 I want to give you a sense of where NATO is in the cyber defense domain, what the priorities are, but let me first just very quickly give you a sense of where NATO is coming from. 1992, during the Yugoslav, the actions in former Yugoslavia, NATO had a first encounter with those times of cyber events, but I think it was a decade that passed, so until 2002 at the Prague Summit, where the subject of cyber security, then afterwards cyber defense, became part of the political agenda of the Alliance, and the first steps were taken in terms of developing strategy in this sense, which was some concrete capability investment which was then reviewed in 2006 at the Riga Summit. Then two major events happened and they were well known. 2007, Estonia, major distributed disruption of service with all the consequences that were well known, and one year later, 2008, the war in Georgia, where one could see it was the first time that a significant cyber dimension was visible in a military action. This generated a strategic shift in the approach of NATO on cyber issues, and it was recognized at the 2010 strategic concept that the development and use of destructive cyber tools threatened national and Euro-Atlantic security and stability. With this recognition, it was clearly that NATO was sending a signal that this domain was starting to be connected with NATO core business, which was allied security and stability. So that was the inflection point, 2010, new strategic concept. What followed? In 2011, in June, NATO developed a new policy, I would say the policy on cyber defense, and I know Heli was part of the founding parents of this process before she moved to the other side of Brussels to the EU. This policy included a number of issues, but I want to focus on the most essential. Governance, mechanism and structure. So starting from the political oversight by the North Atlantic Council, the lead committees, the cyber defense management board, which was including all the bodies that had relevance in the cyber domain. It was also in the context of a creation of a new division, the emerging security challenges division, which was created in 2010 on the way to the strategic concept, and where the cyber section, I would say, is one of the sections with the highest profile. Then beyond the governance structure, it included some very clear priorities, and then it led to an action plan based on these priorities. Now let me go through them. The first and foremost priority was defined and mandated by nations being the protection of NATO's own networks. And not just any protection, the level of ambition was to have a centralized protection of all the NATO entities, starting with headquarters, command structures, locations of agencies and so on and so forth. Based on this, there was a whole process of implementation started, and last October, so only less than a month ago, we were reported by the NCIA, NATO Communication Information Agency, about reaching this level of centralized protection. Of 51 NATO sites. Now, let me tell you that it was defined due to the kind of automaticity of the bidding process and how military operate in defense investment. The requirement was so-called full operation capability of the NATO Computer Incidents Response Center, the NSERC. The fact is and the truth is that in this field, there's never such thing like a full operation capability. I'm actually preparing a memo to make it clear that what we are actually have achieved this centralized protection, but it's the first iteration of a system that will upgrade itself constantly based on the analysis of incidents and traffic, which then should inform the next level of protection in a kind of spiral mode, spiral zero, spiral one and so on and so forth. So, linked to this priority number one or zero, this protection of NATO's own network, was the issue of establishing the critical dependencies of NATO networks upon national networks. And here we established a methodology, and so far nine of the allies have reported their critical dependencies. The next step after having identified all these dependencies upon national systems will be the establishment and implementation of the minimum standard of protection for that level that would imply not to make NATO system vulnerable because of national systems who are connected might be vulnerable. The next priority, the next aspect of importance is that of assisting allies to develop their own capabilities. As in every field of defense, there is a national responsibility to develop capabilities. But NATO has a role through couple of vehicles. One is the so-called defense planning process through which capability targets are established and then implemented in a planned manner over a period of time. Other ways of having, ensuring this facilitating role means information sharing, training, education and exercising. And by the way, we just had an exercise, civil emergency exercise, we finished a couple of weeks ago which had a cyber component dedicated exercise, cyber coalition in nine days if I'm not mistaken, which will be held in the cyber range of Estonia, but with participation of allies plus for the first time a number of partners, Ireland included. Other domains are the inclusion of the cyber dimension in the contingency planning and operational planning because in any military operation there is a growing cyber dimension and of course cyber defense dimension. Last but not least, the application of the concept of smart defense of having this multinational