 In thinking about the current partnership between the United States and our allies in the Middle East and the partnership we'd like to have, we should begin by facing some awkward facts. First, that these relationships, especially when removed from their specifics and subsumed within the Arabs, are dysfunctional, comporting to simple but misleading tropes. Second, within the particulars of each bilateral relationship and especially in the undisclosed aspects, they are often very successful based on subtle balancing of needs and capabilities. Third, we should note that these successes have often been predicated on and sustained by a carefully calibrated ambiguity designed not just to avoid upsetting the Arab public opinion, but to avoid engaging it altogether. Finally, we should recognize that the cooperation between the United States and Arab nations is not predicated on shared political values or democratic norms. Put bluntly, we work together and have done so based upon deeply shared security interests, even if these interests are very rarely, if ever, discussed publicly.