 Mae'r prysgwyddiad felly maes i gael ymateb oherwydd y maes y maes i'r economa yng Nghymru ar y ddarparu ddweud ar y ddweud. Mae'r ddweud o'r ddweud o'r ddweud o'r ddweud oherwydd unig fel y Unew-Wider a'r ysgolwyr ar y ddweud o'r ddweud o'r ddweud o'r ddweud. A ydych chi'n gwybod eich ddweud i ddweud o'r ddweud o'r ddweud, oherwydd i'r ddweud i'r ddweud i'r ddweud, i ddweud i'r ddweud i'r ddweud. Mae'r ffordd yw ydy'r ffordd. Ydych chi'n gweld eu gweithio eich rhan oedd y ffordd yw gweithio gweithio ar google. Yn ydych chi'n gweld eich rhan o'r ffordd, ydych chi'n gweld eu gweithio ar 1985. Mae'n gweithio rywbeth i'n meddylion i'n gwybodaeth o'r ymddangos. Mae'n gweithio am yr ymdill, ym 30 yma. Perastrychur, Laiwheid. Mae'r genedlaeth yma ar y cysylltu o'r desgwysau. Mae'r gweithio arnaf. ac y ffilm ymgyrch yn ymddangos yw i'w ddweud i'w ffugir. Felly, rydyn ni'n fydig i'r ffugir yw'r prydyn ni'n ddifodol. Yn y ffordd o'r cynnig o'r cyfrifol, y dyfodol eich gweithio yn ei ddiddordeb yn ymddangos 30 oed, ac yn y twist. Felly, y dyfodol eich gweithio'r cyfrifol o'r cyfrifol o'r cyfrifol, o'r cyfrifol o'r cyfrifol, ond 30 oed yn y ddweud. For most countries, they are now about doing that at much higher levels of output for capital, much lower levels of aid and for many developing countries, popular developing countries at high levels of inequality, net genie. And I'll talk a bit about that. So, the presentation outlines the two middles and then talks about what really changed because actually the two middles are based on drawing lines for poor countries and poor people in order to generate the thesis and then ask after what really changedадjwys a'r ysty乎ach yn dwylo'r cyfwyrdau y bydd o'r ffordd yma. The first middle is an expansion in a number of middle income countries. Okay, since the late 1980s, total number of middle income countries has increased by about 40. There's also been the shift of populations above what are very low poverty lines of $1 or $2 a day o'r ddweud o'r ddeilio'r llunio gyda'r llunio'r gwaith o'r ddweud hynny, oherwydd, Gai Stanley oedd yn ymgau'r perchariad, y grwyffau perchariad ac oedd yn gweithio'r ddweud yng Nghymru. A o gyda'r cychwyn, rydych chi'n dod o'r ddweud o'r ddweud o'r ddweud, rwy'n neud hwnnw'n gwybod ar hwnnw, oherwydd, a oedd Arthull Lewis, Samon Cusniet, Douglas Sears yn y rhan o'r 50s, 60s a 70s. Mae'r cyfnodau yn y ffrindio am symud a byddai'r swyddthau a dyna mynd i'r s anchoreddau rheoliadau a phrygafidau Ffyrdd yn ymlaen i younggrynau arall, ac fy ffyrdd yn y gwbl â amser y brifael cyfrigeid a bod y gallwn yn rhaid i gael ymlaen i gael y'r cyfrigeid yn y rhaid, ym mwy oedd y cyfrigeid nad oedd yn oed yn beth sy'n ei ffrindio'r cyfrigeid. yw byddai Cysyllt Y Llywodraeth yn hynny'n gwybod lle'i. Apersonal ei dweud amser o'r gweithwyr gweithwyr gweithwyr gweithwyr gweithwyr gweithwyr gweithwyr gweithwyr, o enfg oedd yn fwy flyny eich cydodiad. Rhaid i ddweud i'r Bryn C recall, chi'n gweithwyr gweithwyr gweithwyr o'r plwyd hyn, mae'r ffordd y Llywodraeth yn ôl yn meddwl, o'r hunain chyfnod, ond byddai 2,500 ppp. Roedd oedd y minell yma, a'r myfynol yn dweud yn yr hyn yn y moment, byddai oedd oedd yn yn ymwybod, o ffugwm ymgylchedau o'r myfynol, a'r myfynol yma i'n ddweud. Ym hyn o'r lawr, o'r rhoi'r ffugwm yn y ffugwm yn sicrhau yn ei ddweud y myfynol, a'r byw ymwybod, oedd y pwybod yn y byddai, oedd yn yn yn yn yn ymwybod, o'r ffugwm, ..werth yw hynny'n nhw0 maen nhw'n ddiddordeb yn y cwmbrent. Ychydig cywcif arddur wahanol yn ni gael cyfnodol. Mae'r logig yn credu'r modd. Rhyw dechrau'n gweithio'r ymlaen nhw. Dfalch i'r gwéidio ymdd i 4 grwps... ..mwneud y cyfnod ymddir yn bwysig fel ymddir... ..mae byddai cynhyrchau'n gyffredig. For many middle income leaders, the attainment of middle income status is seen as a goal in itself. Many national development plans include middle income status in 2025 or 2030. And actually they matter a lot to donors because there's a kind of assumption, I think, that once you cross this line you somehow aid can't do anything useful anymore because there are domestic resources and I think that's questionable. Perhaps that's something for discussion. I take a slightly higher poverty line here at $2.50 and use 2011 PPPs just so that I can show you even with a higher poverty line there's still an expanding middle and that middle is only likely to expand further over the next up to 2030. So first of all just to give you a sense of the countries, the green is low income, the red lower middle income, blue upper middle