project among groups of allies to get capabilities as a cheaper price. We have used this in other domains from strategic aleve capabilities to ally ground surveillance and now there is a good focus of doing smart cyber defense projects. Let me go to the next aspect. And that is linked to the fundamental question, the link between cyber defense and common defense in general to the famous Article 5. Here, Allied debate has led to the conclusion that there is a benefit in keeping the ambiguity vis-à-vis the when article, when there is a situation of a cyber attack that could generate the possibility of invoking article 5. The conclusion is on a case-by-case basis, we'll get there when we see it. And frankly, this was also in the past, it was never defined, not even in the treaty, the exact moment or context in which article 5 and common defense will be invoked. So it's based on Allied consultation. There's also a decision on ambiguity of how NATO would respond in a situation of massive cyber attack, for example. And there's no assumption that will be only a cyber response. Then the other key aspect is related to the way the Alliance can assist one ally in a situation of cyber incidents that are below any threshold of article 5. And here there is a consensus of using NATO as a coordinating institution, as a clearinghouse of possible bilateral assistance. As it's in another situation, for example, the use of Patriot missiles to Turkey, it's actually a contribution by three distinct allies. But the coordination element is done by the Alliance. And also the fact that there will be future debates of how to use common funded assets once they are matured in order to give such kind of support. For example, the Computer Incident Response Center includes also a rapid reaction team, which is actually dedicated for those 51 sites that are on centralized protection. And so far there's no decision or consensus to use them in any other location or place. But once this common funded capability is mature, there will be probably a debate to look at this dimension. Then the partnership dimension, NATO has developed partnership relations with about 41 partners across the globe. They're more partners than allies at this moment. But cyber has become a dimension in many of the individual partnership programs. The approach is, again, on a case-by-case basis, based also on the depth of interaction, interoperability. And for example, there are so far seven non-NATO nations that have been invited to participate in the exercise, based exactly on the fact that they have this high level of interoperability and connectivity with NATO and activism in the partnership domain. But other aspects like awareness, education and training or consultation, staff to staff are open and happening with a larger group of allies. Last but not least, the cooperation with the partnership with industry, the private sector, is considered to be key, since the private sector owns the biggest part of the networks and also pushes forward the technology. The NATO industry advisory group, the NAAC, is at this moment performing an analysis and it's to be delivered next spring of how the industry sees the way they would like NATO to cooperate with the private sector. So based on this study, the allies would do the analysis and bring, I mean, decide on the policy in this field. This is, in a nutshell, the moment the cyber defense approach in NATO. Also, I showed you, I gave you a sense of what will be the perspective just to give you a sense of dynamics. In 2011 and 2012, the political attention at the North Atlantic Council level on cyber was reflected in two NAACs. I mean, one in 2011, one in 2000, each year one NAAC. In the first half, first six months of this year, we had about three council meetings in this, all dedicated to the subject. In the next six weeks, after about other three council meetings, and with concrete taskings from the ministerials, including the one of keeping clone activity with what happens in allied nations such as the United States or other international organizations like EU on development of standards and approach, so we don't want to duplicate. It is an issue, a matter of growing concern. It is also a matter that will, even though there has been a significant investment made in terms of resources, human money and time and political attention, we are conscious that we are at the beginning of a process and there's much more to follow. Also, to make a very clear point about the conceptual approach. By the way, NATO doesn't speak about cyber security. It speaks about cyber defense, which is something narrower and focuses on the more, let's say, strategic threats in this domain. But we are conscious about the blurred, let's say, limits or borders between the other domains. So what happens in the field of cyber criminality interests NATO as well? And I suppose that what happens at the strategic analysis level interests the cyber crime level. NATO is also bringing together the analysis coming from, let's say, the traffic on our systems, together with the other analogies coming from the pure intelligence, which brings us to motives and states. The last point on this one is also that we are not speaking about NATO warfare in this organization, which I think underscores the fact that it's only the purely defensive dimension that we are mandated to address. So we are not speaking about NATO offensive or not even active defense. We're speaking about cyber defense period. Thank you.