustration with governments and ultimately despair. Now examples of these strategic assessments include the National Intelligence Council Global Trends Report, the Director of National Intelligence Worldwide Threat Assessment, and the Joint Staff's Joint Operating Environment Report. Additionally, the Joint Staff conducts an annual joint assessment to solicit both combatant command, the warfighters, and service perspectives and input, while the Joint Military Net Assessment measures the Joint Forces ability to execute the national military strategy. The next step in our force planning methodology involves grand strategy that prioritizes the wide array of security challenges I just described. Grand strategy also provides a long-term vision for the United States and its role within the international system, as well as the overall aim for U.S. policy, essentially telling the government's national security apparatus what it must do to be successful, while also articulating the purpose and integration of all levers of national power, specifically diplomacy, information, military, and economic power. In order to address the security challenges, achieve strategic objectives, and protect and advance U.S. national interests. Our national interests are established by the country's leadership, and they help determine what's really important by describing the nation's fundamental wants or needs. Now some national interests are enduring, such as the security of the state and its people, and economic prosperity, while others are more the product of the individual leader, such as the importance of environmental security, human rights, and democracy. National interests are a critical component of grand strategy because they help determine what a country is willing to fight, die, and pay for. United States grand strategy is represented by the national security strategy that's normally constructed by the national security council at the direction of the national security advisor, and issued under the president's signature as commander in chief. In addition to grand strategy, the force planner has to consider other strategic direction, such as the national defense strategy and the national military strategy that focus on the military instrument of national power. The national defense strategy articulates the vision and priority missions for the Department of Defense as an enterprise, while also providing guidance regarding major investments and capabilities. Although fully acknowledging that America's military has no preordained right to victory on the battlefield, the 2018 national defense strategy includes 11 defense objectives that range from defending the homeland to remaining the preeminent military power in the world by emphasizing lethality and strengthening alliances and partnerships. The national military strategy describes the attributes and design of the joint force and explains how it will be employed to meet the national defense strategy objectives. The national military strategy is also intended to provide top-down guidance for operational level planning by the combatant commands, including war plans. Additional sources of strategic direction include the nuclear posture review to shape nuclear policy and force structure, specifically the utility of maintaining the so-called triad of intercontinental ballistic missiles, strategic bombers, and submarines, as well as the role of these expensive, yet strategically important nuclear weapons delivery systems and warheads for deterrence and other purposes. Now, if the strategy provides the ends or what we need to do, then concepts describe the ways. Specifically, concepts describe how the joint force will accomplish the strategic objectives described in the national defense and military strategies. Concepts are future-oriented and incorporate technology and creative thinking to develop more innovative solutions to the complex security challenges described earlier. The United States Armed Forces has a proven track record of developing joint concepts from the 1982 air-land battle concept that was developed during the Cold War to support a strategy of containment against the Soviet Union in featuring a deep, close, and rear battlefield construct to coordinate air and ground forces to defeat a numerically superior Soviet military force through bold maneuver and an offensive oriented mindset. Synchronized combat power, command and control, and tempo. In addition to contributing to the successful end of the Cold War, I would argue that the air-land battle concept also played a significant role in the liberation of Kuwait under General Norman Schwarzkopf's command during Operation Desert Storm. In 1996, then chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General John Shalikashvili published Joint Vision 2010, consistent with President Clinton's national security strategy of engagement and enlargement. The vision emphasized four concepts, dominant maneuver, precision engagement, full-dimensional protection, and focused logistics that are enabled by information superiority in order to achieve what he called full-spectrum dominance against America's adversaries. Now, while ambitious, Joint Vision 2010 looked out over an extended time horizon. And while far from perfect, in retrospect, did a creditable job preparing the Joint Force to confront the challenges of a new millennium and shaping the joint force of today. More recently, the 2012 capstone concept for joint operations introduced a new approach called globally integrated operations intended to quickly combine elements of the Joint Force that are globally postured consistent with national strategy to integrate, fight, and win across geographic boundaries and in multiple domains. The capstone concept was written to support President Obama's strategy that required a rebalance away from the post-911 war on terror conducted against non-state actors, primarily on land, and towards the Asia-Pacific, with a different set of challenges, including a largely maritime environment. This new approach inspired the development of joint operating and supporting concepts that were designed to quickly project military force from bases around the world, to fight through obstacles and into the theater of operations, and win against adversaries with advanced capabilities and contested so-called anti-access area denial environments, where air superiority and sea control advantages that American forces have enjoyed for decades are simply no longer assured. It's easy to see these concepts applied in response to today's crisis in the South China Sea or other global hotspots. Now, these concepts can be used as scenarios and war games to test the effectiveness of the joint force and answer difficult force-planning questions. For example, what's the future of aircraft carriers and man versus unmanned systems in anti-access area denial environments? Concepts also help identify capability options that with further development, analysis, and refinement will ultimately determine and validate required capabilities and produce a better sense of capacity, how much is enough? But while many view the term capabilities through the relatively narrow lens of weapon systems, the Department of Defense and joint staff take a more holistic view that's captured by the acronym DOTMIL-PF. Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership, Personnel, and Facilities. This DOTMIL-PF conceptual framework includes both material and non-material solutions that facilitate and enable the concepts to achieve the strategic objectives and advance US national interests in the future security environment. Once identified, these required capabilities are considered in the defense resource allocation process. And once approved and funded by Congress, never a certain thing in today's political climate, although the logic does provide a powerful argument for advocacy, will result in future forces, or in Rumsfeld's words, the army you want. In conclusion, while certain aspects of this admittedly complex and largely bureaucratic defense resource allocation process have changed over time, and will undoubtedly continue to evolve in the future, the methodology behind the logic of force planning has remained remarkably consistent and resilient. And while Rumsfeld's comments may not reflect favorably on the assessment and strategy leading into the 2003 United States invasion of Iraq, the Bush administration eventually reassessed and recognized the unique counterinsurgency and irregular warfare challenges with the war on terror in both Iraq and Afghanistan, and changed its strategy accordingly. Moreover, the Department of Defense employed this force planning methodology and engaged the defense resource allocation process to create new operating concepts and make the necessary adjustments across the DOTMIL-PF spectrum in order to increase the operational effectiveness of the joint force in these particularly challenging environments. Looking ahead, this methodology will continue to serve the armed forces well. Perhaps now more than ever, in a time of transition, where the return of geopolitics and long-term strategic competition clearly demand a more lethal, agile, and innovative joint force to ensure the protection and advancement of US interests abroad. Thank you for spending a few minutes with me today. I'm Jim Cook, and this has been NWC Talks, The Logic of Force Planning.