income. Whenever Rolf looks at his watch or the Chell looks at his watch you get nervous. When you've done five minutes. Black is high income. The important thing here, I guess, is the number of countries that are at the bottom in terms of taking this definition, I didn't realise that was hanging off me, have in general fallen as countries have gone into the middle. Now it depends whether you're an optimist or a pessimist as to how things are going to play out in the next 20 years. If you take the IMF's World Economic Outlook country by country projections then in 2030 there will only be 15 low income countries. If you're a little bit more cautious and you cut that in half or take historical growth rates then the countries that are currently low income are low income for a very long time and that's because most of the remaining low income are actually less developed countries now. So the countries that probably could take off in terms of growth more easily are the ones that have already done and I'd probably take the line that I think perhaps the countries that remain at the bottom are the ones that may remain for some considerable time. The different lines there are different scenarios based on taking the IMF's projections. The IMF's projections minus 1% which is the historical error which is moderate. The IMF's projections on growth also tally with US electoral cycles, interestingly enough. You might raise an eyebrow. The optimistic scenario is simply taking them at face value, the pessimistic at half. Then if you look at people, so I've taken a low poverty line at $2.50, of course all these lines are arbitrary. Millie drawing lines do kind of generate a thesis. The logic of these are that at $10 a day you have substantially more security from falling back into poverty based on studies in Latin America. Also if you're around $10 a day it puts you in the poorest diesel in OECD countries. So if you wanted a truly global poverty line $10 might give you that. At the lower end $2.50 is approximately the same level of income as multi-dimensional poverty headcounts, about 1.6, 1.7 billion people. So that's the logic at the lower end. But of course the World Bank is about to announce something closer to $1.80 as the update to the poverty lines. Then it doesn't really make a huge amount of difference whether you take optimistic growth or pessimistic growth and we did trends for inequality. Either you extrapolate inequality based on historical trends or you assume a country returns back to its historically lowest inequality point. Because you can't really expect countries to be more equal than they have ever been historically. That was Rolf's idea from a conference about two or three years ago. You see the influence you have. So what this is, as poverty at lower lines has fallen and may continue to fall hopefully, at higher poverty lines there's not that much change and it depends what happens. But you've got this kind of burgeoning group in the middle. So those are the two middles. Obviously they're based on drawing lines over the world. So the next question to just think about is what actually changed. And so if you plot all developing countries, the lower one is the early 90s, the upper one is triangles, is more recently 2010-2012 and I've labelled some of the big middle income countries just for interest. The first thing is substantial amounts of growth across the developing world, apart from at the bottom, in GDP per capita. Not so much convergence overall with the rich world, although some countries have moved up chains, some countries have moved down, but overall there's not that much convergence. Obviously for some specific countries there are. Quite a substantial decline in ODA over GNI. Again, you know, more kind of bunch in there. So AID has become much less important than it was, or much less visible than it was. Some structural change, but only right at the top. Again, there's not the bit in the middle there and a bit up the top. Not a lot of structural change. This is agriculture over GDP. A lot of urbanisation across the developing world, which I think is interesting and important. This inequality has gone up in some countries and down in others. It's actually gone up in the populist developing countries that have been growing fast and down in many of the poorer countries. So there's your two middles. On the left-hand side, almost 40 new middle income countries. They split quite evenly between four groups. I think there's probably 11 genuine countries in terms of genuine development. There's eight pseudo-mix, which are sub-Saharan Africa. These are countries that are better off an exchange rate income per capita, but not better off in PPP GDP per capita. What may have happened is that growth has been driven by commodities, or the PPPs are complete nonsense and rubbish, but we use them anyway. Anyone's guess is which way you could go on that. There are nine former planned economies, which is from the first presentation. Those are bounce backs. Basically, as we saw, they went white down and then went up. There's another 11 quite small countries. On the other side, we now have 3 billion people in this middle if you take my cut-offs. If you extend the cut-offs, you extend the numbers. Half of the world's population, neither poor nor probably secure from poverty. Half of this number in China and India, the rest in other parts of the world. Most middle-income countries, the majority of the population is now in the middle. That doesn't mean people are secure. It probably means they're just not poor on a day-to-day basis. But they're at risk of falling back into poverty. That's why things like social protection and measures to address insecurity I think will be increasingly important. What does this all mean for development economics? He says, with three minutes late. No, three minutes to go. I think actually that has that much change for development economics. It's still the same issues of growth, structural change, poverty reduction, addressing inequality. But those issues now have to be answered or addressed or researched or explored where most of the developing world is at much higher GDP per capita. In a developing world where most countries, ODA is almost insignificant, even in countries in parts of Africa. For many developing countries that have had structural change and are populous, net inequality is actually substantially higher. I'll come to some of the data just on that in a moment. This gave me three thoughts. First of all, Dudley Sears. I was wondering what would Dudley Sears say to all of this. I'm sure he must have been there at the opening of wider. I'm looking at Rolf in case he was there in 1985. First of all, I think you'd hear a kind of screen. He got the screen up in the top right hand corner. First of all, growth without growth. So, some developing countries have actually achieved middle income status by exchange rate growth. If you convert their growth rates into exchange rate dollars, convert their local currency into dollars through exchange rates, you see a substantial growth. But not if you do it through PPPs. There's many countries, I'll show you the data in a moment where unequivocally, net inequality has risen dramatically. This raises questions, I think, about the future sustainability of growth, but also the social instability that rapidly rising inequality can mean. But also for the most part, even if people are in this middle, they're still probably highly insecure and only maybe one growth slow down or one health shock away from poverty. So the idea that poverty is going to be ended by 2030 or indeed we've made drastic movements towards poverty reduction so far is a valid statement if you take one or $2 a day. But if you think living on something as extravagant as $10 a day, then you'd probably ask a few more questions. The median consumption for developing countries is now $4 a day. So that's all developing countries, which is not that significant. The global median is 5.5. Secondly, what would Simon Cusnets say? Given that, for the most part, the ideas around the Cusnets curve have been largely thrown out as a universal question. I mean, as we'll see in the moment, I think actually Cusnets is back with a vengeance in the very populist countries that have had substantial growth and structural change away from agriculture. There's drastically rising inequality. And what would Arthur Lewis say about growth without structural change in the countries that have achieved middle-income status, but are actually largely commodity or agricultural countries? I think he'd probably turn his grave. And a hypothesis to put on the table before concluding is that it seems to me when I did a cluster analysis, actually, if you look at a country's export structure, it can pretty much tell you about the country's poverty, it can tell you about the country's politics, it can tell you about the country's public sector. And I thought that might be an interesting line to follow up. So, on the left-hand side, we have the new middle-income countries with growth and structural change, Angola, Bangladesh, China, Ghana, India, Indonesia, Nigeria, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Vietnam. These countries have had very large increases in GDP per capita, PPP. Most of them have had substantial increases in Gini, although it's been squashed by China's big ones at a scale. And all of them have had, with the exception of Pakistan, a substantial move away from agriculture just in the period since the Cold War. On the other side, we have a number of countries where growth has been, actually, in PPP terms, very limited. If you accept the PPPs are correct. I mean, that's a big if. Those countries actually, inequality's gone up and down a bit. There's no overall pattern. We've had structural change, but actually that's been structural change towards non-agriculture, so fuels and commodities. And the reason I mentioned the export issue is, I mean, interesting enough, when you look across the set of countries, and perhaps it's almost certain exports are going to be correlated with GDP per capita and many of the other variables perhaps. It's coming out. So it's a question of which way, if any, a causation goes, or whether you can just tell a lot about a country by looking at its export structure. So many of the countries that have had more development, meaning growth and structural change tended to have reasonable or some kind of contribution from manufacturing with the exception of a couple of fuel exporters, Niger and Sudan, who have had substantial amounts of growth in PPP terms and structural change. And then maybe with the pseudo mix, it's much more a question of the fuel has taken on much more of a significance, but actually food and agricultural exports are still very important, or ores and metals. So what to conclude from this. Back to my, back to the future. So the argument is that the big change over the last 30 years since Wider was established is the emergence of these two middles, or two new middles. So rather than the world of poor countries and poor people, we're actually looking at a world particularly over the next 20 years that's more a question of not very poor countries and very poor people, but countries and people who are somehow in the middle, maybe not poor on a day-to-day basis for people, but actually not that far away from poverty. But that also raises issues about insecurity, stressors, shocks. I think there's an issue for development economics which is actually got very different types of countries. So whereas development economics was much more straightforward in the 70s, development countries had similar characteristics as Sears noticed. You're now talking about a group of very poor countries, the least developed countries, versus countries of whom much higher income, lower aid, higher inequality. So that sets up three questions to conclude on. The first is how or why possibly for the next 30 years, when we're all here for wider 60 in 2045, of course the SDGs will have been met many years before. How and why growth isn't a company by structural change, there's interesting theories, obviously the gollin at our theory on consumption cities and urbanisation, there's also the Roderick thesis on premature industrialisation that are relevant. Then I think there's questions about cusnets and softening the upswing. I mean I remember a friend when I was in Indonesia said to me if it looks like, I mean Indonesia's having substantial increase in inequality how does a country go through structural change, growth with structural change and how do you stop inequality suddenly increasing when you have large proportions of the population moving? What does that even look like? So there's an interesting question there I think about if the issues of structural change and industrialisation have come across particularly strongly over the last couple of days but how do you manage the upswing of the cusnets curve if it exists in those countries? Then finally an overall shift from what might be poverty to precarity so that suggests more focus on stressors, shocks and maybe linking things like the middle income and trap. One of the impacts of the new middle is that the consuming class, the real middle class in developing countries is expanding very slowly and I define that here as those over $10 a day and that means you may slow down political change because the tax base is so weak and tax is a very strong relationship with political change. You may also hinder future growth because the consuming class is actually still quite small. Thank you.